

**AN
EXPLOSIVE
DOCUMENT**

7 NOV 1972

**ANGOLA:
THE LONG-STANDING
TREACHERY
OF U.N.I.T.A.**

From Caetano to Spínola, JONAS MALHEIRO SAVIMBI, leader of U.N.I.T.A. have been — and still is — a faithful agent of Portuguese colonialism

(Translated from AFRIQUE-ASIE, N° 61, 8-21 July 1974).

THE LONG-STANDING TREACHERY OF U.N.I.T.A.

On 17 June, a ceasefire was reached between the UNIAO NACIONAL PARA A INDEPENDENCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA (U.N.I.T.A.) and the Portuguese army in order to "create a favourable climate for a political dialogue with a view to restoring peace". Amazing, when at the same time the MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC made the cessation of fighting dependent on recognition of the independence of the "overseas Portuguese provinces".

Less surprising, on the other hand, was the fact that UNITA and its President Jonas Savimbi, suddenly found themselves being crowned with laurel wreaths by the General Staff of the Portuguese forces. The Commander-in-Chief stated in Luanda: "Of the three liberation movements, UNITA, at least recently, has been the one that has put up the most vigorous resistance to us in the East." (1) Another officer said: "The results of the talks between Savimbi and the Commander-in-Chief of Luanda are being studied by the Portuguese Government." (2) Spínola, who "received with great pleasure the letter sent to him by the leader of UNITA", may have found the "trust" he needed to "leave the knives in the cloakroom" and put an end to the fighting between the TURRAS (3) and TUGAS (4). In point of fact, this is not the first time that Jonas Savimbi has got himself talked about.

The OAU Assembly of Head of State was held in Cairo in July 1964. Holden Roberto, President of GRAE (5), was there accused, with supporting evidence, of "collusion with American imperialists". Who was his accuser? Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, "minister for foreign affairs", GRAE's left wing and Holden's right-hand man. He cited names and irrefutable facts proving that the FNLA had been infiltrated to the core by the CIA.

Was this "assimilado" from Bié, who had been through the universities of Lisbon and Lausanne and come out with a degree in political science and law, going to join the MPLA, which he had none too insistently contacted in 1960? No. On 12 December 1964, with about twenty of his confederates, he issued a "Manifesto of the Friends of Angola" (AMANGOLA), in which he proclaimed his desire "to cooperate sincerely with all politico-military bodies of Angolan patriots both inside and outside the country", since "a good Angolan never kills another Angolan".

Advocating active struggle "to isolate Portugal in the world", and denouncing "any collaboration with Portuguese colonialism", AMANGOLA asserted that it wanted to "prepare the country to (...) forge a permanent spirit of struggle, as the sole guarantee of the establishment of a PEOPLE'S POWER after the DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION". It was putting out feelers. On 13 May 1966, in the centre of Moxico, Savimbi created his own movement — UNITA. But the red buds of AMANGOLA speech burgeoned and were embellished with Chinese petals. The word of Savimbi were coloured by the thought of Mao-Tsé-toung. "Relying on one's forces", "people's war", "internal contradictions", "the correct solution". The charter issued at the close of the August 1973 Congress was no more than selected passages from the Little Red Book. The Programme "was also ambitious, describing in broad outline the features of a state worthy of "the finest revolutionary traditions of a peoples democracy".

Text after text, one lampoon and manifesto after another, the flamboyant ideological architecture showed two dominant emphases which were as contradictory as they were peremptory: an obsessive dissociation from other liberation movements in terms of theory coupled with a plea for the unity flaunted by the organisation's name.

Was UNITA then the most revolutionary experience of Angolan nationalism? The question was asked... and it was asked of us. Why were we suspicious when many committed publications throughout the world were carrying Savimbi's stirring prose? When some anti-imperialist governments were helping it both vocally and financially? Today we are in a position to provide proof that they were mistaken and to let our readers judge for themselves. Two conclusions can be drawn from the four uncontested letters we were able to obtain after 25 Abril and which we publish below.

1. The new Portuguese regime, despite the statements of some and the promises of others, is tossing from the colonial dice-box the dice already shaken by its fascist predecessors: by making much ado about a fictitious ceasefire, it is reactivating UNITA.
2. Its president, Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, has at least since 1972 been an agent of the Portuguese and their policy, regardless of the ups and downs of that policy. The manner in which he has toed their line is obvious. At the time when the letters were written, he echoed Marcello Caetano's repressive plan which General Cunha was entrusted with carrying out. He then supported the theories of "social advancement" and "integration" for the population. The MPLA then became Enemy Number One, and UNITA's chief task was to try to destroy it.

He concluded his speech at the August 1973 Congress with the following words: "If this war ends in victory for the Angolan forces, it will lead to the total annihilation of the structures established in our country by the Portuguese. If the conflict ends in compromise, it will leave behind the seeds from which neo-colonialism will grow. Therefore, in order (...) to build a different and better society, Angolans must inflict a real defeat on the colonial army and the conflict must end in the total rout of Portuguese colonialism." Yet in a letter dated 9 June, Savimbi identified himself with Spínola's scheme (6). "UNITA favours a period during which the Angolan people may be prepared for democracy. It is therefore essential that the liberation movements take part in a campaign to educate the people with a view of ending the war!" (7) "It is very easy to speak of immediate independence for Angola, but on nature reflection about the problems that beset the birth of a state and, what is more, when that state bears the name of Angola, there is every reason to be cautious." (8) This is what doubtless convinced him that "the process of decolonisation in Angola, if it is to be genuine, must be made the sole responsibility of the Portuguese government..." (8).

IS TREACHERY TOO STRONG WORD?

JACK BOURDIERE

FOOTNOTES

- (1) "Diario de Noticias" 27 June 1974.
- (2) "O Seculo" 27 June 1974
- (3) Terrorists in Portuguese military terminology.
- (4) Term used by the guerrillas to denote Portuguese soldiers.
- (5) "Angolan Revolutionary Government in exile", created in Leopoldville on 5 April 1962.
- (6) The scheme which Silvino Silverio Marques has now been entrusted with implementing. Indeed with whom did Jonas Savimbi reach a ceasefire if not with this former colonel and governor of Angola of the 1960s? Having links with Kaulza de Arriaga, suspected after 25 April of planning a right-wing counter-coup, arrested and then released, he has once again been appointed governor of Angola. Could one imagine any more perfect example of "change in continuity"?
- (7) Cf. Franco Pinheiro, Commander-in-Chief of Portuguese forces in Angola. In order to make it easier for members of the liberation movements to come out into the open, all military operations which might endanger their lives have been suspended." (Luanda, "O Comercio", 18 May 1974), and Antonio de Spínola in his speech of 11 June 1974.
- (8) Letter to Carlos Pereira Mendes, correspondent in Luso of Provincia de Angola" published on 13 June 1974.

DOCUMENT "A"

LETTER FROM

JONAS SAVIMBI

TO GENERAL LUZ CUNHA

26TH SEPTEMBER 1972

Memorandum addressed to His Excellency General Luz Cunha (1), Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in Angola, for the attention of His Excellency General Bettancourt Rodrigues (2), Commander of the Eastern Military Area.

Your Excellencies,

Before entering into considerations of a practical nature, and continuing the contacts which we maintain, I would like Your Excellencies to transmit my deepest respects on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the coming to power of His Excellency Professor Marcello Caetano, President of the Council of Ministers. I would also like to take this opportunity to send my congratulations to General Luz Cunha on the nomination to the high responsibility of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in Angola.

The difficulties of the clandestine struggle, the reality of life in Angola and the perspectives of a fair solution to the problems that afflict the people of our country allow me to imagine the final result of what is happening in Angola.

How ever long it may take to achieve a final solution, we are certain that the authorities are already in a victorious position, because of the enormous means at their disposal (...), the police of "renovation in the continuity" practised by the Government (...).

So far as we are concerned, we want a decisive end to the war in the Eastern Region. We have done all that is in our power to weaken the strength of the common enemy (...).

Our analysis lead to name MPLA as the main obstacle to peace, not only in the East, but in the whole territory of Angola. First hand information which we have at our disposal leads us to believe that MPLA is preparing further ambushes and operations against the Armed Forces, against UNITA, and that it intends to dislodge UPA (3) from Zaire (...) by means of unification manoeuvres between MPLA and UPA.

Zaire knows that MPLA, as well as dislodging it UPA protegés from the Angolan border areas, will also shortly begin subversion against the Kinshasa regime itself. President Mobutu's discretion is based on two factors:

a) the position that Americans may take faced with this unification manoeuvre of MPLA and UPA, but history has shown often enough that American policies are very inconsistent, they always act late and only when their interests are involved. In the fast and loose which exists between the great powers and the OAU, nobody can be sure that the United States won't, once again, make calculating error with respect to the African problem.

b) the political mistakes that, through ambition, General Mobutus risks making in Zaire, that will be not favoured by his army, errors that are fatal for the weak regimes of our independent Africa.

The Rabat OAU Conference, on 11th June 1972, and that in Dar es Salaam on 10th September 1972, continued to put pressure on Zaire to accept MPLA in Kinshasa, using the same manoeuvres of unification of the two movements.

We know very well that there are great differences between MPLA and UPA, but on the other hand UPA is just looking for new support within the OAU to end its isolation over the past five years. The diplomatic strength of MPLA is greater than that of UPA (...) and we can see that has happened in UNESCO for Angola, as well as in the UN, where there are new developments foreseen to have the liberation movements accepted as observers in the world

organisation. This inconvenient situation results from the official recognition of relations between the UN and the OAU. Thus one can understand how a UN delegation could be in Guinea (Bissau) (4). And this manoeuvre will not stop there, for the same commission proposes to visit the areas liberated by MPLA and PRE-LIMO.

The Dar es Salaam Conference has ratified the assignement of parts of countries neighbouring Angola, Mozambique and Guinea for the liberation movements to be able to operate freely and set up their administrative bodies, such as: hospitals, schools, and training camps. This resolution, proposed by Zambia and Tanzania, is within the context of the policy adopted by the Zambian Government to evacuate the border areas of Angola, Mozambique and Catema Mulilo announced on 18 August 1972.

UNITA continues with its cells of activists in Zambia in spite of the hostile attitude of the government surrounding them. They don't even enjoy simple tolerance. But we have support amongst the population, who give us information about MPLA's activities in Zambia, about their plans against us inside the country, and even the plans of Mr. Kaunda, who in 1970, participated with MPLA in making plans to liquidate UNITA in Angola. These plans having failed, Kaunda resort to forbidding any members of UNITA from living in, or passing through, the Republic of Zambia (...). Meanwhile we are trying to strengthen further the work of our activists in Zambia, since it would be unreasonable for us to carry out a defensive war without information about MPLA.

The latest manoeuvre of MPLA and Zambia, trying to find a solution in the East, which is so necessary for them, was to suddenly send us a journalist named Josephat Kachoto (...). We received Kachoto in the best possible way (...). Before this visit we already had the intention of weakning MPLA, inside, with heavy blows and also undermining its authority abroad so that evryone would begin to question the existence of the movement. We could not go very far because we don't have much material means. But (...) often the best plans are those which involve a dozen daring men who carry out great things.

We suspect Kachoto of being a member of the Zambian CID (5), but (...) he allowed us to obtain valuable information about the political situation in Zambia. If he is not too intelligent, nor too incapable, he will be useful as a spearhead, be it for the government, be it for ourselves to penetrate where we have not been able to up till now. He came to sound out our position regarding an eventual front with MPLA. The most interesting thing is that the same Kachoto never once mentioned the name of UPA, nor spoke of any alliance between these two movements may have in Brazzaville or Rabat (6).

Our position is unchangeable. We are not the least interested in the OAU, nor in the present Zambia, much less in any alliance with MPLA. If certain aspects of UNITA's policy are still not clear to the governmental authorities of Angola and the Nation, there is one irrefutable fact: we have actively participated in the weakning of MPLA in certain areas of the East (7).

We cannot indulge in any kind of illusion about any type of alliance with the men whom we have fought and are fighting unceasingly now. Whatever may be the intentions of the government (...) we would not entertain the idea of taking up arms against the authorities. We use them so that MPLA may be forced one day to abandon the East (...).

In our opinion, peace in the East means taking into account the following factors:

a) Weakening the MPLA forces inside Angola to the point of liquidating them. This task can be fulfilled by the combined efforts of the military and militarised forces and the UNITA forces.

b) Liquidating the MPLA camps in the regions on the border between Angola and Zambia. This can be more easily achieved by UNITA, since we do not have a political status such as would make it possible to open any legal dispute within an international body... Our plans have already gone beyond the planning stage (...).

c) Discreting the MPLA (...) we are thus aiming at the OAU itself, at least as far as the liberation movements are concerned. The weakening or liquidation of the MPLA in the East will pave the way towards broader horizons for us.

We are infinitely grateful to you for the Portuguese Government's unofficial note of 4 July 1972. UNITA will try to reach an agreement with the Mexico authorities to facilitate the transit of people between the UNITA regions and the posts, without any undue risks to the population. With a document recognised by both parties, those turned back to the posts (8) will be able to come and fetch their food left in the forest, so long as they have committed no reprehensible acts during their stay in the forest (...).

To this day I maintain my philosophy, which is that the mass surrender of our population and its leaders can be only a partial aspect of the solution to the problems seriously affecting peace in Angola. In my opinion, the existence of a force that can combat those who are causing us all these horrors at every level, without any restrictions imposed by international conventions, might in the long run become a very useful factor for the government of the nation. Our intelligence network abroad is very wide and we can still make use of this apparatus to ensure that the struggle against the MPLA is waged not only arms in hand, but also at the diplomatic level where all its support and all the mystification comes. I should very much like this aspect to be carefully studied by the local and national authorities, in order to see to what extent our efforts can be of public use (...).

There is no better way to fight a subtle enemy like the MPLA supported by a whole range of influences, than to gain a better knowledge of the enemy and of the sources of their strength from where it stems. No one will be better placed than ourselves to know what 80% certainly what is going on in the OAU, in Zambia, Tanzania and MPLA, once all UNITA members will have returned to our posts. Taty (9), Rafael Barbosa (10), Okavandama (11) and others others have made a valuable contribution to destroying the myth of liberation movement leaders. But subversion on our borders is continuing. Peace has not as yet resorted (...).

The powers covet Angola's resources and its choice strategic geographical positions (and) they are waiting for the Angolan situation to ripen in terms of its deterioration (...). We can hasten that ripening process within the liberation movements and within their leadership (...). Although I have dwelt at length on the MPLA, we cannot fail to recognise that it is no longer the seven-headed hydra that we cannot fight. If I have not much to say about UPA, it is because I do not believe that UPA has any future that would make it a serious enemy in the present juncture. Furthermore, the information we have on UPA is more fragmentary, since it is only through Katanga that we can get any more less reliable information (...).

In view of the above, UNITA requests of Your Excellencies provisional permission to use the corridor between the Lufuta-Luanguinga and Luanguinga-Luvo rivers. The authorities know that we have a mobile force on the banks of the Luanguinga, near the Zambian border. This was the force that attacked the MPLA, in April and May, and drove those people out of Lutembo. But these forces run the risk of being attacked by the Lutembo militia (12). They have instructions never to answer fire of the militia in the event of an unexpected encounter, but on the contrary to withdraw as rapidly as possible and to have me warned.

The MPLA bases we have located are as follows:

1. Mushukula, with 20 guerrillas armed with carbines and PPxes (13) and a light machine-gun; Lioko, with 15 men armed with PPxes and a light machine-gun; Muanamunguela, with 10 permanent elements armed carbines, Chinese machine-guns and a rocket launcher (this camp has on many occasions sheltered more than 30 men) when they plan an operation against UNITA or the reinforcement of their areas in Quembo (...). It is also there that "Angola Livre" (14), who in Zambia travels between Cassamba and Nguvu bases, is always to be found.

2. There are other camps at Nguvu, with 20 guerrillas armed with PPxes, PMs and hand-grenades. This camp also has a field hospital in the charge of Dr. Eduardo dos Santos; Litapi, with a total strength of between 10 and 15 elements armed mainly with Mausers and PMs. This camp has the job of establishing liaison with Cassamba, Chavuma and Balovale.

On the Kalabo line, near the Cuando-Cubango border, there are several camps. The best known is Shikongo, which has at least 50 elements armed with the MPLA's usual types of weapon, a military instructor, a doctor and several nurses, a political commissar and three teachers. There a school is to be built with Danish help. Three of our soldiers, captured at Kalabo, were put there for training, but they ran away from Shikongo with their weapons on 5 September, and are now on the way to my base. But it was they who supplied this information, in addition to which we were able to send some of our men to Shikongo, disguised as MPLA members, to attend meetings held by Daniel Chipenda or another MPLA leader. Chipenda has already left Shikongo, but a mulatto has arrived there who, according to the description, must be Carreira or Jorge, but who is known as "Diaquite".

Along the route Mongu-Senanga there are two camps known as Nangweshi and Sangombo (...).

The operations we carried out against MPLA forces have been the greatest success. Our forces acting in the Quembo area between the Cassingo and Micoeso rivers, between 28 July 1972 and the 15 August have achieved the following results (...):

(Here follows a list of operations "carried out against MPLA, and the arms and ammunition captured in these combats or discovered in stocks. After this account he continues.)

Regarding the region mentioned in your letter of the 16 September 1972, ref. 2851/2, a group of 50 men went there to find out what was happening in that UNITA area, already occupied, on my instruction, by our men. I have not yet received information about this subject.

Regarding the providing of guides, our position remains the same. We are prepared to provide them as soon as a camp is certainly localised. The difficult may arise that the enemy discovers the tracks of our men as they return. We have therefore adopted the method of sending a group with an attacking mission as soon as the camp is found. We think that would make the guided mission easier would be joint action between your troops and ours in a carefully preselected area. The problem would have to be studied with our delegation so that we can immediately find way to put into practice such an operation.

As well as I have already explained about sending a group to the Munhango river region, I would be pleased to obtain permission to send patrol to the North and South of the CFB (15) in the region between Cangumbe, Kachipoque and Salenu, so as to track down possible movements of UPA, and in the future stop UPA elements from committing further acts of sabotage which may be attributed to UNITA (...). We expect to set up an armed group on the other side of the Mucanda river near to Cangumbe so as to hinder UPA (...) in its attacks on forces stationed at Cangumbe and on the wood traders, which would put our correspondance in danger (...).

Referring to your letter of the 20 July 1972, ref. 1457/2 we must come to the carrying out the first phases of support that the national authorities can give to UNITA. On a trial bases, we would like to receive:

(Savimbi sets out a list of seeds, livestock, that "could be sent on loan" of detailed school material, medical material and medicines.)

When we have sick people who need more specialised medicine, we will send them to the Cangumbe region through our friends, the wood traders, to Luso so that they can receive attention in the region.

If I have forgotten other points, please mention them to our delegation.

I would like to add to this memorandum, in which I have been as truthful as possible, a request of a very special nature. I request Your Excellencies to furnish me with 1.500 bullets cal. 7.62, since our actions against MPLA and UPA always take place with arms of this calibre. Please pay particular attention to this request as we never use ammunitions against nationals. My request for grenades is cancelled as we still have enough for some

time.

So far as camouflage is concerned, we have asked the wood traders for another cloth according to your recommendation. But I request you to send, if possible, two camouflage suit in good and genuine camouflage, one for me and one for Puna (16).

I forgot to mention the possibility of a consignment of fishing nets and fishing hooks of all sizes so as to exploit the possibilities of the Lungue-Bungo river. The hooks should be big and thick, because, at this time of year there are only big fish in this season. And I hope that we shall also be sent syringes with the medicines (...).

Please, accept, Your Excellencies the assurances of my high consideration.

Lungue-Bungo, 26 September 1972,

JONAS MALHEIRO SAVIMBI,
Bachelor of Political Science and
Law, University of Lausanne,
President of UNITA.

FOOTNOTES

- (1) Commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Angola. When general COSTA GOMES and SPINOLA were dismissed by CAETANO on 14 March 1974, he became Chief of Staff of the Portuguese army. Linked with the right-wing scheme against the CAETANO regime through his brother-in-law, general KAULZA DE ARRIAGA. Suspended after 25 April.
- (2) This was general BETTANCOURT RODRIGUES, who replaced SPINOLA as governor-general of Guinea-Bissau and was relieved of his duties on 29 April 1974.
- (3) HOLDEN ROBERTO's 'Uniao das Populacoes de Angola'.
- (4) The visit indeed took place in 1972.
- (5) Zambian security service.
- (6) An agreement finally signed in Kinshasa on 13 September 1972.
- (7) This has been confirmed by the MPLA which, since the opening of the Eastern Front, has accused UNITA of allying itself with the Portuguese to fight the MPLA.
- (8) A Portuguese post.
- (9) ALEXANDRE TATY, "minister of armaments" in HOLDEN ROBERTO's GRAE. Recruited by the PIDE, he organised an abortive coup d'etat against HOLDEN ROBERTO and then went over to the Portuguese camp and was used by them against MPLA in Cabinda.
- 11 (10) Former President of the PAIGC, who was won over to Portugal's neo-colonial strategy and took part in the SPINOLA plan for the assassination of AMILCAR CABRAL.
- (11) LAZARO NKAVANDAME, a dissident member of FRELIMO who, after trying to push through his schemes of ethnic separatism, rallied to the Portuguese.
- (12) Local forces trained and armed by the Portuguese.
- (13) Soviet automatic weapons.
- (14) Guerrilla name of an MPLA commander in charge of a squadron entrusted with combating UNITA, who rallied to the Portuguese after 1972.
- (15) CAMINHO DE FERRO DE BENGUELA, Benguela Railway.
- TN (16) MIGUEL PUNA ZAU, General Secretary of UNITA. On 28 May 1974 he gave a Press Conference in the Intercontinental Hotel, Lusaka, accompanied by SAMUEL CHIWALA, Commander of UNITA forces, JORGE SANGUMBA, ANTONIO VAKULUKUTA and AERNANDES FWANHINY, members of the UNITA Central Committee.

DOCUMENT B

LETTER ADDRESSED TO

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL RAMIRES DE OLIVEIRA

BY JONAS SAVIMBI

On 25 October 1972

Mr. Armenio Nuno Ramires de Oliveira,
Lieutenant-Colonel of the C.E.M. (1)
Chief of Staff of the Eastern Military Zone,

LUSO

A few days ago, I asked our Captain Clemente to send a note to thank you for the 7.62 cal. ammunition and also to express our satisfaction at seeing that each meeting is bringing us closer to the major objectives we all wish to achieve (...).

An operation was already carried out against the UPA men on 12 October 1972 (...).

As soon as the camp mentioned in the two notes you so kindly sent me was located, we noted that the UPA men had moved. So as to waste no more time, our combat group pursued them. The clash took place at Suta, near a stream called Imonomono, a tributary of the Cassai river.

This happened in Zone 1.

On 13 October 1972, our forces carried out an operation against the MPLA men. A group comprising 20 men, 17 of them armed, had infiltrated into our regions without being noticed by us. Having perpetrated their usual acts, they withdrew towards Quembo. This was why I did not have time to inform the Command of the Eastern Military Zone. Our men therefore had to pursue the enemy as far as Cassingo. As soon as we found them, in the midst of a "makopo" dance, they were violently attacked (...). Our men secured information that there were other enemy camps in that same region, near the Carilongue and Luels rivers, and at Chissimba. Each of the camps indicated has no more than 20 guerillas. This why we are asking Your Excellency the General in command of the Eastern Military Zone for permission to operate in Zones 2 and 3, as from 5 November 1972, for a maximum period of one month or until the action can be carried through. Our forces will withdraw immediately afterwards.

A few months ago we captured an MG machine-gun, 7.92 cal., from the UPA men (...). I should like to see whether it could be sent to you for repair, since it would be very useful to us.

I also wish to remind you that I have made an urgent request, through our Captain Clemente, that you hand over to us an individual named Baptista Sassala, whose brother is Mr. Oliveira's foreman. This individual is involved in the setting up of UPA cells in UNITA regions (...). Some of his accomplices have already been arrested, but we have not been able to take action because everyone accuses Sassala of being the person in charge of operations and hence the only person who knows the others. We guarantee that we shall return this man if the authorities so desire.

I have in my possession an OAU document which I regard as extremely important. I have just received it. The document deals, more precisely, with the supply of arms to the MPLA and other movements operating in the Portuguese territories: quality, quantity, finance, transport facilities, etc. I think it is useful in so far as it reflects the spirit that reigned at the last meeting of African Head of States, in Rabat last June (2). As soon as I have finished studying it, I shall send it on through the usual channels (...) since it would be a pity if a document of such importance were lost.

As for the possibility of our meeting, I have always been ready to meet more authoritative people, so as to have personal talks about what I think and about the position of local and national authorities regarding what we are doing (...). But such a meeting would need to be prepared by our delega-

tion, until we reach minimum agreement as to the place, date, procedure, the agenda to be discussed and the persons who would take part. This is another item we should discuss at the next meeting. If any event, I think that the next time our delegation will be able to put forward proposals on the possibility of setting up a transmitting and receiving set where we are. I don't think I can fix a date for the next meeting, since a number of items in my memorandum are still being studied by the top local authorities (...).

I avail myself of this opportunity to send my respectful greetings to His Excellency Engineer Santos e Castro on his appointment to the high post of Governor-General of Angola.

Respectfully,

JONAS MALHEIRO SAVIMBI

FOOTNOTES

- (1) General Staff Training Course.
- (2) One of the confidential documents ratified by the Assembly of Heads of State held in Rabat, in June 1972.

DOCUMENT C

LETTER ADDRESSED

TO JONAS MALHEIRO SAVIMBI

BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL RAMIRES DE OLIVEIRA

on 4 November 1972

Armed Forces in Angola
Eastern Military Zone Command
No. a 5297/2, p. 215.07
To Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi

His Excellency the General in command of the Eastern Military Zone has instructed me to inform you of the decisions taken on the items dealt with your memorandum of 26 September 1972, and also to reply to your letter of 25 October, which was received on 31 October 1972 (...).

1. The analysis you have made of the internal and external situation of the subversive movements in Angola, and of the relations between those movements and with the African countries that support them, has been duly studied and greatly appreciated. As I have already had occasion to tell you, it largely coincides with our own.
2. We agree with you that it would be very desirable to make use of activists' cells that UNITA continues to maintain in Zambia, for the following purposes:
 - to gather information on the MPLA's activities and on the political situation in Zambia and other African states;
 - to exert pressure on the Zambian government to make it change its policy towards Portugal.

(a) The first aspect — that of ensuring that the population has an unfavourable attitude towards the MPLA — is very important because almost everything else depends on it. Furthermore, whatever discomfort and hostile climate can be created around the movement will aggravate the difficulties of establishing transit to the national territory through the Zambian region.

- (b) There would be many advantages to be gained (...) from putting out reports to the effect that there are no MPLA liberated areas, schools or hospitals in Angola; that its followers are experiencing terror, hunger and lack of comfort; that it has conquered not one village and that it is suffering only defeats. One must ask where the leaders and well-known guerillas are? How all the men who managed to reach Zambia were wounded? Where are the weapons? And so forth.
 - (c) The preparation and execution of attacks must be carried out with the firm support of the population. The authorities would be glad to see action against specific target, as will be seen further on.
 - (d) Gathering information would be very important. However, the problem of divulging it arises. This point could be dealt with at a forthcoming meeting.
 - (e) Political pressure exerted on Zambia by experts would also be extremely useful in so far as it might create another attitude, on the part of that or another government, towards subversive movements on Zambian territory.
3. One of the most interesting items of information would be whether there is any possibility of an agreement between the MPLA and UPA. Even though it has difficulties, the latter movement still holds a favourable geographical position in the East which the MPLA would like to occupy. What is more, MPLA communications would be distinctly improved if it could have facilities in Zaire.
- We know that there will probably be a "national conference" of the FNLA at Kinkuzu shortly, and the MPLA's first congress is to be held at Shikongo in November or December 1972. It would be particularly worth while to infiltrate the latter, so as to know what is discussed and decided there (...).
4. The national authorities agree that as far as UNITA is concerned, the main thing at this stage is to stay in the Upper Lungue-Bungo region, far from the war, and secretly strengthen its cooperation with our troops. At this stage, therefore, the mass surrender of the population and the guerrillas cannot be contemplated (...). We wish the people to remain of their own free will in the regions where they are. We have therefore always suggested a program of advancement aided by us.
- As far as the UNITA movement is concerned, we are not talking in terms of surrender but of "integration", although this concept must be defined at meetings attended by you.
- The desire, therefore, is to maintain a zone of peace which will be gradually expanded through efforts for the population and cooperation against the MPLA and UPA guerrillas.
- Small experiments in integration can start, as fully as conditions in Eastern Angola permit.
5. Unfortunately, the secret nature of these contacts entails certain drawbacks (but that is an evil that one must accept):
- (a) One drawback is the impossibility of granting authorisation for free use of the corridor between the Lufuta-Luanguinga and Luanguinga-Luvo rivers. Each time it is to be used, the command will have to be forewarned, so as to take our troops out of the region for the required time on some pretext or other. Beyond that time, it will be impossible to ensure your safety in using the corridor.
 - (b) Similarly, Zones 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 must not be used without a prior request or, in case of urgent need, immediate notification. UNITA carried out actions against UPA in Zone 1 on 12 October, and only informed us on 21 October. It carried out another in Zone 2 which has only been reported now to us. Since these are zones to which our troops frequently go, and some times with helicopters, the risks your forces are running are obvious.
 - (c) Also because of the question of secrecy, it is becoming very difficult to exchange prisoners, if in fact release is possible (...) This is what is happening with Baptista Sassala, who was a prisoner of the DGS when we located him. We were able to conduct a further interrogation on

- the basis of your instructions. He had nothing interesting to say on the subject, and it is possible that he was the victim of some machination.
6. We are of the opinion that the destruction of the MPLA bases outside the country is extremely important. But we also think that this should be done with some guarantee of success and with every requisite precaution, so as not to compromise the national authorities.
 7. If convenient, at our next meeting we can decide on a target and finalise the necessary details for carrying it out, including any possible support we could give you.
 7. Your forces can operate in Zones 2 and 3 until the end of November. They must not, however, leave the confines of these zones because military operations are planned in the South, especially near the Luena and Carilongue rivers. I take this opportunity to extend our congratulations to you on the results achieved against the common enemy.
 8. As regards the support to be given to the population, they have already been or are being supplied with medicines, seeds, animals, books and school material(...). Everything will be delivered through Messrs. Duarte and Oliveira, timber merchants.
 9. His Excellency the General in command has authorised the repair of your machine-gun, as requested in your letter of 23 October 1972. It should be handed to these same merchants, if possible dismantled and wrapped up. They, in turn, will deliver it to the commander of the company in Cangumbe, with instructions to send it to the 2nd section of the Eastern military zone.
 10. It would be very useful if you were to lend us the OAU document you refer to (...) which would be photocopied and immediately returned.
 11. We agree to study with your delegation the details of a meeting with you. As usual, you will propose a date for the meeting. The main items on the agenda could be as follows: (a) UNITA action against MPLA and UPA within the national territory; (b) action of the UNITA activists' cells in Zambia; (d) UNITA attack on MPLA bases outside; (c) establishment of a transmitting and receiving set where you are; (f) aid required for the population of Lungue-Bungo; (g) procedures to be adopted for the exchange of information.
 12. Before ending this letter, we have received the request of Captain Clemente of UNITA regarding a medical consultation for you. We hope it is nothing serious, but His Excellency the General has instructed me to renew to you his firm guarantees regarding your safety, regardless of the situation required for your complete recovery.
 13. Your greetings to the Governor-General of the State of Angola, Engineer Santos e Castro, will be conveyed to him.

FOR THE GOOD OF THE NATION.

The Chief of Staff,

ARMENIO NUNO RAMIRES DE OLIVEIRA
Lieutenant-Colonel of the C.E.M.

DOCUMENT D

LETTER ADDRESSED

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL RAMIRES DE OLIVEIRA

BY JONAS SAVIMBI

on 7 November 1972

Dear Sir,

I hasten to answer your kind letter of 4 November 1972, for which I thank you.

Please convey my most sincere apologies to His Excellency the General in command of the Eastern military zone for the inconvenience caused by my belated

arrival in Messrs. Duarte and Oliveira's forest areas to consult the doctor whom (...) His Excellency was so kind as to put at my disposal (...). I should like to explain (...) what happened. Having fallen seriously ill, I asked if it was possible for the Eastern military zone command to send me a specialist in heart and liver diseases. We fixed 7 November 1972 as the date for the consultation, thinking that my condition would improve sufficiently to allow me to walk from here to Cunguene. On the contrary, it worsened (...). We thought of having me carried on a stretcher to the place indicated, but the secret nature of our meetings made that impossible. The only thing we could do, therefore, was to send an urgent message that the doctor should not come until I was able to move by my own means, that is to say on foot, as usual. There must have been some delay with that second communication, but this is all due to the distance between me and Cunguene and our means of communication. Furthermore, it is raining so hard that everything is aggravating my already poor condition (...). I think I have gone beyond the stage of either side fearing ambushes in connection with such meetings. I even feel that the most recent impressions brought back from Luso by our delegation could be the touchstone for continued contacts at the highest level (...).

If anyone thought ill of our enforced delay, I should like Your Excellency to assure them of our honesty and good faith in all that we have done (...). Never will we commit an outrage to the person of His Excellency General Bettencourt Rodrigues, who has done everything to help us find a solution to this thorny problem. For this reason, no one has had anything to do with the contacts in which we are involved will ever be ill-treated by us, let alone when the safety of a doctor coming to give us free care is at stake. In your letter of 20 July 1972, No. 1457/2, p. 215.07, it was pointed out as clearly as one could wish that would provide "periodic medical care by a military doctor travelling by land with an escort, through the intermediary of the timber merchants, to a central point to be named by yourself".

We are therefore fully aware of the question of the escort to accompany the doctor and this presents no difficulties for the precise reason that we would not want anything to happen between Cangumbo and Luso, since we have no armed forces on that stretch. This might allow UPA elements occasionally to infiltrate into that corridor. Your Excellencies should recall that one of my proposals was to move a small force to that spot in order to guarantee the passage of our friends Duarte and Oliveira. That proposal was not accepted, which does not mean that the place does not represent a latent danger.

(Outline of tactical and practical considerations with a view to overcoming the Portuguese authorities' opposition to the establishment of a permanent force in the sector.)

The occupation of the sector assigned to us will in fact depend on greater tolerance being shown by the authorities regarding the movements of our forces in Zone 1. The problem should be discussed with all the lucidity that the situation demands, all the more so as, according to reliable sources, the UPA, thanks to its flirtation with the MPLA, has already obtained a certain amount of material from the OAU. Yet I am prepared to follow your instructions while continuing to state my point of view. My strategy is better suited to the movement of small forces than to that of the large forces available to Your Excellencies.

In all the regions where the UNITA has been stationed since my arrival in Angola, we have cultivated a great many fields, which has enabled us to cover our needs in food rather than become a burden on the people (...).

But when our groups are sent into desert regions to be stationed there, it is quite frankly impossible to keep them there, and this gives rise to indiscipline. Moreover, the map of the regions assigned to the UNITA was drawn up taking into account the overall strategy of the struggle against subversion in the East rather than the contribution that UNITA can make to the struggle against MPLA and UPA. I accepted this situation and did not ask anything more, but I know that our role is reduced to what we have doing up to now. In the Luando zone, for example, establishing of the boundaries of the region involved a great deal of violence. Our troops thus retreated from Sachinjimbu to Kamono, near the Chichi river, and found themselves outside the UNITA regions.

Consequently, a few days ago a group of soldiers coming from Munhango attacked the population of Satanda, killing a woman and capturing another. I did not mention the fact to the authorities in the hope that some day those same authorities would understand our genuine will to oppose a war which no longer benefitted anyone. A final solution to all these differences should be found in the spirit shown by His Excellency Professor Marcello Caetano. But an equitable solution to the problems in the East cannot, at this point, come from Lisbon, or even from Luanda. Although strategically and politically it should come from the top, tactically speaking the lower echelons must find practical (tactical) solutions to local problems.

As for the case of Baptista Sassala, I have finally accepted your version and shall not mention this matter again. I am merely glad to affirm that no one hatched any intrigues against him, but that he was not really responsible for UPA cells in our regions (...).

We thank His Excellency the General in command of the military zone for his kindness in authorising the repair of the machine-gun

With my most sincere compliments, etc.

JONAS MALHEIRO SAVIMBI

