


southern africa

VOLUME IX, NO. 2

FEBRUARY 1976



What is the use of so much blood, if in the end we remain subjected to a state which, even if ruled by Africans, only serve the rich and powerful?"

PODER POPULAR PROGRAM — MPLA

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SOUTHERN AFRICA is published monthly, except for a double issue July-August by the New York Southern Africa Committee. Our address: Southern Africa Committee, 244 West 27th Street, Fifth Floor, New York, N.Y. 10001.

All subscriptions run from January to December. Those readers subscribing later in the year will be sent back issues to January, or after June, readers may opt for the 7 month subscription. Subscription rates are \$6.00 per year for individuals; 7 month subscription from June is \$4.00; institutions are \$18.00 per year; cost per copy is 80¢ for regular issues, \$1.00 for double issues

OVERVIEW

Readers will note that we have changed the structure of the magazine in such a way as to provide a major focus on Angola. This reflects our belief that the outcome of the Angolan struggle will have tremendous importance not only for the people of Angola themselves but also for the whole future of Southern Africa.

The current Angolan confrontation has crystallised and clarified the major elements that will inevitably be involved in the ultimate struggle for liberation in Southern Africa, the revolutionary overturn of the most powerful and reactionary State on the sub-continent, namely South Africa.

Events in Angola should have exploded for all time any lingering illusions about the South African regime's willingness to "live in peace" with truly independent African states. It should also have highlighted the increasing sophistication of South Africa's survival strategies.

The South Africans determine all their relationships in terms of one basic criterion—the survival of their State. There is a fundamental contradiction between the continued existence of that State and the spread of true liberation, the destruction of exploitation throughout Africa and in Southern Africa particularly. Tactical considerations may sometimes force them to live in apparent peace but this is the peace of a poisonous snake, waiting to strike at the most vulnerable spot in the enemy's defense. It is not the peace that exists between harmonious equals.

The desire to survive has also forced the South African State into alliances which should reveal the dangerous inadequacy of theories which explain all its behavior in simple race terms. The South Africa State is a racist State, but it is also, and primarily, a Capitalist State. The alliance with the FNLA and UNITA has shown quite clearly that the South Africans are capable of making alliances with Blacks in situations of crisis. As the struggle intensifies inside South Africa itself there will be increasing attempts to co-opt elements amongst the Black population both

within the Bantustan framework, and by building a Black middle-class.

The Angolan conflict has also exposed the nature and extent of US interest in Southern Africa.

There are still some commentators who explain the US presence in Angola as a "blunder", arguing that Kissinger does not have an Africa policy and is acting simply in response to his "cold-war" reflexes. To believe this is to ignore history.


Over the last few years *Southern Africa* has carefully documented growing US capital involvement in Southern Africa—with US investments in South Africa alone doubling in the last ten years to a grand total of well over \$1 billion. We have reported on the parallel development of closer military/strategic links between South Africa, the Portuguese colonialists and the US. Now Caetano is gone—South Africa is left standing alone. Its importance as the United States agent in Africa is greater than ever. Any doubts about that should crumble in the face of the serious determination with which the US acted to crush the MPLA and gave support to the forces that both Washington and Pretoria believed would establish a government "safe" for South Africa in Angola.

It seems that South Africa and the US have suffered serious defeats in Angola. Despite the power behind the attacks on it, the MPLA has been able to repulse invasions on two fronts and appears to be extending its control, establishing a functioning administration immediately concerned with the welfare of the Angolan people in a rapidly growing area.

But the dangerous times are not over—vigilance will be essential in the coming months—for it is certain that South Africa and the United States have not given up. They may try again to destroy the victory of the people of Angola. Our task must be to help prevent them succeeding. ●

angola: the armed struggle continues

MILITARY SITUATION



THE WAR FRONT

Because of heavy rains, western sources report a virtual stalemate in the Angolan war and apparent quiet in the areas north and south of Luanda where much of the fighting has taken place in recent weeks. Most of the fighting in December consisted of skirmishes with major battles between FNLA-UNITA and South African forces against MPLA strongholds near Gabela and Quibala south of Luanda. Allegedly, the "allied forces," which the UNITA-FNLA-South African troops have been labelled, were attempting a drive towards Dondo where a major power station supplying all of Luanda's electricity is located. Attempts to take MPLA-held Luso and Henrique de Carvalho were also reported but apparently "allied" attacks were not successful. At the same time, MPLA has been pressing towards Ambriz, the FNLA headquarters of Holden Roberto with considerable success. In response to MPLA advances here, *Newsweek* quotes Roberto as saying, "The Russian missile power is keeping us at bay ... we cannot advance." (*Newsweek*, Dec. 29, 1975)

It was also reported from Lusaka in late December that UNITA forces were attempting to drive the MPLA out of eastern Angola aiming to take over the town of Teixeira

de Sousa, MPLA's last stronghold along the Benguela Railway and located strategically close to the Zambian border. UNITA spokesman George Sangumba stated that UNITA and FNLA have given top priority to seizing the entire Benguela rail line which runs across the country from the Atlantic to the Zambian border. To date they have not been successful.

Sangumba added that UNITA had suffered heavy casualties because of the introduction of Soviet rockets being used by the MPLA. He also said that UNITA was calling a special meeting to discuss the recent US Senate vote to cut off all covert military aid to Angola, which they hope is not final and that the decision will be reversed. (*Hartford Courant*, *New York Times*, Dec. 27, 1975)

MERCENARIES FROM THE US

To complicate the problem of official US and corporate involvement in the Angolan war, independent organizations have now entered the fray. Two of the most recently publicized of these are CORE, the Congress of Racial Equality, and a Cuban exile group operating out of Miami.

An interview with CORE Chairman, Roy Innis, in the December 11 issue of the Long Island daily, *Newsday*, revealed that CORE is recruiting black Vietnam veterans to serve as mercenaries for the FNLA and UNITA forces alongside South African troops. Innis claimed that the recruitment force would offer black Americans an "opportunity to fight for Black Africa" and would serve as a "truly neutral force that might have an impact on the war." This "neutrality" is a clear anti-Angolan Government position.

Arthur Fitzjohn, head of CORE's international department has denied Innis' statement that an armed force is being recruited to fight in Angola and insists that CORE is simply trying to recruit "medics" to aid the Angolans. Fitzjohn estimates that some 500 to 600 unpaid volunteers, costing CORE from \$100,000 to \$1 million, are being recruited.

Innis denied any US Government influence in this program and maintained that he was taking his lead from his close personal friend, Idi Amin, President of Uganda and current President of the OAU. Innis claimed that the recruits would operate under an OAU mandate. The official invitation and attendance of CORE at the UNITA-FNLA independence ceremonies in Kinshasa in November are significant in light of this new development and are certainly in line with the overall strategy of US policy to undermine an MPLA-led Angola. (*Saspost*, Dec. 17, 1975; *Daily World*, Dec. 13, 1975).

An MPLA Representative said recently in New York in response to the CORE program: "We do not know this man (Innis) nor his organization, but we deplore this attitude and action."

From Miami it was reported that Cuban exiles in New

York and other parts of the US were being recruited as mercenaries to join with UNITA and South African forces to fight against the MPLA in Angola. The spokesman for the recruitment program, Jose Antonio Prat, was a Bay of Pigs veteran himself and claims that recruits will be drawn from such groups as "Alpha 66" a paramilitary force of anti-communist Cuban exiles with an alleged membership of 10,000 soldiers.

The mercenaries' fare to and from Angola will be paid by the Cuban exile group and their salary will be from \$1,000 to \$1,200 a month, according to skill and expertise. Pilots, he claimed, will of course be paid more. Applications are coming in from former Green Berets in Vietnam, many of whom are "frustrated because they didn't do a good job against communism in Vietnam" and many others are applying because they are out of work and need jobs, claimed Prat. (*Daily News*, Jan. 1, 1976)

Meanwhile Ford's Press Secretary, Ron Nessen, would not deny that the US was training 'foreigners' at Fort Benning, Georgia to fight in Angola. The question was particularly directed at the possible training of Cuban exiles and stemmed from a report in the Christian Science Monitor claiming that the CIA had recruited about 600 Americans to fight in Angola. Nessen denied that any US Government agency was recruiting, hiring, or training American mercenaries, but qualified his denials with "as far as I know" and added that "It's no secret the US is giving modest amounts of assistance to some African countries but there is no way of knowing precisely how that money is spent to the very last cent." The intimation here is that the neighboring countries of Zaire and Zambia which are presently receiving the bulk of military funding for the anti-MPLA government factions of UNITA and FNLA are engaged in the training of mercenaries to fight in Angola. (*New York Times*, Jan. 3, 1976) Mercenaries recently returned from fighting in Angola interviewed on ABC News December 27 and 30 stated that private US corporations were in fact the agencies hiring and training mercenaries to fight in Angola.

US DEBATE OVER ANGOLA POLICY

SENATE DEALS BLOW TO KISSINGER

On December 19th, the US Senate dealt the Ford Administration's Angola policy a stinging blow by voting to cut off secret defense appropriations for CIA operations in Angola other than intelligence gathering.

This historic action followed three months of revelations about the extent and amount of US intervention as well as internal dissent in the Administration. The Administration had hoped that Congress could be kept satisfied with secret briefings on what was being done.

On September 25 Leslie Gelb of the *New York Times* had written a major piece revealing CIA funding and arms support for FNLA and UNITA based on four major leaks. It was also clear that the Administration's five fold increase of military and economic aid to Zaire had to be related to Zaire's backing of FNLA, one of the anti-MPLA forces. Details of arms shipments, logistical and reconnaissance planes, and mercenary recruitment of Vietnam veterans and Black GIs were reported more than once in major papers. It was also revealed that Nathaniel Davis had been forced to resign as Under Secretary of State for African Affairs when he opposed Kissinger's intervention policy in Angola. (See *Washington Notes on Africa*, October 1975, *N.Y. Times*, September 25, 1975, December 14, 1975) By December, mounting Congressional anger and concern focused on the necessity to avoid stumbling into another Vietnam quagmire as it became increasingly clear that the Ford Administration was determined to spend big money to prevent "destabilization" in Southern Africa.

According to Senator Lowell Weicker (R. Ct.), the CIA had proposed spending \$100 million in Angola in three months but was scaled down to \$60 million for the fiscal year 1976 by the Congressional oversight committees. But many Senators were highly skeptical of that figure in view



YOU HEARD ME,
MR. PRESIDENT,
I SAID THEY'VE
NAILED ME IN
A PHONE
BOOTH HERE ON
CAPITOL HILL.

of arbitrary values assigned to weapons, the use of Zaire and Zambia aid funds, and possible currency manipulations.

On December 15th, Senator Tunney (D. Cal.) demanded to know if the Defense Appropriations bill contained money allocations for CIA Angolan operations and proposed that such appropriations be eliminated except for intelligence gathering. Senator McClellan, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, refused to say in open session whether any such money was hidden in the bill. Nor was he more forthcoming on the 17th in an unprecedented secret session. By this time Senator Humphrey and others were spilling what they knew from briefings, namely, that the CIA had already spent \$26 million, had obligated \$7 million more and had \$3.2 million left under the continuing resolution authority passed a month earlier. What was in the new DOD appropriation bill was \$9 million earmarked for Angola and another \$28 million in funds that could be reprogrammed.

As time to recess for Christmas drew near, Congressional opposition mounted. Conservatives like Helms of North Carolina, and Scott of Virginia, who are opposed to detente and no-win wars, or don't like foreign aid spending, joined liberals who distrust Kissinger's cold-war theory applied to Africa. Few Senators felt that Soviet aid to MPLA was a threat to US interests or would yield any lasting influence. Eventually even moderate Republicans like Javits, Case, and Weicker were aligning with Tunney and other liberal Democrats such as Cranston, Mansfield, Church and Clark. Tunney clearly had the votes not only to pass his amendment but to cut off the filibuster which had developed after Senator Griffin's substitute amendment, which would have allowed weapons and money but not troops, failed 72-26. To the final vote Tunney had 54 votes and the Administration only 22.


In response to the Senate action, the President labelled the vote a "deep tragedy" which would threaten the security of other countries. Kissinger was clearly angered that Congress should balk at assuming the "responsibilities which a great power had no choice but to assume." Despite Congressional disapproval however, he was determined to pursue his war policy in Angola by proxy to prevent the extension of Soviet influence. According to David Binder of the *New York Times*, "a high United States official" said on December 28th: "We're going to keep it up . . . despite the Senate vote. . . I'm not going to say how much or where it is coming from."

Meanwhile Kissinger was launching a diplomatic and economic offensive against MPLA as well.

CORPORATIONS BOW TO US POLICY: GULF & BOEING

In late December Gulf Oil, under State Department pressure, announced temporary suspension of its operations in the Angolan oil enclave of Cabinda. This included the withdrawal of most of its 430 personnel and the placement in escrow of its \$125 million in royalty payments to the Peoples Republic of Angola. While Gulf's explanation for this action was that "the continuing civil war in Angola made it impossible for operations to be maintained," it was clear that the suspension was linked to Administration pressure since the US Government is currently supporting and funding the anti-MPLA Government factions of UNITA and FNLA.

Gulf's operation consists of the extraction of 150,000 barrels a day at the price of \$10 a barrel which has amounted to \$500 million per annum in royalties and



Loading oil at Malongo in Cabinda

taxes paid to the Portuguese colonial government in Angola since 1968. The most recent payment of \$116 million was made last September while Angola was still technically under the Portuguese. The next payment was due December 31, 1975 and January 15, 1976, and would, under the contract, have been paid to the People's Republic of Angola led by the MPLA. The annual Gulf payment is Angola's largest single source of revenue. Gulf's Angolan operation represented about 10% of its total foreign petroleum production, according to Gulf spokesman, William Cox.

The Corporation statement said that taxes and royalties due to Angola "will become payable to the state of Angola when it has a government that is in control of the territory and population and which has been recognized by the world community." The State Department assertion that in the official US view, "there is no government in Angola" clearly demonstrates the link between Gulf's withdrawal and US policy. (*New York Times*, Dec. 23, *Washington Post*, Dec. 20, 1975)

Shortly after the Gulf announcement, it was disclosed that the Commerce Department had revoked the export license for two Boeing 737 aircraft ordered a year ago by the Angolan airline, TAG. As a result Boeing had to cancel its \$18 million sale to the People's Republic of Angola. According to State Department officials, this action was taken "in retaliation for the MPLA's bringing in of Cuban troops" since it was assumed that the planes were going to be used to transport troops from Cuba as well as "ferry arms around Angola." (In previous years the Administration had always turned a deaf ear to protests against sales of Boeing 707s used by Portugal for troops in its colonial war in Angola.)

TAG is now a government-run airline and reportedly has already had at least three of its planes hijacked by FNLA and UNITA.

There is further concern in Luanda that the US Government might intervene to cancel another Boeing contract aimed at setting up an air traffic control system in Angola.

US AND SOVIET RESPONSE

Secretary of State Kissinger claims that the US interventionist policy in Angola is not due to opposition to the MPLA as a "Marxist faction". He says this country (the U.S.) "can live with any" of the parties and he points to American acceptance of "Marxist rule" in Mozambique to prove his point. The issue, instead, according to Kissinger, is Soviet intervention in support of one faction, the MPLA in this case, in an effort to "impose its brand of government."



MPLA soldiers in Luanda

Soviet Response

While Kissinger continues to issue threatening warnings to the Soviet Union about US determination to stand firm in Angola, saying that the "US will not accept Soviet military expansion of any kind" and claiming that such expansion is far outside the boundaries of detente, the Soviet Union has remained resolute in its commitment to continue to support the MPLA. Soviet response to Kissinger's assertion that intervention in Angola is endangering detente is to claim that the US is misinterpreting Soviet motives since "support for the national liberation struggle in Angola is an important principle of Soviet foreign policy, the same as the steadfast struggle for improving international relations". They see no contradiction between the relaxation of international tensions and support for the Angolan efforts to repulse external forces, primarily the South African racist regime." The Soviets see South African aggression in Angola as being carried out in direct collaboration and with the assistance of the US and other NATO powers. (*Hartford Courant; Baltimore Sun, Dec. 24, 1975; New York Times, Dec. 26, 1975*)

US reaction against Soviet aid to Angola escalated to a pitch of hysteria when the disclosure of Cuban troops assisting the Angolans was made. The Cuban act of solidarity with the Angolan Government in its efforts to gain total independence and resist counter-nationalist efforts was immediately interpreted not as an independent Cuban decision, but rather as the faithful carrying out of an order by the USSR.

CIA Build-up began early

The White House assertion that the US increased its involvement in Angola as a response to massive Soviet intervention has been seriously questioned by major news reports. (*New York Times, Dec. 19, 1975; Los Angeles Times, Dec. 8, 1975*) It now seems clear that the Ford Administration authorized a substantial escalation of CIA operations in Angola in January 1975, two months before a similar increase in Soviet aid occurred. The timing of this decision is significant. Negotiations were in process at this time between the Portuguese and the three movements to establish a working relationship between them in an effort to set up an effective Transitional Government to administer the colony as it moved towards independence, slated for 11 months later. The sudden influx of money and, more importantly, the U.S. commitment to support FNLA and UNITA contributed to the sudden resurgence of military activity and aggression of these groups against the MPLA during the spring and summer.

Another major decision to expand US operations in Angola was made in July 1975 by the Committee of 40, a high level Administration intelligence review board. Nathaniel Davis, former US Ambassador to Chile and then Under Secretary of State for African Affairs is reported to have argued vigorously at the July meetings of the Committee of 40 against further US intervention by aid increases to Angola. His position was that more US military involvement would only lead to an equal escalation of Soviet support for the opposing side. However, Kissinger is said to have believed that without an immediate major influx of US aid the MPLA, which by that time controlled 12 of the 16 provinces in Angola, would soon become the only viable power in the young nation. Shortly thereafter, Davis resigned his post in opposition to the US interventionist policy in Angola.

By early fall the US was sending in monthly installments of several million dollars worth of military equipment to UNITA and FNLA, channelled through neighboring Zaire and Zambia. This triggered increased Soviet support for the MPLA forces. Finally, with the massive invasion by South African troops in the south in November, Cuban assistance, offered in solidarity, was readily accepted by MPLA. Cuban military personnel have helped train MPLA soldiers in the use of more sophisticated Soviet weaponry but the entry of as many as 4 to 6 thousand Cuban troops has been denied by MPLA spokesmen.

Administration arguments to support the continuation and possible expansion of US covert operations, mainly in the form of military assistance, initially drew on strong anti-communist rhetoric reminiscent of both the McCarthy period of the early 1950s and the US Government's statements justifying its policy in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. More than a month before the Senate vote, as news of substantial US involvement in Angola began to leak out in the press, Kissinger began publicly warning the Soviets that their intervention in Angola would not go unnoticed in Washington, and could jeopardize the detente effort between the US and the USSR (*See Southern Africa, December 1975*)

In early December, Daniel Moynihan, US Ambassador to the United Nations, speaking to the General Assembly, accused the Soviet Union of being the new colonizer of Africa. (*New York Times, Dec. 3, 1975*) Since then Ford Administration statements in support of US policy of intervention in Angola have moved away from simplistic anti-communist charges of Soviet expansionism and declarations of the need to protect Africa from the spread of



Members of MPLA display captured US arms

communism. Current Administration arguments now stress the importance of maintaining the present balance of power in southern Africa, the need to uphold the US position as a world power, and the necessity for protecting the sea route from the oil-rich Persian Gulf area around Southern Africa to the United States from Soviet control. (*New York Times*, Dec. 23, 1975; *Wall Street Journal*, New York, Dec. 23, 1975) Oil tankers pass by Angola en route from the Persian Gulf to the US. The argument put forth is that a Soviet-dominated Angola could conceivably threaten the movement of this vitally needed source of energy for the American people. In this way the Administration manages to argue that intervention in Angola is linked to US national interests.

A more compelling argument used to explain the relationship of Angola to US national interests is based on the tremendous potential of Angola's natural resources. Both UNITA and FNLA have made it clear that they will call on Western capital and technical expertise to organize the country's economic development. MPLA, on the other, had taken a cautious position vis-a-vis the investment of foreign capital, stressing that all contracts with existing companies in Angola and future interested ones must be renegotiated with the Luanda Government in an effort to ensure that Angolan resources be developed in the interests of the Angolan people. The multinationals are likely therefore to fare considerably better under a FNLA-UNITA regime than under the present MPLA Government.

Preserving spheres of interest for capitalism

Kissinger asserts that US involvement in Angola is also necessary as a demonstration to the Soviet Union of US commitment to preserving "spheres of interest" for capitalist development. The USSR can not be allowed to be active in areas traditionally aligned with the US, as Angola

was as a Portuguese colony. It is also possible that Kissinger is taking a particularly hard line on Angola to offset both the decrease in his personal power within the Administration and to counter what he believes to be the United States' loss of power and prestige in the world as a result of its defeat in Southeast Asia.

The State Department itself is one source of opposition to Administration policy in Angola. Officials there have maintained that Angola is not strategic to US national security or interests and does not warrant the current investment of US prestige and financing.

Some opponents within the Administration and Congress also argue that intervention will damage US interests because the U.S. is once again backing the losers. They acknowledge that FNLA and UNITA have neither the political or military strength to maintain a stable government in Angola.

They also point out that US interests in Angola are becoming increasingly identified with South Africa because the US is backing the same forces, UNITA and FNLA, which are fighting alongside South Africa. In this sense, US policy in Angola is only further alienating other African nations as well as diminishing the US in world prestige. (*New York Times*, Dec. 14, 1975)

Finally, a number of critics of US intervention have stressed that after 15 years of struggle against Portuguese domination the Angolans will not lightly subject themselves to a new foreign power. They point to other African examples such as Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, which also received extensive Soviet aid, yet have demonstrated complete independence of action, both internally and externally.

US Seeks African Allies

On December 19, Kissinger dispatched William E. Schaufele, the new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, on a mission to Africa to lobby among the more conservative and pro-western nations in support of the U.S. position on Angola. Shortly before Angola's independence on November 11, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had called for the formation of a government of national unity and asked its member states not to recognize any of the competing factions—a stand which the U.S. complied with. Now, however, pressure is building for the OAU to come out in support of the MPLA Government. Schaufele is pushing a 4-point program: refusal to recognize the MPLA Government; the withdrawal of all foreign military aid and troops; a ceasefire under the supervision of the OAU and the formation of a government of national unity representing all the parties.

As the January OAU emergency summit on Angola approached, the likelihood was that OAU might recognize the MPLA Government as the number of African states recognizing MPLA rose to half the total OAU membership. When Ghana and Burundi joined Nigeria and Tanzania in recognition of the Peoples Republic of Angola, it was clear that African nations were less afraid of Soviet influence than of South African domination.

SOUTH AFRICA'S INVASION

Turning Sour

South Africa's invasion of Angola—so full of promise for Pretoria's overlords two months ago—has stalled and turned sour. A note of desperation has crept into the South African regime's announcements. The *Washington Post* reports on January 1, 1976, that Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster "made his first open appeal for the West to get directly involved in the Angolan civil war. Going public with what has been, up to now, a behind-the-scenes effort by his government, Vorster said that 'only a bigger Western involvement, not only in the diplomatic but all other fields' could keep the former Portuguese colony from being 'hounded into the Communist fold.'"

South Africa's presence in the conflict has become an acute embarrassment to its erstwhile allies. Jonas Savimbi, head of one (UNITA) of the two factions warring against the Peoples Republic of Angola, has graduated from vague remarks about South Africans fighting with his troops or in his area in southern Angola to outright denials of co-operation with Pretoria (*Washington Post*, Dec. 17, 1975), to asking "African states to help his UNITA movement to drive South African troops from Angola" (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 20, 1975).

The Pretorian invasion has had other consequences. The *Washington Post* reports (Dec. 26, 1975): "... Ugandan President Idi Amin, chairman of the Organization of African Unity, shifted from his previous criticism of the Soviet Union and defended the presence of Soviet and Cuban advisers in Angola." Two days later, the *Post* said: "The main reasons for Cuban and Soviet involvement, Amin added, was to help the Popular Movement drive South African forces out of Angola."

A report on the upcoming meeting of OAU foreign ministers and heads of government in Addis Ababa tells of

the crucial recognition of the Luanda government by Nigeria. "Nigeria explained its action by saying that the involvement of South Africa on the side of the National Front (FNLA) and the National Union (UNITA) invalidated their claims to legitimacy. This reason was also given over the weekend by the Ghanaian leader, Col. Ignatius K. Acheompong, when he announced that his pro-Western country would recognize the Popular Movement" MPLA (*Times*, New York, Dec. 30, 1975)

Even the United States stutters over mention of the obvious fact that it is connected with the South African regime in the Angola adventure. "Moynihan also disputed that U.S. aid in Angola constituted alignment with South Africa. "Rather", he said, 'there is a convergence in policy. We're both doing the same thing, sort of.'" (*Washington Post*, Dec. 15, 1975)

More and more, Pretoria has had to admit its involvement in Angola. Defense Minister Piet Botha conceded a presence in November. (see *Southern Africa*, January 1976) On December 6, a group of foreign correspondents were given a tour of South African troops dug in at the Calueque dam (part of the Ruacana hydro-electric scheme), 16 miles inside Angola above the border with Namibia. (*Washington Post*, Dec. 7, 1975) It was claimed that the Angolan war was far to the north and that the 150 South Africans were only defending the dam against attacks by troops of the South West Africa Peoples Organization of Namibia (SWAPO). The South African regime claims it is guarding the dam complex pursuant to an agreement with the old Portuguese colonial government.

The Dec. 18 *Washington Post* reported, "South Africa announced today that it is sending reservist commandos into Angola and tacitly acknowledged that some of its forces are already fighting deep inside the war-divided former Portuguese colony." Defense Minister Botha also said reservist units would serve three months at a time instead of the usual three-week training period, and that some servicemen's one-year conscription would be extended by one month. "This is not a panic measure but is intended to increase effectiveness," Botha stated.

Such candour from Pretoria was no doubt induced by the Luanda government's dramatic announcement that four South African soldiers had been captured over 400 miles above the Namibian border in central Angola. Photographs of two army mechanics were emblazoned in the press around the world after they had been taken to Nigeria for another press conference. A statement issued by defense headquarters in Pretoria says the men were on logistical duties only and 'it is assumed that they became lost while fetching an unserviceable vehicle and were taken prisoner by MPLA forces. . . . It is generally known that we have taken protective steps on the northern border of South West Africa and at the hydro-electric power station at Calueque." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 20, 1975)

Number of Troops Grows

In New York, MPLA representative, Elisio de Figueiredo, to the United Nations, said about 50 South African soldiers had been captured, that 4,000 South African regulars were fighting inside his country, and that another 2,500 South Africans were in southern Angola above the Namibian frontier. (*Washington Post*, Dec. 18, 1975) He added "some American mercenaries are there 'fighting side-by-side with the South Africans' and FNLA and UNITA."

Most American press accounts automatically list South African troop strength in Angola at about 1,000 men. The South African regime won't be specific. *Washington Post*

reporter David Ottaway cabled from Lusaka in November that sources estimate from 2,500 to 6,000 South Africans actively engaged. (see *Southern Africa*, January, 1976) Sean Gervasi of the Center for National Security Studies, in a December 14 report, detailed the South African army's committed order of battle as two full regular mechanized cavalry regiments, with mobile artillery and tank support—a total of 4,000 to 6,000 men. An estimated 12 to 20 South African aircraft are in action operating over the northern and central fronts.

A *Christian Science Monitor* story on January 2, 1976, based on "contacts with senior mercenary officers familiar with the situation both in Angola and the United States" and devoted to the growing role of the U.S. in the Angolan war, states that in addition to American mercenaries assisting UNITA, "Also stiffening the 9,000-strong UNITA forces are some 3,000 South African troops—about 500 white and 2,500 black." The report also says there have been heavy casualties on the southern front. "The field hospital outside the UNITA-FNLA capital of Huambo contains some 240 white troops, mainly South African regulars plus some mercenaries, many seriously wounded".

Pretoria announced the death of three more of its soldiers "in the border region" (*New York Times*, Dec. 29, 1975), a term used to refer to Angolan losses both against MPLA and in battle with SWAPO guerrilla troops operating on one side or the other of the Namibia-Angola border. The report adds, "Twenty-five South African soldiers have been killed in recent weeks in the border region."

South Africa's three Dutch Reformed churches—after consultation with Prime Minister Vorster—called for a national day of prayer on January 7. (*New York Times*, Dec. 26, 1975) They stated "We in South Africa must humble ourselves before God in view of the ideological and physical dangers threatening our country from outside, on our borders and also from inside as evidenced by the increasing moral and ethical decline."

Prime Minister Vorster was reported to be ready to propose South Africa's withdrawal from Angola if the Soviet Union and Cuba follow suit. (*Observer*, London, Dec. 28, 1975) The OAU rejected any such plan, according to an AP dispatch from Addis Ababa. (*New York Times*, Dec. 31, 1975) "The concessions sought by South Africa reportedly focused on guarantees for South African interests in Angola—mainly hydroelectric installations on the southern border—and in the neighboring territory of South-West Africa or Namibia."

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

SOLIDARITY

Cuba

Cuban troops are assisting the People's Republic of Angola in repelling the anti-government forces of UNITA-FNLA and South Africa and are reported to be training MPLA soldiers in the use of Soviet-built weapons. US press reports speak of 4,000 to 7,500 Cuban troops in Angola, although this is strongly denied by MPLA and Cuba, who put the figure around 500.

The Cuban effort is offered as one of solidarity and not one of national interest to Cuba. The hysteria in the US

over Cuban troops in Angola is in marked contrast to the silent acquiescence of US policy spokesmen over the direct and blatant invasion by more than 10 times as many South African troops and mercenaries. This contradictory response challenges US assertions of "Cuban aggression."

Mozambique

Recently a Mozambican news magazine, *Tempos*, interviewed Mozambicans on their views of how the independence of Angola should be realized—by election among the three movements, or by one determined power taking over; and secondly, if one power takes over, what should happen to the other two? Typical of the responses they received were the following:

Domingas Langa, a nurse, responded: "I find that the majority of the Angolan people have already opted for the MPLA. It is known for a fact that the latter is the main representative of the people. As for the other movements, they should be dissolved as was colonialism."

Another nurse, Liftin Adrianpoulos, answered: "I find that independence for Angola should be realized by one determined power—the MPLA—taking over. The other movements, FNLA and UNITA, are agents of the imperialists; they represent the interests of the capitalists."

In September of 1975, a Mozambican committee of support for the MPLA was formed.

In late October, President Samora Machel, on behalf of the Peoples Republic of Mozambique, recognized the MPLA as "the only legal revolutionary movement fighting for the interests of the Angolan people" (*Guardian*, 11/1/75). In addition, President Machel stated that the future of Portuguese-Mozambican relations depends on the attitude taken by the Lisbon Government to the demands of the MPLA to be regarded as the genuine representative of the people of Angola.

The Mozambican Government sees the support of the MPLA in any way possible as its duty. Only under the MPLA, it feels, can Angola work towards concrete liberation. Furthermore, it is only with the MPLA in power in Angola that the Namibians and South Africans can make further gains for their liberation.

Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde

Two weeks before independence, President Luis Cabral of Guinea Bissau and President Aristides Pereira of Cape Verde sent a joint telegram to Luanda reaffirming that "all the combatants and militants of the PAIGC are on your side without reservations"; the PAIGC and MPLA have had relations of solidarity for almost twenty years. (Amilcar Cabral was one of the founders of MPLA). On November 6, Pereira sent a cable to OAU Chairman Idi Amin identifying the MPLA as the "only representative of the struggling people of Angola". (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, Nov. 6, 1975)

AT THE UN

The situation in Angola has not, as yet, been formally considered at the UN. Since Angola is now independent, the UN is bound by Charter provisions barring interference in the internal affairs of a State—unless, of course, the question of foreign aggression was brought up for debate. Since the Assembly has adjourned until next fall, the war in Angola will not be taken up for the time being, unless the Security Council decides to meet to deal with the question of aggression. The veto power which both the US and the USSR hold in the Council, however, makes it unlikely that this will happen, at least in the immediate future.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

"PRODUCE AND RESIST"—MPLA SLOGAN

The deep divisions within the OAU on the Angolan war are at the basis of the Assembly's failure to take up the question at the last session. The Africa Group at the UN apparently agreed that the topic should not be considered formally at the current stage. Because the African states have consistently acted as a bloc in the UN, they have been reluctant to vent their differences on Angola in a world forum prior to the forthcoming OAU meeting.

South Africa's intervention in Angola, however, moved several African states which have recognized the MPLA to take up the issue during the debate on South Africa. On December 8, the delegations of Benin, Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Senegal and Madagascar submitted an amendment to a resolution on "The situation in South Africa" condemning the intervention of South African armed forces in the conflict in Angola and requesting the withdrawal of all South African military and para-military personnel, including the mercenaries. Since the General Assembly rules of procedure bar the discussion of two problems under the same agenda item, the amendment was also an attempt on the part of MPLA supporters to introduce the debate on Angola while limiting it strictly to South African aggression, thus exposing the alliance between South Africa, the US and the movements fighting against the MPLA. The effort, however, failed, mainly because of the desire of the African countries to avoid an open break in the UN. Two sub-amendments were introduced by the representative of Zaire to condemn "all foreign intervention" in Angola. The debate quickly began to escalate into a confrontation between the US, the USSR, Cuba and China, and between the radical and the moderate African countries. Rather than being drawn into a debate involving the superpowers, however, the African countries decided to withdraw all amendments and sub-amendments, so that the final version of the resolution (3411 G (XXX) bears no mention of Angola.

Subordinate bodies of the General Assembly, however, which have less political impact, have had no difficulty condemning South African intervention in Angola. On December 3, the Special Committee against Apartheid issued a statement expressing "its grave concern at the aggression committed by South Africa" and calling "on all Governments and organizations to denounce the aggression by the South African racist regime in Angola, and to take all appropriate steps to secure the immediate withdrawal of all South African military personnel, including mercenaries, from Angola." Earlier, the Council for Namibia had issued a statement condemning South Africa's aggression in southern Angola in "hot pursuit" of SWAPO members. The strain between the African countries, however, is beginning to be evident even in these lower bodies, which have a long tradition of working by consensus, and may result in a less militant stand in opposition to the Western powers which are supporting South Africa. The last sentence in the Apartheid Committee's statement, in fact, is surprisingly moderate for such a body, stating that the Committee hopes that "countries that have refused to take energetic measures against the South African regime . . . will allow themselves to be persuaded to cease all co-operation with South Africa." (UN documents A/PV. 2430, 2434, 2435)

Throughout the armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism MPLA has forged a strong socio-political organization which is primarily responsible for the victories MPLA is achieving today. Besides the Central Committee and the armed forces, FAPLA, there are departments dealing with External Affairs, Information and Education, National Reconstruction and mass organization. Such organizations include the Angola Women's Organization (OMA), the MPLA Youth Organization (JMPLA), the Pioneers Organization (OPA), the Angolan Trade Union Association (UNTA) and neighborhood and village committees which are complemented by the mass-based service institutions of the Medical Assistance Service (SAM), and the Centers of Revolutionary Instruction (CIR). The mass organizations, which are linked directly with the MPLA Central Committee, witnessed enormous growth in the months preceding Angolan independence in November under the leadership of MPLA.



Militia training in Luanda

Especially impressive has been the growth of the Committees of Peoples Defense that emerged from the MPLA's urban-based "Poder Popular" campaign. Once Luanda was under MPLA control, the General Command of FAPLA and the neighborhood committees of Luanda set up Committees of Peoples Defense, a para-military organization comprised of workers. More than 50,000 volunteers were recruited in Luanda alone in the first months after the Committees were set up. (*Jornal de Angola*, Sept. 20, 1975) These are the only civilian group that may be legitimately armed in Luanda. In addition to action as a People's Militia, they function as neighborhood organizations dealing with problems of food, water and commodity distribution, workers' grievances and political education. It is through these committees that the people

reach the MPLA Central Committee. As part of a generalized popular resistance to FNLA/UNITA/South African attacks on the MPLA government in Luanda, sectors of the urban population have been armed.

The two major goals of the People's Republic of Angola under MPLA leadership are to liberate the towns and countryside, and to increase agricultural production and normalize work in the industrial sector. The slogan in Luanda continues to be "produce and resist", and conditions are gradually returning to normal in the capital city. MPLA leaders are setting an example by working on Sundays and it is reported that the government has never functioned so well since FNLA and UNITA left. (*O Seculo*, Lisbon, Nov. 16, 1975)

Since November 11, the MPLA has been introducing a system of worker councils in factories and at work places in the major towns. A recent example of their pro-MPLA posture is the action of Angolan Airline TAG workers adopting a resolution to stop service between Luanda and Carmona, the main supply base of the FNLA. When the airline administration tried to reinstate the flight, the workers threatened to strike.

Meanwhile MPLA has announced that "People's Tribunals" are to be established, and measures have been taken to have the prisons function as places for the re-education of prisoners. (*Jornal de Angola*, Sept. 27, 1975) It was also announced that Luanda nightclubs and similar places in the city will be transformed into social centers and utilized by the government Department of Popular Culture.

In a similar vein the MPLA's department for "Orientation of the Masses" and Luanda People's Defense Committees have taken significant steps to fight alcoholism. The alcohol distributors must now deliver all liquor to the local committees which control the quantities sold and regulate the prices.

Few reports are available from the rural areas under the MPLA. Prior to independence the mass organizations of the peasants in the liberated areas are extremely popular because they combine political education with the teaching of practical skills such as literacy, health and hygiene and sewing. MPLA local village councils handle economic production and distribution, political affairs and the settling of disputes. (See report from the *Times of Zambia*, below)

From the coffee-growing districts of Icolo and Bengo (about 40 miles from Luanda), in the home area of Agostinho Neto, peasants have set up a commune, democratically elected to administer the coffee-growing area, and local civil authorities have reportedly abandoned their posts. (*Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, Sept. 14, 1975)

Despite MPLA claim that it is a progressive nationalist organization fighting the reactionary nationalism of FNLA-UNITA, the western press continues to refer to MPLA as "Marxist". The People's Republic of Angola under MPLA leadership intends to build a truly independent country with an international policy of non-alignment, contrary to western insistence that MPLA is and will be Soviet-controlled. In fact, while MPLA receives aid from the Soviet Union and recognizes that FNLA received Chinese assistance, the MPLA has refused to take a stand on the Sino-Soviet divisions, and in fact have stated that they hope to have fraternal relations with the People's Republic of China in the future.

WHERE MPLA IS IN FIRM CONTROL IT'S PEACEFUL

The following article, under the above heading, is reprinted from the Sunday Times of Zambia, December 7, 1975. It was written by George Siemensma after a visit to Angola.

Life is slowly picking up in some parts of Angola that are controlled by MPLA.

The town of Malanje, 400 km (248 miles) east of Luanda, shows clearly that the situation in the MPLA-controlled "corridor" from Luanda via Malanje and Henrique de Carvalho up to the Zambian border is calm and more stable.

During our four-day trip we found that the control at roadblocks was relaxed. We were allowed to travel freely both north and south of the main route.

Everywhere MPLA cadres are making attempts to get the local population back into the fields. The once most agricultural productive province of Malanje faces at the moment a serious shortage of manpower.

Thousands of refugees have fled to this area from the battle zones and have to be fed. This might cause a serious problem in the near future.

The MPLA is therefore setting up cooperatives and organising the people to get the crops planted before the rainy season really starts.

In the town of Malanje itself life is slowly getting back to normal. Hundreds of shops, deserted by the more than 10,000 fleeing Portuguese in July are one by one being re-opened. Many were damaged during the heavy fighting at the end of July this year when the MPLA drove the mainly FNLA forces out of the town. Reports that Malanje had been retaken by the combined FNLA-UNITA forces—who according to these reports would be in control of the town at this very moment—are untrue.

Both the MPLA officials as well as all civilians we talked to strongly denied that the two rival movements had ever come closer to Malanje. The nearest they did was 60 km (37½ miles) away.

The bridge across the Cuanza river is still standing disproving reports by the Western Press about its destruction and Russians, Cubans and even Mozambicans being captured near Malanje.

Various government departments in Malanje are being set up by MPLA. There is a provisional governor awaiting approval by Luanda.

One hotel has already been re-opened and postal services are functioning normally.

Three times a week a train runs between Luanda and Malanje and there is a twice-a-week air service between the two cities.

The local cotton factory still employs 150 workers of the previous 200-manpower. It is waiting for the necessary spare parts and materials to arrive.

The province of Malanje has also always been known to supply large parts of the country with food. At the moment this has gone down to less than half because the manpower has been compared with only only 1,750 tonnes of coffee and 900 tonnes of tobacco.

This factory, also left almost in ruins by the Portuguese, is the biggest in this province where cotton always has been an important product.

In 1971 there was a total production in Malanje alone of more than 60,000 tonnes, drained by the recruitment of young men into MPLA forces.

A visit to the hydro-electric power plant at Cambambe near Dondo, some 160 km (99+ miles) east of Luanda, revealed that the consumption of electricity at present amounts to only half of that before April this year.

Again here it is the same story: with the departure of Portuguese, most of the country's factories stopped operating partly due to lack of technicians and operators and partly unavailability of materials and spare parts. Transport is also a huge problem. Of the previous three engineers at the power plant only one is left, and instead of the former 75 technicians for the maintenance of the hydro-electric scheme only 23 are still working.

Apart from the fact that the electrical supply to cities like Luanda, Dondo & Malanje never has been interrupted,

here too it became clear that reports from Salisbury (as quoted in the British Daily Telegraph of November 17) that the Cambambe dam had been bombed, were utterly false. According to the engineer, there has never been an attack on the installation since the dam was built in 1958.

But the power plant and its surroundings is heavily guarded.

The dam and the underground hydro-electric plant plus the surface installations are flanked by mountains which form an effective natural fort. A strong military base is guarding furthermore a large area around it, aided by ultra-modern electronic equipment.

The installations are of vital importance to Luanda in particular, since its water supply also is controlled by it.

south africa

POLITICS

BOPHUTHATSWANA OPTS FOR INDEPENDENCE

The Bophuthatswana homeland chiefs and headmen, led by Chief Minister Lucas Mangope, have passed a resolution urging the "government" of that homeland to press for "independence." While the homeland government has yet to formally ask for independence, it is considered a *fait accompli*. Bophuthatswana will become the second of the nine homelands to opt for "independence" under the apartheid system. The Transkei is set to receive "independence" in October 1976.



Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana

Bophuthatswana has been "self-governing," one stage in the process towards "independence," since May 1961. The homeland consists of eight non-contiguous pieces of land. Less than 10 per cent of the income of citizens of Bophuthatswana is earned within the homeland. In 1970, there were 1,680,000 Tswana, the ethnic group designated to the Bophuthatswana homeland, in S.A. Only 600,000 lived in the homeland, the only place where, under apartheid, they can exercise "political rights."


Chief Minister Mangope claims that independence will be used as a lever for effecting political change and for demanding the elimination of apartheid everywhere in South Africa. Yet the decision to opt for independence is actually a victory for the Pretoria regime and its policy of apartheid—"separate development." The Bophuthatswana chief's independence resolution "is in line with the Government's policy of establishing independent Black states in Southern Africa," comments *Hoofstad*, an Afrikaans newspaper.

"Independence" is a way of giving apartheid an international legal base. It is meant to allow South African Whites to appear as generous employers to a "foreign" labor force to whom no responsibilities can possibly be owed since they work in South Africa by "choice." Chief Mangope, who is expected to be the head of state, and a few other Blacks will make some personal gains. But independence will not change the reality most Blacks have to face. They will still have to leave the homelands to find work, provide cheap labor for the benefit of others, and have no real say in how they run their lives. Independence for the homelands will reinforce the system of White domination. It will divide the Black population along ethnic lines in an effort to prevent united resistance. It will also create a few well-off Blacks who have an interest in the system and will act as a buffer between the majority of the population and the Pretoria regime. (*Comment & Opinion*, Nov. 14, 1975; *Johannesburg Star*, Nov. 15, 22, 1975.)

GOVERNMENT JUGGLES WITH BLACK OCCUPIED LAND

As part of its apartheid policy of granting independence to the homelands, two districts of the Ciskei homeland have become part of the Transkei. The two districts, Glen Gray and Herschel, had made up over half of the territory of the Ciskei. The Transkei is set to become independent in October.

The South African government promised the Ciskei some land in exchange for the land that went to the Transkei, but so far they have not made any land available. The additional land proposed for the Ciskei is rich farm land owned by Whites who do not wish to give it up. In an



Map of South Africa, indicating the Bantustans

attempt to get the land the Ciskei's Chief Minister Lennox Sebe has offered to allow the Whites to continue to own the land after it becomes part of the Ciskei, rather than being forced to sell it. (Johannesburg Star, Nov. 22, 29, 1975.)

POLITICAL REPRESSION CONTINUES

New Wave of Arrests

In a new wave of nationwide arrests, South African Security Police arrested Judson Khuzwayo and Harold Nxasane on December 5. Both are former officials of the African National Congress, one of the South African liberation movements. Their arrests brought to thirteen the number of people detained under the Terrorism Act in less than a week. In Pietermaritzburg on December 4, seven people were arrested. They are Siphon Kubheka, Truman Magubane, Harry Gwala, Sampson John Nene, France Kunene, Anthony Xaba, and Stanley Msibi.

A few days earlier Edward Webster, a lecturer at Natal University; Charles Nupon, a former president of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS); Karel Tip, also a former NUSAS official; and Glen Moss, former president of the Students Representative Council at Witwatersrand University, were all arrested under the Terrorism Act.

Previous Detentions

Eleven of the people detained by the Security Police under the Terrorism Act after the arrest of Breyten Breytenbach last August have been released. Breytenbach, an Afrikaner poet, was charged with being a member of a clandestine organization called "Okhela," whose aim was to "transform South African society by armed struggle and underground work."

The eleven who were released are: Jenny Curtis of the Institute of Race Relations, Horst Kleinschmidt of the Christian Institute, James Polley, Nicholas Martens, Paulus Mare, member of NUSAS, Glen Moss, former president of the University of the Witwatersrand Student Representative Council, Durten Rohm, wife of an atomic scientist, Robert Gordon Young, a former NUSAS official, and Karel Tip, former NUSAS official. However, as noted above, Karel Tip and Glen Moss have since been rearrested.

Detentions: Some Figures

According to the Christian Institute at least 80 people are currently being held in South Africa and Namibia under the Terrorism Act.

The December 1 *Rand Daily Mail* reported that at least 139 Blacks had been detained in the previous 14 months by the Security Police under the Terrorism Act. According to the report 59 persons are being held under the Act without being charged while another 25 persons are facing charges. Another 51, who had been detained, have been freed, but three have been convicted under the Act and one remains unaccounted for.

Most of the 59 known to be held without charges are in solitary confinement without access to lawyers, family, or friends. Of the 51 known to have been freed from detention, 11 were held for over a year and 13 for five months. The arrests by the Security Police have been directed mainly against the South African Students Organization, the Black People's Convention, the South West African People's Organization, the Anti-Coloured Representative Council Front, and the National Youth Organization. (Johannesburg Star, Nov. 22, 29, Dec. 6, 1975.)

POLICE PREPARE FOR CONFLICT

South Africa is setting up a crack police unit to combat "urban terrorism." According to General Gert Prinsloo, Commissioner of Police, the unit will be based near Pretoria but will be deployed in various parts of the country in times of emergency. General Prinsloo refused to say how large the unit will be.

James Kruger, the Minister of Justice and Police, has urged more English-speaking Whites to join the police force. Traditionally the police force has been dominated by Afrikaners, Whites of Dutch settler descent, as opposed to English-speaking Whites of British descent. Speaking at the South African Police College, Mr. Kruger pointed out that only 12.3 per cent of the 1,541 student body was English speaking. (Johannesburg Star, Dec. 6, 1975.)

GOVERNMENT ACTS AGAINST SONNY LEON

Dr. Schalk van der Merwe, Minister of Coloured Affairs, has replaced Labour Party leader Sonny Leon with Mrs. A.A. Jansen as chairman of the executive of the Coloured People's Representative Council (CRC). Sonny Leon was replaced following his refusal to pass the budget of the CRC, an action taken as a form of protest against the oppression of the coloured people.



Mrs. Jansen, who promptly passed the budget, is a Government-appointed member of the CRC and is an employee of the South African Government's Department of Information. "In the unpleasant—but accurate—terminology used by Coloured militants, this makes Mrs. Jansen a government stooge," comments the *Johannesburg Star*.

Sonny Leon and other Labour Party members were elected to the CRC on a platform of destroying the CRC. The Labour Party wants full representation of Coloureds in the White Parliament instead of a separate institution.

Prime Minister Vorster proposed that the CRC be given "cabinet status" and that all affairs concerning both Coloureds and Whites be dealt with by a joint cabinet council that would work on the basis of consensus. If a consensus could not be reached the Prime Minister would make the decision. Under this system any conflicts between Coloureds and Whites would be decided by Whites.

Despite his ouster, Sonny Leon is widely seen as the victor of his showdown with the government. "When Mr. Sonny Leon set out to expose the Coloured Representative Council as a farce he could hardly have counted on getting so much help from the Minister of Coloured Affairs," comments the *Natal Mercury*.

"He [Vorster] is telling the Coloureds they can have separate freedoms, with their own elections and their own Parliament—so long as they elect people who will carry out *his* policies. If they don't, he will cancel their election results or kick out the people they have elected," concludes the *Sunday Express*. (*Johannesburg Star*, Nov. 15, 1975; *Comment & Opinion*, Nov. 21, 1975.)

WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS VOTE FOR UN MEMBERSHIP

In a recent poll, white South Africans were asked, "Do you agree or disagree that South Africa should leave the United Nations?" The poll was conducted by Market Research Africa for the newspaper, the *Johannesburg Star*. The poll showed that 32 per cent of white South Africans felt that South Africa should quit the United Nations, 36 per cent felt that South Africa should stay, and 32 per cent didn't know.

WHITE POLITICS

In November two by-elections took place—one in the Cape Province for the Bellville parliamentary seat and one for the Bryanston seat in the Transvaal Provincial Council. The Progressive Reform Party (PRP) won the Bryanston election and the National Party (NP), the Bellville election. The NP won its victory by a large majority, getting 7,063 votes of the almost 8000 votes cast.

The Bryanston vote was much closer with the PRP getting 4,423 votes and the United Party (UP) getting 3,988 votes. Both the PRP and the UP are opposition parties with the UP being the traditional "official" opposition. However, the PRP is attempting to become that "official" opposition.

The PRP has been assisted in its aim by persistent talk of a coalition being formed between the UP and the ruling NP. Historically the two parties have been divided so that Whites of Dutch descent (Afrikaners) were members of the National Party (NP) and Whites of British descent were in the United Party (UP). However, the conservatives of the UP actually have a basically NP outlook. A UP/NP coalition seems unlikely in the near future. The NP already has a substantial parliamentary majority. However, the NP Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr. Janson, has called on conservative members of the UP to join the NP.

He pointed out that Marais Steyn, a former UP Member of Parliament had joined the NP. After winning an election he became a member of the Cabinet. It appears that some kind of political realignment is likely to take place among Whites, with some members of the UP joining the NP. (*Comment & Opinion*, Nov. 21, 1975; *Johannesburg Star*, Nov. 15, 22, Dec. 6, 1975.)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES

The growing power of the liberation movements in southern Africa is causing the apartheid system's rulers to become very apprehensive about their own future. Despite their propaganda statements proclaiming the system's future "longevity" and "stability," officials are actually worried that the apartheid system's days are numbered. In order to prolong the system's existence, the South African regime is strengthening its ties with its Western allies through seeking increased Western economic investment in the apartheid system. The strategy is to increase that investment in the fields of general commerce and nuclear technology to the point where the actual stability and survival of the Western economy would be dependent upon the survival of the apartheid system. The apartheid regime feels that once this trade and investment situation is reached the Western governments—through pressure by various corporate interests with connections with the apartheid system—will automatically respond favorably to South African propaganda appeals that the defense of the apartheid system equals the defense of the total Western system.

Nuclear Collaboration

South Africa is using its rich uranium reserves both as a means to increase trade ties and to build its own nuclear weapon arsenal. On Nov. 14, 1975, the South African Minister of Mines, Dr. Piet Koornhof, announced that South Africa will proceed to construct a commercial uranium enrichment plant which would be operational in 1984, with full production expected in 1986. He stressed that South Africa was prepared "to *share the benefits of the project with friendly countries, subject to conditions which protect the republic's interests.*" (italics added) (*Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, Nov. 14, 1975)

Western economic interests are also seeking to help South Africa build two nuclear power plants. (*Southern Africa*, December 1975) A manager of the West German firm Kraftwerk Union visited South Africa during December and a spokesman for the company in Frankfurt stated that the final bid would be submitted at the end of that month. The German Atomic Forum, the lobbyist for West German nuclear interests, is aiding the Kraftwerk Union by pressuring the West German Government to grant the necessary export license and credits. Prof. Heinrich Mandel, President of the Forum, justifies his organization's policy by stating that "West Germany . . . is at a considerable disadvantage in regard to its main international competitors due to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This disadvantage must be balanced out by the active support of the [German] Federal Government for the industry's export efforts." The apartheid regime's potential ability to develop a nuclear bomb and the possible consequences of such a development appear not to be of concern to Prof.

Mandel, who is interested only in increasing profits. Meanwhile, Dr. Hans-Gunther Sohl, President of the Federal Association of German Industries (which represents 95 per cent of German private firms) led a 31 person delegation to South Africa in early November. Dr. Sohl stated that "our interest is to increase trade and economic cooperation and we don't think this should be disturbed by political considerations." The discussions between the Federation delegation and the South African regime centered around the nuclear power station—which is being designed to operate a coal liquidification plant in order to insulate South Africa from the effects of an oil boycott—and West German investment in the Bantustans. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 15, Dec. 6, 1975; *Sechaba*, Oct., 1975)

There is opposition in West Germany to that Government's policy towards the South African regime. Parliamentary Deputy, Ms. Lenelotte von Bothmer (Social Democratic Party) stated that "in regard to South Africa, this [Bonn's policy of separating politics from trade] is eyewash, perversion, and untruth. Nobody can overlook how concretely economics is used to determine politics. We put up with representatives of German industry acting against our interests in South Africa; we pretend not to see that they are committing the Federal Republic politically against its will." She added that Vorster's "detente" policy has had the effect of increasing support for the South African regime among Western government officials. Additionally, the West German Anti-Apartheid Movement has threatened to publish more documents on West Germany's connection with the South African nuclear program if the West German Government does not change its policy on nuclear trade with South Africa. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 15, Dec. 6, 1975)

The South African regime is also seeking Japanese cooperation in South Africa's nuclear development program. In particular, they are interested in aid from Japan's Power and Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation which is jointly controlled by Government and private interests. A senior official of the Corporation stated that the Corporation "would like to have dealings with South Africa but it depends . . . on [the] success of their [South Africa's] detente policy. We could in theory cooperate with them now if the public in other countries would turn a blind eye to our dealings." The Kansai Electric Power Company has not waited for the "success" of South Africa's "detente" strategy to collaborate in the South African nuclear program. It has contracted to buy 8200 tons of uranium concentrates (mined in Namibia) over the next ten years. Although the contract has produced general opposition, the Japanese Government has justified its "noninterference" with this contract by stating that the contract was signed before the UN resolution banning removal of Namibian raw materials went into effect. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 22, 1975)

While the West German and Japanese Governments refuse to stop their nuclear industries' collaboration with the apartheid regime, the Dutch Parliament voted in December against giving a Dutch firm—Ryn Schelde-Verolme—permission to submit a bid for building a nuclear power plant in South Africa. (This Dutch firm had sought to bid for the contract in consortium with General Electric of the US and Braun-Boveri of Switzerland.) The Dutch Parliamentary vote was the result of popular opposition to any economic cooperation with the apartheid regime. However, this does not necessarily end that firm's involvement in the nuclear power program because the

Parliament's decision is not binding upon the Dutch Cabinet. It seems that the Dutch Foreign Ministry, plus a majority of the Cabinet are actually in favor of nuclear cooperation with the South African regime. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 6, 1975)

Trade and Investment

In the meantime the apartheid regime has not neglected the expansion of Western investment and trade in non-nuclear areas. In November, a 22-person delegation led by the South African Deputy Secretary of Commerce, Mr. T.F. van der Walt, was in Paris, discussing expanded trade between France and South Africa in the areas of raw materials and chemical products. Last December, while in South Africa as a guest of the South Africa Foundation, the Ombudsman of the Iranian Senate, Senator Amir Hosein Khozume stated that Iran is considering South Africa as a place of investment for Iran's excess oil revenue. Additionally, South Africa opened an embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel in early December. Trade between these two countries has increased by 300 per cent over the past few years. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 29, Dec. 6, 1975; *WINS*, New York, Dec. 19, 1975)

Strategic Links

Besides trade and investment, South Africa's foreign policy strategy vis-a-vis the West emphasizes the issue of South Africa's "vital strategic position." The apartheid regime is claiming that the Soviets "are threatening" the West's oil lifeline around the Cape and that "communism is penetrating" into southern Africa. However, the apartheid regime has a very strange political vocabulary—maybe only matched by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Ambassador to the UN, Daniel P. Moynihan. In the apartheid regime's peculiar political dictionary "communism" is defined as the objective of any group or individual which seeks to change the current oppressive situation in South Africa. But more importantly, Western political officials have picked up on this theme and are using it to justify their increasingly closer ties to the South African regime. According to Western strategists it is necessary to "maintain" the balance of power between the superpowers on the African continent. Officials like Kissinger, can neither accept the reality that the liberation movements are the expressions of the popular aspirations of the peoples of southern Africa, nor accept the principles of democracy in the area of foreign policy decision-making. Reports from the December meeting of NATO indicate that Sir Peter Hill-Norton, Admiral of the NATO Fleet and Chairman of the Military Committee, advocated the expansion of NATO's official defense area to the southern region of Africa. Few NATO Governments seem opposed to Hill-Norton's proposal. (*Associated Press*, Dec 9, 1975)

ECONOMICS

IMMIGRATION KEY TO SOUTH AFRICAN GROWTH

The Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council has estimated that South Africa will need 14-15,000 economically active white immigrants (a total of 30-40,000 persons) per year until 1980 in order to achieve a 5.75 per cent growth rate in the economy. In 1975 it is calculated that there will be 42,000 immigrants, half of them from Britain where the economy is in a severe depression. The

government Department of Immigration finds jobs for almost half the arrivals. It is claimed that the presence of each new immigrant creates jobs for four Blacks, mainly as servants.

But immigration is obviously only one solution to the labor shortage problem. The mining industry estimates that it will need 10,000 graduate engineers within the next ten years. There is a continual plea for more training for black workers, with only erratic results. A liberal trade union official asserted that even if all Whites in South Africa were employed in skilled positions, the economy would still need 2 million Blacks by 1980. Yet there were only 3,680 black tradesmen trained from 1972-75 and only 630 were in secondary technical courses. South Africa spends only four per cent of its budget on education (compared to Japan which spends more than 11 per cent). Private industry has not developed training programs despite government tax concessions.

South African Government-sponsored and supported training centers are beginning to appear. But interestingly enough, one planned in the East Rand for training Blacks in civil engineering and construction skills (the Apex In-Service Training Centre at Benoni), will not train skilled workers but will offer only fundamentals. Seven other centers are planned, including ones in the area of pharmaceuticals and hotel industries. There is also a government approved course for Blacks given by the Business Equipment Association in the service and repair of business equipment.

Once again the social system appears to be interfering with the efficient operation of the economy. Obviously solutions will continue to occur to those dependent upon expanding the industrial economy. Some propose to increase productivity by mechanization, automation and lowering restrictive barriers to black advancement in order to create a better domestic market and less restless work force.

Labor costs due to inflationary pressures have jumped some 173 per cent in banking, and 190 per cent in manufacturing over their 1970 levels. Pay for skilled and semi-skilled labor reveals the Whites still far ahead with a 48 per cent rise from 1970-1975 to an average of R323 (\$371) per month; African skilled and semi-skilled wages rose 86 per cent over the same time period to R164 (\$188) per month, while for Coloured workers it was up 76 per cent to R208 (\$239) per month. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 21; Oct. 18, 25; Nov. 8, 28, 29, 1975)

RICHEST BANTUSTAN IN TROUBLE

Bophuthatswana, the richest of the South African "homelands," is faced with severe economic problems. Sixty four per cent of Tswana citizens don't even live in the Bantustan which is located near the industrial growth area north of Pretoria. 71 per cent of its economically active population works outside Bophuthatswana, and only 14 per cent of Tswana people's income is spent in the "home land." There are some 61,000 workers in the 25 mines located in the Bantustan but most of them are not Tswana. Housing is inadequate for the huge population increase in the last years, and it is estimated in the government study that 9,100 new jobs in the "homeland" will be needed each year to stop people from leaving. Agricultural development is poor, only seven per cent of the land is arable. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 15, 1975)

DECENTRALIZATION PLANS HIT INDUSTRY

The South African Government has made its first move to encourage an entire industry to decentralize its opera-

tions by moving it towards the Bantustans. The Transvaal Clothing industry has been asked by the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) to cooperate, with the BIC offering training courses, the erection of buildings and repair shops, transport aid and other incentives as lures. Ms. Anna Scheepers of the Garment Workers Union insists that black women, who make up the bulk of the clothing workers, will not want to move back to the "homelands" or accept the lower wages offered in those areas. Two clothing factories have already left the Transvaal because pressures applied under the Physical Planning Act make it difficult to obtain sufficient labor. Instead of going to the Bantustans these firms have moved to Durban and Cape Town. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 8, 1975)

Minister of Planning Loots has announced that since 1961 R66 million (\$75.9 million) has been spent by 20 local authorities for decentralization growth point plan, and jobs have been created in the process for 11,728 Whites, 100,596 Blacks and 12,572 Coloured and Asian peoples. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 8, 1975) It is obvious however that the government will have to do more than offer incentives or manipulate the law to force business into the "homelands."

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD—ECONOMIC NOTES

Christian Concern for Southern Africa, a group which advises British churches on investment policies, has produced a report criticizing the British firm Consolidated Gold Fields as a company which perpetuates apartheid and exploitation through its South African subsidiaries. CGF employs 70 per cent of all Africans working for British mining interests in South Africa and one third of all Africans working for British companies. Although CGF has increased its wages the gap is still huge with white workers earning ten times as much as Blacks. The gap between Black and White in absolute wages has increased by 19 per cent in the last two years and Blacks still earn below the poverty datum line. Profits by the CGF group have increased by 370 per cent in the last three years. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 19, 1975; *Guardian*, London, Nov. 18, 1975)

The British Labour Party's international subcommittee has passed a resolution condemning the British Government's support to the British Steel Company's expansion plans in South Africa's ferrochrome industry. 50 Labour MPs and many other labor officials have loudly condemned the Government. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 15, 1975; see *Southern Africa*, November, 1975)

A 22 person economic mission from South Africa visited France to firm up economic links begun during a similar visit to the Republic by the French last April. 1600 South African business people will attend the French trade fair in 1975 compared to 270 persons in 1972. French investment is concentrated in raw materials, chemicals, iron and steel in South Africa. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 22, 1975).

Japan, in the process of trying to diversify its energy sources, is turning back to coal, and it appears it will need to import additional steam coal from South Africa as well as from China and Australia. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 20, 1975)

The US Fuller Company subsidiary in South Africa, GATX-Fuller (Pty.) Ltd., is planning a R10 million (R11.5 m.) expansion of a cement factory in Uruguay selling 3,000 tons of equipment and sending technical personnel. The sale is underwritten by the South African Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation and the govern-

ment Dept. of Commerce with export credits of 85 per cent of the contract. The same government credits will be provided for the manufacturing and supply of a R12 million (\$13.8 m.) oil drilling platform built with 80 per cent South African content by Dorman Long Vanderbijl Corporation to be sold to the United States. (*SAFTO*, Sept., 1975)

The US company, Mack Trucks Inc., has in the past designed a bus chassis for "black transport needs" and a bumper truck chassis for South Africa. The overseas chairman of Mack said he was very impressed by South Africa's stability and the company may take direct equity in its local assembly plants. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 22, 1975)

MINING NEWS

The Deputy Chairman of Anglo American, W.D. Wilson, has announced that the company plans to increase family housing for workers, but admits that because of government restrictions on married quarters this will not have a "real impact" on the migratory labor system. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 8, 1975)

600 black workers in an Orange Free State gold mine refused to undergo acclimatization training (exercises which simulate the underground hot humid conditions), and 180 of them asked to be sent home. In another incident 3,500 workers at Rand Mines did not go to work because of "misunderstandings" about wages, with what was reported to be "uncontrolled demonstrations" by some Mozambicans. At another Orange Free State mine 18 people were hurt after fires broke out after a wage dispute. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 22, 1975)

SA STATE CORPORATIONS INCREASE ROLE

South Africa's economy is increasingly managed and financed through government corporations or parastatals such as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and others which function in the fields of energy (SASOL, SOEKOR) heavy industry (ISCOR), armaments, transport and chemicals. A recent analysis by the London Africa Bureau suggests that the state companies function to enable the inflow of capital, with increased foreign borrowing, into key economic sectors; to assert Afrikaner economic interests above the traditional British ones; and to create a self-sufficient economy cushioned against international boycotts. Public investment in the economy via state organizations has doubled from 1969-1974, and the IDC has financed 2,000 projects spending R1400 million (\$1610 million). A University of York economist estimates that foreign investment and imported technology are responsible for two thirds of the growth of South Africa's GNP since 1957. The Africa Publications Trust has several pamphlets on these issues including, "The Nature and Role of Foreign Investment in SA", John Suckling; and "The Role of Foreign Loans in SA's Economic Growth: Foreign Investment in SA—the Economic Factor," by Ruth Weiss. For information write: Africa Publications Trust, 48 Grafton Way, London, W.1. England. (*X-Ray*, London, Sept.-Oct., 1975)

"DO SOMETHING"—GOVERNMENT PLEA ON INFLATION

The Government has launched a huge public relations effort to convince the population to participate in anti-inflationary measures. The slogan for the campaign is "Do something—it does help"—spend less, produce more. The *Sunday Times* has reversed the motto and called upon the government to "do something". "Through its giant public corporations and its other vast enterprise, Pretoria dominates the South African economy as do few other governments in capitalistic states. It is not enough to call upon the public to make sacrifices: the Government must be seen to fulfil its promises to curb its own extravagance. It must DO something." (*Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, Nov. 9, 1975)

Although the government has pledged and been pushed to decrease spending, it has also said it will continue investing in the "infrastructure and essential industries" in the country, mentioning the steel plant at Saldanha Bay in the Western Cape. The project will cost R1500 million (\$1725 million) and when finished will produce semi-finished steel products and earn R350 million/year (\$402 million), in foreign revenue. Government cutbacks are planned in public services, in health, education and transport.

The existing lack of decent living standards for Africans was stressed by an African member of the East Rand regional committee for labor when he cited that the cost of education for a Standard 7, (in the US Grade 9) went from R30 (\$34.50) a year in 1971 to R50 (\$57.50)/year in 1975. "You are killing the future of our children" he told the wage board, showing that there has been a 200-300 per cent rise in the price of essentials. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 8, Dec. 6, 1975)

NEW MOVES BY BOSSES

One of the bosses most important organisations, the Federated Chamber of Industries, has written to Mr. Marais Viljoen, the Minister of Labour. They have asked: (i) That the Minister note that Black workers are beginning to press for Trade Unions. (ii) That Black trade unions are 'one of the requirements for future industrial peace.'

Workers will be please to know that the need for workers unity and organisation is today so strong that the bosses can not afford to ignore it.

But workers must also be aware of the fact that if the bosses are keen to see trade unions, then there must be a reason why, they want them. The reason is that they feel they will be able to set up organisations that they can fill with stooges and manipulate. Workers must be on their guard against this and make sure that their representatives always act in their interests. Representatives must express the workers' views at all times, or else the workers must recall them.

Organisation requires unity and vigilance.

From *Abasabenzi*, English Translation, a Cape Town publication for workers., July, 1975, No. 5

namibia

THE HOME FRONT

In addition to being the corridor and staging area for South African intervention in Angola, Namibia has increasingly been the site for the spreading war in southern Africa. A farmer's wife and son were killed by guerrillas, says an announcement from Windhoek. (*Washington Post*, Dec. 22, 1975) The attack was at Grootfontein, 100 miles south of the Angola border and not far from the huge military installation being hurriedly developed by the South African occupation forces (see *Southern Africa*, January, 1976). On the night of December 22, a businessman traveling along a road outside Tsumeb, site of the American-controlled Tsumeb Corporation and even further south from the border, was shot at. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, Dec. 23, 1975) New Years day, 1976, opened with the slaying of "a Briton and an African woman working for him" by machine gun fire in the village of Oshandi, four miles from the border. (*New York Times*, Jan. 2, 1975)

The *Advertiser* writes almost daily front-page headlines such as "Mystery Murders" and "Anti-Terror Pincer Closes" and features photographs of helicopter searches and armed soldiers standing guard. Owambo chief minister Njoba declared armed insurgents with automatic weapons were ranging deep inside his Bantustan which borders on

Angola. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 12, 1975)

The Johannesburg *Star* of Dec. 6 reported that "South Africa is flying anti-terrorist police to Owambo to launch an intensive campaign against SWAPO guerrilla activity in South West Africa." South African Minister of Police Jimmy Kruger, stated the operation was "entirely divorced from the military action . . . we are going to clear Owambo." The *Star* air edition of December 13 ran a story on the creation of a 10 km deep "security zone" along Owambo's 400 km border with Angola. A study is being made on clearing all inhabitants and vegetation from this area and a decision will be announced at the end of January. Such a program would uproot tens of thousands of people from their homes.

Three women (one of them 18 years old) and three men went on trial in the Supreme Court in Windhoek on December 1 charged with violations of the South African regime's Terrorism Act. (*Windhoek Advertiser*, Dec. 1, 1975) They are accused of being supporters of SWAPO and of committing terrorist acts in Angola or Namibia. The women are nurses at the Lutheran hospital at Engeli in Owambo. Six other nurses and four Lutheran pastors are still detained as are at least a dozen other people.

Over 200 demonstrators stood on the court house steps carrying placards and singing SWAPO songs.

zimbabwe

NKOMO-SMITH TALKS

On the first of December Joshua Nkomo and Ian Smith signed a declaration of intent to negotiate a settlement in Rhodesia. One of the key issues of the eight-point agreement was Clause Five which grants "full freedom and/or diplomatic immunity" in a number of respects for African National Council representatives. Specifically Clause Five

assures that ANC representatives 1) will be immune to preventive detention or restriction "for any act or omission in or outside Rhodesia"; 2) will be able to freely enter and depart from Rhodesia; 3) will have complete freedom of speech at any meetings in Rhodesia, subject to the confidentiality of the talks; 4) will not be subjected to any observation, harassment, or recording by any means.

Smith and Joshua Nkomo sign the declaration of intent to negotiate.



"not expressly authorized by themselves." By "representatives" the document means all persons nominated by the ANC to attend any meeting in Rhodesia "in any capacity whatsoever, whether as delegates, advisers, aides or in any other capacity." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 6, 1975)

The ANC referred to in the document is the one led by Nkomo's faction of the organization. He could, in theory, invite Bishop Muzorewa and Rev. Sithole of the original ANC to join in the talks. They would have to accept Nkomo as leader of the ANC delegation, and it is highly unlikely that they would consider such a position. (*International News Press Agency*, Paris, Dec. 4, 1975)

Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, and Mozambique have refused to endorse the Nkomo/Smith pact, despite Nkomo's visit to those countries. President Nyerere of Tanzania, during a visit to Britain, reaffirmed his conviction that diplomatic efforts were doomed in the struggle for majority rule in Zimbabwe. (*Guardian*, London, Nov. 20, 1975)

Nkomo has said that he demands a transition to majority rule within twelve months and a major role in the Government immediately. The ANC, he says, will demand an immediate franchise which ensures a greater number of African voters than the present 90,000 whites. "We must have a common franchise that produces a preponderance of African voters which in turn produces a preponderance of African Members of Parliament resulting in an African government."

One executive of the ANC says that they are willing to settle for eight of the 14 places in a transitional cabinet.

These would include Nkomo as Prime Minister and the portfolios of foreign affairs, agriculture, education, labor and internal affairs going to the ANC. The Rhodesian Front would hold the portfolios of defense, finance, commerce, and industry. Each white Minister would have an ANC deputy and each African Minister would have a white deputy. (*Observer*, London, Nov. 30, 1975)

British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, David Ennals, met with Nkomo in Lusaka and described their talks as "friendly, fruitful and cordial." Mr. Ennals arrived in Lusaka for talks with Rhodesian nationalist leaders regarding the possible role Britain might have in the settlement. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Dec. 6, 1975)

SITHOLE WHEREABOUTS KNOWN

Edson Sithole, Publicity Secretary of the Muzorewa/Ndabaningi Sithole faction of the ANC, was kidnapped several weeks ago and his whereabouts have been unknown. However, a secret document cited by the *Sunday Times* of South Africa says that he is in a high security detention camp within Rhodesia. The paper claims that Rhodesian Security Police under Smith's direct control kidnapped Sithole and detained him for weeks. The paper claims further that the Rhodesian government wanted Sithole out of the way so that it could move ahead on negotiations with the Nkomo faction of the ANC. Sithole is known as a militant and articulate leader within his group. He was one of the few top leaders still within the country when Nkomo began his talks with Smith in late August. (*Africa News*, Durham, North Carolina, Dec. 11, 1975)

the struggle continues

MOZAMBIQUE

RIGHTIST REVOLT PUT DOWN

On December 17 the Mozambican Government put down a rebellion by about 400 soldiers and policemen. This attempted coup was apparently a reaction to the recent Government purge of corruption and indiscipline in the armed forces and was directed against the main power station, the radio stations, and the city airfield. Many people were reported dead as a result of the clash between the dissidents and loyalist troops. Several hundred of the former were arrested, and it is reported that trials will begin soon in Cabo Delgado, part of the area liberated by Frelimo during the war.

The Frelimo Government has indicated in its broadcasts that it views the coup attempt as a spontaneous outbreak and not a part of an ongoing plot. President Samora Machel has, however, repeatedly warned in recent weeks of the necessity for heightened vigilance against counterrevolution.

A few days before the uprising, the Military High Command held a mass meeting of over 5,000 soldiers and police. At the meeting Machel denounced those who had taken advantage of their position to abuse the people. A number of suspected soldiers were personally questioned by the President during the session. (*New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1975; *Guardian*, New York, Dec. 31, 1975)

ORGANIZING A COMMUNAL VILLAGE

The communal village is the foundation upon which the unity of the people of Mozambique will grow. It is not simply a collection of families—it is more like being part of a "village family" with your "relatives" (other communal villages) close by. The development of the communal village is a collective process with each member donating his/her ideas according to his/her experiences. The proposed way of constructing such villages across the country was discussed at the Organization of the Residential Area in a Communal Village Seminar at the First National Agricultural Meeting at Beira Province from September 18 to the 23, 1975. The Seminar was presided over by Julio Carrilho, Minister of Public Works and Inhabitation.

The reasons for organizing living space into communal villages are political, social, and economic. In the past, it was much easier for the colonists to take over because of isolated families living here and there. In communal villages, the people will help each other. Also, the political ideology of Frelimo will reach more people in a short period of time. Lastly, it's cheaper.

The communal village will create conditions for producing enough food and obtaining necessities for the entire population of the village. More people will have

access to social services such as schools, medical centers, day-care centers. Streets will be lined with fruit trees to offer protection from the sun and wind. Roads will be constructed to connect one village with the other.

The distance between streets and residential areas should be a distance of no less than 100 meters. Residential areas should be on dry land with an inclination of approximately 5 per cent facing North. Trees should be cut down only if absolutely necessary—for making roads, building houses, schools, sanitary facilities, People's Shops, warehouses, etc. This is because trees protect not only from the sun and facilitate a better climate but provide a kind of barrier against strong winds and protect the soil from torrential rains.

There will be cultural centers, meeting places, gymnasiums, and sport camps. A central shop for housing and repairing of vehicles and machines will be built. In order to take care of the administrative aspects of communal living, a center for that purpose will exist. Here police, radio, mail, and registration (birth, death, marriages) offices will be located.

Each family will have enough land on which to build a house and have a garden. Recreation areas will be set up in order for all to rest and enjoy fresh air.

In the communal village all work that is done will be for the benefit of everyone. It also ensures that facilities and resources will be used adequately, i.e., a water pump constructed over a river will benefit 500 to 1,200 families instead of a few. In communal living, it's much more feasible to install electricity.

A village will be made up of districts. Each district should not have less than 250 families. Each village should not have less than two districts—2,000 to 3,000 persons or 500 families. A village made up of five districts or 1,250 families (6,000 individuals) is ideal. It provides the opportunity in the future of establishing a high school, maternity hospital, and a developed central area.

Between each district should be a distance of from 100 to 200 meters in which a grove is conserved and converted into a park. The park will lead into the center of the village. The distance between two districts should be from 250 to 800 meters.

Growing maize in the liberated zones of Mozambique. A strong emphasis is being placed on agriculture.



How Communal Villages are Created

The villages will be created in one of two ways. If a village already exists in a good location, i.e., access to water all year around for drinking, sanitary, and agricultural purposes, then it will be adapted to the conditions of a communal village: the houses will be lined up, roads made wider if they are too narrow, trees planted, gutters and sanitary facilities created. An entire village will be created from scratch after careful analysis of a potential area. In addition to criteria such as access to water, other criteria will be used: is the area within easy reach of other villages? Is there a national network of roads such that agricultural, industrial, and artisan products can be transported by truck or boat? How should the area of one village be constructed so that it does not infringe on the privacy of another residential area?

As of now, no communal village has been completed. They are being worked on. Frelimo knows what it wants to do—they have developed their plan, it now has to be put into practice. (*Tempo*, Lourenco Marques, Oct. 12, 1975).

GUINEA-BISSAU



Lun Cabral, President of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau

INSIDE THE REPUBLIC

Following the release of dozens of political prisoners in October 1975, officials in the Council of State noted that some 180 persons are still being held on charges of collaboration with the enemy. (*El Moudjahid*, Algiers, Oct. 31, 1975; *O Seculo*, Lisbon, Oct. 21, 1975) The trials of those charged with association with the PIDE secret police during the war and membership in the MDG (Guinea Democratic Movement), a front organization for Portuguese General Spinoia. The trials to be held soon will be public with counsel provided by the state. The death penalty is possible in cases of treason. (*West Africa*, Lagos, Sept. 1, 1975). The death penalty has also been decreed for armed robbery in uniform in response to an increase of this crime in recent months. This move follows the sentencing of nine convicts to two to ten year terms of hard labor for robbery and theft. (*West Africa*, Lagos, Nov. 3, 1975)

In the economic development of the Republic tight austerity is combined with a continuing emphasis on agriculture. A \$3 million project is planned to regulate water

filtration to deep underground canals and to provide erosion control dams. (AFP, Paris, Nov. 18, 1975)

In Bissau, *barrio* (neighborhood) committees have been set up to parallel the structures found in the liberated zones during the war. These committees also control the Peoples Stores (Armazens do Povo) which have a complete monopoly over the trade in primary necessities such as rice, sugar, oil, and flour. In response to ultra-left criticism, President Luis Cabral noted that "we are not hysterical revolutionaries"; constant progress is being made and nothing will be torn down until an alternative structure is ready to take its place. Thus, the large Portuguese monopolies, CUF and Gouvea will function until the Peoples Stores are fully articulated into the new economy. (Daily News, Dar es Salaam, September 12, 1975) At the end of the war and the beginning of independence in September 1974, there were 24 Peoples Stores. By September 1975 this number had reached 72 with a target of 100 by the end of December and the goal of 120 by mid 1976. This rapid development in the commercial sector involves 40 million escudos [approximately 24 escudos to \$1.00] each month and now employs more than 1,200 persons. The network is currently based in old Portuguese military camps. For 1976 there are plans to import certain types of machinery for agricultural purposes. In 1977 the development plans count on exports of rice, oil, and timber and by 1980 it is anticipated that the Guinean economy will be self-sufficient in sugar with a surplus for export. (Marches Tropicaux, Paris, Sept. 5, 1975)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In response to Guinea-Bissau solidarity with MPLA Portugal slowed down its shipments of food and medical supplies and failed to replace some doctors whose terms of employment had expired. With the rightward swing in Lisbon, relations have deteriorated as the latest Lisbon government does not give full support to the MPLA in Angola. Nevertheless new doctors are coming from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Yugoslavia. The Republic of Guinea Bissau has also rejected French proposals to construct a French cultural center in Bissau in view of the French support to the FNLA forces attacking the MPLA from Zaire. (O Seculo, Lisbon, Oct. 25, 1975; West Africa, Lagos, Nov. 3, 1975)

Relations with Algeria continue to strengthen with agreements signed for 1000 tons of butane gas, 2,000 hectolitres of Algerian wine, building materials, cement, and one million metres of Algerian cloth. (African Development, London, November 1975) The Soviet Union continues to be Guinea's strongest supporter and has now provided an undisclosed number of Mig jet fighter planes in order to build the new nation's Air Force. England has provided some \$2 million of economic assistance. (New York Times, Dec. 2, 1975). Relations with Brazil, which has also recognized the legitimate government of Angola, have improved in the areas of public administration and economic agreements. (Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, Aug. 27, 1975)

CAPE VERDE

THE REPUBLIC OF CAPE VERDE

In the Republic of Cape Verde PIDE collaborators during the war have recently been tried and convicted with

sentences of up to eight years as well as a period of twelve years without political rights. A governmental decree has been promulgated which nationalizes lands which are not directly farmed by the owners; this will affect large scale holdings of non-residents. (O Seculo, Lisbon, Oct. 20, 1975)

Rainfall was especially good this year and many believe that the drought may have come to an end. Fields of maize, beans, manioc, and sweet potatoes are reported to be growing well. Wide-spread mobilization of the people for agricultural production has taken place to reduce the dependency on imported foods. Various water conservation measures are underway such as new dams and reforestation projects. (AFP, Paris, Nov. 18, 1975)

Modest amounts of foreign aid continue to reach the islands. Rumania has granted support in agriculture, fishing, geological research, and industrial development. (AFP, Paris, Oct. 28, 1975) Holland has provided about \$4 million for various development projects plus an additional \$0.8 million for food. (AFP, Paris, November 4, 1975) The World Council of Churches has expanded its aid program to Cape Verde with a grant of \$200,000 in aid which will be primarily directed toward the purchase of fertilizers. (O Seculo, Lisbon, Sept. 6, 1975)

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

During the summer of 1975 the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (MLSTP) won its independence and immediately began to institute a program of economic and political changes. In its foreign policy it has banned all South African use of its airfields and most recently has granted the use of the airfields to the MPLA to which it gives its unconditional support. (Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, November 15, 1975) Some refugees from the islands have been returning from Angola in recent months due to the war of aggression being launched against the MPLA. The arrival of these refugees does not help the severe problems of housing and employment in the two islands. (Zambia Daily Mail, Lusaka, Aug. 28, 1975)

The Soviet Union recognized the new Republic at independence and has now exchanged ambassadors. (Washington Post, Aug. 13, 1975) Large-scale agricultural schemes have been nationalized to bring cocoa and fruit production under the control of the MLSTP. The nationalization without compensation is similar to the program of Soviet collectivization known as "sovchozes". Each new collective will include a management team of one worker, one technician, and one party representative.

The MLSTP has joined the Lome Convention of nations of West Africa, along with the Republic of Cape Verde. This convention provides the economic contacts which permit affiliation with the EEC of Europe. (Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, Oct. 16, 1975)

neighbors

THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY

The Zambian economic crisis continues because of transport difficulties and falling copper prices. In October Zambia increased the *force majeure* on contracted copper shipments to 40 per cent for one consortium's production (Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines) and to 30 per cent for the other's (Roan Consolidated Mines). The two consortia have already been forced to borrow nearly \$200 million from Western banks to underwrite recent losses and may have to borrow \$300 million in 1976. Zambia will have a balance of payments deficit this year of about \$220 million, because copper earnings (98 per cent of foreign exchange revenues in 1974) have fallen a staggering 40 per cent to about \$900 million. In August Zambia had just enough foreign reserves (about \$75 million) to cover one month's imports. (*Africa*, November 1975; *Africa News*, Nov. 28, 1975; *Tanzania Daily News*, Oct. 27, 1975; *The Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 22, 1975)

Tanzania cannot handle the increased load of Zambian exports and imports. The railway can take only about 25,000 tons a month. 160 of the trucks operating on the road cannot function because of an absence of spare parts. At last report 87,000 tons of imports were stockpiled at the Dar es Salaam harbor. Zambia has complained about licensing fees for importers and handling and storage fees and is now arguing before the East African Harbour Corporation about high tariff rates and surcharges. Between January and September of 1975, Dar handled about 270,000 tons of imports and about 247,000 tons of exports for Zambia. (*Tanzania Daily News*, Nov. 13 and 15, 1975; *The Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 29, 1975)

To diversify its outlets, Zambia recently authorized 91 subcontractors to operate trucks on Mozambique routes, with a carrying capacity of 2,290 tons. They will export through Moatize (Tete; 800 km. from Lusaka) and Beira (1400 km. from Lusaka) and return empty, except perhaps for some imports now being rerouted from Lobito to Beira. Zambia is also running 105 trucks to the Salima rail head in Malawi, where the copper will be transhipped by rail to Beira. James Mapowa, Zambia's Minister for Power, Transport, and Works, recently announced an agreement with Mozambique for a rail link between the two countries. Offers of funds have been received for the survey and design work, which will determine the most feasible route. (*Africa*, November 1975; Associated Press dispatch, Lusaka, Dec. 5, 1975)

On a more positive note, the National Agricultural Marketing Board purchased over six million 90-kilogram bags of maize from farmers before Oct. 23, 1975, and has set a target of eight million bags for 1976. The expanded production was in part a response to increased prices, ranging from about 26 to 38 per cent on the three grades of maize, offered by the Government. In addition, the state mining corporation (MINDECO) is increasing its exploration for minerals throughout the country in an effort to diminish dependence on copper. (*Africa*, November 1975; *The Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 8, 1975)



ZAMBIA IN RELATION TO ZIMBABWE AND ANGOLA

Livingstone Member of Parliament Arthur Wina made a speech to his constituents on November 16 in which he said that Zambia had fulfilled its obligations on the Rhodesian problem and must now exploit all available outlets to the sea in order to solve its economic difficulties. (*Zambia Daily Mail*, Nov. 17, 1975) Ten days later President Kaunda said that he welcomed the current constitutional negotiations between Joshua Nkomo and Ian Smith if they produce a settlement based on immediate African majority rule, but that Zambia did not support any particular leader in Zimbabwe and that the battlefield would be the only recourse if negotiations fail. (Associated Press dispatch, Lusaka, Dec. 2, 1975) Zambia has complained vigorously to the British High Commission about Stephen Miles' article in the November 19 *Guardian*, in which the author declared that Messrs. Vorster, Kaunda, Smith and Nkomo had worked out an agreement on Rhodesia and that it was linked to a secret South African loan to the ailing Zambian economy. The Foreign Minister said the story was 'malicious and unfounded' and could prejudice Zambian-British relations. (*The Guardian*, Nov. 22, 1975)

While remaining officially neutral in the Angolan struggle, Zambia may be backing Jonas Savimbi of UNITA, who claimed in November that he could reopen the Benguela railway within a month. (*The Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 22, 1975) President Kaunda has allowed UNITA to maintain offices in Lusaka, disseminates UNITA information to foreign correspondents and has loaned his private plane to Savimbi. (*New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1975) Washington intelligence sources have indicated to the *New York Times* (for example, articles of Dec. 14-16) that it was the intervention of President Kaunda as well as President Mobutu which helped produce US support for UNITA and FNLA in 1975.



President Nyerere in London meets with Prime Minister Harold Wilson (left) and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan

NYERERE'S POSITION ON ZIMBABWE

In his first State visit to Britain since 1961, President Nyerere of Tanzania declared that negotiations on Zimbabwe had failed and that only guerilla warfare could now bring about majority rule in the country. Tanzania would support that warfare, he said. In addition, he criticized South Africa's unwillingness to negotiate with the nationalist movement of Namibia; instead, South Africa is attempting to divide Namibians along tribal lines while using the territory as a staging post for the activities of its troops and mercenaries in Angola. The *Times* of London took exception to Nyerere's prognosis for Zimbabwe and urged the Tanzanian leader to put pressure on the African leaders to 'give Mr. Nkomo his chance' through negotiations. (See *Southern Africa*, January 1976 for speech by President Nyerere) (*Guardian*, Nov. 20, 1975; *Times of Zambia*, Nov. 20, 1975; *Sunday Times of Zambia*, Nov. 23, 1975; *The Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 22 and 29, 1975)

DEVELOPMENTS IN LESOTHO

Prime Minister Jonathan has appointed two members of opposition parties to cabinet posts in an apparent effort at political reconciliation. They are Gerard Ramoreboli of the Parliamentary Congress Party, the new Justice Minister, and Patrick Lehloenya of the Marema Tlou Freedom Party, now in the Prime Minister's office. Four other new appointments were also made. (*Times of Zambia*, Nov. 14, 1975) The Prime Minister has struck a more conciliatory note in his recent statements about South Africa, despite Pretoria's decision to devalue the Rand without consulting Lesotho. Lesotho recently handed back to South African authorities one Mantsoe Ramokgoase, a political refugee and former executive member of the Sharpeville Youth Club. Ramokgoase has been de-

tained initially in the purge of the Black Consciousness movement. In contrast, Botswana and recently Swaziland have allowed political refugees free passage and, in some cases, asylum. (*Africa*, November 1975)

Lesotho will spend \$35 million on agriculture in its second five-year plan in an effort to achieve self-sufficiency in food production. 30 UN experts and 15 volunteers will be attached to the Department of Agriculture. The Government will sponsor capital improvement projects like the Phuthiatsana Irrigation Scheme. Mineral exploration and exploitation will continue, thanks especially to Canadian moneys. British aid for 1975-6 will total over six million dollars while US assistance through AID was four million dollars last year. In spite of the projects and aid, the World Bank sees the development prospects of the mountain state as very bleak, given its small size, overpopulation and poverty of natural resources. (*Africa*, November 1975; *The Star*, Nov. 29, 1975)

JEHOVAHS WITNESSES IN MALAWI

According to the December 8 issue of *Awake*, the Jehovah's Witness newspaper, Witnesses are being persecuted on a serious scale in Malawi and to a lesser extent in Mozambique and Zambia for refusal to bear arms and swear allegiance to the nation. The Malawi Congress Party's Youth League touched off the latest series of beatings and confiscations in such villages as Bundu, Nyanga, Phatha, and Kanchenche. Since 1972, 36,000 adults and children have fled Malawi for Mozambique. After coming to power last June 25, FRELIMO has required refugees to swear allegiance to their regime. The Witnesses have refused and have been driven back to Malawi. (Associated Press dispatch from Johannesburg, *New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1975)

at the united nations



South African Prime Minister, J.B. Vorster

US DOUBLE-TALK ON APARTHEID

An unusual incident, involving Prime Minister Vorster on the one side and the US delegation on the other, took place during the last session of the UN General Assembly. Vorster was reportedly upset by statements made by Clarence Mitchell, head of the Washington office of the NAACP and ad hoc member of the US delegation this year. In a speech on October 23, Mitchell had condemned South Africa for detaining opponents of apartheid. Vorster promptly gave a press conference in which he labeled the statement a "downright lie." In a second speech, on November 28, Mitchell charged that "the majority of South Africans live under an oppressive Government which deprives them of their basic human rights" and that "the South African system of laws is designed and administered so as to prevent that majority from taking effective action to alter that condition of fundamental deprivation." Again, Vorster hastened to accuse Mitchell of "uninformed and biased" views. The *New York Times* hailed the speech as "the strongest official attack the US has ever made against South Africa."

Regardless of Mitchell's personal honesty and good intentions, however, it is clear that such exercises at the UN are basically a smokescreen thrown up by the US to deceive both domestic and international opinion about its real interests and actions. Every year, the US delegation issues some ritual condemnation of apartheid, usually

limited to the question of repressive laws and the denial of human rights. The presence of a black civil rights leader in the US delegation is obviously intended to add credibility to US propaganda, and it is depressing that Mitchell, like others before him, would let himself be used in this way. Mitchell's speech, which conveniently ignored the economic and military dimensions of apartheid and US interests in Southern Africa, was not very different from previous US statements on apartheid in the UN. Such statements, therefore, cannot be seen as anything more than a propaganda exercise. What was different this year was Vorster's reaction, probably destined for his own home public. Certainly this year, with Daniel Moynihan as chief US representative, it was clear that the US was engaged in image-making at the UN, rather than diplomacy. Of all Moynihan's antics at the UN, the height of duplicity was reached during the debate in the Assembly on an amendment seeking to condemn South Africa for its intervention in Angola. Moynihan charged the makers of the resolution with hypocrisy (because they were not attacking Soviet or Cuban involvement), but refused to condemn the S.A. invasion. Even on human rights issues, however, which the US has liked to champion in the past, the US approach was very ambiguous this year.

Three weeks after the first Mitchell speech and about a week before the second, Daniel Moynihan charged that the UN was using "selective morality" in attacking only South Africa and Chile on the question of political prisoners. He complained that the reason why these countries were singled out was that they still permitted enough freedom for international opposition to make its voice heard, and "if the language of human rights can be turned against one democracy, why not all democracies?" Moynihan sought to water down the resolutions already adopted by introducing his own resolution, calling for the release of political prisoners everywhere. As most Third World countries refused to be taken in by this maneuver, he was forced eventually to withdraw his resolution. Observers, however, indicated that the total effect of Moynihan's tactics, plus the previous controversy over the anti-Zionism resolution, had been to considerably weaken the UN "decade of action" against racism—a result which must not have displeased the US Government, never keen on UN initiatives on racism for obvious international reasons. In addition, neither Moynihan's drum-beating on Soviet presence in Angola or on anti-Zionism action, nor Mitchell's statements on the evils of apartheid, can well hide the unmistakable trend towards growing collaboration with the racist regimes of Southern Africa. As the African ambassador put it: "There has been a shift by the US towards South Africa. It has been coming for some time, and the Zionism issue was simply the opening they wanted."

As in the past, the US has either abstained or voted against all resolutions dealing with Southern Africa in which a vote was taken. (*Star*, Johannesburg, November 11 and 22, 1975; UN documents A/10342 and A/PV.2421)

LEGAL ACTION ON NAMIBIA PLANNED

Sean MacBride, recently confirmed in his post of Commissioner for Namibia for another year, is continuing his strong and imaginative leadership against South Africa's illegal occupation of the territory. One of the issues to which MacBride intends to give priority in 1976 is the implementation of the 1974 Decree on the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia (which makes it a crime to exploit or export any resources from the territory with-

out prior consent of the UN). MacBride has repeatedly stated that he intends to take the Decree seriously—an attitude not always common at the UN. Accordingly, the 1976 UN budget for Namibia contains a provision of \$97,000 for lawyers' fees, travel, and research in connection with international litigation arising from the Decree. The Commissioner's intention is to "concentrate on a small number of clearly identifiable opportunities to test the applicability of the Decree." (UN document A/C.5/1713)

ACTION NEWS & NOTES

SUPREMES' SOUTH AFRICAN TOUR CUT SHORT

The Supremes learned the hard way, what many people told them before their tour of South Africa: they shouldn't have gone. In an interview in *Soul* magazine, the world famous trio reported they were given four hours to get out of South Africa by the white authorities there after they protested conditions for Africans there in an interview with a Durban paper.

The Supremes reported they were deceived about the arrangements. Only two of their 24 concerts were given permits for integrated audiences, and these were not publicized so that they had to take to the streets themselves to distribute tickets to Africans. They reported they were "insulted" by their designation as "honorary whites" by South Africa. Scherrie Payne told *Soul* that the conditions under which blacks live in South Africa are worse than anything she has seen in the US. Writes Amadeo Richardson of the *Daily World*: "The Supremes learned through bitter experience and not only saw the light, but were courageous enough to denounce apartheid on the spot. . . . At last, I can play their albums again." (*Daily World*, New York)

LETTER FROM A SOUTH AFRICAN

Just prior to its Assembly in Nairobi this past year, the General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, Philip Potter circulated the following letter from an exiled South African aimed at discouraging visits to South Africa to all participants. Excerpted below are portions of that letter:

Dear Friends,

Over the years many overseas church visitors have come and gone to my country South Africa. They have come for a variety of reasons . . . to maintain links with sister denominations . . . to see for themselves what the situation is like in South Africa. This letter is an appeal to you not to go there, at least until we can freely invite you ourselves, under different circumstances in true fellowship. Why do I make such a request?

In the first place you may not know how deceptive the system is in South Africa. In the silence of my brothers' and sisters' smiles you may not see their hearts torn with loneliness for their loved ones starving in the hated Bantustans (ironically called "homelands"). You will mistake the warm handshake for trust (we never know who is a police agent). We find it hard to speak openly and freely with you when you come to "visit" us when so many of our sisters and brothers have gone to jail because they spoke too freely and openly.

I have also noticed that the visitors from abroad have almost always been white and that you have taken the sincere observations of our white church representatives to be a true reflection of black feelings and aspirations. How could you know? How can they know? How many visitors will hear the voices of the banned, the banished, the hanged, the tortured, the imprisoned and the exiled? How many church visitors have spoken to a few of the tens

of thousands of prison labourers on the farms? How many have sought to visit a jail or Robben Island? How many have lived in a *kraal* and eaten our food with us instead of staying in "white only" hotels or rich suburban missionary homes?

Did you know that our children die from starvation at the rate of one every minute, and that the average amount you spend on one such trip to South Africa is sufficient to feed fifteen children through a Kupugani feeding scheme for a period of 20 years?

But the money you spend in our country will not go into such feeding schemes. It will only build bigger jails and buy more guns to suppress us. Meanwhile our children die daily—hourly.

Your presence in South Africa will be a continuous reminder to every black you see of the privileges they are denied daily. You will have freedom of movement and association. You will be able to use buses and elevators and restaurants forbidden to blacks. And short, you will be treated as a person.

What is it that you come to see in South Africa? Forgive me for sounding so blunt but I don't understand. Do you come to see if the blacks are still suffering? Is that something you must see with your own eyes before you'll believe it? Are you looking for an exciting adventure? (You may even take some risks whilst there—although you can always leave if it gets too hot). Isn't the information you seek already available from anti-apartheid groups in your own country? If not, why can't you invite blacks to visit your church?

We have often noticed how "factfinding" trips by church leaders have been used either by the South African government for propaganda, or by church spokespersons to discredit our liberation movements and our true leaders. This hurts.

If you care, please refuse to go. Do so as an act of solidarity with 80% of South Africa's people who have no freedom of travel in their own land. In solidarity with those who are banned, imprisoned etc., and in solidarity with thousands of us who are in exile and cannot go home . . . yet.

If you will take this small step you will be supporting our struggle.

Thank you—
A South African in exile

HARASSMENT OVER FILM ON SOUTH AFRICA

The Southern Africa Committee in Ann Arbor, Michigan reports harassment on campus in their attempts to show the film "Last Grave at Dimbaza", which depicts conditions in South Africa. Articles advertising the showing of the film were torn out of 7 newspapers on campus locations. University security guards attempted to shut down a literature display the Committee had outside the film's showing in November. Local police were called in when the students refused to close shop. The police gave up however when they were unable to produce any rules by which the table could be shut down. The committee believes the offensive against them was a result of the film's accurate depiction of the involvement of U.S. corporations in a country where hundreds of African babies die of starvation under the apartheid system. (letter, *Michigan Daily*, Nov. 12, 1975)

EXPULSION

SOUTH AFRICA from the U.N.

100,000 PETITIONS PRESENTED TO EXPULSION SA FROM UN

The National Anti-Imperialist Movement in Solidarity with African Liberation, (NAIMSAL) presented 100,000 signatures on petitions calling for South Africa's expulsion from the U.N. December 10. The petitions were presented at the UN on Human Rights Day for South Africa to Madame Jeanne Cisee, of Guinea (Conakry) who chairs the UN Special Committee Against *Apartheid*. Numerous prominent black Americans were at the ceremony, including Angela Davis, actor Ossie Davis, Angie Dickerson of the Professional Black Women's Association and Dennis Serrette of the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists.

NAIMSAL executive secretary, Tony Monteiro read a statement which noted that the petitions "express the association of U.S. citizens with the struggle being waged for freedom and majority rule in South Africa" who themselves are "unarmed fighters for the UN Charter, for world peace and for national sovereignty." Monteiro noted that the African liberation struggle is "besides all else, an act of solidarity with the majority of U.S. citizens who are themselves for peace, who oppose racism, colonialism and apartheid." (NAIMSAL press release Dec. 10, 1975)

INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

INTERNATIONAL CHURCH ACTIONS

The World Council of Churches has again issued an appeal to all church people not to visit the Republic of South Africa. In an eloquent and stirring letter, the WCC has requested all prospective visitors to South Africa to "seriously consider whether it is appropriate." An accompanying letter from a South African in exile reminds us that "our children die from starvation at the rate of one every minute, and that the average amount you spend on one such trip to South Africa is sufficient to feed 15

children for 20 years." The appeal continues: "The money you spend in our country will only build bigger jails and buy more guns to suppress us. Such trips are used either by the South African government for propaganda, or by church spokespersons to discredit our liberation movements. If you care, please refuse to go as an act of solidarity with 80% of South Africa's people who have no freedom of travel in their own land, with those who are banned or imprisoned and in solidarity with thousands of us who are in exile and cannot go home, yet." (Letter dated 9/30/75)

At the WCC's fifth assembly in Nairobi (which began November 29), the WCC finance officer was directed to "make sure none of the WCC funds are deposited in any of the seven banks known to have made sizeable loans to the South African Government and its agencies." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 29, 1975) Withdrawal of funds from the seven banks was agreed to by the Council after the banks refused to assure the Council they would stop granting loans to South Africa. It is clear that the Council's Program to Combat Racism will continue to give monetary aid to the liberation movements; and a bishop of the Church of Ireland has come out in staunch defense of such aid, stating that there comes "time when pacific resistance to tyranny must become violent, when the Christian, though he abhor violence, must be prepared to use violence to achieve freedom." (The Rt. Rev. Dr. John Ward Armstrong, *Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 29, 1975)

South African and Rhodesian delegates were allowed to participate in the Nairobi assembly, where the questions of nuclear involvement in South Africa by certain western nations, the Angola situation, and the liberation struggle in Southern Africa continued to dominate the assembly's sessions. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 22, 1975)

The All-Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) has pledged continued support for liberation movements in Southern Africa because of "their commitment to free Africa from colonial exploitation and racial domination, as well as to redeem White people from the stigma of being racists and oppressors." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 2, 1975)

The Dutch Council of Churches has voted 14-4 in favor of continuing its sizeable donation to the World Council of Churches Program to Combat Racism. The Council is made up of 11 different religious bodies in Holland. The major ones are the Roman Catholic Church, the Hervormde Kerk, and the Ned Geref Kerk. The decision was made in the face of the South African Church's threat to break off all ties with the two latter Dutch Reformed churches. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 22, 1975)

The Ecumenical Research Exchange (ERE), sponsored by the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches in Holland, Belgium, and West Germany, has charged Britain, France, and West Germany with being "accomplices of an unlawful system" and with profiting from apartheid. The ERE report said that the Western European nations were helping the South African Government to increase its military strength and powers of repression by supplying weapons, and it called on European and American churches to develop closer links with black Christians and "seriously and decisively approach the problem of whether they themselves are hindering the liberation of the oppressed." (*Zambia Daily Mail*, Sept. 29, 1975)

A Canadian Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility has launched a campaign of communication to members of Parliament, requesting them to take immediate action to (1) disallow Canadian tax credits now

available to Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. (a Canadian firm operating in Namibia) for taxes paid to the South African Government for operations in Namibia, and (2) to support the adoption by the Canadian Government of the Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia adopted by the United Nations Council for Namibia in September 1974. (Letter to members and colleagues from the Task Force.)

New Zealand's National Anti-Apartheid Committee is campaigning against shareholdings by New Zealand churches in South British Insurance and New Zealand Insurance—the only New Zealand companies with significant interests in South Africa. The Committee is to hold seminars on church investment and has distributed a special pamphlet to over 400 clergy. The Presbyterian and Methodist Special Committees on Investment have already recommended to their general assemblies that the churches present motions at the companies' annual shareholder meetings opposing their presence in South Africa. New Zealand's National Council of Churches passed resolutions at its last annual general meeting calling for an end to economic and sporting links between New Zealand and South Africa. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Nov., 1975)

GROUP CAMPAIGNS AND BOYCOTTS, SPORTS AND CULTURAL

The British Commonwealth Secretariat has protested against the holding of a golf tournament in South Africa last November described as "The Commonwealth Trophy Tournament." Golfers from Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand were invited to take part in the tournament. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Nov. 1975)

The World Meteorological Congress has suspended South Africa from membership of the organization until it renounces apartheid and observes U.N. resolutions concerning Namibia. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Nov. 1975)

An "Africa Week", which focused attention on apartheid, was mounted by the Norwegian Council for Southern Africa in October. The Council is planning to follow up the week with a campaign boycotting South African goods imported into Norway and exposing Norwegian involvements in South Africa. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, Nov. 1975)

The International Red Cross meeting was moved from Rabat because Morocco had refused to give South African delegates visas to attend. The League of Red Cross Societies will hold its annual meeting in Geneva instead. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 18, 1975)

Miss Rhodesia, Corinne Pinsloo, sits it out at home while international beauties prepare for the forthcoming Miss World competition. The organizers of the Miss World contest had written her suggesting that she not come in order to avoid trouble. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 22, 1975)

Demonstrations have followed Gary Player all over Australia on his current tour, but it doesn't seem to effect his game. Occasionally he is seen to frown at the taunts from the sidelines, however, and he did lose the Kensington golf classic in Sydney, the site of the largest demonstration yet. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 1, 1975)

The United Nations General Assembly's Political Committee reaffirmed unqualified support for the Olympic principle that no discrimination be allowed on grounds of race, religion, or political affiliation and passed a resolu-

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tion calling on governments and organizations to bar all contacts with South African sports bodies. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 1, 1975) This resolution contrasts with the victory in New Zealand of the National Party, ushering in a new government which has promised to maintain strong sporting ties with South Africa. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 29, 1975)

Japan barred South Africa from attending the annual conference of the World Medical Association in November. The discovery that visas would not be given to the three-man South African team came too late to cancel or change the venue of the conference. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Nov. 10, 1975)

Australia's anti-apartheid groups have launched a campaign against the sale of South African fish products by Woolworths. The Education Unit of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid has produced a detailed report on the fishing industry in Southern Africa which confirms the importance of such a boycott to the South African economy. (*Liberate Southern Africa* newsletter, Collingwood, Australia, July-Aug. 1975)


A new anti-apartheid movement has been established in Vancouver. The Southern African Action Coalition, 2524 Cypress, Vancouver, British Columbia, plans "to conduct educational work on the conditions of life under apartheid by distributing films, posters and pamphlets." (Unit on apartheid newsletter No. 9/75, Oct., 1975)

The anti-apartheid group in Glasgow, Scotland, picketed the offices of a Glasgow advertising agency, Austin Knight, that had arranged interviews for jobs in South Africa. Leaflets were distributed explaining why one

should oppose emigration to South Africa. (Unit on Apartheid newsletter No. 9/75, Oct. 1975) The Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement forced interviews to be cancelled by the Phillips Ltd. in Dublin, who were seeking television technicians to be sent to South Africa. The movement also warned Irish nurses who might be tempted to go to Johannesburg that they might find themselves occupying the place of an estimated 50 black nurses fired recently. (Unit on Apartheid newsletter No. 9/75 Oct., 1975)

On December 13th a demonstration was called by the Anti-Apartheid movement to protest South African and UN intervention in Angola. Demonstrators marched outside the White House and heard speeches by Ben Gurirab, SWAPO representative in the United States, Paul Irish of the American Committee on Africa and Sean Gervasi among others.





By Auth for the Philadelphia Inquirer

"I've got to read that . . . as soon as I stop Communism in Angola."

Books Received / Book Reviews

M. Tlali, *Muriel at Metropolitan*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1975. Paperback.

Stephen Gray, *Local Colour*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1975. Hardcover.

Breyten Breytenbach, "The Effects of *Apartheid* on Culture in South Africa," Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 37/75. Nov., 1975.

Resources

The following materials are newly available from The Africa Fund (associated with the American Committee on Africa) 305 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017 tel. (212) 838-5030:

• "Message to the Nation on his Investiture as President of the People's Republic of Mozambique—Samora Machel"—first in the Fund's "Voices of Liberation" series, reprint of the feature in the October, 1975 issue of *Southern Africa*
6 pages 15¢ each.

• "South Africa's Military Build-up: U.S. on the Scene" testimony of Jennifer Davis, Africa Fund Research Director, before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Africa featured in the December 1975 issue of *Southern Africa*
6 pages. 15¢ each.

• "Continuing Escalation in Angola" December 14 report by Sean Gervasi, Professor of Economics at the City University of New York, charging that "The carrier Independence, the cruiser Boston and three destroyers have been placed on full alert. They have been given the mission of flying tactical air support strikes over Angola . . . armed with several tons of napalm, sidewinder missiles, and anti-personnel fragmentation bombs." Prof. Gervasi attributes his information to high officials in the U.S. Department of Defense opposed to current U.S. policy on Angola.
8 pages. 20¢ each.

• "Angola in Perspective" by George Houser, ACOA Executive Director, articles appearing in the November 1975 issue of *Christianity & Crisis* magazine.
15¢ each.

• "Communism and the War in Angola" reprint of Mr. Houser's Op-Ed page article from the *New York Times*, December 14, 1975.
2 pages. 5¢ each.

• "Statement on U.S. in Angola" issued by ACOA, Dec. 19, 1975 following meeting of a "Coalition Against U.S. Intervention in Angola"
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• "CIA's Secret War in Angola" an Intelligence Report from the Center for National Security Studies, 122 Maryland Avenue NE Washington DC 20002
50¢ each.

Tchuba Newsletter—printed in newspaper format, in English and Portuguese. It is the organ of the American Committee for Cape Verde, a tax-exempt organization seeking funds for relief and development work in the islands and interpreting the struggle of the PAIGC in the U.S.. Copies are free from Tchuba, 14 Beacon Street, Boston MA 02108 tel. (617) 742-9880.



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Thank you

UPDATE

U.S. Angola Aid Set At \$100 Million

Although the Ford Administration put a \$31 million price tag on American military aid sent to Angola in a December Congressional hearing, *Africa News* has learned from an informed source that the actual market value of equipment sent to Angola may be more than \$100 million.

The revelation that covert aid to Angola has been seriously undervalued in official testimony is consistent with the draft report of the House Intelligence Committee. Press accounts of the report say the Administration is systematically undervaluing aid to Angola in its reporting to Congress.

On the Angolan front, meanwhile, a substantial new inflow of equipment to UNITA is apparently resulting in gains for that U.S.-backed group. Observers believe the new armaments, along with a build-up of South African forces fighting for UNITA, may have postponed the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the MPLA.

U.S. Pleased With O.A.U. Rift

The Organization of African Unity held its first extraordinary Summit Meeting January 10-13, to discuss the Angolan war. The Meeting ended in deadlock, with 22 governments in favor of recognition for the MPLA government, and another 22 insisting on a tripartite "government of national unity."

Immediately after the Summit, which was held in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian government added its name to the list of those countries recognizing the MPLA, while Uganda joined those calling for a coalition government.

U.S. officials were clearly pleased with the outcome of the O.A.U. Summit. William Schaufele, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, said he interpreted the meeting as showing that "a large number of African states want some sort of U.S. involvement, as long as the Soviets continue to intervene." He said also that at least 22 African governments support what he called the American position.

American Diplomacy Provokes Rebuffs

U.S. diplomatic maneuvers to rally MPLA opponents in Africa prior to the O.A.U. Summit drew sharp rebukes from both Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and Nigerian Head-of-State, Gen. Murtala Mohammed. Both leaders publicly denounced what they saw as a heavy-handed and rather pretentious American attempt to pressure the O.A.U. into condemning Soviet involvement in Angola.

Gen. Mohammed went as far as to release the text of a letter from President Ford on the Angolan situation to the Nigerian press, and the leading daily newspaper superimposed the words "Go To Hell" on a front-page photograph of Ford. Thereafter, Nigerian demonstrators in four cities marched on U.S. libraries and other official buildings to protest the U.S. stance on Angola, in two cases ripping down and burning American flags.

The State Department has launched a formal protest over the incident, which reflects what is perhaps a serious

diplomatic rupture between the U.S. and normally friendly Nigeria.

Zimbabwe Divisions Trouble O.A.U.

The O.A.U. Liberation Committee met in early January to discuss what some are forecasting will be Africa's "next Angola"—white-ruled Zimbabwe and its splintered nationalist movement. *En route* to the Liberation Committee meeting in Lourenco Marques, O.A.U. Secretary-General William Eteki said that the African organization must recognize either the Nkomo faction or the Muzorewa faction of the African National Council, before independence comes to Rhodesia. If the O.A.U. does not act, said Eteki, another civil war could follow.

Joshua Nkomo and the Smith government are continuing their Constitutional talks in Salisbury, meanwhile, and are now exploring issues such as "parliamentary composition", according to the latest press releases.

Nkomo insists publicly that one man-one vote be part of any constitutional settlement in Zimbabwe, but reports from BBC correspondent Justin Nyoko suggest that he may settle for "qualified franchise" as long as black majority rule is insured.

Spokespersons for the Muzorewa wing of the ANC continue to condemn the Smith-Nkomo negotiations.

Demonstration Opposes U.S. Angola Role

Several hundred demonstrators gathered at the Capitol on January 1974 to protest U.S. aid to the FNLA and UNITA. Addressing the crowd along with veteran peace activists Dave Dellinger and Cora Weiss, Rep. Bella Abzug called for an end to all foreign involvement in Angola, including that of the Soviet Union, South Africa, and Cuba.

FNLA Threat Poses Dilemma for U.S.

U.S. officials are declining comment on the FNLA's threat to resort to international terrorism to keep its cause alive.

Paulo Tuba, a member of the political commission of the FNLA, told the *New York Times* that his organization will do what the Palestinians are doing. Tuba says he made his comments after reviewing the Angola situation with FNLA President, Holden Roberto, and says he is representing Roberto's viewpoint.

The State Department's only reaction to date has been to reiterate the U.S. position against terrorism, but one official admitted privately that the FNLA threat will make it harder to get U.S. funds appropriated for the Zaire-based group.

Former U.S. Treasurer Visits South Africa

Former Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson made a fact-finding mission to South Africa last month, "on behalf of American and Middle East interests," according to Radio South Africa. Anderson met with South African Prime Minister Vorster, and the Ministers of Finance, Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Mining. He also held talks with Transkei leader Kaiser Matanzima



"I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people."

—Secretary of State Henry Kissinger

Dear Friends:

The struggle for liberation in southern Africa is far from over. While we have celebrated with much joy the independence of Mozambique and Cape Verde this year, and Guinea-Bissau last year, the struggle in Angola—despite its independence just this month—will continue as the war drags on. This coming year will be a vital one for Africa as the situation in Angola reverberates far beyond its borders and those of the neighboring countries.

The situation in Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa itself and the changing role of the neighboring countries, calls for broader coverage and analysis of these areas. *Southern Africa* will continue to provide this vital service to its readers, as well as report on growing involvement of the United States.

Publication of *Southern Africa* can continue only with your support. We urge you to resubscribe for 1976 without delay. We will have to remove non-renewed subscriptions from our mailing list to help bring down the cost, as of January.

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A Luta Continua,

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