



Progress Publishers

FIGHTERS FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION

Fighters for National Liberation

(Political Profiles)

Progress Publishers
Moscow

Translated from the Russian by *Francis Longman*
Designed by *Vadim Novikov*

Борцы за национальную свободу
На английском языке

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Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Б $\frac{0901010000\text{-}046}{014\,(01)-84}$ 56–84

CONTENTS

The political profiles of fighters for national freedom in this book do not claim to give an all-round study of the personalities to which they are devoted, or of their outstanding and many-sided activity both within their own countries and on the international scene. I regard this work merely as a description of the main social content of the activity of the prominent leaders of the national liberation movement in Asia and Africa, and of some of their personal and political traits. Despite the differences in their views, they are united by an intransigence towards colonialism, a striving towards social progress, the liberation and security of their peoples and the achievement of genuine national independence.

Wishing to cover as many prominent leaders of the national liberation struggle in Asia and Africa as possible, I enlisted the help of several young Soviet academics studying these countries and the activity of their national leaders to write political profiles of several of these personalities.

Thus, while studying India, I was unable in my research to ignore the two most outstanding and famous sons of the great Indian people, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Their anti-imperialist activity, their exceptionally important role as leaders of the national liberation struggle in India prompted me to study closely the personality and public activity of these most prominent, highly original and, in their own way, very different fighters for the national freedom and rebirth of India.

One person who should be mentioned without fail as a leading fighter for the cause of freedom for colonial and dependent peoples is Gamal Abdel Nasser. He was a true friend of the Soviet Union and throughout his revolutionary and anti-imperialist activity he gradually became imbued with the ideas of scientific socialism. The untimely death of this leader, in our opinion, has had a fundamental effect on the evolution of Egyptian society.

Houari Boumediene was the outstanding leader of the Algerian national revolutionary war and forcefully proved his worth after the victory, by making an enormous contribution to the social and economic development of his country. He too was a good friend of the Soviet Union and strove towards an understanding of scientific socialism while remaining on the basis and within the framework of national revolutionary democracy with great socialist potentialities.

Agostinho Neto was the prominent political leader of the Angolan people who fought for almost two decades against Portuguese colonialism. As a result of his active participation in the anti-imperialist

struggle, his close and organic link with the more progressive forces of the Portuguese revolution, the development of very friendly relations with the socialist countries and his own vast amount of self-education, he eventually became a Marxist-Leninist. In this sense, he went further than many other figures in the national liberation movement towards the knowledge and practical application of scientific socialism.

Another most interesting figure is Marien Ngouabi, the outstanding African revolutionary, founder and recognised leader of the Congolese Party of Labour, and a true friend of the Soviet Union, who determined the socialist orientation of his country.

When appraising the patriotic work of the eminent leader of the Indonesian revolution Sukarno, one should point out that he was a true national revolutionary, the architect of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, who will remain forever in the annals of the Indonesian people's heroic struggle as the country's leader for almost twenty years after the war.

Patrice Lumumba was one of the first prominent national democrats in Africa. He became a political figure during the revolutionary crisis in the Congo (Zaire) and in the course of the first few years of the liberation struggle he was the most progressive leader of this multinational and multitribal country. For millions of people fighting for national liberation he was and remains a symbol of patriotism, courage, and the love of freedom.

In the sixties, the years of African liberation, great interest arose in the names of Amilcar Cabral, Frantz Fanon and Kwame Nkrumah. The first two were dedicated national revolutionaries, who took both a theoretical and practical part in the popular rebel movement, consistent fighters against colonialists and racists, and apostles of revolutionary violence, were it to become historically necessary for achieving national freedom. Amilcar Cabral had an active grasp of scientific socialism. Among the African fighters for independence, Kwame Nkrumah was noted for his national reformism which also gradually developed towards an understanding of some of the more important principles of scientific socialism.

I had frequent meetings with most of these leaders and discussed topical issues of the national liberation movement with them. Thus I first met Nehru back in 1927 and then later in 1960-63.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that this is the first time this type of study of the activity of these national liberation leaders has been undertaken in Soviet or foreign literature. Controversy over their practical activity, ideological positions and conceptions continues not only in their countries, but also far beyond their borders. Interest in their heritage is as keen as ever today.

The authors hope their book will make a modest contribution to the study of the life and struggle of these prominent figures of the national liberation movement.

R. A. Ulyanovsky



MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND GANDHI

Outstanding leader of the national liberation movement in India. Founder of the doctrine known as Gandhism.

Mahatma Gandhi was born on October 2, 1869 in the Gujarat principality of Porbandar. He was of the bania caste, and grew up in a family that strictly observed the Hindu religion, which influenced the formation of his world outlook. His father was a minister in a number of principalities on the Kathiawar peninsula.

Gandhi studied law in England. From 1891 to 1893 he worked as an advocate in Bombay.

From 1893 to 1914 he acted as legal consultant to the Gujarat trading firm in Southern Africa, where he headed the struggle against racial discrimination and oppression of Indians and elaborated the tactics of non-violent resistance—satyagraha.

In January 1915 he returned to India, where he drew close to the Indian National Congress Party, which he joined in 1919, later to become one of its most eminent leaders.

From 1919 to 1922 Gandhi led the mass national liberation movement in India. He spoke at many, many meetings calling for a struggle against British domination and restricting it to non-violent forms. During the twenties, he worked for a revival of hand spinning and weaving and for the institution of untouchability to be eliminated.

From 1919 to 1947 Gandhi was the ideological and most influential political leader of the Indian National Congress, which, under his guidance, became a mass party enjoying the support of broad sections of the population. Mahatma Gandhi's chief merit and the source of his tremendous popularity among the people, who called him Mahatma, meaning "great soul", was the way he managed to draw the masses into the national-liberation movement.

He was arrested and imprisoned on several occasions (1922-24, 1930-31 and 1942-44). In prison and outside he often went on hunger strikes aimed against British colonial domination in India.

In 1942, in connection with the growing dissatisfaction with British colonialism, he put forward the slogan "Quit India!"

After India had been divided into two states—India and Pakistan (in August of 1947) and the ensuing Hindu-Muslim pogroms, incited by the forces of imperialism and internal reaction, Gandhi called for unity of Hindus and Muslims.

On January 30, 1948, Mahatma Gandhi was murdered by N. Hodse, a member of the Hindu chauvinist organisation Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh.

The years of intense struggle for the liberation of this great and ancient country from the colonial yoke recede further and further into the past. There has been a certain abatement in the passions which once raged in any attempt to assess the contradictory and, in European eyes, unusual life of this 'rebellious fakir', as Winston Churchill, that arch-opponent of decolonisation, once called Gandhi. But this important, and—for all his contradictions—remarkably integrated personality continues to be of enormous interest as regards his ideological and political legacy, his role in the history of India, and his links with the country's past and future. The arguments about Gandhi, though not so vehement as during his lifetime, will probably go on for a long time, for he personifies a whole epoch in Indian history, one which saw the formation of modern India and of the people who to this day determine the country's image. This is why all the political forces and all the socio-political trends in India today have expressed some attitude towards Gandhi. The interpretation of his legacy is an important reference-point of any political platform.

It is well-established that history is created by the popular masses. But it becomes symbolised by individuals. One such symbol was Gandhi, as was Jawaharlal Nehru after him, and these symbols have become part of the political consciousness and political life of India. They have even overstepped the borders of the country, since the lives and thoughts of Gandhi and Nehru embody much that is characteristic of the struggle of many other peoples to free themselves from colonial dependence and oppression.

Gandhism—the sum of all the political, moral and philosophical ideas put forward by Gandhi in the course of the Indian people's struggle for national independence—is not only something bound up in the national consciousness of the Indians with the years of struggle against British imperialist rule. It is also a factor in the present-day political and class struggle, and is resorted to by almost all political parties as a means of influencing the masses.

Hence it is both important and topical to analyse Gandhism, its real content and historical role.

* * *

Gandhi began to develop as a thinker and public figure at the turn of the century, when, while maintaining close links with his own country, he led the tenacious and courageous struggle of the Indians in Southern Africa against racial discrimination.

It was at this time that the national liberation movement was born in India, under the seemingly indestructible British colonial rule. Even then there were two main trends within the movement—the liberal faction was linked mainly with the top crust of the propertied classes, who supported a bourgeois line of development, while the democratic radical-nationalist trend reflected the protest against national enslavement which was growing in the Indian people. This protest was also characteristic of wide sections of the then emerging national bourgeoisie.

Progressive leaders of the national liberation movement called for a resolute struggle against the colonial authorities, and the popular masses counted on them for liberation from the mediaeval social oppression, landowner-usurer bondage and merciless exploitation in the emerging capitalist industry. Their democratism was, however, usually confined within the framework of the bourgeois nationalism of an oppressed nation, and this inevitably dampened class contradictions and, at best, engendered a striving for social compromise.

During this period, India experienced a significant growth of national consciousness and an intensification of social contradictions. In the context of the development of bourgeois relations, which was just beginning, under the pressure of foreign capital and the universal penetration of local capital, the demolition of patriarchal traditions and ruin of the peasant masses began. Resentment of the national and feudal oppression grew among the people. Under these conditions, the fact that part of the Indian intelligentsia was familiar not only with the ideas of Enlightenment and liberal-bourgeois social thought, but also criticism of bourgeois society, determined the orientation of the ideological quest by progressive national figures on democratism, and gave birth to the dream of a society free from exploitation and oppression, though their ideas on this score remained purely utopian.

The most important features of Gandhism, resulting from its close link with the chiefly peasant traditions of Indian society, are its social ideal—*sarvodaya*, or the welfare of all—and the method of achieving this ideal—*satyagraha*, or non-violent resistance.

Gandhi's social ideal is a petty-bourgeois, peasant utopia, the realisation of God's kingdom on Earth. The establishment of social justice was seen by Gandhi as a return to the 'golden age' of self-contained peasant communities, and as the non-acceptance of the European machine civilisation he hated and of the market economy which was harmful to the patriarchal village and doomed the peasant-artisan community to destruction.

The Gandhian doctrine of universal welfare—*sarvodaya* is above

all the longing of the peasant and village artisan, of the urban poor and lower officials, crushed by foreign rulers and their own feudal lords, merchants and usurers, for that society which is described so beautifully, alluringly, profoundly and penetratingly in the sacred books of Hinduism. The description of this society is sought in the cultural and historical monuments and in the vestiges of tribal and patriarchal traditions of various Indian peoples.

At the same time *sarvodaya* is a quite natural, just and sincere protest against capitalism, the protest of social strata not yet aware of real, scientifically founded ways of transforming society, strata which seek, but have not yet found, a way out of the intolerable social and material conditions in which they live. This protest reflects the enormous suffering of tens of millions of people oppressed by an inhuman caste system and by the tyranny of landlords and usurers, people who have not understood their position and who therefore still do not realise that the solution lies in the establishment of a firm union with the revolutionary working class born of the 'European', capitalist civilisation they hate. The inevitability and—compared to all societies hitherto—progressiveness of this civilisation are denied in Gandhism, which dooms the Indian peasant and artisan to sad memories of primitive social forms gone forever and deliberately idealised.

But despite its clearly utopian and archaic character, the Gandhian ideal of *sarvodaya* has objectively played a positive role in the Indian national liberation movement. It inspired broad sections of the rural and urban population with the belief that the struggle for independence from British rule was of vital importance, for it was at the same time a struggle for social justice, for a new society based on principles which they longed to see realised. Gandhi honestly and sincerely linked the struggle against the colonialists with the achievement of *sarvodaya*.

The gaining of independence and elimination of imperialist rule was a great achievement of the Indian people, and it is organically linked with the name of Gandhi, who rightly commands enormous respect. But the independence gained in 1947 did not lead to *sarvodaya*.

The method of non-violent resistance to colonial oppression was founded on the spiritual tradition of India, on the psychology of the Indian peasantry. Like Gandhi's social ideal, it is marked by a combination of enormous patience and protest, of conservatism and spontaneous revolutionary feeling—features characteristic of the Indian peasant, brought up for centuries on a fatalistic religious view of the world.

These features of Gandhism found their expression in the Swadeshi doctrine. Three aspects of Swadeshi—the religious, political and economic—are permeated with the idea of retaining the institutions and customs inherited from the past, while gradually and non-violently transforming them, by giving them new meaning. In this we see a

deep dissatisfaction with the present and a belief in the idealised past, the rejection of all possibilities other than a return to the past and at the same time a fear of radical change. All these are classic features of peasant psychology in the face of the still powerful survivals of traditional society, not so much, it is true, in real economic life as in the consciousness of the average Indian.

As an ideology and practical policy, Gandhism is strongly marked by its fidelity to national, cultural, historical and religious traditions, by its ability to find in them a message which is close to the peasant and artisan, and to link their spiritual lives directly with the need for independent national development and the transformation of society. In this fidelity to popular traditions and concepts of justice lies the secret of the enormous influence exerted by Gandhi's ideas and personality on the Indian people.

For the reasons outlined above, Gandhism can be seen as a deeply national and principally petty-bourgeois ideology.

This, perhaps debatable understanding of Gandhism should by no means minimise the achievements of Marxist students of the problem, who point to the close link between Gandhism and the interests of the Indian national bourgeoisie, and to the effective use made by the latter, for its own class purposes, of the theory and practice of Gandhism.

Meanwhile, Marxists stress that this connection was more complex than usually asserted or, at least, it was not so direct and simple.

The great paradox of Gandhism lies in the fact that while sharing the patriarchal peasant's dream of a 'golden age', Gandhi not only did nothing to bring it about, but insisted on the need to put off settling the land question until after independence was gained, and thanks to his exceptional influence on the popular masses rendered enormous assistance to the bourgeois leadership of the national liberation movement in achieving this. In practice, this end was also served by the dream of *sarvodaya* and the principles of non-violence.

One extremely important and curious feature of the liberation struggle of the Indian people in the period 1918-47, when Gandhism exerted almost undivided political and organisational influence was that throughout the thirty-year period, the Indian bourgeoisie managed to divide and isolate the national independence movement and the peasants' struggle for a land reform. Such a division would have seemed impossible, even unnatural, for the colonial-feudal system and exploitation were based on a long-standing political union between the powerful foreign occupants and big capitalists on the one hand, and the major Indian feudal and semi-feudal landowners on the other. It is precisely this symbiosis of ruling forces—foreign rulers and their internal reactionary support—that should be swept away by the national liberation, peasant, bourgeois-democratic revolution.

This, however, did not happen. The agrarian revolution did not become an axis of the anti-imperialist revolution. The two revolutions did not merge together, never reaching the state of unity and

interpenetration where the necessary premise is created for the national liberation revolution to be at the same time a peasant revolution. Why did the Indian bourgeoisie strive to prevent such development in the revolutionary process?

A large part of the middle and urban petty bourgeoisie, as well as the big bourgeoisie, was 'territorialised'. As a result of slowing-down of India's independent industrial development by British capital, the emergent Indian bourgeoisie settled to a greater or lesser degree on the land, making land its property. Investment in land as property, rather than in modern large-scale agriculture, often proved more profitable, and certainly secure, throughout the period of British rule.

This does not mean, of course, that the diverse bourgeoisie of India restricted itself only to this kind of capital investment. With the development of national capital, investments were directed more and more towards industry, trade, the banks, various spheres of the infrastructure, and large plantations. But absolutely all forms of India's national capital, from merchant's and usurer's (which were in many ways medieval, primary forms of capital) to industrial, banking and even monopoly capital, were (and still are) linked to landownership and to the exploitation of the poor, enslaved peasantry—exploitation supported and guaranteed by the state power of the colonialists, by their mighty apparatus of coercion and by the *de facto* military occupation of the country.

This peculiarity of the Indian national bourgeoisie as a class explains its tactical line given the preponderance of feudal vestiges in the countryside. The specific political development of the oppressed nation, and above all the role of bourgeois nationalism, which obscured the contradictions both between classes and within the propertied classes themselves, had an effect on the alignment of political forces in the struggle against imperialism, leaving the bourgeoisie plenty of room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis the peasantry. It made use of this in the anti-imperialist struggle for national liberation, not allowing itself to be bound by the necessity to simultaneously develop the anti-feudal peasant movement.

All this allowed it to abdicate from active struggle against the feudal landowners who were ruining the Indian peasantry, and forced it to compromise with the landlord class and to adopt the reformist course—after it had come to power—of gradually and, for the peasantry, painfully getting rid of the vestiges of feudalism.

Who then was the political leader who, having the necessary political influence and a mass political organisation, could take upon himself the leadership of the peasantry and lead them into an anti-imperialist, but not anti-feudal, struggle?

This was Gandhi. There was no leader who was closer to the peasantry or who was better acquainted with life in the 500,000 Indian villages. The peasants called him Mahatma—the great soul or, simply, the saint. But, while expressing in his own way both the maturing social protest and social hopes of the peasantry, and what Lenin

called the flabbiness of the patriarchal countryside, Gandhi remained the leader of a liberation movement which was national-bourgeois in its class guidance. Gandhi and the Indian National Congress were able to direct the awakening of the peasantry and use its revolutionary potential in such a way as to achieve national independence without allowing the anti-imperialist struggle to develop into an agrarian social revolution.

And yet this was a country in which nearly 80 per cent of the population lived in rural areas. The bourgeoisie wished to see a change in the Indian social system only when it came to power itself and could do it in its own way, and not in a peasant or plebeian way and mainly in its own interests, rather than in the interests of the majority of the peasants. It realised that only then could it start gradually restructuring the village to suit itself, by means of embourgeoisement of the landowners and by quickly developing the entrepreneurial upper crust of the peasantry at the expense of its toiling majority. How and to what extent it succeeded in this after independence is another matter, and one which has already been widely written about. Let us say merely that although capitalism has considerably developed in Indian agriculture, bourgeois reform has not resolved the agrarian question entirely. The poor peasant—whether he owns or rents his property—is still the chief figure of the Indian countryside, but the agricultural proletariat has also considerably grown, changing the character of village life.

The example of India confirmed the Marxist-Leninist thesis of the existence of two trends in any national liberation movement—one revolutionary-democratic, the other bourgeois-nationalist and reformist—and of the dual political role of the national bourgeoisie itself. Both trends aim to get rid of foreign rule, and in this sense there is a natural union between them. A united anti-imperialist front of all the forces participating in the national liberation struggle has always been an important premise for the achievement and consolidation of national independence. But whereas the revolutionary-democratic trend aims to accomplish an agrarian revolution in the course of the struggle for national liberation, and then also to put through other social changes for the good of the people, the bourgeois-nationalist, reformist trend postpones these measures, and tries to separate the question of power from agrarian and social problems.

The Indian bourgeoisie would not have armed itself with the ideology of Gandhism if this ideology had not corresponded to its basic class, political interests, which were to get rid of British political rule and establish itself in power by peaceful means, supported by the mass movement led by Gandhi and using this movement for general national, and above all its own class aims. Gandhism and the national bourgeoisie had much in common—not only the anti-colonialist struggle for Indian independence, but also the class and ideological unity which in the final analysis determines the objectively bourgeois character of a utopian 'peasant socialism' in a country

developing along capitalist lines.

Of course, the Gandhian ideal of *ahimsa* (non-violence), firmly linked with the religious views of the peasantry, encouraged the development of the mass liberation struggle and helped draw the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie to the side of the national bourgeoisie, which found in the principle of non-violence a means of using the popular masses against the colonialists, forcing them to leave India, while maintaining its class control over the people. Nor should one forget that the petty-bourgeois features of Gandhi's ideology and politics were to a large extent obscured by his political unity with the bourgeois Indian National Congress and by his long term as its accepted leader.

The combination of the utopian thinker, rooted in the Indian village, with the sober, far-sighted politician, acting objectively in the interests of the national bourgeoisie (which naturally had general national aspirations) prevented the peasant aspects of Gandhi's ideology from fully asserting themselves. This combination often led Gandhi to make compromises, behind which could be seen the contradictions characteristic of the various classes and social groups taking part in the national anti-imperialist struggle. For this reason it would be wrong, in our opinion, to see Gandhism merely as the objective expression of the interests of the Indian bourgeoisie in the liberation movement. It is broader than this, and includes many elements which contradict such an interpretation. Gandhism has its roots in the complex interplay of social phenomena and forces in the Indian national liberation movement. It reflects both their common interests and their differences and contradictions. Gandhism came about in an agrarian country and therefore, let us stress once more, could not fail to express, in a distinctive form, the natural aspiration of the Indian working people for social justice—an aspiration which went beyond the class interests of the bourgeoisie.

Only if this feature of Gandhism is taken into account can one fully understand Gandhi's historical role, which was conditioned by his deep affinity with the Indian people. It is in this affinity that the secret of his influence lies. Even when collaborating closely with the bourgeoisie in ideological and political terms, Gandhi always strove sincerely to maintain his affinity with the popular masses. Moreover, it was this affinity which determined his leading position and special role in the Indian National Congress. The following words of Lenin may shed more light on Gandhi's role and on the nature of his relationship with the national bourgeoisie and the peasantry: 'the chief representative, or the chief social bulwark, of this Asian bourgeoisie that is still capable of supporting a historically progressive cause, is the peasant.'[1] Gandhi and his ideology constituted a strong link between the national bourgeoisie and the broad peasant masses.

[1] V. I. Lenin, 'Democracy and Narodism in China', *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 165.

Research published before the Second World War sometimes showed a lack of understanding of the diverse national and historical forms of mass struggle, and of the links between them, and in many cases a single method of struggle was proclaimed and absolutised. Sectarians and dogmatists in the national liberation movement today absolutise the method of armed struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racialism, rejecting non-violent forms of struggle.

A one-sided approach in evaluating and using tactical methods of the masses' struggle led people to forget the dialectical nature of this important question. Gandhi also held a one-sided approach: he proclaimed non-violent resistance to the colonialists and racialists as the sole and universal form of struggle. Many of his opponents at various stages of the liberation movement in India were inclined to deny, and just as vehemently and one-sidedly, the positive aspects of non-violent struggle. Non-violence was frequently seen by them as passivity, bordering on reconciliation with reaction and colonialism. Such criticism was built on the denial in principle of Gandhi's philosophical credo of mass non-violent resistance, and this was both understandable and correct, but his opponents also applied this criticism indiscriminately to the method of political struggle against imperialism—and this was clearly wrong.

Scientific socialism does not absolutise any one form of struggle, be it peaceful or violent. On the contrary, it recognises the necessity of the comprehensive use, combination and dialectical interpenetration of various forms of struggle, and the expediency of constantly renewing and enriching the arsenal of revolutionary methods, of testing, checking and selecting new effective forms of struggle. Marxist-Leninist revolutionary tactics are not bound to any single form of mass struggle, even though it may be effective, but constantly strive to maintain a correspondence between the selected forms and methods of struggle and the nature, stage and aims of that struggle. Finally, they demand the readiness and ability of progressive political party to change the forms and methods of struggle quickly and decisively to suit the concrete historical conditions.

Basing themselves on scientific socialism, Communists have always made use of the various methods of struggle available, including, of course, non-violent methods. But Marxists certainly have a negative attitude to the Gandhian principle of *ahimsa*—non-violence—if it is made absolute. It is impossible not to see that in relation to the colonialists and racialists, the Gandhian principle of non-violence is very contradictory, combining active protest with tolerance of the enemy. It was in this combination that Gandhi saw non-violence as the only acceptable and possible form of resistance to the colonial-racialist oppression. There is a purely utopian aspect to Gandhi's non-violence, connected to religious dogmatism and to an ascetic approach to life. But it also undoubtedly includes the perfectly realistic idea of tactical use of peaceful forms of mass and individual anti-imperialist, anti-racialist and in principle even anti-feudal and anti-capitalist struggle,

although Gandhi never called for this.

It is quite clear that in Gandhi's specific interpretation of it during the years of struggle against British colonial rule in India and racialism in Southern Africa, the idea of *ahimsa* possessed considerable revolutionary potential. Gandhi undoubtedly did much to work out and put into practice his distinctive methods and forms of peaceful struggle against the colonialists. He lifted *ahimsa* out of the sphere of mere individual actions and made it a means of prolonged and purposeful mass struggle, linking it to the anti-imperialist and social demands of the people. He elaborated methods of mass non-violent action of the whole people against the order and laws enforced by the colonialists, against the constitution imposed by them on the oppressed people, and against the tyranny and despotism of the foreign rulers. The mass non-violent campaigns against British imperialism held in the twenties, thirties and forties under Gandhi's leadership demanded great courage of their participants and put the colonialists in an extremely embarrassing position. These campaigns quickly revolutionised the situation in India.

It must be said that Gandhi was a brilliant leader of the mass non-violent movement, expertly aware of when the movement should be started, and when it would have the real support of tens of millions of simple people all over the country. While noting Gandhi's qualities as leader and organiser of the specifically Indian forms of the liberation movement, it should also be pointed out that no one in India knew better when the mass non-violent movement should be stopped, in order to prevent it from becoming mass revolutionary violence, and, ultimately, a social revolution against the ruling classes and foreign conquerors. It follows that Gandhi never exhausted, and did not wish to exhaust, all the possibilities of mass non-violent resistance. For quite understandable reasons, these possibilities were hushed up by Gandhi and the then leadership of the Indian National Congress; they might have prepared the ground for the movement's transition to a higher level of decisive, uncompromising and unrestrained struggle against the colonialists, to the struggle of rural and urban working people against foreign and national exploitation. It was precisely this, however, that Gandhi and the Congress strove to avoid by advocating 'pure' anti-imprialist struggle on the basis of national unity and by always holding the door open for negotiations with Britain.

Consequently, we believe that the left-wing criticism of Gandhi's great tendency to compromise was correct, but it would have been more convincing if it had been based not on a denial of the opportunities of non-violent anti-imperialist resistance, as was often the case in the twenties, thirties and forties, but on the inadmissibility of absolutising it as the sole method of struggle against colonialism and racialism with the help of religious dogmas and abstract moral categories, unrelated to the social and class nature of the forces taking part in the movement.

Let us look briefly at the application of Gandhi's principle of

non-violence in international life. Because of the specific nature of international relations, this principle proves to be more realistic in relations between states than in the sphere of class relations. In the international sphere, *ahimsa*—its metaphysical aspect aside—means nothing other than refusing to use force and outlawing war, i.e., it affirms the principle of peaceful interstate relations. Gandhi arrived at fruitful conclusions about the need to strengthen friendship between nations, and to establish just interstate relations based on mutual respect, non-interference and the resolution of all contradictions by means of negotiations. In this respect Gandhi's ideas had a considerable influence on the foreign policy of the government of the Republic of India formulated by Jawaharlal Nehru.

At the same time the Indians themselves rightly renounce the extremes of *ahimsa*, which often led Gandhi to adopt a defeatist attitude in international affairs, to support the idea of self-sacrifice and to neglect the interests of the nation in the face of enemy aggression in the name of the principle of non-violence. An abstract, unhistorical interpretation of the problem of ensuring peace, regardless of the enemy's aggressive plans or actions, does not hold water.

The social views held by the progressively-minded leaders of the national liberation movement had something in common with Russian Narodism and with the ideas of Lev Tolstoy. The ideological affinity between Tolstoy and Gandhi is reflected, among other things, in Lenin's analysis of the Russian writer's philosophy. At the same time there are serious differences between the basically bourgeois-nationalist political views of Gandhi and the world-outlook of Tolstoy.

Gandhi's aspirations for national liberation and democracy conditioned the important fact that his development as leader of India's anti-imperialist movement was substantially influenced by the first Russian revolution, which roused the whole of Asia, including India. He considered the all-Russia political strike in October 1905 a great lesson for the Indian patriots, and called on them to show the same strength as the Russians.

As far as Gandhi's attitude to the national bourgeoisie is concerned, one should bear in mind the peculiarities of that historical period, when they worked in close collaboration, when Gandhi became ideological leader of the Indian National Congress and the Congress acted as organiser and executor of Gandhi's plans, especially the mass non-violent campaigns under his leadership. It was a time when the objective need existed for a bloc comprising all anti-imperialist forces, including the national bourgeoisie. The period was characterised by the existence of a national anti-imperialist front which not only affected the relations between different—including opposite—classes, bringing them together on the common ground of the struggle against colonial rule, but also to a certain extent determined the political line adopted by these classes over a fairly long period.

Gandhi was closely linked to the national bourgeoisie, which stood at the head of the national liberation movement. The Indian National

Congress's idea of achieving complete political independence, and its call for a relentless struggle against the colonialists, brought the bourgeoisie closer to the whole nation. It was this common aspiration of various classes for political independence that led to the thirty-year political alliance between the essentially petty-bourgeois democrat and utopian Gandhi and the bourgeois leaders of the National Congress, whose aim was to get rid of foreign rule in order to concentrate state power in their own hands.

Both sides—Gandhi and the National Congress—were aware of the temporary (though it lasted for a long time) nature of their concurrence of interests, and each side, of course, needed the other. In Gandhi, the Congress found a popular national leader, a brilliant tactician, and a determined politician capable of rallying round himself an active, vigorous, young generation of fighters, and with their help of stirring and winning the support of tens of millions of oppressed people. In the Congress, Gandhi found a powerful and experienced political organisation, unrivalled in India. Without going into the history of the relationship between Gandhi and the National Congress in detail, let us merely note that in the final period of the struggle against British imperialism, when the goal of political independence was in sight, the conflicts between Gandhi and the bourgeois leadership of the Congress—conflicts which, convertly, had always existed—began to intensify dramatically.

Having attained power, many of the Congressites forgot the democratic, humanistic ideals of Gandhi. He had fulfilled his mission, as they saw it, by successfully concluding the long independence struggle he had led.

Yet Gandhi had in mind a new phase in the struggle, involving campaigns of non-violent action with the aim of realising his broader social ideals. He was deeply disappointed with the partition of India and the flaring up of Hindu-Muslim strife, accompanied by a horrible bloodbath. He was sickened by the almost universal flourishing of bourgeois money-grubbing, careerism and egoism. Once political independence was gained, Gandhi consistently advocated the struggle for economic, social and moral independence, i.e., for the establishment of social justice, for the triumph of *sarvodaya*.

Gandhi's attitude to the caste system, whose influence is still very substantial today, deserves some attention here. His views on the caste system and on the question of the Untouchables were influenced, on the one hand, by his natural peasant democratism, by his sympathy for the common people and by the need, of which he was deeply aware, to rally as wide strata of the population as possible to the anti-imperialist cause. On the other hand, Gandhi's views were affected by a certain conservatism of his thinking, by his attachment to religious traditions and his reformist theory of social evolution.

Gandhi repudiated the spirit of inequality and superiority which permeated caste customs, and the existence of so many castes, with their rigid isolation and the prohibition of intercaste contracts. But

the negative aspects of the caste system were regarded by Gandhi not as the essence of the system, but merely as a perversion of it. Gandhi criticised these customs, considering the ideal form of social organisation to be the ancient system of the four *varnas*: Brahmans (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaisyas (traders and artisans) and Sudras (land-tillers). He was convinced that a man's place in society was to a large extent predetermined by his hereditary abilities. And his basic sociological views were a reflection of this unhistorical and unscientific idea, which substitutes abstract arguments about heredity, that lies at the root of Gandhi's theory of guardianship and paternalism, for an analysis of the social relations in a given class society. According to this theory, landowners exist in order to act as fathers to the peasants, while capitalists are exclusively endowed with the gift of business management, so that the workers, intended by nature for physical labour, cannot, of course, have any claim to the running of a business.

On the question of the Untouchables, Gandhi was more consistent. He rightly considered the institution of untouchability to be a slur on India, and devoted much effort to the struggle to achieve equality before the law for almost a third of the population. Gandhi's noble, democratic views on this question had an appreciable effect on Indian public opinion, and led both to legislation granting the Untouchables civil rights and to increased efforts aimed at improving their intolerable conditions of life.

However petty-bourgeois, peasant and therefore inconsistent the idea of a society of 'social justice' might have been, an open, all-out struggle for it after political independence would, in our opinion, have been a great step forward, even using specifically Gandhian methods. But this was prevented by the bourgeois-capitalist elite, whose egoism Gandhi condemned, but against whom he did not, and would hardly have been able to, raise a mass movement.

* * *

India's gaining of political independence brought considerable changes in the alignment of class forces in the country and qualitative shifts in national unity. Gandhism gradually ceased to function as the only ideological and political means for unifying different classes. This happened both as a result of objective conditions—the country's transition to independent bourgeois development—and as a result of the fact that this turning-point in the recent history of India almost coincided chronologically[1] with the death of Gandhi, whose personal qualities no less, perhaps, than his philosophical and political doctrine and activities helped to consolidate the national forces of the country. Since the declaration of India's independence, there has been much

[1] India's independence was declared on 15 August 1947, and Gandhi was killed on 30 January 1948.

progress in the formation, ideological consolidation and independent political organisation of opposing class forces. These tendencies dominate India's social affairs today; they have gone so far that there is now neither the former basis nor the former stability of the united national front, although the historical inertia of its influence still tells on many classes and social strata in modern Indian society.

It should be borne in mind that, since even today India is often the object of imperialist pressure, national unity continues to play a historically positive role in resisting this pressure, and in this respect the interests of all anti-imperialist—national-revolutionary, national-reformist and proletarian—forces continue to coincide. As things stand today, the initiative for such resistance comes more and more often from left democratic and progressive circles which, though still uncoordinated, are strengthening and posing a serious obstacle to the powerful monopolies and the reactionary forces of feudalism and Hinduism.

The above-mentioned essential realignment of class forces in India did not, of course, result in the disappearance of Gandhism from the political arena. Gandhi's authority was too great, and his influence, especially among the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie, was too powerful for his ideas to stop being used in the political struggle, far less in political vocabulary. The concepts of Gandhism are widely used in the propaganda of all shades of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political parties. To a certain extent Gandhism has suffered the same fate as the former national anti-imperialist alliance formed in the course of the struggle for independence. Just as that alliance disintegrated and revealed more and more class contradictions, so there has been an ideological weakening of Gandhism. This process has been furthered by parties both to the right and to the left of the Indian National Congress and the latter also contributed to it. Bourgeois and petty-bourgeois movements, many of them vying with one another, use only certain of Gandhi's ideas, according to their own interests, giving them as a rule a tendentious, dogmatic interpretation, so that Gandhi's moral, political, economic and social doctrines are often interpreted differently today.

With its eternal, abstract, utopian categories, devoid of dialectical logic, Gandhism always tended to proclaim religious and moral postulates as the universal truths of political struggle. Now it has become a kind of holy scripture, and has suffered the same sad fate of all holy scriptures, in that people look to it for confirmation of the most diverse and mutually exclusive ideas, sometimes having nothing in common with the spirit of the original source or with the historical activities of its creator.

If we look at the literary sources of the period of Indian independence, it becomes apparent that the Indian reactionaries tried to make maximum use of Gandhi's authority and popularity. This was seen in the way the right-wing forces within the National Congress, and also the reactionary Jana Sangh and Swatantra parties, tried to use the

social and economic concepts of Gandhi as a basis for criticism of the at times inconsistent, but historically progressive, socio-economic changes brought about by the Congress, and for opposing state planning, the state sector, the industrialisation policy, the partial restrictions on the monopolies, and even the essentially bourgeois, limited, land reform.

The reactionary circles misuse Gandhi's name for the sake of undermining any feeling of trust between the peoples of India, and even for the sake of justifying the essentially harmful centrifugal forces cultivated in individual Indian states by irresponsible elements, interested in weakening and destroying the unified, multinational India, and not in strengthening its unity and power. The reactionaries strive to undermine the friendly relations between the Republic of India and the socialist countries, and to whip up antagonism towards Indian democrats, progressive forces, the working class and the Communist Party.

The centrist circles in the Indian National Congress resorted to the Gandhian idea of non-violence to justify the Congress's inconsistency and sluggishness in working out and realising democratic reforms, as a result of which Gandhi's idea—which during the struggle against imperialism was marked by vigour, mass appeal and mobility—was transformed into an unjustifiably prolonged acceptance of neglected and quite overt social evil.

Since independence, Gandhism has been a constant factor of Indian political life. But after the Indian National Congress's electoral defeat which led to the fall of Indira Gandhi's government and the advent to power of the Janata Party, Gandhism, as the Indian press noted, became particularly fashionable. Circles close to the ruling party noted deviations of the Indian National Congress from Gandhism, and basic differences in the approaches of Gandhi and Nehru to social and political problems. The slogan 'Back to Gandhi' was sounded, contrasting Gandhism with a number of progressive aspects of the Indian National Congress policy.

We are speaking here of a peculiar, selective approach to Gandhism. The supporters of a 'return to Gandhism' call for accelerated development of domestic production and agriculture. In themselves these are correct proposals, suited to the needs of the national economy and drawn, indeed, from Gandhi's arsenal. But sometimes they are interpreted rather one-sidedly, contrasted with the policy of industrialisation, and linked to calls for decentralisation of the economy and for priority to be given to agriculture at the expense of the state sector and major projects in heavy industry. The attention paid to domestic crafts and agriculture, which provide millions of Indians with work and means of subsistence, is perfectly justified. But how could this be held up against the development of heavy industry, without which the country's economic independence could not be guaranteed? Could the leading role of the state sector in creating a modern industrial base really be doubted? What developing country today is conceiv-

able without a strong state sector?

The 'Back to Gandhi' call is often used to contrast the positions of Gandhi and Nehru. That the views of the two greatest leaders of the Indian liberation movement were strongly at variance, is self-evident, and both Gandhi and Nehru spoke a great deal of this, but they both also saw the common foundation which made them comrades-in-arms in the struggle for independence. Moreover, Nehru's ideological evolution brought him closer to Gandhism as Gandhi himself had foreseen when, in 1942, he named Nehru as his political successor. If the Indian National Congress publications tended to exaggerate the affinities between Gandhi and Nehru, then the political opponents of the present Indian National Congress strive to absolutise their differences. The 'return to Gandhi' thereby presupposes the rejection of Nehru. Both approaches are one-sided: a comparative study of their views shows the mutual influence of the two leaders. All his life Nehru found himself under the influence of Gandhi's principles and personality. Gandhi also accepted some of his younger friend's ideas, and acknowledged that they enriched the Congress's ideological platform, as is seen, for example, in his approval of the resolution on basic rights and an economic programme introduced by Nehru at the Congress session in Karachi in 1931.

To oppose these two names is hardly justifiable. But something else is important: it appears that neither Gandhi nor Nehru could provide a solution to many of the problems of contemporary India. And yet it would be impossible to solve these problems without taking the legacy and influence of Gandhi and Nehru into account. Both have become part of the national consciousness, culture and life, although in Gandhi, perhaps, traditions and national sources prevailed, while in Nehru it was the orientation towards the future and the conviction that the whole of mankind was essentially united in its movement towards progress.

Presumably India will not choose between Gandhi and Nehru, but synthesise them. The question is what to take, and what to reject, from their legacies. And this is determined by class and political attitudes.

Nowadays Gandhism is used in criticising various aspects of the Indian National Congress's economic policy, especially the correlation of industry and agriculture, the role of the state sector, domestic crafts and centralisation. As far as Gandhi's social ideal is concerned, his condemnation of capitalism as such, in industry and agriculture, and his aspiration for a society without classes and exploitation, these ideas remain outside of the interests of those who call for a return to Gandhi. The same can be said of Gandhi's methods of social transformation and pressure—*satyagraha* and guardianship. Guardianship meant more than just good will for Gandhi; he did not exclude legislative settlement, nor government intervention, nor resorting to the tested weapon of *satyagraha*. The slogan of 'Back to Gandhi' does not imply actual efforts to realise the principles of *sarvodaya* and

guardianship, or to revive Gandhi's utopian socialism.

All shades of bourgeois politicians use Gandhi's ideas of guardianship and *sarvodaya* only to dull the working people's class consciousness in the new historical conditions of today, when the working class and peasantry are opposed above all by big monopoly capital, by the national bourgeoisie, with its pockets well-lined and heels dug in politically, and by the capitalist landowners.

The anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and democratic forces have severely criticised the attempts of the bourgeoisie to use Gandhi's prestige as a cover for their own selfish class aims. Even the most faithful of Gandhi's disciples, however, for example Vinoba Bhave, are now revising Gandhi's ideas. On the one hand, they tend to narrow down the social aspects of Gandhism, and on the other, they cannot bring themselves to use the well-tried method of non-violent resistance against the present-day propertied exploiting classes, so that they constantly slide from the principle of non-violent resistance to any social evil to calls for non-resistance in general. The active social character of Gandhi's ideas, his intervention in social and political affairs on the side of the masses—even in the specific forms used by him—are forgotten by Indian bourgeois politicians and ideologists. The epigones of Gandhism tend to represent it purely as a road to personal moral perfection and as a categorical demand for conciliation between all classes.

It should be remembered that not all that masquerades under the name of Gandhism these days is in fact Gandhism. There are now widespread attempts in India to use the name of Gandhi for ends which run counter to the very essence of his doctrine.

A one-sided view of Gandhism as the ideology of the Indian national bourgeoisie cannot serve as a reliable basis with which to oppose these trends, since it does not express the true meaning of these trends that aim to take control of this popular ideology and put it at the service of capitalism and reaction.

The time which has elapsed since the Indian people gained independence allows us to take a more objective look at Gandhism. It is now clear that, despite Gandhi's tendency to compromise with the British government, his ideological and political doctrine was nonetheless the sworn enemy of colonialism, and Gandhi himself was bent on achieving the ultimate goal—national independence. His compromises caused temporary recessions in the mass movement, but each time, under his leadership, the liberation movement was reborn on a higher level, putting forward more precise demands. Gandhi's life and work show beyond any shadow of doubt that he always remained faithful to the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, anti-racialist struggle and to a humanistic, though not always realistic, ideal of social justice which was close to the people, especially the peasants.

In many ways, the words of Nehru about Gandhi's social significance are very true.

'It should be remembered,' wrote Nehru, 'that the nationalist

movement in India, like all nationalist movements, was essentially a bourgeois movement. It represented the natural historical stage of development, and to consider it or criticize it as a working-class movement is wrong. Gandhi represented that movement and the Indian masses in relation to that movement to a supreme degree, and he became the voice of the Indian people to that extent. He functioned inevitably within the orbit of nationalist ideology, but the dominating passion that consumed him was a desire to raise the masses. In this respect he was always ahead of the nationalist movement, and he gradually made it, within the limits of its own ideology, turn in this direction.

'...It is perfectly true that Gandhi, functioning on the nationalist plane, does not think in terms of the conflict of classes, and tries to compose their differences. But the action he has indulged in and taught the people has inevitably raised mass consciousness tremendously and made social issues vital. And his insistence on the raising of the masses at the cost, wherever necessary, of vested interests has given a strong orientation to the national movement in favour of the masses.'[1]

It is in the interests of progressive circles in India to thwart attempts at emasculating the democratic content of Gandhi's doctrine. Gandhi's name and ideas should not be used by the Indian bourgeois and landowner reactionaries, who, counter to the interests of the masses, ignore his anti-imperialism and democratic humanism.

Consistent Indian revolutionaries and supporters of scientific socialism have always had basic ideological and tactical differences of opinion with Gandhism. But they do treat Gandhi's work and noble aims with sincere respect. In their struggle for a better future for the Indian people, they use Gandhi's democratic and social ideal, making it more realistic and scientific. And they employ his methods of struggle, his mass movement tactics, realising that the Gandhian type of movement is a constituent part of the universal forms of mass national liberation and class struggle, elaborated by the world revolutionary movement.

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Soviet researchers have often investigated Gandhism. In the past, they sometimes made mistakes, due to a certain one-sidedness in their approach. These mistakes were due to various reasons, including the long isolation of India from the Soviet Union and the international workers' movement, insufficient knowledge of India and of its specific conditions and highly original national traditions, which were reflected very strongly in Gandhism.

All the attempts of Marxists to evaluate Gandhi's ideological plat-

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, *India and the World*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1936, pp. 172-73, 174-75.

form and historical role are basically attempts to establish the place of scientific socialism and Gandhism in the conditions of the national liberation movement and the existence of a comparatively young national state, recently rid of colonial dependence. It is not a question of comparing the two ideologies, if only because they are incompatible and as different as science and utopia. It is a question of trends of development in the country's ideology and politics.

Although in India the ideas of Gandhism have always held sway over those of scientific socialism, it is between these two ideological trends that the main struggle for influence over the masses has always been waged. This was well understood by the Indian bourgeoisie, who in the years of the struggle for independence rated Gandhism highly as an ideology that could be used against scientific socialism, which was quickly gaining a foothold in India, especially in educated urban revolutionary circles, among left-wing democratic young people. The national bourgeoisie and its party, the Indian National Congress, strove to find in Gandhism a kind of guarantee against the spread of scientific socialism among the workers; at the same time Gandhism expressed national anti-imperialist interests.

Today, too, Gandhism and scientific socialism represent the two main ideological trends in Indian society.

What, then, is the attitude to Gandhism and scientific socialism in modern India? There are two main attitudes: on the one hand, Gandhism is understood as the system of Gandhi's views on anti-imperialism and peasant socialism, and on the other, there is the interpretation of Gandhism by the numerous bourgeois schools of thought, often contradicting each other and the basic concepts of Gandhism itself, which take only certain of Gandhi's ideas and adapt them to suit their distinct class interests. In the first interpretation—as an offshoot of the Indian people's struggle for national liberation—Gandhism contains certain substantial elements of a general democratic nature. And because of this, one can speak of its affinity with any truly democratic, progressive movement. It is not difficult here to envisage the possibility in the future of a joint anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-racialist, anti-war, anti-feudal and anti-monopoly struggle, waged by all democratic and progressive forces in India and defending the interests of the broad popular masses. Together, the supporters of scientific socialism and Gandhism could form a powerful united national-democratic front in the struggle for peace, for the consolidation of national independence, and for democracy and social progress. At the present time, all democratic and progressive social movements, including those in India, are united by certain common goals. One of these goals, proposed by Indian Marxists, is to limit, and then liquidate, foreign and national monopoly capitalism and to prepare the way for the gradual departure of the country from the road of capitalist development. This great prospect demands joint efforts; it will produce further differentiation amongst Gandhi-

ans and promote the consolidation of all supporters of social progress.

As regards the other interpretation of Gandhism, whereby it is used for the narrow class interests of the Indian big bourgeoisie and the reactionary forces which try to use Gandhi's social ideals against the democratic movement, in order to emasculate their anti-capitalist content—any attempt to find common ground with scientific socialism here is simply pointless.

An analysis of Gandhism from the point of view of scientific socialism shows not only a certain kinship between it and bourgeois interests and ideas—something quite natural and inevitable in any national reformism and utopian socialism—but also a certain acceptability of Gandhism from the point of view of the bourgeoisie's class interests. The point is that the combination in Gandhism of ruthless exposure of capitalist society from moral and religious positions with the putting forward of methods of changing this society that serve to avert revolutionary upheavals, won the sympathy of the Indian bourgeoisie, in spite of Gandhi's critical attitude to bourgeois morality and the bourgeois way of life.

But Gandhism also has affinities with scientific socialism, and this not only in the struggle for national independence. The utopian and archaic ideal of *sarvodaya* reflects a sincere concern for the welfare of the masses and the desire to improve the working people's position and bring about a society of social justice. Like all versions of utopian or national socialism, it reflects many principles advanced more than a century ago by scientific socialism: labour as a must for all, the abolition of exploitation of man by man and of the division of society into classes, public ownership of the basic means of production, and the distribution of material wealth according to one's work. That would appear to account for most of the similarities in the approaches of Gandhism and scientific socialism to the most important problems facing the Indian people. In other respects they mostly disagree. The differences are everywhere: in their criticism of capitalist society, in the ideal of socialism, in the methods for achieving it, and in their concepts of classes and class struggle, of the future state, and of those social and party political forces which are historically destined to bring about, and which are really capable of bringing about, social justice on Earth. In all these basic questions of the theory and practice of changing modern society, scientific socialism and Gandhism are in opposition, like science and utopia, or materialism and idealism, or dialectics and metaphysics.

Sometimes Gandhi gave vivid exposures of capitalist and feudal oppression. Here is one example.

Asked how, in his opinion, the Indian princes, landlords, millionaires, money-lenders and other profiteers were enriched, Gandhi replied: 'At the present moment by exploiting the masses.' He stressed that these classes had no social justification for living in greater comfort than the common workers and peasants, whose labour created the

wealth.[1] But these motives were not crucial in Gandhi's criticism of exploiting society. His condemnation of 'European' civilisation was characterised by the absence of a clear social orientation and by ignorance of the real ways and methods to overcome the vices in society he correctly noted. These qualities were apparent in the fact that he determined the object of criticism not as bourgeois civilisation, but as 'European', machine civilisation, 'It was not,' wrote Gandhi, 'that we did not know how to invent machinery, but our forefathers knew that, if we set our hearts after such things, we would become slaves and lose our moral fibre. They, therefore, after due deliberation decided that we should only do what we could with our hands and feet.'[2] Hence, it is not the capitalist mode of production which lies at the centre of Gandhi's criticism, but machine production in general which, it appears, was vetoed by the forefathers of today's Indians. It is in machinery that Gandhi saw the source of social evils—unemployment, exploitation, the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the few, etc. He does not say that all these results of the development of large-scale industry are transient and class-determined; it is not the exploiting classes that are seen as the enemy, but the machinery.

As far as the relations between classes in the process of machine production are concerned, Gandhi did not perceive them as the objective basis for the appearance of those vices which he castigated. He was aware of the existence of class contradictions, but did not attach vital importance to them, seeing them as a superstructure built on essentially healthy human relations. 'Class war is foreign to the essential genius of India,'[3] he said. Contradictions emerged and intensified as a result of greed, egoism, moral degradation and delusion. The normal state of relations between zamindars (landowners) and ryots (peasants), and between capitalists and workers, ought to have been peaceful collaboration. Gandhi ignored the class and economic laws of social development. His understanding of social development was idealist, based on lack of knowledge of the political and economic laws governing the historical process. Therefore, his ideas about the very best and most just social transformations were marked by subjectivism and voluntarism. According to Gandhi, people had to imbue their minds with high morality and then, with time, social justice would inevitably come about. Class peace, and the paternalism of the propertied classes over the propertyless, were part and parcel of Gandhism. And if a class war were to break out, then only because the capitalists and landowners grew insensitive to their

[1] M. K. Gandhi, *Towards Non-Violent Socialism*, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1957, p. 161.

[2] *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. X, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi, 1963, p. 37.

[3] M. K. Gandhi, *Sarvodaya (The Welfare of All)*, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1954, p. 89.

responsibility, forgetting that they were supposed to be fathers of the 'family', a part of it. Gandhi wrote: 'In the West an eternal conflict has set up between capital and labour. Each party considers the other as its natural enemy. That spirit seems to have entered India also, and if it finds a permanent lodgement, it would be the end of our industry and of our peace. If both the parties were to realize that each is dependent upon the other, there will be little cause for quarrel.'[1]

Gandhi did not take into account the fact that the social and economic conditions of people's social and personal lives, and the bourgeois or feudal mode of production of material and cultural commodities, are an insurmountable obstacle to the universal spread of high moral principles. Gandhi's non-violent method of changing the world is an old, honest and sincere (but, as has been shown over the centuries, and in Indian history in particular, fruitless) call on the exploited not to use violence against the exploiters, a call on the exploiters to be kind towards those they exploit. In criticising the way Gandhi absolutised the principle of non-violence, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote in his *Autobiography*: 'If there is one thing that history shows it is this: that economic interests shape the political views of groups and classes... It [non-violence] can, I think, carry us a long way, but I doubt if it can take us to the final goal... The present conflicts in society, national as well as class conflicts, can never be resolved except by coercion.'[2]

We have outlined Gandhi's criticism of 'European' civilisation, and the concepts developed by him almost a century after the appearance of the *Communist Manifesto* and Marx's *Capital*. After the rise of the first socialist country in the world, in an age when the machine civilisation which Gandhi hated, i.e., capitalism, was being overthrown by revolution, such doctrines seemed utopian, and against the background of the scientific theories of Marxism-Leninism Gandhi's criticism of capitalism was simply helpless.

Marx was also a passionate—and profound—exposer of the vices of 'European' civilisation. But he spoke not of European, but of capitalist civilisation. With scientific irrefutability, Marx demonstrated the catastrophe which befell the working masses because of the introduction of machine production, but for him the trouble lay not in the machinery but in the capitalist methods of industrialisation. Disclosing these methods, he also showed the historical inevitability of the colonialist annexations made by capitalism, including the British subjugation of India, with all the horrors committed there by the 'bearers of European civilisation'. Marx revealed the class nature of bourgeois civilisation and of the utilisation of machinery.

It was the scientific nature of Marx's critique of capitalist society

[1] M. K. Gandhi, *Towards Non-Violent Socialism*, p. 42.
[2] Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, Allied Publishers Private, Ltd., Bombay, 1962, pp. 544, 551.

that led him to such a well-founded and convincing definition of socialism as the society which would resolve all the contradictions of the capitalist system. But nonetheless, this society arises on the material basis of capitalism and makes use of all its valuable technological progress, particularly its heavy industry and machine production. Gandhi's emotional, romantic approach to bourgeois civilisation, on the other hand, naturally led to his illusory, utopian conceptions of socialism.

Gandhi continued the tradition of the first utopians who saw the triumph of their abstract ideals of justice in the form of a return to the 'golden' age, to the Indian peasant community. This was a community which never protected its members from oppression by Asiatic despots, conquerors or tribal lords, who were turning feudal, a community which was always based on the cruel laws of the caste system and which, for centuries, isolated the country and its people from the outside world. This idyllic community ceased to exist long ago, first under the influence of the commodity economy, then under capitalism, led by the British colonialists, and now under the national bourgeoisie, capitalist landowners and the growing class of wealthy peasants.

Only Gandhi's indistinct conception of the onward march of history, and of the irreversible evolution of mankind from a lower to a higher stage, could allow the archaic picture of *sarvodaya* to appear as an ideal for the future. For Gandhi, since progress and modern machine civilisation entail social evils and moral suffering for the people, there was no alternative but to return by force of will to patriarchal moral simplicity. Gandhi appealed not to the future but to the past, looking for the basis of the new society not in the growing elements of social progress which capitalism, despite itself, brings about, but in the surviving remnants of doomed forms of production and social life.

Even if the impossible were to be done, and the artificial creation of a *sarvodaya* type of society succeeded, then the extreme technological backwardness of this society would obstruct economic, cultural and moral progress and deprive the calls for universal plenty and cultural growth of real meaning. Even in this artificially recreated and isolated cell of society, due to the inexorable inner laws of social development, there would be a resurgence of those elements of decay and decadence which in the course of long historical change had already once led to the degeneration of the Indian community into an archaic institution.

In analysing Gandhism from the point of view of scientific socialism, particular attention is usually paid—and rightly so—to the problem of the means and methods of social change. Gandhism made its banner non-resistance to evil, i.e., non-violence, and Gandhi is credited with having discovered and applied this method. Marxism, on the other hand, is portrayed by some of its critics (including some of Gandhi's followers), whose knowledge of Marxism stems from

secondary, and often distorted, sources, as the resolute denial of the principle of non-violence, as a synonym for bloody armed struggle and an armed violent movement. Of course, such an interpretation of the relationship between Gandhism and scientific socialism on the question of violence and non-violence suits the ideological opponents of scientific socialism down to the ground. But this interpretation has nothing in common with reality, or with the real attitude of scientific socialism towards the ways and means of struggle for national and social liberation.

It would be difficult to convince anyone today that the supporters of scientific socialism—true revolutionaries, not dogmatists or adventurers—stand for armed violent struggle under any circumstances. Such views run entirely counter to historical facts, to the theory and revolutionary practice of Marxism. Marxists-Leninists have always been ready to use even the smallest possibilities of peaceful development of the national liberation movement and social revolution, and have always considered that from the point of view of the workers' and all the working people's real interests, peaceful means are preferable to armed struggle. Gandhi's non-violent methods, if one ignores their metaphysical and religious basis, represent in practice none other than peaceful, unarmed methods of struggle. Gandhi did not discover them, though it is quite clear that he was outstandingly successful in elaborating and applying these methods against the power of the British colonialists and South African racialists, and in lending them a true mass character and thus making them effective. Long before Gandhi, all or almost all of the means included in the arsenal of *satyagraha*—hunger-strikes, demonstrations, local and general strikes, non-payment of taxes, and the boycotting of colonial and racialist powers—had been widely used by the international workers' and national liberation movements. The peasant movements in Western Europe, Russia, Latin America and many countries of Asia, which developed from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, and the workers' movement since the eighteenth century, are all well acquainted with these forms and methods of mass struggle. The innovation of Gandhism was not the invention and use of these methods, but above all their application against the British colonialists, and also the upholding of them as the only moral methods, sanctified by religious traditions.

The history of the national liberation struggle in India has seen huge anti-colonialist demonstrations, general workers' strikes, mass peasant movements and a wide student and youth movement. It has seen armed uprisings by workers, peasants, seamen of the Indian fleet and soldiers of the Anglo-Indian army. The movement knows many examples of courage and self-sacrifice. Specifically proletarian, revolutionary methods of struggle played an important part in the movement, sometimes exerting a decisive influence on it, though the backbone of the movement, of course, was the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie, who followed Gandhi.

Gandhism proclaimed non-violence as the sole and universal method of struggle, capable of resolving all the national and social contradictions in a class society or oppressed country by the most painless means. Life has shown this not to be true. Scientific socialism, in full accordance with life, with the age-old experience of mankind and above all with the experience of the struggle waged by the working class and peasantry in all countries, refuses to absolutise or dogmatise any single method of struggle and force it uncritically on the people, without consideration of the current political situation and the historical and national conditions.

When peaceful methods prove ineffective because of the fierce resistance of foreign colonisers or the indigenous bourgeoisie and landowners, when the exploiters unleash an armed struggle against the people, Marxists—in view of the actual situation—propose a transition to more decisive methods of struggle, including the highest form of class struggle—armed uprising and civil war. When Gandhians are forced to admit the impossibility of satisfying their demands and ideals by non-violent means because of the violence of the colonisers, they emphasise the moral unpreparedness of the people for victory in view of their not observing the religious and ethical principles of the non-violent movement, and call on the masses to forget the final aims of the movement, demanding that they reconcile themselves with the impracticability of the goals of their struggle and take comfort in the awareness that they had performed their moral and religious duty. This is where the real difference between Gandhism and scientific socialism on the question of the methods of mass struggle lies.

Nehru's attitude to the question was interesting. With the greatest respect for Gandhi, he declared: 'For us and for the National Congress as a whole the non-violent method was not, and could not be, a religion or an unchallengeable creed or dogma. It could only be a policy and a method promising certain results, and by those results it would have to be finally judged. Individuals might make of it a religion or incontrovertible creed. But no political organisation as long as it remained political, could do so.'[1]

This is fairly exhaustive and clear. Methods of mass struggle are not given once and for all, they depend on the political climate, on the aims and results of the struggle, and, we would add, on the behaviour of the enemy. If the enemy does not yield, then it must be forced to yield, arms being used in the name of humanism when necessary.

Political organisation is of immense importance for the forces of democracy and progress. Therefore the question of the progressive political party and of the socialist state and of the relation to them of the fighters for national liberation and social justice is central. And in this question Gandhism cannot serve as a reliable guide for the

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Mahatma Gandhi*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, Calcutta, 1966, pp. 49-50.

working people, although Gandhi often rightly criticised the bourgeois state, bourgeois democracy and particularly the colonial and racialist state.

Scientific socialism sees in the socialist state the main weapon for the reorganisation of society, and in the party it sees the only possible political organisation of like-minded people capable of preparing and carrying through revolutionary changes. Scientific socialism presents the working people with a complex task—to organise themselves politically, basing themselves on the party, to solve, under its guidance and in their own interests, the question of state power—the cardinal question of all revolutions—and thus to take possession of this mighty lever of influence on their lives and on the transformation of society for the benefit of the working and exploited people.

Gandhism proceeds from anarchistic conceptions of the state as unquestionable evil, and even when Gandhi was forced to admit that the independent national state could and should be used in the interests of progress, his position was still to have nothing to do with power, for in his opinion all power corrupts. Gandhism does not propose that the workers create their own political parties, but it is not against their having lower forms of organisation. Thus the political arena is placed at the disposal of representatives of the educated class, the bourgeois intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie itself. This leads to the working people being defenceless in face of the class enemy, who is in full possession of state power and party organisation.

Gandhi's greatest service was that he always called for the masses to be drawn into the social movement. It can be said without exaggeration that Gandhi's name, his anti-imperialist policy and tactics and bold appeal to the people, are at the root of the Indian liberation movement's transition from the bourgeois loyalty towards the colonialists and respectful attitude towards the British authorities which characterised the Indian National Congress prior to Gandhi, from the petty-bourgeois terrorism of the national extremists, to a truly mass, popular movement for independence. But the role of the masses is understood differently by Gandhism and scientific socialism. The adherents of scientific socialism aim to awaken, develop and make full use of the revolutionary potential of the working classes, to spark off their initiative, and to give their revolutionary energy an outlet in diverse and purposeful forms of struggle. They believe in the masses, in their revolutionary creativity, and in their ability not only to destroy the old society and do away with its vestiges which hold up progress, but also to build a new, better society, without exploiting classes. The Gandhians, on the other hand, always hold the masses within the limits of non-violence. They need the masses as executors of the leadership's will, and the masses must act within the strictly defined limits of peaceful resistance. Gandhism always contained an element of deep mistrust towards the independent revolutionary creativity of the masses in the liberation movement.

Hence, one can understand why the attitude of Gandhism to the popular masses is defined by the formula of guardianship.

Gandhi, like no other, could raise the Indian people against the colonialists, but at the same time he could, like no other, hold the masses back from open revolution, ensuring for himself the possibility of holding talks with the colonial powers. It is self-evident that these tactics of Gandhi's made him the most outstanding leader of a liberation movement guided by the bourgeoisie.

This is also the starting point of two approaches to the working class. For Marxism-Leninism, this is the advanced class, destined in the course of historical development to play the leading role in the struggle for a society of social justice. For Gandhi, it was a product of 'Satanic' European civilisation, a class supposedly not yet fit for political life, not understanding its place in it, or the needs of the nation. Scientific socialism counts above all on the industrial proletariat. Gandhism sees it as a potential opponent of the principles of non-violence, is afraid of its political activity and strives to confine its struggle to purely economic demands for reforms aimed at a certain improvement in the material standard of living. 'I don't deny,' said Gandhi, 'that such strikes can serve political ends. But they do not fall within the plan of non-violent non-cooperation. It does not require much effort of the intellect to perceive that it is a most dangerous thing to make political use of labour until labourers understand the political condition of the country and are prepared to work for the common good. This is hardly to be expected of them all of a sudden and until they have bettered their own condition so as to enable them to keep body and soul together in a decent manner. The greatest political contribution, therefore, that labourers can make is to improve their own condition.'[1] This is the source of Gandhi's negative attitude towards the idea of forming an advanced political party of the proletariat.

The basic features of scientific socialism and Gandhism noted above determine the attitudes of the ruling classes in India to them.

The attitude of these classes to scientific socialism is irreconcilable. They have always seen it as an uncompromising enemy of the very base of capitalism. The ideologists of the ruling classes have always related to Gandhism with explicit sympathy. Many Indian bourgeois ideologists try to establish it as the national world-view—in spite of the sincere subjective anti-capitalism of Gandhi and his true followers. Why should this be? The fact is that for all its anti-capitalism, Gandhism proved practically harmless to the capitalist development of India, precisely because of the basic features discussed above. It has become, as it were, a constituent part of the bourgeois order in contemporary India, which in a number of spheres of the economy has reached the stage of monopoly capitalism. Bourgeois ideologists are trying to find a new application for Gandhism—the defence of the

[1] Mahatma Gandhi, *Young India*, 1917-1922, Madras, 1922, pp. 737-39.

present social system from infringements by the exploited classes.

Gandhi's non-violent methods were effective enough in the struggle against the colonialists and for national independence. Combined with the non-Gandhian, sometimes quite extreme, violent methods employed by the masses despite Gandhi, they led to the creation of an independent Indian state. But since then the Gandhian doctrine has regrettably proved powerless to bring about any substantial change in the position of hundreds of millions of working people.

The task of the ruling classes in contemporary Indian society is to split the workers' movement and weaken the influence of left-wing circles and of scientific socialism. This has led to a flexible combination of diverse methods of class struggle, from political manoeuvring to cruel repression, from propaganda of the utopian ideas of Gandhism, 'Indian socialism', to the terror of Shiv Sena, a fascist organisation created by Bombay monopolists to intimidate the working people. In reality, then, the methods of Gandhism are used today in the interests of the working people, and against those of the bourgeoisie, only when they are used by left-wingers in the mass *satyagraha* campaigns, held in support of the socio-economic and socio-political demands of the working people.

Modern Gandhism still retains some general democratic traits which have not lost their importance. With American capital and its militarist ideology advancing in India, with the growth of Indian monopolies and the resultant intensification of the anti-imperialist and anti-monopoly movement, broad collaboration between all democratic progressive forces is still possible. Unfortunately the development of Gandhism after Gandhi did not, in the main, follow the line of strengthening and developing these positive aspects of his doctrine.

Since the Second World War, and especially in the last few years, a number of non-Marxist ideological trends in the national liberation movement have grown closer to scientific socialism (e.g. national democracy). Gandhism has not developed in this way. While emphasising the democratic content of Gandhism, one must bear in mind that with the majority of its present-day adherents it has regrettably tended to grow away from scientific socialism.

One need not and should not agree with Gandhism, but it is essential to know, study and respect it as an important and objective phenomenon in Indian history.

Difference of opinion does not preclude respect. Gandhi himself was a fine example of this. He could not share all the ideals of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, he reproached the Communists for their atheism and support of class struggle, but he did acknowledge the justice and grandeur of the Bolsheviks' ultimate goals and the magnificence of Lenin, the leader of the revolution.

Gandhi continues to enjoy tremendous respect among the Indian people. For this reason Gandhism must be studied in detail and in all its controversial aspects, and a positive scientific approach must

be taken to criticising it, and to the highly complex socio-economic and political problems of present-day India.

The Soviet people respect Mahatma Gandhi for his enormous contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle against colonialism, to the cause of ridding his country of foreign rulers. The Soviet people are well aware that Gandhi was always in the midst of the Indian people, sharing their lives. He always found inspiration in the people's difficult struggle against the British rulers, in their selflessness and courage, and strove honestly and sincerely to lighten their destinies, to avert disaster and to inspire them in their search for a new and better society.

Decades of persistent struggle against British imperialism culminated in the triumph of the Indian people, who will always remember Mahatma Gandhi with the greatest respect. Their feelings are sincerely shared by the people of the Soviet Union, who always sympathise deeply with the revolutionary and creative efforts of the masses.



An important Indian politician and state figure. Leader of the Indian National Congress party (INC).

Born in Allahabad into a family of Kashmirian Brahmans on November 14, 1889. His father, Motilal Nehru, was an advocate and a prominent figure in the reformist wing of the Indian National Congress.

Jawaharlal Nehru received his education in England from 1905 to 1912, first at the upper-class English school of Harrow and then at Cambridge University. An advocate by profession.

In 1912 he joined the Indian National Congress. Active in the Indian national liberation movement from 1916. When Mahatma Gandhi took over the leadership of the National Congress (1919) Jawaharlal Nehru became his supporter and closest associate. First arrested in 1921 for anti-colonial agitation. He spent a total of ten years of his life in prison. Elected on many occasions as Chairman of the Indian National Congress party (1929-1930, 1936-1937, 1946, 1951-1954). In 1946 he was deputy Prime Minister in the provisional government of India (the viceroy was the Prime Minister).

Nehru permanently occupied the post of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister from the formation of independent India in August 1947 until his death. He saw the future of India in socialism, but felt, as did Gandhi, that the path to socialism lay through social compromise.

Under Nehru's leadership, the Indian government took vital measures aimed at eliminating the economic backwardness which remained after the colonial period. As Chairman of the National Planning Committee, he took a direct part in the putting together of the first three five-year plans for the development of India.

In the field of foreign policy Nehru pursued a course of nonalignment with blocs and of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems. He participated in the elaboration of the five

principles of peaceful co-existence in relations between states—Pancha Sila. One of the initiators of and a participant in the Bandung Conference of Asian and African Countries (1955).

He regarded the all-round development of Indo-Soviet relations as essential and during the Second World War, he was an active supporter of the Soviet Union. He visited the USSR on several occasions (in 1927, 1955, and 1961).

Awarded the Bharat Ratna ("Pearl of India") order in 1955. Posthumously given the supreme award of the World Peace Council—the Frédérick Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal (in October 1970).

Died on May 27, 1964 in Delhi at the age of 74.

Jawaharlal Nehru has gone down in history as an outstanding politician, one of the greatest leaders of the national liberation movement, a fighter for peace, democracy and social progress, a sworn enemy of social injustice and national oppression and a friend of the Soviet Union.

The time that has elapsed since the death of Jawaharlal Nehru has allowed us to see his life more clearly and to evaluate objectively the significance and consequences of his many-faceted activity. The past years have been full of stormy historical events, which have not spared many people, including prominent state and party figures who, having left the political scene, have quickly lost their significance. This has not happened with Nehru. His image as an outstanding Indian leader and one of the best spokesmen of the ideas of national liberation and social progress has remained unchanged.

The main reason for the undiminishing attention paid to Nehru and his prominent historical role is that, as a thinker, he touched on many problems which concern humanity to this day. The interest in this great figure is, to a considerable extent, caused by Nehru's personal charm which struck not only those who had the good fortune to meet him, but also those who read his rich literary legacy and the numerous memoirs and academic publications which have captured his image.

It would be wrong to explain major historical events by the activity of individual people, but nevertheless it is not fortuitous that landmarks in history are firmly associated in our minds and memories with definite names which have, as it were, become symbols of those events. For example, India's long struggle for independence, which gave many famous and courageous heroes and which advanced brilliant politicians of different trends, is, above all, linked with the name, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, and the establishment of independent India, with the name, Jawaharlal Nehru. The latter was, more than anyone else, the creator of the country's political system and its political course. And no attempts whatsoever by certain Indian figures to gain political capital by undermining the prestige of the

country's first Prime Minister can change anything.

For several decades his name was inseparably linked with the struggle for the liberation of India from colonial enslavement, for its rebirth and development as a great sovereign state in Asia. From 15 August 1947, when Nehru raised the national tricolour flag above the historic Red Fort in Delhi, he led the independent country for almost 17 years, helping it come to life again and abolish colonialism, the legacy of feudalism and age-old backwardness.

Under Nehru's guidance, India was reorganised into states according to national, ethnic and language factors, thus putting an end to the British administrative system, based on the principle of 'divide and rule', and abolishing the country's feudal division. Initial agrarian reforms were implemented, undermining the power of the big landowners. Nehru led the restructuring of the economy along the lines of a planned economy, and started the policy of industrialisation which was decisive for the country's economic independence. Nehru's initiative led to the creation of a powerful, and strengthening, state sector. He was a thoroughgoing democrat, a fighter for equality, an opponent of caste vestiges and religious-tribal reaction and supporter of lasting national unity in India, based on a combination of the principles of democracy and centralism.

But Nehru does not belong merely to India. He belongs to the whole of mankind. In his policies he not only embodied trends typical of certain Afro-Asian states, but also influenced the formulation of their home and foreign policies.

Nehru was one of the initiators of modern international relations with their characteristic heightening of the role of the newly-free countries, and he was, among others, at the source of the policy of non-alignment and détente. While voicing the aspirations of those peoples fighting imperialist oppression, Nehru by no means opposed them to the peoples of Europe and America or advocated isolation, national dissension and vengeance for the past. He believed in the common fate of humanity and in the rapprochement of East and West. Eventually settling on positions of left-wing national reformism, Nehru completely avoided nationalistic narrowness, arrogance and parochialism. He strove with all his heart for equal international cooperation. He was an uncompromising opponent of great-power chauvinism, from wherever it issued and irrespective of the slogans used to conceal it.

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Both complexity and contradictoriness were typical of the evolution of Nehru's political views. His active social and political work began in the second decade of this century. Studying in an aristocratic English college, he took in the ideas of bourgeois liberalism shared also by his father, Motilal Nehru, a leading figure in the national liberation movement. At the same time he became interested in the

socialist movement, which he then knew only in its Fabian version. By the end of the First World War the liberation struggle in India had come alive. Nehru began taking part in the work of the Indian National Congress (INC) and searched for new forms and methods for the national liberation struggle. He was fascinated by Gandhi, who was then making his first steps in politics. Nehru was vastly impressed by Gandhi's courage and activeness, his talent for communication with the masses, his novel methods of resistance and also by his desire to turn the INC from a political club into an efficient mass organisation. Jawaharlal Nehru became a passionate supporter of Gandhi's non-violent but, indisputably, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist methods. He carried out vigorous activity during the years of the first nationwide *satyagraha* campaign, and shared with many of its participants the belief in a rapid victory. But success was not immediately forthcoming and Gandhi stopped resistance. The national movement was deadlocked. Nehru's belief in Gandhi's principles of the struggle for national liberation was shaken. While conducting work in the twenties, to restore the shattered forces of the INC, Nehru experienced deep dissatisfaction with the state of the liberation movement and looked for a way out of the crisis.

In 1927, he was invited as a representative of the INC to the Congress of Oppressed Nations in Brussels. Nehru's participation in the work of this Congress, in the Anti-Imperialist League established there, and also his visit to the USSR in November 1927 had a noticeable influence on the evolution of his political outlook. In the Soviet Union he met representatives of the revolutionary and national liberation movements of Europe, Asia and Africa. He saw the necessity for their unity and cooperation, and became acquainted not with Fabian, but with revolutionary, scientific socialism, which had ceased to be merely a theory and had begun to be put into practice.

The ideas of Marx and Lenin replaced to a considerable degree Nehru's former liberal, social-reformist and Gandhian concepts. However, the effect of Marxism-Leninism on Nehru was never complete and he did not become a materialist philosoper. In the supreme philosophical problems of being and consciousness, in his theory of knowledge and in his ideas on the spiritual and moral development of the individual, Nehru was predominantly a mixture of idealist and agnostic—the result of ethic and religious traditions of Hinduism and European rationalistic scepticism. But in social and political questions the influence of scientific socialism was powerful and fruitful. Nehru basically recognised the Marxist interpretation of history and its treatment of the mode of production, the role of the popular masses, the social structure, class contradictions and the class struggle. He saw history as a logical movement from lower stages of socio-economic development to higher ones; he acknowledged that capitalism was doomed and discovered for himself the oppressive nature of its economic, social and political system. He showed great sympathy for revolutionary forces throughout the world, in particular, for the

first ever socialist state.

The influence of Marxism-Leninism on Nehru's political activity manifested itself in the fact that he recognised the narrowness of the nationalist movement and appealed for it to be oriented towards defending the interests of the working people, as well as for the ground to be prepared for fundamental social reforms. Without hesitation, Nehru declared himself a supporter of scientific socialism and regarded the building of socialism the ultimate objective of the liberation movement. He strove to expand the participation of peasants and workers in the INC, and to make them the main support of the Congress, and to work for the satisfaction of their social and economic demands.

Nehru supported the ideas of international solidarity, of cooperation with peoples striving for national independence, with the workers' and democratic movements of capitalist countries, and with the Soviet Union as a staunch opponent of imperialism and a sincere friend of oppressed peoples.

Nehru's political platform at the end of the twenties both fully and accurately expressed the views of the left wing of the INC. Having put forward this platform, he became the leader of this wing of the INC. The strengthening of the revolutionary and socialist tendencies in Nehru's outlook continued until the mid-thirties. At that time he worked out and propagandised a programme which in many ways anticipated the programme of national democracy of the sixties.

But Nehru's position was extremely difficult. He did not have a political organisation of close supporters and operated withing the limits of the INC, which had remained a fundamentally bourgeois organisation in which Gandhi's political and moral influence was undivided. Gandhi did not share Nehru's radicalism, not to mention the fact that Gandhi more than once supported the right-wing conservative elements of the Congress in their struggle to maintain their positions and in their desire to put a stop to rivalry from the revolutionary youth. Nehru's role was somewhat dual. On the one hand he was the leader of the left wing, and on the other, a person who enjoyed the trust and love of Gandhi, and was linked to him by quite special personal ties which no political disagreement could break; a person who had maintained contacts with right-wing leaders in the Congress. But, for Gandhi, Nehru was not only a spokesman for the left wing, but also a generally recognised political leader of the Congress, capable of ensuring the unity of the INC and of restraining radicals who were trying to expand their activity and influence, and sometimes even to take over the Congress. Nehru also strove to ensure the unity of the INC; he could not think of a political movement in India without Gandhi and operating contrary to Gandhi's will. But, while speaking out for unity, he hoped to influence Gandhi and the conservative majority of the INC along revolutionary and socialist lines. Both Gandhi and Nehru were right in their recognition of

the necessity for the unity of the INC, for a split would have been fatal for the anti-imperialist forces. However, Nehru did not manage to convince the Congress of his ideas; giving in to pressure from Gandhi, and believing in the latter's faultless perception, he allowed the right-wing forces to neutralise the effect of the revolutionary-sounding declarations. The right wing countered the left-wing attack and at the session of the Congress in Tripura they began a row with the left wing, which threatened a split in the INC. Nehru sensed that if he continued to defend his platform this could undermine the unity of the nation and so came to a compromise. From the second half of the thirties the socialist and revolutionary tendencies in his activity became weaker.

This became particularly noticeable after India had gained independence and Nehru became head of government. A major shift took place in his social and political views. Marxist-Leninist ideas receded into the background and in practical issues they almost totally disappeared, and were expressed only in the most general and abstract evaluations of the social and historical process. The ideas of liberalism and social-reformism, synthesised with Gandhism, began to predominate. Gandhi's prophecy that after his death Nehru would speak with Gandhi's voice came true.

When Nehru became Prime Minister, the term socialism at first disappeared completely from his vocabulary. It is true that towards the mid-fifties it again appeared in his speeches, but by then in a totally different interpretation—not in a revolutionary or national-democratic but in a reformist sense. Nehru had worked out a home policy programme which remained within the limits of national-reformism and presented no threat whatsoever to the national bourgeoisie which had retained its dominating economic and political positions.

It is easy to reproach Nehru for being inconsistent and for making backward steps. Theoretically, perhaps, he deserves this criticism, but it can be neither convincing nor justified if it does not take into consideration the force of objective factors in the recent history of India which conditioned and restricted the revolutionary and socialist tendencies in Nehru's activity.

Nehru's outlook from the thirties until the end of his days is marked by a very profound objective contradiction. As he himself said, his views had overtaken the political consciousness of the INC. A subjective socialist stood at the head of a bourgeois political organisation. The unity of theory and practice is of supreme importance for a revolutionary. Nehru strove for this, particularly in the late twenties and early thirties. But he was not destined to achieve this unity. Working in the INC, the apparatus of which was controlled by right-wing leaders, and heading a government machine which had not overcome its faulty colonical legacy, he was unable to carry out his views and ideas.

In theories and conceptions, one can be altogether uncompromis-

ing and revolutionary. As opposed to politics, this does not result in such fatal consequences. What would have happened if from the thirties Nehru had shown greater persistence in promoting his views and had not come to a compromise with Gandhi and the right-wing circles of the INC? He would not have broken Gandhi's will nor the influence of the conservative wing of the Congress, nor could he have made them adopt his line. He could have become a political renegade and bankrupt like Subhas Bose, or joined ranks with Manabendra Nath Roy or other left-wing adventurists. But, had he managed to create a political organisation to rival the INC, this would have led to the weakening of the anti-imperialist front, and this would have been exploited by the British colonialists.

At the end of forties, Nehru said that while he was himself an adherent of socialism, he did not put forward this objective before the nation because it was not shared by the majority of the INC. He could not have been the Prime Minister of India and the head of the Congress government if in the forties he had repeated his speech at a session of the INC in Lakhnau (1936), in which he spoke out in favour of scientific socialism. Nehru needed almost ten years to prepare public opinion for the modest, reformits idea of the socialist pattern of society proposed by him as a panacea for capitalism.

Nehru was right in the sense that India was not then ready for socialism, and that the logical step was a transitional stage of preparation of the conditions for future socialist reforms. But he neither defined the length of this stage, nor its tasks, nor the alignment of class forces. He did not create the organisational, political and ideological prerequisites for socialist reforms. The very concept of socialism in the INC's propaganda was extremely vague and devoid of class content. In fact, socialism was identified with economic growth, an improvement in the position of the working people, and with the declaration of the principle of equal opportunities for all the country's citizens. Nehru's policy did not undermine the foundations of capitalism in India, nor did it oust the Indian monopolists, nor did it solve the acute social contradictions. On the contrary, as Nehru himself admitted, the rift between poor and rich widened and monopoly capital strengthened its hold.

When summarising Nehru's activity at the head of the Indian government, one has to say that he achieved a great deal in boosting the national economy, the industrialisation of the country and the creation of a state sector, and did much in the fields of education and public health. He also did away with large- and medium-scale feudal landownership, but on a bourgeois basis. Poor peasants were not granted land and the India sharecropper's age-old dream of a better life did not come true. Nehru actively and successfully promoted the strengthening of a bourgeois democratic and secular state. He worked out a foreign policy which gained India recognition as a peace-loving power. On balance, Nehru's activity was undoubtedly positive. But socialism, about which he so loved

to speak, remained a good intention.

Nehru was unable immediately to set about implementing socialist reforms in India—there were not the political prerequisites for this. But, in our view, he could have done much to promote the ideas of socialism, to form and rally class and political forces devoted to socialism, and to weaken the influence of exploiting classes on the political life of the country and the activity of the state, if life had not required difficult compromises with bourgeois and conservative circles, compromises which forced Nehru to revise his revolutionary and democratic ideas.

The point is, however, that the real alternative to Nehru's course both during his lifetime and afterwards was not a revolutionary left-wing, but a right-wing government. Nehru staved off this shift to the right and undermined the positions of conservatives and the more reactionary social forces in India. It is here that his noble role and his great historic service lie.

Despite all the contradictoriness of Nehru's positions, his name is firmly associated in our minds with the progressive development of India.

Nehru's activities were not confined to politics. He was a man of great spiritual culture, encyclopaedic erudition and a deeply philosophical frame of mind. His numerous writings combine universal education, breadth of interests, originality and sharp-wittedness with the warm, temperamental, dramatic, lively approach of a man who sought, fought and sometimes doubted and retreated, but who always retained his belief in man's progress. He was a thinker and a poet. And even without his outstanding political work, resting on his writings alone, he would, it seems, have earned the attention and interest of future generations. But Nehru's literary work cannot be separated from his political biography. 'The more action and thought are allied and integrated, the more effective they become,' he wrote. 'The happiest man is he whose thinking and action are co-ordinated.'[1] His historical and philosophical deliberations were not an end in themselves, but a search for the answer to the most important problems troubling his country and the world. He turned to the past in order to understand the present and foresee the future.

It was from these positions that Nehru's books *The Discovery of India* and *An Autobiography* were written. These books—the first two to be issued in Russian—were first published in the USSR over a quarter of a century ago, aroused great interest among Soviet readers and played an important role in acquainting them with the history and problems of independent India.

The same can be said of Nehru's book *Glimpses of World History*. But here the author's range is wider. Nehru draws a picture of the development of human society on the scale of the whole world,

[1] *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. 3, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Calcutta, 1958, p. 472.

resting on vital events in world history and picking out and generalising the main aspects of the historical process. The history of India is dealt with on a parallel with events in other countries and parts of the world, and in comparison with them. This is the profound and original work of a historian, but it is not an academic study. Like in *The Discovery of India*, Nehru tries to interpret his country's past, in this case through the prism of world history, so as to see its present more clearly and to plan its path of progress. The past concerns Nehru primarily as a pointer to the future. History was for him a school of life, experience and struggle, a source for developing a world outlook. And Nehru approached it as an active politician, impelled to study by practical needs. 'My fascination for history,' he wrote, 'was not in reading about odd events that happened in the past but rather in its relation to the things that led up to the present. Only then did it become alive to me. Otherwise it would have been an odd thing unconnected with my life or the world.'[1]

This is a fascinating glimpse of history by a man, one of the recognised leaders of the national liberation movement, who headed the independent Indian state and had a tremendous influence on both its present and future.

One can approach Nehru's views on history in the same way as he himself approached history, that is, one can look for what is particularly relevant for today, for what he foreordained for the future.

He approached history of his country and the world as a rationalist, without *a priori*, unhistorical categories, looking for its inner meaning and logic. Nehru also looked at his own country's past in this way. His attitude shows no trace of uncritical admiration of the past, of any idea that India's history was exceptional and isolated, or subject to a spiritual law inherent in that country alone. His views were free of religious or moral mysticism of a type fairly common in India. The traditions of European rationalism and culture—critically absorbed by Nehru, who was educated in Europe—influenced his ideas on history, particularly as they affected India, and helped him to avoid prejudiced idealisation and see his country as it was in relation to other countries. 'India was in my blood and there was much in her that instinctively thrilled me. And yet I approached her almost as an alien critic, full of dislike for the present as well as for many of the relics of the past that I saw. To some extent I came to her via the West, and looked at her as a friendly westerner might have done.'[2]

Having refused to look for the meaning of history outside of itself, Nehru came to acknowledge the inner laws of historical development and thus took an important step towards a realistic, one might almost say materialist, understanding of the historical process. 'In Asia,' he said, 'many historical forces have been at work for many

[1] *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. 2, Calcutta, 1954, p. 378.

[2] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1964, p. 51.

years past and many things have happened which are good and many things which are not so good, as always happens when impersonal historical forces are in action. They are still in action. We try to mould them a little, to divert them here and there, but essentially they will carry on till they fulfil their purpose and their historical destiny.'[1] Nehru's recognition of objective laws led him to realise the direction of the historical process upwards in a spiral, to understand it as an objective and progressive course of events proceeding from lower to higher. These elements of his world outlook had a positive effect on his political work, which he approached not as a voluntarist or moralist, or from a religious point of view, but, as a rule, scientifically, trying to bring it into line with the general, objective course of history and subjugate it to progressive trends. It was in obeying the command of Time, predetermined by the whole preceding development of mankind, that Nehru saw the justification and realism of his political course and political struggle. He said that ideals and goals should not run counter to historical tendencies. He consistently adhered to the progressive scientific conception that the real agent of history is the people, and that the activities of political leaders should be subordinated to the struggle to satisfy the hopes and aspirations of the popular masses. Nehru stressed: 'The people were the principal actors, and behind them, pushing them on, were great historical urges... But for that historical setting and political and social urges, no leaders or agitators could have inspired them to action.'[2]

Nehru's world outlook took shape under the influence of many schools. His views on the laws governing the historical process and the role of the masses show the greatest influence of the ideas of scientific socialism.

One may think: Nehru is not original, he is an eclectic, and leave it at that. But Nehru is much more complex and his views must not be studied simplistically. Nehru strove to know and assimilate as much as possible of the experience accumulated by mankind and to select the best of it. Sometimes in the political struggle he used isolated premises from various philosophical systems, and this, of course, prevented him from seeing their irreconcilability, their antagonism. And then he inevitably tended towards eclecticism, which he wanted at all costs to avoid. He preferred 'a mental or spiritual attitude which synthesizes differences and contradictions, tries to understand and accommodate different religions, ideologies, political, social and economic systems'.[3]

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy. Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Delhi, 1961, p. 256.

[2] Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, Allied Publishers Private, Ltd., Bombay, 1962, p. 282.

[3] *The Mind of Mr. Nehru. An Interview by R. K. Karanjia*, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1961, p. 89.

No one succeeded yet in creating a 'synthesis' of ideologies. And he knew it. The contradictory elements in his world outlook were not unified or reconciled. It is impossible to unite that which is irreconcilable, antagonistic and class-opposed. Nehru often self-critically reviewed his original ideas, trying to move forward and improve them. The direction of his political and social searches, the trends of their development, were fruitful and are still important today. In seeking an answer to the problems of the anti-imperialist struggle and the future of former colonies, Nehru strove to keep in step with the times.

Nehru imbibed the traditions of ancient Indian culture and the rich experience of the national liberation movement, especially the philosophy and practice of Gandhism. He assimilated all that West European bourgeois liberalism had to offer, and turned to socialist ideas, at first in their Fabian version. But having once turned to the ideals of equality and social justice, Nehru was bound to perceive, by force of his critical, searching mind, many of the premises of scientific socialism. He eagerly studied the theory and practice of scientific socialism and found much there that was applicable in India. Nehru was one of the first national liberation leaders unafraid of speaking of the importance of Marxism-Leninism, seeing in it the logic of historical development, the call of the times.

Nehru repeatedly underlined the positive influence of the ideas of scientific socialism on his own world outlook. He wrote: 'The theory and philosophy of Marxism lightened up many a dark corner in my mind. History came to have a new meaning for me. The Marxist interpretation threw a flood of light on it, and it became an unfolding drama with some order and purpose, howsoever unconscious, behind it. In spite of the appalling waste and misery of the past and the present, the future was bright with hope, though many dangers intervened. It was the essential freedom from dogma and the scientific outlook of Marxism that appealed to me.'[1] Elsewhere, he wrote: 'A study of Marx and Lenin produced a powerful effect on my mind and helped me to see history and current affairs in a new light. The long chain of history and of social development appeared to have some meaning, some sequence, and the future lost some of its obscurity.'[2]

Scientific socialism attracted Nehru not only as a theory. The reason for its appeal was that Nehru was delighted and attracted by the colossal and unprecedented experiment in revolutionary change which took place before his eyes in Soviet Russia. 'While the rest of the world was in the grip of the depression and going backward in some ways, in the Soviet country a great new world was being built up before our eyes. Russia, following the great Lenin, looked into the future and thought only of what was to be, while the other countries lay numbed under the dead hand of the past and spent their energy

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, pp. 362-63.
[2] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 29.

in preserving the useless relics of a bygone age. In particular, I was impressed by the reports of the great progress made by the backward regions of Central Asia under the Soviet régime. In the balance, therefore, I was all in favour of Russia, and the presence and example of the Soviets was a bright and heartening phenomenon in a dark and dismal world.'[1]

Nehru followed the social changes in Soviet Russia with great interest. He made his first trip to the country with his father Motilal Nehru, an important figure in the Indian National Congress, in 1927, during celebrations to mark a decade of Soviet power. What he saw brought him to the conclusion that 'the Soviet Revolution had advanced human society by a great leap and had lit a bright flame which could not be smothered, and that it had laid the foundations for that new civilization towards which the world could advance'.[2]

Nehru showed great interest in Lenin, his personality, theories and practical work. Evaluating his role in history, Nehru wrote that 'millions have considered him as a Saviour and the greatest man of the age'.[3] He called Lenin 'a master mind and a genius in revolution'.[4]

Nehru's ideal was the unity of thought and action, of theory and practice. The influence of scientific socialism and his high appraisal of the historic achievements of the USSR naturally led him to recognise the necessity of bringing about radical socio-economic changes in India, and to proclaim socialism first as the ideal social system and later as the ultimate goal of political activity.

In his presidential address to the INC at Lakhnau in 1936, Nehru said: 'I am convinced that the only key to the solution of the world's problems and of India's problems lies in Socialism, and when I use this word I do so not in a vague humanitarian way but in the scientific, economic sense... I see no way of ending the poverty, the vast unemployment, the degradation and the subjection of the Indian people except through Socialism. That involves vast and revolutionary changes in our political and social structure, the ending of vested interests in land and industry... That means the ending of private property, except in a restricted sense, and the replacement of the present profit system by a higher ideal of co-operative service... In short, it means a new civilization, radically different from the present capitalist order.'[5]

Nehru saw the socialist transformation of society as a natural law of the world's historical development. He stressed that capitalism 'is ... completely out of place today in the world',[6] that the world

1 Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, pp. 361-62.
2 Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 29.
3 *Ibid.*, p. 307.
4 Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1964, p. 638.
5 Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Freedom*, Unwin Books, London, 1962, p. 35.
6 See Jawaharlal Nehru, *India Today and Tomorrow*, Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, 1959, p. 20.

had outgrown it. He noted that the scientific and technical revolution made the need for socialism particularly clear, and that the modern scientific approach was also a socialist approach.

Nehru was one of the first leaders of the anti-colonialist movement to make quite clear that the movement towards socialism was a specific need for developing countries, an objectively predetermined road of progress for states liberated from imperialist rule, including India. In this thesis, Nehru anticipated many arguments later put forward by other politicians in Asia and Africa. He clearly stated the unacceptability of capitalism for the developing countries, as they had no time to achieve progress by the same methods, or at the same rate, as the Western world had. 'Are we to follow the English, French and the American way?' he asked. 'Have we time of 100 to 150 years to reach our destination? This is impossible. We will perish in the process.'[1] The idea that only socialism could allow the former colonial peoples to wrench themselves out of their backwardness was also put forward in his well-known article 'The Basic Approach': 'It has to be remembered that it is not by some magic adoption of socialist or capitalist method that poverty suddenly leads to riches. The only way is through hard work and increasing the productivity of the nation and organising an equitable distribution of its products. It is a lengthy and difficult process. In a poorly developed country, the capitalist method offers no chance. It is only through a planned approach on socialistic lines that steady progress can be attained though even that will take time.'[2]

Nehru's sympathetic attitude towards socialism reflected an important shift which took place in Indian democratic social thought first under the influence of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia and the achievements of socialism in the USSR, and then under the influence of the defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism in the Second World War, which opened the way to India's success in the national liberation struggle.

In his speeches regarding the social and economic policies of the ruling party, the Indian National Congress, after independence, Nehru laid the main stress on the need for industrialisation and planning in order to ensure independent national development and an improvement in the economy and in the welfare of the people. He said, 'Broadly our objective is to establish a Welfare State with a socialist pattern of society, with no great disparities of income and offering an equal opportunity to all.[3]

Nehru recognised the objective need for the reorganisation of Indian society along socialist lines, although his understanding of the actual process, of the forms and methods of reorganisation, betrayed

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Towards a Socialistic Order*, All-India Congress Committee, New Delhi, 1956, p. 64.

[2] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Congressmen's Primer for Socialism*, A Socialist Congressman Publication, New Delhi, 1963, p. 197.

[3] *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. 4, p. 151.

his own specific, mainly subjectivistic, idealist notions that came about as the result of the complex interplay of the class contradictions in modern India, as a result of the plurality of social structures and, most important, of Nehru's underestimation of the special historical role of the working class as the bearer of the ideology of scientific socialism. The alignment of class forces in the national liberation movement against British rule, and in independent India afterwards, restricted Nehru's chances of realising his subjective ideals in prictice.

His ideas, and especially his practical politics, were inevitably affected by the enormous number of unresolved general democratic tasks which faced India and made the broad unification of national forces imperative. Nehru tended to absolutise the temporary alignment of classes, which was determined by the particular level of the democratic movement and corresponded to the aims of a particular stage, but which could not be retained if there was to be socialist transformation. In his analysis of Indian society, he seemed to be unwilling to go beyond the general democratic stage of the revolution, unwilling to admit that the struggle for socialism required a radically different class orientation and that in passing from general democratic to socialist goals the content, make-up and correlation of the components of the united national front of the period of the anti-imperialist movement must change radically.

Nehru recognised the existence of classes and class struggle, but in the last period of his life he laid stress on the thesis that class contradictions could be resolved through compromises and reforms based on class cooperation. He considered that persuasion alone was enough to prevent the growth of influence of the propertied and exploiting classes in the country's economic and political life.

One is bound to notice in this a definite influence of liberal bourgeois ideas, plus traces of Gandhi's utopian moralistic concepts.

It was these ideas and concepts which served as the basis for Nehru's unfounded subjective criticism of certain aspects of Soviet history, of some of the propositions of scientific socialism, and of the communist movement in India. Here we see the profound contradiction in Nehru's world outlook, a contradiction which he never overcame, despite his efforts. The long isolation of India, its social thought and Nehru himself, from the achievements of Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of building socialism in the USSR and other countries, also limited his chances of fully understanding the development of the new socialist world, which Nehru came to accept gradually and with many reservations, especially as regards the concept of class struggle and the role of the working class.

On the one hand, Nehru acknowledged the scientific accuracy of Marx's interpretation of history, based on the idea of class antagonism. 'Marx constantly talks of exploitation and class struggles,' wrote Nehru. But, 'according to Marx, this is not a matter for anger or good virtuous advice. The exploitation is not the fault of the person exploiting. The dominance of one class over another has been the natur-

al result of historical progress... Marx did not preach class conflict. He showed that in fact it existed, and had always existed in some form or other.'[1] 'Individuals may be converted, they may surrender their special privileges, although this is rare enough, but classes and groups do not do so. The attempt to convert a governing and privileged class into forsaking power and giving up its unjust privileges has therefore always so far failed, and there seems to be no reason whatever to hold that it will succeed in the future.'[2]

But on the other hand, in the fifties and sixties, Nehru tried in vain to reconcile his recognition of class struggle with the Gandhian concept of class harmony, thus contradicting his own realistic evaluations of previous years. 'So while not denying or repudiating class contradictions,' he said, 'we want to deal with the problem in a peaceful and co-operative way by lessening rather than increasing these conflicts and trying to win over people instead of threatening to fight them or destroy them.... The concept of class struggle or wars has been outdated as too dangerous...'[3]

Leaving aside the confusion of class struggle and war, and the absolute opposition of non-violence and violence, of peaceful and non-peaceful ways of resolving class contradictions, it would appear that these words reflect not so much the evolution of Nehru's convictions towards the end of his life, as a pragmatic requirement resulting from a political course largely determined by the conservative forces in the leadership of the multiclass and extremely heterogeneous ruling party–the Indian National Congress–forces that were consolidating their influence at that time, which subsequently led to the division of the Congress.

But the facts of the political struggle and the country's socio-economic development constantly affected Nehru's views. These facts belied the concept of class collaboration and the possibility of 're-educating' Indian landowners and capitalists, indeed they abounded in social conflicts in which the privileged classes resorted to every means of quelling the protest of the working people, including open violence, to protect their own interests.

The heat of the class struggle, Nehru's sincere sympathy with the oppressed, his desire to improve their lot and constant subjective devotion to socialist ideals forced him once again to take a sober look at the depth and objective character of the class contradictions in Indian society.

Finally, Nehru recognised the existence in India of privileged groups and classes who opposed progressive change. He indicated that to protect their own selfish interests these social strata (and Nehru had in mind not only the semi-feudal landowners but above all the monopoly bosses) might go against the country's social progress.

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History*, p. 565.
[2] Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 544.
[3] *The Mind of Mr. Nehru. An Interview by R. K. Karanjia*, pp. 76-77.

The Indian National Congress's bandying of socialist slogans did not bring Nehru to idealisation of Indian society. Always a realist, he said that the Indian economic system could be defined as a capitalist economy with considerable state control, or a capitalist economy plus a public sector directly run by the state. But in essence it was a capitalist economy.

Nehru saw that the country's socialist course, progress and democracy were threatened not only by the traditional forces of feudal landowners and religious and communal disparities, but also by the growing monopolies. Shortly before his death, in the autumn of 1963, Nehru wrote: 'Monopoly is the enemy of socialism. To the extent it has grown during the last few years, we have drifted away from the goal of socialism.'[1]

* * *

Nehru's views on foreign policy were consistently progressive; in this area his views were not marked by the conflict inherent in ideas of socialism and internal policy. Both as a thinker and as a statesman, he made an outstanding contribution to the cause of fighting imperialism, ensuring world peace, and turning the balance of forces on the world arena since the war in favour of national liberation, progress and socialism.

Jawaharlal Nehru was a thoroughgoing fighter for peace and international security. A supporter of peaceful coexistence, he spoke in favour of détente, curtailment of the arms race, and universal disarmament. He was one of the founders of the policy of non-alignment, which by no means signified passive neutrality. He said that when freedom and justice were under threat, when aggression was committed, India could not and would not be neutral.

Nehru combined positive neutralism with a consistent fight against colonialism, the urgency of which he always stressed. 'Imperialism or colonialism suppressed and suppresses the progressive groups or classes because it is interested in preserving the social and economic status quo,' he wrote. 'Even after a country has become independent, it may continue to be economically dependent on other countries."[2] Nehru's warning about economic dependence on imperialism is still entirely relevant to India and other developing countries.

Nehru was one of those who proposed the five foundations of peaceful coexistence between Asian countries (the doctrine of Pancha Sila). He was involved in convoking the historic Bandung Conference (1955), a watershed in the process of unifying the liberated states of Asia and Africa in the struggle against imperialism, neo-colonialism, racialism, for peace, freedom and socio-economic progress.

[1] *Congress Bulletin*, No. 9-10, 1963, p. 55.
[2] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Congressmen's Primer for Socialism*. p. 196.

One of Nehru's great merits was his constant desire to unite with all progressive forces on the world scene. In 1927 he took part in the anti-imperialist Congress of Oppressed Nations held in Brussels. He wrote: 'Ideas of some common action between oppressed nations *inter se*, as well as between them and the Labour left wing, were very much in the air. It was felt more and more that the struggle for freedom was a common one against the thing that was imperialism, and joint deliberation and, where possible, joint action were desirable.'[1] This was an important step towards recognising the unity between the national liberation struggle and the revolutionary movement, including the workers' movement. Nehru's revolutionary nationalism was consonant with the appeal made by the leader of the proletarian revolution, Lenin, for collaboration and joint efforts in the fight against imperialism. Nehru said: 'Socialism in the west and the rising nationalisms of the Eastern and other dependent countries opposed this combination of fascism and imperialism... Inevitably we take our stand with the progressive forces of the world which are ranged against fascism and imperialism.'[2]

One of the most vivid and fruitful manifestations of this line was Nehru's unceasing aspiration for mutual understanding with the Soviet Union. The establishment and successful development of Indo-Soviet collaboration is inseparably linked with the policies pursued by Nehru. The friendly relations between the two countries, based on his policies, have long been, in the words of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, 'a most convincing manifestation of the great alliance between the world of socialism and the world born of the national liberation movement'.[3] These relations are a model of peaceful coexistence and fruitful cooperation of states with different socio-economic systems, linked by common interests in the struggle for peace and international security.

The favourable development of Indo-Soviet relations since India gained independence was reflected in the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed in August 1971. In the years that followed, reciprocal visits by top-level Soviet and Indian delegations made a major contribution to the development of friendly bilateral relations and to the strengthening of international détente, peace and security in Asia and the world. The documents signed during these visits, which developed the basic principles of relations between the USSR and India and determined the general direction of their cooperation, were greeted with great approval in the Soviet Union and India and valued highly by democrats throughout the world.

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 161.

[2] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The First Sixty Years*, Vol. 1, The Bodley Head, London, 1965, p. 427.

[3] L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles (1972-1975)*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 336.

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The ideas and policy course of Jawaharlal Nehru are still alive. But any political platform loses its significance if it ceases to respond to the spirit of the times.

A sense of time was one of Nehru's most characteristic traits. Constant development and change were typical of his activity and outlook. In the years since Nehru's death, there has been much change in the life of India. The working people are becoming more socially active and politically aware and the level of maturity of democratic forces is growing. In order for Nehru's legacy to remain a factor for progress under these circumstances, it must develop and deepen.

Nehru realised which direction the development of Indian society was taking. Although years of reformist practice had a strong influence on his outlook, he did not lose his revolutionary ideas, nor the ability to see his policies objectively and to evaluate them soberly. He was well aware what genuine socialism was and therefore he understood the conditional and relative nature of the concept of a socialist pattern of society. It was only logical, therefore, that he showed an interest in defining more clearly and further elaborating this concept, in particular at a session of the INC in Bhubaneshwar. He sensed the public's disappointment with the results of the social policy and was, himself, not altogether satisfied with them.

Time dictates the need to take account of the revolutionary platform which Nehru defended in the twenties and thirties and whose validity he never negated. This is the only way, in our view, to give his subjective socialism real content and to transform it from a propaganda slogan into a programme of action for the people.

After Nehru's death, bourgeois elements, while formally following Nehru's course, limited the action of his general democratic reforms and his orientation towards the people as a whole and introduced into his reforms inconsistency, class self-interest and elitist narrowness. Class protest action by the working people intensified. The right-wing national capitalist circles increasingly revealed their desire for the open implementation of a consistently bourgeois policy in favour of big capital in the towns and in favour of major capitalist landowners, and rich peasants in the countryside, and for a renunciation of Nehru's course with its socialist ideals and principles of centralised planning and a strong state sector, in which Indian monopoly capital increasingly sensed a threat to its freedom and its unhindered development. Democratic forces criticised the INC more and more consistently and sharply for forgetting the socialist elements of his programme. This criticism found a growing response among the masses, who were beginning to realise that the socialist pattern of society was not working out, that the poor were getting poorer and the rich richer.

The fourth general elections in 1967 became a deep dividing line in the political development of India. The serious weakening of the

Congress's positions in the centre and the formation of non-Congress governments in seven states was a tangible blow to the system of INC domination and a noticeable step towards the alteration of the party and political system in the country.

The Congress's poor results in these elections and the squabbles within the party leadership over the reasons for these failures and the necessary measures to overcome them were an obvious sign of the split in the INC.

The Congress victory over the united right-wing opposition, "the great alliance", in the 1971/72 general elections outwardly returned the Congress to its previous political domination of the fifties and early sixties. However, the objective and subjective factors undermining the INC's position of domination continued to accumulate intensively.

However, the state of emergency in 1975-1977, and the well-known measures declared by Indira Gandhi's government, including those related to the progressive 20-point programme, were already belated actions. The lower classes turned away from the INC. The ineffective measures undertaken by the INC during the state of emergency showed that the ruling party had not managed to overcome the objective and subjective factors which had provoked the crisis of its power. The party suffered a major defeat in 1977.

What were the causes of the Congress's disintegration and the decline in its prestige, which led the party to defeat at the 1977 elections? If one searches for the causes not in the specific political situation in India during the second half of the seventies, but in the more profound social processes, the answer, in our view, is obvious. It was an accumulation of difficulties and contradictions of India's capitalist development which had a grave effect on the popular masses. The INC's good intentions of easing these difficulties, of including the development of national capitalism within the framework of nationwide interests and of subordinating it to the aim of increasing the public's welfare, and of averting the rapid growth of monopolies so as to ease class conflicts, turned out to be illusory. The contradictions both within the ruling class, between its right-wing, centrist and left-wing groups, and between the national bourgeoisie and the masses continued to grow. Protest action by workers gained unprecedented scope. In 1973, Indira Gandhi said that the INC sensed the growing impatience of the Indian people and that if the existing system was not able to satisfy the just aspirations of the people, then the latter might prefer other methods. This is precisely what happened.

However, the Janata coalition which replaced the Congress was unable to provide the Indian people with a satisfactory alternative. Janata concentrated on criticising the Congress policy, trying to exploit public dissatisfaction to the full, but it was unable to work out an effective and dynamic course of action. Janata required thirty months to exhaust the trust of the electorate which the Congress had previously held for thirty years. At the parliamentary elections in

1980, the INC under the leadership of Indira Gandhi came away with a convincing victory.

There are various opinions as to the prospects for India's political development. Many political observers do not rule out the strengthening of tendencies towards the concentration of power in the hands of one person. This is quite definitely the aspiration of influential national capitalist groups. Already several propositions concerning alterations of the constitution have been made with this aim in mind, and some attempts have even been undertaken to create a social movement around such ideas. Will the Congress resort to this method of maintaining power, or will it remain loyal to the democratic institutions established by Nehru? It appears that in the latter case, the INC cannot have any real reserves for strengthening its authority other than by turning to Nehru's progressive ideals and by giving them real content via the policy of social progress in the interests of Indian working people—the majority of the nation.

In conclusion we would like to point out that it is impossible to use Nehru's legacy for the formulation of a progressive policy without its critical interpretation and development. This criticism is not at all directed against the memory of Nehru or against his legacy. On the contrary, it is based on respect for him, belief in the value of his ideological and political platform, and the conviction that the positive aspects of this platform are far from exhausted.

* * *

Looking at all the facets of Nehru's work as a political and public figure, as a philosopher and historian, it should be stressed that all that is best in his legacy—and we are deeply convinced of this—was due to his attraction to socialism and progress, and his interest in scientific socialist theory, which considerably influenced his world outlook and politics.

His attraction to socialism gave him the idea of joining forces with the international workers' movement and of collaborating with the USSR.

It was his attraction to socialism that determined the Indian National Congress's declaring its aim to be the construction of a society along socialist lines.

Despite the haziness of Nehru's socialist ideal, it is undeniable that he was one of the first leaders of the national liberation movement who understood the narrowness of anti-imperialist nationalism and the need to give it a socialist orientation. It is for this that he will always be remembered. And it is this that explains the great sympathy and respect felt by the Soviet people for Jawaharlal Nehru, a great man of India.

A prominent figure of the Indonesian national liberation movement. Born on June 6, 1901 in Surabaya, Java, into the family of a school teacher. Introduced in his youth to the ideals of the struggle for the national independence of the Netherlands East Indies, the name given the country by Dutch colonialists.

In 1926, he graduated as a civil engineer from the Bandung Technological Institute, the first higher educational establishment in the colony. During his studies, he became acquainted with the works of the great thinkers of various countries and peoples, and acquired a wide knowledge of history and sociology.

In the same year he took part in the organisation of the Bandung Study Club, whose members called for the rejection of cooperation with the Dutch colonial authorities. On July 4, 1927 the Nationalist Party of Indonesia was established on the basis of the club and Sukarno became its first Chairman. It was at this time that the main features of Sukarno's system of views were formed, which he called Marhaenism and which represented a variety of petty-bourgeois socialism.

Sukarno was arrested by the Dutch in December 1929 for anti-colonial activity. At his trial he exposed the crimes of the colonial authorities and spoke out in defence of the right of the Indonesians to independence. This outstanding speech promoted a rapid growth in the popularity of Sukarno, who had become a prominent leader of the national liberation movement in Indonesia. On his release in 1932, he continued his political activity but was arrested again a year later. He was imprisoned or exiled for nine years until the beginning of the Japanese invasion of Indonesia in 1942.

During the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, Sukarno maintained outwardly loyal relations with the military authorities, reckoning at first to use the links with Japan in order to prevent the country from returning to Dutch rule. At the same time, he kept up contact with

and assisted underground national and patriotic organisations.

In March 1945, Sukarno headed the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence, set up by the Japanese administration when it saw the approaching defeat of Japan in the war and under the influence of the stirring up of the national liberation movement on the Indonesian islands.

In the conditions formed as a result of the defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism by the Soviet Union and the other participants of the anti-fascist coalition, Sukarno announced the country's independence on August 17, 1945, on behalf of the Indonesian people and became the first President of the new Republic of Indonesia.

In 1945-49 the Indonesian people conducted a persistent struggle against Dutch colonialists who were trying to re-establish their power over the country. In December 1948, Sukarno was taken prisoner and only released in July 1949. As a result of the heroism of Indonesian freedom fighters and owing to the support of world public opinion, the government of the Republic managed to force the Dutch into negotiations which ended in December 1949 with the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty.

As head of the Republic of Indonesia, Sukarno contributed much to the formation of the country's active, independent foreign policy. He was one of the initiators of the Bandung Conference of Asian and African countries in 1955 and he was one of the founders of the non-aligned movement.

Owing to the worsening of the country's internal political situation, Sukarno, as head of state and Supreme Commander of the Indonesian armed forces, introduced a state of emergency in the Republic on March 14, 1957, concentrating full power in his own hands.

In 1957-59, in agreement with the main political groups in the country, Sukarno implemented a series of reforms of the state structure, strengthening the role and prerogatives of executive power and of the President as its head. One of the consequences of these reforms was the restriction of political activity in the country within the framework of state policy and ideology.

In the latter half of the fifties, the Indonesian government took steps to develop relations with the USSR and other socialist countries. Sukarno visited the Soviet Union on more than one occasion, in 1956, 1959, 1961, and 1964. In 1962, with the support of the USSR, the Indonesian people obtained the liberation of West Irian, Indonesian territory since time immemorial and illegally retained by the Dutch.

In 1963, the supreme organ of state power, the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, gave Sukarno the title of "the great leader of the Indonesian Revolution", and made him life President.

The worsening of socio-political contradictions and the aggravation of economic difficulties in the country resulted in a serious crisis of state power in Indonesia beginning in October 1965. Opposition to Sukarno was headed by influential military circles. On March 11,

1966, the President was forced to agree to virtually hand over all executive power in the country to the commander-in-chief of ground forces, General Suharto. On July 5, 1966, Congress withdrew its decision appointing Sukarno life President and on March 12, 1967, finally deprived him of all his titles and powers as head of state.

Sukarno died on June 21, 1970 in a military hospital in Djakarta and was buried the following day in Blitar with full state honours. Nine years later, on June 21, the official opening ceremony of Sukarno's burial vault, built on the decree of the country's President, took place in Blitar.

"Once again we are talking about him" was the heading of an article in one of the Djakarta weeklies, devoted to the personality and political activity of the first President of the Republic of Indonesia. At first glance the profound interest in the figure of the late leader, which has appeared in recent years among a very broad section of Indonesian society, might seem odd. After the tragic events of 1965 and the subsequent severe political crisis which led to the overthrow of the head of state, after the prolonged efforts of Sukarno's opponents to discredit his political course, and after the direct prohibition of the spreading of his views, it would have been hard to imagine that in under ten years these views would become the object not just of lively interest, but also of a tense argument over Sukarno's ideological and political heritage. To explain this phenomenon, one evidently has to answer three questions. First, what was the essence of Sukarno's views. Secondly, what phenomena and processes in the economic, social and political development of modern Indonesia compel people to turn to concepts which on the whole were never fully realised. Finally, why was Sukarno unable to put into practice the ideals to which he devoted his life, even though he remained true to them throughout sharp turns in history and the most complicated political manouevres and compromises.

Sukarno is one of the most complex and outstanding figures in the national liberation movement in Asia and Africa during the first stage of its post-war development. Lenin, when analysing the contradictory essence of Tolstoy's outlook, wrote: "The contradictions in Tolstoy's views are not contradictions inherent in his personal views alone, but are a reflection of the extremely complex, contradictory conditions, social influences and historical traditions which determined the psychology of various classes and various sections of Russian society in the *post*-Reform, but *pre*-revolutionary era."[1] This method is equally applicable to an analysis of Sukarno's outlook.

[1] V. I. Lenin, 'L. N. Tolstoy', *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 325.

The conditions for the formation and development of national private enterprise in Indonesia in the colonial period were particularly unfavourable even in comparison with other colonies. This was determined by the especially exploitative forms of oppression used by Dutch imperialism. The result of this was not only the extreme weakness of the national bourgeoisie (still not overcome to this day), but also the relatively weak class differentiation of Indonesian society and the rigid patriarchal nature of relations within its individual strata and between these strata. The end of the 1920s and early 1930s saw the rise of the anti-Dutch national liberation movement. The ideals of national independence united all classes and social groups and became the leitmotif of all political activity.

Sukarno belongs to that generation of political leaders of the newly-free countries who developed in the course of the struggle for national independence. The idea of national liberation became for them the first principle of all that existed in politics and public affairs. They regarded all other ideologies through the prism of nationalism and from nationalism emerged their own social conceptions. Their further ideological evolution depended not only on the development of the liberation movement of the country, but also on their subjective ability to understand correctly the position of society at every stage, to grasp the constantly changing demands of its development and to see the genuine and not the imaginary interests of the people.

Sukarno's social views reflected not only the anti-colonial, but also the anti-capitalist sentiment directed primarily at the Dutch colonialists who were regarded as mainly responsible for these inhuman social relations. The Indonesian village community with its principle of 'gotong-royong'—cooperation and mutual aid—became for Sukarno the ideal for social organisation. He set forth his views on the development of Indonesian society in the concept of Indonesian socialism, calling it Marhaenism after a simple Javan peasant Marhaen. According to the future head of independent Indonesia, the meeting with this man had inspired him to theoretical searches in this direction. In the sixties Sukarno formulated his concept thus: 'Marhaen is a man who possesses limited means of production, a small man with a small property, primitive tools, a man who has just as much as he needs for himself. Our nation is made up of millions of improverished people working for themselves. No one works for anyone else. There is no exploitation of man by man. Marhaenism is Indonesian socialism in practice ... it embodies our return to Indonesian identity.'[1]

An extremely significant point: the elimination of the exploitation of man by man as the return to national identity. According to Sukarno, class oppression was not a product of the development of Indonesian society itself but something introduced from outside.

[1] Bung Karno, *Penjambung Lidah Rakjat Indonesia*, Djakarta, 1966, pp. 84-85.

Therefore it would be sufficient to stimulate a rise in national self-awareness, and all social problems would be solved.

But Sukarno's views could not avoid the influence of the era opened with the victory of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917, and with the growth of influence of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism throughout the world. Sukarno's anti-capitalist and egalitarian outlook is distinguished by a greater radicalism than that of the majority of his associates in the national liberation struggle. In 1933, for instance, he wrote of his hostility towards any manifestation in Indonesian society of the passion for accumulating capital,[1] and warned it would be the folly of the Indonesian people if its 'chariot of history' were to take the path 'leading to the world of Indonesian capitalism and the world of a bourgeois Indonesia'.[2] There are numerous quotations from Marx, Engels and Lenin and references to the experience of the development of the Soviet Union in Sukarno's speeches and articles. Sukarno could not ignore the increasing political role of the Indonesian proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party. Founded in 1920, the Communist Party of Indonesia had, by the middle of that decade, become a leading force in the country's liberation movement and headed the nationwide uprising against the colonialists. Sukarno pointed out that it was then that he became convinced of the need for a unity of the three main ideological and political currents in the Indonesian people's struggle for national liberation, i.e., the nationalist, the religious (primarily Moslem) and the communist. This subsequently took shape in the concept of NASAKOM, formed from the first syllables of the Indonesian words "nasionalis", "agama" (religion) and "komunis". Of course, it is not surprising that nationalism took first place, just as it is no coincidence that in Indonesia, where up to 90 per cent of the population practise Islam, religion is mentioned only as one of the currents. The fact is that although Sukarno and his adherents were in the main Moslems they never desired the creation in Indonesia of a theocratic Islamic state, and opposed any attempts in this direction both before and after independence. But the main thing which puts Sukarno above many figures in the national liberation movement was his recognition of the ability of the workers' movement, of its historical right to have its own ideology and its own political party. It was not yet an understanding of the proletariat's mission with regards to the nation as a whole, but it was here that Sukarno undoubtedly made a step forward in comparison with his general national-populist system of views. We consider the use of this term justified here (although Sukarno himself considered Marhaenism to be Marxism applied on Indonesian soil), in so far as all the main signs of populism (known as Narodism in Russia) that Lenin singled out are characteristic of Su-

[1] Sukarno, *Indonesia Accuses*, Foreign Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1956, p. 211 (in Russian).
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 239.

karno's ideology (naturally with the necessary amendments owing to the difference in conditions between 19th-century Russia and Indonesia of the first half of the 20th century):'By Narodism we mean a system of views which comprises the following three features: 1) *Belief that capitalism in Russia represents a deterioration, a retrogression.* Hence the urge and desire to "retard", "halt", "stop the break-up" of the age-old foundations by capitalism, and similar reactionary cries. 2) *Belief in the exceptional character of the Russian economic system in general, and of the peasantry, with its village community, artel, etc., in particular.* It is not considered necessary to apply to Russian economic relationships the concepts elaborated by modern science concerning the different social classes and their conflicts. The village-community peasantry is regarded as something higher and better than capitalism; there is a disposition to idealise the "foundations".The existence among the peasantry of contradictions characteristic of every commodity and capitalist economy is denied or slurred over; it is denied that any connection exists between these contradictions and their more developed form in capitalist industry and capitalist agriculture. 3) *Disregard of the connection between the "intelligentsia" and the country's legal and political institutions, on the one hand, and the material interests of definite social classes, on the other*'.[1] Populism in general comes quite close to some features of nationalism, as Lenin noted in reference to the Russian Narodniks.[2] This is all the more characteristic for Sukarno, whose nationalism grew up on anti-imperialist soil, in a country crushed for centuries by colonial oppression, degradation and poverty, and had a distinct and militant anti-colonial orientation. In this was one of the sources of the immense progressive potential which Sukarno's activity possessed in the period of the fight for national independence and the warding off of imperialist aggression. As opposed to the Russian Narodniks, he was, in this sense, not the first in Indonesia. Before him this had been done by the Moslem nationalist movement at the beginning of the century and by the Communist Party of Indonesia in the 1920s, each from its own positions. But after the Dutch suppression of the anti-colonial uprising in 1925-26, the Communists remained underground right up until the1945 revolution and their opportunities for direct appeal to the people were restricted. Sukarno had significantly greater opportunity to do this, despite persecution by the colonial authorities, and as a result, for a long time criticism of capitalism (even if for the most part as a foreign phenomenon), came almost solely from Sukarno and his supporters. This also made the national leader's ideas more attractive. Finally, the third, but not the least important idea of anti-imperialist national unity, the thread running through practically all Sukarno's speeches, retained its relevance not

[1] V. I. Lenin, 'The Heritage We Renounce', *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 513-14.
[2] See *Ibid.*, p. 512.

just until the 1945 national revolution, but for many years after the expulsion of the colonialists. On the threshold of the country's liberation Sukarno became the only figure in the national liberation movement who could give this movement a platform capable of uniting all the nation's forces for the struggle to overthrow colonial rule and to achieve independence for Indonesia. It was he who played the main role in the formulation of the Five Principles of Pancha Sila which became the official ideological basis of the Indonesian state. Speaking before the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence on June 1, 1945, Sukarno said that these principles were to be Indonesian nationalism, internationalism or humanism, consent or democracy, social prosperity, and a tolerant cultural belief in God.[1] Both Pancha Sila and the constitution, introduced in August 1945 and based on these principles, were formulated in very general terms, and their practical implementation, the imparting to them of real content, fully depended on the actual path which independent Indonesia chose and which class forces might determine the socio-political orientation of this path.

The Constitution of 1945, still in force today, invested the executive authorities with extensive powers, placing them under the altogether relative control of the legislative organs. The President and head of state was also the Prime Minister and the Supreme Commander of the armed forces and exercised extensive prerogatives in the field of legislation and in the everyday running of the country. The election of the first President of the independent Republic of Indonesia did not require much discussion. The only man who could claim the post was Sukarno, with his immense political prestige acquired over more than twenty years of the fight for independence, and with his system of views acceptable to the wide spectrum of social and political forces which participated in the national revolution.[2]

Once head of state, it would have seemed that Sukarno could have earnestly set about implementing the ideals of social harmony and class cooperation which he had formulated and preached during the course of his life. Moreover, he could have relied on his authority as a political leader, which had been strengthened even more after the repulsion of colonial aggression in 1945-48. The anti-imperialist course of Indonesia on the world arena won the country and its leader wide international recognition, especially following the Bandung Conference of Asian and African countries in 1955. Sukarno was not only one of the main organisers of this forum, but also an ideological inspirer of the historic conference which adopted the ten principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between states, which are still relevant today.

[1] See Soekarno, *The Birth of Pantjasila*, Issued by the Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, 1958, p. 28.

[2] It is not the aim of this essay to give a stage-by-stage examination of President Sukarno's views and policies throughout his periods in power.

The main problems facing Sukarno were in the sphere of domestic policy. In the mid-fifties the situation in Indonesia became extremely complicated with the intensification of inter-party strife and the beginning of reactionary, separatist revolts on the islands, threatening the integrity of the young state. Basically these difficulties were the reflection of emerging disagreement over the future development of Indonesian society. It is in this context that one should examine the parliamentary elections in 1955 and the local elections in 1957-58, which reflected the general move to the left in public feeling, the increased popularity of the Communist Party of Indonesia and other parties and groups speaking from positions of anti-imperialism and democracy and in favour of radical social changes.

Sukarno could not ignore the fact that the question of the Republic's future was being decided. As head of the Indonesian state, he was also confronted with the choice of the country's path. He unequivocally condemned the separatists and suppressed their actions by force of arms (it is true that the bloodshed was minimal on these occasions). But Sukarno failed to see the real source of tension. He declared the cause of all difficulties to be the parliamentary system, which had functioned in the country in accordance with the provisional Constitution of the Republic introduced in 1950. According to Sukarno, parliamentary democracy and the struggle of political forces it involved were borrowed phenomena, unsuitable for the national traditions of Indonesian society and the people of Indonesia. When the threat from the right was still meaningful, the progressive forces perceived the President's initiative as directed primarily or exclusively against right-wing groups. Therefore they supported, though with certain reservations, the series of reforms of the political system implemented by the President in 1957-59. He restored the Constitution of 1945, abolished the responsibility of the government before parliament and, in the end, concentrated full national power in his own hands. It was at this time that Sukarno reached the height of his power and it would seem that there was nothing to stop him, in the interests of the people, from putting into practice Marhaenism, his concepts of universal fraternity and cooperation, or from applying his own practical methods solving the problems facing the country or from devising his own strategy for the development of Indonesian society.

But looking retrospectively at the life and politics of Sukarno, one can say that it was at the end of the fifties that his national populist views were put to a more severe test than ever before, and that it was at this point that their inner conceptual weakness made itself felt. Sukarno himself was loyal to his ideas to the end of his days, never expressing one word of doubt as to their viability, nor did he propose any modifications to them. But the subjective loyalty to his convictions of this head of state and national populist inevitably generated the profound contradictoriness of Sukarno's and his government's politics.

This contradictoriness was manifested primarily in the approach to problems of the country's economic growth. Sukarno's opponents and critics constantly speak of the former President's incompetence in the economic field and his neglect of the issues of economic activity. He himself tended to take up a pose of distinctive revolutionary romanticism on this point.

'I don't give much thought to such mundane things as finance. Only people who have never breathed the air of nationalism can allow themselves to get bogged down in such commonplace matters,' he says, not without self-admiration, in his autobiography.[1] 'To tell the truth, I'm not an economist, and I'm not a specialist in the technical details of economics... My ideas on economic issues are altogether simple. They can be expressed thus: if the population of a desert can solve its economic problems then why shouldn't we be able to do so too?'[2] he declared on August 17, 1963, when the country was already plunged into a severe economic and social crisis. One can cite many such utterances. But it would be simplistic to explain them merely by Sukarno's desire to adopt the pose of a messiah, unaffected by 'petty' down-to-earth matters. The roots of Sukarno's unwillingness to tackle the problems of the economy lay much deeper.

Any economic development in an exploitative society inevitably generates new contradictions, destroys the illusion of social harmony, reveals class antagonism and, in the end, leads to the polarisation of class forces and to an intensification of their struggle. The instinctive fear of the petty-bourgeois faced with this prospect, with the necessity of choosing a clear class position, in certain circumstances pushes him to make attempts at preserving social processes and halting their development. And in so far as this preservation is impossible, such attempts lead to regression, deforming the development of society and giving it critical and agonising forms. In Indonesia, this led to the growth of capitalist elements in their most parasitical, anti-national forms; to the emergence of a stratum of bureaucratic bourgeoisie, which was engaged in the primary accumulation of capital by robbing the state sector, mainly enterprises and plantations confiscated from the British, Dutch and other foreign proprietors during the anti-imperialist struggle of the Indonesian people, led by Sukarno. The ban on strikes, which was introduced on the pretext of anti-imperialist unity, left the workers defenceless against the anti-popular bourgeois clique that was laying its hands on the political and economic apparatus of the country. Behind the wings of the wide-scale and intense anti-imperialist campaigns, the aggravation of stagnation and crisis phenomena in the Indonesian economy increased the country's dependence on imperialism and objectively undermined its political potential. By the end of his career, Sukarno admitted that the mis-

[1] Bung Karno, *Penjambung Lidah Rakjat Indonesia*, p. 161.
[2] *Genti Suara Revolusi Indonesia*, Djakarta, 1963, p. 30.

handled nationalisation of foreign property had led to a fall in production in the country.[1]

Remaining loyal to the conviction that there could be no antagonistic contradictions in Indonesian society, Sukarno mainly chose compromises in the sphere of the superstructure as the method for solving all problems, thus letting the economic basis develop uncontrolled, not only by not interfering in this process but frequently by actually distracting public attention from it. Sukarno and his government were prompted to work out laws on landownership and on rent limits, among other things, by the acute agrarian shortage, the overpopulation of Java, the wide-scale and increasing dispossession of peasants' land and unemployment, and food shortages. As for the moderate nature of this legislation, suffice it to say that a harvest could be divided between the tenant and landowner at a ratio of 1:1. When this legislation was democratically and consistently carried out, it could, at best, limit a little the arbitrary practices of the landowners and rich peasants in the village and free the peasant from the survivals of feudalism in the agrarian sphere. But even the first steps towards implementing the reforms revealed such a fierceness of contradictions, antagonisms and social animosity in the village, and gave such a violent push to political and class demarcation in the countryside, that continuation of work in this direction could have led to the direct confrontation of the country's class forces. Sukarno stepped back and, using his authority, convinced the leadership of the left-wing forces to do the same. Once again, the agrarian problem was temporarily pushed aside to the detriment of the fundamental and vital interests of the very same Marhaen whom Sukarno believed should become the support of a 'society of Indonesian socialism'.

He demonstrated the same inconsistency when forming the political structure of his regime. Towards the end of his state activity he denied, and quite justifiably, the accusation of dictatorship, saying, not without bitterness: 'Behind a dictator stands a party which is always ready to take power. This is not the case with me. I have no organisation to support me.'[2] And this was a man who in 1933, in the work *For a Free Indonesia*, provided a detailed elaboration, with quotations from Marx, of the idea of the necessity of a revolutionary vanguard party in Indonesia, welded by strict discipline, ideological and organisational unity and capable of leading the masses.[3] Striving to be a President on behalf of the whole nation, Sukarno did not attach his name to any of the existing parties after the 1945 revolution. He set out his idea of the ideal form of government later, in the following way: 'For us, the head of state is no different from the head of the family. According to Moslem custom, the father takes all decisions for his family, the village elder bears the entire burden of

[1] Bung Karno, *Penjambung Lidah Rakjat Indonesia*, p. 416.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] Sukarno, *Indonesia Accuses*, pp. 203-206 and pp. 227-29.

government in the village. This custom has existed in Indonesia for many centuries.'[1] Here once again a characteristic feature of populism creeps in; a phenomenon engendered by the socio-economic backwardness and under-development of society is idealised and made out to be something historical and for all times, as opposed to 'foreign' progress. This one can understand as one of the manifestations of the nationalism of an oppressed nation; technological, economic and social progress came to Indonesia for centuries from the metropolitan country via the oppressors and in a terribly distorted form, and thus it was often instinctively perceived as something hostile. This attitude can be understood but not justified.

Sukarno's regime of personal power, established in Indonesia at the end of the fifties, was essentially Bonapartist, in the sense that Lenin described Bonapartism: '... it is not definite classes that serve as a support, or not they alone, and not chiefly, but hand-picked elements, mostly from among various dependent sections of the population'. Lenin goes on to point out that from the point of view of the class struggle, the possibility of this phenomenon 'is due to a balance between the forces of the hostile or rival classes.'[2] As this temporary balance was tipped in favour of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, acting in a bloc with big landowners, and as subsequently the contradictions between the exploiting elite and the exploited working people intensified, the social foundation of Sukarno's regime (he called it 'guided democracy') became increasingly unsteady.

Two opposing camps became more and more clearly marked in Indonesian politics: the anti-imperialist, progressive forces of the country, the most consistent and active of which was the Communist Party of Indonesia, and the bloc of right-wing groups, the political vanguard of which was the anti-communist wing in the leadership of the armed forces, while the army itself turned into a potential strike force of this bloc.

It was not the views and concepts of the President that prompted the right-wing groups to support the head of state, but rather the conviction that his presence in power would allow them to maintain a little longer the illusion of national unity and to gather strength before the inevitable decisive battle. Evidently Sukarno himself began to realise this. He later wrote the following about the motives for the conferment upon him of the title of life President in 1963: 'In the opinion of my advisers, it was necessary to designate Sukarno life President, as the only figure above all parties and groups, in order to convince the Communists that right-wing extremists would not seize power, to show the Moslems that extreme left-wing elements would not come to power, and to guarantee that the reins of government would not be seized by the army.' One of the people closest to the

[1] Bung Karno, *op. cit.*, p. 393.

[2] V. I. Lenin, 'The Priesthood in the Elections, and Elections with the Priesthood', *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 342.

President, the Deputy Prime Minister, Chaerul Saleh, told Sukarno frankly: 'This is a political necessity. Otherwise we will all be dragged into a civil war.'[1] No one knows what feelings Sukarno experienced when he saw that he could not create a society of social harmony and all that he could do was to delay the explosion for a while.

It would be wrong to assert that in his activity the President did not look for ways round the growing problems. Expanding Indonesian relations with the socialist countries in the fifties on the basis of the joint struggle against imperialism, Sukarno became increasingly interested in these countries' experience in social development. He was attracted by the moral and political unity of the socialist nations, the effective resolution of the national question and the way the socialist Asian countries consolidated their national independence. But here again, it was mainly the processes in the superstructure that attracted his attention. He did not see or did not wish to see the fundamental differences between the homogeneous class make-up of society in the socialist states and the essentially exploitative society in Indonesia, differences stemming from the economic basis. While attaching extreme importance to the political support by socialist countries of Indonesia's struggle against imperialism, the President and his government paid far less attention to the effective use of the substantial economic aid coming from these countries. Both the volume and the nature of this aid could have promoted not only a rise in the living standard of the population, but also the achievement of the economic independence of the state, and thus, to a certain degree, could have narrowed the sphere of imperialist influence, a move which would have accorded fully with Sukarno's militant anti-imperialism.

The President's political rivals both in Indonesia and abroad, particularly in the last years of his life, speculated much on the rapprochement between Indonesia and China in the early sixties. The various aspects and effects of the Sino-Indonesian cooperation of that period, and the interests and plans of both sides, deserve a separate analysis. Let us say only that the motives which determined Sukarno's positions with regard to China were varied. An important role was played by his memories of the time of Sun Yatsen, whom the Indonesian President regarded as one of his ideological predecessors.[2] Later, like all progressives at that time, Sukarno was greatly influenced by the Chinese revolution of 1949, both in its social aspect and as an act liberating the Chinese people from oppression by imperialism and its protégés. Finally, the successes achieved by the Chinese people in the fifties in close cooperation with other socialist countries and in spite of the imperialist blockade became widely known in an Indonesia of age-old backwardness.

[1] Bung Karno, *op. cit.*, p. 416.

[2] In particular, in his speech 'The Birth of Pancha Sila' on June 1, 1945, Sukarno said that he had adopted the ideas of nationalism in counterbalance to cosmopolitanism under the influence of Sun Yatsen's book, *Three National Principles*. – See Sukarno, *Indonesia Accuses*, p. 264.

On the other hand, by virtue of the particular features of his political thought, Sukarno was impressed by the theses then popular in China: 'politics is a commanding force', 'all imperialists and reactionaries are paper tigers' and so on, which coincided with his own views and which, he felt, reinforced them. But the perception of these slogans as foreign policy concepts in the specific world situation at the beginning of the sixties, and the practical steps by Indonesian diplomacy resulting from these concepts,[1] led to the complication of the Republic's foreign policy position, created elements of estrangement in its relations with socialist states and thus weakened its role as a participant in the anti-imperialist struggle on a world scale, causing damage to the basic national interests of Indonesia and promoting the intensification of its internal political contradictions.

The deep intrinsic contradictoriness of Sukarno's views and practical politics was reflected in his attitude towards the Communist Party of Indonesia. His concept of NASAKOM could theoretically have become a progressive basis for a united patriotic front, capable of leading the nation's efforts towards the completion of the tasks of the national democratic stage of the revolution and the transfer of Indonesia on to the path of socialist orientation. The parliamentary and local elections in 1955-58 convincingly showed the steady growth of the influence of the Communists from year to year, and Sukarno could not ignore this. From 1957 onwards he spoke out very definitely in favour of including members of the Communist Party in the government. Sukarno was attracted by the Communist Party's contribution to the struggle against the colonialists and rightly saw it as the country's most organised, militant and consistent anti-imperialist force. Lacking his own party, he was most concerned that the Communists should become his allies. In the eyes of the President, the Communist Party of Indonesia's international contacts were undeniably effective in that they made it possible for the Party to enlist the solidarity of the entire progressive world public with the Indonesian people's struggle against imperialism. Many of the Communists' social ideals, such as equality and fraternity between people, the elimination of exploitation of man by man and the achievement of universal well-being, were also close to Sukarno's patriotic heart. However, Sukarno's subjectivist approach to the problem of classes and the class struggle, and his conviction of the possibility of avoiding the capitalist degeneration of Indonesian society without the fundamental revolutionary break-up of the entire social system limited substantially his chances of cooperating with the Communist Party.

[1] It was at this time that more and more unfounded reservations began to appear in Indonesia's foreign policy doctrine with regard to the struggle for peace, disarmament and limiting nuclear weapons. Slogans of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems were brought into conflict with the anti-imperialist struggle, and the thesis was put forward of the primacy of the contradiction between imperialism and the newly-free countries over all other contemporary contradictions.

When in 1960 the Communist Party leadership came out with a detailed criticism of the government's socio-economic policy, the party leaders were repressed by the military administration, and only after some time did the President stop the anti-communist campaign, thus emphasising the unconditional support of his policies as one of the terms under which the Communist Party could operate within the system of 'guided democracy'.

The practical realisation of the concept of NASAKOM was reduced to the coordination of the activities of the country's main parties at the leadership level in the interests of supporting and carrying out the government's policy. This cooperation between the three ideological and political trends was not allowed to spread to the democratic public supporting these trends, where it could have become a powerful factor in the anti-imperialist movement and the struggle for social progress. Here one can see the persistent resistance of the right-wing bourgeois circles and the particular features of Sukarno's own world outlook: the tendency to regard the masses simply as the object of leadership from the viewpoint of leader, or messiah. Therefore, while continually prompting activity among the people by political campaigns and slogans, and while creating the illusion of the public's participation in the determination of state policy,[1] he never managed to recognise the masses' role as the subject of the historical process, their right to political and revolutionary creativity.

Sukarno never drew the working people's party, the Communist Party of Indonesia, into actual participation in the country's government. As I have already mentioned, a ban on strikes was introduced and the peasant movement for agrarian reform was curtailed on the pretext of anti-imperialist unity. These measures were actively supported by bourgeois and landowning elements on the one hand, and on the other, whether he wanted to or not, the President's policy hampered the work of Communists among the masses and their struggle for the basic interests of the working people. Thus, he objectively undermined the position of the Communist Party both as the class vanguard of the Indonesian proletariat and working peasantry, and as a force capable of fighting for the highest interests of the nation as a whole. This ultimately served to erode the social basis of 'guided democracy', depriving it of popular support. Was this process predetermined and inevitable? It would seem that it could have been avoided if, as is indicated in present-day documents of the Communist Party of Indonesia, a section of the party leadership had not made serious right-wing opportunist mistakes. The Marxist-Leninist line worked out at the 5th and 6th party congresses in 1954 and 1959, aimed at rallying all patriotic anti-imperialist forces in the country

[1] The newspaper *Merdeka* of April 16, 1982, published an interview with a certain rickshaw driver. He proudly reminisced about rallies and anti-American campaigns in which he had taken part under the 'old system', and complained that under the new regime no one cared about him and nobody wanted to recognise his right to participation in the political life of the country.

while maintaining the full ideological, political and organisational independence of the Communist Party, was replaced by virtually unreserved support for Sukarno and by the renunciation of any criticism of the President's course. This line was fatal for the Party, but it also objectively harmed the President: there was no force in the country the activity of which could have stimulated the President's ideological evolution towards a radicalisation of his position and towards scientific socialism.

Following the removal of Sukarno from power in 1967, many opinions were expressed on the reasons behind the defeat of this outstanding and popular leader. It was in Soviet historical literature that the word 'tragedy' was first used with regard to Sukarno.[1] The tragic element of Sukarno's position was that while truly loving his country and people, he was unable to break out of the system of views and ideas which could not provide a solution to the problems facing Indonesian society and which doomed their proponent to a vicious circle of contradictions: populist anti-capitalism and the tolerance of the embourgeoisement of society in the most agonising and parasitic bureaucratic-bourgeois form; Marhaenism, i.e., essentially a peasant socialism, and the freezing of agrarian reform, thus leaving the peasants defenceless against the whim of the landowners, rich peasantry and money-lenders; constant appeals to the masses, the encouragement of their activity, and attempts to govern the country by patriarchal authoritarian methods; militant anti-imperialism and an economic chaos which led the country towards increasing dependence on world imperialism; patriotism and loyalty to the idea of national sovereignty, the belief in the special role of Indonesia on the world arena, and the carrying out of a foreign policy course which encroached on the fundamental national interests of the country. Sukarno's love for his people did not allow him to take a step backwards, from national populism to consistently bourgeois concepts, but neither did he find the strength within him to make the decisive and necessary step forward towards scientific socialism.

Gradually, Sukarno discovered that the political system he had created, which was intended to ensure political and social harmony, was degenerating severely, and that within its framework a bourgeois bureaucratic elite had emerged which had amassed vast fortunes and was striving merely to maintain or increase them. This elite grew up and multiplied around the President, concealing itself from the people behind the slogans and noisy campaigns of 'guided democracy' and using the system created by Sukarno to satisfy their anti-popular interests. This elite enmeshed the head of state in its web, cut him off from the people, compromised him in the eyes of the public, but never finally managed to completely swallow Sukarno, or 'tame' him. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie managed to adapt Sukarno's

[1] A. B. Belenky, B. I. Ilyichev, 'Some Lessons from the Events in Indonesia', *Kommunist*, No. 15. 1968.

political system to their demands, but not the man himself. In 1965, the President and supreme commander of the armed forces learned of the existence among the top generals of a right-wing conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the head of state or severely limiting his powers, a basic revision of the entire political course, the elimination of left-wing forces, above all the communist and left-wing nationalist movement, and at a rapprochement with the imperialist West.

Sukarno remained true to himself: he took the decision to make do with measures at the top, having limited as far as possible the scale of the conflict. He did not relate the fact of the conspiracy to general class processes in society and hoped to avoid bloodshed by depriving the conspiracy of its leaders with the help of loyal officers of the palace guard, the army, air force and navy. The President and his supporters tried to enlist the support of the leadership of left-wing forces. But here once again, his petty-bourgeois fear of involving the masses in political struggle played its fatal part. Sukarno and the officers on whom he relied did everything to ensure that the participation of the members of left-wing parties, above all the Communist Party, was reduced to auxiliary activities, guaranteeing the operation of the military units, and that the whole conflict under no circumstances got out of control.

Unfortunately, as has been indicated in present-day documents of the Communist Party of Indonesia, the small group of Party leaders who were initiated into Sukarno's plans went along with the President's cause and did not show the necessary political independence, but accepted the secondary, dependent role which it was allotted under these plans and did not appeal to the people to save the republic from the threat from the right.

The result of this was the failure of the move undertaken by the President and the subsequent campaign of terror against left-wing forces unprecedented in scale and cruelty. The right reckoned on first eliminating the Communist Party and the left-wing nationalists and then, having deprived Sukarno of all organisational support, on trying to use his surviving popularity in its own interests. Thus, at this first stage, the fate of the President was still not finally determined; at least some of the leaders of the group opposing him were willing to keep him in the capacity of nominal head of state. This would have attracted to them a moderate section of Sukarno's supporters and, what is most important, would have secured the constitutional continuity of the new regime. But in order for this to happen Sukarno had to fulfil several conditions: to agree to the restriction of his power, to approve and sanction anti-communist pogroms, having attributed to the Communist Party the attempt to seize power in the country, and to renounce anti-imperialist trends in foreign policy.

In the resulting struggle, the figure of Sukarno was manifest in all its complexity and drama. Even at the point when the irreconcilability of the contradictions became obvious, when class antagonisms became most acute and when throughout the country Communists,

trade union and peasant activists were being killed, Sukarno did not have sufficient resolve to define his position precisely and summon the people to make the choice between himself and his opponents. He fought persistently and stubbornly but in his own way; the President's speeches are full of appeals for national unity and promises to provide the country with a political settlement, etc. While his enemies steadily moved him away from all levers of real power, Sukarno continued in nearly every speech to assert: 'I am still President, Prime Minister and Supreme Commander-in-Chief'. But this great master of compromise and manoeuvre did not concede on those issues which he regarded as matters of principle. He did not renounce his convictions, neither did he condemn the Communists (even though he lacked the resolve to speak the truth about the counter-revolution, he was not capable of direct betrayal), nor was he prepared to review his views on foreign policy issues. During the course of his political career, Sukarno frequently made concessions, but always in the name of what he, rightly or wrongly, considered as good for his people. Whatever his purely human weaknesses, he did not renounce his convictions in order to live the luxurious and peaceful life of a 'founding father' deprived of his rights. Only in 1967 did his opponents give up the idea of taming Sukarno, and officially remove him from the post of head of state. This was followed by three years of house arrest, interrogations and humiliating badgering in the press. Sukarno's health rapidly worsened and he died on June 21, 1970 in his seventieth year.

And then the unexpected happened. Sukarno's name took on a new life. There was a violent rush of sympathy among the population for the late leader which manifested itself in various ways; from the pilgrimage to his grave on Eastern Java to the vast wave of books, articles and memoirs that flooded the country's book market. A mausoleum was erected on the grave of the Republic's first President on the decision of the government, and he was officially awarded the posthumous title of herald of Indonesian independence.

Leaving aside the emotional aspect of the issue, one can see that the revival of interest in the ideas and activity of Sukarno has become one of the forms of the ideological struggle over the question of the future paths for Indonesian development. It is obvious that even the most devoted adherents and admirers of the late leader would probably be dissatisfied now with a return to the policy of 'guided democracy' in the form in which it existed in the early half of the sixties. The political experience acquired by Indonesian society during the last two decades is too great, and the very grave crisis of 1965, which put an end to Sukarno's period in power, demonstrated the necessity to regard many of the aspects of this policy in a critical light. It is therefore not surprising that the Democratic Party of Indonesia, although it made the name of Sukarno its symbol and banner for the parliamentary elections of 1982, was unable to draw any considerable number of votes as it had not advanced an integral positive programme.

However, in circumstances where the revolutionary process in Indonesia has been sharply and dramatically curtailed, where national sovereignty is being increasingly threatened by transnational corporations and where social and property differences and social and class inequality are deepening, many of the ideals proclaimed by Sukarno have once again become attractive in the eyes of the population. The *Indonesian Observer* wrote in an editorial article (July 9, 1979) that nationalists of various shades agree in their estimation of such aspirations of Sukarno as political independence, self-reliance (in the economy.–*Author.*) and national originality in culture. A member of the Indonesian parliament, Yusuf Hasyim, stressed that 'people are beginning to turn again to the ideas of national dignity, economic independence, and political sovereignty. All of this one can find in the concepts of Bung Karno (Sukarno.–*Author.*).'[1]

The intensification of the exploitation of urban and rural working people and the appearance in the foreground of overt mercantile relations have generated a certain nostalgia for Sukarno's anti-capitalist and egalitarian slogans and have roused the memory of the agrarian reform he decreed and, last but not least, the memory of the period when he was in power, when a mass-based Communist Party and multimillion-strong democratic organisations functioned in the country, and despite all the difficulties and mistakes in their practical work, the mere fact of their existence kept a check on the propertied classes, compelling them to manoeuvre and make definite social concessions. In other words, the turning to the heritage of Sukarno by the democratic circles of Indonesia can be explained by the real democratic achievements of the period when he led the country, and also by the aims and ideals which he proclaimed but did not implement. Let me add that after the prohibition in his country of the propaganda of the ideology of scientific socialism, Sukarno's populist ideas were the most left-wing within the legal political spectrum and this undoubtedly made them even more attractive.

Under these circumstances the ruling circles of Indonesia in their turn discovered the necessity of partially rehabilitating the late President, placing their own accent on the interpretation of his views. Time will show whether or not this phenomenon is connected with a certain evolution of the ruling regime towards the strengthening of the nationalist tendencies in its policy. Meanwhile it is obvious that in their desire for the consolidation of the social forces of Indonesia on the basis of the 1945 Constitution and the principles of Pancha Sila as the recognised national outlook, the official ideologists of present-day Indonesia consider it inexpedient to fully dissociate themselves from the author of those documents, all the more so since he himself can no longer express his view of their present-day interpretation and implementation. The growth of Moslem opposition makes particularly relevant the secularism which was characteristic of Sukarno's

[1] *Matahari*, No. 2, 1978, p. 6.

views. On the other hand, with the sharpening of class antagonisms in the country and the growth of the workers' movement in recent years, Sukarno's propagation of peace between classes and of the social uniformity of Indonesian society is becoming a means of restraining the growth of the working people's class consciousness.

Sukarno's opponents are ready to forgive and forget all his mistakes, the economic chaos and his foreign policy miscalculations, in so far as they overthrew him not so much for his mistakes as for his real and imaginary revolutionary potentiality. It is therefore no coincidence that the present-day criticism of Sukarno focusses on the idea of the unity of democratic forces, on the concept of NASAKOM, which recognised the right of the working people to their own ideology and their own party. Whereas many other views of the late President remain untouched or, after some modification, are recognised as retaining their relevance, on this particular issue, the position of his opponents remains uncompromising.

Sukarno, with all his merits and errors his gift of foresight and his limitedness, charisma and human weaknesses, persistence and lack of resolve, belongs to the history of the Indonesian people's struggle for national and social liberation, and of the struggle of peoples against imperialism and colonialism. Likewise, Sukarno's experience, the experience of the era when he led the country, is a part of the historical experience of the Indonesian people with all its diversity, drama and heroism.

An outstanding figure of the Egyptian and Arab national liberation movements.

Born on January 15, 1918, in the town of Ben Mor in Assiut Province (Upper Egypt), into the family of a postal worker. At the age of eight he entered the Al Nahda Al Misria secondary school in Cairo, which he finished with distinction in 1935.

Gamal Abdel Nasser became interested in politics at an early age. He was 16 years old when he organised a demonstration of the school pupils against British dominance in the country.

In 1937-39 he studied at the Royal Military Academy, and graduated with distinction from the General Staff College in the rank of first lieutenant. In 1939-42 he served in various military units in Egypt and the Sudan.

In 1942, Nasser set up an illegal organisation called the Free Officers. He took an active part in the fighting during the Palestinian war in 1948-49. From 1949 to 1952, Nasser taught at the General Staff College.

Between January 1953 and May 1954, he was General Secretary of the Liberation Rally (later replaced by the National Union party), and its Chairman from June 1954, until its dissolution in 1957.

From May 1953 to February 1954, Nasser occupied the post of Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council; from June 1953 to February 1954, first deputy to Prime Minister Naguib. From June to October 1953, Nasser was Minister of Internal Affairs in Naguib's government.

In March 1954 and then from June to August 1956, Nasser occupied the post of Military Governor-General of Egypt, and from April 1954 to June 1956 he was Prime Minister and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council.

From June 1956 until his death, Nasser was the first President of the Egyptian Republic, later the United Arab Republic. He also

occupied the posts of head of government, commander-in-chief of the armed forces and headed the mass political organisation, the Arab Socialist Union, and others.

Gamal Abdel Nasser visited the Soviet Union several times, in 1958, 1965, 1968 and 1970.

In 1964 he was given the title Hero of the Soviet Union and awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal, for special services in the repulsion of imperialist aggression in 1956, for his great efforts in the cause of promoting international détente and of securing peace, and for his prominent role in the strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the USSR and the United Arab Republic.

Gamal Abdel Nasser died suddenly on September 28, 1970.

The name of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the prominent Egyptian statesman and political figure, is linked with the most outstanding pages in the history of the national liberation struggle of the Egyptian and other peoples of the Arab world. Nasser, the first President of Egypt, was noted for his unshakeable desire to rid his country for ever of imperialist influence and to secure its genuine independence. He clearly understood that real national independence is impossible without economic independence.

Such vital events in the life of Egypt as the anti-feudal agrarian reform, the ending of the British military presence, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the repulsion of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression in 1956 are linked with his activity. These events undermined imperialist positions in the country and promoted the strengthening of national sovereignty and the consolidation of Egypt's international positions.

Nasser made a great contribution to the elaboration and implementation of Egypt's independent foreign policy which pushed the country into the forefront of the national liberation struggle of Arab peoples in the mid-fifties and sixties. The Egyptian President was a devoted and sincere champion of the unity of Arab peoples in their fight for national independence. He stood alongside other eminent statesmen of the young national states at the source of the non-aligned movement and was an active adherent of its anti-imperialist orientation. He was also a consistent supporter of friendship and all-round cooperation between Egypt and the USSR.

Nasser's firm and persistent struggle for the consolidation of the political and economic independence of Egypt was inseparably linked with his evolution as a revolutionary. His path was a difficult one from a supporter of the policy of the 'harmonious development of Egyptian society' as a 'united national family' to the position of convinced opponent of his own bourgeoisie. It is he, above all, who deserves merit for the elaboration of Egypt's course of socialist

orientation in the sixties.

It is already over thirty years since the conspiratorial group, the Free Officers, headed by Nasser, carried out the anti-monarchist and anti-imperialist coup that marked the beginning of the Egyptian (July) revolution which eventually led to the establishment of the Egyptian Republic. For all its peculiarity, its slow and contradictory course and the indeterminate and incomplete nature of its tasks, the revolution made an important contribution to the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist struggle. While responding to the national interests of the Egyptians, the July revolution also had a great influence on the neighbouring Arab countries, both accelerating the progressive socio-economic and political processes within them and encouraging the struggle of Arabs for national and social liberation.

The Egyptian officers who organised the coup had no formal association with any party or political organisation. Apart from personal friendship and corporative army interests, they were united by a feeling of ardent patriotism and dissatisfaction with the monarchist regime, foreign domination and with the policies of the bourgeois and landowners' parties; they were all under the strong influence of nationalism and Arabism. In other words, the success of the coup convincingly demonstrated that the Free Officers expressed the will of millions of Egyptians who did not wish any longer to reconcile themselves with the dual oppression of Farouk's feudal monarchy and the imperialist powers led by Britain.

The leading body of the Free Officers, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), included representatives of a wide variety of social strata. Each representative defended the interests of his own class, social strata or group in the RCC and put forward his own solutions to the country's problems, considering them to be the most correct. Therefore, the initial period of the revolution (the fifties, i.e. the time when the first steps were taken to solve the most urgent national problems) can be described justifiably as a period of experimentation in the sphere of the socio-economic and political development of the country. In his early work, *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, Nasser wrote: '...what is it that we want to do? ... what are the means to it? ...the answer to the first question was to achieve freedom. But the second question—how to achieve this hope—was the point of long discussions until the very day of July 23rd.'[1] In essence the members of the Revolutionary Command Council sought the optimal routes to secure genuine national independence as they went along, attempting to use the still rather poor experience of independent development of other Afro-Asian countries, which did not altogether suit Egyptian conditions. They did make mistakes, and yet, despite all their vacillation, the leaders of the Egyptian revolution were able, even in its initial stages, to find answers to the key prob-

[1] Gamal Abdel Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation. The Philosophy of the Revolution*, Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1955, p. 58.

lems of the country's socio-economic and political development. Much of the credit for this goes to Nasser.

Initially the political programme of the Free Officers was reflected in the so-called 'six principles' of the revolution which were formulated back in 1951 under the direct guidance of Nasser. They included the demands to put an end to British occupation, to abolish feudalism and the dominance of capital over government, to obtain social justice, to create a strong national army and, finally, to consolidate democracy in the country. Such aims corresponded fully to the tasks of an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution. The six principles mentioned above essentially became the starting point in the ideological and political evolution of the military revolutionaries. However, immediately after the July revolution disagreement emerged among the leaders of the Free Officers.

The subsequent concretisation of the tasks set forth in the six principles, and in particular, the practical search for ways and means of realising them, provoked a bitter ideological and political struggle among the Free Officers' leaders, which led to their first significant division.

A section of the Free Officers, with General Mohammed Naguib at their head, considered the July revolution to be over and demanded that the process of democratisation be limited to the establishment of a parliamentary system, whereas Nasser and the radical wing of the RCC under him called for the further social reorganisation stipulated in the six principles. The struggle between these two factions ended in November 1954 with victory for the radical wing of the RCC.

On the theoretical plane, this struggle within the Free Officers was expressed in Nasser's idea of the need to implement a social revolution in Egypt. Or, rather, he put before the Egyptian people the task of carrying out two revolutions at once: a political revolution which he evidently saw as the liberation of the country from the British and the overthrow of the monarchy, and a social revolution aimed against 'exploitative aspirations' and promoting the interests of 'all deprived classes and social strata of Egyptian society'.[1] The idea of a simultaneous accomplishment of two revolutions reflected, as it were, his conjecture and possibly even his understanding of the need for the organic unity of the struggle for national independence and the fight for social justice in Egyptian society of the mid-fifties.

It should be pointed out, however, that both before the revolution and during the first years after it, Nasser quite categorically denied the existence in Egypt of different classes and a class struggle. The aspiration to accomplish two revolutions, political and social, contained an objective contradiction: if the political revolution

[1] G. A. Nasser, *Problems of the Egyptian Revolution. Selected Speeches 1952-1970*, International Relations Publishing House, Moscow, 1979, pp. 13, 18 (in Russian).

'united' the nation, then the social revolution inevitably led to its split, because of the clash of interests of the different classes and social groups in Egyptian society.

Nasser and his like-minded colleagues saw the resolution of this contradiction in the continued guidance of the revolution by the army, which they regarded as a homogeneous, supraclass force, issuing from the people and retaining its link with the people. Proceeding from this interpretation of the army's role, Nasser and his RCC colleagues considered it both natural and necessary 'to carry on with the government until they could translate their hopes and those of the masses into a crystallised idea and a defined programme'.[1] Thus the need was substantiated for the concentration of all administrative power in the country in the hands of the military, the maximum centralisation of the state apparatus and the governing of the country 'without intermediaries', i.e. without political institutions.

Having concentrated complete political power in their hands, Nasser and his supporters began to act in two directions: the creation of active government and the implementation of a purposeful legislative initiative on the main issues of the country's social and economic development.

On the whole, the new government correctly solved the task of securing political support from the people, by means of carrying out social and economic reforms. Thus, by September 1952 they had already set about implementing an agrarian reform, if only a very limited one. No more than ten per cent of cultivated land was subject to redistribution and only ten per cent of peasants with insufficient arable land benefitted directly from the reform. However, by means of legislation the rent for land was noticeably lowered and this eased the position of the poorest peasantry. The new regime had not yet resolved to affect the basic interests of the rural bourgeoisie and the big semi-feudal landowners in any serious way and promised former owners compensation for requisitioned plots of land. But nevertheless, this reform did undermine the basis of the political influence of this social stratum which it had possessed until the revolution. It also noticeably broadened and strengthened the social-class support of state power in the countryside.

At the beginning of 1953, the Revolutionary Command Council announced the introduction of a three-year 'transition period' during which it was planned to prepare the conditions for the creation in the country of a democratic constitutional state. A three-in-one formula, 'Unity, order, work' was proclaimed by Nasser as the slogan of the transition period, a formula which lacked any specific social class content. Nasser maintained that at that stage of the revolution, a single nationwide organisation, capable of implementing the ideas of the 1952 Revolution and ensuring social justice in the country, should

[1] Khaled Mohei El-Din, 'The Course of the Egyptian Revolution and Its Future', *World Marxist Review*, No 8, 1966, p. 19.

become the political incarnation of the unity of the people. A mass formation of this sort called the Liberation Rally was established in January 1953. Though fully under the control of the RCC, this organisation all the same was not invested with political power, nor did it receive a clear political and social programme. It was a rather amorphous association more or less typical of the subsequent types of mass political organisation in Egypt. What its activity came down to was the holding of mass cultural events, sports competitions, public military education and the campaign against illiteracy. The slogan promoted by the RCC, 'We are all in the Liberation Rally', was obviously the expression of a sincere though speculative desire to unite all politically active forces in Egypt on a nationalist basis, irrespective of the social and class differences between them. It is characteristic that in his speeches in the early fifties Nasser, who was still some way from a social and class evaluation of Egyptian society and had still not formulated his views on the socialist perspective, spoke invariably of progress for all classes, of the desire to eliminate the rift between rich and poor and of the aspiration to create a society of social justice where the rich would help the poor and so on. He also asserted that it was vitally important to develop the cooperation of labour and capital to their mutual advantage and in the interests of the nation as a whole.

In this period all the main problems of socio-economic development were solved practically on a nationwide scale. This approach by the authorities to the problems of upgrading the national economy was revealed, in particular, in the way it was proposed to promote economic development by encouraging almost all socio-economic structures in the country, except the feudal. At the same time, a number of laws both of the traditional free-trade and *dirigiste* type were adopted in order to revive existing industrial production. Interference by the state in the economy was manifested in its guidance of the relatively small public sector, in the studying of the possibilities for a planned development of the economy with the emphasis on private investment, in the elaboration of legislation regulating the organisational structure of stock companies, in the taxation of high profits, etc. The decision on the construction of a high dam and an agro-industrial complex in Aswan adopted in 1954 was of major significance.

Nasser's views on the problems of political and economic development in that period were reflected in a condensed form in the text of the Constitution of 1956, which was prepared with the personal participation of the Republic's President. Its main provisions consisted of the following:

'–Social solidarity is the basis of the Egyptian society;

'–National economy should be organised in accordance with plans which safeguard social justice and aim at expanding production and raising the standard of living;

'–Capital is to be used on behalf of the national economy and

should not clash in its use with the public interest;

'—the Law guarantees co-operation in the sphere of public economic activities and promotes business activities;

'—the State shall supervise the organisation of insurance.'[1]

The reformatory activity of President Nasser's government in various spheres of Egyptian life took place in the initial stages of the revolution against a background of an independent and active anti-imperialist foreign policy and a course for the establishment of close friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. The most important political undertakings by the Egyptian government during this period were the obtaining of an agreement on the evacuation of British troops from the country's territory (June 1956) and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company (July 1956). Egypt also managed to resist the triple Anglo-French-Israeli aggression of 1956 by relying on the firm support of the USSR, other socialist states, progressive world opinion. The victory over the aggressors became the turning point in the recent history of Egypt, which, to a great extent, predetermined the country's subsequent foreign policy course, and also some of the trends in home policy. Immediately after the fighting, Nasser's government sequestrated foreign property and then set about transferring control of it to Egyptian specialists. The subsequent economic blockade of Egypt undertaken by Western countries only strengthened even further Nasser's resolution to follow an active anti-imperialist course.

The political and economic measures carried out in Egypt in the mid-fifties, the rise of the national liberation movement in the Middle East and North Africa, in which Egypt played a leading role, and the creation of the United Arab Republic made up of Egypt and Syria, actively promoted the growth in the Egyptian people's national awareness. In these circumstances and faced with the task of major socio-economic reorganisation in the country, the revolutionary authorities led by President Nasser persistently strove to work out adequate forms for the permanent participation of a definite coalition of classes and social groups in the internal politics of the state. A new organisation, the National Union, was set up in place of the dissolved Liberation Rally and united 'all moderate elements of society' on the very same basis of class cooperation.

Nasser himself defined the essence and tasks of the new political organisation thus: '...the National Union is the means through which we can realise a socialist, democratic, co-operative society, and by which we can protect our goals in establishing this society. We can also achieve our development without a civil war, without killing, not by class war, but by love and brotherhood.'[2] Indeed, the very name of

[1] *World Marxist Review*, No 8, 1966, p. 20.

[2] Khaled Mohei El-Din, 'The Course of the Egyptian Revolution and Its Future', *World Marxist Review*, No 8, 1966, p. 21.

the new organisation was evidence of the fact that it was guided by nationalist ideology. The slogan 'Freedom, unity, socialism' characterised the association of Arab states as a prerequisite for social reform.

Nasser spoke out many times in favour of the creation in Egypt of a society according to the socialist model. There was a reference to socialism, which was to be realised through the elimination of the rift between classes, in one of Nasser's speeches made on his return from Bandung back in 1955, but it remained unnoticed at the time. Later he spoke of 'a socialist, cooperative, democratic society'. At times he would speak of socialism as a society without exploiters, at other times as a society of owners or 'proprietors'. In an interview with Indian journalists in 1957, the President explained that by socialism he understood cooperation between workers and employers, between the private and state sectors of the economy and also the planning of economic development. At the 4th Congress of Cooperatives in November 1958, Nasser interpreted the concept of socialism somewhat more broadly: 'Socialism is the abolition of feudalism, of monopolies, and of the domination of capital over power and the elimination of exploitation. The positive sense of socialism is in the creation of a national economy and then in the kind of development of this economy that would satisfy the needs of society and create social justice.'[1]

In the fifties this formulation of the question of socialism in Egypt reflected the mainly economic approach of Nasser and the country's leadership as a whole to social development, and the speculative, supraclass attitude to the problem of social justice. But there was also a desire to somehow limit the exploitation of man by man in Egyptian society. At that time, Nasser had not yet included in his conception of socialism the issue of the people's control over the main means of production. However, as the national democrats in power clashed more and more frequently with problems of socio-economic development (the agrarian reform and cooperative organisation of the countryside, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the Egyptianisation of foreign enterprises, the growth of private capital, the increase in social contrasts and the inevitable intensification of the class struggle), Nasser became increasingly aware of this objective.

The Egyptian national bourgeoisie was able to strengthen its economic positions significantly by the end of the fifties by relying on the protectionist and material support of the state. At the same time there was also a tendency towards a growth in its political influence in state affairs. Representatives of big Egyptian capital and related circles succeeded in establishing control over parliament (the People's Assembly) and the National Union. They did not conceal their negative attitude to the further development of the revolution and asserted that it had already completed its tasks. Thus, the forces behind local

[1] *Speeches and Statements by President G. A. Nasser*, Vol. 9, Cairo, s.a., p. 52. (in Arabic).

big business set themselves up more and more against the political authorities, encroaching on their prerogatives.

The formulation of the task of accelerating the growth of the national economy and of creating, to use the President's own words, 'an Egypt of iron and steel', and the increasing resistance by big local capital to the government development programmes prompted President Nasser to come out with criticism of the 'capitalist threat', which, one can assume, he understood not as the private sector in general, but as the large capitalist associations which had acquired the nature of monopolies. The practical steps were not long in coming either: the nationalisation in 1960 of the assets of the major private Misr and National banks which controlled the great majority of investment in industrial and commercial firms. This was followed by the 'socialist laws' (1961), in accordance with which the largest enterprises in industry, and transport, credit and financial institutions became the property, or came under the control, of the state, and state control over external and partially over internal wholesale trade was established. In 1963 the laws on nationalisation were extended to include hundreds of medium-sized and even small private enterprises in light industry. Nasser's government also promulgated a new Agrarian Reform Law (July 1961) which limited still further the maximum size of landownership (42 hectares to a family of five), abolished the redemption payments to landowners for confiscated lands, and also significantly lowered the rent for plots of land given to the peasants within the framework of the reform. The process of organising on cooperative lines the peasants who had obtained land through the reform was also given a new impulse.

These were by no means all the 'socialist laws'. Almost simultaneously the government began to implement a series of measures aimed at improving the social and material position of the people: a 42-hour working week was formally introduced, a fixed minimum wage was established for workers and employees in the main branches of the economy and they were given the right to paid leave and a pension. An important innovation was the resolution on the deduction in favour of workers and employees of 25 per cent of the profits of state and private firms, and on worker participation in the solving of management and production development problems. Measures were also implemented to lower unemployment, to regulate food prices and housing rents, and free education was introduced both in schools and higher education establishments.

The progressive socio-economic measures of 1961-63 were a great event in the life of Egypt, and were met with the wide support of the working people. However, there were also many unsatisfied people, above all among the 'aggrieved' bourgeoisie. Thus the logic of life brought to the forefront not 'class peace', but a class struggle, the acuteness of which intensified the more the interests of the exploiters were attacked.

Naturally, under these circumstances, President Nasser and his

government had to take firmer action to limit the political influence of the exploiting classes. With this aim in mind, Parliament and the National Union were dissolved in November 1961, since they were opposed to the progressive reforms, and the 'campaign against millionaires' was begun involving sequestration of the property of prominent financiers, industrialists and tradesmen who opposed the governments's socio-economic course. A section of the opposition-minded parliamentarians and functionaries of the National Union and landowners and capitalists were subjected to 'civil isolation', i.e., they were deprived of the right to participate in political life. In February 1962, the elections took place to the new institution of power, the National Congress of People's Forces. President Nasser and his government presented for consideration by the National Congress the draft of the National Charter which became the programme document of the Egyptian national democratic revolution.

The National Charter, prepared with the personal participation of Nasser himself, was the fullest and most systematised exposition of the views of the progressive section of the Egyptian leadership whom by the nature of their activity and ideological and political evolution, one can describe as revolutionary democrats. The Charter reflected not only Nasser's ideological evolution from the time of the revolution of July 23, 1952, but also testified to the growing convergence of his views on the problems of Egypt's socio-economic development with some of the principle tenets of scientific socialism.

One of the most important provisions of the Charter is the clearly formulated necessity for the establishment of socialism in Egypt as a form of social structure. The document's authors stressed: 'The socialist solution to the problem of economic and social underdevelopment in Egypt – with a view to achieving progress in a revolutionary way – was never a question of free choice. The socialist solution was a historical inevitability imposed by reality, the broad aspiration of the masses and the changing nature of the world in the second part of the 20th Century.'[1] What is more, when referring to socialist re-organisation in the country, the Charter no longer used the terms 'Arab socialism' and 'Egyptian socialism' which had been popular not long before. The Charter referred to scientific socialism as the most suitable method for finding the right path to progress, i.e., it refers to 'the Egyptian path to socialism'.

The main elements of the conception of socialism set forth in the Charter come down to the following: the creation and predominance in the economy of the nationalised (state) sector; the continued existence of a private sector placed at the service of and controlled by the people; the recognition of the need for planning in all spheres; the priority of heavy industry; the establishment of social justice by

[1] *The National Charter. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews. January-December, 1962*, Information Department, U.A.R., Cairo, 1962, p. 322.

means of the redistribution of wealth in the interests of all social strata and classes; the narrowing of the gap between the levels of socio-economic development in the towns and countryside; and finally, the development of the cooperative movement and the trade unions. As for trade unions the Charter indicated that they could eventually be invested with political responsibility.

In the exposition of their conception of scientific socialism or 'the Egyptian path to socialism', Nasser and the co-authors of the Charter no longer denied the existence of classes and the class struggle in Egyptian society, although they continued to support the idea of conducting this struggle, as far as possible by peaceful means. The Charter states: 'The inevitable and natural class struggles cannot be ignored or denied.'[1] We would also point out that the class struggle was no longer regarded as a hindrance to the national liberation movement, but as a necessary prerequisite for its success. The Charter defined the class struggle first of all as the clash of forces concerned about social progress (i.e. the working people) with forces of the old, conservative world (i.e. with the reactionary bloc of the big bourgeoisie and landowners, closely linked with imperialism). It noted that the forms of the class struggle depend on the position and behaviour of the exploiters and that precisely because of this, a peaceful outcome to the class struggle could only be achieved on one condition: by making reaction incapable of resistance. It went on to point out correctly that the eradication of the main antagonism could not in itself remove the differences between the other classes; however, this would open up the possibility of the peaceful settlement of these differences via democratic means.

Of course, one cannot agree with the way that all the national forces, opposed to the reactionary bloc of landowners and big bourgeoisie (defined as 'exploiting ownership'), i.e., peasants, workers, soldiers, intelligentsia and the national petty and middle bourgeoisie (described as 'non-exploiting ownership') were included in the Charter under the category of working people. The authors of the Charter saw the difference between these two types of 'ownership' in the fact that 'exploiting ownership', by relying on the support of imperialism, tried to establish its dominance over the government, exploited the working class, and strove to gain maximum profits. 'Non-exploiting ownership', on the other hand, allegedly did not make any claims to the prerogatives of state power and renounced exploitation of the working class, establishing a fair wage for workers and granting them the right to have a share in profits and the management of enterprises. This forced tactical step was elevated to the rank of a universal theoretical thesis which was, quite naturally, a mistake. It is characteristic that later the authors themselves considered it necessary to regulate the activity of 'non-exploiting ownership', limiting it mainly to trade and light industry, and even then with great reservations. For

[1] *The National Charter...*, p. 317.

instance, it was stated that although light industry was open to private ownership, the state sector was assigned a role which permitted it to control this branch throughout the country in the people's interests.

The issue of national capital functioning in the agrarian sector was formulated differently. The Charter merely stipulated measures preventing the revival of large estates of the semi-feudal type, though it said nothing of the danger of the strengthening of large exploitative farms of the capitalist type. The importance of organising the peasants along cooperative lines was rightly emphasised (all peasants who received land under the agrarian reform were united into the cooperative farms on an obligatory basis), and the authors of the Charter considered the cooperatives a socialist factor in the countryside. One cannot agree with this since these cooperatives preserved and strengthened private property on the basis of the principle proclaimed in the Charter: '...the right solutions to the problem of agriculture do not lie in transferring land into public ownership, but they necessitate the existence of the individual ownership of land, and the expansion of the ownership by providing the right to own it to the largest number of wage-earners...'[1]

The revolutionary democrats of Egypt with Nasser at their head were no doubt aware of the realities of the epoch, including the fact that in the second half of the 20th century the correlation of forces in the world had changed in favour of socialism and that these changes were auspicious for the activation of the forces of national and social liberation. Nasser and his like-minded colleagues expressed in the Charter their conviction that 'political democracy or freedom in its political aspects, are of no value without economic democracy or freedom in its social aspect. ...The political freedom in this state could only be the freedom of feudalism.'[2] They unequivocally identify feudalism and monopolies ('exploiting ownership') with the reactionary camp of enemies of the revolution and natural allies of imperialism. This was followed by the correct conclusion that national 'capital ... is no longer able to lead the economic drive'[3].

One of the Charter's key provisions concerned the creation of a new political organisation, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), called upon to secure the implementation of the new conception of social development in Egypt. An important factor which distinguished this organisation from the National Union which preceded it was the declaration of a principle by virtue of which half the membership of all elected bodies of the Arab Socialist Union (and also of parliament and the local organs of self-government) was to consist of workers and peasants, in so far as they represented, as the Charter acknowledged, the majority of the nation and had been deprived longer than other social groups of the right to build their own future. For this reason it

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 333.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 312-13.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 323.

was suggested that: 'Popular organisations, especially co-operatives and trade unions, can play an effective and influential role in promoting sound democracy. These organisations should form a vanguard force in the various fields of national democratic action.[1]' The Charter set the task of replacing the dictatorship of 'reaction and exploiting capital'[2], characteristic of the capitalist system, with a new alliance—'the co-operation between the powers representing the working people'[3]. The aim of this alliance was socialism, i.e., 'the setting up of a society on a basis of sufficiency and justice, of work and equal opportunity for all'[4].

The main tenets of the Charter were confirmed in the Constitutional Declaration of March 23, 1964, and thus elevated to the rank of official state political doctrine.

Even a summary of the National Charter's main clauses shows that the authors of the document and, above all, President Nasser himself, were striving to generalise the experience of the Egyptian people's anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle and to plan a programme for the further development of the country along a socialist-oriented path. Nasser and his colleagues got as far as recognising the class struggle, which they interpreted primarily as a fight against imperialist forces, feudal elements and the upper crust of the bourgeoisie. They rejected the bourgeois concept of democracy meant to serve the interests of a wealthy exploiting minority. Their philosophy included such vital principles as the elimination of the exploitation of man by man, the abolition of big feudal and big capitalist property and the recognition of the decisive role of the working masses in revolutionary reforms.

At the same time, the system of revolutionary democratic views as expounded in the Charter still displayed a touch of eclecticism and the significant influence of unscientific philosophical and socio-political opinions. In the Charter alongside correct conclusions and theses exist such tenets as the denial of the leading role of the working class even in the future, and the identification of the nationalisation of private property and the development of the most basic forms of co-operative farming in the countryside with the realisation of socialist reforms. There are also traces in the Charter of 'fear of the people', of the desire to resolve class antagonisms via paternalistic, 'peaceful' means within the framework of national unity, and of the exaggeration of ideas of national originality and of the spiritual uniqueness of the Egyptian people. In short, the Charter reflected both the weak and the strong sides of revolutionary democrats, the effect on them of the petty-bourgeois psychology of the numerous semi-proletarian and middle-class social strata in the towns and countryside which had experienced the oppression of colonialism and dependent capitalism. It also reflected the increasing attraction of the ideas of scientific so-

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 319.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 313.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 318.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 310.

cialism and of the achievements of the USSR and other socialist countries.

Obviously, this was not a programme of socialist but of pre-socialist development, a socialist-oriented programme. When one considers that it was put together for Egypt at the beginning of the sixties not by Marxists but by revolutionary democrats, its appearance was a most significant event in the development of Arab revolutionary democratic ideology.

Following the course of extensive socio-economic reforms outlined in the Charter, the revolutionary leadership headed by Nasser opened up important new horizons for Egypt. In the fifties and sixties the foundations were laid for modern industry. Egypt was one of the fastest of the Afro-Asian developing countries to industrialise (by the end of the sixties the volume of the country's industrial production had grown almost five times in comparison with the 1952 level). The state sector, in the heart of which emerged an organised working class, became the basis of the national economy. A fairly ramified private sector was maintained alongside the state sector, both in services and industry and especially in the agricultural sphere. The carrying out of agrarian reforms in the countryside strongly undermined large landownership, promoted the development of cooperatives and cleared the way for new production relations.

If one turns to the socio-political side of the reforms conducted in Egypt by the ruling revolutionary democracy, on the whole, they consisted in the abolition of the system of feudal relations and of big private property in the towns and countryside, and the removal of feudalists and big capitalists from the political scene. The socio-political basis of power was declared to be 'the co-operation between the powers representing the working people', which included five categories of the Egyptian population: peasants, workers, intellectuals, the army and the national ('non-exploiting') bourgeoisie.

In practical terms, Nasser's government took a number of steps towards guaranteeing the people's control over the governing of the nation by means of granting them in accordance with the Charter, no less than 50 per cent of places in all elective bodies and in the only mass political organisation in the country, the Arab Socialist Union, the chairman of which was Nasser. The democratisation of political life was carried out step by step. There had been a time when Communists were persecuted and sent to prison or concentration camps for their activity. The lifting of martial law and the emergency laws led to the release of the majority of political prisoners. Nasser's revolutionary democratic regime set about drawing many Communists into working in the bodies of the ASU and the mass media. The ban on the dissemination in Egypt of Marxist literature was also removed and the experience of building socialism began to be more widely covered in the press. The works of Marx, Engels and Lenin appeared on the shelves in bookshops. Nasser and his companions moved slowly but surely towards an understanding of the necessity of coopera-

tion with Egyptian Marxists, and began to put this into practice.

One can say that all these measures, though not fully completed (as, for example, the reorganisation of the state apparatus which remained in the hands of those who had previously served the landowners and the capitalist section of society), were stimulated by the desire to defend the gains of the national democratic revolution. The very logic of the struggle for the realisation of the revolution's programme convinced Nasser that the support of the working people and the progressive, revolutionary intelligentsia was essential for the achievement of the set goal.

In the field of foreign policy, Nasser saw friendship and all-round cooperation with the socialist countries and, in particular, with the Soviet Union, as the guarantee of the successful development of the Egyptian revolution. Therefore, as the progressive trend of Egyptian home policy deepened, Soviet-Egyptian relations strengthened and expanded. The basis of these relations was the proximity or concurrence of the two countries' interests in the struggle against imperialism and reaction and the campaign for freedom of the peoples and social and economic progress. It was altogether natural and fitting that the Egyptian revolutionary leadership headed by Nasser, having declared socialist orientation to be the goal of its policy, then turned for support to the Soviet Union.

This explains why Soviet-Egyptian cooperation in the sixties rapidly became wide-scale, affecting the economy, politics, trade and military affairs, culture, science and tourism. Suffice it to say, for instance, that approximately 150 different construction projects were built in Egypt with the participation of the USSR. They include the famous high dam and the country's most powerful hydro-electric power station in Aswan, Egypt's largest metallurgical plant in Helwan and an aluminium complex in Nag Hammadi, and Africa's only power transmission line with a capacity of 500 kilowatts.

It is not surprising that Nasser did not merely value highly the importance of Egypt's diverse cooperation with the USSR—he stressed this point in many of his speeches—but indeed considered it one of the main conditions of Egypt's success in the various fields. What is more, one should point out that Soviet-Egyptian cooperation was always built on the basis of reciprocity.

The progressive nature of the socio-economic and political reforms implemented by Nasser's ruling revolutionary democracy in the sixties is clearly apparent. The democratic value of these reforms was measured primarily by the benefit which they brought to the people and by the actual rise in the standard of living. But even then it was clear that only when the working masses as a whole were freely and without fear drawn into participation in the implementation of the progressive reforms, would the significance of the reforms grow immeasurably and they become irreversible. In the matter of the political mobilisation of the working people, however, there remained many unsolved problems. In particular the great hopes that Nasser

put on the rapid activation of the work of the ASU in accordance with the demands and programme tenets of the Charter turned out to be not fully justified. Despite the political leadesrhip's desire to strengthen the position of workers and peasants in the lower, middle and, moreover, the upper sections of the ASU, it was the middle-class strata of society that were most widely represented in it.

The activity of the ASU had, on the whole, little political effect, since the 'supraclass' nature it had been given basically doomed it to inactivity. The situation was aggravated further by the fact that the socio-political situation in the ASU and other public organisations reflected the further intensification of the class struggle in the country. The exploiting classes displayed bitter resistance—in the most diverse forms—to the policy of the revolutionary leadership. This even went as far as open anti-government demonstrations by reactionary elements. By making use of the numerous loopholes in the legislation, the big bourgeoisie, even after nationalisation, continued to function actively in the spheres of trade, services, building and small and medium-scale industry. The rich peasantry and agrarian bourgeoisie rapidly developed in the post-reform countryside. The bourgeois regeneration also affected the top level of the state, administrative and military apparatuses, which sabotaged the progressive reforms. With their help and even participation, the bourgeoisie developed a thriving activity, growing rich through speculation, contracts or simply through bribery and plain theft.

All these counter-revolutionary forces, both spontaneously and in an organised way, strove to change the internal political development of the country, in order to force it to turn away from its socialist-oriented path. Arab reaction as a whole acted with these forces, since the Egyptian revolution contained a potential threat to its positions as well.

Nasser's home and foreign policy, aimed at the creation of a new, strong and independent Egypt, and his support for the national patriotic forces in other Arab countries, clearly also went against the plans of Israeli expansionists. They did not hide their intention to seize territory and to eliminate the progressive regimes in Arab countries, above all in Egypt.

In this situation, the Israeli aggressors provoked a wide-scale military conflict in the Middle East in June 1967, bombing military targets in Egypt and seizing the Sinai peninsula and putting the Suez Canal out of action.

The defeat suffered by the Egyptian army was perceived in different ways by the various sections of Egyptian society. Members of the propertied classes in the towns and countryside, in the state apparatus, the army and in religious circles, who were affected by the progressive reforms, secretly, and sometimes openly, gloated. They saw the opportunity of doing away with a regime that was foreign to their interests and which encroached on their property and political privileges, so they launched a conspiracy with the aim of overthrowing

President Nasser's government. On the other hand, for the working masses—the workers, peasants, craftsmen, patriotic intelligentsia—and for a significant proportion of young people and students, the defeat of the Egyptian army came as an unexpected blow and prompted them to take a new look at the situation in the country. They clearly saw the threat hanging over President Nasser's progressive regime and over what it had done in the interests of the working sections of the population.

It was these sections of society who expressed their complete trust in Nasser during these troubled times and who, in effect, granted him full powers to mobilise all the country's resources for the further expansion of the socio-economic reforms in order to repulse the enemy. Undoubtedly the Egyptian people were determined to continue under Nasser the struggle to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression and liberate all occupied Arab territories. With the aid of the USSR, the combat power of the Egyptian army was quickly restored.

The events of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, which shook the country deeply, forced President Nasser to take a principled political step: to muster strength for the elimination of the gradually emerging new centres of power opposed to him and his leadership by expelling from the ASU people known for their conservative views and by removing from the state apparatus several hundred members of the 'military bourgeoisie' who were trying to slow down the development of the revolution. In the spring of 1968, Nasser came out with the Declaration of March 30, which declared war on bureaucracy and contained the demand to strengthen the role of the ASU, the confirmation of Egypt's socialist orientation and an appeal to reinforce national unity and use all the country's resources to liberate the occupied territories. It was directly stated in the Declaration that the leading role in the national unity should belong to the alliance of working sections of the nation and that this role should be exercised via the reformed Arab Socialist Union and via the new 'political nucleus to be created within the ASU, one consisting of cadres capable of carrying out coordinated political guidance in the policy of obliterating all distinctions between classes'.[1]

In response to the intrigues of internal and external reaction President Nasser adopted a series of measures aimed at defending and deepening the socio-economic reforms. Apart from the purging of the state apparatus and the ASU of blatantly pro-bourgeois and corrupt elements in 1969, a new Agrarian Reform Law was passed, which reduced still further the maximum amount of landownership (to 20 hectares) and which was intended to limit the growth of capitalist elements in the countryside. However, Nasser did not manage to complete these measures, a fact made use of by the forces of reaction, which had gained strength even under his regime.

[1] G. A. Nasser, *Problems of the Egyptian Revolution, Selected Speeches 1952-1970*, p. 179.

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Historical experience has convincingly shown the vitality and forward-looking nature of the course which President Nasser conducted both within the country and in the sphere of foreign policy. No one can deny his decisive contribution to the progressive development of Egypt. The very declaration of the republic's socialist orientation was an achievement of this true son of the Egyptian people. He did a great deal for the strengthening of friendship between Egypt and the Soviet Union. Nasser was not a Marxist, but the influence of scientific socialism on him became more and more obvious with the implementation of the progressive socio-economic reforms and with the intensification of the anti-imperialist struggle of the Arab nations. Nasser slowly but surely changed his ideas of the revolution, of its motive forces and prospects, deriving much from the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

The ideology of Nasser, the statesman and politician, was the revolutionary democratic ideology of those prominent members of the intermediate strata of society who, starting from consistent patriotism, gradually grasp a number of scientific socialist principles. It is clear, however, that the trend of the ideological evolution of Nasser and his like-minded colleagues was sufficiently defined: Figures like him lead the people of their countries along a path which can eventually result in the victory of socialism.

The expereince of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the radical economic reforms and social reorganisation carried out in Egypt under him merit serious analysis. Of course, this experience has both positive and negative aspects. Nasser as a revolutionary and a politician and Egyptian revolutionary democracy stand before us in all their diversity, complexity and inner contradiction.

HOUARI BOUMEDIENE

An outstanding leader of the Algerian national liberation movement. An active participant in the armed struggle against French colonialists. After Algeria gained political independence he was Defence Minister, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the National Liberation Front (FLN) of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, and President later. A prominent figure in the Organisation of African Unity and the Arab national liberation movement.

Houari Boumediene's real name was Mohamed Boukharouba. He was born on August 23, 1932 in a mountain village in the northeast of Algeria near the town of Guelma, the eldest of seven children in a poor peasant's family. He studied simultaneously at a Koranic and a 'native' school and finished the Kettania madrasah in Constantine.

In 1949, Mohamed left for Tunisia to avoid serving in the French army and entered the Moslem University of Zitouna. A year later he moved to Cairo where he continued his studies at Al-Azhar University.

As a student, Mohamed Boukharouba took an active part in the organisations of Algerian national freedom fighters abroad. After November 1, 1954 at the start of the Algerians' war of liberation from the French, he joined the ranks of the Mujahids, the National Liberation Front fighters. He returned to his homeland on a responsible mission supplying weapons to the guerrillas, and adopted the pseudonym Houari Boumediene.

In 1957, Boumediene was made commander of the Fifth Wilaya forces. In 1959 he became chief of staff of the FLN army and commanded the forces which managed to contain the bulk of the French armed forces on Algeria's border with Tunisia and Morocco.

Boumediene was Minister of Defence in the first independent Algerian government, which was formed in September 1962. Following the removal on June 19, 1965 of President Ahmed Ben Bella, Boumediene became Chairman of the FLN Revolutionary Council, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. In 1976 he was elected President.

In the latter half of the sixties and seventies major progressive social reforms which determined the socialist orientation of independent Algeria, were carried out under the leadership of Boumediene and his government. The main landmarks here were the nationalisation of foreign-owned oil companies, the strengthening of the state sector, the introduction of the principle of economic planning, an agrarian revolution, the democratisation of local government and the adoption of the National Charter and Constitution.

Boumediene conducted a consistent policy of support for national liberation movements, such as the POLISARIO Front in Western Sahara, the Palestine resistance movement and the people's revolutions in Ethiopia and Angola. He was one of the organisers of the Arab 'steadfastness front' in response to the capitulationist policy of the Sadat government, which concluded the Camp David agreement.

Boumediene visited the Soviet Union several times and contributed much to the consolidation of fraternal relations between the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Boumediene died on December 27, 1978. The new Algerian government, headed by Chadlie Benjedid, which was set up in January 1979 at the Fourth Congress of the FLN, is continuing Boumediene's course, which includes the country's socialist orientation, an anti-imperialist line in international politics and the strengthening of ties with countries of the world socialist system.

Too little time has passed since the death of Houari Boumediene to be able to give an all-round, objective and balanced evaluation of his legacy. Researchers will probably continue to make alterations to the description of this major political figure. But in the main, I think that their evaluations will remain unchanged. Boumediene will always hold a prominent place in the Algerian people's struggle for national independence. For over a quarter of a century all the achievements of the Algerian revolution were, in one way or other, connected with his name. Moreover, the significance of his legacy goes far beyond the bounds of Algeria and adds to the overall experience of the national liberation movement as a whole, as an example of an efficient progressive political leader, both a theoretician and a practical worker.

The history of the revolutionary movement has shown that not all revolutionaries, by any means, not even the most outstanding, managed to rise to the occasion after they came to power, when they were given the opportunity to put their ideas into practice. Some, by their nature, were either academic thinkers or propagandists. Others knew merely how to destroy, not to create. Others had no knowledge of the subtleties of political struggle and were edged out by more experienced rivals. Still others, on the contrary, revealed a rare savoirfaire and invulnerability in the field of politics, but this struggle for self-assertion

became an end in itself and led to their political degeneration. Contemplating the experience of European bourgeois revolutions, the famous Russian democrat, Nikolai Chernyshevsky, once noted the peculiar rule that in politics we 'invariably see either honest people, who allow themselves to be cheated, or people who know very well how to manage their affairs by deceiving decent folk, people who can do things well, but only do bad'.[1] One either has a sincere but inefficient revolutionary idealist or a political smart operator. This dilemma is characteristic not only of the bourgeois revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries, but is also visible in the national liberation struggle of the modern developing world.

Boumediene was one of the few revolutionaries and politicians who were able to avoid this dilemma. He was not an impractical dreamer. He was able to calculate his actions, use the weaknesses of others and agree to a compromise. He was resolute and tough in the political fight. At the same time he did not allow practical daily affairs overshadow tactics and strategy, or the search for the main guidelines of the revolution. He strove to achieve the goals of the revolution not via any means, for he understood that inadequate means can betray the goal itself. Therefore, in particular practical undertakings he never lost sight of the general view and did not cross that line beyond which a revolutionary becomes a pragmatist or an egocentric and vain politician. He was always a principled politician and it was precisely this that ensured him success in the difficult work as national leader.

Throughout his life Boumediene was purposeful and consistent and stuck to his principles.

Boumediene's desire for freedom emerged when he was still a child, when his father was forced to work as a farm-labourer for foreign landowners and when every appearance of a French gendarme in the region was a sharp reminder of the national humiliation. At the age of thirteen, Mohamed Boukharouba witnessed the anti-French uprising in the town of Guelma in which hundreds of his countrymen were killed. In those days, as he later remembered, it became clear to him that it was necessary to fight with weapons in one's hands in order to become free people. When he was fourteen, he joined the illegal organisation, the Algerian People's Party.

Mohamed Boukharouba's final transition to the revolutionary path occurred during his student days in Egypt. While intensively studying philosophy, economic sciences and history, he joined up with other Algerian emigrés and became increasingly drawn into the national liberation struggle. He demonstrated an exceptional ability to lead and a desire and inclination for practical work. 'The Revolution cannot be content with empty words or loud slogans. The Revolution is, above all, action,'[2] he said later. Along with other Algerians he underwent

[1] N. G. Chernyshevsky, *Complete Works*, Vol. 6, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1949, p. 231 (in Russian).

[2] *Citations du Président Boumediène*, Société Nationale d'Edition et de Diffusion, Algiers, 1979, p. 45.

special military training. On learning of the revolution in Algeria, which began on November 1, 1954, Mohamed became anxious to go back to his country to join the Mujahids who had risen against the French.

During his stay in Cairo the foreign representation of the National Liberation Front was formed there, headed by Ahmed Ben Bella, who had escaped from a French prison. Mohamed Boukharouba became one of his closest associates. Appointed the leader of a combat group he landed secretly with a load of weapons near the town of Tlemsen on the west coast of Algeria. This was the start of his life as guerrilla.

Once a Mujahid, he chose a new name, Houari Boumediene, for the purposes of secrecy. 'Houari' in Arabic means a Bedouin on horseback and symbolises military activity. The surname comes from the prominent Moslem lawyer and *sufi* of the 12th century, Sidi Boumediene, who was considered to be the patron saint of Tlemsen. The Soviet researcher R. G. Landa believes that Mohamed Boukharouba was attracted to Boumediene, on the one hand, by his fame as a highly educated Arab literary expert and important national cultural figure, and on the other hand, by his prestige as an indefatigable champion of justice and a man of singular integrity, simplicity and even asceticism. The young Boukharouba considered these qualities essential for a person fighting for the revolutionary reorganisation of society.[1]

This was exactly how his colleagues knew him right from the start of his guerrilla activity: a man of extreme modesty concerned mainly about others and the common cause. This was not a pose, but an inner motive based on the conviction that a revolution is achieved not by isolated individuals but by the masses. He frequently stressed that it was precisely the rank-and-file soldiers who 'bore on their shoulders the main burden of the bloody war for independence'.[2]

Two years after landing in Algeria Boumediene became deputy commander, and a year later, commander of the Fifth Wilaya troops. He not only led the military action, but also skilfully headed the formation of new units of the FLN on the terrritory of Tunisia and Morocco. In December 1959, the twenty-seven-year-old Boumediene became chief of staff, virtually in command of all field forces of the revolutionary army.

But even then Boumediene was occupied not only with military problems. He was already contemplating the future of Algeria and formulating a programme for the new government. 'We want a party capable of directing and educating the masses, of giving the country a socialist economy so as to place bread on the peasant's table, educate his children and get rid of slums and hovels,' stated Boumediene. And the main force leading towards these achievements was to be made up of those who had fought, that is, 'militants in uniform'[3] as they were

[1] R. G. Landa, 'Houari Boumediene: The Making of a Revolutionary', in: *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1, p. 120 (in Russian).

[2] Z. Pecar, *Alzir do nezavisnosti*, Belgrade, 1967, p. 522.

[3] *La stratégie de Boumediène. Textes choisis et présentés par Paul Balta et Claudine Rulleau*, Editions Sindbad, Paris, 1978, pp. 12, 18.

called. The Tripoli Programme, adopted in June 1962 at the First Congress of the FLN, contained several of these ideas.

With the end of the long and harsh war a new period began in Boumediene's life. He was actively involved in the building of a new Algeria. After the signing of the Evian Accords on a ceasefire, he was to observe the bitter struggle for influence between the various factions of the Algerian Provisional Government in exile (Youssef Ben Khedda, Mohamed Boudiaf), the leaders of the former Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (Ferhat Abbas) and others. He spoke with bitterness and alarm of those who 'wished power for power's sake'. Not only did they claim a monopoly of power, but they revealed a clear tendency to make compromises with the French administration. Boumediene was the first to condemn the political and moral behaviour of these corrupt leaders. It was he who as head of the armed forces guaranteed the coming to power of Ben Bella's radical group in the autumn of 1962. Boumediene was made Minister of Defence in this first independent Algerian government.

However, serious disagreements very soon began to emerge between Boumediene and Ben Bella. At that time Ahmed Ben Bella, the first President of free Algeria, was undoubtedly a very popular figure. But his popularity was based more on sensational political effects than on real achievements. Ben Bella preferred loud campaigns, rallies and mass demonstrations. He was the sort of person who, rather like the Caliph of Bagdad, would unexpectedly appear in some suburb or village in order to 'settle' local problems. Going out once on to the streets of the capital, he picked up a homeless boy in his car and later used this example to raise the question of the immediate establishment of orphanages. One loud campaign followed another: for the surrendering of valuables into a solidarity fund, for the creation of village restoration stations, for a forest planting operation and so on.[1] But these Robin Hood-type actions had virtually no effect on the solving of the urgent problems facing the country.

And, indeed, these problems were extremely serious. During the terrible eight years of war one and a half million people, a tenth of the country's population, had lost their lives. Help had to be given to widows, orphans and returning refugees. Production was in chaos, many villages were ruined and there was a lack of seed grain, carts and cattle. The emigration of the European population and specialists contributed still further to the economic disorganisation. Thus, in 1963, half the able-bodied urban population were unemployed.[2] Added to this, was a decline in labour and civil discipline, a growth in the black market, outbursts of violence and *Wilayism*,* and anarchic

[1] Ania Francos et Jean-Pierre Séréni, *Un Algérien nommé Boumediène*, Edition Stock, Paris, 1976, pp. 141-42.

[2] See Y. V. Potemkin, *Algeria: Problems of Development* (The Experience of a National Democratic Revolution), Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 39.

* *Wilaya*—a territorial unit often formed on an ethnic basis. *Wilayism*—the manifestation of civil strife between different ethnic and territorial groups in Algeria.

and separatist actions. 'It is time,' warned Boumediene, 'to pay serious attention to the building of the country and its economic development.'[1] But it seemed that the President was more concerned with foreign tours, speeches at international forums, etc. He was surrounded by dubious advisers such as Raptis ('Pablo'), a Trotskyist figure.

Of course, subjectively, Ben Bella was revolutionary minded. He called for the building of 'Algerian socialism' but in practice was unable to suggest anything that could promote even an early elimination of the social anarchy and disorder reigning in the country. The Algerian Charter of 1964, which proclaimed the country's socialist orientation, was not backed up with specific deeds and was divorced from the real situation which became more and more threatening. Under these circumstances there was no time for hesitation. In June 1965, Boumediene removed Ben Bella from power and headed the recreated Revolutionary Council of the National Liberation Front.

The events in Algeria were a manifestation of the pattern in the national liberation movement of the sixties when, as it was pointed out in Soviet literature on the subject, a number of important national figures of the 'first generation', e.g., Sukarno, Kwame Nkrumah, Modibo Keita, had suffered a fiasco; while commanding high personal respect, they were incapable of doing painstaking, everyday constructive work.[2] The same thing happened with Ben Bella. But the difference with the events in Algeria was that the leadership did not lose its revolutionary essence. Boumediene immediately stressed his loyalty to the earlier proclaimed socialist principles. 'Nothing has changed, only the methods,'[3] he declared.

Another feature which distinguished the power shift in Algeria was that although its initiator was the army, it was not like the standard military takeover. The new leadership, in the pursuance of social civilian aims, had no intention of achieving them by military means. Precisely because of this, Boumediene did not become (though he could have had he wished) a military dictator. He repeatedly pointed out the army's important role in the building of the new Algeria, and by this he meant the constructive mission of a vanguard uniting people who were most devoted to the cause of the revolution and who had proved this in the harsh struggle for freedom, rather than the negative function of an apparatus of suppression and regimentation.

Therefore the assumption of power was not an end in itself for Boumediene, but the expression of his desire to strengthen, develop and expand the revolutionary reformation of the country. He said that the way to build socialism was by three revolutions, industrial, agrarian and cultural. But, in his words, it was impossible to carry out these revolutions immediately or even quickly. It demanded a definite succession of actions and a vast amount of preparatory work. Catchy

[1] A. Francos et J.-P. Séréni, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

[2] N. A. Simonia, *Countries of the East; Paths of Development*, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp. 338-52.

[3] A. Francos et J.-P. Séréni, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

slogans and loud campaigns were a thing of the past. People had to start from scratch, to restore, if only minimally, production, supply and the normal running of life, and to establish elementary law and order. 'We had to ask much of the people,' explained Boumediene. '... We had to get the peasants to pay taxes which they had not done since 1961. We had to inculcate a civic spirit... All this was unpopular, but it had to be done.'[1]

The new leadership took practical measures aimed at the solution of these problems, at the elimination of the consequences of the war and at strengthening the people's power in the struggle against anarchic Wilayist tendencies. But at the same time Boumediene's government began to carry out and expand measures which corresponded to the main trend, viz. the non-capitalist development of the country. In the second half of the sixties a period of nationalisation of foreign private capital began, in the mining, metal-working, chemical, food and other branches of industry. By the end of 1968, the state financial system had almost fully replaced the foreign private banks.

The fight for the control of oil, the country's national wealth, was conducted both with determination and tactical foresight. First (up until 1971), the government nationalised all foreign companies except the French and established and developed the national oil and gas company, SONATRACH. Then, after SONATRACH was strengthened and there was a sufficient national technical personnel being trained within it, the government announced the nationalisation of the French companies as well. Thirty years after Mexico, under the leadership of the legendary President Lazaro Cardenas, liberated itself from the dominion of American oil monopolies, Algeria provided a new example of the successful 'battle for oil' in the developing world. It was followed by Iraq, Libya and other newly-free countries of the East.

These measures had a beneficial effect on the recovery of the national economy. In the latter half of the sixties the gross national product began to grow significantly. The country's gold and foreign exchange reserves almost tripled. Planning began to be introduced in the economy and the state sector occupied the commanding heights in national industry.[2]

Then came agrarian reforms. The Law on the Agrarian Revolution was promulgated in November 1971. It meant the elimination of absentee landownership, the assignment of cultivated land to the tenant, the limitation of the size of private holdings, the development of cooperation and the allotment of plots to peasants with little or no land. The construction of 'socialist villages' was started, in which, besides the farms and living quarters, schools, hospitals, hotels, cinemas, post-offices and clubs were also put up. The agrarian revolution was intended to eliminate the survivals of feudalism, to improve the peas-

[1] A. Francos et J.-P. Séréni, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
[2] A. G. Virabov, *Essays on the Economic and Social Development of Algeria*, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1981, pp. 68, 137-38.

ants' position and to boost labour productivity.

In the early seventies a reform was also carried out in the field of education, significantly increasing the number of places for schoolchildren and students and also making education cheaper and bringing it closer to the essential needs of national development. By the end of the decade, almost nine-tenths of the young population in the country were being educated.[1]

The administrative reform and the establishment of the people's assemblies of communes and departments (1967-69), the reorganisation of the FLN (1968-70), the working out of long-term development plans (1967-73), the introduction of a free medical service (1973) and the adoption of the National Charter and the Constitution, which consolidated the country's socialist orientation (1976), were some of the many achievements of independent Algeria in the second half of the sixties and early seventies. They bear, if one may put it that way, the imprint of Boumediene as a politician, of his style of leadership, combining an invariable general strategic line with tactical flexibility.

Boumediene regarded integrity, consistency and loyalty to one's chosen path as vital qualities of a revolutionary. Observing the events in Portugal in the mid-seventies he remarked characteristically: 'The young Portuguese military will lose power. They want to have everything: socialism, bourgeois-type democracy, to be part of the Third World and of NATO. This is too much, and all of it incompatible.'[2] The Algerian leader was himself a staunch advocate of socialist orientation and remained so all his life.

At the same time, Boumediene understood very well that consistency on the main issues did not exclude practical flexibility, specific calculation, or the ability to come to a compromise, and he demonstrated this ability more than once. For instance, he willingly made use in the army of French military specialists who had agreed to serve the Republic, for which he was reproached. 'Has Algeria really so many cadres that it can refuse competent people? '[3] he said in reply at a congress of the FLN in 1964.

Some people said that the agrarian reforms in the country had been begun later than they should have been. Boumediene explained that the agrarian revolution was a 'long-term, expensive enterprise. It would have been suicide to risk it with an empty purse. On the contrary, with the acquisition of oil, the venture becomes possible.'[4]

One can also cite as an example Boumediene's policy with regard to the national bourgeoisie. In fact it was straightforward: he warned more than once that the main danger for Algerian socialism would 'come from the private sector which ... may rapidly develop into a

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 175.
[2] A. Francos et J.-P. Séréni, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
[3] Ibid., p. 154.
[4] A. Francos et J.-P. Séréni, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

powerful force if it is not kept under control'.[1] But it did not follow that it was expedient to disregard the sphere of small-scale private enterprise which offered many possibilities, especially in the difficult initial period after independence, for production of consumer goods and the increase of the national economic potential. Therefore, an investment code was adopted in 1966, which granted certain privileges and guarantees to private capital investment. The revival of the private sector helped the country to overcome critical problems in the production of consumer goods. However, the key points of the industry remained under public control.

Boumediene's dialectical interpretation of one of the key political problems, the interrelation between leaders and the masses, is also significant. He constantly emphasised the importance of creating a revolutionary state on a firm foundation that has its roots in the people. On the whole, the formation of the country's political institutions went according to this scheme of 'from the bottom up': from the people's assemblies of communes and departments, which were granted considerable administrative and financial autonomy, to the national elective bodies established by the 1976 Constitution. At the beginning of the seventies a law was passed on the socialist management of enterprises, in accordance with which workers' assemblies were elected at factories and plants every three years, with the right to make recommendations to the management, and to decide many labour and production training issues on a par with it. In the opinion of Algerian Communists, this system of management contained the prerequisites and opened up the way for the establishment of socialist production relations. Boumediene believed that the transfer of political power into the hands of the working people 'constitutes, in the final analysis, the sine qua non of the victory of socialism'.[2]

While lacking the 'fear of the masses', peculiar to certain radical leaders of the national liberation movement, Boumediene did not overestimate the opportunities for the political and managerial initiative on the part of broad sections of the population at that stage. This view, in particular, was reflected in his attitude to the so-called self-governing sector in agriculture. In the very first years after independence, workers and farm-labourers, who had previously been employed on French colonial plantations, spontaneously took over the farms of their former employers. This was an act of mass initiative by the people and provoked an enthusiastic response both in Algeria and abroad. Some considered it necessary to spread this principle to the entire economy and to make self-government the 'show-case' of the Algerian revolution. However, it was soon discovered that self-governing farms, since they lacked the necessary personnel and experience, were unprofitable and production in them had dropped signific-

[1] Khalfa Mameri, *Orientations politiques de l'Algérie (Analyse des discours du Président Boumediène 1965-1970)*, Société Nationale d'Edition et de Diffusion, Algiers, 1978, p. 114.

[2] Mameri, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

antly in comparison with the pre-war period. 'How can an illiterate society like ours,' said Boumediene on this point, 'where there are so many feudal survivals ... introduce self-government? The masses have not yet become politically conscious. The world of labour is not yet ready.'[1]

The task consisted of educating the masses and Boumediene assigned the main role in it to the revolutionary party. He never tired of repeating that 'without a genuine vanguard party, a loyal spokesman for the fundamental aspirations of the people and a vigilant guardian of our options, the state would be doomed to immobility, inefficiency and bureaucracy.'[2] Throughout his activity as national leader he strove to create such a party. The final solution of this problem turned out to be more difficult than expected. Nevertheless, on Boumediene's initiative the reorganisation of the FLN was undertaken in different years, its local cells were set up in all areas and the strata of workers and peasants among the activists expanded. At the same time mass organisations of trade unions, peasants, young people and women were established around the FLN, aimed at uniting the party with broad sections of the working population.

Until now we have spoken of Boumediene as a political figure, in so far as the practical aspect is his most noticeable and determining feature. On the basis of this, some tended even to talk of Boumediene's sheer 'pragmatism' as a political leader. But one cannot agree with such an evaluation. Boumediene was not merely a prominent politician, but also a theoretician and ideologist with his own clear-cut system of views, which can be defined as revolutionary democratism of the populist type.

As Lenin inferred from the example of Sun Yatsen, populism as a variety of 'peasant' socialism and as an original theory of non-capitalist development turned out to be characteristic not only for pre-revolutionary Russia. Similar ideological tendencies arose and are still emerging today in developing countries as a reaction to the contradictions of belated bourgeois development complicated by pre-capitalist survivals and colonial exploitation. They are an attempt to avoid the bourgeois stage by making use of traditional elements of collectivism (the commune, family, religious community and so on). What is more, populist tendencies today are receiving a powerful extra impulse as a result of the changes in the correlation of forces in the world in favour of socialism, and of its influence on the newly-free countries.

Because the peasantry played such a considerable part in the armed struggle against the colonialists, Algeria was a favourable soil for the rise and dissemination of the ideological tendencies of populism. It is no surprise that such an outstanding representative of 'peasant democracy' in the developing world as Frantz Fanon should have developed

[1] A. Francos et J.-P. Séréni, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
[2] K. Mameri, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

here. Boumediene's world outlook also possessed indisputable tendencies of populism.

They were manifested, in particular, in the constant emphasis of the link between the projected socialist future and the national traditions of the past, which, in the opinion of Boumediene and his colleagues, were characterised by collectivism and the communal spirit. They also saw the beginnings of socialism in an original interpretation of Islam, 'which preaches justice, equality, the elimination of exploitation of man by man, and which calls for the distribution of national wealth according to a principle of equality'.[1] As all revolutionary populists the Algerian leader combined this original, radical peasant egalitarianism with clearly pronounced democratism and a firm rejection of all institutions and survivals of feudalism.

Another populist element in Boumediene's views, which is somewhat reminiscent of Fanon's arguments, is the accent on the special role of the peasantry and on its revolutionary potentialities. From this point of view, his comment on the agrarian revolution is symptomatic: 'The agrarian Revolution embodies ... a return to the historical basis out of which the war of liberation developed. After independence, the Revolution abandoned its historical fundamental base of the villages and mountains and moved towards the towns with their comforts and prosperity, but also with their contradictions. It is true that the level of consciousness in the countryside is not as high as the towns, because of a lack of education. But the revolutionary spirit in the countryside is more considerable and more profound because it was precisely there that the rural population suffered most from exploitation and poverty. Therefore, our Revolution, its body, is of peasant origin, even though its leaders, who have served it loyally, possess a mature consciousness which they acquired in the towns. But if the leaders become divorced from the Revolution and its sources, they will only be able to achieve superficial results. Therefore, they must maintain close links with the body of the Revolution and with its source.'[2] This 'peasant democratism' of Boumediene's was undoubtedly a progressive factor of his activity.

.The arguments cited are important for an understanding of the basis of the Algerian leader's views, so let us deal with them in more detail. '...The working class,' Boumediene continues, 'forms a small part of our population. Does our Revolution have to mark time for dozens of years until the working class grows enough to become a real political force, both conscious and organised? And are our enemies going to sit with their hands folded all that time? So, what are we to do? We have no other choice than to maintain revolutionary cooperation with those national forces that we have today ... to create what I call a revolutionary rural society, with which we can eliminate the

[1] H. Boumediène, 'La révolution algérienne plus forte que jamais', *Révolution africaine*, Algiers, No. 644, 1976, p. 12.
[2] *Citations du Président Boumediène*, pp. 312-13.

bureaucratic excrescences that pose a serious ... threat to out Revolution.' Moreover, the link with the peasantry was not just a forced necessity, but also something which, by its very essence, corresponded to the spirit of the impending social reforms, since 'in the countryside ... Algerian society has kept its national authenticity'. [1]

What can one say in connection with this? Undoubtedly, a Marxist cannot fully agree with these attitudes, and in particular, with the definite underestimation (though less than Fanon's) of the role of the working class. Incidentally, one can see that Algeria did not have to 'wait' long for a working class. It was created quite rapidly, in proportion to the swift growth of the state sector. In the same way one can dispute the utter denial of the existence of a class struggle in developing countries and a certain overestimation of the peasantry, which one sometimes meets in his writings. But, while disagreeing in part or entirely with revolutionary populists on some points, Marxists-Leninists continue to this day to study their theories and doctrines with care and respect in order to determine their social class content and to pick out the positive elements in them and the real problems that caused them to arise. Lenin once advised people to 'extract the sound and valuable kernel of the sincere, resolute, militant democracy of the peasant masses from the husk of Narodnik [i.e. populist.—*Authors*] utopias'.[2] There is undoubtedly a revolutionary, democratic and anti-capitalist content in the views of Boumediene and his followers.

It should be emphasised that genuinely revolutionary figures cannot help absorbing, even if only partially, Marxist-Leninist ideas, nor can they ignore the experience of building socialism. We see this influence very clearly in the works of Boumediene and in the programme documents of the FLN. It is stated in the Algerian National Charter that the workers 'play a growing role' in the 'union of revolutionary patriots'.[3] Remarks about the leading role of the party in the building of socialism, about the importance of the scientific approach to the theory and practice of socialist construction, the role of industrialisation and the need for planned development are all, in one way or another, evidence of the influence of Marxist-Leninist thought and the experience of world socialism.

It is not surprising that in his foreign policy course Boumediene proceeded from the acknowledgement of the historic role of the world socialist system in the world revolutionary process and in the strengthening of peace among peoples. 'The road to peace,' he said, 'lies only through the joint efforts ... of all forces of progress, including the Soviet Union, with the aim of eliminating colonialism, both old

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 313-14.

[2] V. I. Lenin, 'Two Utopias', *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 359.

[3] 'Projet de Charte Nationale', *Révolution africaine*, Algiers, 1976, No. 644, p. 11.

and new, and imperialism.'[1] Under Boumediene, the Algerian government kept up close friendly ties with all the socialist countries and offered assistance to peoples fighting for their national freedom.

Let us note, in conclusion, that whatever aspect of Boumediene's activity or outlook we touch on, we always meet the remarkable dialectic that is typical of a genuine revolutionary. He was both a theoretician and a practical worker, a tactician and a strategist, both a professional soldier and a civilian leader. He combined progressive nationalism with internationalism, populist tendencies with an inclination to a scientific interpretation of socialism. While skilfully overcoming numerous practical problems, he adhere to the main line of socialist orientation. He always remained a modest and unpretentious man, for whom one of the most important principles in politics was the observance of revolutionary ethics. We see in everything that magnitude that distinguishes a versatile, gifted personality and an outstanding figure in the national liberation movement.

[1] *La stratégie de Boumediène. Textes choisis et présentés par Paul Balta et Claudine Rulleau*, p. 235.

A prominent figure in the African national liberation movement.

Born on September 17, 1922 in the village of Ikolu-i-Bengu, near Luanda, into the family of a Methodist priest from the Kimbundu tribe.

Went to a Protestant school in Luanda ('Salvador Correia')

Between 1944 and 1947, Neto worked in health service organisations in Luanda and in 1947 left for Portugal to study at the medical department of Lisbon University and the University of Coimbra.

During his studies in Portugal Neto took part in the fight for the independence of Angola and the other Portuguese colonies and kept up contacts with the underground Portuguese Communist Party.

Neto was a gifted poet and even in his student years he enjoyed recognition on the Portuguese literary scene.

In 1952-60, he was arrested several times by the Portuguese authorities for his political activity.

In December 1956, while still in prison, Neto headed the establishment of the MPLA (the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) A member of the MPLA from 1957.

Neto graduated as a surgeon from Lisbon University in 1957 and returned to Angola in 1958.

At the same time as practising medicine in Luanda, he did political work, heading the MPLA.

On June 8, 1960, Neto was arrested in Luanda and in September of the same year he was exiled by the Portuguese authorities to the Cape Verde Islands. He was subsequently released,but in November 1961 he was again arrested on the orders of the Governor of the Islands and sent to a Portuguese military prison in Aljuba.

Owing to intervention by democratic organisations of Portugal, the authorities were forced to release Neto in the spring of 1962, though he remained under house arrest near Lisbon. In July 1962

the MPLA organised his escape (together with family) to Léopoldville (now Kinshasa).

Neto was Chairman of the MPLA from December 1962 to 1979 (re-elected in 1977).

He was a member of the Presidium of the World Peace Council from 1969 to 1977.

In 1974, according to a report by the bulletin Guerrilero, *published by the Committee for the Freedom of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau, the leadership of the MPLA discovered a conspiracy within the party with the aim of assassinating Neto (two unsuccessful attempts were made on his life).*

Between 1974 and 1977, Neto was Chairman of the MPLA–Party of Labour.

After many years abroad, Neto returned to Angola on February 4, 1975.

With the declaration of Angolan independence on November 11, 1975, Neto became the first President of the People's Republic of Angola, the head of the government formed by the MPLA and commander-in-chief of the Angolan national army. He was Chairman of the Council of the Revolution of the People's Republic of Angola from November 1975 to September 1979.

Neto visited the Soviet Union in 1967, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979.

On October 8, 1976 he signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the People's Republic of Angola.

At the beginning of September, 1979, Neto arrived in the USSR for medical treatment and died after an operation on September 10.

Of all the African states that have gained their independence, Angola is perhaps the country whose path to this goal was the hardest. Angolan patriots were the first among the populations of the then Portuguese colonies to start an armed uprising on February 4, 1961 in Luanda, against Salazar's fascist dictatorship which had utterly ruled out a peaceful resolution to the conflict between the ruling circles of the metropolitan country and the population of the colonies. The uprising of 1961 served as a signal for the beginning of a resolute struggle against foreign oppression, a signal for the peoples of Angola and the other Portuguese colonies.

But the Luanda uprising was badly planned and its organisers did not take into account the specific conditions of fighting a fascist regime. The majority of the people did not know what the aims of the fight were, the revolt was viciously suppressed by the colonial troops and many brave Angolans were killed. This was followed by the restructuring of the national liberation forces and their preparation for a prolonged armed struggle. It took fifteen years of continual, persistent armed resistance before Angola, having beaten back foreign aggression and defeated the separatist groups supported by international

imperialism, was able to take its place among the sovereign African states.

The Angolan people came honorably through all their ordeals because they had an experienced and well-tested vanguard, the MPLA, which had the international support of the workers', communist and national liberation movements, and a united group of consistent and intrepid revolutionaries at its head. The foremost among them was undoubtedly the recognised leader of the MPLA, Agostinho Neto.

Neto belonged to that renowned cohort of the African revolutionary intelligentsia which preferred the deprivation, sacrifices and dangers of the fight for national liberation to a well-off and privileged (in comparison with the general level of the local population) life under colonial oppression. This intelligentsia formed the organisational and ideological nucleus of the national revolutionary movement and conducted the main work of rallying the masses oppressed by Portuguese colonialism and of developing their national consciousness.

Both a doctor and a talented poet, Neto, prompted by feelings of patriotism and justice, made the fight for his country's independence the main cause of his life.

By the 1940s, his exceptional poetic gift had already made him one of the major figures in the movement for the revival of Angolan national culture. His very first works were closely linked with the main problem facing the country, that of the liberation of Angola from colonial oppression.

Having saved up enough money, Neto left for Portugal in 1947 and entered the medical department of Lisbon University and later the University of Coimbra.

Neto was arrested for the first time in 1952 for collecting signatures for the Stockholm Appeal for Peace. On his release from prison he became an active participant in the radical student movement where he represented the young students from the Portuguese colonies. Neto was again arrested in 1955, during a rally, and was imprisoned until 1957. The fact that Jean-Paul Sartre, Louis Aragon, Simone de Beauvoir, Nicolas Guillen, Diego Rivera and others signed the petition demanding his release in 1957, is evidence of his international fame as a major poet of 'Portuguese' Africa.

In 1958, Neto completed his medical degree and returned to Angola where he immediately became the head of the MPLA, which had been founded in 1956. At the same time he worked at his medical practice. Neto was arrested for the third time on June 8, 1960 and sent to prison in Portugal, later to be exiled to one of the Cape Verde Islands. On hearing the news of Neto's arrest, the Angolan population responded with protest demonstrations. These were so large that for the first time in the history of the colonial government in Angola, the authorities had to use the army as well as the police in order to suppress them. It was at this time that Neto was elected honorary Chairman of the MPLA as a sign of acknowledgement of his services to the liberation movement.

In November 1961, Neto was transferred to a military prison in Portugal, and in 1962 he was released owing to pressure from an international campaign, started by the MPLA, for the release of political prisoners, but remained for some time under house arrest near Lisbon. However, with the aid of some Portuguese friends, he managed to leave the country illegally and in July 1962 he arrived in Léopoldville (now Kinshasa), where the MPLA was temporarily based following the defeat of the 1961 uprising. From that point on, Neto was the direct and permanent leader of the Angolans' struggle until his death. The revival of the MPLA after the serious defeat of 1961 owed much to him.

In December 1962, the First National Conference of the MPLA, which was to become a landmark on the difficult path towards preparing the next stage of the fight, took place in Léopoldville. It was held under Neto's guidance. On the basis of the experience of the events of 1961, the MPLA put forward a new plan of action. Since all peaceful methods for achieving independence were ruled out, the movement directed its attention towards armed struggle, emphasising, moreover, the need for thorough and all-round preparation. The Conference also passed a vitally important resolution on the development of political and organisational activity among the peasantry with the aim of drawing them into the liberation movement.

As the experience of 1961 showed, the option of a putsch or military coup was closed to the Angolan patriotic forces. The only way to obtain freedom from colonial oppression was by means of a harsh and protracted guerrilla conflict developing into an all-out patriotic war. But this demanded systematic, timely, long and thorough preparation, and the historical importance of the First National Conference of the MPLA lies in the fact that it set forth this goal. It proceeded from the necessity of mobilising the population politically and of educating the people to be aware of the irreconcilability of national interests and colonial domination and of the inevitability of armed struggle. Hence the political support of military actions and the training of military and political cadres was put forward as the primary task, with due regard for material and technical provision as well. The MPLA began the systematic training of personnel, for which many of the movement's activists were sent to friendly, primarily socialist countries. The Conference adopted measures to strengthen the MPLA organisationally. A military and political committee was set up for the purposes of coordination and operational guidance. Neto was elected chairman of the MPLA.

The First National Conference of the MPLA formulated a new approach to the liberation struggle. Henceforth, armed resistance was considered not as a specifically military act, but as a form of political struggle, requiring the mobilisation and unification of all patriotic forces and the raising of their political consciousness. It also demanded an alliance and cooperation with all opponents of colonialism not only in Angola, but beyond its limits, and especially with the so-

cialist countries, which are always prepared to support peoples fighting against imperialist oppression. This line was opposed by the ultra-left elements headed by the former General Secretary of the MPLA, Viriato da Crus, who were eventually expelled from the movement in 1962. They supported the idea of self-reliance, attempted to isolate the MPLA from the countries of the socialist community and the international communist movement and foisted on the movement the racist attitude of distrust towards all Portuguese and people of mixed birth. The ultra-left group demanded fundamental concessions to the tribal organisations that were laying claim to the leading role in the national liberation struggle.

The strong influence of the tribalist elements was a real curse for the anti-imperialist movement in Angola. Of course, it was, to a considerable extent, the result of the embryonic state of the process of forming a united Angolan nation, the large number of nationalities (according to some calculations 11) and tribes (over 100), and the extremely uneven distribution of the population throughout the country's territory. But the root cause of tribalism as a political phenomenon in Angola and in other African countries lies not in the mixed character of a country's ethnic structure, but in the use of tribalism by power-hungry African politicians for their own mercenary aims and in the support for these aspirations offered by imperialist powers, who are always prepared to finance any undertaking that undermines the national liberation movement.

Without foreign interference, the role of any African politician who claimed to represent national interests would have been determined by his actual influence in the country. But the separatist, puppet groups were encouraged by the generous supply of financial resources and arms from outside, the possibility of establishing strongholds outside the national territory and the concentration of efforts not against colonialism, but on rivalry with the genuine patriotic freedom fighters.

Because of its natural wealth, territory and geographical position, Angola is a strategically important country from the point of view of international imperialism. What is more, it is bordered by states whose leaders either did not approve of the revolutionary orientation of the MPLA (Zaire), or were openly hostile towards the national liberation movement (the authorities of South African-occupied Namibia). They found the consistent anti-imperialism of the MPLA unsuitable and gave every support to the opportunist tribalist groups which had no real backing among the masses and took guidance from conservative circles in Africa, the Western powers and racist South Africa. Two of the most prominent such groups were the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) headed by Holden Roberto and functioning from the territory of Zaire, and the National Union for the total independence of Angola (UNITA), which emerged later in 1966 under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi and was based in the south of the country under the auspices of South Africa.

The treacherous actions in Zaire of Holden Roberto, a protégé of the CIA, created exceptionally difficult conditions for the MPLA. The organisation was banned. Only after it moved to the Congo (Brazzaville), when the overthrow in 1963 of the reactionary regime there made revolutionary activity possible, was the MPLA able to start preparing for the armed struggle which began in Cabinda in 1964. This proved that the MPLA had emerged from the crisis that followed the defeat of 1961, and had become the only movement conducting serious anti-colonial military action in Angola. From then on the activity of the MPLA expanded and gained increasingly wide support from the people. The movement managed to liberate a sizeable territory on which it set about organising the life of the population on the basis of democracy, collectivism and mutual assistance.

In the spring of 1974 the Salazar-Caetano regime fell as a result of the anti-fascist revolution in Portugal. It became clear that the fight for independence had entered a decisive stage. Just as ten years previously, the MPLA was the only national organisation that had a solid military and political basis in the country. Neto's service towards this was truly inestimable.

But the activity of the splinter groups still posed a threat to the successful completion of the national liberation struggle. That is why the moment of declaration of Angolan independence in November 1975 became a moment of utmost danger for this long-suffering country. Detachments of the FNLA, reinforced by Zaire and well armed by imperialist powers, moved on the capital of the new republic from the north while regular South African units and an army of mercenaries, united with UNITA forces, began a rapid attack from the south. Thus began the so-called 'second war of independence' in which the patriots, rallied around the MPLA and led by Neto, fought for the independence of their country, not against the Portuguese colonialists this time, but aganst international reaction and imperialism, which controlled and armed the splinter groups.

At this critical moment, the MPLA leadership headed by Neto mobilised all the resources of the young state in order to repulse the enemy and turned for help to the countries of the socialist community. The support of Cuba, the USSR and other socialist countries helped the Angolan patriots to expel the interventionists from their country and to defend the freedom that they had won with such difficulty. The last act of the 'second war of independence' was the expulsion from Angolan territory of South African forces in March 1976.

Only then was the People's Republic of Angola able to start carrying out the socio-economic tasks of the national liberation movement, although the conditions in which this had to be done could not really be called peaceful, since provocations by the splinter groups and sallies by South African troops continued and, indeed, are still going on today.

Neto took an important part in the determination of the MPLA's

revolutionary course. By this time he had formed truly Marxist views on the prospects for Angolan development. He read a great deal, seriously studied Marxist-Leninist literature and made many visits to the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. Neto's statements prove that his philosophical outlook was that of a dialectical materialist.

Agostinho Neto became the true and nationally recognised leader of the people and the head of state. He had twenty years' experience of leading a prolonged armed struggle against the colonialists. He clearly recognised the need to restructure the ranks of the MPLA and to turn it into a political party of the Marxist-Leninist type. In accordance with this a decision was taken to convene the First MPLA Congress for the discussion of questions pertaining to the transformation of the movement into a vanguard workers' party.

The First MPLA Congress took place in Luanda on December 4-10, 1977.

The Central Committee's report, delivered by Neto, summarised the twenty years of struggle, noted the main changes that had taken place in the MPLA in connection with the gaining of independence, and defined the ultimate goals and the contemporary stage of the struggle as well as the specific socio-political, economic, ideological and organisational tasks. The Congress adopted the vitally important documents: the Programme and Rules of the MPLA—Party of Labour, and the guidelines for economic and social development for the period 1978-80.

The Congress declared the main aim of the MPLA to be the building of socialism and defined the contemporary stage of Angolan development as the stage of national democratic revolution, a period of transition towards socialist construction. Neto pointed out in his report that with the formation of the People's Republic of Angola, the MPLA had fulfilled its historical mission as a national liberation movement and that the construction of a society of people's democracy and socialism required the establishment of a vanguard party of the working class, uniting all Angolan working people and founded on Marxist-Leninist principles. Thus, the MPLA changed its name to the MPLA-Party of Labour.

In one of the resolutions of the Congress special note was made of 'the firmness, courage and perspicacity which always distinguish Comrade Antonio Agostinho Neto, the leader of our struggle and the tireless architect behind the Angolan people's victories'.[1] These virtues were brilliantly demonstrated in the years following the First MPLA Congress, when Angola had its first successes in reviving the national economy, which had been ruined by the war and sabotage by colonialists and their henchmen, in the strengthening of security and law and order, and in increasing its influence on the international

[1] *MPLA. Congresso 1. Luanda. 1977. Teses e Resoluções*, Luanda, 1978, p. 145.

arena. Neto died in September 1979 in his 57th year.

The death of this outstanding revolutionary came as a sudden shock. Angola's most pressing problems had not yet been solved. The country was going through a stormy and uneasy period of development. But Neto left behind a glorious heritage and he will remain forever with the Angolan people and with his creation, the MPLA—Party of Labour. Under Neto's leadership, the country gain independence. Neto planned the country's development prospects and there is every evidence to show that his colleagues and the working people are determined to follow the path of socialist orientation which he indicated. Neto bequeathed Angola, and indeed Africa as a whole, the invaluable experience of revolutionary struggle in the most difficult conditions. Undoubtedly this experience is of considerable international importance.

Neto was one of the best and the more authoritative representatives of the 'new wave' of African revolutionary democracy that came to power mainly in the mid-seventies. Neto and his colleagues relied in their activity both on their long personal experience of armed struggle, which served to harden them well and which logically led them to the necessity of fighting for socialism, and on the experience of the African states who already had ten to fifteen years of independent development behind them. This 'new wave' of African revolutionary democrats went considerably further than their predecessors, the pioneers of national democracy of the sixties, in moving towards scientific socialism, in the scientific analysis of African society, of the objectives and stages of revolution and the arrangement of class forces, and in practical reforms. The conclusions which Neto drew from his own revolutionary experience and that of other revolutionaries represent one of the high points of political thought of the African national liberation movement of the seventies, and they deserve generalisation and analysis. While not making it our task here to dwell on the political legacy of Neto, let us, however, note some of its points which are of particular importance for the future of the African peoples' revolutionary national liberation movement.

Regarding armed struggle as the only means of opposing Portuguese colonialism, Neto and his colleagues in the MPLA, and also in FRELIMO and PAIGC, which headed the liberation movements in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, did not place absolute value on military action. Neto understood the political nature of the war of liberation and the need for its political preparation and political leadership. He insisted on the organic combination of military and ideological, political, social and propagandist work. He stressed that the liberation movement should not enclose itself in insurgent activity but that, on the contrary, it should envelope all areas of national life and, indeed, this was the guarantee of the movement's success. The experience of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, as earlier that of Vietnam, has demonstrated the correctness of this approach as opposed to the erroneous, purely military approach which led to the

defeat of a series of liberation movements in Latin America.

Dialectics are characteristic of Neto's activity. He rejected clichéd slogans, ideas and forms; in his consistent work for the complete political and social liberation of the Angolan working people he set specific tasks and always took into consideration the existing possibilities. He proceeded from the scientific idea of the stages of the revolutionary process.

Even at the beginning of the sixties Neto realised that national independence could not be ensured simply by overthrowing Portuguese colonial rule, and that it was necessary, as was noted in the documents of the MPLA, to show vigilance with regard to attempts by imperialist powers to replace the archaic Portuguese colonialism with more flexible forms of neocolonialism. Neto also advanced social tasks, demonstrating his desire to reform Angolan society, defend the interests of the workers and peasants and establish social justice under conditions of independence.

However, in the years of struggle for independence, neither Neto, nor the other MPLA leaders spoke of socialism being the aim of the movement. They realised that national liberation was in itself a great aim and a reliable basis for rallying the patriotic forces. Realising that the anti-imperialist, nationalist stage was a logical step in the development of the mass struggle of the peoples of colonial countries, they did not hurry to omit this stage or declare it passed or overcome, but they also firmly rejected absolute nationalism, narrow, egoistic and essentially bourgeois nationalism.

There are many examples in the history of the national liberation movement over the last two decades of two extreme approaches to the problem of anti-imperialist nationalism. On the one hand, bourgeois circles try to emasculate the revolutionary content of the democratic, anti-imperialist nationalism of oppressed nations, to detract from them the ideas of social reform and satisfaction of the needs of the working people, and to declare the notions of class interests and a class struggle in colonial society to be seditious, anti-national and borrowed from the Europeans. This is typical of bourgeois, egoistic nationalism, in which even elements of protest against foreign oppression usually wither away, yielding to the desire for cooperation with the imperialist powers for joint opposition to the revolutionary forces.

On the other hand, the ultra-left denied the democratic content of the nationalism of oppressed nations and the very existence of revolutionary nationalism. They saw it as exclusively opportunist, dangerous and opposed to the cultivation of the class consciousness of the working people, as something sacrificing their interests to local capital. From this came the abstract slogan of the struggle against every kind of nationalism and its contrasting slogan calling for the rallying of the working people exclusively on the basis of class interests and socialism. The latter slogan nearly always turned out to be at variance with the level of the working people's class consciousness,

thus leading to a rift between the vanguard and the masses and to alienation from the patriotic forces which should and could have become allies of the working people in the fight for national independence and social progress.

The MPLA and its leader, Neto, and their colleagues in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique fighting against Portuguese colonialism, took neither of these paths. They chose the correct, though long and difficult path of developing revolutionary, democratic, anti-imperialist nationalism, deepening its social content, gradually and continually weakening and forcing out exploitative elements and thus leading the working people to the ideas of scientific socialism via this democratic nationalism. During the long years of struggle, this path made it possible for the MPLA to rally very broad sections of the population in order to fight colonialism.

It was not until the Third Plenum of the MPLA Central Committee, which took place at the end of 1976, when political independence had already been gained, that socialism was declared to be the movement's ultimate goal. But even this step was accompanied by a clear definition of the contemporary stage of development not as socialist, but as popular democratic, and this was confirmed in the Programme of the MPLA–Party of Labour adopted at its First Congress. 'With the defeat of Portuguese colonialism,' it stated in this document, 'the conditions have emerged for the transition to a new stage in the fight–to a popular democratic revolution ... during which the necessary political and material conditions will be created for the transition to the next stage, that of a socialist revolution.'[1]

Neto was well aware that the new definition of the goals of the struggle implied not only an important change in the ideological and political platform, but also a new attitude among the majority of the movement's participants towards the ideology of scientific socialism. As we have mentioned, on Neto's initiative the MPLA–Party of Labour at its First Congress declared scientific socialism its ideological basis. This was never done during the years of struggle for independence, although the adherence of the leading nucleus of the MPLA and, above all, Neto to Marxist-Leninist doctrine was then obvious. Neto believed that in undertaking such a step, it was necessary to be guided by strategic objectives and the needs of the struggle, to proceed not from one's own level of consciousness, but from the level of consciousness of the majority of participants in the movement. He was in no hurry to declare scientific socialism the ideological basis of the MPLA–Party of Labour, not wishing to frighten off those sections of the population who, because of their social status or degree of political maturity could not or were not ready to accept it.

The MPLA, on Neto's initiative, only made the choice in favour of scientific socialism after independence, when there was a sharp in-

[1] *MPLA. Partido de Trabalho, Estatutos e Programa*, Luanda, 1978, pp. 37, 41.

tensification of class antagonism in Angola, provoked by imperialist attempts to create a bourgeois and petty-bourgeois stratum in the country and mobilise it as rapidly as possible as a counter-revolutionary force, and in the situation just after the civil war which had led to the polarisation of society and when the ultra-left adventurist group of José Van-Dúnen declared itself an adherent of Marxism-Leninism and accused the MPLA leadership of petty-bourgeois attitudes. The movement was fully consistent on this issue and avoided the ambiguity that was characteristic of many spokesmen for 'African socialism'. Neto declared that there could not be a European or an African socialism, a socialism for developed countries and a socialism for the developing countries. 'There is only one, scientific socialism, that has become a reality on a considerable part of the globe,'[1] he said, adding that the task was to put the brilliant doctrine of Marxism-Leninism into practice, proceeding from specific Angolan conditions. Moreover, Neto was well aware that the transformation of the MPLA into a vanguard workers' party was just beginning and that it was not enough to work out and adopt a programme meeting the requirements of scientific socialism; the main thing was to bring it home to all members of the party and steadily to put it into practice.

The problem of defining the arrangement of class forces is indissolubly linked to the determination of the stages of revolution. Neto made a great contribution to the solving of this problem. He supported the maximum unification of national forces to repulse imperialism. In the MPLA documents it is stressed that the policy of the national front requires all social strata to take part in the struggle for independence. It was pointed out that the desire to unite the whole population on an anti-imperialist basis was not at all equivalent to levelling its participants. It did not mean that one should forget the different roles which the various social strata played because of their economic status, or ignore the contradictions and even antagonisms between them. As Neto saw it, national unity was based on the recognition of the principle of class struggle and the need to transform it in line with the development of the revolutionary process.

During the years of the struggle for independence the programme documents of the MPLA did not pick out from among the participants in the resistance movement any social strata as the main force in this fight. The situation changed when political independence had been obtained and the task had been set to build people's democracy in order to prepare the ground for the future transition to the stage of socialist revolution. Before independence the inner class contradictions in Angolan society moved into the background because of the existence of common goals in the struggle against the Portuguese colonialists. After the country was liberated, as Neto pointed out at the First MPLA Congress, the inner contradictions in Angola intensi-

[1] *Relatório de Comité Central ao 1º Congresso de M.P.L.A.*, Luanda, 1979, p. 53.

fied, the class struggle became more acute, and petty-bourgeois elements became more active.[1] Thus, it was stressed in the MPLA Programme and Neto's speeches that power in the People's Republic of Angola was in the hands of the working people, and that the unity of all patriotic forces was based on the alliance of workers and peasants, in which the working class had the leading role.

Neto came out firmly against the adventurist attempts by Van-Dúnen's factional group to counterpose the idea of proletarian leadership of the working masses to the idea of national unity, and to pit the working class against the intermediate, petty-bourgeois strata by means of artificially forcing the revolution. Neto countered this propagandist contrivance, to which the power-hungry factional group resorted, by stressing the firmness of the MPLA's principle: 'All patriotic classes are called upon to contribute to the achievement of the revolution...' 'We defend national unity,' declared Neto, 'and they do not. They would like to see the working class rule, but rule alone and continuously fighting the other classes.'[2] The statement by the Political Bureau of the MPLA Central Committee on July 12, 1977, concerning the exposure of the activity of the factionalists mentioned the party's resolve to continue to struggle so that 'the working class, "legitimate repository of the doctrine of scientific socialism", takes on its leading role, but without isolating itself from the other forces in the National Revolution'.[3] But in the very same statement the need was emphasised to fight all opportunists and especially those members of the petty bourgeoisie who had decided that with the defeat of the ultra-left group the time had come for them to become rich without restraint.[4]

In his last speeches in July and August of 1979, Neto frequently drew attention to the danger of the growth of petty-bourgeois influence which could frustrate the implementation of the resolution of the First MPLA Congress. He stressed that power in the country should belong to the workers and peasants and not to the bourgeoisie. He also stated that although in Angola the bourgeoisie had no power, it could gain it if vigilance was not shown. At the same time, Neto emphasised that the petty bourgeoisie had no reason to fear the workers and peasants and that it would retain the opportunity of carrying out economic activity if it avoided abuses and subordinated itself to the interests of the working people. This combination of permitting and even encouraging private enterprise in a number of branches of the economy with termination of its claims to political leadership and power formed the dialectical unity of the national front and the class struggle, of the rallying of all national forces and the strengthening of the leading role of the working class, so characteristic

[1] See *Relatório de Comité Central ao 1º Congresso de M.P.L.A.*, p. 14.
[2] *Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1977-1978*, Africana Publishing Company, London, 1979, p. 497.
[3] *The African Communist*, No. 71, 1977, London, p. 49.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

of Neto's revolutionary line.

The problem of national unity in Angola, just as in the majority of African countries, has not only a class, but also an ethnic aspect. We already know what disasters Angola suffered as a result of attempts to use ethnic diversity for political aims. Neto consistently defended the idea of the unity of all tribes, races and nationalities living in Angola. Under him, the MPLA became a truly nationwide organisation as opposed to the tribalist groups and movements that had no scruples about adopting even racist slogans. He was ready to act jointly with all those fighting for national interests. But he was irreconcilably opposed to unprincipled politicians who were willing to sacrifice the country for their ambition and love of power. 'There can never be unity with puppets,' said Neto. 'The question of unity is justly put only when it is between patriotic forces of differing tendencies, not when it is between patriots and traitors.'[1] Neto adhered firmly to these views and this is one of his behests to the Angolan nation.

Neto did a great deal to strengthen fraternal friendship between the USSR and his country. In this sense his experience has international significance. He was one of the first African leaders to realise that solidarity with the socialist countries and their internationalist aid are a vital strategic reserve of the national liberation movement, the pledge of its victories and a reliable guarantee against the encroachments of imperialism.

Once head of state, Neto made wide use of the new opportunities for developing relations with the world of socialism. In the Angolan revolution's hour of greatest danger he turned without hesitation for help to the USSR, Cuba and other socialist countries. In October 1976, during his visit to Moscow, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the People's Republic of Angola was signed, laying the firm foundation for bilateral cooperation. Inter-party ties between the CPSU and the MPLA—Party of Labour also began to develop.

As Neto noted many times, one of the greatest lessons that he had learned from the experience of Africa was that an organisationally and ideologically strong political party had to be the guiding nucleus in the political and social life of the country. Back in the years of struggle against Portuguese fascism Neto remarked: 'It is necessary that the party be built up, that it constitute the backbone, the base and the principal element in the life of the nation... Where there is no party, where the militants are not placed under a strict discipline, where the leaders are not bound to revolutionary principles—there anarchy enters. There the enemies penetrate easily, and instead of independence, we will have neocolonialism or an insecure balance between dependence and independence, between progress and reaction.'[2]

[1] Don Barnett and Roy Harvey, *The Revolution in Angola. MPLA, Life Histories and Documents*, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., New York, 1972, p. 300.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

Neto saw the aim of the Angolan revolutionaries not only in the creation of a party, but also in its continuous development and in the growth of its socialist potential. A crucial moment in this respect was the First MPLA Congress, which put forward the task of creating a party of the working people which would unite 'workers, peasants, the revolutionary intelligentsia and other working people loyal to the cause of the proletariat in a single, close alliance'.[1] Neto gave constant attention to the reorganisation of the structure and activity of the MPLA in accordance with the principles declared by its First Congress. With this aim in mind the Corrective Movement was begun in the Party in 1978.

Neto also put much effort into establishing the bodies of people's power in Angola, the organisation of which dragged on owing to the violent opposition of reactionaries and the machinations of the factional group which tried to use the elections to these bodies in its selfish interests. It took a long time to ensure the truly popular character of the organs of power and the representation in them of workers and peasants, and this work was only completed after Neto's death.

Not long before he died, Neto travelled round a number of regions in the country giving many speeches at mass rallies. At the centre of his attention were questions of the development of the Party and the state. The first President of the People's Republic of Angola warned against the danger of the embourgeoisement and bureaucratisation of the Party and state apparatus. He noted that the activity of the Party and state still did not fully correspond to the requirements of the political education and mobilisation of all sections of the population. He called for more workers and peasants to be drawn into political life, seeing in this the guarantee of progress towards socialism.

As if sensing his approaching death, Neto said in one of his last speeches that the revolution in Angola would continue, though any one of its participants could die at any moment. The revolution has continued and derives strength from the legacy of Agostinho Neto, who not only led the struggle for independence in the most difficult circumstances, but who also pointed out to his people the only true prospect for development. The revolutionaries of Angola and other countries emulate Neto's determination, courage, restraint, realism and devotion to national interests, to the ideals of justice and socialism.

[1] *Relatório de Comitê Central ao 1º Congresso de M.P.L.A.*, p. 18.

A prominent figure in the African national liberation movement.

Born into a peasant family in the village of Ombele near Fort-Rousset (Congo) on December 31, 1938.

He received a military education in Brazzaville (in the Leclerc Military School), and graduated from a military school in Strasbourg and the Saint-Cyr military college in France. He returned to his country in 1962 and in 1963 was made commanding officer of the Point-Noire garrison.

In 1965-66, Marien Ngouabi was commander of a paratroop battalion stationed in Brazzaville and received the rank of captain.

In 1966-68 he was a member of the Central Committee of the ruling party, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR).

Arrested in July 1968 on the orders of President Massamba-Débat, but soon freed together with other political prisoners as a result of a military coup.

Commander-in-chief of the National People's Army from August 1968 to March 1977. From August 1968 to December 1969 Marien Ngouabi was Chairman of the National Council of the Revolution.

Chairman of the Central Committee of the Congolese Party of Labour (Parti Congolaise du Travail–PCT) from December 31, 1969 to March 1977.

From 1970 to 1977, Chairman of the State Council and President of the People's Republic of the Congo, head of state and government.

Between 1973 and 1977 he was Vice-Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), having been elected at the Second Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU member-countries.

At the Second Congress of the PCT, Marien Ngouabi was elected permanent secretary of the Party and he occupied this post till the end of his life.

In March 1975 he paid an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union

as head of a party and governmental delegation from the People's Republic of the Congo.

On March 18, 1977, Ngouabi was killed by a terrorist.

December 1969 saw the proclamation of the People's Republic of the Congo and the foundation of the Congolese Party of Labour, the first ruling revolutionary democratic party on the African continent to declare scientific socialism its ideological basis. This event of paramount importance took place in a small, economically weak state of barely one and a half million, enmeshed in a web of neocolonial dependence. Coming at the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies this may have seemed a bit politically extravagant, and, indeed, many people were surprised. The question arose as to what extent this decision was prepared and socially conditioned, and how consistently the Party of Labour would implement it. Subsequent events, however, showed that it was both logical and firm. Many years have passed since then, and despite all the changes in the party leadership, all its digressions from the revolutionary course and all the complexities of the internal and external situation and, indeed the tragic nature which the internal political struggle at times acquired, the Congolese Party of Labour has held firmly on to power and managed to find the strength for severe self-criticism and correction of the political line, and has maintained its devotion to the ideals and theory of scientific socialism. The orientation adopted in 1969 was not accidental. It embodied the natural movement of the revolutionary anti-imperialist ideology of the national liberation movement towards scientific socialism, which was manifest everywhere, though in different forms. The non-capitalist path of development, i.e., the path of development towards socialism 'not via capitalism', which already has a history in Africa and which has taken on a variety of forms and acquired ever greater scope and popularity despite the failures and retreats in a number of countries, serves as the best confirmation of the natural social and historical origin of this process.

The shift by the revolutionary representatives of the national liberation movement towards scientific socialism had several stages and was not an even process. It began with the very general ideals of socialism, experienced disappointment with national social-reformism, thus learning how to differentiate between true, revolutionary, and false, reformist, socialism, and subscribed to a platform of consistent revolutionary democracy.

The resolute and unquestioning approval of the main principles of socialism in the People's Republic of the Congo was essentially one of the new forms of this process. It would, however, be wrong to assert that this form is universal or even the best for all revolutionary national parties and movements in Africa. But its novelty and stabil-

ity compel us to consider what kind of conditions made it possible and viable.

While sharing the common fate of Africa, Congo is in many respects an unusual country for the continent. This is caused by the peculiarities of its history. Using Congo's advantageous geographic position, French colonialists turned the country into a base from which they carried out their conquests of Chad, Gabon and the Central African Republic. Congo was also transformed into the administrative centre of French Equatorial Africa. The need to train low-level personnel for the apparatus of colonial administration induced the French to stimulate the development of education in Congo to a greater degree than on the periphery of their colonial possessions. The neighbouring countries, which had no exit to the sea, transported goods via the territory of Congo, which was situated on the ocean coast. This led to the reviving in Congo of a intermediatory type of economic activity. As a result Congo rapidly began to be urbanised. Today, city-dwellers constitute approximately 40 per cent of its population, a very high level for Tropical Africa. The size of the intelligentsia also increased considerably faster there than in the neighbouring countries. And the intelligentsia is precisely where the outlook of the national liberation movement is initially formed. The processes of urbanisation and the forming of a national intelligentsia accelerated after independence. At present almost all children of school age are offered free primary education. Qualified national personnel, traditionally distinguished by a great political activeness, are rapidly being trained.

These circumstances could not help having an effect on the development of the young state. It was determined to a great extent by two factors: the extensive urbanisation and the relatively high level of political awareness of the urban population. As a rule, the political struggle in Congo has not taken the form of a military coup, so characteristic for many African countries. Thus, the neo-colonialist regime of Abbé Fulbert Youlou was overthrown by a powerful wave of union-sponsored strikes in the 'three glorious days' (as they are called in Congo) of August 13, 14 and 15, 1963. Although when President Massamba-Débat was removed (in the latter half of the sixties, under pressure from external forces he began to change the progressive trend that had been characteristic of his first years in power) outbursts of armed conflict, or rather confrontation, did take place, it was not they that turned out to be decisive factors, but the political mobilisation of opponents of the degeneration of the revolution of August 1963. As a result, the change of power occurred without bloodshed and without the murder or arrest of leaders. During its ten years in power the leadership of the Congolese Party of Labour has changed rather frequently, but all these changes have been the result of political action within the framework of the party and not of conspiracies or military coups.

Marien Ngouabi was the founder of the Congolese Party of Labour

and the initiator of its conversion to the ideas of scientific socialism. He was born in a village in the very heart of the country. Both his mother and father belonged to families of tribal chiefs, but led an ordinary, traditionally patriarchal peasant life, typical for the majority of rural people. But in Ngouabi's childhood, the new tendencies were already being felt in the remote Congolese village. His parents considered it necessary to give their son an education. On finishing primary school in Ovando in 1953, Ngouabi entered the Leclerc Military School in Brazzaville from where he graduated in 1957. After a four-month probationary period he received the rank of sergeant in the colonial army.

From 1959 to 1960, Ngouabi served in Cameroon. This was an important stage in the formation of his political views. The whole of Africa was living with the presentiment of the impending fall of colonialism. The authoritative representatives of African peoples publicly announced their determination to fight for national liberation at the Bandung Conference, an event which was to have great repercussions. The imminent end of imperialist domination was felt particularly acutely in the French colonial army, despite the efforts of the commanding officers to maintain the stability of the existing order. The French soldiers in Cameroon could not help being alarmed by the successive defeats of their fellow soldiers in Vietnam, or again in Algeria, where the national liberation war was then at its height. In a situation of uneasiness, ferment and the widening struggle of peoples against colonial oppression, French troops in Cameroon carried out cruel operations to suppress the guerrilla movement led by the underground Union of Residents of Cameroon which had been banned in 1955. For Ngouabi these events were a clear demonstration of the oppressive nature of French colonialism and its military and administrative apparatus. What he witnessed made a very grave impression on him. He even wanted to retire, but the colonial laws stipulated that graduates of military schools who did not serve five years in the army had to refund expenses for their training. Ngouabi was unable to obtain the required sum and was thus forced to continue his service.

Ngouabi returned to Congo at the beginning of 1960. Here he clearly showed his aptitude for political leadership, not limiting his activity and horizons to military interests, but striving to take an active part in the political life of the country. Ngouabi was twice arrested for participating in popular demonstrations for the declaration of independence first of Belgian and then of French Congo. After his release from arrest he entered the Preparatory Military School in Strasbourg.

From September 1960 to July 1962, Ngouabi completed his studies in Strasbourg and then in Saint-Cyr. His biographer writes that these years were marked by friendship with Algerian freedom fighters and by a deep interest in the problems of national liberation. While in Strasbourg Ngouabi read the works of Nkrumah, Nasser and

Fanon and in Paris he turned his attention to the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism.[1]

In July 1962, Ngouabi received the rank of officer and was assigned to the garrison in Point-Noire. This is the second most populated town and the economic centre of Congo. Here he became fully convinced of the anti-popular nature of Fulbert Youlou's regime, which had been oppressing the country for two years. Ngouabi actively defended the interests of the soldiers against the arbitrary rule of the commanding officers. During the period of the 'three glorious days' of August 1963, which were a turning point in the history of the young state and which put an end to political neo-colonial domination, Ngouabi established contacts with trade union leaders who had organised a national strike of workers and office employees.

The revolution of August 1963 opened a new phase in the country's history. Congolese authors describe it as 'a democratic revolution of the bourgeois type', something like the French Revolution of 1789.[2] But the Congo revolution took place in the second half of the twentieth century, when the question of choosing the path of development had been consciously raised by progressive members of the anti-imperialist movement. Among the forces that overthrew the pro-colonialist and dictatorial regime of Fulbert Youlou were people who objectively cleared the way for the fight not only for real independence, but also for socialist orientation. Subsequent developments were determined by the struggle within the broad social front which carried out the August revolution. Initially the forces to gain the upper hand were those who voiced the interests mainly of the broad sections of the working people. Democratic forces managed to unite and lay the foundations for a national democratic system. In June and July 1964 there was a constituent congress of the united mass political party, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), which, as was stated in the congress's resolution, had made 'the final choice in favour of development along the path indicated by scientific socialism'. The old political parties were dissolved and new public organisations were set up. In 1964-65 a series of measures were adopted for introducing state control of the economy. The foundations of a state sector were laid by the nationalisation of the electricity and water companies and the confiscation of enterprises whose owners had left the country at the same time as Youlou. Ties with the socialist countries began to develop and Congo's foreign policy became anti-imperialist.

However, very acute contradictions remained within the framework of the National Revolutionary Movement between the revolutionary group and the opportunist elements, which voiced the interests of the bourgeois strata of society. 'In reality,' states the

[1] See Théophile Obenga, *La vie de Marien Ngouabi, 1938-1977*, Présence africaine, Paris, 1977, pp. 33-35.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

Programme of the Congolese Party of Labour, 'the MNR was, by its nature and social composition, a conglomeration of elements ideologically representing social classes with antagonistic interests. It proclaimed scientific socialism, the doctrine of the proletariat, whilst lacking in its midst a leading nucleus organised into a proletarian vanguard which could guarantee permanent and universal control.'[1]

A serious and widening gap emerged between revolutionary declarations and practice. As a result, in the second half of the sixties the slogans of scientific socialism had begun to be used to disguise the policies of the bureaucratised MNR leadership, which had become divorced from the people and which had buried the ideals of the August revolution in oblivion. In the PCT's Programme it was stated that the leadership of the MNR had been taken over by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the true leader of which was the General Secretary of the MNR and the Republic's President, Massamba-Débat. He was avoiding implementing the progressive reforms of socialist orientation stipulated by the programme documents of the MNR. Private, local and foreign capital seized one position in the country after another, and the state sector proved economically inefficient. In the sphere of foreign policy, links with imperialist powers were increased. In home policy, Massamba-Débat began curtailing the activity of public organisations and creating a regime of personal power. Arrests and murders of opposition figures took place. Any Congolese could at any moment be executed without any trial or investigation. A political crisis was imminent. The National Revolutionary Movement was powerless to resist this course of events. Forces of resistance were compelled to unite outside the MNR framework on an illegal basis.

Ngouabi played an outstanding role in the process which pulled the country out of the deadlock into which Massamba-Débat's policy had led it.

In 1965 he was transferred as a captain from Point-Noire to Brazzaville where he became the commander of an infantry battalion and later of the first paratroop battalion. In the conditions of a police regime, the army was the best environment for political work. Secret meetings regularly took place at Ngouabi's flat and at the flats of other officers in which representatives of the revolutionary-minded civilian intelligentsia also took part. Ngouabi and his colleagues realised that a genuinely revolutionary movement should not be confined to a circle of officers and that its only chances of success lay in the establishment of close links and understanding with the working people, the revolutionary youth and the intelligentsia. These links were successfully established.

By now, Ngouabi had become a major political figure. Members of the government camp tried to cut him off from active political work and even physically to destroy him. An attempt on Ngouabi's life

[1] *Etumba*, No. 539 (Special), December 31, 1979, Brazzaville, p. 4.

was planned, foiled only because of the vigilance of his like-minded colleagues.[1] In April 1965, the authorities ordered Ngouabi to return to Point-Noire. He refused and the military authorities took the decision to reduce him to the ranks. Only public indignation finally prompted them to revoke this decision. Attempting somehow to contain Ngouabi's revolutionary activity, the command transferred him to a research bureau at General Headquarters, where he served from 1966 to 1968 without even a clearly defined sphere of duties.

By the middle of 1968 the turmoil in Congo had reached a critical stage. A powerful opposition had formed. Faced with this situation, Massamba-Débat dissolved the National Assembly, suspended the activity of the leading public organisations and arrested his opponents. Ngouabi was arrested on the night of July 28, 1968, but was released from custody on July 31 by a small group of officers. He was taken to a paratroopers' camp in Maya-Maya. Thus began the July 31st Movement, aimed at the restoration of the principles of the August revolution and the country's socialist orientation. Ngouabi became the symbol and leader of this movement. Everything was ready for an armed campaign against Massamba-Débat, but Ngouabi's support both in the army and among the people was so extensive that Massamba-Débat and his supporters were practically unable to put up any resistance. Massamba-Débat fled Brazzaville but was returned on the insistence of Ngouabi, so that he could be kept under observation, with the aim of preventing any conspiratorial activity.

On August 5, 1968, the National Council of the Revolution was set up in Brazzaville. It was not a uniform body and there was a struggle within it between the adherents of the revolutionary and the conciliatory tendencies. But the victory of the July 31st Movement and the support which its leader enjoyed both in the army and among the people ensured the strengthening of the revolutionary elements. The Chairman of the National Council of the Revolution, Marien Ngouabi, now became the head of state.

With the July 31st Movement a new stage began in the history of Congo, a stage associated with Ngouabi. The logical development of the movement was the creation of the Congolese Party of Labour at its constituent congress on December 29-31, 1969 and the proclamation of the People's Republic of the Congo. Ngouabi became Chairman of the Central Committee of the PCT, President of the People's Republic of the Congo and Chairman of the State Council.

The founders of the PCT intended it as a vanguard party of the Congolese working class. Its strategic and ideological positions were expressed most fully in December 1972 at its Second (Extraordinary) Congress which adopted the Party's Programme and Rules. It was stressed in these documents that Marxism-Leninism was the theoretical basis of the Party, determining its ideological and practical activity.

Some leaders of the African national liberation movement per-

[1] See Théophile Obenga, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47.

ceived scientific socialism as the most left-wing radical trend. The ideological evolution of Kwame Nkrumah following the coup in Ghana in 1966 is revealing in this respect. At that time, Nkrumah associated loyalty to scientific socialism with a declaration of socialism (along with African unity and national independence) as the immediate task of the African revolution, with thrusting on African freedom fighters the alignment of class forces characteristic (though by no means in all circumstances) of only the final stages of a socialist revolution (i.e. an alliance between the working class and the peasantry with the hegemony of the former and the rejection of an alliance not only with the national bourgeoisie, but also with petty-bourgeois elements), and with the promotion of armed activity as the only form of revolutionary struggle.

The Congolese Party of Labour avoided this kind of exaggeration. In its Programme worked out under the guidance of Ngouabi, the current stage of development was clearly defined not as socialist, but as a 'national, democratic and popular revolution'. 'This essential stage of the revolution,' it states in the document, 'is the preparation for the next phase which will be one of building socialism.'[1] At the basis of this thesis lies a definition of the main and secondary contradictions of Congolese society: 'The main contradiction at this stage remains, without doubt, the contradiction between the entire Congolese people and foreign monopoly capitalism, and in particular the French imperialism that dominates our country.' The other contradictions (between national unity and tribalism and regionalism, between the exploiting classes, the national bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the intelligentsia and the manual workers on the other) 'remain secondary contradictions which can only finally be resolved after the resolution of the main contradiction that opposes us to international imperialism in general and French imperialism in particular'.[2]

The Party of Labour's Programme starts out from the dialectical combination of the unity of all national forces in the anti-imperialist struggle with a differentiated appraisal of the revolutionary potential and role of each individual force within social liberation. Whilst acknowledging the interest of national capital in the country's independence, the Programme went on to state its exploitative nature and its hostility towards socialism. Hence the creation of conditions for the economic activity of local business with the curtailment of its aspirations for political power. The PCT avoided the idealisation of the peasantry, which was still the largest class in society. It proceeded from the recognition of the working class's leading role and of the need to increase its consciousness and activeness.

The PCT programme planned the main trends in home and foreign policy. These involved the expansion of the state sector with the aim

1 *Etumba*, No. 539 (Special), p. 20.
2 *Ibid.*, p. 20.

of eventually transforming it into the dominating force of the economy, planning on a national scale, and the development of the cooperative movement, public education and health care, etc. In the field of foreign policy, the Programme said, the Party consistently adhered to anti-imperialism and supported all peoples fighting for their freedom, as well as the non-aligned movement, African unity, solidarity and the strengthening of links with the socialist countries and with the communist and workers' movement on the basis of the principles of internationalism.

The PCT adopted its Programme while it was the ruling party. It had no need to fear persecution for its socialist ideals, since the principles of scientific socialism were already well known to many members of the African intelligentsia. It made the right theoretical choice which was not particularly difficult for it. The problem was how to put this choice into practice, how to achieve the aims declared in the Programme and how to secure the penetration of its ideas into all areas of life in the young state. And, in this sense, the significant advantages which the PCT had as the ruling party, entailed very definite shortcomings. The Party had not been politically toughened through underground struggle and it lacked a large and experienced cadre that had embraced scientific socialism in the course of revolutionary practice, in the midst of the people and in changing circumstances. One of the greatest difficulties was to raise the political consciousness of party members to a level at which they could understand every clause of the Programme, convey it to the masses and lead them to the goals declared in the document.

This immense task is still relevant today. Ngouabi put all his effort into solving it, not for one moment tempted by the possibilities of quick success, for he was well aware that the great majority of the Congolese working people 'approve of Marxism without understanding it properly'.[1]

The policy of socialist orientation continues to come up against obstacles of all sorts. There was deliberate and active resistance both by right-wing, counter-revolutionary forces (e.g. the attempted coup d'état in March 1970, to which the PCT responded by breaking up of the gendarmerie which had remained since the time of Youlou, and by creating a people's militia, an emergency committee for the investigation of counter-revolutionary activity, and revolutionary committees at enterprises and institutions) and by pseudo-revolutionary ultra-left groups (e.g. the armed action by a group of PCT figures in February 1972, which was only fully eliminated in a little over a year). Tribalism, which penetrates all spheres of state and social life, remains a constant danger. Supporters of tribalism are prepared to masquerade as anything for the sake of defending the interests of their tribe, and the egoistic struggle for position and influence. There was a terrible threat of inertia, indifference, apathy, unwillingness to

[1] *Etumba*, 11-18 July, 1970.

work and a tendency to live a parasitic existence. There was a desire for enrichment and exploitation stirred up by the colonial era and the penetration of capitalism, a desire which gripped the petty-bourgeois circles, flourished in and around the state apparatus and led to the formation of a dangerous enemy, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. There was the economic domination of foreign capital, in particular French, which held the vitally important centres of the country's economy in its grip. And, besides all this, there was permanent pressure from imperialist powers, who were ready to make use of any failure and to support any action designed to disrupt the struggle for national independence and social progress. All these critical problems, typical of the majority of former colonial countries, faced the PCT and Ngouabi, its founder and leader.

In response to the ultra-left campaign in February 1972, the PCT strengthened the party structure and its ideological work. The very adoption in December 1972 of the Programme, defining the current historical stage as that of a national democratic revolution, was a convincing reply to the adventurist elements. The Second (Extraordinary) Congress of the Congolese Party of Labour adopted the draft of a new constitution, approved by a national referendum on June 24, 1973, which took place at the same time as the elections to the National People's Assembly and the local bodies of power. In December 1974 the Second (statutory) Congress of the PCT took place, at which Ngouabi gave a report on an issue of paramount importance: 'On the Constructive Activity of the People and the Leading Role of Cadres'. The Congress adopted Guidelines for the first three-year programme for the economic, social and cultural development of the People's Republic of the Congo in 1975-77. In December 1975, summing up the first results of the implementation of the three-year plan, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the PCT found them unsatisfactory. The Plenum noted that the revolutionary process in the country had been slowed down because of poor links between the Party and the people, the weaknesses of the political leadership, the inefficiency of the administrative apparatus, the unprofitability of the majority of enterprises in the state sector and the embourgeoisement of many Party members and officials. The condemnation of ultra-left extremism had, it seems, been perceived by some as an appeal for a quiet life and for maintaining the ways of the old society. To counter this mood, the PCT Central Committee passed the resolution 'On the Radicalisation of the Revolution'. A special revolutionary headquarters headed by Ngouabi was set up to implement this resolution. This body was responsible for preparing the Third Extraordinary Congress of the Party and for a purge of the Party and state apparatus.

The realisation of the resolutions of the PCT Central Committee and the start of the purge intensified the struggle within the Party. The representatives of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the adherents of tribalist methods feared for their position. In the carrying out of

these campaigns matters of principle were at times confused with personal vendettas and many mistakes and abuses seem to have been made, which imperialist circles and local reaction took advantage of in their own interests. In these difficult circumstances, when preparation for the PCT Congress was rapidly being carried out, Ngouabi was assassinated by conspirators on March 18, 1977.

Marien Ngouabi is greatly honoured by the Congolese people, as leader of the national revolution and founder of a party which plans to build a socialist society. Ngouabi succeeded in giving the liberation movement in Congo a new impulse just when it had been dragged into deadlock by the MNR leadership which had become bourgeois. The July 31st Movement, headed by Ngouabi, which led to the creation of the Congolese Party of Labour, signalled a new stage in the revolutionary process in Congo. According to Ngouabi's plans, the country was, at this stage, to put into effect the idea of a non-capitalist path of development, which Massamba-Débat, in his last years of rule, had reduced to mere demagogic declarations. Ngouabi chose a socialist orientation for his country, and the people supported him with enthusiasm. Ngouabi regarded the theory of scientific socialism, Marxism-Leninism, as the only revolutionary theory capable of securing the movement of African peoples towards socialism. He firmly opposed attempts to replace scientific socialism with various types of 'national socialism'. He worked out the scientifically based programme of the PCT, proceeding from the general patterns of the struggle for national and social liberation.

Ngouabi did not have time to achieve much in the realisation of this programme, but what he did do has neither gone unnoticed nor lost its significance. Ngouabi was noted for his realistic and critical approach to Congolese life and to Party and state activity. He realised that a correct programme would not in itself make a revolution. He strove to apply scientific socialism to Congolese conditions, and what he said and wrote in this connection represents a vital part of his legacy. These ideas put forward by Ngouabi are of great importance for Congo and for all those who wish to study and promote the revolutionary process in the developing countries.

Let us highlight just a few of these ideas.

'We must under no circumstances skip over stages under the pretext of accelerating the course of the revolution,'[1] stated Ngouabi. A realistic definition of the contemporary stage of the revolution was the greatest virtue of the PCT's Programme which he worked out. In line with the programme thesis about the main contradiction of this stage being that between the entire Congolese people and imperialism, Ngouabi defined the struggle against neo-colonial penetration as a primary task. He stressed that Congo had received a fictitious freedom in 1960. Thirteen years later, at a meeting of the PCT Central

[1] Marien Ngouabi, *Vers la construction d'une société socialiste en Afrique*, Présence Africaine, Paris, 1975, p. 144.

Committee in August 1973, Ngouabi still proceeded from the incompletion of the task of national liberation and called for 'a real war for economic independence, achieved through specific, tangible and precise actions and victories'.[1]

Ngouabi believed Western monopolies to be the main weapon of neo-colonialist influence. He was a shrewd critic of their economic 'aid' and 'concern' which created the impression of promoting progress, but which in fact subordinated and exploited the national economies, by establishing control over the domestic market and leaving the principal socio-economic problems unresolved. He emphasised that the money which the foreign private sector gave to the governments of developing countries was miniscule in comparison with the profits which it derived from exploiting these same countries, and added that monopoly capital led to 'growth without development'.[2] He called for an end to the expansion of monopolies and was clearly aware that this task had by no means been accomplished in Congo. 'From an economic point of view,' he said in 1972, 'we have nothing to conceal. Congo is a country totally dependent on the capitalist powers and, more precisely, on France.'[3] He also noted the continued cultural dependence, and the influence of the Western mass media and propaganda.

Paradoxically, the state apparatus of Congo was itself to a considerable extent a vehicle of neo-colonial penetration and Ngouabi was not afraid to admit it. He stressed again and again that the state apparatus was still a colonial type of apparatus.[4] And he never tired of calling attention to the individualism and egoism of administrative personnel who continued the traditions of colonial administration, ignoring the requirements of the working masses.[5]

Ngouabi renounced demagogic attempts to blame the complex problems and crises which had emerged during the years of Congo's independence on the country's socialist orientation. 'No one could possibly believe that our present problems were caused by the colour of our choice,' he said. 'That would be a grave mistake. Our difficulties are simply a product of the system established by imperialism with a view to sacrificing us to the greed of dominating capitalist monopolies.'[6] But at the same time he was not the kind to put everything down to imperialism and overlook his own mistakes and failures.

Ngouabi was convinced that the best way of fighting neo-colonialism was to create a viable national economy. The leading role in this process belongs to the state sector. Ngouabi assigned it an important part in national reconstruction and was a severe and fair critic of

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 173.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 139.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 152.
[4] Marien Ngouabi, *Vers la construction d'une société socialiste en Afrique*, p. 152.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 214-15.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

its weaknesses. The aim of state enterprises was to gradually establish the control of the state, and the people, over all the means of production still held by foreign capital, asserted Ngouabi in 1973. 'The absence ... of a political orientation,' he said, '...the inexperience of our cadres, the mistaken appraisal of the internal and foreign markets and the improvised and clumsy application of economic laws ought to have inevitably led state enterprises into decay. Today, state enterprises, with a few exceptions, are veritable nests of people without conscience, without professional integrity, without morals, and very often of cleptomaniacs... State enterprises are sick and their condition urgently requires the dynamic action of the Party, authorities and the trade unions.'[1] One of the prevalent reasons for the lingering crisis of the state sector was that 'certain workers lacking a political education have turned public property into private property'.[2] Ngouabi made the recovery of the state sector the key problem for the entire national economy and it has fully maintained its relevance to this day, since the vast majority of state enterprises remain ineffective.

There is a widespread tendency in the developing countries to blame all economic problems on the lack of financial sources. Ngouabi realised that it was not a matter of finance alone and that loans did not, in the end, solve the problem, which, in his words, fundamentally affected the management and civic conscience of all participants in the production and administrative process.

Ngouabi constantly drew the PCT's attention to the disparity between its programme aims and declared intentions and its practical activity. 'A revolutionary army cannot be created through the theory, the only way is through practice.'[3] Ngouabi was referring to the army in the literal sense of the word, i.e. to the country's armed forces, but his statement is also applicable to the Party as an army of revolutionaries. In 1974, Ngouabi wrote:

'We can say that:

'—the PCT, from a theoretical point of view, is a party of the vanguard, a party which can accomplish a socialist revolution;

'—the institutions created by the PCT are viable and can promote the strengthening of revolutionary ideology among our people;

'—the directives are sufficiently clear and the Party Programme is a working document which can unite all the vital forces of the nation around the Party in a common anti-imperialist front.

'But these directives have not been implemented. Is the PCT Programme doomed never to be put into effect and are we thus to mark time for a long period?..

'Where do the causes lie for this gap between theory and revolutionary practice in our country, between the gravity of the problems

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 140.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 141.
[3] Marien Ngouabi, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

facing the masses and the negative social practice of the leaders? Are they to be found among the masses or among the Party cadres? Or are they totally engendered by the state and by officials of the neo-colonial apparatus?'[1]

In our view, these causes should be sought in all the areas listed by Ngouabi. Some of these causes he noted: for instance, the tendency towards demagogy and the aspiration of power-hungry groups and people to declare themselves revolutionaries and Marxists instead of solving real problems[2]; the petty-bourgeois desire, which became rather widespread in the non-capitalist countries, to get as much as possible from society for oneself while giving nothing in return[3]; the weakness of the links with the masses and the disregard for the principle that they can only be organised and mobilised on the basis of their own interests[4]; and, finally, the basically intellectual composition of the Party and the gap between the level of consciousness of the vanguard revolutionary intelligentsia and the working masses. 'I am very afraid, comrades, lest our party become cut off from its base, from the trade unions, from the peasants, from the deprived masses,' said Ngouabi. 'It would be very dangerous to have a far advanced vanguard without a levelling of the frontline. A vanguard which advances too far and does not maintain a firm link with the whole army of labour, i.e. with the great majority of working people, the masses of workers and peasants, will become isolated.'[5]

Ngouabi also noted with alarm the dangerous tendency of Party activists, who had not attempted a creative Marxist study of Congo's social structure, economic life, revolution, history and traditions, to yield to the temptation automatically to apply Marxist theses engendered by different conditions to Congolese reality.[6] Ngouabi opposed this temptation, fatal to the creative spirit of Marxism, with an appeal to study Congolese society in depth. This is one of Ngouabi's bequests that has still not been completely fulfilled. What is more, as Ngouabi justly pointed out, this kind of study on a specific practical foundation with the use of statistics and sociological methods would improve the knowledge of Congolese society, accelerate the revolution and enrich discussion generally.[7] This is the true path of the creative assimilation and enrichment of Marxism, and it alone can help the country solve the problems of the Congolese revolution.

Although the PCT continued to function after Ngouabi's assassination, a curtailment began of the revolutionary processes. This was the line of the new head of state, Joachim Yhombi-Opango. His two years in power were reminiscent of the era which preceded the

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 203.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 95, 116-17, 134.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 171.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 174.
[5] Ibid., p. 121.
[6] Marien Ngouabi, *op. cit.*, p. 195.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

July 31st Movement: revolutionary phraseology was combined with the brazen enrichment of bureaucratic circles. The rift between words and deeds in the country had never been so deep.

However, the PCT succeeded in rectifying the situation. In February 1979, a Plenum of the Party's Central Committee removed Yhombi-Opango from power. Right-wing elements in the PCT suffered a defeat and Ngouabi's colleagues took over the leadership of the Party and the state.The PCT began to restore the traditions laid down by its founder and to set about solving the urgent problems of socio-economic development. The Third Extraordinary Congress of the PCT, which took place in the spring of 1979, was one of profound self-criticism, a trait characteristic of the Party in the best periods of its history. The Congress confirmed loyalty to socialist orientation and to the ideas of scientific socialism. A realistic approach to the pressing socio-economic problems prevailed. Subjectivism and apostasy were rebuffed. This was in full accord with the tasks set by Ngouabi, the founder of the Congolese Party of Labour, an outstanding African revolutionary, one of the pioneers of socialist orientation, and an ardent propagandist of the ideals of scientific socialism in Africa.



An important figure of the African national liberation movement and the head of the first government of the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire).

Born on July 2, 1925 in the village of Onalua (Kasai Province of the former colony of Belgian Congo) into the family of a poor Batetela peasant. Having been educated in a Catholic mission school, he worked as a clerk, a postal official and an employee of several Belgian companies.

From the age of 23 he took an active part in the political life of the country; he founded and led a number of public organisations and was in charge of the publication of the newspapers Uhuru *(Freedom) and* Independance. *In 1958 he founded and became the permanent leader of the major political party of the Congolese National Movement (MNC).*

In 1958-59, he participated in the work of the First All-African People's Conference in Accra, the capital of Ghana, and the international seminar of cultural workers in Ibadan, Nigeria, and then in January-February 1960, in the Belgian-Congolese conference in Brussels which took the decision to grant Congo independence. He was subjected to repression and imprisonment a number of times for anti-colonial activity.

At the parliamentary elections in May 1960, the MNC and the parties supporting it received the majority of votes; in June 1960, Lumumba headed the government of the Republic of the Congo but in September he was dismissed from the post. In January 1961, following several months of illegal imprisonment, he was viciously murdered.

Patrice Lumumba has gone down in African history as a major leader and an active supporter of abolition of the imperialist colonial system. Today his views and practical activities remain the subject of acute ideological debate in and outside Africa between the champions and opponents of progressive development. A flow of publications about Lumumba continues. Some authors focus attention on his lack of political sophistication, at times verging on naïvete, on his errors and miscalculations and try to belittle his role. Others, on the contrary, are inclined to idealise him as a leader and martyr.

A political profile of Lumumba is certain to need more than one colour. In trying to recreate his portrait one should be mindful of the specific conditions which shaped Lumumba's personality as a public figure and statesman.

His working life began early. From the age of six, Patrice Lumumba worked in the field, helping his family to eke out a miserable existence, and to pay the taxes and numerous requisitions imposed by the colonial authorities. At ten he went to a mission school. However, the career of a priest, just like the other road to a materially secure life, service in the colonial troops, did not appeal to him. The sixteen-year-old youth entered training as a medical orderly. Before long, however, he left medicine in favour of sociology and politics. Higher education was not available in the colonial Congo and Patrice had to rely on self-education. To this end he moved, in 1943, to the town of Kindu and then went on to Kalima in Kivu Province where he became employed as a clerk in the management of the Simetain tin-mining company. There Lumumba became first acquainted with the life of the Congolese proletariat.

By this time, Patrice had a good command of French, as well as several local languages.

He went to great lengths to obtain books and spent most of his free time reading Hugo and Molière, writing summaries of the works of Aristotle, utopian socialists and the French Encyclopedists and Enlighteners. Of the contemporary works he was most interested in those which were critical of capitalism and bourgeois democracy.

At eighteen Lumumba published in the local press his first poems and prose essays praising Belgians who had allegedly saved the Congo from ignorance and slavery. It was some time before he rid himself of such views, which were imposed on Africans by official colonialist propaganda, although by this time he was beginning to turn his attention to the disparity between the propaganda slogans of the Belgian authorities and their activity in the Congo.

The living standards of the Congolese were among the lowest in Africa. In the 80 years of Belgian rule, the population of the country had more than halved as a result of direct physical destruction during the process of colonisation and merciless exploitation of the Congo. But the people of the Congo never resigned themselves to slavery. When a child Lumumba heard the old folk talking about numerous anti-colonial uprisings cruelly put down by the Belgians, especially

the rebellions of the Batetela in the late 19th and early 20th century and of the Bapende in 1931, these stories leaving a deep imprint on Lumumba's memory. At Kindu Lumumba learnt about the anti-colonial political and religious movement in the Kivu forests whose members called on the people 'to take the reins of power in their hands', about the mutiny of the military garrison in Luluabourg (now Kananga) in 1941, and in Stanleyville (now Kisangani), where he moved in the middle of 1944, about the armed uprising of the dockers in Matadi in 1945 and other anti-colonial actions by the Congolese.

Lumumba spent three years in Stanleyville working as a postal clerk and in a tax office. In July 1947 he was enrolled in a postal workers' school in the colony's administrative centre Léopoldville (now Kinshasa) and graduated from it a year later. Apart from his school curriculum, he diligently studied philosophy, political economy, the history of political doctrines, the theory of state and law and current African history.

His own experience, although still small, and mainly his acquaintance, through literature, with the life and activity of many prominent figures, finally convinced Lumumba that he could do much to help his people if he became actively involved in the public and political life of the country. In Stanleyville, where he resettled in 1948 and lived until 1956, Lumumba headed six public organisations including a section of the Belgian Liberal Party, which he established. It should be pointed out that none of these organisations were at all tribalist and, indeed, Lumumba never divided people up according to the principle of their ethnic affiliation.

That was the period when Lumumba began to formulate his profoundly democratic ideas about the functioning of an African public organisation. In 1952 he said that any organisation derived its strength from the collective creative activity of its members. In order not to wither, it must act, constantly set and solve new tasks. Much depends on the leaders, who should be informed, efficient, energetic, courageous and dedicated, and not 'sleepyheads who sit with their arms folded waiting that the task assigned to them would solve itself without the slightest effort on their part'.[1]

Lumumba travelled widely about the country, which gave him first-hand knowledge of the life, ideas and aspirations of his people. His countrymen found him not only an interesting conversationalist but also an impressive public speaker: his public lectures and speeches at meetings drew thousands of listeners. He had every reason to say that he wrote his book *The Congo: Land of the Future Under Threat?* (1956) after 'thorough investigation conducted among the various strata of the local population'.[2] He often travelled abroad to other African countries, to Belgium and the USA.

[1] *La voix du Congolais*, Léopoldville, No. 89, 1953, p. 578.
[2] P. Lumumba, *Le Congo, terre d'avenir est-il menacé?*, Brussels, 1961, p. 8.

In July 1955 the colonial administration introduced Lumumba to King Baudouin, who visited Stanleyville, as one of the most prominent Congolese public figures. They had a long talk and it seemed to Lumumba that the young monarch inclined to regard his views with understanding. Lumumba wanted to believe that the Congolese and the Europeans could together dispel the clouds gathering over the country. He wrote in 1957: 'Our dearest wish—perhaps some may find it utopian—is to found in the Congo a Nation in which differences of race and religion will melt away, a homogeneous society composed of Belgians and Congolese who with a single impulse will link their hearts to the destinies of the country.'[1]

In the mid-1950s a number of Congolese political leaders demanded independence for the Congo. Lumumba did not immediately join them. He continued to favour a 'Belgian-Congolese community', regarding it as compatible with the solution of such problems as the elimination of racial discrimination, the raising of living standards, the development of the education system, the emancipation of African women and the active involvement of the Congolese in the government of the country. In criticising the colonial authorities' refusal even to discuss these issues, Lumumba advocated the idea of gradual, consistent action.

Yet the changing world situation, the mounting struggle of the colonial peoples for liberation and the impressions of his trips in Africa and to Europe broadened his horizons and led him to see the problems of the Congo in a different light. One is struck by the rapid evolution of Lumumba's views and practical activity. By the late 1950s he was among the leading fighters for the complete liberation of Africa from colonialism and neo-colonialism.

In October 1958 Lumumba founded the party called the Congolese National Movement (MNC), the most broadly based and authoritative political organisation in his country. In the first programme of the MNC, written by Lumumba, it was stated that the party would 'use every means to liberate the Congo from imperialist colonialism'.[2] The statutes made it the duty of members of the MNC to fight for the unity and indivisibility of the country, to take a personal share in carrying out the decisions of the governing bodies of the party, and to work constantly to raise their personal political maturity, and to expose abuses by colonialists.[3]

At the end of 1958 Lumumba represented the Congo at the conference of African peoples in Accra (Ghana) and was elected member of its permanent secretariat. The following year he attended an in-

[1] George Brausch, *Belgian Administration in the Congo*, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, p. 78.

[2] *L'avenir politique du Congo belge*, Les Editions de la Librairie encyclopedique, Brussels, p. 47.

[3] René Lemarchand, Kenneth W. Grundy, Charles F. Andrian, *African Political Thought: Lumumba, Nkrumah and Toure*, University of Denver, Denver, 1968, pp. 40-41.

ternational seminar of cultural workers in Ibadan, Nigeria, where he delivered a speech on 'African Unity and National Independence'. 'The aspirations of the peoples of colonial countries,' he stressed, 'are identical, their destinies are similar and the goals they pursue in their national development are the same: liberation of Africa from the yoke of colonialism. Africa will never be free and independent if any part of it remains under foreign domination.'[1]

At the conference of independent African states in Léopoldville (August 1960) Lumumba said that without unity Africans could not oppose the monstrous appetites of imperialism: the newly-free African peoples and those still fighting for their liberation must form a united front so that every state could count on help from all the countries of the continent.

He became aware of the need for the unity of anti-colonial forces inside the country earlier and more deeply than many other leaders of the freedom movement in the Congo. 'The more united we are, the more successfully we can oppose oppression, corruption and attempts to disunite us by the proponents of the "divide and rule" policy,'[2] he pointed out as early as 1956.

Lumumba and his supporters were waging a very difficult struggle for uniting the Congolese. Congo's ethnic diversity is great even by African standards. The country is inhabited by over 200 tribes and ethnic groups with varying levels of social and economic development. There were no stable economic links between regions, and between town and country. Separatist trends were clearly felt in areas predominantly inhabited by one nationality (Lower Congo, Kasai and Katanga).

Regarding tribalism as a most dangerous 'internal enemy', Lumumba tirelessly called on his countrymen to put nationwide interests above narrow ethnic interests and lashed out against the colonial authorities for the preference in socio-economic development which they showed to the districts with good prospects from the point of view of capital investment and of profits, which was damaging to the harmonious development of the country as a whole. He opposed the colonialists' plans to divide the Congo into small, inviable provinces, and the aspirations of certain political figures to use these plans in their own mercenary interests, once they had turned these provinces into semi-independent 'little republics', as he called them. Addressing the Brussels conference which was deciding the question of Congo's independence, Lumumba said: 'We protest against any attempts to split our national territory. The Congo's greatness is based on the maintenance of its political and economic unity'.[3] He was quite direct in saying that the political, social and economic structures inherited from colonialism had to be destroyed if a united

[1] *Remarques congolaises et africaines*, Brussels, No. 3, 1964, p. 47.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[3] *La pensée politique de Patrice Lumumba*, Présence africaine, Paris, 1963, p. 165.

Congolese nation was to be formed.

At the same time Lumumba preached collaboration between various classes and social groups of the Congolese society—the peasants, agricultural and industrial workers, who were more numerous in the Congo than in most African countries, the emerging bourgeoisie, the national intellectuals and the traditional elites. This illusion—one of the many illusions he had—prevented Lumumba from, on the one hand, revealing the existing social strata whose interests were challenged by his policy, and, on the other hand, from identifying the forces whose support he could have enlisted. 'All together, dear brothers and sisters,' he urged, 'workers and government employees, workers by brain and by hand, rich and poor, Africans and Europeans, Catholics and Protestants, Kimbanguists and Kitawalists [supporters of religious-political anti-colonial movements.—*Y. V.*], let us unite and create a great nation.'[1]

One should not forget, however, that to some extent it was his keen awareness of the need for the unity of all the forces of the Congolese society—not only for political but also for economic liberation—and of the dangers inherent in the Congo's ethnic diversity that impelled Lumumba to argue that social harmony among Africans was possible, even though he himself understood that the process of social differentiation in the country was already quite distinct.

A poor peasant by origin, who had moved from low-ranking official to Prime Minister, Lumumba always felt at one with the people, had deep respect for the working people and regarded them as brothers and fellow-fighters. 'We know,' he wrote in 1956, 'that some Congolese are well off, but they are in the minority; meanwhile we are concerned with the majority of the population.'[2]

Lumumba tried to make the Congolese National Movement an effective channel of links with the masses. As he saw it, the MNC was to mobilise the people in the struggle not only against the colonial regime but also to destroy exploitation of man by man. The leaders of the MNC strove to strengthen ties with broad sections of the population. In the fight for independence, said Lumumba, it is necessary to count not on individual political figures, but on the people, who are dissatisfied with their position.[3] The MNC had regular meetings of its central bodies and local branches set up in many parts of the country. The leadership of the party organised rallies attended primarily by peasants, wood-cutters and agricultural labourers. Unlike other parties in the Congo, the MNC had links with the trade unions. In fact it was an organisation similar to a united national front.

Lumumba's enemies in and outside the country regarded his

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 246.

[2] P. Lumumba, *Le Congo terre d'avenir est-il menacé?*, p. 28.

[3] See *Notes pour servir a l'étude des "Groupements politiques" à Léopoldville*, Part 3, L'office de l'Information et des Relations Publiques Pour le Congo et le Ruanda-Urundi, Brussels, 1959, p. 80.

democratic attitudes to be all the more dangerous because they were accompanied by radicalisation of his views and policies.

The leaders of the MNC, notably Lumumba himself, held imperialism to be chiefly responsible for the misery of the Congolese people. They exposed the plans of the neocolonialists to perpetuate their rule in Africa. 'The European powers,' said Lumumba, 'want to enlist the sympathies of those African leaders who follow their lead and deceive their own people. Some of these powers see the meaning of their presence in the Congo and in Africa in exploiting their riches as much as possible, availing themselves of the services of the corrupt leaders.'[1]

There were strong elements of a class approach in Lumumba's assessment of the Western policies. 'I know that an overwhelming majority of the Belgian people are against the oppression of Africans,' he said in October 1959. 'They disapprove of a colonial status for the Congo under which 14 million Congolese are exposed to the diktat of a tiny economic oligarchy. If the Belgian people were to have their say, the Congo would never have experienced the misfortunes which are affecting it now.'[2] And a short while before that, on September 6 of that year, he told a rally of six thousand people in Luluabourg that 'tensions in the relations between the Congo and Belgium are being exacerbated only by the groups interested in exploiting the Congo's wealth and who egg the authorities on to extend the colonial regime, as well as by some officials who are pursuing their private interests.'[3]

Lumumba considered the people to be the prime mover in the struggle for independence and social progress. In a lecture given in Brussels in April 1959, he said that it is the masses who prompt politicians to put forward demands and slogans, since it is the people who 'want to advance more rapidly than we [the leaders of the people. – *Author*] do'.[4] This view of the role of the masses distinguished him favourably from many contemporary political figures in his country and in other African states. 'History attests,' he said, 'that independence is never brought to you on a silver platter. It must be won. To that end we must organise ourselves and mobilise all the healthy forces in the country. The Congolese have responded to our appeal and thanks to this united strength we have dealt a mortal blow to rotten colonialism.'[5]

On this issue, Patrice Lumumba not only disagreed with the majority of conservative politicians in the Congo who accused him of inculcating the masses with harmful ideas, but far outstripped certain representatives of contemporary revolutionary democracy, who were inclined to exaggerate the role of one social group or other

[1] *Afrique-Asie*, Paris, No. 154, 1978, p. 10.
[2] *La pensée politique de Patrice Lumumba*, pp. 87-88.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 45.
[5] *Afrique-Asie*, No. 154, 1978, p. 11.

and to underestimate the contribution of the working masses to the revolutionary reforms taking place today in newly-formed states.

Belgian imperialism had to give in to the mounting national liberation movement. On June 30, 1960, the Republic of the Congo was proclaimed. Patrice Lumumba became head of the first national government. One cannot help recalling the words he said at the ceremony proclaiming independence: 'No Congolese ... can ever forget that we have gained our independence through struggle, a daily, persistent and idealistic struggle, a struggle in which we were undaunted by privation, suffering or great sacrifice, nor by the blood shed by our peoples.'[1]

As soon as he became Prime Minister, Lumumba, who was probably unaware that the real levers of power were not in his hands and that imperialism preserved its economic and political positions in the Congo, tried to pursue a sharply anti-imperialist policy. 'The policy of the government will only be that of the people. It is the people who dictate us, and we act in accordance with their aspirations and in their interests.'[2] Patrice Lumumba did not manage to complete the putting together of a government programme, but his rough drafts and preparatory material give us grounds to conclude that he was aware of the need to develop the struggle for political independence into a struggle against exploitative relations.

Proceeding from the perfectly sound belief that 'political independence will remain meaningless ... unless it is immediately complemented by economic development',[3] Lumumba began to work vigorously for national control over the resources and the economy of the country. The government banned export of capital from the Congo and set about drawing up a plan of economic development on the basis of the state sector in industry and production cooperation in agriculture. To raise the living standards of the people, it tried to impose price control, induce the employers to raise wages, ensure full employment, and work out a unified labour legislation.

Lumumba's democratism was distinctly manifested in his views on the state and in his practical activity in the regulation of the work of the state apparatus. He was convinced of the viability of the new society emerging in Africa and believed that it would unite elements of the European state system and traditional African principles. Moreover, he stood out against the mechanical borrowing of Western political and social norms. Thus, he considered quite unsuitable for the Congo, the principles of parliamentary activity (prolonged and often fruitless debates, conflicts between factions, etc.) which had formed in Belgium (a European country that had no similarity with Congolese conditions) and which the colonial authorities had tried to plant in the future Republic of the Congo. Disagreeing with many

[1] *La pensée politique de Patrice Lumumba*, p. 198.
[2] *Congo 1960*, Vol. 2, Centre de Recherche et l'Information Socio-Politique, Brussels, 1961, p. 593.
[3] *La pensée politique de Patrice Lumumba*, p. 140.

of the principles of the work of the state apparatus worked out by the Belgian authorities on the eve of the declaration of Congo's independence, Lumumba, unlike many of his political opponents, did not permit himself any unconstitutional acts, and worked in close contact with the government and parliament even during the difficult days of crisis caused by imperialism.

Lumumba did not regard the process of Africanisation as the merely mechanical substitution of Congolese for European officials. He made great professional and political demands on the national leaders and constantly reminded them that they were servants of the people. 'We want leaders to carry out their duties consciously, competently and with a sense of patriotism and any Congolese who does not wish to work in the interests of the people, must be dismissed. We want worthy people, people who work for the good of the country.'[1]

Lumumba proposed to assign a significant place in the government's activity to spiritual decolonisation of the Congolese in order to rid them of the 'psychological attitudes, complexes and habits which colonisation had for centuries instilled in us'.[2] Condemning the negative role of the church in the colonial period and especially its subversive actions against the authorities of the sovereign Congolese state, Lumumba separated the church from the state and secularised schools.

Perhaps one of the most dangerous demands as far as Western interests in Africa were concerned was Lumumba's call for an end to the military presence of imperialist powers in the continent, in particular, for placing NATO bases there under the control of the national governments. In the Congo, Lumumba alone among the leaders of the liberation movement raised that question. 'Kamina,' he said referring to one of such bases as early as February 1960, 'is the first enterprise we are going to nationalise in Congo.'[3]

The very first steps of the Lumumba government alerted the imperialists as the economic interests of the West in the Congo were being threatened. They were also unhappy about Lumumba's foreign policy programme which envisaged the course for non-alignment and full liberation of Africa from colonial and racist regimes, the establishment and development of equal relations between the Congo and the socialist countries.

Having finally shed his illusions that alliance with Belgium was favourable for the Congo, Lumumba rejected the proposal of merger between the two countries in a state entity under the Belgian king. He also spoke sharply against establishing Western trusteeship over the Congo under the aegis of the UN. 'Some people would like to use the UN,' noted Lumumba in a public statement on July 9, 1960, 'in

[1] G. Heinz & H. Donnay, *Lumumba Patrice. Les cinquante derniers jours de sa vie*, Editions du C.R.I.S.P., Paris, 1966, p. 192.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 194.
[3] *La pensée politique de Patrice Lumumba*, p. 158.

order to impose on us a certain international status for 15 years.... On behalf of the people and government I declare that Congo ... will never become a country under UN trusteeship.'[1]

In a bid to preserve its positions in the independent Congo, imperialism ganged up with local reactionaries to engineer economic and political chaos in the country. In this difficult situation, Lumumba courageously upheld the interests of his country and sought an end to foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Congo, exposing imperialist policy. In abrogating the 'treaty of friendship and cooperation' between Belgium and the Congo in July 1960, Lumumba held responsible for it not the Belgian people but the country's rulers 'who refused to see the Congo as anything but an object of exploitation, domination and selfish interests.'[2]

It was then that a conspiracy against the Congolese leader was set in motion. In fact, Lumumba was already a victim of persecution during the colonial period. He was spied on, he was blackmailed and was twice put on trial as a libelling device.

In 1956-1957 he was imprisoned for several months on false charges of embezzlement. In late 1959 he was jailed on a 'political' charge of inciting the inhabitants of Stanleyville to riot. The authorities then staged a rehearsal of Lumumba's transfer to a prison in Katanga, from which he had to be released on the demand of the Congolese leaders who met in Brussels to discuss the question of independence for the Belgian colony.

In June 1960 the colonialists made an attempt to challenge Lumumba's right to head the government of the Republic of the Congo to which he was entitled as leader of the parliamentary majority. Rejecting the slander levelled at him, he said at the time that accusations that he was in the pay of the Communists began to be spread by imperialist propaganda after he declined the proposals of the Western powers to make a deal with them which would amount to an act of corruption.[3]

He again spoke about attempts to bribe him upon return from the USA in August 1960: 'We became the target of attacks because we no longer want to submit ... and reject corruption. They tried to bribe us and millions were promised to me, but I refused, I did not take a single centime.'[4]

In September 1960 a group of opposition leaders whose policies reflected the interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and other wealthy strata of Congolese society, supported by imperialist powers, removed Lumumba from office. In November of that same year he was seized by security agents and put in jail. Still, Lumumba was undaunted in his determination to continue the struggle for genuine

[1] *Congo 1960*, Vol. 2, p. 588.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 586.
[3] See *Congo 1960*, Vol. 2, p. 833.
[4] G. Heinz & H. Donnay, *Lumumba Patrice. Les cinquante derniers jours de sa vie*, p. 193.

sovereignty for the Congo with the backing of the popular masses. In his last appeal to the people from a prison in Thysville, Lumumba said: 'My dear countrymen! In joy and in sorrow I will always be with you. It is together with you that I fought to free my country from foreign rule. Together with you I am fighting to strengthen our national independence. Together with you, I will fight to preserve the integrity and national unity of the Republic of the Congo.'[1]

But his days were numbered. On January 17 secret police bundled Lumumba and two of his associates—Mpolo and Okito—into a plane which headed for the capital of 'independent' Katanga. During the many-hour flight to Elizabethville (now Lubumbashi) the captives were brutally beaten with hobnailed boots and machine-gun butts. At Luano Airport in the presence of Katangese secessionists and their European principals the three martyrs, more dead than alive, were thrown into a jeep and taken to a farm where they were shot dead in the evening of the same day.

'Neither cruelty, nor violence, nor torture will make me beg for mercy, because I prefer to die with my head raised high, with unshakeable faith ... in my country's predestination rather than live in submission forsaking my sacred principles.'[2] These words of Lumumba provide an epilogue to his short but beautiful life.

A UN commission to investigate the circumstances of Lumumba's death named as accomplices in the murder the Léopoldville administration headed by the then president of the Congo, Kasavubu, the authorities of Katanga, the managers of the Belgian mining firm Union Minière du Haut Katanga, and a group of Belgian mercenaries in the service of Chombe, leader of the Katangese secessionists.

The US Senate commission which in the mid-1970s looked into the activities of the American intelligence services, found that the CIA back in August 1960 set 'an urgent and prime objective,'[3] namely a conspiracy to murder the Prime Minister of the Congo who, according to the then CIA Director, Allen Dulles, remained 'a grave danger'.[4]

The national hero of the Congo fell victim to an imperialist conspiracy. Rabid demagogues accused him of insincerity, usurpers of violating democratic principles of government, bigots of inability to understand the needs of the country and the puppets of the foreign monopolies of forgetting the national interests.

History, however, has judged him otherwise. Today Africa and the world only remember his murderers in order to brand them and express contempt for them. Meanwhile, Lumumba is spoken and written about, he is credited with great services to the struggle o'

[1] *La pensée politique de Patrice Lumumba*, p. 394.
[2] *Afrique-Asie*, No. 154, 1978, p. 10.
[3] *An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1975, p. 15.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

Africans for independence; factories, streets and schools are named after him, monuments are erected to him, and works of fiction have been written about him.

Patrice Lumumba was one of the first prominent African national democrats. And although his world outlook was not devoid of eclecticism, and contained elements of petty-bourgeois influence and distinctive African populism, and was marked by the influence of utopian socialists and ideologists of early bourgeois African society, one has to agree that he was an honest and consistent national revolutionary, a democrat, anti-imperialist and anti-racist, and that he opposed national reformism and neo-colonialism. It is even possible that in the course of further struggle, he could eventually have arrived at an understanding of the ideas of scientific socialism.

For millions of people both in Africa and in other continents, Lumumba remains a symbol of the love of freedom, of patriotism and courage in the fight for national liberation.

A prominent figure in the African national liberation movement, the founder and first President of the Republic of Ghana.

Kwame Nkrumah was born on September 21, 1909 in the village of Nkroful (in the Western province of what was then the British colony of the Gold Coast) into a jeweller's family from the Nzima tribe.

On finishing a Catholic primary school in Half Assini, in 1926, he trained at the Accra and Achimota colleges of education.

Nkrumah began his career working as a teacher in Catholic schools in Elmina and Axim (Ghana).

Between 1935 and 1945, Nkrumah studied and then taught philosophy at Lincoln University (Pennsylvania, USA), having graduated with a Bachelor of Economics, Sociology and Theology. In Pennsylvania University, where he taught history and philosophy, he received the degree of Master of Education and Philosophy.

During his studies in the USA, he worked in shipyards, at a soap factory and as a waiter and corridor attendant on ships. While in the States, he began active political work. He studied the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and the writings of Black ideologists and educationalists in the USA. He also studied at London University and at the London School of Economics.

Nkrumah also possessed honorary degrees of Doctor of Law from the universities of Moscow, Lincoln, Cairo and others.

From 1945 to 1947, Kwame Nkrumah lived in England, where he took part in preparations for the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester (October 1945). He was Secretary of the Congress's organisational committee and then General Secretary of the Working Committee which was elected to implement the programme for African liberation planned by the congress. At this time he became the General Secretary of the West African National Secretariat, set up in London. In 1946-47, he was editor of the New African *newspaper, published in London.*

Kwame Nkrumah returned to his country in December 1947, and became a member and later the General Secretary of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). On March 12, 1948, he was arrested (in connection with unrest in the February and March of that year) and exiled to the north of the country. The increase in the revolutionary mood in the country led to Nkrumah's split with the United Gold Coast Convention.

In June 1949, he established the Convention People's Party, which called for the immediate granting of national independence.

In September 1948, Nkrumah began printing the newspaper Accra Evening News. *In January 1950 he was arrested again and imprisoned for organising strikes.*

During the elections to the Legislative Assembly in February 1951, at which the Convention People's Party was victorious, its leader, still in prison, was elected a member of the Assembly from the Central constituency in Accra. On February 12, 1951, he was released early from prison..

From 1952, Nkrumah was Prime Minister of the first African government of the Gold Coast; he simultaneously held the posts of Minister of Defence, Home Affairs Minister and Foreign Minister.

On March 6, 1957, after the Gold Coast gained independence, he became the country's Prime Minister, now named Ghana on his suggestion. On July 1, 1960, when Ghana was declared a republic, he was elected President, and remained so until February 24, 1966.

In 1961, Nkrumah was elected General Secretary of the Convention People's Party and its life Chairman.

In April 1962, the International Lenin Prize Committee awarded Nkrumah the 1961 International Lenin Prize for the Strengthening of Peace among Peoples.

Kwame Nkrumah visited the Soviet Union twice, first in 1961 and then in March 1966.

On February 24, 1966, following a military coup in Ghana, Nkrumah was removed from all his posts and forced to leave the country. He settled in Guinea where he became an honorary member of the House of Representatives, co-President of Guinea and General Secretary of the country's Democratic Party.

Kwame Nkrumah died on April 27, 1972 in Bucharest. On July 9 of the same year he was buried in his home village of Nkroful.

Kwame Nkrumah was one of the leading figures of the anti-colonial movement in Africa in the 1940s-1960s. His contribution to the development of the continent after the Second World War went far beyond his own country. As a politician, Nkrumah became a symbol of the freedom and unity of Africa, and of the relentless struggle against colonial and neo-colonial exploitation. He was a statesman who enjoyed international respect and a notable ideologist and political

thinker. He strove to achieve a philosophical understanding of the processes of national and social emancipation of the colonial countries. He aimed to fathom and uncover the inner contradictions of the national liberation movement and its powerful latent forces which contributed to the progress and crises of the movement. Slowly but surely, he came to the recognition of the decisive role of class and anti-imperialist struggle in Africa today.

Nkrumah's fate was tragic. After the triumphant culmination of the liberation struggle by peaceful means in the British colony, the Gold Coast, and after many years of apparently lasting and outstanding government in the Republic of Ghana, he ended his days in solitude and in exile. In this difficult moral and political climate, when his activities were restricted against his will, Nkrumah took to his literary, or investigatory, work with redoubled energy, trying to examine critically the history and outline the perspectives of the African revolution. It must be said that the end of Nkrumah's life was not a tragedy of despondency and despair. It was the tragedy of a great fighter for a better future in Africa, who did not find adequate support for his plans either in his own country or in the continent.

Nkrumah's activities reflected many diverse features characteristic of some of the leaders of the contemporary national liberation movement: the democratism of a leader of the masses in the period of the liberation movement and methods of power handed down from the medieval traditions of the African tribal system; attraction to socialism and crude nationalist prejudices; the desire to honestly serve the interests of the people and excessive personal ambition; Labour-type reformist illusions and leftist radicalism. All this reflected the acute and very real contradictions which characterised the intermediate, petty-bourgeois strata in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, strata which came to the forefront in the struggle for independence and became the most active force after the Second World War in the dozens of young national states which emerged in the 1950s-1970s. It is precisely for this reason that the whole of Nkrumah's political life, with all its ups and downs, and the whole of his theoretical legacy, with all its correct ideas and mistakes, represent a major experimental school for African revolutionaries.

Kwame Nkrumah became widely known after the war, when the pan-African movement was entering a new stage—the organisation of the national liberation movement in various countries within the continent. At the Fifth Pan-African Congress at Manchester in October 1945, he was the main speaker on the problem of the struggle of the peoples of Western Africa for independence. Even then Nkrumah was a militant anti-imperialist, who rejected the conciliation and reformism of earlier pan-African congresses and the false assertions of bourgeois and right-wing socialist propaganda about the civilising mission of colonialism. It is indicative that Nkrumah, like the majority of the participants at the Fifth Pan-African Congress, shared the view that the aims of the national liberation movement

did not come down merely to the attainment of independence, but presupposed the establishment of a democratic system and the improvement of the people's welfare on the basis of socialism. This demonstrated that Nkrumah's political views had really evolved in a progressive direction, which many of the African leaders at that time could neither understand nor foresee.

True, Nkrumah's ideas about socialism were not entirely class-oriented at that time. In this sphere he had not yet got rid of his reformist illusions. Some aspects of his ideas on socialism in the forties and early fifties were tinged with European social-democratic and nationalist conceptions. He was influenced by George Padmore, an authoritative figure in the pan-African movement in the forties, who became Nkrumah's advisor after the declaration of Ghana's independence. Padmore's falsely formulated dilemma—pan-Africanism or communism—was not repudiated by Nkrumah at that time.

As President of Ghana, Nkrumah passed through a rough stage during which he was strongly influenced by national reformism with its illusions about the eternal harmony of national interests and its repudiation of class struggle in African society, etc.

Among the positive aspects of Nkrumah's subsequent evolution is the fact that he did not get stuck at that stage, where the convinced African national reformists, flirting with the Socialist International, have been for the last twenty or thirty years. This type of political position is again advocated by some renegades from the revolutionary wing of the anti-colonial movement. All their evolution amounts to is shifting the balance from the ideas of the exceptional, unique historical development of the African peoples to the typical conceptions of right-wing European social-democracy. This modification of African national reformism in the second half of the seventies is reflected in the work of Léopold Senghor, in the orientation towards the Socialist International and in the desire to consolidate their forces on a continental scale by creating a so-called Confederation of African Socialist Parties. There can hardly be any doubt that this type of evolution is linked, directly or indirectly, with the growing influence of neo-colonialism.

At the end of the fifties, various ideological and political trends began to precipitate out of the eclectic ideology of African nationalism, which combined, as the Fifth Pan-African Congress showed, revolutionary and reformist tendencies. Right-wing nationalists firmly took up bourgeois reformist positions, applying these reformist ideas not only to domestic but also to foreign policies, often resorting to collaboration with the imperialist powers. The left wing turned to the idea of non-capitalist development and worked out policies and ideological principles of national democracy. Nkrumah was one of the initiators and best representatives of the latter movement, which sought to strengthen the revolutionary potential and deepen the social content of the national liberation struggle. He came to the Marxist conclusion that both the socialist orientation and the consolidation

of true national independence in the economic and political spheres demanded the continuation of the consistent struggle against imperialist exploitation and the curbing of the egoistic aspirations of bourgeois elements. It was in this way that he gradually overcame the national reformist hostility towards the theory and practice of scientific socialism. And it was with Nkrumah that the national liberation movement in Africa began to grow closer to the socialist countries and that the ideas of Marxism-Leninism actively affected its ideology. These processes in Tropical Africa were most vividly embodied in the policies of the Republic of Ghana under Nkrumah and in his theoretical works.

At a time when the national reformists urged for conflicts with the former colonial powers to be forgotten, Nkrumah insisted on the need to maintain vigilance in the face of imperialist intrigues and to unite all revolutionary forces to oppose them. This goal was served by his ardent agitation in favour of African unity. Here, however, Nkrumah was prone to exaggeration. He saw all regional unions as a threat to broader unification and strove for the immediate formation of a continental government and army, forgetting that the necessary conditions did not exist for this, that extra–and large–obstacles were created by the deepening disparities in African political trends and by the diverse social orientation of the emergent states. But Nkrumah did undoubtedly play an outstanding role in the creation of the Organisation of African Unity, and was guided in his aspiration for African unity by his awareness of the need to unite the political, economic and military resources of the African countries to repulse the still grave threat posed by imperialism. He was convinced of this by the tragedy of the Congo.

Nkrumah spoke tirelessly of the great danger of imperialism and revealed new forms of imperialist expansion and oppression. This is dealt with, for example, in his book *Neo-Colonialism–The Last Stage of Imperialism*, published in London in 1965, in which he analysed such neo-colonialist methods as the imposition of 'defence' treaties and the building of military bases, the support of puppet governments, economic control in the form of aid and loans, unequal trade and the smothering of local economies by international corporations, penetration into the social environment through the indigenous bourgeoisie, and ideological propaganda. Nkrumah's book is still topical today.

The recognition of the class struggle was the most important and fundamental, qualitatively new ideological and political achievement of Nkrumah, and of national democrats in general, in the analysis of the internal situation in African countries. It was Nkrumah's book *Consciencism* which best expressed the general, tentative, more political than socio-economic approach to class contradictions in African society, which was typical of the whole of the national democratic movement at the first stage of its development. In this book, Nkrumah spoke of the conflict between 'positive action' and 'negative

forces', i.e., of the struggle of the forces of progress to establish social justice, abolish oligarchic exploitation and suppress the forces of reaction trying to prolong their colonial rule. Nkrumah took into account the conditional nature of this division. He foresaw the possibility of divisions within the positive revolutionary process and of some of its forces going over to the side of reaction.[1]

Undoubtedly, this way of looking at things does not yet betray a Marxist understanding of social classes or a scientific analysis of the socio-economic and political structure of society. But it does contain a kind of basis for the objectively necessary tactics of a united anti-imperialist front, which, while not rising to a Marxist understanding of the issue, does not fundamentally contradict it. This position may, in the course of the struggle and with the accumulation of experience, take on Marxist content. True, in his *Consciencism*, Nkrumah called on the progressive forces ('positive action') to anticipate disintegration at its seminal stage and 'discover a way of containing the future schismatic tendencies'.[2] It is hard to say what is greater in this proposal: the desire to preserve by all means the union of progressive forces, or the illusory hope of quelling the class struggle—a hope sometimes expressed by Nkrumah, as is evidenced by certain publications in the Ghanaian newspaper *The Spark*, which reflect his contradictory evolution.

The publication of *Consciencism* was seen by official Ghanaian propaganda as the culmination of the 'theory of Nkrumahism'. The strong influence on this theory of the ideas of scientific socialism was obvious. It was seen in the recognition of general laws governing historical development, in the clear influence of Marxist dialectical materialism, and in Nkrumah's understanding of imperialism. As early as 1963, Fenner Brockway spoke of Nkrumah as a representative of 'African Marxism'. Nonetheless, in the early sixties, Nkrumah felt it necessary to voice his disagreements with Marxism on certain philosophical issues. But, as Engels said, 'to the crude conditions of capitalistic production and the crude class conditions corresponded crude theories'.[3]

Though considering Nkrumahism a materialist philosophy, the Ghanaian press underlined that it was not atheistic. While recognising in principle the law-governed nature of revolution, Nkrumah supposed that the preservation of traditional conditions in Africa allowed socialism to be attained by evolutionary means. *The Spark* characterised the identification of Nkrumahism with Marxism as an attack on Nkrumahism from the right, meaning that it would lead in Ghana to the awakening of those who, under the influence of imperialist propaganda, considered communism as brigandage and immorality.[4]

[1] See Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism*, Heinemann, London, 1964, pp. 104-105.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] Frederick Engels, 'Socialism: Utopian and Scientific', in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 119.
[4] *The Spark*, March 5, 1963.

Thus, basically tactical and not entirely unfounded considerations were put forward for drawing a line between Marxism and Nkrumahism.

Of course, it would be wrong to identify the two also from the point of view of scientific objectivity. Nkrumahism did not overcome reformist and nationalist ideas. But it did undoubtedly move towards Marxism rather than away from it. Moreover, there were no basic contradictions in the philosophies in their recognition of the possibility of successful non-capitalist development and of a united front of anti-imperialist forces on this basis, though they understood these phenomena differently. The constant evolution of Nkrumahism gave hope for its further rapprochement with scientific socialism on the basis of the gradual deepening of socialist trends in the framework of non-capitalist development. Such a rapprochement did come about. Several issues of *The Spark*, around which were grouped representatives of 'left Nkrumahism', and statements made by its editor-in-chief, Kofi Batsa, gave evidence of certain shifts in the concept of 'positive action', emphasising the special role of the working people in the alliance of progressive forces, pointing out the duality and contradictoriness of the views of national capitalists and their hostility towards socialist tendencies, and stressing the fundamental divergencies between Nkrumahism, characterised as scientific socialism in Africa, and national reformist 'African socialism'.

Nkrumahism was prevented from growing any closer to scientific socialism, however, by the reactionary coup in Ghana in February 1966, which led to the fall of Nkrumah's government. This major political defeat, which interrupted the non-capitalist development of the country, was bound to force Nkrumah to take fresh stock of things. He gradually came to the realisation that the counter-revolutionary coup could not have happened with such ease and success, had it not been for the mistakes committed by the leadership. His reconsideration of the past was made difficult by the demoralisation felt by the supporters of a socialist course and by their being uprooted from their native soil. In his many years of rule, the people got used to his personality cult, and he himself got used to governing single-handed and to settling issues by decree. Because of this, even afterwards, Nkrumah was unable to make an objective analysis of the economic, social and political situation in Ghana or of his own misjudgements, or to outline ways of organising and mobilising the country's revolutionary forces. In exile, Nkrumah wrote several books, two of which—*Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare* (1969) and *Class Struggle in Africa* (1970)—are of considerable interest in the context of the history of African socio-political thought. But he failed to write a book about the reasons for his own defeat, about the weaknesses and contradictions of the progressive regime in Ghana. He apparently lacked the courage to take an objective, fearless look at his own mistakes.

Nkrumah preferred the easier way out—an abstract, theoretical

review of strategies and tactics. The abstract nature of his considerations was clearly seen in the fact that after the reactionary coup in Ghana, he dreamt of revolution not in his own country but on a continental scale, and addressed his new ideological and political platform to the whole of Africa, from north to south, and from east to west.

The defeat of the revolutionary forces in Ghana could have led to their concentrating on a comparatively limited battlefront, to their stressing relatively modest immediate goals capable of gathering the remnants of the shattered forces and gradually preparing them for a fresh struggle. Having been defeated on the path of non-capitalist development in Ghana, however, Nkrumah began to speak of socialist revolution in the whole of Africa. It became apparent that he had to a large extent lost touch with reality. This was a paradoxical reaction to bitter defeat, certainly linked with his utopian socio-political ideas and his overestimation of the role of his own personality.

No one could doubt that the coup in Ghana testified to the social, economic and political troubles in the country. This was felt by Nkrumah too. He was also right in his tacit recognition of a certain ambiguity, incompleteness and contradictoriness in the ideological and political platform of Nkrumahism during the period of his rule. But unfortunately, as has been already said, Nkrumah did not choose to make a thorough critical analysis of the socio-political and economic development of Ghana in the first years of independence, of the development of the state apparatus and party, or of the alignment of classes in the country or of the position of the army. He did not notice the growth of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and did not wish to see the general corruption in the country.

Had he undertaken such an analysis, he would have seen many of the negative aspects of Ghana's internal development resulting not so much from strategic aims as from the real, acute contradictions between intentions and actions. He would have realised that the country's economy was marked by disproportions and that the desire for immediate maximum industrialisation and the realisation of major projects neither accorded with the state of the country's economy nor satisfied its most urgent requirements. He would have also understood that the desire for socialism was not preventing the intensive growth of capitalist tendencies, that the popular masses had gained little from the new power, least of all a rise in the standard of living, that the state apparatus was divorced from them and had become a means of personal, and in essence primitive, accumulation of capital. He would have seen that the Convention People's Party was not broadening or strengthening, but was losing its ties with the masses which had brought it to power, that the genuine revolutionary enthusiasm of the period of the struggle for independence had given way to ponderous official pomposity and to impetuous eulogies to the 'osagyefo', the leader and teacher, and that all this testified to the degeneration of power and its isolation from the people.

Though undoubtedly an intelligent man and experienced politician,

Nkrumah missed all this. He limited himself to pointing out the undermining activities of imperialism and internal reaction, the heterogeneous class composition of society as a result of the mixed economy, and the readiness of certain groups of officers in the armed forces, civil servants and police to work for the reactionaries. All this he saw when he was in power. What is more, he was frequently told this by Marxist-Leninists. Messages to Nkrumah from leaders of the socialist states constantly pointed to these unfavourable processes within the country, but to no avail. Nkrumah did not realise the danger threatening him when he was in power, and he did not grasp the whole diversity of reasons which caused his defeat, after he had lost power.

After his defeat, Nkrumah's theoretical and methodological judgments became more mature. He took, as it were, a new step towards scientific socialism. Now he asserted that 'there is only one true socialism and that is scientific socialism, the principles of which are abiding and universal'.[1] His illusions about quelling the class struggle were belatedly replaced by the clear statement: 'Socialism can only be achieved through class struggle.'[2] His general argumentation about the political blocs of progressive and reactionary forces ('positive action' and 'negative forces') gave way to a concrete analysis of the structure of African society, based on the position of different social strata in the production process and their division into privileged and oppressed.

All these positive changes in Nkrumah's views could have taken place much earlier, before his defeat, for they were quite compatible with his political course in the first half of the sixties. They could have promoted greater consistency in his socialist tendencies. But in the Nkrumah of the late sixties and early seventies, who had suffered a great shock, they went hand in hand with a full, and perhaps sometimes too radical, review of his old course. He began with the declaration of armed struggle as the only method of bringing about the aims of the liberation movement. All Nkrumah's works from 1967 onwards speak of the approach of a new, decisive phase in the revolution, whose distinctive feature would be armed struggle against the forces of reaction.

It is characteristic that Nkrumah suggested revolutionary war not only as a means of gaining independence—which was justified in a way at the time, for the liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies and in Southern Africa had taken precisely that course—but also as a means of fighting neo-colonialism and reaction. Despite the extreme diversity of conditions and tasks of the democratic, revolutionary movement in various countries and parts of Africa, Nkrumah recom-

[1] Kwame Nkrumah, *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare. A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution* , Panaf Books Limited, London, 1968, p. 29.

[2] Kwame Nkrumah, *Class Struggle in Africa*, International Publishers, New York, 1971, p. 84.

mended all to use his universal method—armed struggle, which was an exaggeration of the role of armed struggle, its fetishisation, and a reaction to his own defeat as a result of underrating the role of the class struggle in Ghana. Towards the end of his life, he understood its role, but then perceived it principally in one form—armed struggle—and applied it to the whole of the African continent, irrespective of the concrete historical situation and actual conditions.

This 'unification' of Africa reflected one aspect of Nkrumah's desires—to create a pan-African government—for it was not only of a methodological, but also of an organisational character. Nkrumah advocated the creation of a unified African revolutionary army and party, seeing in them a power capable of bringing about the national and social liberation of the African peoples. This aim was, and still is, quite unrealistic, ignoring completely both the total absence of the conditions for such an organisation and the essential heterogeneity of the African revolutionary movements as regards their tasks and class and political nature. Moreover, it was a harmful aim, for it came close to denying the independent importance of the struggle waged within national frontiers. It still remains a misguided aim.

Nkrumah also unified the goals of the revolutionary movement in Africa. In his *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare*, he spoke of three interrelated objectives—nationalism, pan-Africanism and socialism—underlining that none of these objectives could be achieved fully without the others.[1] Here Nkrumah was let down by his sense of national specific features, which bring one main aim to the forefront in each country, and by his sense of history. Contradictory elements—nationalism and socialism—are brought together; there is no convincing evidence of the stages of the revolutionary process. In his last book, *Class Struggle in Africa*, Nkrumah somewhat changed his definition of the objectives of the movement and removed logical contradictions. At the same time he took a new step in working out a revolutionary platform. He replaced 'nationalism' by the 'achievement of genuine national independence', which was certainly correct from the point of view of a class-based approach to the national liberation movement, and declared that true independence and pan-Africanism were only possible on the basis of socialism[2]—which could also be welcomed. But the evident growth of Nkrumah's subjective socialist ideas led him to declare socialism the immediate task of the liberation movement in Africa today.

This was followed by a complete review of strategy, again not on the basis of a scientific analysis of reality, but by getting rid of the logical mistakes contained in the *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare*. Nkrumah offered the African liberation movement a strategy of socialist revolution. He declared that 'it is only peasantry and proletariat working together who are wholly able to subscribe to policies of

[1] See Kwame Nkrumah, *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare*, p. 24.
[2] See Kwame Nkrumah, *Class Struggle in Africa*, p. 84.

all-out socialism'.[1] But this basically true declaration led him to reject the tactics of a united anti-imperialist front, although he had supported it before, in the *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare*. He called the whole of the African bourgeoisie a counter-revolutionary force which had finally joined up with international monopoly capital, and opposed union not only with it but also with petty-bourgeois circles at the current stage of the liberation movement.

Thus culminated the book version of his voluntarist programme of leftist radicalism, begun in 1967 with the enunciation of armed struggle as the sole means of struggle.

The profound contradictoriness of Nkrumah's ideological development after 1966 is self-evident. On the one hand, there was his noble intolerance of reformism and of the egoistic policies of national capital, his belief in socialism, and his assimilation of many theoretical principles of Marxism-Leninism; on the other, there was his inability to apply these principles to reality, which led him to hold views which basically coincided with many of the trends of petty-bourgeois radicalism in Africa, Europe, Asia and Latin America. The very instability of Nkrumah's views, and his sudden transitions from reformist illusions to extreme radicalism, also testify to his affinity with these trends. Nationalist views were also present in the platform which Nkrumah considered consistently socialist.

But these errors should not obscure the main achievement of his life. Having covered the complex path of a progressive revolutionary nationalist, Nkrumah came to the conclusion that only scientific socialism was capable of guaranteeing freedom, prosperity and social justice for the peoples of Africa. He played an important part in spreading the ideas of socialism in Africa, and was one of the first leaders of the liberation movement on that continent to appeal to his people to be guided by the principles of scientific socialism and create a vanguard party of working people. Nkrumah never consciously opposed his own understanding of socialism to the Marxist-Leninist interpretation—and this sets him apart from most representatives of contemporary leftist radicalism. In spite of the inaccuracy of his understanding of socialism and of the ways to bring it about, his views were an important step forward in the development of ideas of liberation in the African continent.

Nkrumah often changed his views and repudiated his past mistakes. Death prevented him from correcting his last theoretical works. To review them critically is the task of the African revolutionary movement. It is to Nkrumah's credit that African revolutionaries can to some extent be considered his successors: they arm themselves with all the best aspects of his theoretical and political experience; they continue the process of convergence with scientific socialism, not confusing it with the pseudo-revolutionary platforms of petty-bourgeois radicals.

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

AMILCAR CABRAL

An outstanding figure of the African national liberation movement. The founder and General Secretary of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). An activist in the African and Asian peoples' solidarity movement and a member of the World Peace Council.

Amilcar Cabral was born on September 12, 1924 in the town of Bafata (Guinea-Bissau) into the family of an employee of the colonial administration. His father owned large plots of land on the Cape Verde Islands.

Cabral studied at the lycée on the island of San-Vincente. In 1945, he entered the Lisbon Higher Institute of Agronomy, from which he graduated in 1952 with the degree of engineer-agronomist. As a student, he took an active part in the democratic movement in Portugal.

In 1953 he began working as an engineer-agronomist at the Pessuba experimental station in Bissau. He was sacked in 1955 for 'anti-colonial activity' and exiled from Guinea-Bissau.

In 1955-56 he worked as an agronomist on Angolan sugar plantations. He took part with Agostinho Neto and other Angolan patriots in the organisation of the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA).

On September 19, 1956, Cabral founded and became the leader of the African Party for the Independence and Union of the Peoples of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAI). In 1960 it was renamed the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). In 1957 in Lisbon, he took part in the setting up of the Anti-Colonial Movement (MAC), the first illegal organisation of Africans in Portugal to make their objective the struggle against colonialism. From the middle of 1960 he headed the bureau of PAIGC in Conakry (Guinea).

He participated in the work of the Second All-African Peoples' Conference which took place in 1960 in Tunis. In April 1961 he was elected deputy General Secretary of the Conference of National

Liberation Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP).

Cabral visited the USSR on more than one occasion.

In September 1961, he participated in the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in Belgrade.

On January 20, 1973, Cabral was killed in Conakry by mercenaries of Portuguese colonialists.

The active political work of Amilcar Cabral helped his colleagues to lead the country and its people to complete victory – the declaration of independence in September 1973.

In 1975, the World Peace Council posthumously awarded Cabral the Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal.

Guinea-Bissau is a small country on the south-west coast of Africa. It is not rich in natural resources and does not lie in the centre of international politics. But it is wellknown because of the long, selfless armed struggle waged by its people for more than ten years against the Portuguese colonialists. This struggle was led by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), whose creation in 1956 was termed by its founder and leader Amilcar Cabral a major event in the history of the Guinean people.

Amilcar Cabral was a leader of the liberation movement who enjoyed great authority not only in the PAIGC and among the population of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, but all over Africa and throughout the democratic movement of the world. Yet he was devoid of any personal ambitions and made no claims to the role of ruler of men's minds or ideologist of the contemporary national liberation movement. Cabral was marked by exceptional modesty, and complete concentration on the task of liberating the two countries and peoples linked by a common fate. He understood that the colonial yoke could be thrown off above all as a result of their joint efforts, their political, ideological and armed struggle, and that the organisation of this struggle required deep knowledge of the conditions of life, the history and the traditions of the people. He would have nothing to do with isolationism, national seclusion, and the denial of the decisive role of solidarity among progressive forces, and of the international experience of revolutionary struggle. Cabral was convinced that all the achievements of progressive revolutionary thought and practice should be taken into account in the course of the liberation struggle and adapted and applied to the concrete conditions.

This synthesis of a wide mental horizon and a thorough knowledge of his own people ensured great success in the struggle for national independence and bringing about social change in the areas liberated as a result of the armed struggle against the colonialists, and also gained international recognition for the activities and ideological and political platform of the PAIGC. Cabral's work was vital in helping

the two young republics (Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands) to take up a worthy place among the progressive African states. He left a rich theoretical legacy, using the example of these two countries to examine important socio-economic and political problems arising in states no longer under colonial rule.

Cabral's father came from Cape Verde, but he himself was born in Guinea-Bissau, and lived there almost all his life. He thus personifies the unity which is the aim of the peoples of the two countries. Cabral was one of the few Guineans who received their education in Lisbon. There, together with natives of other Portuguese colonies, he organised a Centre d'Etudes Africaines, whose activities combined scientific and educative aims with the political aim of amalgamating the then still rather modest forces of the liberation movement in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Having trained as an engineer-agronomist, he returned to his country and carried out a census of the rural population, which gave him a deep knowledge of his country and people. His account of the census is an invaluable source for the study of the agrarian economy and social structure of Guinea. Later, Cabral used the document to analyse the actual alignment of class forces at various stages of the liberation movement.

Meanwhile, a revolutionary organisation was set up in Guinea. The anti-colonialist African white-collar workers drew the workers of Bissau into the underground Movement for the National Independence of Guinea (MING). In September 1956, with the active participation of Cabral, the PAIGC was founded, also aiming for national independence. For two years the underground organisation was built under the extremely difficult conditions created by the fascist colonial regime. In 1958 the PAIGC stepped up its activities among industrial and professional workers, laying stress on traditional methods of legal economic and political struggle—demonstrations and strikes. The brutal shooting down of strikers at Pijiguiti in August 1959 convinced the leadership of the PAIGC of the inadequacy of such tactics, however. Legal methods of struggle proved to be not only ineffective, but often turned the best members of the organisation into targets for repression.

In September 1959, a PAIGC conference took the historic decision to mobilise the rural masses, prepare for armed struggle, and continue and extend conspiratorial work in the towns. The conference called for the rallying of all ethnic groups and social sections round the PAIGC and for ties with other national liberation movements in Africa to be strengthened. The aim was now to turn the PAIGC into an efficient fighting organisation covering the whole country. Party activists were sent into various regions to mobilise the population.

From then on there was careful preparation for armed struggle against colonial rule. The Party leadership was moved to Conakry, where cadres were trained. After a short course, the patriots immediately returned to Guinea-Bissau to organise the resistance movement.

Widespread armed activity broke out in 1963 since when the

history of the PAIGC's armed struggle was an unbroken chain of difficult experiences, partial defeats, and ultimately—growing success. Beginning with acts of sabotage against colonial rule and subsequently going over to large-scale guerrilla warfare, the PAIGC demonstrated to the world the ability of a people, full of determination to fight and defend their freedom and honour, to come out on top of a well-trained and armed colonial army against all the odds.

In 1964 the PAIGC held its First Congress on liberated territory. The congress reorganised the Party, making it more democratic and effective. The country was divided into zones and districts, each with its own party committee. The congress emphasised the political nature of the armed struggle and the direct responsibility of the party committees for the course of the guerrilla activities. It was decided to set up a regular insurgent army—the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces—which signified the start of a new stage in the struggle. The congress called for organs of popular power to be organised, for the economy to be improved, for education and health care to be developed in the liberated areas, and for the all-out development of political work among the masses to explain the aims of the PAIGC, mobilise the people against colonialism, and step up economic activities.

Even before the First Congress of the PAIGC, armed resistance was well under way all over the country. Fighting had begun in the south, and now new fronts were opened in the east and west. The patriots attacked the colonialists' fortified bases.

The successes of the liberation movement were largely due to the reforms of 1964. In 1964-65, the new political and administrative structure, based on the initiative of the population and the PAIGC leadership, was put into action in the liberated areas. In these areas a new social system took shape, proclaiming the abolition of inequality and exploitation, the establishment of comradely relations and the strengthening of discipline—a system based on mutual assistance and selfless collective work for the common cause. The enthusiasm and trust with which the people responded to the socio-political transformations were no less an achievement for the PAIGC than the military victories. In the final analysis it was they that decided the outcome of the war. Feeling themselves to be the masters of their country, the people could no longer come to terms with the colonial yoke. The popular trust won by the PAIGC also ensured it victory in the struggle against the dissenting pseudonationalist organisations which tried to contest the PAIGC's right to represent the peoples of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. It was precisely the support of the broad masses and the PAIGC's close links with them that cut the ground from under the dissenters' feet, depriving them, after the fall of fascism in Portugal, of the chance of exerting any kind of serious influence on the course of decolonisation, as happened in other countries.

The PAIGC gained more military successes every year, and by the

end of 1972 controlled two-thirds of the country. All that remained in the hands of the colonialists were the towns of Bissau, Bafata and Bolama, and some military bases. The state had been reached where the PAIGC had sovereignty in a country occupied in part by a foreign power. To bring the political superstructure into line with the existing state of affairs, the PAIGC organised elections to the National Popular Assembly in 1972, which would declare the birth of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.

Cabral was not destined to see this day. In January 1973 he was treacherously assassinated by hirelings of the Portuguese colonialists. The death of the leader of the liberation movement was a grave loss for the PAIGC, for the peoples of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, and for the whole of Africa, in its hour of wakening. But this bloody crime by the agents of imperialism did not achieve its main purpose—it did not lead to a crisis in the PAIGC nor stop the advance of the patriotic forces. As though foreseeing his own death, Cabral once said that a man could not consider his business complete if there was no one to carry it on after his death. Cabral was survived by hundreds and thousands of faithful followers, rallied in the PAIGC, united by years of hard struggle.

After a short hitch, caused by the death of their leader, the liberation movement surged on with new strength. In September 1973 the first National Popular Assembly in the history of the country declared the creation of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. It was clear that the complete and final military defeat of the Portuguese colonialists was not far off. The fall of fascism in Portugal sped up the course of events and allowed the PAIGC over the negotiating table to consolidate recognition of itself as the sole and rightful representative of the peoples of Guinea and Cape Verde. This was achieved by the Party after many years of selfless struggle for freedom, independence and social progress.

The leaders of the Republics of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde repeatedly declared that their policies would be based on the ideas of Amilcar Cabral. The Third Congress of the PAIGC in November 1977 again confirmed their loyalty to the principles and theories of the Party's founder and acknowledged leader.

The national liberation movement of Guinea-Bissau was faced with conditions of extreme backwardness (even by Tropical African standards). The task of mobilising the people in such conditions, and of arming them with an understanding of the aims and methods of struggle, required careful preparation of the political vanguard, devotion and selflessness on its part, its affinity with the people and knowledge of their lives and moods, skill in organisation and propaganda, and unity of word and action.

That the PAIGC honourably coped with this difficult role was in many ways due to the clarity of the ideological and political doctrines which Cabral gave the Party, to the attention he paid to political work, to his theories, his gift of foresight, his thorough analysis of

the laws of the revolutionary process and his ability to affect this process purposefully. For Cabral, theory was an integral part of revolutionary work, and the most important means of knowing and changing the world. He opposed in principle voluntarist, empirical and pragmatic approaches to the national liberation movement.

At the beginning of the sixties, when one African country after another was gaining independence (1960 was declared the Year of Africa) and the prospects for universal decolonisation seemed to many people more favourable than ever before, Cabral spoke of the crisis in the African revolution. 'It seems to us,' he said at the Third All-African Peoples' Conference in Cairo in March 1961, 'that far from being a crisis of growth, it is principally a crisis of consciousness. In many cases, the practice of the liberation struggle and the prospects for the future are not only devoid of a theoretical basis, but also more or less cut off from reality. Local experience, and that of other countries, concerning the achievement of national independence, national unity and the basis for future progress, has either been forgotten or is still forgotten.'[1] The successful development of the anti-imperialist struggle required, in Cabral's view, concrete knowledge of the actual conditions in each country and in Africa as a whole, and also of the experience of other peoples, plus the scientific elaboration of strategic principles.

He saw the essence of the crisis in the African liberation movement in the fact that in many countries it had not taken a revolutionary course, and the hopes of the popular masses had been deceived by an illusory independence which merely concealed new forms of neo-colonialist exploitation. Cabral's ideal was the transformation of the national liberation movement into a revolution, both in the sense of total liquidation of all forms of imperialist oppression and in the sense of the abolition of inequality and exploitation of local origin.

In defining the nature of colonialism and imperialism, and of the tasks of national liberation, Cabral—like all the best representatives of the anti-imperialist movement in the sixties and seventies—used the experience accumulated in Africa as his starting point. He did not reduce colonialism to political dependence on the metropolis, and, of course, did not suggest that the formal ending of such dependence and the achievement of external signs of sovereignty would make colonialism a thing of the past. Lenin's theory of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism was used by Cabral and many other fighters for genuine independence. Cabral saw colonialism as the natural consequence of the capitalist economy, as the result of the policies of state-monopoly capitalism and the aspiration of the monopolies for guaranteed and high profits. The obvious conclusion was: so long as the capitalist economic system persists, its expansion into

[1] Amilcar Cabral, *Unité et lutte*, Vol. 1, *L'arme de la théorie*, François Maspero, Paris, 1975, p. 270.

backward countries will continue, and only the forms of exploitation will change. The developed capitalist countries move from 'classical' colonialism to neo-colonialism.

Cabral contributed to the study of the forms of neo-colonialist exploitation. He stressed that under the new conditions the imperialist strategy is to pursue a policy of 'aid' towards the former colonies which serves 'to create a false bourgeoisie to put a brake on the revolution and to enlarge the possibilities of the petty bourgeoisie as a neutraliser of the revolution'.[1] In other words, in an age when direct political dictates are becoming impossible, the aim of imperialism is to encourage, as a counterweight to revolution, the local exploiter elements in the developing countries, elements which pursue a policy of national reformism and conciliation with international capital. For this reason, Cabral saw the anti-colonialist movement as the liberation of the national productive forces from all forms of direct and indirect exploitation. In particular, he underlined that 'the principal aspect of national liberation struggle is the struggle against neo-colonialism'.[2]

Cabral preferred not to use the term socialism, considering it inopportune for the historical stage at which the country found itself, but he admitted that the goals of the Guinean revolutionaries were akin to those of a socialist revolution. Yet he did not base this view on the ideas (which were widespread in the former colonies) of the exceptional development of the peoples of Asia and Africa, and of the stability and primordial socialist character of their way of life, but on a scientific study of the course of history. He shared the historical materialist conceptions of the development of mankind from the primitive communal system, through the slaveowning, feudal and capitalist systems, to socialism and communism, and supported the Marxist conclusion that in our age the general social progress of the world offered backward peoples the unique chance to avoid capitalism. Cabral pointed to two factors which allowed the peoples of Africa and Asia to omit the stage of developed capitalism on the way to socialism: 1) the power of modern technology to tame nature, and 2) the emergence of socialist states which have radically changed the face of the world and the historical process.

Cabral was in no doubt that the peoples of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, and of Africa in general, had no prospect of progress, freedom and prosperity other than socialism. The whole of Cabral's theoretical and practical work was, in the final analysis, aimed at transforming the anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist struggle into a social revolution, taking into account the country's lack of direct economic, social, political, material and spiritual prerequisites of socialism. This was his great theoretical contribution. He understood the con-

[1] 'Revolution in Guinea. An African People's Struggle. Stage I', *Selected Texts by Amilcar Cabral*, London, 1969, p. 60.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

tradictoriness of the development of the former colonies, knew how to combine faith in the socialist ideal with an awareness of the need for interim stages in the revolution, and planned them so as to make them a means, not a hindrance, in the pursuit of the ultimate goal.

Cabral found the key to these problems in his deep knowledge of historical laws and of the specific situation in Africa, particularly Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

He made a truly scientific political analysis of the social structure of the two countries. He was a firm believer in the need to unite all the patriotic forces of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde to combat Portuguese colonialism and imperialism in general. Given the weak class differentiation, this union of national forces should, in his view, have embraced all social strata, almost the whole population of the two territories, and the PAIGC's slogan was 'Unity and Struggle'. At the same time, Cabral considered it essential to make a thorough study of the economic positions of all social groups, in an attempt to find an explanation there for their political behaviour, realising that this could not be identical at different stages of the revolution. The economic foundation, the position in material production, and the development of the revolutionary process, which passes through two stages—the struggle for independence and the struggle for the liquidation of exploitation—these are the two main coordinates in Cabral's definition of his attitude to various social strata.[1]

Of particular interest in his analysis is his examination of the specific features of the social structure and revolutionary strategy in the most backward colonies and dependent countries. He rejects several of the conceptions common in some newly-free countries as a result of the exaggeration of national peculiarities, and takes up a position basically similar to scientific socialism.

This was particularly so in his definition of the revolutionary potential of the peasantry and working class. Cabral did not accept Frantz Fanon's idea that the peasantry was the main revolutionary force in the colonial world. He insisted on drawing a clear line between physical and revolutionary strength. Cabral knew better than anyone else that the peasantry constituted the main contingent of armed resistance to the colonialists, and that without drawing it into the struggle there was no hope of toppling colonialism. But he did not idealise the peasantry like Fanon, seeing that its backwardness hindered the spread of national and social political consciousness and knowing how difficult it sometimes was to raise the peasantry for action.

Cabral was convinced that the peasants' position prevented them from fully understanding the revolutionary prospect, and that to revolutionise them a catalyst was needed, in the form of guidance by townsmen bearing the progressive ideology. Cabral considered Fanon's assertion that the peasantry was essentially a colonial proletariat

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

mistaken for his country. This conclusion undoubtedly has methodological importance. It is particularly weighty and symbolical as it was made by a revolutionary, theorist and practical man from a purely peasant country, whose views were confirmed by the successes of the liberation movement.

Together with the idealisation of the peasantry, he rejected the associated nihilistic attitude of Fanon to the 'embryonic proletariat', which had supposedly become an adjunct of the colonial system and benefited from it. Noting the weakness of the colonial proletariat, Fanon counted it out as a revolutionary force. Cabral proposed raising the level of consciousness of the working class, bearing in mind its special historic mission. 'This working class,' he said, 'whatever the level of its political consciousness (given a certain minimum, namely *the awareness of its own class needs*), seems to constitute the true popular vanguard of the national liberation struggle in the neo-colonial case.'[1] At the same time he called on the working class to close ranks with the other exploited strata—the peasants and nationalist petty bourgeoisie.

The latter, given the weakness of the working class, had a special function. It should, according to Cabral, compensate for that class's inadequate experience and revolutionary activity, and take on itself the mission of the 'ideal proletariat'. He supposed that the revolutionary part of the petty bourgeoisie (the rest being the conciliatory and vacillating elements) was capable of playing this role and merging its interests with those of the workers and peasants. But he did not ignore its natural tendency to embourgeoisement, and realised how difficult and contradictory the petty-bourgeois revolutionaries' path to socialism was. Seeing no alternative at that stage, Cabral understood that 'this specific inevitability (the leadership of petty-bourgeois groups) in our situation constitutes one of the weaknesses of the national liberation movement'.[2]

This weakness, and in general the insufficient socio-economic and political premises for social progress, had to be, in Cabral's opinion, compensated for by increased ideological, political and organisational work. His concentration on this work was a distinctive feature of Cabral's activities at the head of the PAIGC. He constantly emphasised the political character of all the tasks carried out in the course of national liberation, including in particular in the armed struggle. It was precisely the combination of military activities with clearly defined long-term goals and ideological and political preparation that ensured complete success for the patriots of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, and laid the basis for social progress in the two countries.

Cabral never called himself a supporter of scientific socialism or Marxism-Leninism. But fidelity to the ideals of socialism is by no

[1] 'Revolution in Guinea. An African People's Struggle. Stage 1', *Selected Texts by Amilcar Cabral*, p. 86.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

means always measured by declarations. In his theoretical and practical work, he was guided by the principles of scientific socialism, and all his work for the happiness of his people was undoubtedly in accord with Marxism-Leninism.

'Whether one is a Marxist or not, a Leninist or not, it is difficult not to recognise the validity, not to see the brilliance of Lenin's analysis and conclusions,' said Cabral. 'They are of historical importance because they illuminate with a life-giving light the thorny path of peoples fighting for their total liberation from imperialist domination.'[1]

The life and work of Amilcar Cabral are vivid examples of the beneficial influence of scientific socialism on the national liberation movement. They show that the future belongs to those champions of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America who honestly and consistently unite the national liberation movement with socialism.

After 1963, I had occasion to meet Amilcar Cabral fairly often at international forums, conferences and seminars held by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation. This was when the armed liberation struggle of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies was at its height. This was a peak of the national revolutionary war against the colonisers. Cabral devoted all his heart, all his designs and all his outstanding abilities to this struggle. He was a frequent and welcome guest in the USSR, and he had very close relations with various Soviet mass organisations, especially the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Cabral had profound respect for and maintained friendly relations with the CPSU. Both publicly, and privately with his Soviet friends, he often expressed deep gratitude for the extensive help of the Soviet people to his heroic people, who for more than ten years fought against the Portuguese colonialists supported by the imperialist countries of NATO.

It was wonderful to see how boundless was his belief in the victory of his people and how often he dreamt of how after this victory, he, an agronomist, would fervently set about changing the countryside and educating the peasants. Cabral awakened their consciousness and led them in their struggle, and tens of thousands of peasants and poor people from the towns of Guinea joined the ranks of the liberation army, rightly declaring him to be their supreme commander.

Amilcar Cabral invited his Soviet friends to come to Guinea after its victory, and promised to show them all the country's natural beauty, the diligence and hospitality of its people, its customs, generosity and sincerity. He himself was not to see the victory which he had passionately awaited, for whose sake he had lived.

By writing this sketch of Cabral's life, I have expressed what I have wished to for a long time—my attitude to this outstanding man and most adamant fighter. In the pantheon of fighters who died for national and social liberation, stands the figure of Amilcar Cabral, a thinker and a passionate revolutionary convinced of the victory of his people.

[1] Amilcar Cabral, *Unité et lutte*, Vol. 1, *L'Arme de la théorie*, p. 315.



An Algerian political leader and sociologist.

Born on July 20, 1925 on the island of Martinique. A psychiatrist by profession, he received his education in France.

He lived in Algeria from 1951. When the national-democratic revolution began in Algeria in 1954, he joined the Algerian patriots and became a guerrilla. From 1958 he carried out various political and diplomatic missions for the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. During the last years of his life (he died in 1961), he was an Algerian diplomatic representative in Ghana.

Frantz Fanon was the author of works on the issues of the Algerian and Pan-African revolution. He supported decisive and merciless struggle against colonialism and imperialism, and upheld the idea of the exclusively peasant nature of the revolution in Algeria. Fanon had considerable influence on the formation of the ideology of the Algerian National Liberation Front.

The influence of the outstanding ideologist of the national liberation movement, Frantz Fanon, was felt not only in Algeria, for whose independence he fought all his life, but in the whole of Africa. To some extent this can be explained by Fanon's personal charisma, by his selfless service to the cause of liberating the colonial peoples and by his brilliant and passionate literary work, to which no one can be indifferent. Reading his most important work, *The Wretched of the Earth*, it is difficult not to feel sympathy towards this popular tribune of the anti-colonial struggle, even if one is basically in disagreement with some of his ideas. But the main secret of Fanon's popularity and the ongoing effect of his ideas lies in the fact that his works reflect historical reality, that he examined the most urgent problems of the anti-imperialist movement and tried, by interpreting the experience

of Algeria and other African countries, to resolve these problems to the advantage of the working masses.

He was not equally successful in everything he undertook, but on balance his activities were undoubtedly positive. Fanon was firmly on the side of the oppressed peoples determined to get rid of colonialism. He was one of the earliest representatives of national democracy in Africa and the Arab world, i.e., of that ideological and political trend in the anti-imperialist movement which combines militant anti-imperialism with anti-capitalism. Fanon's legacy clearly shows not only the positive sides of national democracy as a revolutionary trend within anti-imperialist nationalism, but also the contradictions inherent in it (even in its left-wing, revolutionary factions), especially at the early stages of the development of national democracy.

Personal liking and respect for Fanon should not get in the way of a critical, objective evaluation of his work. We cannot restrict ourselves to judging him only in the moral sphere; we must examine the real role played by Fanon's ideas in the liberation movement.

Among his greatest merits, mention should above all be made of his militant and consistent anti-imperialism. Fanon vividly exposed the essence of colonial supremacy as the systematic suppression of the masses in all areas of life: political, economic, cultural, etc. He argued for complete destruction of the system of imperialist exploitation, and the lawfulness of the oppressed using violence against the violence of the oppressors. He called for armed struggle as the most decisive method of struggle against colonialism.

Fanon was one of the first ideologists of the African national liberation movement to realise the historical narrowness of nationalism as a banner in the anti-imperialist struggle. He rejected the path which up to the end of Second World War was seen by bourgeois ideologists as infallible and absolute, the path whereby the anti-imperialist struggle would bring the national bourgeoisie to power and the declaration of political independence would mean the creation of conditions for the fast, smooth development of local capitalism. Fanon declared the capitalist path of development not only non-obligatory, but even impossible for the countries of Africa. He advocated that African capitalism should be avoided and that the hegemony of national capital, and the creation by its representatives of a political party claiming to lead the nation, should not be allowed. Fanon took the road foreseen by Lenin when he said that, having begun with anti-imperialism, the colonial peoples would then turn to the struggle against capitalism. Fanon realised the danger of selfishly narrow bourgeois nationalism and saw the guarantee of success for the anti-colonial struggle in its becoming enriched by social content, the ideas of social justice and equality, in its democratisation and internationalisation. He fought for a national consciousness that did not slip into nationalism and chauvinism, which he opposed.

Characteristically, Fanon did not advance socialist slogans, and this was where his weakness lay, since it was a matter of Algeria, a relative-

ly developed country in the economic sense. In this, he was influenced by various considerations: perhaps he was not enraptured by what was already beginning to take place under the banner of socialism in several other African countries; he also wrongly assumed that recognition of socialism meant adopting ideas and experience supposedly foreign to Africa, believing that the continent should work out its own ideals. But behind all this lay a vague awareness that most African peoples were not ready to set about building socialism directly, an awareness of the need for some intermediate stage, when bourgeois nationalism would be ousted by a national consciousness dominated by the interests of the working people, and a limit would be set to the selfish claims of the exploiting elements.

One of Fanon's merits was his criticism, from a revolutionary democratic point of view, of bourgeois and bureaucratic trends in the young African states. In certain cases Fanon approached this question one-sidedly and too categorically (a characteristic tendency of his). For example, he objected in principle to a one-party system in Africa, considering it the simplest and most overt form of bourgeois dictatorship, and thereby excluded the possibility of using the one-party system in the interests of the revolutionary forces. But on the whole, his criticism of bureaucratic degeneration, of the use of mass organisations as a screen for one-man power, of corruption, of bourgeois accumulation, money-grubbing, hypocrisy, etc., and his negation of the theory of 'guardianship' over the popular masses, focussed attention to the real vices in the government of the young African states, vices which flourished under the conditions of post-colonialism and which unfortunately affected not only reactionary and reformist regimes, but also, and sometimes to a substantial extent, progressive, revolutionary ones. Fanon's concept of a democracy designed to preserve and develop the political activity and independent action of the masses as it takes shape during the anti-imperialist struggle, deserves to be studied closely and put into practice.

The weak points in Fanon's platform are inseparably linked to the lack of a dialectical approach to social phenomena. Fanon came very close to Marxism, but was not a Marxist; he was neither a materialist nor a dialectician, but a metaphysician.

Fanon warmly welcomed revolutionary violence by the oppressed in the form of armed struggle, and this would seem to be his strong point. But he absolutised armed methods, declaring them to be the only means of achieving true independence, and this led to significant miscalculations.

A politically conscious revolutionary eventually chooses armed struggle after careful analysis of the political situation, of the correlation of class and political forces, the moods of the masses and the possibilities of open resistance. For Fanon, however, violence was not the fruit of consideration and conscious choice, but was felt intuitively, conditioned not so much by socio-political factors as by

socio-psychological, anthropological or even psycho-physiological factors. It was an instinctive, spontaneous act, rather than the result of carefully selecting the best means of revolutionary struggle in the given situation.

Fanon also absolutised violence in another sense. It was, for him, not only a method, not even the only method. Violence as such was declared valuable and equated with revolution: Fanon expected it to bring about both the spiritual and political emancipation of the masses and guarantees against those bureaucratic distortions of the party and state system which he so perceptively noted in the young states. It need hardly be proved that in itself armed struggle, in any form and on any scale, cannot guarantee all that, and that its success in maintaining a revolutionary and democratic regime depends on the political situation and the level of political awareness, steadfastness and activity of the masses, even when they are waging an armed struggle. Armed struggle is not an aim in itself, far less a panacea for counter-revolution and reaction. It would seem that the experience of Algeria—which Fanon was not destined to observe—also substantiates this.

Fanon did not contrast open armed methods with political methods, as certain ideologists of guerrilla warfare in Latin America did after him, in the mid-sixties. But he too did underestimate political work, and was bound to, due to his overrating of violence.

Fanon's reduction of all revolutionary methods to armed action also left its mark on his conception of the motive forces of the revolutionary process and of the alignment of class forces in the struggle for independence.

When the anti-imperialist movement takes the form of guerrilla or popular war, it necessarily becomes concentrated in rural areas and relies on the peasantry. This must be the case since, according to the ideologists of guerrilla warfare, towns are the fortified centres of colonial rule. It is there that its repressive power is concentrated, so that guerrilla resistance cannot even start up in the towns. The liberation of the towns comes as the culmination of the war, as a rule. This was the case in Algeria, Vietnam, the former Portuguese colonies, and wherever the guerrilla movement turned into a popular liberation war and won. In all cases, the guerrilla war gathered momentum in rural areas, and the main contingent of insurgent detachments consisted of peasants. The guerrilla movement would have been doomed to failure if it had not had the support of the peasantry. This is precisely what happened in the latter half of the sixties in several Latin American countries.

The peasantry constituted by far the largest share of the population in colonial and dependent countries. And Fanon was undoubtedly right in saying that a great deal depends on the peasantry's position. But this still does not solve the problem of the peasantry's revolutionary potential, of what it is that activates them, or of what can guarantee that they behave in a consistently revolutionary fashion:

whether this guarantee lies in the actual position and psychology of the peasantry, or it should be introduced from without and backed up by a close alliance with the consistently revolutionary forces of the town, above all with the working class.

In solving these questions, Fanon did not rise above the level of narrow empiricism. The support given to the resistance war by millions of metayers, Algerian peasants and labourers led him to make the conclusion about the revolutionary character of the whole peasantry, and in every country at that.

Fanon's evaluation of the revolutionary potential of the peasantry contains three basic faults.

1. His recognition of the revolutionariness of the peasantry goes hand in hand with his denial of the revolutionary potential of the colonial working class. In Fanon's opinion, the view of the European proletariat as the main revolutionary force is not applicable to colonial society, where the working class belongs to the privileged strata, profiting from the colonial regime. The true proletariat in the colonies, that class which according to Fanon has nothing to lose, is the peasantry alone. The colonial working class is neither a revolutionary nor a national force—these qualities are possessed only by the peasantry.

To a certain extent this position was determined by the trade-unionist tendencies in the top crust of the colonial proletariat and by the scornful attitude towards the role of the peasantry in the revolutionary process which was prevalent among those intellectuals in the colonial countries who had yielded to the temptation of modelling their scheme of the revolutionary movement in the colonies on that in the developed industrial nations. But whatever Fanon's motives may have been, nothing can justify his nihilistic approach to the working class in the colonies as a whole. He proposed an artificial, illusory alternative—either the proletariat or the peasantry—whereas the interests of the revolution and progress demanded the combination of the revolutionary activity of both, and demanded not only the alliance of the proletariat and peasantry, but also recognition of the guiding importance of the ideology of the proletariat.

Fanon's ideas were fraught with contradictions. He sometimes noted the danger of 'opposing' town and country, but many of his own ideas were objectively directed against an alliance between the working class and the peasantry.

Fanon did not assert that the peasantry should create a fighting vanguard from its own numbers. He proposed that this role should be assumed by the 'revolutionary minority' at the head of the peasantry. What would be the class character of this minority? Fanon answers this by the process of elimination. He is categorically against the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, but neither does he hide his disapproval of the hegemony of the working class. So what is left? The petty-bourgeois position of the intermediate strata? But how long can such a position hold out between the poles of bourgeoisie and

proletariat, against imperialism?

When Fanon speaks of the 'revolutionary minority', he shows his understanding of the fact that the essential characteristic of this minority is not its class origin, but its class essence. And this is true. But if this is the case, why does he exclude the possibility that this minority can take up the position of the 'ideal proletariat'—not that proletariat which picks up the crumbs from the table of the colonial lords, but that which is conscious of its historical role? Surely the vanguard of the peasantry—as in Russia—could accept its platform? Was this not what happened in Vietnam, where both the Party and army were mainly made up of peasants, but were proletarian in ideology? Was it not this path which was proposed and successfully realised by Amilcar Cabral, from whom we have the term 'ideal proletariat', whose functions, in his opinion, were to be performed by intellectuals? Fanon did not pose these questions and rejected the very possibility of such a solution.

2. Fanon's approach to the motive forces of the revolution was anti-historical. He disengaged himself from its stages, defining its motive forces once and for all. Yet Fanon was aware of the restricted nature of nationalism and advocated an anti-capitalist future. Can the driving forces be exactly the same during the struggle for independence as during the stage of anti-capitalist development? Will not certain changes and regroupings take place in them, will the positions of the working class and peasantry not alter? Fanon did not consider this. After him, this was done by other ideologists of national democracy. As early as 1964, in *Consciencism*, Nkrumah spoke of the constant changes within the framework of the 'positive action', and Cabral in the sixties raised the question of the revolutionary potential of each class in relations, first, to national independence and, second, to socialism.

3. Fanon's third mistake in defining the driving forces of the revolution is linked to the question of the stages of the revolutionary movement. He did not discern the class differentiation of the peasantry, regarding it as a homogeneous social group with a unified position. Cabral analysed the stratification of rural society in the extremely backward 'Portuguese' Guinea and emphasised that it affected the attitude of the peasantry to the struggle for independence. In the Algerian countryside the processes of differentiation were certainly more mature, and absolutely essential for defining the revolutionary potential of the peasantry both at the stage of the independence struggle and—especially—at the stage of anti-capitalist development.

It has already been noted that Fanon was one of those ideologists who understood the narrowness of the nationalist platform and were attracted towards internationalism and anti-capitalism, but the 'birthmarks' of nationalism remain in his legacy. In both instances he shares the fate of national democracy as a whole. Nationalistic flaws can be seen in Fanon in two directions. He did not understand the class

character of colonial supremacy. For him it was ethnic rather than class contradictions that were concentrated in colonialism; hence every Frenchman in Algeria was an oppressor.

The second aspect of Fanon's nationalist tendencies is also linked to this. He did not devote enough attention to the question of the liberation movement joining forces with the democratic forces and the working class of the metropolis. In a wider sense, although Fanon appreciated the help rendered by the socialist countries, he did not examine the influence of the experience of the socialist countries, of the international communist movement, on the fate of colonial peoples. To some extent this was encouraged by his conviction of the need to seek his own, unique paths, by his constant fear of adopting the ideas of others, and by the hopes he set on a 'union of the downtrodden'.

Such in very general terms were the strong and weak points in Fanon's thinking. We have already said that during his lifetime the strong points definitely predominated. Fanon has gone down in history as a convinced and uncompromising opponent of imperialism and fighter for a brighter future for the working people of Africa.

His ideas continue to live, so that they must now be approached from two stances—the position of his own time and that of today. That which may have been justified in the given conditions at the end of the fifties cannot be acceptable at the beginning of the eighties. The development of the revolutionary process modifies the evaluation of ideological trends when they do not keep in step with the times.

Fanon can be reproached for the fact that his historical horizons were not particularly broad, that he relied basically on the experience of Algeria, and his theoretical thinking could not often rise above that experience. Looking back at the state of affairs in the fifties, much of Fanon's work can be understood and explained by the situation in his country or even by his personal experiences. Thus, as has been noted, his over-reliance on violence was to a certain extent conditioned by the desire of the intellectual and individualist, isolated from the people, to join his fate with theirs. From this point of view, the insurgent army as opposed to the city office seemed like an ideal place But in politics, to understand everything is not to forgive everything especially when there is the tendency to continue making the mistakes of the fifties and sixties in the seventies and eighties.

Today we must evaluate Fanon from the vantage of the experience of revolutionary struggle which we have witnessed but which Fanon was not destined to see. At the new stage, the stage of socialist perspective, Fanon's mistakes take on more weight and are fraught with great dangers for the progressive forces. Not only the revolutionary practice but also the revolutionary theory in the countries of Africa has made great progress. The main amendments made by the African national democrats in their analysis of the alignment of class forces have already been mentioned. Basic changes have taken place in

the attitude of revolutionary democrats to the universal laws of historical development, to Marxism-Leninism, to overcoming national prejudices. The absolute faith in armed struggle may be regarded to a considerable extent as a thing of the past, on the international scale. This was the case both in Vietnam and in the former Portuguese colonies. In the mid-seventies, many supporters of guerrilla warfare as the only means were made to change their minds under the influence of history (R. Debray, Gerard Chaliand). In some cases (Chaliand) this led to utter scepticism with regard to the possibility of revolutionary development in former colonies and dependencies, in others (Debray) to a more serious attitude towards several old, but eternal truths of Marxism-Leninism.

Fanon could not amend *The Wretched of the Earth* according to the dictates of time. But, proceeding from the general trend of his doctrine, we may assume how Fanon's views could have evolved today, when we evaluate attempts to present them as the ideal revolutionary theory for the present day, or to use the name and ideas of this outstanding fighter and theoretician in order to maintain the prestige of essentially reactionary, pseudo-revolutionary, left-extremist groups.

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









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