Hegel’s Logic: An Essay in Interpretation. John Grier Hibben 1902
As we have seen, Hegel regards the disjunctive syllogism as the point of transition from the subjective to the objective notion. Let us examine this statement more in detail, in order that we may the more clearly understand the essential relation of the subjective to the objective notion.
The disjunctive syllogism is merely the subjective notion expressed in its highest and most complete form. It signifies as regards its syllogistic structure that the subjective notion is essentially an active process of thought, for this is the meaning of the syllogism in general; and as regards its disjunctive character, it indicates that the process in question is a complete unfolding of the total significance of the notion. Gathering together these characteristics in a single statement, we find that Hegel regards the subjective notion in its highest form of expression as an active force, revealing its various phases through a process of mediation, in a manner which gives complete scope for the realization of all its possibilities. The subjective notion as thus conceived contains within the very conception itself the ground of its objectivity. In speaking of the transition from the subjective notion to the objective, we do not express correctly the significance of the Hegelian conception. It is not a transition properly speaking, for the objective lies within the subjective as a potential moment of the same. Hegel insists as a fundamental postulate of his whole system that the syllogistic process is not merely an act of consciousness. We have seen that the subjective notion contains the implicit categories of being, essence, existence, substantiality, cause and effect, and the like. The subjective may, therefore, be regarded as the programme of cosmic evolution, while the objective is the historical evolution itself. Either would be incomplete without the other. Again, the idea of an active process which is the essential significance of the subjective notion, necessitates a resulting product; and the product, which is the result of a mediation, it is true, is nevertheless as a product something immediate, and this immediacy is one of the characteristic features of objectivity. Hegel defines an object as that which is “independent, concrete, and complete in itself."[29]There is only one conceivable object which perfectly fulfils the requirements of this definition, – the Absolute, God. The totality of all things, the universe in its progressive unfolding in space and time, represents the one all-embracing object.
And while within this totality, Hegel recognizes separate and independent objects, nevertheless their reality is assured only in so far as they partake of the nature of the unifying Absolute underlying them, whose essential nature and being are independent of space and of time.
At this point Hegel refers to Kant’s criticism of the ontological proof of the being of God, which is based upon the statement that the thought of a thing does not necessarily imply its existence, and insists that the highest expression of the subjective notion is an altogether unique thought, of such a nature as to combine the notion of God and His being in one.
Hegel says, in commenting upon the Kantian criticism, in the introductory part of his Logic: – “The unexampled favor and acceptance which attended Kant’s criticism of the ontological proof was undoubtedly due to the illustration which he made use of. To mark the difference between thought and being, he cited the instance of a hundred thalers which, as far as the notion is concerned, are the same hundred thalers, whether real or only possible, though the difference is manifest as regards their effect upon a man’s purse. Nothing can be more obvious than that anything we only think or fancy is not on that account actual, and that a picture of the imagination or even a logical notion cannot attain to being. Setting aside the fact that it may not incorrectly be styled a barbarism of language to apply the term notion to things like a hundred thalers, it is still true that they who like to taunt the philosophic conception with the fundamental difference between being and thought, might have admitted that philosophers were not wholly ignorant of the fact. Can there be, indeed, any more trivial observation than this? Above all, it must be remembered, when we speak of God, that we have an object of a very different kind than any hundred thalers, and unlike any particular notion, idea, or whatever we may choose to call it. The very nature of everything finite is expressed by saying that its being in time and space differs from its notion. God should be, however, expressly conceived to be that which can only be ‘thought of as existing.’ His notion involves being. It is this unity of the notion and being that constitutes the notion of God."[30]
The question which naturally suggests itself at this point is whether Hegel’s system is not pantheistic, whether the individuality of man is not completely lost in the universality of God. If man is only a spectator for a brief time of an extremely limited portion of the great world evolution which is solely the external manifestation of God, which is in fact God, then the whole Hegelian system, as the product of the human mind, contradicts and nullifies itself by thus eliminating the human individuality as a real factor of the system itself. The question whether the system leads logically to pantheism, it is not in the scope and purpose of this work, as one simply of exposition, to discuss; nevertheless, it may be remarked in passing that Hegel himself stoutly maintains that individuality is not suppressed in universality, but is conserved (aufgehoben) in a higher state of being and existence, and he most emphatically disclaims for his system this imputation of a pantheistic taint[1] 1t has been seen that the warrant for the notion of objectivity is contained at the last analysis in the notion of the Absolute, “the only true being.” So also, in a similar manner, the warrant for the notion of human personality, Hegel declares, is to be found only in the underlying, all-embracing personality of God. It is a thought similar to that of St. Paul, “In Him we live and move and have our being.” The notion of objectivity, as developed by Hegel, manifests itself in three forms: – (1) Mechanism. (Der Mechanismus.) (2) Chemism. (Der Chemismus.) (3) Teleology.(Die Teleologie.) In the mechanical type, the objects stand related in an external manner, and without evincing any natural affinity as regards each other.
They are immediate, and each indifferent to all the others.
In the chemical type, the objects exhibit an essential tendency to change and unite with others, so that their significance really lies in their union with something else.
In the third type, the teleological relation expresses the unity of mechanism and chemism. Like the mechanical object, it is, in a sense, a self-contained totality, inasmuch as a purpose has always some complete effect as an end in view; at the same time, it is subjected to the principle of differentiation and change in order to realize the end, which principle is the essential characteristic also of chemism.
Hegel divides the principle of mechanism into three kinds: –
(1) Formal Mechanism. (Formeller Mechanisamus.)
(2) Mechanism accompanied by affinity. (Differenter Meckaniamus.)
(3) Absolute Mechanism. (Absoluter Mechaniamus.)
Formal mechanism possesses two essential characteristics. The object has the notion within it only as a potential; for the notion as subjective is primarily outside of it. And in the second place, the objects remain independent and are related to each other only in an external manner.
Figuratively, we speak of a mechanical memory, where ideas are associated externally and where the element of thought to a large extent is omitted. Hegel says, “Whenever a man’s mind and will are not in his actions, his conduct is called mechanical."[32]The relation which obtains between objects which are mechanically connected is one of pressure and of impact, which operate essentially as external forces.
The second form of mechanism has associated with it the element of affinity. An object which is operated upon by some external force is affected by it not merely according to the nature of the force operating upon it, but as well by its own nature. Thus a billiard ball made of ivory and another made of putty behave differently when subjected to precisely the same impact. Therefore, what it is possible for any object to effect mechanically does not depend merely upon its own native force, or as Hegel puts it, its own centrality (die Centralität), but also upon the nature of the object upon which it acts as well, – that is, the centrality of the other lying outside of itself. In other words, no object is fully self-centred; and when two objects are so related that the centre of each must receive some complementary element which belongs to the centre of the other in order to complete its significance, the relation between them is of this second type, that of mechanism with affinity. The illustrations of this order of mechanism which Hegel gives are the relation of gravitation, in which the result varies according to the relative centrality of each of the objects mutually attracted; the relation of desire to its object; and the relation of the social instinct which binds together the different members of one and the same society.
Every object may be regarded as a system within itself. The centre of such a system Hegel calls an abstract centre, – that is, without reference to anything outside of itself. When two objects come into a mechanical relation, one to the other, the centre of each in turn becomes the relative centre of the other. The centre of that system which includes the two objects and their relative centres within its scope is the absolute centre. Absolute mechanism is merely the fully expressed form of the type of mechanism with affinity. These relations of the various kinds of centres may be illustrated by the mutual attraction of two masses, each of which may be represented as concentrated at a single point, which is its abstract centre. Each point has in turn a relative centre in the other, and both are referable to an absolute centre which lies between them.
Thus the earth revolves about the sun as its relative centre; its absolute centre lies between earth and sun in such a way that the earth and sun both revolve about it. however, the absolute centre is so near the sun centre that the difference is discounted, and we refer simply to the earth’s revolution about the central sun. But to speak precisely, the real centre of the system lies between the earth centre and the sun centre. Inasmuch as this is a mechanical relation, it is dynamic. And the dynamic always expresses itself in a syllogistic process, – that is, the mediation of two terms by means of a common or middle term. We have, therefore, a triad of syllogisms, corresponding to the three possible mechanical relations.
Let I represent any individual object, P its particular or relative centre, and U the universal or absolute centre.
The resulting syllogisms would be as follows: –
(1) The type expressed by the formula I-P-U, in which the relative centre is regarded as the mediating term between the individual object and its absolute centre.
(2) The type expressed by the formula U-I-P, in which the individual object forms the mean between its relative and absolute centres.
(3) The type expressed by the formula P-U-I, in which the universal or absolute centre is the mean between the individual object and its relative centre.
As an illustration of these three syllogisms, Hegel cites the state in its various relations to the individual and his particular needs. “In the first instance, the individual in virtue of his particular being, or his physical and mental needs (which when completely developed give civil society) enters into union with the universal, – that is, with society, law, right, government. Secondly, the will or conduct of the individuals is the intermediating force which procures for these needs satisfaction in society, in law, etc., and which gives to society, law, etc., their fulfilment and realization. But, thirdly, the universal – that is, the state, government, and law – is the mean, the underlying substance in which the individuals and their satisfaction have and receive their fulfilled reality, intermediation, and persistence."[33] In mechanism the related objects preserve a quasi independence; but when they lose their independence in the affinity which each has for its antithesis, and they so coalesce that the identity of each is merged in the product resulting from their combination, then the relation thus characterized is that of chemism. Thus a natural transition is effected from the mechanical relation to the chemical. The product thus formed is a neutral, inasmuch as the individual striving of each of the elements which constitute it ceases completely when the process has been finished and the product alone remains. However, concerning this neutral, which we may regard as the mean, it may be resolved by chemical analysis into the two original extremes. But the inverse process is independent of the former combining process. The resulting product does not of itself separate into its component parts. The first process exhausts itself, and its activity ceases when once the product has been formed. There is in these operations of chemical combination and of chemical analysis no centre of initiation. Chemical affinity seems in a manner to be a kind of selective attraction, and yet there is no self-directing activity. If there were, it would have a longer life, and not consume its energy in the process of using it. The chemical process, therefore, does not rise above a conditioned and finite activity. “The notion, as notion, is only the heart and core of the process, and does not in this stage come to existence in its own individual being. In the neutral product the process is extinct, and the existing cause falls outside of it."[34] This lack of spontaneous activity, of all initiative, indicates a state which is unsatisfactory in the extreme. The very nature of thought constrains us to demand some more fundamental relation than either mechanism or chemism as the supreme principle of activity in the universe.
Such a relation must involve the element of purpose or finality, in which there is a liberation of the notion or reason. It is in the teleological relation that we find an explicit and undisguised manifestation of a supreme principle of intelligence in its free conscious activity. In mechanism and chemism the notion is present, it is true, but only in the germ, and not yet evolved. The notion, however, in the form of the aim or end (der Zweck) comes into an existence of its own. In the lower relations the notion is imprisoned, as it were, behind the barriers of objectivity. But in the teleological relation these barriers are burst asunder, the objectivity overcome, and the subjectivity of the notion completely asserted. Hegel expresses this by saying that the idea of an end to be achieved is the negation of immediate objectivity; it is also a recognition of the antithesis between subject and object, and the overcoming of the same. Thus when we entertain a purpose in mind, its subjective character is antithetical to the purpose conceived as realized objectively. But when the purpose in the mind goes forth into action, and the objective end is actually realized, then all difference between the end in view and the end achieved has been overcome, and there is a complete synthesis of subjective and objective.
The difference between efficient cause and final cause may be indicated at this point. The efficient cause appears as passing into its other, the effect, and it therefore loses its essential priority in the latter by sinking into a sort of dependency. The aim or end, on the other hand, must necessarily contain in its own nature the determining and significant factors of the whole resulting process. In the simple causal relation the effect seems to emphasize its nature of otherness as regards its cause.
By aim or end we must not think merely of the purposes which are ever present in consciousness, and which we achieve by means of objects external to us. There is also an inner design, an immanent finality in things themselves, as has been emphasized both by Aristotle and Kant.
The purely external design, the adaptation of means to ends, may be seen in the various phenomena of utility. Hegel cites as an illustration of the relation of the subjective to the objective in teleology the case of appetite or desire. There is the subjective desire, on the one hand, and the object which will satisfy it, on the other. But the two are apart, and therein consists the contradiction between them. It is only in the complete satisfaction of the desire through the attainment of its object, that this contradiction is overcome, and the two extremes, subjectivity and objectivity, become reconciled. The teleological relation is represented by a syllogism, in which the subjective design coalesces with its external object, by means of a middle term which constitutes the unity of both. The middle term is the means which is used to bring about the desired result.
Hegel marks three stages in the development of the subjective design.
(1) The Subjective End. (Der subjective Zweck.)
(2) The End in process of accomplishment. (Der sich vollführende Zweck.)
(3) The End accomplished. (Der vollführte Zweck.)
The first syllogism of final cause is made up of the following three terms: – The universal is the end indefinitely desired.
The particular is the end definitely desired, as a particular mode of the universal in question.
The individual is the self whose activity makes a particular choice out of the various possibilities which the indefinite universal embraces.
Thus, we might have as an indefinite end in view, the building of a house. This would stand as a universal admitting of an indefinite variety of particular modes of realization. The individual choice would then appear as the determining force, initiating the actual process of accomplishment towards a specific end.
In the second place the initiative activity of the individual throws itself immediately upon something objective which it appropriates to itself as means of bringing about the desired end. Here the middle term is the subjective power of the notion tending to bring together the subjective end desired and the objective material which is to be used in its realization. In finite design the mediating term in this process is twofold, a combination of the active powers of the individual, and the objective material upon which they work as the means of realizing the end in view. Thus, in the illustration of building a house, the materials used in its construction must be first immediately appropriated by the constructive mind before they can become its instruments in the actual putting together of part to part in the realization of the complete architectural design, which process is essentially one of mediation, – that is, syllogistic.
Or to cite Hegel’s illustration, drawn from another and a higher source: “Every living being has a body; the soul takes possession of it, and in that act has at once objectified itself. The human soul has much to do before it makes its corporeal nature into a means. Man must, as it were, take possession of his body, so that it may be the instrument of his soul."[35] All this is preliminary to the actual realization of the design by means of the objective materials and forces which have been both invaded and pervaded by the purposing mind. This brings us to the point where the end is finally realized, – the third and last stage in the process.
Now while the subjective end rules these material processes which are the mechanical and chemical forces already described, it does so without losing itself in them. It takes advantage of their activity and compels them to serve its ends, while its controlling intelligence is in the background. This Hegel calls the craft of reason (die List der Vernuft).
The craft of reason consists in the controlling sway which it exercises over objects while yet permitting them to obey their own mechanical or chemical bent. “Divine Providence,” says Hegel, “may be said to stand to the world and its processes in the capacity of absolute craft[6]God lets men direct their particular passions and interests as they please; but the result is accomplished, – not of their plans but of His, and these differ decidedly from the ends primarily sought by those whom He employs.” [37] The realized end expresses the complete unity of the subjective and the objective; but in finite design the accomplished aim is itself no less fragmentary and defective than was the initial aim and means used in the process of its realization. The end which is achieved is only itself an object, which may again become the means or material for other purposes, and so on ad infinitum.
Infinite design is, on the other hand, of such a nature that it comprises within its own self the means to realize its ends. The process of the same is one of self-mediation. It is the self-determined notion, representing the complete unity of subject and object. This Hegel calls the idea (die Idee), – a term which he has selected in order to emphasize its nature as that which is essentially and fundamentally reason itself.
In mechanism and chemism the notion appears as an sich, – that is, implicit. In the teleological relation, it is für sich, – that is, explicit. But in the eternal purpose (die Idee) it is both an sich und für sich, – that is, revealing itself by the light of its own nature in a manifestation completely self-determined and self-directed.