Defeated in the Central Committee, Kamenev and Zinoviev resolved to commit a crime that was unprecedented in the Party’s history. On October 17, several hours after the meeting of the Central Committee had ended, they sent a statement to the Menshevik newspaper Novaya Zhizn announcing their disagreement with the Central Committee.
“In view of the fact that the question of action is being more and more strongly mooted,” wrote Kamenev, “Comrade Zinoviev and I have sent a letter to the largest organisations of our Party in Petrograd, Moscow and Finland, emphatically opposing the idea that our Party should take the initiative in any armed action in the immediate future . . . . Not only Comrade Zinoviev and I, but a number of comrades engaged in practical work are of the opinion that to take the initiative in an armed insurrection at the present time, with the present relation of social forces, independently, and a few days before the assembly of the Congress of Soviets, would be impermissible and fatal for the proletariat and the revolution.”[1]
Sukhanov, the editor of the Menshevik newspaper, immediately informed his party colleagues about this letter. Hitherto, the question of insurrection had been discussed in absolute secrecy. Nobody outside the Bolshevik Party was aware of the steps that were being taken. Suddenly, on the eve of the insurrection, Kamenev and Zinoviev betrayed the Central Committee’s secret decision.
That same day, literally only an hour or two after Sukhanov had informed his friends about this letter, the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Bureau of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets was hastily called together and it was decided to postpone the Congress of Soviets until October 25 and to take measures to ensure that the petty-bourgeois parties represented at it had a majority. Only three days previously the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had declared that the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region was unauthorised and had hushed up its telegram calling upon the army to sweep away all obstacles and send delegates to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. But now, making a complete about-face, they referred to the appeal of the Congress of the Northern Region, and in their turn also called upon the army to make every effort to be represented at the Congress. Telegrams were sent to all the army Soviets which had not stood for re-election and were therefore still controlled by the compromisers, urging them, as these petty-bourgeois leaders stated:
“To give the policy of the Congress stability and direction in conformity with the interests of the entire revolutionary democracy and the revolution.”[2]
The calculations of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were simple in the extreme. They were aware that Trotsky had demanded that the insurrection should be postponed until the Congress of Soviets had assembled. They had now learned that Zinoviev and Kamenev were opposed to armed insurrection. The compromisers calculated that by postponing the Congress of Soviets they would give the opponents of revolutionary tactics in the Bolshevik Party time to intensify their struggle against Lenin and Stalin. Moreover, they wanted to take advantage of the postponement to secure for themselves a majority at the Congress. The postponement also gave the Provisional Government more time to prepare to crush the insurrection.
On the morning of October 18, the letter of Kamenev and Zinoviev appeared in the press. The enemy learned that an insurrection was being prepared. Colonel Polkovnikov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd Military Area, immediately issued the following “extremely urgent” order to the garrison:
“1) Every military unit, in conformity with special orders and within the precincts of the district in which it is stationed, must render every assistance to the organs of the city administration—the Commissars and militia—in protecting government and public buildings;
“2) jointly with the district commandant and the representative of the City Militia, must organise patrols and take measures to detain criminal elements and deserters;
“3) all persons who appear in the barracks and call for armed action and rioting are to be arrested and placed in the custody of the deputy commandant of the city;
“4) prevent street demonstrations, meetings and processions;
“5) put a stop to armed demonstrations and rioting forthwith with all the armed forces available.”[3]
Later in the day, armoured cars and automobiles mounted with machine guns were posted in the Palace Square, in front of the Winter Palace.
In the evening, the Provisional Government met in secret session. Verkhovsky, the Minister for War, and Nikitin, the Minister for the Interior, reported on the measures which had been taken to combat the insurrection. After the meeting of the Cabinet, a Council of War was held in Kerensky’s private room. Those present were Colonel Polkovnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Military Area, Kozmin, his second-in-command, General Bagratuni, Chief of Staff of the Area, and the brigade commanders.
Polkovnikov and Bagratuni reported on the steps they had taken to avert an insurrection, or to crush it if in the event of its breaking out. The capital had been divided into districts and “maintenance of order” in each district had been entrusted to the commanders of the army units. Reinforced patrols were on duty throughout the city. Strong forces had been posted in the suburbs to prevent crowds from gathering and all over Petrograd reserves of mounted troops had been posted under cover, ready to take action at a moment’s notice.
“Concrete measures have already been drawn up and approved, and will be put into operation tomorrow,” said Polkovnikov.[4]
The discussion of these measures lasted until 6 o’clock in the morning of the 19th. A little later the cadets were called, the patrols were reinforced, and Cossacks posted in different parts of the city.
The Mensheviks made no secret of the government’s measures. On October 19, their central organ, Robochaya Gazeta, informed its readers:
“A series of measures have already been taken to avert dangerous excesses. Yesterday revolvers were served out to all militiamen. Six hundred picked soldiers, highly conscious politically and loyal to the Provisional Government, have been incorporated in the militia.”[5]
But these petty bourgeois, scared out of their wits, thought that this was not enough. The article in which the above information was given ended with the following anxious observation:
“Nevertheless, it must be said that the protection of the capital from dark forces is not so well organised as it should be, for a sufficiently reliable executive organ is lacking.”[6]
Nikitin, the Minister for the Interior and the Menshevik representative in the government, tried to calm the fears of his nervous colleagues. In an interview published in the same newspaper he assured them that “the most resolute and energetic measures” had been taken against the anticipated Bolshevik action.[7]
Forewarned, the enemy was able to prepare and to take the initiative. In the light of this, the action of the counter-revolutionaries in Kaluga on October 19 becomes intelligible.
The entire bourgeois press raised a hue and cry. On October 19 the Menshevik Rabochaya Gazeta published an article under the heading, “Zinoviev Against Lenin,” in which, gloating over the dissension in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, the Mensheviks let loose a flood of slander and vilification against the Bolsheviks. They falsely asserted that the Bolsheviks were inciting against the government deserters from the army and navy and that they were enrolling criminal elements in their ranks. These worthy Menshevik windbags already pretended to see mysterious “shady characters” prowling the streets of Petrograd.
“There is an atmosphere of approaching storm,” the Mensheviks shrieked hysterically. “The action of the unorganised masses may take place independently of the will of those elements who by their propaganda have cultivated the soil for it.”[8]
Dyen even published the alleged “plan” of the Bolshevik insurrection, according to which the insurrection was to have started on the night of October 17. One “army” was to have marched from the Okhta, through the Vyborg District, across the Liteiny Bridge and capture the Taurida Palace. Another, marching from the Narvskaya Zastava, was to have captured the Winter Palace and other government buildings. A third was to have marched from Staraya and Novaya Derevnya and capture the Fortress of Peter and Paul.
“In the evening it was learned,” added the “well-informed” correspondent of this newspaper, “that the Bolsheviks have decided to postpone this action. This was due to the communication made yesterday at a secret meeting of one of the committees of the Council of the Republic by Colonel Polkovnikov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd Military Area, concerning the steps he had taken to suppress likely disorders.”[9]
Abusing and vilifying the Bolshevik Party, the entire pack of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois scribes shrieked to the government: “Act!”
Nor did the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks in the army remain idle. The Committee of the Twelfth Army, which consisted of compromisers and only the day before had in the name of the “front” threatened to prevent the Congress of Soviets from being held, was now hastily, also in the name of this “front,” mobilising its forces for the Congress. These quondam opponents of the Congress sent the following telegram to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and to the Bureau of the Military Department:
“Request you to display utmost energy in organising delegates to the Congress arriving from the front. Outcome of Congress will depend on the rapid and extensive organisation of these delegates. Our delegation will arrive on October 23 in full force. Request you to issue no credentials unless certificates of Army Committee are presented.”[10]
On October 22, the soldiers’ section of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets, which hitherto had been opposed to the holding of the Congress, adopted on a motion of urgency a resolution in favour of peace and of transferring the land to the peasants. But following on these pompous phrases the compromisers repeated their old, thread-bare arguments.
“We must not shrink even from transferring power to democracy,” they said in their resolution, but scared by their own boldness they immediately added, “but not to the Soviet.”[11]
In this resolution the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks insidiously suggested to the Provisional Government that it should cut the ground from under the feet of the Bolsheviks by adopting their slogans of “peace” and “land.” These old hands at the game of politics advised the government to resort to this manoeuvre in order to prevent the Soviets from taking power and really satisfying the demands of the people.
The despicable conduct of Kamenev and Zinoviev found some echo in the ranks of the revolutionary fighters, but on the whole it failed to shake them. In view of the treacherous betrayal of the plan to organise an insurrection the Petrograd Soviet was obliged to publish a denial, declaring that it had no such intention. There was some danger that this would mislead the masses whom the Bolsheviks were calling upon to revolt. Indeed, at a special meeting of Regimental Committees held on October 21, one of the speakers expressed bewilderment “concerning the disagreements which are so obvious when one compares the statement made by the Petrograd Soviet in its appeal to the Cossacks, in which it denies the possibility of an insurrection, with Lenin’s articles in Rabochy Put, in which he openly calls for insurrection.”[12]
On the morning of October 18 Lenin was not yet aware of the treachery perpetrated by Zinoviev and Kamenev, but he was in possession of the letter they had sent to the Petrograd, Moscow and other Party Committees after the Central Committee had adopted its decision on October 10. In this letter, which Zinoviev and Kamenev had given the heading of “On the Current Situation,” they repeated all their arguments against the armed insurrection. Replying to this letter Lenin declared:
“The arguments which these comrades have advanced are so weak, they are evidence of such astounding confusion, cowardice and renunciation of all the fundamental ideas of Bolshevism and revolutionary proletarian internationalism, that it is difficult to find an explanation for such shameful vacillation. The fact nevertheless remains, and since the revolutionary party has no right to tolerate vacillation on such a serious question, and since the conduct of this precious pair who have scattered their principles to the winds may cause some confusion, it is necessary to analyse their arguments, expose their vacillation and to show how shameful it is.”[13]
Lenin had barely finished wording this reply when he received the latest issue of Novaya Zhizn, in which Zinoviev and Kamenev had betrayed the secret of the insurrection. These traitors had treacherously stabbed the revolution in the back. The enemy had been forewarned. He was aware that the armed insurrection might break out any day and had no doubt taken urgent measures. The success of the operation on which the fate of the revolution depended, which had cost so much labour and energy, on which all the hopes and aspirations of millions of proletarians and the poorer peasants were based, was jeopardised.
As if physically feeling this treacherous blow, Lenin, the leader and organiser attacked these traitors with all the passion he was capable of. Addressing a letter to the members of the Bolshevik Party, he branded the two men as blacklegs and contemptible defenders of the capitalist system.
“Dealing with the burning problem of the highest importance,” he wrote, “on the eve of the critical day of October 20, two, ‘outstanding Bolsheviks’ oppose an unpublished decision of the Party Centre in the non-party press, and above all, in a paper which in this matter goes hand in hand with the bourgeoisie against the workers’ Party!
“Obviously, this is a thousand times meaner and a million times more harmful than, say all Plekhanov’s writings in the non-party press in 1906-1907, which the Party so strongly condemned! At that time, however, it was only a question of elections; now it is a question of insurrection for the purpose of seizing power!
“And with such a question before us, after the centre had made a decision, to dispute this unpublished decision before the Rodzyankos and Kerenskys in a non-party paper—can one imagine a more treacherous and more blacklegging act?”[14]
Lashing out at these traitors, Lenin declared that he would insist on their expulsion from the Party. In his opinion their treachery had caused the Party enormous harm and had undoubtedly had the effect of postponing the insurrection.
“As for the question as to how matters now stand with the insurrection,” he wrote, “I cannot, so near to October 20, judge from afar how much damage has been done to the cause by this blackleg publication in the non-party press. Very great practical damage has undoubtedly been caused. To remedy matters it is first of all necessary to re-establish the unity of the Bolshevik front by expelling the strike-breakers.”[15]
But even at that moment—one of the most dramatic in the revolution—Lenin had no doubt whatever that victory would be achieved. His confidence in the strength and solidarity of the Bolshevik Party was supreme. He was aware of the incalculable sources of energy that were latent among the proletariat. He knew what the common people were capable of when led by a tried proletarian Party. He concluded his stinging letter with the words:
“Hard times. A difficult task. A grave betrayal. But for all that, the task will be fulfilled, the workers will rally, the peasants revolt and the extreme impatience of the soldiers at the front will do their work. Let us close our ranks more firmly—the proletariat must win!”[16]
Lenin followed this letter up with another, addressed exclusively to the Central Committee in which he called for the immediate removal of the traitors from the Central Committee and their expulsion from the Party.
“The statement made by Kamenev and Zinoviev in the non-party press,” he wrote, “was despicable also for the reason that the Party could not publicly refute their infamous slander. . . . We cannot tell the capitalists the truth, namely, that we have decided on a strike and have decided to conceal from them the moment we have chosen for it.
“We cannot refute the slanderous statements uttered by Zinoviev and Kamenev without doing the cause still more harm. This is exactly what makes the conduct of these two men so absolutely mean and treacherous. They have betrayed to the capitalists the plans of the strikers. Since we are keeping silent in the press, everybody can guess how things stand.”[17]
In this letter Lenin again analysed the crime committed by Zinoviev and Kamenev and revealed the depths of depravity to which they had sunk.
The Central Committee discussed Lenin’s letters on October 20. It removed Kamenev from the Committee and prohibited both him and Zinoviev from making any statement on behalf of the Bolsheviks, thus, practically depriving them of the right to be members of the Party.
The treachery of Zinoviev and Kamenev, however, failed to arrest the onward march of the revolution. The Bolsheviks mustered and organised vast forces. The masses of the people were mobilised. The counter-revolution was surrounded by a raging sea of revolutionary workers and soldiers. But owing to this treachery, the insurrection had to be postponed. To commence operations at such a moment meant falling into the enemy’s trap.
But postponing the insurrection did not mean calling it off. The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party was guided by what Lenin had written in his last letter:
“Even though the strike-breakers who have betrayed the matter to Rodzyanko and Kerensky have caused it to be put off for a long time, the question of armed insurrection has not been withdrawn from the order of the day . . . not been withdrawn by the Party.”[18]
Having rid itself of both capitulators, the Central Committee, under Lenin’s guidance, persistently and perseveringly continued to organise the insurrection.
[1] Minutes of Proceedings of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., August 1917-February 1918, State Publishers, Moscow, 1929, p. 136.
[2] Materials of the Secretariat of the Head Editorial Board of The History of the Civil War, Fund of Vol. II of “H.C.W.”
[3] “Order to Staff of Petrograd Military Area,” Soldatskoye Slovo (The Soldier’s Word), No. 171, October 20, 1917.
[4] “Excerpts from Interviews,” Rech, No. 246, October 19, 1917.
[5] “The Bolshevik Action. Days of Alarm.” Rabochaya Gazeta (The Workers’ Gazette), No. 190, October 19, 1917.
[6] Ibid.
[7] “The Statement by A. M. Nikitin, Minister for the Interior,” Rabochaya Gazeta, No. 191, October 20, 1917.
[8] “The Bolshevik Action. Days of Alarm.” Rabochaya Gazeta, No. 190, October 19, 1917.
[9] “The Bolsheviks’ Plan,” Dyen, No. 192, October 18, 1917.
[10] Materials of the Secretariat of the Head Editorial Board of The History of the Civil War, Fund of Vol. II of “H.C.W.”
[11] “The Soldiers’ Section of the Central Executive Committee,” Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, No. 207, October 26, 1917.
[12] “The Meeting of Regimental Committees,” Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, No. 204, October 22, 1917.
[13] V. I. Lenin, “Letter to Comrades,” Collected Works, Eng. ed., Vol. XXI, Book II, p. 111.
[14] V. I. Lenin, “A Letter to the Members of the Bolshevik Party,” Collected Works, Eng. ed., Vol. XXI, Book II, p. 129-30.
[15] Ibid., p. 131.
[16] Ibid., p. 132.
[17] V. I. Lenin, “A Letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.,” Ibid., p 135.
[18] Ibid., pp. 135-36.
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