Upon his arrival in Russia, Lenin flung all his energies into revolutionary work. On the morning of April 4 he put forward his theses, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in the present Revolution,” at a conference of leading Bolshevik Party functionaries and then read his theses at a meeting of delegates—Bolsheviks and Mensheviks—who had attended the All-Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies held at the end of March 1917.
In these theses—historically known as the April Theses—Lenin summed up the experience gained by the Party in the struggle and presented a clear-cut programme of action for the Party in the new stage. Lenin’s April Theses opened a new chapter in the history of the revolutionary struggle of the Bolshevik Party—new, not in the sense that it marked a break with the old theory and practice of Bolshevism, but in the sense that the theses constituted an all-embracing programme of action for the party of the proletariat in the transitional stage inaugurated by the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917.
The overthrow of tsarism had changed the conditions under which the Bolsheviks worked.
“This was a tremendous turning point in the history of Russia and an unprecedented turning point in the history of our Party,” Stalin wrote in reference to the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917. “A new orientation of the Party was required in the new conditions of the struggle.”(1)
The Bolshevik Party had only just emerged from its illegal, underground existence. Numerous members of the Bolshevik Party were returning from exile in distant parts of Russia. Hundreds and thousands of Bolsheviks were making their way to Petrograd, Moscow and other industrial centres from Narym, Turukhansk, Yakutia and from remote places of exile in the Far North. The railways were jammed by military traffic and could not carry the returning exiles fast enough. The Committee for Aiding Amnestied Persons, which was helping the political exiles to return home, had fallen under the sway of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who hampered the return of the Bolshevik exiles. The Bolsheviks were scattered over the vast territory of the country, from Petrograd to Vladivostok, from Archangel to the Caucasus.
But the Bolshevik Party was closely knit, ideologically and organisationally, by a long and successful struggle against every species of Menshevism and Socialist-Revolutionism and by a constant struggle against opportunist vacillations and deviations from Lenin’s line. The Bolshevik Party entered the new stage equipped with Lenin’s plan of transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to a Socialist revolution, the plan he had drawn up as far back as 1905. The Bolsheviks entered the new stage supported by Lenin’s doctrine that it was possible for Socialism to triumph in one country alone. The Bolsheviks were armed with Lenin’s theory of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. They exposed the predatory and annexationist character of the imperialist war. The whole history of the revolution had prepared the Bolshevik Party for the “new orientation in the new conditions of the struggle.”
The Party did not stop at the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Bolsheviks called upon the proletariat to continue the revolution. The Bolsheviks opposed the imperialist war, which did not cease to be a predatory war because of the transfer of power to the bourgeois Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks exposed the class character of the Provisional Government and called upon the proletariat to consolidate and develop the Soviets as organs of revolutionary power.
On March 14, two days after his return from exile Stalin wrote in Pravda:
“We must consolidate . . . the Soviets, make them universal, and link them together under the aegis of the Central Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies as the organ of revolutionary power of the people.”(2)
But general conclusions had to be drawn from the experience of the Party; the new tasks under the new conditions had to be formulated. And this is what Lenin did in the April Theses. Stalin wrote of these theses:
“It required Lenin’s famous ‘April Theses’ to enable the Party to emerge on to the new road at one stride.”(3)
Lenin’s Theses
1. In our attitude towards the war, which also under the new government of Lvov and Co. unquestionably remains on Russia’s part a predatory imperialist war owing to the capitalist nature of that government, not the slightest concession must be made to ‘revolutionary defencism.’
The class-conscious proletariat could consent to a revolutionary war, which would really justify revolutionary defencism, only on condition: (a) that the power of government pass to the proletariat and the poor sections of the peasantry bordering on the proletariat; (b) that all annexations be renounced in deed and not in word; (c) that a complete and real break be made with all capitalist interests.
In view of the undoubted honesty of broad strata of the mass believers in revolutionary defencism, who accept the war as a necessity only and not as a means of conquest, in view of the fact that they are being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary thoroughly, persistently and patiently to explain their error to them, to explain the inseparable connection between capital and the imperialist war, and to prove that it is impossible to end the war by a truly democratic, non-coercive peace without the overthrow of capital.
The widespread propaganda of this view among the army on active service must be organised.
Fraternisation.
2. The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that is represents a transition from the first stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organisation of the proletariat, placed the power into the hands of the bourgeoisie—to the second stage, which must place the power into the hands of the proletariat and the poor strata of the peasantry.
This transition is characterised, on the one hand, by a maximum of freedom (Russia is now the freest of all the belligerent countries in the world); on the other, by the absence of violence in relation to the masses, and, finally, by the unreasoning confidence of the masses in the government of capitalists, the worst enemies of peace and socialism. The specific situation demands of us an ability to adapt ourselves to the specific requirements of Party work among unprecedented large masses of proletarians who have just awakened to political life.
3. No support must be given to the Provisional Government; the utter falsity of all its promises must be explained, particularly of those relating to the renunciation of annexations. Exposure, and not the unpardonable illusion-breeding “demand” that this government, a government of capitalists, should cease to be an imperialist government.
4. The fact must be recognised that in most of the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies our Party is in a minority, and so far in a small minority, as against a bloc of all the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie and convey its influence to the proletariat, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries down to the Organisation Committee (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov, etc., etc.
It must be explained to the masses that the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies are the only possible form of revolutionary government and that therefore our task is, as long as this government yields to the influence of the bourgeoisie, to present a patient, systematic and persistent explanation of the errors of their tactics, an explanation especially adapted to the practical needs of the masses.
As long as we are in the minority we carry on the work of criticising and explaining errors and at the same time advocate the necessity of transferring the entire power of State to the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies, so that the masses may by experience overcome their mistakes.
5. Not a parliamentary republic—to return to a parliamentary republic from the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies would be a retrograde step—but a republic of Soviets of Workers’. Agricultural Labourers’ and Peasants’ Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom.
Abolition of the police, the army (i.e., the standing army to be replaced by the universally armed people) and the bureaucracy.
The salaries of all officials, who are to be elected and to be subject to recall at any time, not to exceed the average wage of a competent worker.
6. In the agrarian programme the emphasis must be laid on the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers’ Deputies.
Confiscation of all landed estates.
Nationalisation of all lands in the country, the disposal of the land to be in the charge of the local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers’ and Peasants’ Deputies. The organisation of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The creation of model farms on each of the large estates (varying from 100 to 300 desyatins, in accordance with local and other conditions, at the discretion of the local institutions) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers’ Deputies and for the public account.
7. The immediate amalgamation of all banks in the country into a single national bank, control over which shall be exercised by the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies.
8. Our immediate task is not to “introduce” Socialism but only to bring social production and distribution of products at once under the control of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies.
9. Party tasks:
(a) Immediate summoning of a Party congress.
(b) Alteration of the Party programme, mainly:
(1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war;
(2) On the question of our attitude towards the state and our demand for a “commune state” (i.e., a state of which the Paris Commune was the prototype).
(3) Amendment of our antiquated minimum programme.
(c) A new name for the Party (instead of “Social-Democrats,” whose official leaders throughout the world have betrayed Socialism by deserting to the bourgeoisie [the “defencists” and the vacillating “Kautskians”] we must call ourselves a Communist Party).
10. A new International.
We must take the initiative in creating a revolutionary International, an International directed against the social-chauvinists and against the “Centre.”*
*The “Centre” in the international Social-Democratic movement is the tendency which vacillates between the chauvinists (“defencists”) and internationalists, i.e., Kautsky and Co. in Germany, Longuet and Co. in France, Chkheidze and Co. in Russia, Turati and Co. in Italy, MacDonald and Co. in England, etc. (Lenin’s footnote.)(4)
Lenin’s speech came as a bombshell to the Mensheviks. Plekhanov called it a “farcical dream,” the ravings of a madman. “Lenin is calling for civil war,” the Mensheviks exclaimed in horror.
Tsereteli spoke in opposition to Lenin:
“If power had been seized in its first days the revolution would have ended in utter defeat very soon. The annulment of our treaties with the Allies would have resulted in our being crushed from without. And profound reaction against Socialism would have gained sway in Europe; the International would have been crushed. . . . You cannot isolate yourself from the entire people and from the class-conscious proletariat.”(5)
At this same conference, Chkheidze endeavoured to scare Lenin by declaring:
“Lenin will remain alone outside the revolution, and we all will go our own way.”(6)
There was consternation even among some of the Bolsheviks, who were dismayed by the difficulties of the impending struggle. But the Party as a whole remained faithful to its leader, as was borne out at the All-Russian Conference of the Bolsheviks.
The April (Seventh) Conference was held in Petrograd on April 24-29, 1917. It was attended by 133 voting delegates and 18 delegates with a voice but no vote, who together represented about 80,000 Party members.
Before the Revolution of February 1917 the Bolshevik Party had been an underground organisation and had carried on its activities secretly. It was an illegal party and membership in it was punishable by arrest, exile and penal servitude. All conferences and congresses of the party were held in secret, the majority of them abroad. The April Conference was the first legal conference in the history of the Bolshevik Party.
Lenin’s fellow-fighters arrived from all parts of the country. Comrades returned from remote exile and from penal servitude; delegates arrived from industrial centres and from the border regions inhabited by non-Russian nationalities. Leaders and organisers of the recent barricade fighting attended from mills and factories of the capital. Among those who took part in the work of the conference were Lenin, Stalin, Molotov, S. Kosior, Krupskaya, Stasova and Dzerzhinsky; Moscow (city and region) was represented by Zemlyachka, Nogin, Bubnov, Skvortsov-Stepanov, Smidovich and others; the Donbas by Voroshilov, Samara by Kuibyshev, the Urals by Sverdlov. Many other prominent Bolsheviks attended, and the fact that representatives of Party branches cut off from the guiding centres found a common language and solidly supported Lenin was one more proof that the tsarist government had not broken the will of the Party and had not severed its contacts with the masses; it was proof that the Party had been preserved and that it had grown organisationally and ideologically.
The All-Russian April Conference of the Bolsheviks had all the importance of a Party Congress held at a most serious moment of history. As Lenin pointed out in his opening speech, the Conference met “in the midst not only of the Russian revolution, but also of a developing international revolution.”(7)
The delegates from the various localities related how rapidly the Bolshevik Party was growing and what a tremendous amount of work it had performed in the two months of the revolution.
During the war in the city of Petrograd there were about 2,000 dues-paying members of the Party, whereas on the eve of the April Conference there were 16,000 dues-paying members. In Kronstadt there had been only a small underground organisation; now there were 3,000 Bolsheviks in Kronstadt. There were 3,000 in Helsingfors and 560 in Vyborg. There were 7,000 Bolsheviks in the city of Moscow and 13,000 in the Moscow Region as a whole. There were 3,500 in the city of Ivanovo-Voznesensk alone. There were more than 1,500 members in Saratov, 2,700 in Samara and 400 in Kazan. Whereas underground work in the Urals used to be carried on in nine places, on the eve of the April Conference there were 43 branches with a total membership of 16,000 Bolsheviks. Before the February Revolution there were 100 Bolsheviks in Lugansk, now there were 1,500.
In addition to Pravda (Truth), several Bolshevik newspapers had already appeared. There were the Sotsial-Demokrat (Social-Democrat) in Moscow, with a circulation of 60,000 copies; the Uralskaya Pravda (Urals Truth) in the Urals, the Vperyod (Forward) in Ufa, the Volna (Wave) in Helsingfors, the Golos Pravdy (Voice of Truth) in Kronstadt, the Zvezda (Star) in Ekaterinoslav, the Proletary (Proletarian) in Kharkov and the Kavkazsky Rabochy (Caucasian Worker) in the Caucasus. Saratov, Samara and Kazan each had their Bolshevik newspaper.
The influence of the Bolsheviks was rapidly spreading. In the Urals they had the following of nearly all the Soviets. Everywhere they introduced the eight-hour day and instituted control over industry. In the Donbas, one delegate related:
“Lugansk is now practically in the hands of the workers. When there are more Party workers the Bolsheviks will undoubtedly have complete power in their hands. . . . The miners are everywhere: in the commissariats, in the militia and on the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. They are even acting as judges. All the organisations are under the control of the miners, so that the miners are complete masters in the collieries.”(8)
The Bolsheviks carried on propaganda among the prisoners of war—German, Austrian and Czecho-Slovakian. In Lugansk, a Bolshevik organisation numbering forty members had existed among the prisoners of war even before the February Revolution; after the revolution its membership increased to over a hundred. In the Urals, in spite of the orders of War Minister Guchkov forbidding prisoners of war to participate in demonstrations, the Bolsheviks got Germans and Austrians to take part in the May Day celebrations. Hundreds of splendid organisers and thousands of devoted revolutionary fighters emerged from the ranks of the prisoners of war as a result of the work of the Bolsheviks.
Village nuclei were formed by the Bolsheviks in a number of places. A peasant congress in Penza supported the Bolsheviks; the peasants resolved to confiscate the landed estates and to take possession of all their farm implements for the common use. In the Moscow and the Volga Regions and in the Ukraine the Bolsheviks succeeded in gaining control over several peasant Soviets.
Wherever the influence of the Bolsheviks was strong, the revolution went farther than it did in the centre. A delegate from a district in the Moscow Region declared:
“In Orekhovo-Zuyevo the power is entirely in the hands of the workers. Nobody may carry arms without the permission of the Soviet. The peasants are working hand-in-hand with the workers. . . . The peat incident is characteristic. We told the capitalists that if they did not give us fuel, if they did not create the proper conditions for work, we would confiscate their plant. . . . Comrade Lenin says that power must be seized by the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies—but we have nothing more to do in this respect.”(9)
Lenin at the April Conference dwelt in detail on the fact that the provinces were outstripping the capital:
“The material presented by the comrades on the activities of the Soviets, although incomplete, has been extremely interesting. This is perhaps the most important material provided by the Conference; it is material which enables us to test our slogans by the actual course of events. The picture created disposes us to draw optimistic conclusions. The movement began in the centres, where at first all the energies of the proletariat were concentrated on the struggle. A tremendous amount of energy was expended in fighting tsarism. In Petrograd this struggle has led to the removal of the central state authority. Gigantic work has been done. . . .
“The revolution is passing from the centre to the provinces. This is what happened in France—the revolution is becoming municipal. The movement in the provinces shows that the majority there are in favour of the peasants and the workers, that there the leaders consist of bourgeois least of all, that there the masses are not dismayed. The more information we gather, the more it shows that the larger the proportion of proletarians among the population and the smaller the number of intermediate elements, the better the revolution progresses in the localities.”(10)
The reports of the delegates from the various localities showed how far the revolution had progressed wherever the Bolsheviks led the working masses. The Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies in a number of the industrial areas had become masters of the situation. The government authorities were impotent. They could issue no orders without the sanction of the Soviet. The Soviets assumed charge of food affairs. They took the industries under their control and saw that work in the factories was not interrupted.
The reports of the delegates from the various localities once more showed that in their practical and political work the Bolsheviks were prepared for Lenin’s April Theses.
The Bolshevik (April) All-Russian Conference opened on April 24 at 10 a.m. in one of the lecture halls of the Higher Courses for Women in Petrograd. Lenin made a brief opening speech. He said that the prophecy of the great founders of Communism had come true: the World War had inevitably led to revolution. The great honour of starting the revolution had fallen to the Russian proletariat, but the latter must not forget that the Russian revolution was only part of the world revolution. Lenin concluded with the words: “Only from this angle can we define our tasks.”(11)
The Conference conveyed its greetings to the first of the internationalists, Lenin and Karl Liebknecht, the latter of whom had been imprisoned by the German imperialists. The Conference instructed the presidium to find ways and means of conveying the greetings of the Bolsheviks to Liebknecht in prison.
After Lenin’s introductory speech, the Conference approved the following agenda:
1. The current situation (the war and the Provisional Government, etc.).
2. Peace conference.
3. Attitude to the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.
4. Revision of the Party programme.
5. Our tasks in connection with the situation in the International.
6. Union of the Social-Democratic internationalist organisations.
7. Agrarian question.
8. National question.
9. Constituent Assembly.
10. Organisation.
11. Reports from the regions.
12. Election of Central Committee.
The central items at the Conference were Lenin’s reports on the current situation and the agrarian question, which were a development of the April Theses.
The substance of Lenin’s reports was as follows:
The chief symptom by which Marxists determine the character of a revolution is the transfer of power from one class to another. In the February Revolution power passed from the feudal landlords to the bourgeoisie and the capitalist landlords, i.e., landlords who ran their estates on capitalist lines. A new class had come into power—the bourgeoisie—and from this standpoint the February Revolution was a bourgeois revolution.
But on coming to power the bourgeoisie had to solve three problems: to end the war, to give land to the peasants and to save the country from the economic crisis.
Could the bourgeoisie end the war? War is an inevitable consequence of capitalist development. As long as capitalism exists, wars are bound to continue. The present war was an imperialist war on the part of both groups of belligerent powers, that is to say, it was a war waged by the capitalists for mastery of the world, for profitable markets and for the suppression of weak nationalities. The transfer of power from Tsar Nicholas Romanov to the government of landlords and capitalists had not changed the character of the war as far as Russia was concerned. The new government was continuing the annexationist and predatory war. It had reaffirmed all the former tsarist treaties, which promised the Russian capitalists the spoliation of China, Turkey, Persia and other countries. Since it represented the interests of capital, the new government could not renounce annexations, i.e., the conquest of foreign countries, or the keeping of other nationalities under Russia’s sway. At the best, the bourgeoisie might, under the pressure of the masses, end the present war by a peace. But it would be an imperialist peace made at the expense of the weak and oppressed nations. Such a peace would inevitably lead to a new war.
Could the bourgeoisie give the peasants land? The landed estates were mortgaged up to the hilt with the bourgeois banks. To take away the land from the landlords would be to hit at the pockets of the bourgeoisie. At the best, if the people exerted strong pressure, the bourgeoisie might sacrifice part in order to save the whole, and would surrender some of the land to the peasants for compensation. But this would not solve the agrarian problem. Furthermore, the war had reduced peasant husbandry to such a plight that it was impossible for the peasants to carry on in the old way. They required implements and cattle, and these could be obtained only in a revolutionary way, by depriving the bourgeoisie of its capital.
At the Petrograd Conference of Bolsheviks, held on the eve of the April Conference, Lenin had said:
“The bourgeoisie might reconcile itself to the nationalisation of the land if the peasants took the land. As the proletarian party, we must say that the land alone cannot feed you. Consequently, in order to cultivate it, communes would have to be organised. . . . The Cadets are already acting as bureaucrats. They are telling the peasants to wait until the Constituent Assembly. Ours is the only party that is issuing slogans which really further the revolution.”(12)
Of course, the bourgeoisie might attempt to achieve an economic improvement, but only at the expense of the poor peasants and the workers, by laying the whole burden on their shoulders.
Having seized power, the bourgeoisie was unable to solve a single problem of the revolution. As a matter of fact, it had taken over the power of government only with the purpose of combating revolution. The problems of the revolution could be solved only by the new class, the working class, to which the power should be transferred.
“The specific feature of the present situation in Russia—Lenin said—is that it represents a transition from the first stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class-consciousness and organisation of the proletariat, placed power into the hands of the bourgeoisie—to the second stage, which must place power into the hands of the proletariat and the poor strata of the peasantry.”(13)
Thus the specific feature of the situation was that it represented a transition from a bourgeois-democratic revolution to a Socialist revolution, or, as Lenin put it, the growing over of the bourgeois revolution into the Socialist revolution.
The transfer of power to the proletariat did not necessitate an immediate revolt against the Provisional Government. It would have to be overthrown, but not at the moment, not by direct storm. The country was enjoying almost complete political freedom. The government had not yet resorted to violence against the revolution, because the weapons were actually in the hands of the masses. The workers and peasants had no interest in the war. Their defencist sentiments were only superficial, the result of “honest error,” as Lenin expressed it, and therefore, he recommended, the workers had to be helped by “patient” explanation to understand their error.
“We must admit,” Lenin said in the draft resolution he submitted to the Conference, “that a very large number of the ‘revolutionary defencists’ are honest, i.e., they really do not desire annexations, conquests and the oppression of weak nations, and are really striving for a democratic and non-oppressive peace between all the belligerent countries. This must be admitted because the class position of the proletarians and the semi-proletarians of town and country (i.e., of people who earn their livelihood wholly or partly by selling their labour power to the capitalists) is such that these classes have no interest in the profits of the capitalists.”(14)
Lenin at the Conference explained this passage of the resolution in the following way:
“There is no doubt whatever that, as a class, the proletariat and semi-proletariat have no interest in war. They are under the influence of tradition and deceit. They still lack political experience. Hence, our task is one of prolonged explanation. We do not make the slightest concession on matters of principle, but we cannot approach them as we approach the social-chauvinists. These elements of the population have never been Socialist, they have not the slightest inkling of Socialism and are just awakening to political life. But their class consciousness is growing and broadening with extraordinary rapidity. We must know how to adapt our explanations to them, and that is a most difficult thing, particularly for a party that but yesterday was underground.”(15)
The Soviets represented the majority of the workers and working peasants. But the leadership of the Soviets had fallen into the hands of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who had surrendered the power to the Provisional Government. The latter had the support of the Soviets, and it would be overthrown only by winning a majority in the Soviets.
These circumstances created a phenomenon that was extremely rare in revolution: power could be transferred from the Provisional Government to the Soviets by peaceful means. All that was required was to isolate the petty-bourgeois parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, to destroy their influence over the masses.
“All power to the Soviets!”—such was the slogan of the Bolshevik Party at this stage of the revolution.
By the power of the Soviets Lenin did not mean that the capitalists should be expelled from the Provisional Government and representatives of the Soviets substituted in their place.
Trotsky completely distorted the Bolshevik line when subsequently, in his article, “The Lessons of October,” he asserted that his proposal to transfer the power from the hands of the ten capitalist Ministers to ten Peshekhonovs(16) was equivalent to Lenin’s slogan, “All power to the Soviets!” It was not a question of replacing capitalist Ministers by Socialist Ministers. Lenin’s slogan implied the destruction of the bourgeois State apparatus and its replacement by a new kind of State apparatus, the Soviet State apparatus.
The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were in the majority in the Soviets; the Bolsheviks were in the minority. But the Soviets, if they took over the power, would be subject to the constant pressure of the masses, and the members of the Soviets would be freely elected and recalled. Under such circumstances, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries would either advance, by endeavouring to achieve the purposes of the revolution, or, which was more likely, they would remain at a standstill and thus expose themselves. The workers and peasants would support the Bolsheviks, who were actually fighting in the interests of the working population, and the Bolsheviks would become the majority in the Soviets. Having become the majority, the genuinely revolutionary Bolshevik Party would proceed to carry out its programme, namely, conclude a democratic peace, confiscate the landed estates and hand over the land and the implements for its cultivation to the toilers, and undertake immediate measures of economic restoration at the expense of the capitalists by nationalising the banks and the large enterprises. These measures would not constitute an immediate transition to Socialism, but in their sum total they would represent the first step towards the transformation of Russia into a Socialist country.
“What, then, are the tasks of the revolutionary proletariat?” Lenin asked at the April Conference of the Bolsheviks. And he replied as follows:
“The main defect and the main error in all arguments of the Socialists is that the matter is put in too general a form—the transition to Socialism. What we should discuss is concrete steps and measures. Some of them are ripe, others are not. We are in a period of transition. We have created forms that patently differ from the forms of bourgeois States. The Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies are a form of State without parallel anywhere or at any time. This form represents the first steps towards Socialism, and is inevitable at the inception of a Socialist society. This is a fact of decisive importance. . . .
“Why do we desire the transfer of power to the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies?
“The first measure the Soviets must accomplish is the nationalisation of the land. . . . Private ownership of land must be abolished. This is the task facing us, for the majority of the people are for it. To accomplish this, we need the Soviets. It is a measure that cannot be effected with the aid of the old government bureaucracy.
“The second measure. We cannot advocate the ‘introduction’ of Socialism—that would be sheer nonsense. We must preach Socialism. The majority of the population of Russia consists of peasants, of petty proprietors, who cannot even conceive of Socialism. But what objection can they have to there being a bank in every village which would enable them to improve their husbandry? They can have no objection to that. We must preach these practical measures to the peasants and imbue them with the firm conviction that they are indispensable.
“The sugar syndicate is a different matter—that already exists. Our proposal here must be eminently practical. These fully developed syndicates must be handed over to the State. If the Soviets wish to assume power, it must be only for such ends. There is no other reason why they should assume power. The matter stands as follows: either the Soviets develop, or they die an inglorious death, as was the case with the Paris Commune. If it is a bourgeois republic that is wanted, the Cadets can manage that just as well.”(17)
Advancing the slogan, “All power to the Soviets!” for the transition period, Lenin outlined a definite programme for the Soviets when they had achieved power.
As Stalin points out, the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” implied:
“The rupture of the bloc of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries [sic] with the Cadets, the formation of a Soviet government consisting of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (for at that time the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks predominated in the Soviets), freedom of agitation for the opposition (i.e., for the Bolsheviks) and the free struggle of parties within the Soviets, the assumption being that by means of such a struggle the Bolsheviks would succeed in capturing the Soviets, and in changing the composition of the Soviet government by a peaceful development of the revolution. Of course, this plan did not imply the dictatorship of the proletariat. But it undoubtedly would make it easier to create the conditions necessary to ensure the dictatorship, for by putting the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries into power and forcing them to carry into effect their anti-revolutionary platform, it hastened the exposure of the true nature of these parties, it hastened their isolation, their rupture with the masses.”(18)
Lenin proposed tactics that conformed with his estimate of the current situation, namely, to explain to the masses at every step that the Provisional Government was counter-revolutionary and incapable of bringing about peace or of giving the peasants land; to show that the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries were nothing but servitors of the bourgeoisie and that the power could be taken from the capitalists only if the treacherous character of the compromising Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties were exposed. In the preparatory stage of the proletarian revolution, the petty-bourgeois compromising parties constituted the greatest danger of all. Diverting the masses from the fight against the enemies by advocating a compromise with the bourgeoisie, they undermined the will to struggle and demoralised the workers and other sections of the working population. If the compromising parties were not exposed and isolated, the masses could not be trained for the decisive fight against the bourgeoisie. All genuinely revolutionary elements, those who were prepared to go the full limit, had to be rallied to the support of the Party, and the defencists, the supporters of a “war to a victorious finish,” had to be isolated.
These tactics, which were designed by the Bolsheviks to achieve the peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets, were explained by Lenin at the April Conference as follows:
“Some may ask: Have we not repudiated our own principles? We advocated the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war—are we not going back on ourselves? But the first civil war in Russia has ended; we are now passing to a second war—a war between imperialism and the armed people. In this transitional period as long as the armed force is in the hands of the soldiers, as long as Milyukov and Guchkov have not resorted to violence, this civil war, as far as we are concerned, turns into peaceful, prolonged, and patient class propaganda. If we speak of civil war before people have come to realise its necessity, we shall certainly be guilty of Blanquism. We are for civil war, but only when it is waged by a class conscious of itself. Only he who is known to the people as a despot can be overthrown. But there are no despots now: the guns and rifles are in the hands of the soldiers, and not the capitalists; the capitalists are getting their way now not by violence, but by fraud. To cry out against violence now is nonsense.”(19)
This orientation towards a proletarian, Socialist revolution presumed a new disposition of class forces. The bourgeoisie in town and country could be opposed only by the proletariat, acting in close alliance with the poor peasants and neutralising the unstable elements among the peasantry—the middle peasants. But “neutralising” did not mean that the middle peasants should be neutral, should hold aloof from the struggle and await its issue. In a civil war, when the people are sharply divided into two hostile camps, there can in general be no neutrals, there can be none who take no part in the fight. Neutralising the middle peasant meant compelling him not to interfere with the revolution, but it also meant securing his help, if possible. As a matter of fact, right up to the eve of the proletarian revolution the majority of the middle peasants, clad in soldier’s uniform, were the greatest waverers of all, and it was only in September 1917, when the agrarian question and the question of peace could be settled only by the proletariat, that they began to act as the temporary supporters of the workers. But it was just because the middle peasant was a vacillating ally that Lenin insisted on an alliance between the proletariat and the poor peasants.
Lenin’s proposals were hostilely received not only by the petty-bourgeois parties, not only by Trotsky, but also by a small group within the Bolshevik Party. Kamenev, supported by Rykov, Nogin and others, opposed Lenin and asserted that until the landed estates had been abolished it could not be said that the bourgeois revolution had ended and that the transfer of power to the Soviets was on the order of the day. As against Lenin’s revolutionary call to break with the Provisional Government and to transfer the entire power to the Soviets, Kamenev advocated that the Soviets should exercise control over the Provisional Government. Kamenev, in fact, took up the Menshevik position of defending the bourgeois government, which could not and would not advance a single step, because it was counter-revolutionary by its class nature. To demand control over such a government, without possessing the real power to back that control, was to disseminate among the people the false hope that the bourgeoisie was capable of achieving the aims of the revolution.
Criticising Kamenev’s views, Lenin said:
“I can understand the uneducated mass of workers and soldiers naïvely and unintelligently believing in control. It is sufficient, however, to ponder over the fundamental aspects of control to realise that such a belief is a retreat from the basic principles of the class struggle.”(20)
At the Petrograd Conference of Bolsheviks, which was held a few days earlier than the All-Russian Conference, Lenin had said in reply to Kamenev:
“There can be no control without power. To control by means of resolution, etc., is pure nonsense.”(21)
The nature of the differences between Lenin and the group of Right Bolsheviks was expressed most definitely of all by Rykov in his speech at the Conference.
“Where will the sun of Socialist revolution rise?” he asked. “I consider that, in view of all the conditions, in view of our petty-bourgeois level, the initiative of a Socialist revolution cannot be ours. We possess neither the forces nor the objective conditions for this. But in the West the question is approximately in the same stage as the overthrow of tsarism with us.”(22)
Like Kamenev, Rykov would not go beyond a bourgeois revolution for Russia. Lenin severely criticised this Menshevik attitude:
“Rykov says that Socialism must come from other countries with a more developed industry. But this is not so. Nobody can say who will begin it and who will end it. That is not Marxism but a parody on Marxism.”(23)
The Conference supported Lenin. Only seven or eight delegates abstained from voting on Lenin’s motions, the rest voted in favour. This was one more proof of the ideological solidarity of the Party.
The April Conference adopted a resolution on the principal question on the agenda—the current situation—of which the chief point was as follows:
“The proletariat of Russia, operating in one of the most backward countries of Europe, in the midst of a small-peasant population, cannot set itself the aim of bringing about the Socialist transformation immediately.
“But it would be a great mistake, and in practice even complete desertion to the bourgeoisie, to deduce from this that the working class must support the bourgeoisie, or that we must confine our activities within limits acceptable to the petty-bourgeoisie, or that we must reject the leading rôle of the proletariat in the work of explaining to the people the urgency of a series of steps towards Socialism which are now practically ripe.
“Such steps are, firstly, the nationalisation of the land. Such a measure, while not directly transcending the bounds of the bourgeois system, would nevertheless be a serious blow at the private ownership of the means of production, and to that extent would strengthen the influence of the Socialist proletariat over the semi-proletarians of the countryside.
“Such steps are, further, the establishment of State control over all the banks and their amalgamation into a single central bank, and also over the insurance societies and the larger capitalist syndicates (e.g., the Sugar Syndicate, the Coal Syndicate, the Metal Syndicate, etc.), and the gradual introduction of a fairer progressive tax on incomes and property. Economically, such measures are completely ripe, technically they can without question be put into effect immediately, and politically they may well meet with the support of the overwhelming majority of the peasants, who would in every respect benefit from these reforms.”(24)
Reporting to the Conference on this part of the resolution, Lenin added:
“‘This is a bourgeois revolution, and it is therefore useless to speak of Socialism,’ say our opponents. But we say just the reverse: ‘Since the bourgeoisie cannot find a way out of the present situation, the revolution is going on.’ We must not confine ourselves to democratic phrases, we must make the situation clear to the masses and must indicate to them a series of practical measures: they must take over the syndicates and must control them through the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, etc. And when all such measures are carried out, Russia will stand with one foot in Socialism.”(25)
The Conference adopted a separate resolution on the war, which was drafted by Lenin. In this resolution Lenin described the class significance of the war, explained what the revolutionary defencism of the masses meant and dwelt chiefly on how to end the war. On this last point the resolution of the April Conference of the Bolsheviks states:
“As regards the most important question of all, how to end this war of the capitalists as early as possible—and not by a coercive peace, but by a truly democratic peace—the Conference recognises and resolves:
“This war cannot be ended by the refusal of the soldiers of only one side to continue the war, by the simple cessation of hostilities by one of the belligerent parties.
“The Conference once more protests against the vile slander spread by the capitalists against our Party that we are sympathetic towards a separate peace with Germany. We consider the German capitalists the same sort of bandits as the Russian, British and French capitalists, and Kaiser Wilhelm as much a crowned bandit as Nicholas II and the British, Italian, Rumanian and all other monarchs.
“Our Party will patiently but persistently explain to the people the truth that wars are conducted by governments, that wars are always intimately associated with the policy of definite classes, and that this war can be ended by a democratic peace only as a result of the transfer of the entire power of the State in at least several of the belligerent countries to the class of proletarians and semi-proletarians, which is really capable of putting an end to the yoke of capital.”(26)
In the light of this resolution on the war, it is very important to note the opinion of the Bolsheviks on a proposal to summon a peace conference. A Danish “Socialist” named Borgbjerg came to Petrograd. He belonged to the opportunist majority of the Danish Social-Democratic Party, which had gone over to the side of its bourgeoisie. Borgbjerg, speaking in the name of the three Scandinavian parties—the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish—which also favoured the defence of the bourgeois fatherland, suggested that the Petrograd Soviet should summon a Socialist peace conference. Borgbjerg admitted that he was acting on behalf of German defencists, of the type of Scheidemann, who agreed to peace negotiations on the basis of Germany’s renunciation of her conquests. It was clear that under the spur of starvation, economic disruption and growing revolution in the rear, German imperialism was endeavouring, through the intermediary of a neutral “defencist”—Denmark was not one of the belligerent countries—to come to a peaceful understanding with her antagonists over the division of the spoils. Germany was prepared to renounce the conquests she had made during the war, but she said nothing of her earlier conquests. The British and French defencists did not agree to a peace conference, thereby showing that their masters—the British and French imperialists—would not hear of peace and were in favour of fighting the war to a victorious finish. The Bolshevik Conference exposed the imperialist character of this peace farce. The resolution stated:
“Socialists cannot, without betraying the proletarian cause, participate either directly or indirectly in this filthy and mercenary deal between the capitalists of the various countries for the division of their plunder.”(27)
The conference dwelt specially on the role of the British and French defencists:
“The Conference further records the fact that the British and French Socialists, who have gone over to the side of their capitalist governments, have refused to attend the conference Borgbjerg is endeavouring to organise. This fact clearly shows that the British and French imperialist bourgeoisie, whose agents these supposed Socialists are, want to continue, want to drag out this imperialist war and refuse even to discuss the concessions which the German imperialist bourgeoisie is obliged to promise through Borgbjerg under the influence of growing exhaustion, famine, economic disruption and what is most important, the approaching workers’ revolution in Germany.”(28)
The Conference decided to make these facts known as widely as possible, and declared that the Bolsheviks would attend a conference and enter into a fraternal alliance only with those labour parties of other countries which were also fighting in their own countries for the transfer of power to the proletariat.
An important part in the struggle for the transfer of power to the new class was played by the oppressed nationalities. The result of the revolution would depend on whether the proletariat succeeded in securing the following of the working masses of the oppressed nationalities. The bourgeois government was continuing the old tsarist policy of throttling and crushing the national minorities. The national movement was suppressed as of yore. The Finnish Diet and similar bodies were dispersed. “Russia, united and indivisible,” continued to be the guiding principle of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties. The Bolsheviks were the only party to oppose this feudal principle and openly to declare that the working populations of the oppressed nations were entitled to determine their own destinies.
In his report to the Conference, Stalin, who in conjunction with Lenin had drawn up the principles of the policy of the Bolsheviks on the national question, brought out the predatory character of the government’s policy and mercilessly exposed the petty-bourgeois compromisers, who were following in the wake of the bourgeoisie. Stalin set forth the revolutionary programme of the Bolshevik Party in opposition to those who wanted to perpetuate national oppression:
“. . . Our views on the national question can be reduced to the following propositions: (a) recognition of the right of nations of secession; (b) regional autonomy for nations remaining within the given State; (c) special legislation guaranteeing freedom of development for national minorities; (d) a single, indivisible proletarian body, a single party for the proletarians of all nationalities of the given State.”(29)
Y. Pyatakov made a counter-report on the national question at the Conference and was supported by several delegates. He declared that in the era of a world economy, which bound all countries together in an indissoluble bond, the national State represented a past stage in history:
“The demand for independence has been borrowed from another historical era; it is reactionary, because it wants to reverse history. On the basis of an analysis of the new era of imperialism, we declare that we cannot at the present moment even conceive of any other fight under the slogan ‘Down with frontiers!’—and fight for the abolition of all frontiers.”(30)
Pyatakov’s speech was severely criticised by Lenin, who said:
“The method of a Socialist revolution under the slogan ‘Down with frontiers!’ is a complete muddle. . . . What is meant by the ‘method’ of a Socialist revolution under the slogan ‘Down with frontiers!’? We recognise the necessity for the State, and a State presumes frontiers. . . . It would be insane to continue the policy of Tsar Nicholas.”(31)
L. Kamenev and Y. Pyatakov were united by their common misunderstanding of the aims of the revolution. The former, by denying the Socialist character of the revolution, was dragging the Party into the Menshevik swamp. The latter, without coming out openly against Lenin’s position on this question, was in practice condemning the revolution to isolation and defeat. The Party fought on two fronts—against the Right opportunists and against the “Left” oppositionists.
The reports of Lenin and Stalin covered the principal questions at the Conference. Other delegates only developed the leading ideas set forth by Lenin and Stalin.
On the question of the attitude towards the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, the Conference stressed the fact that in the provinces the revolution was advancing and was making for the transfer of the entire power to the Soviets, whereas in Petrograd and Moscow and in certain other large cities, where the main forces of the bourgeoisie were concentrated and where the policy of compromising with the bourgeoisie was most marked, the transfer of power to the Soviets would be accompanied by very great difficulties. The resolution stated:
“It is therefore the task of the proletarian party, on the one hand, to give all possible support to this development of the revolution in the provinces and, on the other hand, to carry on a systematic fight within the Soviets (by means of propaganda and by new elections) for the triumph of the proletarian line; to direct all its efforts and attention to the worker and soldier masses, to the separation of the proletarian line from the petty-bourgeois line, the internationalist line from the defencist line, the revolutionary line from the opportunist line, and to the organisation and arming of the workers and the preparation of their forces for the next stage of the revolution.”(32)
Having discussed the question of “uniting the internationalists against the petty-bourgeois defencist bloc,” the Conference declared its opposition to any kind of bloc with parties which had not abandoned defencism. The Conference rejected agreements with social-chauvinists of other countries and advocated the creation of a Third International.
The April Conference of the Bolsheviks was of tremendous significance for the development of the Party and the revolution. The April Conference served to concentrate the attention of the Bolshevik Party on the struggle for the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the Socialist revolution. The Conference drew up a definite revolutionary programme for this stage in the transformation of the revolution. The Conference indicated the classes which furthered the revolution. It adopted decisions on every fundamental question of the revolution—war, land, and the fight against famine. It pointed to the only way out of the situation, namely, the transfer of the entire power of the State to the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, Peasants’ and other Deputies all over Russia.
Lenin, in his speech closing the April Conference, said:
“The proletariat will find in our resolutions material to guide the advance to the second stage of our revolution.”(33)
As against the honeyed phrases of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, which called on the masses quietly to submit and calmly to await the blessings that might be conferred on them by the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks issued a bold fighting call, a call for the further development of the revolution.
The heroic path leading to the defeat of tsarism having been traversed, the Party, at its April All-Russian Conference, worked out the general lines for the defeat of the bourgeoisie and its petty-bourgeois allies. And the unanimity with which the Conference adopted the decisions on the reports of Lenin and Stalin was a pledge of victory in this new stage.
[1] J. Stalin, The October Revolution. A Collection of Articles and Speeches, Moscow, 1932, p. 58.
[2] J. Stalin, The Road to October. Articles and Speeches. March-October, 1917. Moscow, 1925, 2nd edition, p. 2.
[3] Ibid., p. viii.
[4] See Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution,” Selected Works (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, pp. 21-24.
[5] “Conference of Representatives of the Social-Democratic Parties on the Subject of Unity,” Yedinstvo (Unity), No. 5, April 5, 1917.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Lenin, “Speech Delivered at the Opening of the All-Russian April Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., April 24, 1917,” Collected Works, (Eng. ed.), Vol. XX, Book 1, p. 271.
[8] The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), April 1917, Moscow, 1934, pp. 144-75.
[9] Ibid., p. 119.
[10] Ibid., pp. 129-30.
[11] Lenin, “Speech Delivered at the Opening of the All-Russian April Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., April 24, 1917,” Collected Works, (Eng. ed.), Vol. XX, Book I, p. 27.
[12] Lenin, “The Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., April 14-22, 1917,” Collected Works, (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 181.
[13] Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution,” Selected Works, (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI.
[14] Lenin, “Report on the Current Situation,” Selected Works, (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, p. 94.
[15] Ibid., p. 95.
[16] Peshekhonov was a petty-bourgeois Socialist.—Ed.
[17] Lenin “Report on the Current Situation,” Selected Works, (Eng. ed.) Vol. VI, pp. 100-101.
[18] J. Stalin, “The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists,” Leninism, Vol. I, p. 128.
[19] Lenin, “Report on the Current Situation,” Selected Works, (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, p. 95.
[20] Ibid., p. 91.
[21] Lenin, “Two Rebuttals During the Discussion of the Resolution on the Attitude Towards the Provisional Government,” Collected Works, (Eng. ed.), Vol. XX, Book I, p. 209.
[22] The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), April 1917, Moscow, 1934, p. 93.
[23] Lenin, “Concluding Remarks in Connection with the Report on the Political Situation,” Collected Works, (Eng. ed.), Vol. XX, Book I, p. 287.
[24] The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), April 1917, Moscow, 1934, pp. 235-36.
[25] Lenin, “Speech in Favour of the Resolution on the Political Situation,” Collected Works, (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 282.
[26] The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), April 1917, Moscow, 1934, pp. 221-2.
[27] Ibid., p. 227.
[28] Ibid., p. 228.
[29] Ibid., p. 194.
[30] Ibid., p. 195.
[31] Lenin, “Speech on the National Question, April 29, 1917,” Collected Works, (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 277.
[32] The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), April, 1917, Moscow, 1934, p. 238.
[33] Lenin, “Concluding Remarks at the Closing of the Conference, April 29, 1917,” Collected Works, (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 283.
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