Just before the April Conference of the Bolsheviks the class antagonisms in Petrograd assumed an open form. Neither the concessions of the bourgeoisie nor the manœuvres of the compromisers were of any avail. On April 20 and 21 mass demonstrations against the war were held in the streets of the capital.
Until now the Provisional Government had concealed its true intentions. Its references to the war were deliberately vague and designed to inspire the masses with the hope that the slaughter would soon come to an end. The government bided its time, waiting until the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had accomplished their task of preparing the masses for the continuation of the war. But the bourgeoisie began to fear that the efforts of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik agitators would be nullified by the growing hostility to the war. Moreover, the government’s declaration of March 28, which spoke, although vaguely, of “the establishment of a lasting peace on the basis of the self-determination of nations,” had produced an unpleasant impression on the Allied imperialists. They demanded a plain answer—would Russia fight?
On April 18 Milyukov explained that the declaration of March 28 expressed “the general desire of the people to fight the World War until a decisive victory is achieved.”(1)
It was on this very day—May 1 (New Style)—that the workers and soldiers demonstrated on the streets under the slogan announced in the declaration of the Soviet: “A Peace Without Annexations and Indemnities!”
The patently imperialist character of Milyukov’s note evoked a furious protest—above all among the troops quartered in Petrograd. On April 20 the Finland Regiment organised a demonstration. They bore a banner with the inscription, “Down with the Policy of Conquest!” A little later the 180th Regiment came out. A part of the naval garrison demonstrated. No Officers accompanied them. Over 15,000 demonstrators assembled in a determined mood in front of the Mariinsky Palace, where the Provisional Government was in session. Gotz and Skobelev, leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, were sent to address the soldiers, but their speeches were unavailing. The soldiers adopted the following resolution:
“Having acquainted ourselves with Milyukov’s note on the aims of the war, and expressing our indignation at this shameless utterance, which is in open contradiction to the appeal of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies to the peoples of the world and to the declaration of the Provisional Government itself, we demand Milyukov’s immediate resignation.”(2)
In order to divert the attention of the masses, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks summoned an extraordinary meeting of the Soviet. At this meeting the representative of the soldiers and sailors assembled in front of the Mariinsky Palace declared that the crisis would be overcome either by “our own government” or by “civil war.”
The action of the workers and soldiers evoked the counteraction of the bourgeoisie. The supporters of the Provisional Government brought out regiments which had still not realised the true policy of the Provisional Government. House-owners, shopkeepers, small tradesmen and salaried employees, led by the Cadets, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, organised a demonstration under the slogan “Confidence in the Provisional Government!”
Under cover of this noisy patriotic demonstration, the government proceeded to adopt more vigorous measures. General Kornilov, the new Commander of the Petrograd Military Area—the man who was later to become the standard-bearer of counter-revolution—ordered the Mikhailovsky Artillery School to dispatch two batteries of guns to the Palace Square. The private soldiers at the school and some of the officers decided to verify whether the Soviet was cognizant of Kornilov’s order. They learnt that the Soviet had given no instructions. Within two hours the over-zealous general was obliged to countermand the order for the dispatch of guns. But the mere fact that the order had been given showed that the government had intended to fire on the demonstration. This was borne out by subsequent events: here and there the workers were fired on.
The action of the bourgeoisie, in its turn, evoked a demonstration by the proletariat. The following day the workers of factory after factory flocked into the streets. The outskirts of the city were filled with workers and soldiers who had come out to protest against the imperialist policy. In the centre of the city, along the Nevsky Prospect, marched small groups of government supporters.
Banners bearing the slogan “Down with the Provisional Government!” were also to be met with in the workers’ demonstration. This slogan was advanced by a section of the Petrograd Bolshevik Committee although it was counter to the policy of the Central Committee of the Party. Lenin severely condemned this thoughtless slogan. At the April Conference of the Party, he said:
“All we wanted was to carry out a peaceful reconnaissance of the enemy’s forces, but not to give battle. . . . To move ‘a wee bit more to the Left’ at the moment of action was inept. We regard this as a great crime, as an act of disorganisation.”(3)
L. Trotsky, who at that time was not yet a member of the Bolshevik Party, has completely distorted Lenin’s views. In his Lessons of October, Trotsky writes:
“The April demonstration, which went ‘more to the Left’ than was necessary, was a reconnoitring skirmish to test the mood of the masses and the relations between them and the majority on the Soviet. Having made this reconnaissance, Lenin withdrew the slogan demanding the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government, but withdrew it for several weeks or months, depending on the speed with which the indignation of the masses against the compromisers would grow.”(4)
This false assertion is fundamentally contradictory to Lenin’s whole tactics. In April Lenin did not withdraw the slogan demanding “the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government,” for the simple reason that Lenin had not advanced this slogan in April. In fact, Lenin was opposed to this slogan in April and condemned it at the Party Conference. The great significance of the tactics of the Bolsheviks lay precisely in the fact that their slogans reflected the cherished wishes of the masses, that they formulated the political demands of the masses and rallied the masses around the Bolshevik standards. The reconnaissance of the enemy’s strength, of which Lenin speaks, means something quite different in class war from what it means in ordinary war.
“A political army is not the same thing as a military army,” as Stalin very aptly puts it. “While a military command begins a war with an army ready to hand, the Party has to create its army in the course of the struggle itself, in the course of the collisions between classes, as fast as the masses themselves become convinced by their own experience that the slogans of the Party, the policy of the Party, are right.
“Of course, every such demonstration threw a certain amount of light on the interrelation of forces which were hidden from the eye; there was a certain amount of reconnoitring, but this reconnoitring was not the motive for the demonstration, but its natural consequence.”(5)
The April demonstration in Petrograd served to stimulate the class consciousness of the masses in other industrial centres.
The Moscow proletariat responded to the events in Petrograd by a demonstration of solidarity.
The April events in Moscow were described by an employee in the office of the Governor of the City of Moscow as follows:
“A crowd of people filled the square in front of the Soviet. Orators clung to the Skobelev monument. Red flags fluttered and waved above the crowd and scores of placards were held aloft bearing the motto, ‘Down with Milyukov!’ The crowd was in an exalted and excited mood. . . . One after another, Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary orators appeared on the balcony of the House of the Soviets and made pacifying speeches. . . . The crowd down below on the square greeted the orators in a very unfriendly spirit; the pacifying speeches were interrupted by catcalls, ironical interjections and demands for Milyukov’s resignation. Red placards with the demand, ‘Down with Milyukov!’ were poked up by the crowd to the balcony so that the orators could see them better. . . . The situation grew more alarming when the demonstrators were joined by the 55th Regiment, which arrived almost in full strength also bearing banners with the demand ‘Down with the Capitalist Ministers!’ ‘Down with Milyukov!”(6)
The demonstrating soldiers were joined by large numbers of workers from the Zamoskvorechye district, prominent among whom were the workers from the Michelson Factory, who had established friendly relations with the Fifty-fifth Regiment.
The April demonstration and the echo it evoked in the country revealed the full profundity of the political crisis.
The soldiers, who had sincerely believed that the Provisional Government desired peace, were incensed most of all. The unstable mass swung to the Left, to the side of the workers. The vacillations of this mass, which, as Lenin defined it, “could by its strength decide everything,” imparted motion to the extremes—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie supported the Provisional Government, the proletariat supported the slogans of the Bolshevik Party. The question was, which of the two classes—the proletariat or the bourgeoisie—would win the following of the unstable mass, the petty-bourgeoisie?
The petty-bourgeois leaders in the Soviet, the Socialist- Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, had also momentarily swung towards the revolution, but the bourgeoisie scared them with the spectre of civil war, and after the demonstrations of the workers the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks again obediently followed the bourgeoisie. Before the April crisis about half the members of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet had declared their opposition to the Provisional Government, but after the demonstrations thirty-four members, as against, nineteen, supported a motion expressing confidence in the capitalists and readiness to work hand in hand with them.
A resolution drafted by Lenin and adopted by the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party described these class movements as follows:
“The petty-bourgeois masses, being incensed with the capitalists, first swung away from them towards the workers, but two days later they again followed the Menshevik and Narodnik [i.e., Socialist-Revolutionary—Trans.] leaders, who were advocating ‘confidence’ in and ‘compromise’ with the capitalists.
“These leaders agreed to a compromise, completely surrendered their positions and contented themselves with the empty and purely verbal reservations of the capitalists.”(7)
The April outburst proved to the bourgeoisie that by himself Kerensky—the “hostage of democracy,” as he was called—could not ensure the support of the masses. A further extension to the Left would have to be made. The Provisional Government decided to sacrifice Guchkov and Milyukov. On April 26 the government issued an announcement declaring that it would invite fresh public forces into the government. On April 27 Prince Lvov wrote to Chkheidze proposing that the Soviet should appoint its representatives to the government, otherwise the bourgeoisie would resign the government. Having failed to secure undivided power, the bourgeoisie hoped to put an end to the dual power by forming a coalition with representatives of the Soviet. And that is just how Milyukov regarded the coalition:
“At any rate it [the coalition government—Ed.] enables us to hope for the attainment of two of the most important aims of the moment, viz., reinforcement of the government and a change in the mood of the army.”(8)
But the Executive Committee of the Soviet was bound by its old resolution of February 28 not to join the Government. The ultimatum of the bourgeoisie created a situation in which the power might fall into the hands of the Soviet, and this was precisely what the compromisers feared most of all. An all-Russian conference of Mensheviks was at that time in progress. It explained the necessity of joining the government as follows:
“Incapable either of sufficiently energetic revolutionary measures in the sphere of internal development, or, in particular, of a consistent policy of peace in the sphere of foreign relations, it [the Provisional Government—Ed.] has inspired mistrust in the broad democratic masses. It therefore did not enjoy the necessary plenitude of power, and a considerable part of the latter steadily passed to the Soviets.”(9)
The Mensheviks frankly admitted that the power was passing from the Provisional Government to the Soviets. This transfer of power to the Soviets could be prevented only by joining the government and thus bolstering it up. On May 1 the Executive Committee rescinded its old resolution and resolved to appoint another four “Socialist” Ministers to the government. On the evening of May 5, reporting to the Soviet on the subject of the new government the Menshevik Skobelev said:
“If, on the basis of this declaration, you deem it necessary to appoint us to the new government, you will then have to display complete confidence in the government and ensure it full power.”(10)
At this meeting, A. R. Gotz, one of the most prominent Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, stated that the Socialist-Revolutionaries were appointing their representatives to the government in order that they might there achieve the demand for “land and freedom.” Gotz concluded his speech with the words:
“They are not going as captives of the bourgeoisie, but in order to occupy a new position in the trenches of the revolution, now pushed forward.”(11)
Tsereteli said at this meeting of the Soviet that there were only two ways out of the existing situation: either to join the government or to take power. The second alternative, in Tsereteli’s opinion, was out of the question because
“the bourgeoisie is not isolated: it is supported by a part of the army and by the peasantry, and these would swing away from the revolutionary movement.”(12)
The Soviet endorsed the decision of the Executive Committee. On the following day, May 6, the following list of members of the coalition government was published: Premier and Minister for the Interior, Prince G. E. Lvov; Minister of War and Marine, A. F. Kerensky (Socialist-Revolutionary); Minister of Justice, P. N. Pereverzev (a close supporter of the Socialist-Revolutionaries); Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. I. Tereshchenko; Minister of Ways of Communication, N. V. Nekrasov (Cadet); Minister of Commerce and Industry, A. I. Konovalov (Progressivist); Minister of Production, A. A. Manuylov (Cadet); Minister of Finance, A. I. Shingaryov (Cadet); Minister of Agriculture, V. M. Chernov (Socialist-Revolutionary); Minister of Post and Telegraph, I. G. Tsereteli (Menshevik); Minister of Labour, M. I. Skobelev (Menshevik); Minister of Food, A. V. Peshekhonov (“Popular Socialist”); Minister of Poor Relief, Prince V. N. Shakhovskoi (Cadet); Procurator-General, V. N. Lvov (Centre); Comptroller-General, I. V. Godnev (Octobrist).
Kerensky’s appointment betrayed the real purpose of the coalition. He was put in charge of the Ministers of War and Marine in the belief that he enjoyed a certain measure of confidence among the armed forces. The day before, on May 5, at the evening session of the Soviet, a representative of the Eleventh Army had emphasised the extreme importance of Kerensky’s appointment on the grounds that he enjoyed the confidence not only of the soldiers but also of many officers. It was largely on the recommendation of Milyukov that Tereshchenko—a millionaire and patron of the theatre and the arts—was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. “He at least will know how to talk to the diplomats,” Milyukov said, referring to the new Minister’s knowledge of languages and his polished manners. But it was not so much a question of manners as of politics.
Nabokov, a Cadet, wrote of Tereshchenko as follows:
“The aim he set himself as Minister of Foreign Affairs was to follow the policy of Milyukov, but in such a way as not to be interfered with by the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies. He wanted to fool them all.”(13)
[1] “Note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs,” Russkiye Vedomosti, No. 87, April 20, 1917.
[2] “The Provisional Government. A Resolution of the 180th Infantry Reserve Regiment and the Finland Guards Regiment, April 20, 1917,” Soldatskaya Pravda (Soldier’s Truth), No. 8, May 10, 1917.
[3] Lenin, “Reply to the Discussion on the Current Situation, April 24,” Collected Works, (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 232.
[4] L. Trotsky, “Lessons of October,” Collected Works, Vol. III, Part I, Moscow, pp. 27-8.
[5] J. Stalin, “The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists,” Leninism, Vol. I, p. 123.
[6] A. N. Voznesensky, Moscow in 1917, Moscow, 1928, pp. 45-46.
[7] Lenin, “Resolution of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Adopted on the Morning of April 22, 1917,” Collected Works, (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 224.
[8] The Bourgeoisie and the Landlords in 1917. Private Conferences of Members of the State Duma, Moscow, 1932, p. 13.
[9] The All-Russian Conference of Menshevik and Joint Organizations of the R.S.D.L.P., Moscow, 1917, p. 35.
[10] “Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies,” Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, No. 60, May 7, 1917.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] V. D. Nabokov, The Provisional Government. Reminiscences, Moscow, 1924, p. 78.
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