

THE PATH OF OUR REVOLUTION

While criticising the C.C. resolution, *New Situation and Party's Tasks*, these comrades raise the question of the path of our revolution. They have used all their originality to harangue the C.C. on 'people's war and armed struggle' with the choicest pieces of satire, abuse and sarcasm at their command. Since they could not find the call for armed struggle and people's war in *New Situation and Party's Tasks*, they go at it fretting and fuming and present our C.C. and our Party, at last, with "a clear-cut perspective of the path of our revolution towards which all our struggles must be directed". A long-felt need of the Indian revolution is thus met indeed! How does it stand in a nutshell?

1. "We feel that the path of people's war, taking our own particular objective conditions in our country into consideration, is the only path of our revolution".

Thus objective conditions have decided the path !

2. "We categorically say that in all backward countries winning the majority of the people, building mass organisations and party-building are closely linked with the armed struggle".

They with a stroke of the pen have creatively extended the people's war to 'all backward countries' in the world, and ruled out the prospect of building mass movement, mass organisations and Party in all these countries without armed struggle ! We are, of course, not enlightened as to whether anything like Party, mass movement and mass organisation is necessary to start 'an armed struggle' or all should start simultaneously.

3. "Various C.C. documents and recent articles by Comrade B. T. Ranadive on Naxalbari reveal a quite different perspective of the path of our revolution".

Neither the C.C. documents nor Comrade Ranadive's articles were ever aimed at discussing the 'perspective path of our revolution', as neither the C.C. nor Comrade Ranadive had deluded themselves with the foolish idea of undertaking such as a task. Hence it is a gross untruth. What they were doing was a resolute refutation of the infantile slogans of the Naxalbari leaders, in the name of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), about 'people's liberation war' without actually reckoning with either the people or liberation or war—only adding grist to the mill of our enemies.

4. "Now, due to Naxalbari, and the Chinese criticism, the C.C. says that it stands by the 1952 Policy Statement. Having sat tight over the line, for the last 15 years, without any thorough discussion on the point at any level of our Party till this time, the C.C. statement on this question merely surprises us."

Every single syllable of this statement is a real gem ! How grateful our C.C. should be to the Naxalbari rebels and the massive support they get from the Chinese radio and press for waking it from its slumbers and forcing it to dig out the hidden *Policy Statement of 1952* ! Who sat tight over it for the last 15 years ? Evidently according to them, it is the present C.C. and neither the opportunist policies pursued for long by the Party nor the opportunist

and revisionist leaders in authority had anything to do with it! Do they not know that one of the crucial issues of ideological-political dispute between the Dangeites and our Party is precisely on the path of the Indian revolution, with the former holding the thesis of so-called peaceful parliamentary path, and the latter, in direct opposition to it, advocating the revolutionary path?

5. Our critics climax their thesis thus: "Lenin gave the general strike as a strategic weapon of the proletariat to achieve its socialist revolution in the industrially developed countries.

"Mao gave people's war as a strategic weapon of the backward countries, to achieve their social and political emancipation.

"Our C.C. is giving its creative contribution—the U.F. Governments of Kerala and Bengal—strategic weapons for the social and political emancipation of the Indian masses!"

How 'brilliantly', 'truthfully' and 'pithily' these comrades have summed up the strategic slogans of Lenin, Mao and our C.C.! It becomes quite evident that they are adepts at distorting and vulgarising all the three positions.

It is atrocious to attribute to Lenin what these comrades concoct—that he advocated the general strike either to the 'industrially developed countries' only or 'for achieving socialist revolution'! Was Russia an industrially developed country in 1905? Lenin was not of that opinion. And yet do we not know that he upheld the general strike in the 1905 revolution? One and all admit that both the Russian revolutions of 1905 and of February 1917 were not yet socialist revolutions. Did not Lenin uphold the general strike in both the cases? Did he 'reserve it' only for achieving the October Revolution? Why create such 'profound' theories and make confusion worse confounded?

Listen to a sentence of what Lenin wrote: "Social-Democracy in the seventies rejected the general strike as a social panacea, as a means of overthrowing the bourgeoisie at one stroke by non-political means—but Social-Democracy fully recognises the mass political strike (especially after the experience of Russia in 1905) as one of the methods of struggle essential under *certain* circumstances." (Emphasis Lenin's—Lenin, *Partisan Warfare*)

Why should Lenin's clear ideas of the general strike as 'one of the methods of struggle' and its necessity under 'certain circumstances' be distorted, why depict as though his unique contribution lies in giving "the general strike as a strategic weapon of the proletariat to achieve its socialist revolution in the industrially developed countries"?

Are we to understand from these comrades that, according to Leninist teachings, the general strike of the Chinese proletariat in Canton, Shanghai and Nanking during the 1921-24 period was wrong since China was neither an industrially developed country nor its revolution, then, was socialist? From where do they get the facile idea that Mao's 'strategic weapon is people's war', as though insurrectionary and revolutionary means of struggle are not the fundamental point common to both. Both Lenin and Mao insisted on a concrete study of the concrete conditions for concrete application of these revolutionary means and methods of struggle.

First of all, these comrades are not clear as to what they exactly mean when they use the phrase 'people's war'! It appears to us that 'people's war', 'national liberation war', 'armed struggle', 'partisan war', etc., are rolled into one by them, perhaps distinguished only from workers' armed uprising in the cities and urban centres. Such a view leads to clumsily confusing several phases and stages of the struggle, to the annulling of different aims and objectives of the different phases and stages of the revolutionary movement and reducing all of them into one and only one concept of people fighting with arms. Whether it is peasants' armed struggle for land or whether it is tribal armed revolt like that of the Nagas and Mizos, or whether it is against foreign intervention as a national liberation war like that of Vietnam and the anti-Japanese war or revolutionary civil war as fought out by the Chinese during 1927-33 and 1946-49—all are rolled into one, people's war.

May we be enlightened as to what our critics are referring to? We are all the more perplexed when we listen on the Peking radio and read in the Chinese press descriptions of the Naxalbari struggle as armed struggle which has established liberated bases, and of scores of small and big peasant struggles in the country as armed

struggles. Our Party's non-acceptance of this characterisation, on the ground that none of these struggles have, by any standards, matured to such a stage, and that the class enemies in the country are purposely raising such a bogey to violently suppress every peasant partial struggle on that pretext and destroy the communist revolutionary movement, is inviting denunciation of the Party as neo-revisionist, cowards, traitors and lackeys of imperialism.

Our critics assert, "We think that the CPC is essentially correct on all these points and it has discharged its international duty in pointing out how the Party is slipping into wrong channels."

Everyone of us is aware that the above-stated "all these points" of the Chinese criticism essentially boil down to one point, namely, their massive support to the Naxalbari platform, upholding their programmatic, political-tactical and organisational line as revolutionary while denouncing the CPI(M) and its leadership as neo-revisionist, lackeys and stooges of the big bourgeois-landlord government, it centres round the theme of advocating *armed struggle in India as an immediate and practical slogan*; and it directs its fire against the party leadership for not implementing it in Naxalbari in April-May, 1967, and in several other places, all over India, and, in fact, for betraying it.

Can these comrades deny that such is the essence of the criticism and attack on our Party by the Chinese radio and press, and it is precisely this which, according to them, is "essentially correct"? They cannot deny it since it runs like a red thread throughout their critique of the party line and C.C. resolutions.

And yet our critics tell us, "Of course, we do not mean to say that such a struggle could be started tomorrow. The whole point is, the Party has no perspective of this and no conscious preparation towards this direction—political, organisational, ideological—is being undertaken."

Before we proceed to meet the charge of our Party lacking perspective, we would like to deal with some other points of people's war as understood and advocated by these comrades.

Let us take for example the Chinese revolution. There,

a bourgeois-democratic revolution broke out in the year 1921 and the Chinese Communist Party which was very young and whose membership did not exceed more than 5 to 6 thousand participated in it, in alliance with the national bourgeoisie which was in the leadership. During the course of the revolution, a sizable portion of the army belonging to the old Chinese Government deserted to the side of the revolution, and it gave a big fillip to it. This factor and its special significance were emphasised by the C.I. and Stalin, and approvingly quoted by Mao in several of his writings. How did Stalin view it?

"Formerly, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, revolutions usually began with an uprising of the people, for the most part unarmed or poorly armed, who came into collision with the army of the old regime, which they tried to demoralise or at least to win in part to their own side. That was the typical form of the revolutionary outbreaks in the past. That is what happened here in Russia in 1905. In China things have taken a different course. In China the troops of the old Government are confronted not by an unarmed people, but by an armed people, in the shape of its revolutionary army. In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counter-revolution. That is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution. And therein lies the special significance of the revolutionary army in China." (J. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 8, page 379)

It was this army, further strengthened by the Communists joining in large numbers, that became the principal instrument for leading and organising the agrarian revolution.

It is true that in our country the economic crisis is deepening, that a growing political crisis has set in, and is leading to the maturing of a revolutionary situation. None of us can forecast the exact time of its maturing and its course, the exact international situation that would be present then, and whether a nationwide insurrectionary situation will arise or local insurrectionary situations in different regions and states. The only thing that a revolutionary party can ignore at its peril is, that the ruling classes will not tolerate peaceful transition and the revo-

lutionary means to resist and defeat their violence is a 'must'. Secondly, taking the experiences, of the Russian, Chinese and other democratic and socialist revolutions, and basing on the general socio-economic and national factors of our country, we can have a perspective. Of course, this does in no way imply that we will have to get fixed into a rigid formula or recipe. Anything beyond that will land us into idle guesses.

These comrades, in their haste, assert that Lenin's 'strategic weapon of general strike' for advance capitalist states and Mao's strategic weapon of 'people's war' for backward countries are the two fixed and unalterable forms and methods of struggle, for two sets of countries in the world. Some people even go to the extreme length of applying the 'people's war' slogan on a global plane, describing the backward states as "the rural areas of the world" and advanced countries as "the cities of the world", the latter to be encircled and liberated by the former. When we read these and similar other sweeping generalisations we are reminded of Lenin's observation: "The surest way of discrediting and damaging a new political (and not only political) idea is to reduce it to absurdity on the plea of defending it: for any truth, if 'over-done' (as Dietzgen Senior put it), if exaggerated, or if carried beyond the limits of its actual applicability, can be reduced to an absurdity, and is even bound to become an absurdity under these conditions". (Lenin, "*Left-Wing Communism*")

Does not this observation of Lenin get striking confirmation when agrarian clashes in one or two villages are sought to be elevated to "armed struggles" and fitted into "national liberation wars"? What else is the meaning of such reports which are so often seen in the Chinese press and heard on Peking radio as "...a struggle of the 'Naxalbari' type also broke out in Punjab state. The CP revolutionaries recently led the peasants in wresting back land in Naiwala and Nagin village in Patiala district"? How ridiculous it becomes when a Peking *People's Daily* commentator writes, "From Bihar in north down to Kerala in the south, large numbers of peasants in the vast rural areas have unfolded struggles for land with whatever primitive arms they can

lay hands on and have violently shaken the foundation of feudal rule in the country"!

How can a Marxist-Leninist conceive that the contradiction between imperialism and the national liberation movement, which is at present in the forefront as the focus of world contradictions, will continue in the same position while other fundamental contradictions of our times remain static, uninfluenced and unaffected? Can it be ruled out that in the course of time and process, the contradiction between the workers and capitalists in the imperialist countries get accentuated to the point of bursting into socialist revolutions and civil wars in these countries? Then how can the thesis of "world rural areas" encircling the 'world cities' for liberation through people's war remain operative and valid?

How do our critics reconcile the thesis of people's war being applied on a global scale with the statement of the CPC which reads: "The centre of world contradictions, of world political struggles, is not fixed but shifts with changes in the international struggle and the revolutionary situation. We believe that, with the development of the contradiction and struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in western Europe and North America, the momentous day of battle will arrive in these homes of capitalism and heartlands of imperialism. When that day comes, western Europe and North America will undoubtedly become the centre of world political struggle and world contradictions." (*Apologists of Neo-colonialism*, from the Comments of the CPC)

If such is the truth how can the thesis of liberation of 'world cities' by 'world rural areas' through a 'people's war' remain valid? It is, indeed, difficult to find any consistency in the two. Let no Marxist-Leninist, under one wrong notion or other, land himself in the false theory of world peasantry leading the world proletarian revolution, world peasants liberating world workers, etc.

The left critics charge us with having no revolutionary 'perspective' and with advocacy of the perspective of parliamentary path in the Central Committee resolution. They quote two sentences out of context from the C.C. resolution,

give it a totally distorted and perverted interpretation and then proceed to launch an assault on the resolution.

What are these two sentences ?

One is, "Hence it is imperative that our Party realises that its *immediate future*, in no small way, depends on how it plays its worthy part in running the two state governments"; and the second is, "since the fortunes of the entire Party, *at the present stage of development*, are closely linked with the successful running of these ministries and the role our Party plays in them, etc." (*New Situation and Party's Tasks*, Page 67—Emphasis added)

How do they interpret them and start their attack ?

"The C.C. does not have the perspective of prolonged armed struggle as the strategic weapon of the Indian revolution. On the other hand, the C.C. is holding out that *on our work in Kerala and Bengal United Front Governments, the fate of our Party and the course of the struggle will decisively depend.*"

Only a 'small' distortion ! If the C.C. resolution speaks about the Party's 'immediate future', 'at the present stage of development', our critics read into it the meaning that, "the fate of our Party and the course of the struggle will decisively depend", on our working of the Kerala and West Bengal U.F. Governments.

If what they read from the C.C. resolution is that it tells the Party that 'the fate of our Party and the course of the struggle will decisively depend' on these two governments, then how else can it be characterised except as a perverted understanding ? The substitution of the phrases 'immediate future' and 'at the present stage' with 'fate of the Party', 'the course of struggle', and their 'decisive dependence' on the two U.F. governments is not a mere slip but it is deliberate and purposeful. It is nothing but resorting to the usual cheap tactics of calling the dog mad before killing it !

Is there anything wrong in warning our Party about its work in the two coalition ministries of Kerala and Bengal, about the possible dangers of right-opportunism damaging the 'immediate future' of our Party at the present stage of development ? It is, indeed, very necessary and correct to do so.

These two sentences, cited by our critics, let us recall,

appear at the end of a full seven-page discussion in the chapter headlined, "Struggle in defence of unity and United Fronts and the place and role of the Kerala and West Bengal Governments". What are the essential points raised in this discussion ?

The first point emphasised in this chapter is, "that the struggle for allies and the degree, measure and extent of success are dependent upon first and foremost, the independent strength of the Party, and its organisational, class and mass base", while pointing out as to how the struggle for allies based on correct class lines in turn is necessary for the Party's independent strength and its growth.

The second point, made in it is that the two coalition Governments in which our Party is participating as a major partner "comprise of several petty bourgeois, bourgeois parties, groups and individuals", and points out how these parties would try to interpret and implement the accepted programme differently from their different class angles.

The third point, to which the attention of our Party is drawn, is about the mass of the people in these states, their political awakening and the still existing predominant bourgeois-landlord ideological-political hold on them, and warns the Party of the urgent need of radicalising, politicising and winning them in solid support of the minimum, agreed programmes.

The fourth point, sharply focussed, is regarding the issue of what real state power is, how it should in no way be confused with the state coalition governments, how the power of the state governments is very limited and how this limited power also comes to be exercised within the confines of the overall central power of the bourgeois-landlord state. Summing up it says, "to speak of real political power to these state coalition governments is unreal and devoid of substance", and explains how the entire bureaucratic state apparatus stands in the way of implementing the minimum agreed programme, and how people should be made to realise this truth through their experience.

The fifth point, the resolution seeks to highlight, is about the totally deceptive nature of the slogan of 'centre-state cooperation' raised in a big way by the central Congress

leaders, and deals at length with the real class content of the so-called centre-state conflicts and contradictions, and enjoins on our Party to mobilise the widest possible forces to defeat the centre's game and fight for real states' autonomy and class and people's unity.

The sixth point, it makes out, is about the deepening economic crisis and rising mass discontent, and shows how with 'depleted resources and limited powers for the states' on the one hand and 'the running of the Kerala and West Bengal governments together with several other political parties who do not yet see eye to eye with us on several pressing issues', these governments will not be able to give any substantial relief to the suffering masses, particularly when big hopes and expectations of relief are roused among them, following the defeat of the Congress and victory of United Fronts.

It is while concluding this long discussion in the resolution, and stating that "our Party is faced with an extremely difficult and formidable task" that it calls on the Party to "rise to the occasion and boldly grapple with" the situation or "*allow itself to be overwhelmed by events and lose initiative and face all the politically damaging consequences that follow from it*".

It is here that the C.C. resolution appeals to our Party to realise that its immediate future in no small way depends on successful discharging of these tasks.

It is again here that the C.C. resolution demands that our Party should treat and understand these two U.F. governments "as instruments of struggle in the hands of the people, more than as governments that actually possess adequate power, that can materially and substantially give relief to the people".

It is here, while closing the discussion, that it is stated, "In clear class terms, our Party's participation in such governments is *one specific form* of struggle to win more and more allies for the proletariat and its allies in the struggle for the cause of People's Democracy and at a later stage for socialism". Can one by any stretch of imagination equate the concept of "*one specific form* of struggle to win more and more allies" with that of "strategic

weapon for the social and political emancipation of the Indian masses" ?

What conclusions are drawn by our wise critics from this entire chapter ?

(a) They ridicule the C.C. and exclaim, "U.F. governments of Bengal and Kerala—leading to People's Democracy and socialism—could anything beat this" ?

Yes, none can beat them in distortion and perversion !

(b) They sarcastically state that if Lenin and Mao respectively gave the proletariat the 'strategic slogans of general strike and people's war', 'our C.C. is giving its creative contribution—U.F. governments of Kerala and Bengal—strategic weapons for the social and political emancipation of the Indian masses' !

It is a downright lie to say that the C.C. resolution treats them as a 'strategic weapon', and in fact it does not indulge in that sort of cheap prattle about 'strategic weapons'. Nor does it intend to raise the infantile slogan of armed struggle, without which, the critics "categorically say", talk of mass movement, organisation and Party building is an empty prattle.

(c) The critics assert that according to the C.C., the "successful running of Bengal and Kerala U.F. governments has come to occupy a *central place* in the *programme of the whole Party*".

Probably they do not understand even the meaning of the terms "central place" and "the programme of the whole Party". Otherwise how do they import these things into a Party resolution on the current situation and attempt to discover in the resolution what is not, and cannot be there.

(d) The critics state, "the C.C. resolution describes these two governments as instruments of struggle in the hands of the people".

Our critics are so much upset and rattled when the C.C. resolution says that the Party's immediate future depends upon the manner and method our Party functions in these coalitions. But, how are they justified in concluding that our Party joining and working in these two "hodge-podge coalition governments" has destroyed everything of Marxism-Leninism, entire present and future of the Party, and

everything of mass revolutionary movement? This is what is called in common parlance blowing 'hot and cold'. On the one hand, these comrades launch a wild attack on the C.C. for altering the Party to the possible mistakes and their effects on the immediate future of the Party; on the other, they take the liberty of giving exaggerated importance to our participation in these governments as though the only peril for our Party emanates from this participation.

The C.C. resolution is certainly disappointing to our critics, because they failed to find in it the perspective of armed revolution. We admit our guilt, and submit that the *New Situation and Party's Tasks* is aimed at discussing and deciding the *current tactics* of the Party, and not intended for discussion of the "perspective path" of the Indian revolution. But our critics search for it in vain, only to discover, in the process, another perspective, the dangerous revisionist perspective of parliamentary path!

The resolution of the Central Committee on "Left Deviation", passed at its Madurai session, has stated, "The Party endorses the *Policy Statement* of 1952 and endorses the perspective of development as given there".

Our critics make the issue of perspective path the issue of their political platform, and are hurling challenges at the C.C., right and left, demanding a public discussion, though cleverly naming it an inner-party discussion. They have made their aim and objective clear in so many words. It short, it boils down to repudiating the programmatic formulation on this issue which reads as follows:

"The Communist Party of India strives to achieve the establishment of People's Democracy and socialist transformation through peaceful means. By developing a powerful mass revolutionary movement, by combining parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forms of struggle, the working class and its allies will try their utmost to overcome the resistance of the forces of reaction and to bring about these transformations through peaceful means.

"However, it needs always to be borne in mind that the ruling classes never relinquish their power voluntarily. They seek to defy the will of the people and seek to reverse it by lawlessness and violence. It is, therefore, necessary for the revolutionary forces to be vigilant and so orientate

their work that they can face up to all contingencies, to any twist and turn in the political life of the country." (*Party Programme*, para 113)

In its place they substitute their thesis of 'people's war', which according to them, is "the strategic slogan" of our epoch for all the backward countries.

This, we consider, is totally wrong, and immensely harmful. Why do we say so, and what is the rationale behind our opposition? It needs no big elaboration; suffice to draw their attention to certain pertinent statements made by the CPC, with which we agree. What are they in brief and how do our critics oppose them?

(i) On the question of forms of transition from capitalism to socialism it would be more flexible to refer to both the possibilities, peaceful and non-peaceful, as it places us in a position to have the *political initiative*, at any time.

Our critics wish to refer to only one possibility, presenting it as an inevitability, and thus deprive us of the political initiative on the issue.

(ii) Reference to the possibility of peaceful transition indicates for us, Communists, that the use of violence is primarily a matter of self-defence, it enables the Communist Parties to side-step the attacks of the enemies on this issue, and it is *politically advantageous—advantageous for winning the masses and also deprives the bourgeoisie of its pretext* for such attacks and isolating it.

Our critics oppose it, demand the virtual elimination of any reference to the possibility of peaceful transition and lay thick on the perspective of 'people's war'. Thus they wish to deprive the Party of the *political advantage, the advantage of winning the masses and of depriving the enemy of the pretext to attack us* and thus want us to go into splendid isolation.

(iii) In the present situation of the international communist movement it is advantageous from the point of view of *tactics* to refer to the desire for peaceful transition, though wrong and inappropriate overemphasise it.

Our critics are opposed to this and these, according to them, are opportunist tactics. They argue that it is necessary and more advantageous to us to emphasise the non-peaceful path, and even demand detailed elaboration of it.

They probably think that in the present situation of the international communist movement it will be tactically more advantageous to declare for "armed struggle" and "people's war."

(iv) Our Party's desire for peaceful transition should not be interpreted in such a way as solely or mainly to mean the winning of a parliamentary majority. We must fully utilise the parliamentary majority. We must fully utilise the parliamentary form of struggle while not for a moment forgetting the limited role it plays and the utmost need to proceed with the hard work or accumulating revolutionary strength.

Our critics are dead set against it, and maintain that parliamentary work breeds illusions, that it has become obsolete, that assemblies and parliament are nothing but "talking shops and brothels" of bourgeois deception, and that we should not attach any importance to this work. Our contesting elections, joining electoral fronts, participating in the anti-Congress democratic state governments, etc., according to them, is the crassest form of revisionism and parliamentary cretinism.

Such in brief are the fundamental divergencies between us and our critics who denounce us for lack of "perspective", and present this "perspective" of "people's war". It is for the Party comrades to judge whether there is anything common between the Marxist-Leninist standpoint on the issue and the one advocated by them describing it as "Mao's thought, as the Marxism-Leninism of the present era".

Do our comrades care to understand the meaning and significance of the following statements by Comrade Mao. Speaking at the CPC's National Conference in May 1937, Comrade Mao said, "A bloodless transition is what we would like and we should strive for it, but what will happen will depend on the strength of the masses" (*Selected Works*, Vol. I, Page 290). Similarly, in August 1945, right in the midst of the revolution and in the face of the impending civil war, he asserts, "The Communist Party of China is firmly opposed to civil war" and, "The problem now is that this enemy of the people wants to start a civil war" (*Selected Works*, Vol. IV, pages 42 and 44). We hope our

comrades will not smell revisionism in these statements, but will understand them as correct Marxist-Leninist revolutionary tactics.

PARTY PROGRAMME

Now we come to the criticism of the Party Programme made by our comrades.

The Party Programme, a product of twenty years of struggle for a correct analysis of the national and international situation and concrete application of Marxism-Leninism to Indian conditions, a product which strove to steer clear of both rightist and leftist errors, to draw the lessons from our past mistakes and achievements, is based on firm Marxist-Leninist ideological foundations, contrary to the critics who challenge its sound ideological basis.

To cite the main points :

(a) *New epoch* : The right-reformist and revisionist interpretation of it as an epoch of peaceful competition between socialism and imperialism, peaceful coexistence of states as a general line of foreign policy of socialist revolution is decisively rejected. The gross underestimation of imperialism and the deliberate underplaying of the role of foreign capital and, consequently, ignoring the dangers it poses to the political independence of the newly liberated countries, etc., is sharply exposed and pinned down.

While doing so, the Programme has guarded against the danger of interpreting events in the old framework, the framework of international correlation of class forces as it existed prior to the victory in the anti-fascist war, the emergence of east European People's Democracies and the great Chinese revolution, and viewing developments in that framework. Some of the grave mistakes in the *Political Thesis* of our Second Party Congress and the 1951 Programme can be traced to this defect. The Programme corrects both these errors.

(b) *On national independence* : Moving in the old framework our Party was, for long, interpreting it as formal independence and was dogmatically maintaining that there can be no political and national independence without economic independence. Thereby, while correctly uphold-