


# southern africa



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Cape Verde Independence - July 5, 1975



# CONTENTS

VOL. VIII NO. 7

JULY/AUGUST 1975

<b>1. FEATURE</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Past and Present in Angola:         Reflections of a Portuguese Soldier</b>	
<b>2. SOUTH AFRICA</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Politics</b>	
Black Consciousness on Trial	
Bantustans	
African National Congress	
Vorster's Interpretation of His Famous Six Months Time for Change	
Progressive-Reform Merger	
Christian Institute of Southern Africa Declared "Affected Organization"	
<b>Foreign Relations</b>	
South Africa and Its Western Allies	
South Africa and Black Africa	
<b>Economics</b>	
Black Bank to Open	
Anglo-American	
Labor: Gold Mines	
White Builders Get More	
Strike Record	
Unions: Black or Mixed or White?	
South African Trade	
Tourism	
Agriculture	
Oil	
Steel	
Chrome Plant	
<b>3. NAMIBIA</b>	<b>19</b>
The United Nations—The Triple Veto	
South African Reply to Security Council	
The Public Relations Campaign	
Inside Namibia	
"I Won't Go."	
South Africa's "Constitutional Conference"	
UN Council for Namibia	
<b>4. ZIMBABWE</b>	<b>23</b>
Thirteen Zimbabweans Shot	
Constitutional Conference	
Commonwealth Conference	
Four Zimbabweans Face Death Penalty	
<b>5. ANGOLA</b>	<b>24</b>
Angola Independence in Jeopardy	
Question of Civil War in Angola	
International Reactions to the Angolan Situation	
<b>6. SPECIAL: GUINEA-BISSAU</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>Let Us Create a Life of Work and Progress</b>	
<b>7. THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>The Cape Verde Islands</b>	
Inside The Cape Verde Islands	
Visit to The Islands	
Cape Verde to be Independent on July 5th	
<b>Mozambique</b>	
The New Mozambique: News in Brief	
Going Home	
Foreign Affairs	
US Senate Subcommittee Hears Testimony on Mozambique	

Republic of Guinea-Bissau  
Inside Guinea Bissau

8. **SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE**
9. **NEIGHBORS** 35  
Malawian Mine Labor  
Kaunda and Zambia on Zimbabwe  
Kaunda in the United States  
Kaunda in Portugal  
Zambia Reshuffles its Cabinet  
Soviet Visit to the Seychelles
10. **AT THE UNITED NATIONS** 36  
Anti-Apartheid Conference Decides  
on Joint Strategy of Action  
Western Powers Again Veto Action  
Against South Africa  
South Africa Suspended from More UN Bodies  
Decolonization Committee Holds Special  
Session in Lisbon  
Sanctions Committee Calls for Information  
on Violations
11. **UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN AFRICA** 38  
Senate Southern Africa Hearings Open  
South Africa's Chief Propagandist Visits US  
Diggs Continues Focus on Africa  
Rhodesia Seeks US Mercenaries
12. **ACTION NEWS AND NOTES** 40  
**Political Action**  
ZANU Representative in US Arrested  
Black Lawyers Support UN Expulsion  
of South Africa  
Announce N.Y. Campaign to Expel  
South Africa  
  
**Economic Actions**  
IBM Stockholders Criticize Role  
in South Africa  
Strong Protest at Annual ITT Meeting  
  
**Solidarity Actions**  
African Liberation Day Demonstrations  
Cape Verde Support Group Provides  
Drought Relief
13. **UPDATE** 42

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**OUR COLLECTIVE**

wendy aranoff  
charlie ebel  
jennifer davis  
carolyn fleuhr-lobban  
lynn goodwin  
peggy halsey  
janet hooper  
tami hultman  
paul irish  
bill johnston  
richard knight  
reed kramer  
richard leonard  
richard lobban  
edgar lockwood  
mary mcannally  
bill minter  
ruth minter

gail morlan  
don morton  
antonio neves  
marie orth-pallavicini  
angela passaro  
dipankar ray  
david robinson  
susan rogers  
christine root  
janet siskind  
melba smith  
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# Past and Present in Angola : Reflections of a Portuguese Soldier

AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW



Colonial Portuguese soldiers in training.

In November, 1974, Christopher Jones conducted a five hour interview in Paris with a young, highly educated Portuguese soldier who had just completed two years of service with the Portuguese army in Angola. What follows is an edited, and of necessity, considerably shortened version of this interview. It is important not only as a detailed description of Angola during the war years, but because it provides many insights into the current period of strife and difficulty in the most trouble-laden of the former Portuguese territories.

The editors are grateful to the soldier who asked to remain anonymous, and to Christopher Jones for conducting the interview, for undertaking the arduous task of initial transcription and translation, and above all, for contributing this fascinating document to *Southern Africa*.

**Q.** *Could you describe the region of Angola where you were stationed?*

**A.** I was in the AM/1 (Military Area No. 1), a region north of the district of Luanda, stretching to the frontier of the Congo, and bordered on the east by the province of Cuanza Norte. It's an area where guerrilla warfare had begun in 1961 and was strongly implanted in the African population which has either fled into the *mata* (bush) or into Zaire. Those who didn't flee were massacred by the repression of the war ... especially during the period 1961-1963. . . .

The entire area is full of abandoned *fazendas* (plantations—usually for coffee or sugar). The Africans of the area were rich: they had their own coffee, which is no longer to be seen. The economy of the local population was completely destroyed by the war.

The Africans usually cultivated coffee near larger *fazendas* operated by Whites. Besides coffee, they would have bananas, mandioca (flour made from mandioca is an integral part of their diet), corn, and palm trees from which they obtain palm oil, also an important part of their diet.

Thus the population there was more or less self-sufficient; there was not the misery of central and southern Angola. A lot of people cultivated small plots of land and lived with a certain ease.

The "contract" (which I'll explain a bit later) never really existed for the northern populations. They were often, however, obliged to work for the Whites during the periods of the coffee harvest or to help with certain jobs that had to do with the coffee. That started in the '50's. The head of the local governmental post would round them up and take them to the *fazenda* where they would be paid a very low unit wage. . . .

This situation probably became unbearable for the northern people, so the *fazendeiros* turned to the very cheap manual laborers from central Angola, the *Bailundos*. The land where the *Bailundos* lived produced almost no cash crops, and there was no industry. Thus no jobs and no money.

It was these people who then began coming north. They came usually because they owed money to shopkeepers in the south, these shopkeepers inevitably being white, or more rarely mulattos or Cape Verdians. The shopkeepers, then, gave the lists of the people who have contracted debts to the heads of post. Following the administrative hierarchy, the names went to the *conselho* (roughly the same as a county) administrator, who designated the contingent of contract laborers. From one *conselho* several thousand workers would be sent north for the contract. . . .

The contract workers . . . received 4 thousand *escudos* (approx. \$160) at the end of a year's work, which they hardly got to look at because of debts previously accumulated. . . .

We should remember that in African society . . . the head of a family sometimes has as many as twenty people to support: children, brothers, cousins, people who are sick or don't work. . . . Of course, when they were in debt up to their ears, they had no choice but contract labor. When they arrived home after the contract they signed up again immediately because they knew that before long they'd be deep in debt again. . . .

I haven't talked about child labor. Africans were authorized to work at the age of 12. These young boys and girls . . . of 13, 14, or 15 years of age made . . . \$40 for a year contract, and . . . \$2 per month at the *fazenda* where they were working. . . .

What is for sure is that the coffee *fazendas* could not survive, the way they were organized, without this extraordinary cheap labor. . . .

We shouldn't forget that Portugal was the last country to do away with unpaid forced labor. Many of Angola's roads were constructed by Blacks who were transported sometimes far from where they lived and were not paid. They worked only for their food and they were forced to work. Forced labor was allowed for in the Constitution until 1970, in spite of being officially abolished at the beginning of the war in 1961.

In speaking of the northern population, I had to speak of the contract workers, because that's mostly who we saw. We only saw people who were really from the north in villages controlled by the army or in certain villages which were far from war zones. The majority of the

northern population, as I mentioned, was in the *mata*. With the war, they were forced to create an entire new social structure.

Q. Did you have African soldiers or white Angolans in your platoon?

A. One third of my company was African soldiers, which is typical. All the troops from Portugal were mixed with Angolans in 1973-74, which was the way it had been since 1968, I believe. Obviously the first battallions in 1961 had no African soldiers.

Locally recruited soldiers could be black or white, but the Whites made up only a tiny percentage of the total. In my platoon I had 7 Angolans, all black, from all parts of Angola.

Q. How were the relations between black and white soldiers?

A. For the white soldiers it was the first time that they had relationships with black people. . . .

The Angolan Blacks who joined us were mostly typical urban Angolans. One very important thing: they all knew how to sign their names, and practically all could read and write. Only 10 percent of the Africans we received had not attained basic literacy. This is important, because 10 percent of the Whites in our company, at least were illiterate. It was a great shock to learn that the Africans could sign their names and they, the Whites, couldn't. It was necessary to sign the pay slip, and humiliating to sign with an X.

Of course there was a discrepancy. The Whites, illiterate or not, earned a full salary. Illiterate Blacks earned only a quarter of what they should have earned for duty in a combat zone. This situation has now been changed, but it was maintained until the 25th of April without the slightest pressure for change in the Army Ministry. In fact, at our level the pressure we could exercise was almost nonexistent. We were already collaborating in so much injustice and there were already so many unjust situations that it was just one more.

Most African soldiers are full of guilt feelings from participating in a war against people they admire. Usually our soldiers had more sympathy for the MPLA than for the FNLA, but for them to kill any brother, any brother of race, was extraordinarily grave. We noticed that the African soldiers never shot to kill. Sometimes we had target shooting practice, which they didn't like at all. They had lower shooting averages than white soldiers. I believe that it was because those bullets which they were shooting at the target could eventually kill brothers whom they had no desire to kill.

Also, at times when we were out on a mission and they saw someone in the distance, they would shoot without authorization. They would pretend that the enemy was close and that they were defending themselves, but that was false: they were shooting so that the others could flee.

Of course not all African soldiers conducted themselves that way. Some of the most efficient troops, whom I didn't mention before, are composed exclusively of Africans. They were controlled directly by the political police: the so-called "Flechas" (Arrows). They were used primarily in Angola, but were also being introduced in Mozambique. Some of the most important victories, especially against the FNLA in Angola, were obtained with these troops. They were constituted of people who had been captured in the *mata* or had presented themselves to the authorities, usually former members of the MPLA, though sometimes of the FNLA. They were immensely successful. Never did they go out without



African and white soldiers in the colonial army.

getting someone. As they had spent time in the *mata*, they knew perfectly the trails used by the others. They treated their guides horribly, torturing them on the road, and when they arrived in cultivated areas, they didn't hesitate to kill unarmed people. That is, they killed anything which crossed their path, captured those who threw themselves on the ground or who weren't hit, and took weapons to justify the deaths. They usually killed a lot more than they would say, but that was a normal practice: the casualties inflicted on actual guerrillas were always less than those reported.

Superficially, the white soldiers get along well with the black soldiers. There was the language problem: sometimes the Blacks spoke dialects, though they all spoke Portuguese well. To be frank, for the Africans, the army was good in one way only: it made them aware of the territorial unity of Angola, which is rather important, now that Angola will soon be independent. All those who spent time in the Portuguese army at least became more aware, and got to know different people and places in Angola which otherwise they would have been unable to do. The majority of them have understandably limited means. Usually the guys from the South learned a lot from the Northerners who are in the Army, just like the contract workers from the South learned from living in areas where there was guerrilla warfare. I know of cases where the contract laborers collaborated, especially with the FNLA, though at times the FNLA carried out punitive actions against the contract laborers so that they would be afraid to work in certain *fazendas*. The way the FNLA acted in those situations is questionable, as far as I'm concerned, because in the regions where this was done (the action of the FNLA varied from region to region) many of the contract laborers began to side with the colonialist forces.

**Q. What sorts of logistic support did you have?**

**A.** If we saw that the enemy's firepower was much greater than expected, or if we were surrounded, we could contact the command post directly. Within a short period of time we could have "heli-support" which meant at least what was called a heli-cannon. . . .

Napalm was used to force the population to leave

certain districts. Of this there are numerous testimonies of people who fled during the repression of the revolt in the North of Angola in 1961. Supposedly it has also been used in the East.

The heli-cannon was the weapon most feared by the guerrillas, not napalm. In the last years of the war, I don't think napalm was used much in Angola. Perhaps in Guiné it was different, undoubtedly it was, according to eye-witness accounts of international observers. It has been used, of that I am sure. I even heard officers speak of the use of napalm, which was always denied by our authorities. But not in my time.

In my time, in the East for example (I never experienced the war in the East, which is different) the illegal camps were often in relatively open areas. The helicopter could go down low enough to machine-gun any and all people who might be present in the camp. . . .

I did see defoliants used. We couldn't use them whenever we wanted for the simple reason that there wasn't enough money to pay for them. Thus they were used in relatively restricted areas to destroy crops in enemy territory. They were not used to destroy forests. Herbicides were dropped from the air. Once I saw two planes doing this 40-kilometers from Quambatela, next to the river Dange, in an area outside of A.M./1—the military sector of Cuanza Norte, or Salazar (the city, which is about to have its name changed).

**Q. Did you ever have support from Rhodesian or South African Troops?**

**A.** Never did we have support from South Africa or Rhodesia: we were too far. I believe that South Africa has carried out actions in support of our army in the South east of Angola. Rhodesia collaborated in Mozambique only; they don't even have a common border with Angola. On the other hand, it is likely that Portuguese authorities collaborated in the repression of the Ovambos from Namibia. Recently, we began receiving a large number of Ovambos who presented themselves to the Portuguese authorities as political refugees, and since the 25th of April they have not been returned, or at least that is official policy. I can't confirm whether that is in fact happening.

**Q. What was the situation of international companies on Angolan soil?**

**A.** The big companies, especially those the size of Diamang, usually don't have fighting in their areas, to begin with. This was also true of smaller companies, like the wood dealers in the East, near Luso, for example. Here's what happened. The wood dealers, as well as many owners of large coffee *fazendas*, etc., would make agreements with the liberation movements. They often supplied salt (there's a great lack), food, and clothing to the guerrillas in exchange for a kind of unwritten agreement: the guerrillas wouldn't attack and the others would supply food. They would leave sacks of flour in the middle of the road which the next day were gone—every day things like that. This happened a lot in Cuanza Norte, not so much in Nambuogongo. In Nambuogongo it was local people who were in the *mata* and they hated the local *fazendeiros*, many of whom had participated as Army guides in the repression of the 1961 revolts. Thus there were no friendly agreements. . . .

It is believed that Diamang gave a lot of money to the liberation movements (FNLA and MPLA) so they would stay out of the area. What is certain is that nothing ever happened there, and nobody can prove any of that. But, for example, there is plentiful proof of contacts between

Jonas Savimbi and the wood dealers and Portuguese authorities. I spoke with a captain of the militia who was in the UNITA area from December of '71 till April of '72 and was present during the '72 deal. At a certain time they received tips from all over that there was a large gathering of UNITA guerrillas below Luso. So they went there. What in fact happened was a meeting between the commander of the Eastern military zone, several highly placed agents of the political police, and several UNITA leaders. We also know perfectly well that Jonas Savimbi was treated in the Luso military hospital. . . .

The other industries [besides coffee and sugar] are located in or more less peaceful places. . . . As for Cabinda, the oil is of course on the high seas, otherwise it's just wood dealers. . . .

As for the wood dealers, they're something else. They had contacts with all the liberation movements and paid by the other—FLEC. Anything to do with splits or divisions, the Whites and people connected with big capital have their hands in it. Gulf, at this moment, will pay for FLEC to do their propaganda, to have their puppet presidents and organize that whole farce, but not much else. Because Gulf has no problems with the war—the oil is at sea, and the engineers and the other personnel involved with oil live in Cabinda (the city) where there is no fighting. Since April 25th, all the action in Cabinda (of the FNLA and MPLA) could be classified as psychological warfare.

The MPLA was interested in increasing their actions because they'd already fought a lot in Cabinda and had controlled it better than they do at this moment. Besides, they needed to make their presence felt so that FLEC couldn't say that they controlled Cabinda, an obvious untruth. It is known that parts of the Cabindan population (remember that Cabinda only has 80 thousand people) are highly favorable to the MPLA, others are favorable to the FNLA.

Q. How would you evaluate the guerrillas you were asked to combat?

A. If we compare: the FNLA had a stable military potential, because they always had support from the mobile groups which in turn entered into contact with Zaire for arms. They still do, in fact. The MPLA in the North was completely isolated and incapable of receiving arms. They lived from what the population gave them or from the fields they themselves cultivated (which were large, it should be noted). They had, however, an excellent socio-political organization in place. From captured documents and extensive descriptions made, it is clear that all people had a quite rigorous political preparation. We would see, for example, children who were born in the *mata*, who besides speaking and writing impeccable Portuguese, were perfectly aware of the objectives of the MPLA. It was remarkable to talk with an 11-year-old kid who had never seen a white man and hear him say that the MPLA was not against Whites, it was against "nazism and colonialism." He said nazism instead of fascism. But if we spoke with a normal MPLA guerrilla, usually he was a guy with a lot of class, that is, who knew what he wanted, why he was fighting, and so on.

In the FNLA this wasn't so common. We know now that we have spoken more or less openly with a lot of guerrillas. The people under their control are vaguely aware that they are FNLA, that the FNLA wants independence for Angola, and little else, even those that have been in Zaire.

They know that their leader is Holden Roberto and that they belong to an exceptionally centralized military

organization, but there are no theoretical discussions like there are in the MPLA. The MPLA in the 1st Politico-Military Region (which is very sophisticated politically, and it's not by chance that they support Agostinho Neto) carried out their political work in depth. They had political commissars who were quite good, usually two per camp. They had a women's organization and the children were pioneers. Anyway, everyone was very well integrated.

They had literacy classes; the use of weapons was taught at the same time. They would help the guerrillas until, after a certain time, they themselves would become guerrillas.

The FNLA had schools as well. One thing that happened, however, was that if an MPLA teacher died or was captured, he was immediately replaced; in the FNLA there were often teacher-less schools.

If the FNLA had few sophisticated weapons (except for the mobile groups, that is) the same was true for the MPLA. At best they had some anti-personnel mines, often homemade from bombs or mortar shells which hadn't exploded. The problem was that a large percentage of these homemade mines didn't work. Other times they would just make a hole in the ground and fill it with scrap iron and nails with gunpowder plus something to detonate it.

The operations of the FNLA in the Cuanza Norte sometimes approximated the *cangaco*\*. I mean that a lot of people who joined the FNLA had personal revenge to take care of, and they didn't rest until that revenge was carried out, sometimes even against Africans. Usually it was against people who had taken over farms they shouldn't have, or before the war had harmed members of the families of the guerrillas. These were the people who suffered most from the effects of guerrilla warfare.

In fact, lately all the movements were less strong in the North of Angola, except for one zone which was never controlled near Songo. Any troops which entered there were in trouble, there it was constant.

This year (1974) the FNLA announced a large offensive because they had received a large quantity of arms from Zaire and some from China. But army intelligence was skeptical about the 450 tons they were supposed to have received. There were some Chinese advisors training FNLA guerrillas, but not much else. As to arms, no proof as of yet. The arms taken from the guerrillas were marked F.A.Z. (Forces Armees de Zaire). Thus it was Mobutu who offered those arms to his brother-in-law Holden Roberto so that Roberto's soldiers could fight.

FNLA recruiting is an important thing to mention. It's quite different from the recruiting of the MPLA, which has a volunteer system among the refugees who are in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Congo refugees are nowhere near as numerous as those in Zaire. In Zaire there are about one million refugees, and it is among those million refugees that a compulsory tax is collected to finance the FNLA combat. Secondly, each man who was either born in Zaire or lives there must do a certain period of military service. The men of Angolan origin fulfill their obligation in the FNLA instead of in the Armed Forces of Zaire. Obviously a lot of people in the FNLA who were drafted had no particular motivation for fighting in a

\* *cangaco* or the *cangaceiros*: Brazilian bandits who became folk heroes through the carrying out of a sort of popular justice.

liberation movement. They were simply there because they had to be. The MPLA accused them of this, as did parts of the Angolan press, but it is difficult to know to what extent that is merely party rivalries. One thing I do know is that a soldier captured in July, when asked for whom he was fighting, said the FNLA. When he was asked who he thought should be president of Angola, he said Agostinho Neto. Holden Roberto hates Agostinho Neto, thus it's hard to see what political preparation that soldier had received. It must have been extremely superficial, in any case, like the "psychological warfare" of our own troops, which nobody paid any attention to. If the guerrillas themselves are like that, the rest must be worse. The people live in adoration of Holden Roberto, but that's about all. And of course that's just in FNLA zones.

The MPLA does things differently. For one thing they don't have the financial support necessary for an FNLA-type setup. However, even for the FNLA, that relatively large volume of support is a recent phenomenon. In any case, between the FNLA and the MPLA there's no love lost. Starting in 1967 there were huge battles between FNLA and MPLA forces. The Portuguese Army even used this rivalry to their advantage in the north of Angola: they pushed the FNLA one way and the MPLA the other, with a dividing river, so that they would fight among themselves. At least the Portuguese could know where they were fighting.

For example, I spoke with a captain who was in that area at the time and said that there was a lot of action. He was in places where there were no Portuguese troops out but where one could hear battles going on. These were battles between the MPLA and the FNLA.

That was more or less the situation. One thing: except for the offensive which didn't come off, the combat power of the FNLA in the north of Angola was much greater than that of the MPLA. But the MPLA had more support. It was especially after the 25th of April that we could see: the MPLA is a political force in the cities. The people in the cities support the MPLA spontaneously, much more than the FNLA. However, in the countryside it is not so clear.

The MPLA also has cadres much better prepared to assume responsibilities than the FNLA, and a lot of

sympathizers who are taking advantage of the slight opening of the 25th of April to take sides in favor of the MPLA. It's not an accident, for example, that by July the MPLA basically controlled two Luanda weekly papers (though no dailies). They also have two hours a day of radio (the voice of Angola) which is for all practical purposes MPLA propaganda under a different name.

*Q. How has the situation changed since the 25th of April?*

*A.* In Angola the Armed Forces Movement hadn't penetrated much, which is easy to understand. All the maneuvers of captains and later superior officers which took place in Portugal would have been difficult in Angola because of the scattering of career officers throughout an enormous territory and because of the fear that the implications of the Movement's development were too broad and too dangerous.

Militarily the situation didn't change from April 25 to July 27. . . .

After the revelation of the Program, we understood a few things. Since the program foresaw a political solution, it was clearly ridiculous for us to still be risking our lives in the *mata*. A lot of soldiers refused to go out or at least put up a lot of resistance.

Only after May 10 did we receive an order to fire only when fired upon, and to only burn camps or houses where we encountered armed resistance. The soldiers reacted strongly against the order; we were to expose ourselves to ambushes with only the possibility of subsequent punitive action. The level of enthusiasm for fighting became even less than that of pre-April 25th days, if that is possible. (It should be noted that even before April 25th, the war was fought in a way approaching total indifference. Most often the soldiers would simply avoid their objectives on missions. We were fighting at about 30 percent, or less.)

We weren't good for much militarily. Our missions usually had no results because we didn't want them to. . . . We had no feeling of a national cause. . . . We knew perfectly well that Angola was a foreign territory. In fact, it was good for the majority of the soldiers to have been there; they became aware that it was an unjust war. Everybody agreed, and nobody went to the objectives, that's all there was to it. Now if that was the case before



Credit Melba Smith

MPLA school in the liberated zone during the war.



April 25th, it was even more so afterwards. . . .

The military situation of the liberation movements was not altered by April 25th. It found them weak and beset by internal problems. Many FNLA pockets in the north of Angola were not, and are not, directly informed by their superiors about what was happening. In many cases it was through army pamphlets that elements of the FNLA discovered that the Portuguese regime had fallen and that the war had lost most of its meaning.

Those same pamphlets called for the guerrillas to leave their arms where they had them and come to the bases. All we really wanted was a undeclared cease-fire, just so the fighting would stop.

As for the MPLA, they were so weak that in spite of their orders that the combat should continue, they represented no military problem.

On the 27th of July the right of the peoples of the colonies to independence was recognized, a right which became an integral part of the Portuguese constitution. After that the war was even more useless. Military action ended almost immediately. We only did protection for supply columns and the population. Even patrols around the bases were kept in close so as not to be the cause of military provocation.

At just that time the FNLA carried out an attack. In fact Holden Roberto had always been against the war stopping without a signed cease-fire. That cease-fire was achieved after the 28th of September (the attempted rightist counter-coup) when it had become very clear that the doctrine of decolonization was sincere and irreversible. The Republic of Guiné-Bissau had been recognized on the 10th, the Lusaka agreement had been signed, Mozambique practically had a provisional government, and a white minority conspiracy had been crushed. The intentions of the Portuguese administration were thus more than clear.

In Angola things were not so clear. On the 27th of September General Spínola received 23 representatives of the post-April political parties, or rather 23 "personalities" representing various Angolan ways of thinking. Most of them had been denounced by one or more of the liberation movements. One of them was the president of LUNA, Argelino Alberto, who was a PIDE collaborator and called a traitor by nearly everybody. . . .

There were secret contacts, for example, the meeting of the Presidents Spínola and Mobutu on the Island of Sal was certainly preceded by secret talks. Same thing with the MPLA. As UNITA was the only movement to immediately sign a cease-fire, obviously talks with them were open. There were also many contacts between UNITA and journalists, white businessmen, etc, some of whom were in search of support for certain political parties and wanted to take advantage of UNITA to raise their own status in Angola. Thus after the massacre in the Luanda *muceques*, there was a white demonstration on August 5 during which thousands of Whites carried UNITA posters. Not a single Black had one. As a result UNITA released a communique saying that no one was authorized to make decisions for UNITA or exploit their party name. They had to back up; they'd already been criticized enough.

Meanwhile the MPLA was rising in popularity and support in the cities, but failing to achieve union at their Congress. The MPLA has three factions. One is the official line which controls the clandestine radio, that of the President of the MPLA, Dr. Agostinho Neto. Another is called Eastern Revolt (Revolta do Leste), and criticizes



African peasant in the MPLA liberated zone.

Credit Melba Smith

the "excessive authoritarianism" of Dr. Agostinho Neto. This second group is headed by the former director of MPLA Youth and Eastern military commander, Daniel Chipenda. The third (Active Revolt) is an intellectual faction; though supported by a few militants and guerrillas, the majority, and the majority of those who signed the "Manifesto of the 19," are intellectuals. This faction is led by Father Pinto de Andrade who since 1962 has hardly been in Angola, having been imprisoned, then confined to residence at various points in Portugal. He was again imprisoned at the end of the '60's and got out only on April 25th.

Faced with all this complication, the Whites tend to stick closely to one point. That is, no decisions can be made about Angola without consulting the Angolans. They believe themselves to be privileged Angolans and are irritated when they are ignored. They could care less about everybody else, though they say they do care. But as they hold economic power, they also want to hold political power. They would hate to see people without economic power become politically powerful, since they know it would be costly for themselves. This above and beyond the entire racist and colonialist mentality which reigns supreme, of course.

**Q.** Does the division white/black in Angola correspond as well to a clear class division?

**A.** I would say yes, because of white privilege and the colonial situation which has existed until now. In Angola in 1961 there were only 200 thousand *assimilados*—that is, people who had abandoned tribal habits and learned to read and write—out of a black population of 5 million. If they weren't completely Europeanized they at least spoke and write correct Portuguese and paid the *assimilado* tax (larger than the tax paid by *indigenas*) and they were not obligated to do what indigenous people were.

Of course Whites were never classified by this system, whether they knew how to read or not. And there were, and are, quite a number of illiterate Whites in Angola. . . .

Though this is without statistical accuracy, the Whites are members of the upper and middle classes and a minimal percentage of the working class, while Blacks represent the working class and lumpenproletariat, or rural labor. Exceptions to this rule are black public

employees who exist in fair number, though most always at the bottom end of the scale. This is true especially since 1961 and is not reflected in private companies. Thus they appear in administration, in the Police or militia (*sanzala* police).

**Q.** *Among the Whites, is there a tendency to accept the legitimacy of the liberation movements?*

**A.** The historical tendency of Angolan Whites was not to accept the legitimacy of any of the liberation movements. The historical tendency was to classify any talks or contacts with the liberation movements as treason. . . .

There are a few who supported the MPLA from 1961 on, who were generally people who were already opposed to fascism and colonialism. . . . There were many Whites who were sent to Angola against their will. In the beginning of the dictatorship, especially, many Whites were sent to Angola to get them away from Portugal and in a place where they would have no audience whatsoever.

But if I mention those who always opposed fascism, I must also speak of all the others who were indifferent to fascism who came to Angola simply to make their fortune and return with it to a comfortable life in Portugal. And also not to be forgotten is Portuguese and international capitalism, always the big winner in the war and in colonialism. To speak of Portuguese capital linked to international imperialism is to speak of the entire Angolan bourgeoisie. And that's a good many people. Many who are not linked directly to big capital identify themselves perfectly with the ideas and intentions of Portuguese and international capital for Angola and the other colonies. It is perfectly clear that there is a powerful white Angolan bourgeoisie which identifies itself with imperialist ambitions and is presently trying to hang onto any liberation movement which, in the name of anti-colonialism, will install neo-colonialism in Angola.

We must remember that the media are under the exclusive control of capital interests. In the newspapers of Angola, for example, a huge propaganda campaign was

undertaken in favor of UNITA. It was the first black movement to be seized upon as a lifeboat for the white bourgeoisie. After UNITA a new gold mine was discovered—the FNLA. Now it is clear that the FNLA had been vigorously and publicly attacked by all Angolan “patriots,” that is, the Angolans linked to big capital, fascism and Salazarism. It was only with great reservations that they could from one day to the next begin to defend the FNLA.

The magazine “A Noticia”, for example, had previously attacked the FNLA in editorials, articles, photographs, in short any way they could. Now they are beginning to praise Zaire, saying that the Congo's independence wasn't such a mess after all.

Joao Fernandes visited Zaire on President Mobutu's invitation and returned saying that Zaire is not at all like Angolans say—it is a well organized country. That the only Portuguese expelled were those close to the border. Some of the most prosperous businessmen in Kinshasa were Portuguese. Apparently the largest property owner was also Portuguese; Mobutu even cited his name in an interview and said he had neither been expelled nor had his holding nationalized, etc., etc. All that to emphasize the fact that Zaire has treated the rich well and especially businesses, which is very important to white Angolans. When it comes to nationalizations and their money. . . .

As in the beginning it was UNITA, now it is the FNLA, and since Daniel Chipenda was getting along very well with Mobutu, he might be a gold mine as well. But only the MPLA of Daniel Chipenda.

There is one person who is universally hated by the Whites of Angola: Agostinho Neto. It is not by chance. They know that the first anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist program to appear in Angola was that of the MPLA and are not interested in having the leader of the MPLA or of the Agostinho Neto faction come to power in Angola. Thus, they think it wise to make huge amounts of propaganda saying that Agostinho Neto is authoritarian, that he doesn't accept discussions, etc.

# South Africa

## POLITICS

### BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS ON TRIAL

Almost a year has passed since the apartheid government, the security branch and the police launched a full scale attack on Black Consciousness organizations in South Africa, arresting leaders and supporters of the South African Students Organization (SASO), Black Peoples Convention (BPC), Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU), Theatre Council of Natal (TECON), Peoples Experiential Theatre (PET), and Black Community Programs (BPC). The initial pretext for an assault that has since involved the arrest and detention of scores of Blacks and the specific arraignment of 13 under the Terrorism Act and 19 under the Riotous Assemblies Act involved a “Pro-Frelimo Rally” at Curries Fountain on 25th September, 1974. At that time, police used dogs to disperse a peaceful crowd of 2000 and arrested 21 persons.

Yet four separate subsequent waves of arrests and detentions which came on the 27th and 28th of September, the 7th-11th October, the 7th of November, 1974 and on the 14th and 15th of February, 1975, involved persons who had had nothing to do with the rally, thus making it clear that the South African Government had in mind to behead and silence the entire spirited and multi-faceted Black Consciousness Movement. Many members of organizations associated with the Movement are known to have fled the country to escape arrest, while others have stayed on to continue to fight against the apartheid system despite well-founded fear of further repression.

Court appearances of those specifically accused have been occasions for demonstrations of powerful solidarity between the detainees and packed galleries who have defiantly shouted their greetings and thrown food and clothing to the detainees. The scene at the third appearances on 12th March was typical:

“On the 12th March the 13 appeared in the “Palace of

Justice", the Supreme Court in Pretoria. Before the session started, the singing of the accused could be heard rising from the cells below. They entered the court, their fists clenched in the Black Power salute and singing:

"Asikathali Noma Siyaboshwa  
Ngoba Sifuna Inkululeho  
Unzima Unzima Lomthawala. . . .

"We don't care even if we are arrested  
Because we want freedom  
The burden is hard. . . ."

"As they filed, still singing, into the dock they turned and faced family, friends and supporters who packed the court gallery and who were also singing. The accused then sat down and started exchanging greetings and talking with people in the spectators gallery. At the same time, some of the accused challenged the activities of the white Security Branch men in the court, including that of one man who stood with a tape recorder directly behind the dock. . . .

"Soon after the Judge left the court friends and families of the accused moved down to the dock to greet them. As they were kissing, embracing, shaking hands and conversing, the police attempted to separate the spectators from the accused and lead the latter back to their cell. According to newspaper reports a scuffle then broke out between the accused and the police. In the melée that followed, fists and police caps were seen to fly. The already lively atmosphere, in a normally subdued courtroom, was punctuated by cries of anger and concern from the spectators. Eventually, the accused disappeared down the stairwell. It was reported that there was then a further confrontation between the accused on one hand and the uniformed police on the other.

"After the hearing, a large number of spectators gathered outside the courtroom where sections of the crowd demonstrated their solidarity with the accused.

"Before, during and after the court proceedings, a large number of Security Branch were present. Some were posted at different parts of Church Square photographing people arriving for the trial. In the courtroom large numbers stood at the three entrances observing the spectators while also guarding the doors. More were seated in the balcony overlooking the courtroom from which position a man was recording the activities in the courtroom with a video tape camera. Another Security Branch man stood in the well of the court recording what was happening and at least one other white man was seen standing among the spectators with a small pocket tape recorder.

"In addition to the Security Branch there was a large contingent of uniformed police whose purpose was to guard the accused. After the hearing Security Branch were photographing the spectators as they left the court building.

"The accused throughout were very confident, showing a strong bond of solidarity and indicating clearly that wherever possible they would challenge any misuse of court procedure by the Security Branch. The bond of solidarity permeated throughout the spectators gallery, which other than the Security Branch, was almost exclusively Black."

At present (July, 1975), at least 27 people are still being held incommunicado without formal charges having been made. The charge sheet against the 13 specifically accused runs to 105 pages. To better grasp the nature of

the South African system of "justice" under which they are being tried, we quote at length; the accused are:

- 1) SATHASIVAN COOPER, Indian, male;
- 2) JUSTICE EDMUND LINDANE MYEZA, Black, male;
- 3) MOSIQUA GERARD PATRICK LEKOTA, Black, male;
- 4) MAITSHE NCHAUPE AUBREY MOKOAPE, Black, male;
- 5) NKWENKE VINCENT NKOMO, Black, male;
- 6) PANDELANI JEREMIAH NEFOLOVHODWE, Black, male;
- 7) GILBERT KABORANE SEDIBE, Black, male;
- 8) RUBIN HARE, a Coloured, male;
- 9) STRINIVASA RAJOO MOODLEY, Indian, male;
- 10) SADECOQUE VARIAVA, Indian, male;
- 11) ABSOLOM ZITULELE CINDI, Black, male;
- 12) SULAYMAN AHMED ISMAIL, Indian, male;
- 13) SIVALINGHAM MOODLEY, Indian, male;

"They are accused of participating in "terroristic activities" in terms of various sections of the Terrorism Act (No. 83 of 1967) and General Law Amendment Act (No. 56 of 1955). On the main count the charge is that between 1st December 1968 and 31st October 1974 the accused, "at all relevant times members and/or active supporters" of SASO, and/or BPC, and/or the Peoples Experiential Theatre (PET) and/or the Theatre Council of Natal (TECON) and/or the SRC of Turfloop, "did wrongly, unlawfully and with intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order . . . . . conspire . . . . . to commit one or more of the following acts, to wit:

- 1) to transform 'the State by unconstitutional, revolutionary and/or violent means; and/or
- 2) to condition the Bantu, Indian and Coloured population groups of the Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Blacks) for violent revolution; and/or
- 3) to create and foster feelings of racial hatred, hostility and antipathy by the Blacks towards the White population group of the Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Whites) and/or the State; and/or
- 4) to denigrate the whites and to represent them as inhuman oppressors of the Blacks, and to induce, persuade and pressurize the Blacks to totally reject the White man and his way of life, and to defy him; and/or
- 5) to eulogise and encourage emulation of persons who have been convicted in the Republic of the crimes of terrorism, subversion, sabotage and offences under the Suppression of Communism Act No. 44 of 1950; and/or
- 6) to portray historical events in such a way as to cause, encourage or further feelings of hostility, resentment or hatred by the Blacks towards the Whites; and/or
- 7) to make, produce, publish or distribute subversive and anti-White utterances, writings, plays and/or dramas; and/or
- 8) to organize and hold subversive and anti-White rallies



and/or gatherings; and/or

- 9) to discourage, hamper, deter or prevent foreign investment in the economy of the Republic, and to call upon foreign investors to disengage themselves from the said economy or sections of the said economy; and/or
- 10) to discourage, hamper and/or deter foreign organizations and/or Governments from recognising and/or co-operating with the Republic;

"The alternative charges relate to the compiling, dissemination, reading, reciting etc. of "inflammatory, provocative anti-White, racialistic and/or subversive material", and the proposing, supporting etc. of motions described with the same adjectives, similarly "plays or dramas". Rubin Hare is charged with inciting SASO to "resort to an armed struggle against the State" and "Coloured persons" to "attack, assault and/or kill" Whites. Seven of the accused are also charged with organising "so-called pro-Frelimo rallies", provoking the police to use violence, and with "demonstrating" or "propagating anti-White and anti-State feelings". A significant charge is that they did "advertise, make known or suggest the efficacy of an armed struggle to transform the State and/or to bring about political, social, industrial and/or economic change".

"Two of the accused are further charged with discouraging, hampering, deterring and/or preventing foreign investment in the Republic's economy.

"A final alternative charge is clearly in the nature of a

test case in that accused number one is charged with "participation in Terroristic activities" through endangering maintenance of law and order in that he was a member of the BPC Executive Committee, another of whose members, Siphon Buthelezi (since believed to have fled the country), had written or caused to be written, letters to various companies and "thereby did, or did attempt to, discourage, hamper, deter and/or prevent foreign investment in the economy of the Republic".

(source: 3rd Report on Arrests, Detentions and Trials. . . . Issued by The Program for Social Justice 80 Jorissen St., Braamfontein, South Africa.)

## BANTUSTANS Transkei

With the prospect of Transkei getting "independence" in a few years, considerable attention is focused on the future policy of the Transkei Government. Chief Minister Kaiser Matanzima has explained that the Transkei will have a capitalist economy with emphasis on "fair" distribution as opposed to equal distribution. At least initially trade unions will not be allowed. He urged white businessmen to invest in the Transkei where cheap labor and the absence of "industrial trouble makers" are assured.

Regarding the question of separation of the races, he gave assurances that there would be no discrimination against whites and no "forced integration."



Kaiser Matanzima, Chief Minister of the Transkei.

He has also announced that the South African Government is to help the Transkei to have an "army" soon. The army will initially only be provided with small-arms and will remain under the control of the South African Government. After independence the Transkei Government will eventually take control of the army although the extent of such control remains unclear.

#### KwaZulu

In the recently concluded session of the KwaZulu legislative assembly, the members pressed KwaZulu Chief Buthelezi to take a stronger line against the South African Government.

#### Lebowa

The Lebowa bantustan government is willing to modify its constitution so as to have the legislative assembly divided into two houses, one for the traditional chiefs and the other for elected representatives. Under the present arrangement the assembly is a single house and the hereditary chiefs and elected representatives have the same rights and privileges in the house. The South African Government is strongly opposed to the move which is likely to reduce the powers of the chiefs. However in spite of opposition from Pretoria, Lebowa's Chief Minister Dr. Cedric Phatudi is moving ahead with the plan. He dismissed with contempt the allegation that the proposal if adopted will make chiefs into rubber stamps.

#### Black Townships in "White" South Africa

The South African Government has traditionally maintained that the Africans living in homes outside the "homelands" are not permanent residents but only "temporary sojourners." As a corollary, they were not allowed to own homes but were forced to live on a month to month rent basis. Recently the Government has decided to allow such Africans living in urban areas leasehold rights for 30 years although not complete ownership.

#### AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

Police carried out a series of raids in March in an attempt to stop the publication of the ANC's underground publication "Vukuni." The African National Congress is a banned organisation in South Africa. (Anti-Apartheid News, London, May, June 1975; Comments and Opinion, Pretoria, April 18, 1975; Star, Johannesburg, May 24, 1975; Guardian, London, April 22, 1975; New York Times, New York, May 18, 1975)

#### VORSTER'S INTERPRETATION OF HIS FAMOUS SIX MONTHS TIME FOR CHANGE:

On November 5, 1974, Mr. Vorster said at Nigel, in the Transvaal: "Give South Africa six months' chance—I ask no more than that—give South Africa six months' chance and do not make the road ahead more difficult than it is, and, if you give South Africa that chance, you will be astonished where South Africa will stand. Even if you refuse to give South Africa that chance, you will still be astonished where South Africa will stand in six or 12 months' time". That was during the period when South Africa faced expulsion from the United Nations, and there was increasing realization that the changes in the political map of southern Africa had far-reaching implications for white-dominated South Africa. So, Vorster made this appeal to the outside world—and certain quarters expected major changes inside as well as outside South Africa. The past six months demonstrates that South Africa has done very little to change its internal face. The carrot for the outside world—detente—meant nearly nothing for South African Blacks.


Vorster gave an interview to South African reporters as the six months came to a close, and singled out three major areas in which he believes the political situation has changed substantially during this period. These areas are: (1) There has been a "totally new appraisal" by the major powers of the strategic significance of the Cape sea route; (2) The outside world's attitude to the South West African People's Organization has "changed very much"; and (3) South Africa has built certain bridges" and "whetted the appetite of a number of African countries" to have a closer look at South Africa and to realise their own economic interests demanded that they buy in the "nearest, best and cheapest market". Asked whether there had been further contacts between South Africa and Africa since the OAU meeting in Dar es Salaam, Vorster's answer was that "most of the countries have been occupied with the Commonwealth conference, and ... Zambia and Tanzania have been busy with ZANU". In an editorial, the Johannesburg STAR (May 7, 1975) pats Vorster on the back as having "good reason to sound satisfied. . . . The country, along with the thinking (sic) part of the world community, has indeed been surprised at the dramatic progress made since last November in our relations with Black Africa. The Southern African situation is still fluid, but full of promise such as has not been known in two decades".

In a debate in Parliament, Vorster made the following points very clear re his detente initiatives:

- \*Rejected dialogue through SWAPO on eventual independence for South West Africa or Namibia;

- \*Rejected Nelson Mandela as South Africa's Black nationalist leader, and refused to release him from jail;

- \*Made it clear he was negotiating on the basis of the



Prime Minister Vorster

National Party's policy of separate development, involving the independence of the homelands and their acceptance by the world outside; and

\*Again explained that South Africa's interest in a Rhodesian settlement would not extend to interference with Rhodesia's own decision-making.

(*Star*, Johannesburg, April 26, 1975; May 10th, 1975; May 17, 1975; *Comment & Opinion*, May 9, 1975).

#### PROGRESSIVE-REFORM MERGER:

The leaders of the Progressive and the Reform Parties have agreed on a merger SUBJECT to APPROVAL of their respective national congresses. A special sitting of the Progressive executive committee announced on May 18 that his party's National Federal Council together with provincial executive committees and caucuses at parliamentary, provincial council and municipal levels, had also approved the merger. This merger was immediately denounced by the official Opposition Party, the United Party as "sudden capitulation".

The merger statement sets out a declaration of principles and a statement of policy relating to a number of issues.

#### Declaration of Principles:

1. The recognition of the dignity and worth of the individual human being.
2. The elimination of discrimination against any citizen on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex, and the creation of conditions in which equality of opportunity can be exercised.
3. The Protection of the religious, language and cultural heritages of the various groups forming the South African nation.
4. The equitable sharing of political power by all citizens

of South Africa, with safeguards against domination and oppression of any race by another.

5. The restoration and maintenance of the rule of law and the protection of civil liberties.
6. The improvement of the quality of life and the standard of living of all citizens through the energetic development of a modern economy utilising South Africa's national resources to the full.
7. The upholding of South Africa's status as a sovereign African state, the fostering of understanding and cooperation on the continent, and the promotion of the social and economic progress of its people.

#### Statement of Policy:

This statement is being referred to a joint committee of the two parties for examination in detail and drafting for presentation to the congress of the two parties.

The important section is that relating to constitutional and franchise policies. It is proposed that an equitable sharing of political power by all citizens without domination and oppression of any race by another can be attained via a federal system consisting of self-governing states, linked through a rigid constitution together with a bill of rights, interpreted by a powerful independent judiciary.

According to the proposal

(i) The states, whose boundaries will be drawn taking into account group and other interests and such homelands as have not chosen independence, will have maximum legislative and executive powers; the federal government will have only such powers as are essentially national in character. The franchise and the system of election for the state legislatures will have to take into account any system which might already be functioning.

(ii) The federal parliament will consist of a house of assembly and a senate with equal and co-ordinate powers. The senate will be elected on a proportional basis by the state legislature. The house of assembly will be elected directly by the voters in each state through a combination of proportional representation and constituency systems so as to ensure both the widest possible participation of citizens in the elections and the orderly transition to a responsible multiracial government.

(iii) There will be a bill of rights entrenched in the constitution and a powerful independent federal judiciary to protect the basic rights of citizens and to protect groups from domination and oppression.

(iv) The Constitution will be entrenched so that it cannot be altered save by the consensus of a substantial majority of both the federal and state legislatures.

A national convention representative of all races will be called to achieve the widest possible national assent to such a federal constitution.

According to *Africa News*, "the new party will have to come from behind to win support at the polls, (still) it has the advantage of backing from the country's larger financial interests. The giant South African conglomerate called the Anglo-American Corporation is a major source of financial support for the former Progressive Party. And several other major corporations have backed both the Progressives and the Reformers".

(Sources: *Comment & Opinion*, May 23, 1975; May 30, 1975; *Africa News*, May 22, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, May 10, 1975).

The South African reception of the merger was mixed. The *Sunday Express* (May 25, 1975) said this could well be the policy of a new official Opposition in a couple of

years' time. That means it is being presented to the public not as some idealistic academic exercise, but as something which may soon be South Africa's first alternative to the crumbling policy of apartheid". DIE VADERLAND thinks that "it boils down to this: In the individual federal states it will be a case of one man one vote, regardless of race, nation or colour. With nearly 13-million Blacks, Coloureds and Indians in the 'White' area, this means Black governments at the first election in ALL the federal states. To the Whites this is unacceptable. But for the federal parliament there will be a qualified franchise: A political trick to ensure White baaskap (overlordship). This will be unacceptable to the Black and Brown peoples" (May 27, 1975). The *Rand Daily Mail* commented: "In their new form the Progressive Reformists will step effectively into the centre of South African politics—in a commanding position between those who demand White domination and those who preach Black power . . . poised to steer a compromise between White economic power and Black numerical resources. Politics is the art of the possible. And the statement of policy as announced makes it possible to build a society where dominance is not based on colour". (May 26, 1975).

#### **CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA DECLARED "AFFECTED ORGANISATION":**

The Government's action of declaring the Christian Institute an "affected organisation", came within 48 hours of the tabling in Parliament of the report of a Government Commission alleging that certain activities of the Institute constituted a danger to the State. The Institute is accused of supporting black power and revolution through the SPROCAS studies. The Commission particularly found "obnoxious" the Institute's relation with the World Council of Churches. The latter, according to the report, supports "violent action against South Africa in the form of assistance to terrorist organizations". The Institute has repeatedly said that it is opposed to violence.

By being declared 'affected', the Institute is barred from receiving funds from abroad. The Affected Organisations Act passed last year empowers the Government to declare any organisation 'affected' if it deems it to be engaging in 'politics' in cooperation with or under the influence of any organisation or person outside the country.

(*Guardian*, London, May 30, 1975; May 31, 1975; June 6, 1975; *Africa News*, June 2, 1975; June 5, 1975)

## **FOREIGN RELATIONS**

### **SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES**

The former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. Donald Easum, while posing as a "friend" of black Africa, has actually been one of South Africa's staunchest allies in the US State Department. Ken Owen of the *Star* (Johannesburg, May 24, 1975) reports that "South Africa has never had better direct access to effective levels of American Government than during Mr. Easum's tenure. This meant that on several occasions minor grievances or misunderstandings could be quickly shifted out of the way of the more important relationships." As an architect of US policy supporting South Africa's dialogue program, Mr. Easum helped to arrange a meeting in New York between the South African Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, and the Nigerian Foreign Minister, Dr. Okoi Arikpo. Additionally

Mr. Easum had been involved in the discussions that took place between Vorster and Kaunda on the question of the Ian Smith regime of Rhodesia.

Thus, the change from Mr. Easum to Mr. Davis as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs does not reflect any real modification in US policy toward South Africa, in that both these officials are friends of the apartheid regime of South Africa. The difference between these two men—vis-a-vis the South African regime's interests—is only one of style, not one of actual policy. In a *New York Times* article (June 18, 1975) unnamed US State Department officials are quoted as saying that the present American policy on Africa is "well within our best national interests." South Africa represents a "part of the world stability America wants." The "stability" which the US seeks—along with West Germany, Japan, Great Britain, and France—is one which allows its multi-national corporations to obtain enormous profits from the economic and political exploitation of black South Africans.

In response to this western desire for "stability" in South Africa, the apartheid regime is mobilizing western government support by raising the bugaboo of the "threat of Soviet expansion into the southern Africa region." Prime Minister Vorster stated in an interview "that the infiltration of the communists into the Indian Ocean showed that they were aiming at the control of Southern Africa which was Europe's lifeline." (*Star*, Johannesburg, May 31, 1975) *Die Volksbad* writes that "South Africa has for many years emphasized this [South Africa's role as "guardian" of the Cape route] . . . Now there are signs that the danger of communist penetration into both the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean is being realised. Politicians are beginning to listen to military experts who have long since realised the value of the Cape sea route and have pleaded for its protection." The *Hoofstad* adds that "the Cape sea route remains completely safe since it is controlled by South Africa and the Republic is a stable country in virtually every sphere." (*Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, May 16, 1975)

Picking up the cue from the Vorster propaganda machine, the US Secretary of Defense, Mr. James Schlesinger urged at the May meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers that NATO should establish a major monitoring installation in South Africa for NATO intelligence purposes. This installation would have the job of monitoring all Soviet fleet movements in the Indian Ocean, and the idea received the support of the French and British governments. At the moment the plan has not yet been finalized because of the opposition to it which was raised by the Dutch, Norwegian, and Danish Defense Ministers. The Dutch Defense Minister, Mr. Vredeling, stated that if Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's proposal was adopted, Holland would withdraw from NATO and that his Government would also consider making the Rotterdam harbor out of bounds to the NATO fleet. (*Star*, Johannesburg, May 24, 1975)

Meanwhile trade ties between South Africa and the West continue to increase. The French trade mission, headed by Minister of Commerce, Norbert Segard, which visited South Africa last April, succeeded in selling to the South African Airways a number of European Airbuses, capable of transporting 280 passengers. Three French firms will participate in developing South Africa's nuclear energy complex. The South African regime bought three more French made submarines. Last April, there were discussions between a trade delegation from Bremen, West Germany and South African corporations. The objective

of the talks was to increase South African exports of fruit, wool, grain, fishmeal, steel and copper to West Germany. (*Le Monde*, Paris, Apr. 17, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, Apr. 19, 1975)

## SOUTH AFRICA AND BLACK AFRICA

It seems that South Africa has been slow to accept the reality that the overwhelming majority of black African Governments reject the South African concept of "détente." Although the *Dar es Salaam Declaration* in uncategorical terms repudiated the politics of "détente" with the apartheid system of South Africa, the South African regime and press initially attempted to present the false image that the politics of "détente" had won a "victory." In a statement before Parliament, Prime Minister Vorster said that "his interpretation of the OAU declaration was that contact and consultation with South Africa under certain circumstances is permissible" and that he "would continue to hold discussions with those African states that wanted to talk to South Africa." Further, he has continued to foster internationally the false image that the heads of the bantustan governments are the representatives of African political opinion inside South Africa. Complaining about the OAU rejection of the Bantustans, Vorster stated that "there were African states who do not want to know anything about Buthelezi, Matanzima, and all others [Bantustan heads]. They look upon one man and one man only as the leader of all black peoples of South Africa and that man is Nelson Mandela [the imprisoned leader of the African National Congress who is serving a life sentence on Robben Island]." (*Guardian*, London, Apr. 19, 1975) Adding to the erroneous theme of South Africa's "victory" at the OAU meeting last April, the *Hoofstad* wrote that "The Dar es Salaam declaration gives its unconditional support to negotiate peaceful solutions to the problems of Southern Africa and may be regarded as one of the most moderate documents ever to have emerged from the council chambers of the OAU. . . . It is a triumph in our [South Africa's] effort to build bridges in Africa with contact and dialogue." (*comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, Apr. 18, 1975)

However since President Kaunda's visit to Washington last April and his criticism of US policy toward South Africa, the tone of the South African analysis of the implications of the *Dar es Salaam Declaration* has changed. The South African Government is no longer so confident that the African Governments will continue to accept the bait of "détente" South African style and forget about the elimination of the apartheid system. In an attack on President Kaunda's statements in Washington, Prime Minister Vorster "warned" President Kaunda "not to overreach himself" because "this would not be good for the cause of peace in Southern Africa." (*Guardian*, London, Apr. 22, 1975) *Die Vaderland* comments that "the Dar es Salaam conference has brought an increasingly conspicuous change in emphasis in the statements of Black détente leaders. . . . During the meeting of African ministers of foreign affairs militant Africa brought its strength to bear. . . . Dr. Kaunda's utterances in Washington gave a disquieting indication of just how strong the pressure of militant Africa is on Black détente leaders. . . . This must be seen as an essential prologue to the actual OAU conference in June this year. And it gives an indication of the power of the militants." The *Pretoria News* writes that "dangerously wishful

thinking makes some people still cherish the hope that, if Rhodesian and South West African settlement can be achieved, Black Africa will be content to leave White South Africa free to go its own way with little or no significant change in its domestic racial policies." Additionally in *Die Transvaler* it was stated that "from the most recent development it is clear that South Africa's enemies have teamed up to try to wreck the brittle peace negotiations in Southern Africa at the most inopportune moment." (*Comment and Opinion*, Pretoria, Apr. 25, May 2, 1975)

One of the best chapters, although a little too brief, is that which deals with Cabral's writings, in which Rudebeck shows Cabral's keen awareness of the use of historical and dialectical materialism. Rudebeck clearly demonstrates that Cabral was a man and revolutionary of creative genius.

The conclusions are more of a summary of the book and a broad review of various theories of political mobilization. This final chapter seemed to lack integration with the rest of the book. This is not to say that the material was unrelated, but that the logical continuity was not always clearly apparent.

## ECONOMICS

### BLACK BANK TO OPEN

The African Bank of South Africa with capital of \$1.45 million is expected to open two branches by the end of the year. All that is needed for the opening is the endorsement of the bantustan governments, and so far three have given the okay, kwaZulu, Gazankulu, and Basotho QwaQwa. A white accountant, Allan Wentzel, has been voted the general manager of the bank. The reason he was chosen over more than 80 other applicants, was given by S.M. Motseunyana, president of the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce. "Some of the Blacks who applied had imposing qualifications and degrees but no experience. This bank carries the hopes of the Black people and cannot be allowed to fail. For this reason an efficient White man was chosen." (*Star*, Johannesburg, May 3, 10, 1975)

### ANGLO-AMERICAN

The giant Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa has had a major influence on labor relations, mining, trade—in a word on the entire South African economy. The moves it makes are of significance for the whole country. Recently, company chairman H.F. Oppenheimer outlined the direction in which his company is moving in relation to a number of problems.

Regarding the question of black labor, Oppenheimer does not advocate the creation of black unions. Instead he is setting up a Manpower Resources Division. Its functions will include personnel services, assistance in determining wages and working conditions, communication in both directions between workers and management, adoption of scientific methods of job evaluation and rewards, provision of superior job training at all levels, the advancement of black workers and the elimination of race discrimination, etc.

Oppenheimer is a liberal within South Africa, one of the few corporation heads who will point out that the wage gap between Blacks and Whites is in fact increasing. Even if there were an increase of 50 percent in black wages, and ten percent in white, the gap would widen





Harry Oppenheimer

because of the historical inequity in the wage scale. In order for there to be peace within the corporation, in order for the mines to function properly, these inequities must be overcome, according to Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer admits that the strikes that hit his mines were caused, at least in part, by dissatisfaction over wages and working conditions. (*Observer*, London, May 18, 1975)

Anglo-American has just bought a 49 percent share in Brazil's largest gold mine from the private banking interests of Sr. Walter Moreira Salles, making Anglo-American the largest stock holder. Anglo-American is just one of a number of South African firms expanding into Brazil. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, June, 1975)

Oppenheimer wants to see the expansion of trade throughout the world. He says that there will be "incalculable economic benefits" for southern and central Africa if Vorster's detente policy succeeds. His position is a good illustration of the fact that Vorster's foreign policy moves are fully consistent with the needs of an expanding capitalist economy and have moved beyond the narrow racism of the past. For justice to come in South Africa, the economic as well as the social structure will have to be radically altered.

#### LABOR: GOLD MINES

Mining company earnings for the first quarter were well below those previously estimated, in spite of the high price of gold. Mine owners claim that this was due, at least in part, to increased costs and to the labor shortage which prevented the mines from functioning at full capacity. Now, the Chamber of Mines says the labor crisis has eased. Workers are arriving from Mozambique in good number, recruitment of South African Blacks has doubled, and the increased rate looks as if it will be maintained; in addition the shortage of labor has forced the mines to function more efficiently with the labor they do have. In order to attract local Blacks, the wages for underground workers have been raised by 37 percent, bringing the minimum

wage up to \$80 a month. This is a very competitive starting wage for Blacks in South Africa. However, it is still \$100 per month below the poverty datum line for an average family. (The poverty line allows for basic expenditures such as food and housing, but allows nothing for emergencies, furniture, recreation, etc.) In 1974, the average wage for white miners was about \$750 a month. The average wage for black miners was \$100. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 19, May 17, 1975; *Africa News*, Durham, June 2, 1975)

#### WHITE BUILDERS GET MORE

The article in the Johannesburg *Star* is entitled "Black Builders Get More." And the lead paragraph states that "employers . . . have quadrupled the automatic cost of living adjustment for Black workers on the minimum wage scale." This kind of reporting is typical of the South African press, and is exceedingly misleading. Instead of making a one cent adjustment, the employers in the Transvaal building industry are adding four cents to African wages, bringing the minimum pay to 50 cents an hour or R22 a week. (R22 equals about \$32.)

White builders on the other hand are having eleven cents added to their pay, making the minimum per hour R1.87 or more than three times the black pay rate. (*Star*, Johannesburg, May 3, 1975)

#### STRIKE RECORD

The Government claims that the record of labor peace in South Africa is outstanding. In fact, according to Progressive MP Alec Boraine, only one other African nation has more labor strikes than does South Africa. That nation is Morocco. Boraine stated in Parliament that the strikes prove that the day of black worker passivity and docility is over. The statistics bear this out. In 1973, 67,338 black workers were involved in 246 stoppages which could be regarded as strikes in terms of existing legislation. There were also 115 disputes which resulted in stoppages which could not be termed strikes under the law. These involved 22,744 people. In 1974, there were 374 strikes involving 57,656 workers. These figures are even more significant when one remembers that all strikes by black workers are illegal in South Africa. (*Star*, Johannesburg, May 3, 1975)

#### UNIONS: BLACK OR MIXED OR WHITE?

The Minister of Labor, Mr. Viljoen has stated emphatically that there will not be black unions in South Africa. Instead, the system of works and liaison committees will be continued. Critics of these committees, including Dr. Boraine, have pointed out that they give no real power to workers. Workers can merely express their opinions and advise. Further, it is not even mandatory for employers to form such committees. They are not empowered to conduct wage negotiations, and are in fact meaningless window dressing.

Some employers recognize the inadequacy of the committees, and have their own solutions. The Association of Chambers of Commerce (ACC) has become the first major employer's organization to call for racially integrated trade unions. They have taken this position because they fear the black trade unions that are being organized but are not recognized by the government. As things stand now, the unrecognized unions are under no control. Further, an employer might have to deal with several different trade unions. The solution, according to

the ACC is to bring black workers into existing unions where they can be controlled. (*Star*, Johannesburg, May 3, 24, 1975)

### SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE

South African trade figures have been released. While Britain is still South Africa's largest export market, West Germany has replaced Britain as the largest supplier of imports to South Africa. Japan is third in the export market, and the fourth biggest supplier of goods to South Africa. After Britain, the rest of Africa is South Africa's biggest export market. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, June, 1975)

Even with the change of government in Mozambique, South Africa is supplying machinery and money to keep open the rail link between South Africa and Lourenco Marques. The city is a major port for South Africa, and is very dependent on the flow of South African goods for its income.

Canada is trading with South Africa more heavily than ever before, and is now South Africa's eighth largest trading partner. In 1974, Canada imported about \$123 million worth of goods from the Republic compared with \$78 million for 1973. The main imports were sugar, iron, steel and alloys, and metals, concentrates, and scrap. Canadian exports to South Africa rose from \$62 million in 1973 to \$88 million in 1974. Principal exports were trucks, tractors, motor vehicle parts, and paperboard.

Israel has announced that South Africa is a "preferred export target." This means that Israel views South Africa as a very good prospect for expanded trade and will offer exporters special incentives to concentrate on that market. Other preferred nations are Ecuador, Venezuela, Japan, and Cyprus. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 19, May 17, 24, 1975)

### TOURISM

South African Airways is spending \$400,000 this summer on advertising in the United States and Canada. Ads will appear in *Time*, *Newsweek*, *Business Week*, *Town and Country*, and *Gourmet*.

The South African Tourist Corporation is launching an expanded program that will cost more than \$1.4 million. An office was opened in Tokyo in February, and new offices will open soon in Buenos Aires and Zurich. In addition, the London and New York offices are being expanded. The focus of the new program will be "active marketing" rather than public relations. That is, the South African Tourist Corporation is assisting in the design of tours and organizing group travel. The goal is to have one million tourists visit South Africa by 1980. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 19, 1975)

### AGRICULTURE

1974-75 was an excellent year for sugar. Production was up about 150,000 tons over the previous season, and local consumption rose about 20,000 tons. The additional 130,000 tons available for export led to export earnings of about \$275 million, an increase of more than 80 percent over the previous season. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 19, 1975)

Although fruit sales increased on both the local and export markets, income was down because of increased costs, especially shipping costs. The overseas market for canned fruit is expected to be poor, resulting in a loss of about \$17 million in export earnings.

Although the maize crop is expected to be good, there is anger from both producers and consumers. The farmers have condemned the new prices set by the government, saying that costs have increased by some 25 percent, and a six percent increase is hopelessly inadequate. They blame



Durban beaches, a tourist attraction.

the increased costs on the higher price of fertilizers, petrol, farm implements, and labor. A ton of maize will now cost about \$73. It is the black population which will suffer most from the increase, as maize is the staple of their diet. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 19, 26, 1975)

What is the overall picture for agriculture? Costs are increasing, especially those of fertilizers and machinery. The cost of labor is also increasing. As reported in the last two issues of *Southern Africa*, a major effort is being made to recruit South African Blacks to work in the gold mines. One of the incentives is higher pay. In order to compete, farmers will also have to raise wages. According to the *Star*, another major factor in the overall agricultural picture is that of the cost of land—which is often greatly overpriced. Though there appears to be no immediate crisis, there is the danger that increased costs will result in the bankruptcy of many farmers, especially maize farmers, if prices fail to rise. And of course if prices do rise, the cost to the consumer goes up, and the vicious cycle of inflation goes round again. (*Star*, Johannesburg, May 3, 1975)

## OIL

The announcement of new efforts to discover oil in South Africa is greeted with a certain skepticism. South Africa is always on the verge of discovering oil, and the eight wells to be drilled off the Cape are described as

offering a "reasonable" chance of success. What is illustrated is South Africa's frantic effort to end its vulnerability to an oil embargo. At the end of 1974, about \$138 million had been spent in oil exploration, and nothing worth exploiting had yet been found. (*Star*, Johannesburg, May 3, 10, 1975)

## STEEL

Unlike most of the capitalist world where production is down, South African steel output in the first four months of 1975 is 15.4 percent higher than in the corresponding period last year. The production of pig iron is also up.

## CHROME PLANT

Union Carbide and General Mining have formed a company that is to construct a \$50 million plant designed to produce 120,000 tons of charge chrome a year. The plant will be built on the border of Lebowa, one of South Africa's bantustans. The chrome plant will fit into the white government's scheme to decentralize industry, moving plants out from urban centers to African areas where there is a cheap supply of labor and where the politicizing effects of interaction with people from other parts of South Africa are avoided. (*South African Digest*, April 25, 1975)

# Namibia

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## THE UNITED NATIONS— THE TRIPLE VETO

The United States, Britain and France on June 6 exercised their veto power in the United Nations Security Council in behalf of South Africa and against an assertion of UN rights in Namibia and of the rights of the Namibian people to their independence.

The big three teamed together—as they did on October 30, 1974, when they thwarted South Africa's expulsion from the UN—to cast the second triple veto in the history of the world body. The Western permanent members of the Security Council rejected a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa because of its continued illegal occupation of Namibia.

Resolution S/11713, put forward by Cameroon, Guyana, Iraq, Mauritania and Tanzania, invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter in declaring that South Africa's defiant presence in the international territory "constitutes a threat to international peace and security", and that all states should prevent the supply of arms, ammunition, aircraft, vehicles, military equipment, spare parts or any activities promoting their supply or their manufacture or maintenance in South Africa and Namibia.

Ten of the 15 members of the Council voted in favor of the resolution: China and the Soviet Union (both permanent members), the five sponsors and Byelo-Russia, Costa Rica and Sweden. Japan and Italy abstained.

Although there had been a number of draft resolutions talked about in the corridors of the UN, no other was presented to the Security Council and the week-long session on the subject of Namibia ended on June 6. Unless demanding events in Namibia happen sooner—always a distinct possibility—the UN will not take up the issue until the September meeting of the General Assembly. South Africa appears to be free for the moment to pursue its own aims.

But Security Council resolution 366 of last December still stands with its provisions unmet by the occupying power, despite the concern of some over possible jeopardy to the intricate legal structure built up over the years to affirm UN rights in Namibia. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Nathaniel Davis, in testimony before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food and Energy of the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations (chaired by Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr.) on June 10 said "there were serious and good faith efforts to work out a meaningful compromise text during the negotiations at the United Nations last week, but in the end the African group decided to press for a vote on its text. We shall continue to work through the UN and with interested parties for the implementation of UN resolutions regarding Namibia."

US ambassador to the UN John A. Scali, during the Security Council debate, announced his government



Crowd gathered outside Pretoria Supreme Court during SASO terrorism trial. When 13 accused arrived they were greeted with Black Power salutes.

opposed mandatory sanctions against South Africa (*Times*, New York, June 4, 1975). South Africa was delighted. "The South African state-run radio station was giving top play today to the U.S. stand as were all . . . newspapers" (*Post*, Washington, June 5, 1975). Radio South Africa also hailed the appointment of Daniel P. Moynihan to succeed Scali (on July 1st), because of the former's recent statements on ethnic relations and policies toward developing nations.

Leaders of the South West Africa People's Organization, in New York for the historic meeting, pledged an intensification of the struggle for Namibian freedom. Peter Katjavivi, SWAPO representative for Britain and Western Europe, told *Africa News*: "We regard what happens on the diplomatic front as important, but we know that what happens inside the country is decisive. SWAPO must see that the struggle there is maintained."

It is an irony that SWAPO President Sam Nujoma and Theo-Ben Gurirab, SWAPO representative at the UN and in the Americas, were seeing Secretary Davis in Washington on the very afternoon that the triple veto took place.

The Organization of African Unity, which like the UN recognizes SWAPO as the legitimate representative of the Namibian people, denounced the veto. An *Agence France-Presse* dispatch of June 10 says that OAU Assistant Secretary-General Kamanda Wa Kamanda "warned that Africa and the liberation movements no longer had any choice other than 'to intensify the armed liberation struggle in this region until final victory' since the highest organism for the maintenance of world peace and security was unable to find a peaceful solution to the Namibia problem."

#### SOUTH AFRICAN REPLY TO SECURITY COUNCIL

The deadline for South Africa's "solemn declaration" to the Security Council regarding its occupation of Namibia was May 30. On May 20, South African Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster addressed a group of businessmen in Windhoek, capital city of the territory. The *Star* (air edition, May 24, 1975) reports Vorster "devoted the major part of his 50 minutes speech to a tendency in the private sector to lose confidence in the territory". This reflected business and industrial distress in Namibia and among multi-national corporations about the future of their investments in the territory. Interestingly, this portion of the Vorster statement was omitted from an excerpted version circulated by the South African Mission to the UN.

South Africa's formal reply came on May 27 in a letter to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim by Minister of Foreign Affairs Hilgard Muller, a communication substantially the same as the political elements of Vorster's speech. "... it is for the peoples of South West Africa themselves to determine their own political and constitutional future . . . they should exercise their choice freely and without interference from South Africa, the United Nations or any other outside entity. . . . any political group in the Territory is free to campaign for and propagate any constitutional changes it likes and to participate without hindrance in any peaceable political activities. . . . South Africa will remain in and continue to administer the Territory only as long as the inhabitants so wish. . . . My Government has repeatedly stated that it recognizes the distinct international status of South West Africa and that it does not claim one inch of the Territory for itself. . . ."

The Foreign Minister listed a number of expenditures in Namibia to assist the inhabitants therein. He, as did Vorster, held out the inducement of dialogue with a representative of the Secretary-General, at the same time rejecting UN supervision in the territory. The South Africans offered to discuss "the progress and developments in the Territory" with the president of the Council for Namibia and the OAU Committee on Namibia, and to arrange for the "true leaders", i.e., the homelands officials, to meet with the Council and OAU representatives. These lures were seized upon by soft-liners at the UN to argue against Chapter VII pressures on the usurper. SWAPO President Nujoma, speaking at the Security Council on May 30, dismissed Vorster's reply as presenting "no new position we can consider".

### THE PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN

Following the passage of resolution 366 on December 17, 1974, South Africa—having been narrowly saved from expulsion from the UN and having indeed been suspended from the General Assembly for that session—swung into high gear on a number of fronts. Announcements of increased investments from the public and private sectors in the territory, carefully mentioning funds for projects in the homelands, poured forth from Pretoria and from Vorster's proconsuls in Windhoek. Water schemes, mineral surveys, extension of roads, railway improvements, electric power development, agricultural projects were blared to the world. Nervous foreign investors were bolstered up, culminating in Vorster's Windhoek speech.

In mid-May public service officers were called to Windhoek "to discuss a master plan to prepare the population of South West Africa for social and political change" (*Star*, Johannesburg, May 17, 1975). Hand-picked agents "would launch an intensive campaign to persuade the Whites to accept major deviations from the apartheid policy". Puppet leaders of the South African-imposed homelands have been flown into Windhoek in an unending stream to be 'consulted', wined, dined and flattered. One June 5—while the Security Council was in session—the head of the South West Africa Legislative Assembly, Dirk Mudge, announced a start in dismantling apartheid barriers (*Guardian*, U.K., June 6, 1975). Hotels and cafes would be able to cater to blacks as well as whites. "The choice would lie with these establishments who would have to apply for permission to admit all races" and segregation signs in public buildings would be removed, "but first certain steps would have to be taken because of the practical problems that could arise as a result."

On May 29 *The Rand Daily Mail* of Johannesburg broke the news of the revocation of pass laws in Namibia. United Nations Commissioner for Namibia Sean MacBride clarified the matter by stating on June 4 that only laws affecting certain tribes were repealed and that the pass laws assuring control of African people in their travel and employment were untouched.

Also in May a group of newsmen from South African and overseas papers was given a tour of Namibia by none other than "Pik" Botha, the newly appointed South African ambassador to Washington. "Pik" Botha has emerged as a top lieutenant of Vorster's regime, serving as ambassador at the UN during last fall's expulsion-suspension crisis and featuring as a secret go-between for Pretoria in its maneuvers with an official of the Liberian government as part of Vorster's delicate game of 'detente' with black Africa. *Time* magazine co-operated with a full-page article in its June 16 issue entitled: "South West

Africa Timetable for Independence", an article generally sympathetic to South Africa, full of errors and featuring a portrait photograph of Botha wearing a (green?) beret.

### INSIDE NAMIBIA

Emboldened by the American, British and French go-ahead signal contained in the triple veto, South Africa tightened its grip on Namibia with a series of actions:

- on June 11, operating through the Windhoek City Council, banned a peaceful demonstration planned through downtown Windhoek by the coalition Namibia National Convention;
- on June 16 ordered Anglican Bishop Richard J. Wood and Mr. Rolf Friede, director of the Christian Centre in Windhoek, to leave the country by noon, Monday, June 23, acting under terms of Proclamation 50 of 1920, as amended, and designating them "undesirable residents";
- on June 17 issued an identical expulsion order to the bishop's American wife, Ms. Cathleen Wood;
- on June 18, through a representative of the South African Minister of Justice and Police, forbade a political rally scheduled to be held in a car-park on Windhoek's Kaiser Street by the Youth League of SWAPO;
- on June 25 sent four South African police officers to take Ms. Cathleen Wood and her two-year-old daughter, Rachel Ndimuwa, into custody and put them on a flight out of Namibia;
- on June 25, through Windhoek's City Council Management Committee, determined strict new policies regarding political meetings and rallies.

Eighteen demonstrators were arrested on June 14 on Kaiser Street and then released two days later at a court appearance marked by supporters shouting "Namibia" and "Power, power". A rally of 1500 held at Katutura African township outside Windhoek on June 14, closely watched by armed police, was depicted in the *Windhoek Advertiser* with a full page of pictures showing forests of raised fists. The theme was "Free Namibia". A farewell service on June 22 at the Lutheran church in Katutura hailed the Woods and Mr. Friede. A procession to the church wound its way through the township and included several young SWAPO supporters, carrying their national colors and chanting "Power". Bishop Wood said in his final message that he would prefer not to "be desirable" considering the meaning attached to the word "undesirable" by the occupation authorities.

Mr. Friede departed Windhoek that Sunday afternoon and the following morning Bishop Wood set out by automobile for Botswana, with his wife scheduled to follow by air. But by Monday afternoon, a new situation had developed, one which the *Windhoek Advertiser* of that day describes well: "Reporters were stunned".

### "I WON'T GO."

Cathleen Anne Roark Wood of Tucson, Arizona, daughter of a retired US army colonel and his wife, refused to obey an illegal expulsion order issued by the local administrative arm of the South African usurper.

The *Advertiser*, which has given more and more space to the "blonde 24-year-old American" wife of the Anglican bishop over the past months, went into a flurry of front-page articles and stop presses. Officials didn't know what to do for two days. Ms. Wood stayed mostly at home, supported mainly by African friends but she did go into town to shop. The Wood's residence and automobiles had over the course of their final week in Namibia been

sprayed by nighttime visitors with such slogans as "SWAPO HQS", as had the doors of the Anglican cathedral across town. In their living room, the bishop and his wife had put up posters reading "The God we believe in intervenes in history to break the structures of injustice" and "This house is bugged". The *Advertiser* printed the text of penalties for not obeying the expulsion order—"be liable to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a period not exceeding twelve months"—and interviewed "a subdued and slightly irritated" occupation official.

At four p.m., on Wednesday, June 25, four police officers drove to the Wood's house. Ms. Wood said: "I won't go". A policeman took her arm, instructed her to pack, pick up Rachel Ndimuwa and come with them. They were put on the late flight to Johannesburg.

Continued phone calls to the US State Department from New York brought forth the information that the US ambassador to South Africa had made a representation to Pretorian officials, pointing out that the Woods had not had a hearing and that South Africa was in the territory illegally. The *Advertiser* of June 25 quotes newly-installed Ambassador Bowdler as saying: "I think I could say we have sought and are awaiting information on the grounds for the expulsion. We are concerned with the rights of individuals and as an embassy are following closely the situation of this American citizen."

#### **SOUTH AFRICA'S "CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE"**

Tucked away in Foreign Minister Muller's May 27 letter to the UN Secretary-General is mention of an initiative by the executive of "the ruling National Party in South West Africa. . . . the representatives of more than 80 per cent of the total population have already decided to participate in the proposed constitutional conference and present indications are that the conference will take place in the near future."

South Africa is pressing ahead with plans for this conclave of puppet black officials and leaders of the white minority to attempt to concoct some sort of "government" for South West Africa (or even, Namibia). Since then Herero Chief Clemens Kapuuo, prominent in the now defunct National Convention (distinct from the strongly independence centered Namibia National Convention), has announced he will choose delegates to the upcoming conference (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, June 20, 1975). His claim is somewhat dimmed by a tribal split, with Chief Jephtha Maharero saying the Hereros are not united and in no position to appoint a delegation (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, June 23, 1975). National Party leader Dirk Mudge, local headman for organizing the conference, once again spoke of the imminent gathering, while warning that subversion of law and order "under the vaneer of religion or in the name of free political activity would not be permitted" (*Advertiser*, Windhoek, June 24, 1975).

The NNC and SWAPO have steadily denounced the conference. A statement to the press by Mr. Skinny Hilundua, northern chairman of SWAPO, rejects the conference "based on tribal or ethnic lines and homeland governments. . . . it is part of a carefully designed plot to delay the withdrawal of the South African administration from our country."

#### **UN COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA**

Sean MacBride, UN Commissioner for Namibia, announced in a press release on May 29 that an



Rupiah Banda, President of the Council on Namibia.

international consultation of lawyers had convened to discuss implementation of Namibia Decree no. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia. The Decree was adopted by the Council for Namibia on September 27, 1974 and by the General Assembly shortly thereafter, in order to insure that the natural resources of the territory are not exploited to the detriment of the country, its people or environmental assets.

The president of the Council for Namibia, Ambassador Rupiah Banda of Zambia (recently appointed to be his country's foreign minister) and Commissioner MacBride lead a six-person mission to persuade Japan to live up to UN resolutions on Namibia (*Star*, Johannesburg, May 17, 1975). They warned government officials and businessmen there that the UN had the right to seize their cargoes of resources of Namibia. The commissioner said: "I got the impression they didn't much like the idea of being branded as thieves" and the ambassador reported: "So far we have not achieved any significant breakthrough".

"International trade union organisations have promised to help identify and keep track of cargoes from South West Africa so they can be seized under a UN decree" (*Star*, Johannesburg, May 10, 1975). Commissioner MacBride said "he had obtained these promises from organisations representing trade unions in both the Western and communist countries".

Commissioner MacBride has issued a memo on statistics of the Namibian population. He refers to South Africa's latest Survey claiming a total population of 852,000 of which 99,000 are classified as white. MacBride says he estimates, after information received from Namibian sources, that the territory's inhabitants come closer to 1,200,000 and that many Africans avoid being counted because of police census takers and other political factors.

# Zimbabwe



Police use force to disperse Salisbury protesters. 13 were killed.

## THIRTEEN ZIMBABWEANS SHOT

On June 1 in Salisbury's Highfield African Township, Rhodesian police opened fire on a crowd of Zimbabweans estimated as high as 10,000, who had gathered outside a meeting called by the African National Council to discuss resuming talks with the Smith regime. Clashes between supporters of ZANU and ZAPU broke out. Enos Nkala, a ZANU member of the ANC executive, was reported to have been thrown into the street by a ZAPU member. Police were threatened by the crowd and fired, killing 13 and wounding others. Sporadic confrontations broke out in other African suburbs as well. (*Guardian*, London, June 2, 1975; *New York Times*, June 3, 1975)

Bishop Muzorewa, chairman of the ANC, in the US at the time, called the police action "cold blooded murder." He added, "I believe our people have the right to self-determination—by armed struggle if that should prove necessary." (*Guardian*, London, June 4, 1975) It has been noted that the Bishop's support of a military solution has been increasing since he left on tour about a month ago. (*News and Observer*, Raleigh, N.C., June 2, 1975)

Tapson Mawere, ZANU representative in North America, deplored the shootings and re-affirmed ZANU's stand that armed struggle is the only way to achieve total independence. (ZANU Press Release, New York, June 2, 1975)

## CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

Dr. Gordon Chavanduka of the ANC announced that the ANC and the Smith regime agreed to drop preconditions for talks at a constitutional conference. This means that guerrillas would not have to observe the cease-fire and the Smith regime would not have to release political prisoners. These have been two major conditions demanded by both sides since the February Lusaka talks.

Talks have been on and off for weeks because the two sides have differing interpretations of the Lusaka declaration. Smith has threatened to abandon the ANC and open negotiations with other African "leaders." It is widely known that any conference without the ANC's participation would be meaningless. (BBC News, London, June 3, 1975; *New York Times*, June 5, 1975; *Guardian*, London, May 27, 1975)

The developments took place while Muzorewa and Sithole were out of the country. It is expected that they will not pursue talks with Smith until the divisions within the ANC are mended. Nkomo's opponents believe that he used the absence of Muzorewa and Sithole to force the ANC executive into the agreement. The *Guardian*, recognizing Sithole as the effective leader of the nationalist movement and head of the guerrilla army, calls on him to devise a workable program for moving to majority rule. Sithole has insisted for months that armed

struggle is the only action which will achieve the nationalist aims. (*Guardian*, London, June 4, 1975)

Nkomo denies that he was seeking leadership of the ANC in the absence of the others. He also said that there are no longer ZANU and ZAPU parties—only the ANC, which should seek a negotiated settlement with Britain as the responsible authority in Rhodesia. (*Washington Post*, June 4, 1975)

Most observers expect the talks to fail if they take place at all. Nationalists are continuing their build-up of the guerrilla movement, and Smith talks of "holding on", whatever that may mean. Officials of the ANC in Dar Es Salaam announced that a guerrilla army composed of elements from the three nationalist movements was being created in Dar. This is being supported by the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity. They said there would be over 3,000 guerrillas in training by July. The governments of Zambia and Tanzania have told ZANU and ZAPU that they face the possibility of deportation to Rhodesia if they do not co-operate in this joint ANC effort. (*Sunday Times*, London, April 13, 1975)

#### COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE

The Commonwealth Conference, held in Jamaica, was attended by Muzorewa, Nkomo, Sithole and Chikerema of the ANC. The conference supported peaceful negotiations for majority rule, intensifying sanctions, and holding-out the threat of renewed armed struggle. Black leaders, particularly Kaunda and Nyerere, urged the recognition of the ANC and financial support for it, including funds for

guerrilla training.

Economic pressures were urged, including the closure of the Botswana route for Rhodesian goods bound for South African ports. This would be followed by the closure of the Mozambique rail routes to the sea. The Commonwealth would compensate Botswana annually about \$19 million and Mozambique about \$60 million for their loss of trade. (*Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, May 8, 1975; *Guardian*, London, May 5, 1975)

The Commonwealth nations also discussed setting-up a peace-keeping force for Rhodesia. Caribbean leaders initiated the idea of a 3,000 man force with an air wing and telecommunication system, to keep order during the transition period to majority rule. (*Guardian*, London, May 5, 1975; *Evening Standard*, London, May 5, 1975; *Agence France Presse*, Paris, May 1, 1975)

#### FOUR ZIMBABWEANS FACE DEATH PENALTY

Percy Mkudu, Movan Mahachi, Maurice Nyagumbo, and John Mutasa have been charged under the law and order maintenance act with recruiting guerrillas. Conviction carries a mandatory death sentence. Mkudu is a former member of the Rhodesian parliament. Mahachi runs an African cooperative farm which supports the Tangwena people who have been harassed by the Rhodesian government for over three years in a land dispute. Nyagumbo and Mutasa are influential members of the ANC. (*Guardian*, London, May 5, 1975)

Former ANC vice-president, Rev. Cnaan Banana, was arrested as he landed in Rhodesia after two years stay in the U.S. He may face criminal charges. (*Washington Post*, May 29, 1975)

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# ANGOLA

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#### ANGOLA INDEPENDENCE IN JEOPARDY


For the past two months Angola has been torn again by intense fighting that has resulted in the deaths of an estimated 1000-1200 people. The violence has been concentrated in the capital city of Luanda, but reports in June indicate that the fighting has spread to the perimeters of Luanda and to the northern coffee towns as well as the enclave of Cabinda. The fighting has been most severe between loyalists of the MPLA and FNLA, but during May and June UNITA forces and its offices in these regions have been involved as well. Western correspondents continue to describe the situation in Angola as 'civil war' or as conditions preparatory to civil war, but the political contradictions between battling liberation movements do not appear to be generalized throughout the country, and are focused on the struggle to control the capital at this moment.

In the separate periods of the most extreme violence, in late April and early May and again in June, it is not clear what provocations or specific events led to the fighting. Early on reports indicated that the FNLA had led attacks on MPLA offices in Luanda. (*The Black Panther*, Oakland, May 19, 1975) Later an MPLA communique indicated that it would move from a defensive posture and take up the attack against FNLA. (*New York Times*, May 11, 1975) The heaviest fighting

took place in May when an estimated 1000 Angolans died during the conflicts but again in June another several hundred were killed in fighting which was concentrated around the offices of the liberation movements. (*Guardian*, London, May 7, 1975; BBC, June 9, 1975) Machine guns, mortars, bazookas and grenades have been used in the latest round of fighting which has overwhelmingly involved the African population. City hospitals and the Luanda morgue were reportedly unable to handle the volume of wounded and the number of corpses during the two periods of the longest fighting. Combined patrols of Portuguese troops and liberation movement soldiers returned order to Luanda after the May fighting, but only Portuguese troops patrolled the city after the June violence. (*New York Times*, May 5, 1975; *Washington Post*, June 10, 1975) The city was without water and electricity for some time and food shortages prompted the Portuguese Air Force to begin flying in food from provincial centers to Luanda.

In the wake of the violence the Portuguese High Commissioner in Angola instituted a 9 P.M. curfew and the Portuguese military in Angola warned that any nationalist fighter found outside his unit's normal zone of operations would be arrested, and any who resisted would be shot. (*Washington Post*, June 7, 1975; June 10, 1975) Portuguese troops have also raided headquarters of MPLA





Flash violence in Luanda on day Savimbi arrived.

and FNLA with the purpose of seizing arms and ammunition, claiming that the two liberation movements had not lived up to the cease-fire agreements. (VOA, June 10, 1975) In another effort to control the flow of arms, a Yugoslav ship, the *Postejna*, allegedly carrying arms for the MPLA, was barred from entering Luanda harbor and was escorted from Angolan territorial waters.

Although only three Portuguese soldiers have been reported killed during the recent events, morale is low among the 24,000 Portuguese troops still in Angola as part of the four-part Transitional Government structure. In Lisbon a military spokesman said that 60 soldiers refused to obey orders to go to Angola, and in Angola Portuguese troops are badly demoralized over their role as peace-keepers throughout the bitter decolonizing process in the country. (*Guardian*, London, May 7, 1975)

Among the 350,000 African residents in Luanda, thousands have chosen to return to their homes in the countryside in the aftermath of the most recent violence in this the third major exodus of Africans from Luanda within a year's time. Of the approximately 150,000 whites living in the capital, thousands are attempting to return to Portugal. In June hundreds of whites demonstrated at the government palace in Luanda in anger over the slowness of the Portuguese government to respond to their situation. Portuguese information minister, Jorge Jesuine, said that about 200,000 whites have asked to leave Angola before independence in November. (*Providence Journal-Bulletin*, June 14, 1975) Another block of white Angolans would like to see Angola break away from a Socialist Portugal, build ties with FNLA and UNITA and come to terms with the multinational corporations operating in Angola.

Portuguese Foreign Minister, Mele Antunes, arrived in

Luanda in May on urgent business to discuss the deteriorating political situation between MPLA and FNLA, and issued an urgent call for a summit meeting between them. The leaders of the movements did not respond immediately, and the proposed summit did not come about until after the June violence. Prior to the new round of talks in Kenya among the liberation leaders a number of positions were stated. FNLA rejected any intervention on behalf of Angolan independence from other African states. FNLA also rejected having Portugal participate in the talks since both FNLA and UNITA have accused Portugal of favoring the MPLA. (*Reuter News Service*, May 10, 1975; *Washington Post*, May 12, 1975) After the June violence a truce went into effect to which the three movements held. Prior to the talks MPLA, FNLA and UNITA issued conciliatory statements saying in effect that they had no quarrel with each other, and through the summit meeting in mid-June a tense calm settled over Luanda.

Leaders of the three liberation movements met in Kenya in the absence of non-Angolan intervention or participation. Statements issued from Nakuru in Kenya said that the movements have reached "solutions to permit the decolonization process to return to normal", and that steps will be taken to smooth the way to independence in November. A joint statement from the latest Kenya summit said that the previous agreements, including the Algarve independence agreement, will be implemented. (*Providence Journal-Bulletin*, June 19, 1975) If this latest agreement is not effective in suppressing the severe and bitter violence that surrounds the political power struggle among the movements, then it appears the Lisbon government might postpone the Angolan independence date. Portuguese officials have said

they will request United Nations' intervention if the fighting continues. (VOA, June 10, 1975) Portugal has also indicated that it is considering postponing the pre-independence elections until the security situation in Angola improves. (Guardian, London, May 5, 1975)

#### QUESTION OF CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA

The western press has repeatedly suggested that civil war in Angola is inevitable. Although the situation in Angola is a grave one from the standpoint of needed political unity prior to independence, the fighting up to this point has been localized and has not divided the country into two or three major sections each fighting against the other. Although the fighting has spread outside the capital the balance of power in these regions has not shifted. After heavy fighting in the Cabindan enclave, the Portuguese are back in control. Fighting that occurred at the periphery of Luanda (about 25 miles outside the city) between MPLA and FNLA was apparently a defensive move by MPLA to retain control of this traditional MPLA stronghold. MPLA is now reported to be in control of all of the main roads to Luanda. (BBC, *Focus on Africa Program*, June 10, 1975)

Intervention from the outside is another question. Agostinho Neto of the MPLA has said that any war in the future would be the result of foreign aggression, not civil war. (Tanzania Daily News, Dar Es Salaam, April 21, 1975) The former High commissioner of Angola, Rosa Coutinhe, has accused Zaire of fomenting discord among the rival liberation movements and of acting like "an invader". (Washington Post, April 29, 1975) It is now known that, in an effort to isolate the progressive MPLA, Mobutu encouraged the internal MPLA Chipenda revolt, some say with considerable financial incentives. ("Report From Angola", *Foreign Affairs*, 1975) Since Chipenda defected from the MPLA he has been elevated to important positions in FNLA's National Revolutionary Council and the Political Bureau. Similarly eight of Chipenda's followers have been appointed to FNLA's Central Committee. (Tanzania Daily News, Dar Es Salaam, April 19, 1975) Mobutu has also encouraged an alliance between FNLA and UNITA against the MPLA and he continues to assist the build-up of a strong FNLA conventional army. It is strongly suspected that if Mobutu cannot maneuver his brother-in-law, Holden Roberto, into a central leadership position in independent Angola, that Zaire will simply seize oil-rich Cabinda. FNLA troops

move freely across the border between Zaire and Angola, and in June there were fresh reports of a Zaire-backed FNLA invasion of northern Angola. (BBC, June 4, 1975) Until recently no cracks in the Mobutu regime were apparent, but reports of an attempted coup d'etat in June and the kidnapping of some Americans by Zairian guerrillas operating in the east bring into question the stability of Mobutu's rule. (Providence Journal-Bulletin, June 14, 1975)

While the situation in Angola at present is not favorable just five months prior to independence and the united front among the liberation groups has not been achieved, still it is premature and misleading to label this 'civil war'. (For historical background, see Feature)

#### INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE ANGOLAN SITUATION

In the aftermath of the May violence the Angolan Interior Ministry expelled eight foreigners for alleged agitation during the FNLA-MPLA fighting. The Interior Ministry, which is currently controlled by the FNLA under the Transitional Government, said the individuals were posing as journalists and school teachers and once they were exposed they tried to leave the country using documents issued by the MPLA. The eight foreigners were from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Brazil, Finland, Congo and two from Germany (not specified whether from GDR or the Federal Republic). (Reuter News Service, May 15, 1975)

During April a joint mission of the Organization of African Unity visited Angola to study the political situation. The intent of the visit was to understand the bases for the clashes between the liberation movements and to meet leaders to avert the possibility of future violence, according to the OAU Secretary General Mbeumoua Eteki. (Tanzania Daily News, Dar Es Salaam, April 6, 1975)

In a surprise move Portugal and Zaire reported that they have decided to normalize relations. In a joint communique issued from Kinshasa both agreed on the need to assist the peaceful decolonization of Angola. Recently tensions between Portugal and Zaire increased as the fighting between MPLA and FNLA erupted. They also agreed to set up a joint committee to repatriate Angolans from Zaire and to protect Zairians in Angola. (BBC, June 2, 1975; VOA, June 2, 1975)

Meanwhile Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia has publicly stated again his distress concerning the political situation in Angola with which Zambia shares a 1,100 mile border.



Seen meeting with Kenyatta (left) and Waiyaki, Kenyan Prime Minister, are Jonas Savimbi of UNITA and Holden Roberto of FNLA.

Reports of violence in Angola have been greeted with great satisfaction not only in South Africa (*Southern Africa*, June 1975) but in Rhodesia as well where such reports serve as confirmation of the belief that rule cannot be transferred to the African majority. (*Guardian*, London, May 9, 1975)

And finally, reactions in Portugal have been divided between those who favor intervention in the Angolan political situation and those who oppose it. Agostinho Neto has sharply criticized the Portuguese Army and called for an end to its "criminal neutrality" while he encouraged a more active role in controlling the violence. Certain leftist elements in the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement favor further military intervention in Angola, while the Portuguese Communist Party, adhering strictly to the decolonization timetable, oppose the idea of

intervention. Members of the Armed Forces Movement, many of whom had direct military experience in the colonies, are more deeply committed to a progressive transformation of Angola beyond simple decolonization.


Clearly the transition to independence in Angola is not the smooth process it was for Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Mozambique. Because of its vast resources the capitalist countries are considerably more intent upon maintaining interest in and control of Angola, than of the other ex-colonies. As long as the movements remain divided, Angola is that much weaker and more vulnerable to manipulation, even invasion, from outside. There are not yet signs that the power struggle being waged among the three liberation movements has abated, nor has any one group emerged as strong enough to dominate Angolan politics.

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special: guinea-bissau

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# Let Us Create a Life of Work and Progress



Luis Cabral, left, talking to PAIGC militant in the liberated zone.

Speech of Comrade Luis Cabral, Assistant General-Secretary of PAIGC, and President of the Council of State, on the occasion of the New Year. Department of Information, Bissau, January 1, 1975 Excerpts.

translated by Juliette Rodrigues and Grace Rodrigues

It is with the greatest pleasure that I thank you on behalf of the Party and the Council of State for the wishes you sent us for the new year of 1975. I also want to wish to each one present, to the collectives you represent and to your families, a year of peace, health and prosperity for you and for our glorious country.

Credit Robert Van Lierop

At the beginning of a new year in the history of humanity, we cannot help marking the balance of our life and our fight during the last year, a balance that is marked by the transcendental victories of our people and our Party that led to the total liberation of our land, Guinea, and the contribution of a government of transition in Cape Verde, with the responsible participation of the PAIGC, and the definitive deadline of July 5, 1975 for the total independence of the Islands.

Whatever the price and the suffering we had to live throughout the long years of fight for liberation, we can be proud of how we were able to conduct our action. From the moment in which the Portuguese colonial-fascist government was overthrown, new perspectives were open towards the solution of the conflict that opposed our state to the Portuguese state. If, on the one hand, the results we achieved showed the good will of the present leaders of Portugal, and their sincere desire to solve the colonial problem, they confirmed on the other hand, the maturity of our Party and its leaders, that were able to define a just line of action, not only for Guinea, but also for Cape Verde. This line of action was inspired in the words of our immortal leader, founder of our Party and of our nationality, comrade Amilcar Cabral.

We have already taken a few secure steps to re-organize our administration and the structure of our Government. The efficiency of the departments of the new government will depend however, on its workers. The Colonial administration created in its workers the irresponsibility and the opportunism that were characteristic of the actions of the majority of civil servants. Thought of how to work the least possible, while its heads tried to earn the maximum. Thus laws were created for the benefit of higher officials at the expense of the lower ones.

Thus we found officials in the colonial administration with salaries coming from various sources while the minimum salary of the state workers was little—about one thousand escudos. As a first step to look for just solutions, our government increased the minimum salary more than eighty percent and increased also the family allowances, in its minimum to more than fifty percent. Other adjustments were carried out and will be implemented to guarantee the state worker, the necessary and just salary according to his capacity and responsibility.

We, the fighters for freedom, lived more than fourteen years without salaries, happy with what the Party could give us for our maintenance which could only provide the indispensable amount after many years of fight.

Many thought that with our taking of power in all the national territory, salaries would be reduced for all the workers of the state as happened in other countries that achieved independence before we did. Our Party and our government decided to increase the hours of work, as a necessary contribution to the first stage of our life, for the good functioning of the public services. We count upon the civic responsibility, understanding and the good will of all the civil servants, and we invite them to become responsible groups in each Commissariat and each service, trying to fulfill in the best possible way their duties to the nation, criticizing one another, in order to overcome irresponsible behavior such as arriving late to work, constant interruptions, chats and visits that have nothing to do with their work as well as other anomalies we see daily in our public service.

The year 1975 should be the year of the birth of a new

man in the public service, with full conscience of his place in the new society we are creating, a responsible element of the intransigent defense of the interests of our state, that is totally at the service of our people.

We have many projects to carry out, and its fulfillment will be the work of factory workers and other workers of the country. We have tried to guarantee and we will proceed, within the limits of the state resources, to give work to all workers that were connected with the infra-structures of the colonial army. All those workers that acquired, during the period of the disintegration of colonialism, habits harmful to their good productivity should re-integrate themselves in a new spirit of patriotism, of desire to participate in the reconstruction of the country and try to work harder and better. It is sad to see in offices, factories, in construction, factory workers and workers working at a rhythm incompatible with our desire for progress. Our workers have the responsibility of transforming our land into fertile land, have the responsibility of transforming our cities and towns, making them beautiful and agreeable to their inhabitants and visitors. And we have to do this fast so that we can still see in our days our objectives fulfilled. For this task, we have to create a new spirit of love of work, of professional responsibility and sane competition.

Throughout the history of colonialism, the peasant has been the worst exploited man of our land, the one who didn't benefit, either economically or culturally or socially from the conquests of progress. For this reason we have seen thousands of young people running away from the land to the cities. For this reason the peasant was a prime force in our fight for liberation, and should be the first beneficiary of our national independence. The first important measure taken so far by our government in the economic sphere was to substantially increase the price of the main agricultural products and give the peasant the possibility of selling his product where he wants to. This measure as well as the accomplishments that will be made in the said plan open new perspectives to our rural populations and constitute an invitation to return to the fields to those who went to the cities and were unable to find work and live like parasites with their urban families, that are thus prevented from leading the decent life they have the right to.

We have to dignify the work in the fields and the peasant should occupy as a decisive element of our progress, the place of respect and appreciation that he deserves in our society.

With the schools we built in the countryside during the fight for liberation, and with others that will be created in the future, we should prepare the basis for the transformation of the peasant of today into a modern man, open to progress and able to profit from the development of our land. To this end we have to eliminate all kinds of exploitation of the rural workers.

In the new context of total liberation of our country, we have tried to create conditions so that trade can be run efficiently. The hesitations of the first hours, that could be understood then, do not justify themselves today, and we count upon the good will of everyone, so that the commercial life of our people can develop itself in a harmonious way, without the state having to take extensive measures to defend the interests of the people, each day more alarmed with the constant rise of prices and the shortage of certain articles the population used to have.

Our department of commerce is taking rigorous measures to effectively control the prices, so that the government is in a condition to act against all and any speculation. On the basis of our desire to create stable conditions for all those who live in our land, we ask for the highest understanding from the commercial enterprises which will find all the necessary cooperation from the appointed authorities. However, we cannot accept or pardon any enterprise or individual engaged in fraudulent transactions or that tries to boycott the economy of the country, or that acts against the interests of our people, taking away from the country articles for national consumption.

We are making efforts to make our education national in order to have in our land a modern system of education adapted to our concrete situations on the basis of the experience we had throughout our fight for liberation. Our people should try to understand the chaotic situation we inherited from the colonial administration. Secondary education was of a very low standard, inferior to the education given in other African countries, and it was conceived only to serve the demagogic propaganda of the colonialists. And the students, only saw in their studies a means to obtain a diploma that allowed them to earn a living. The progress of technical education, without precise objectives will also have to be revised in order to give to our youth a basis for the formation of technicians at all levels, giving the more meritorious ones the possibility of attaining higher levels of education. Our state highly appreciated the spirit of collaboration of the young people who offered themselves voluntarily to be teachers, that allowed the new academic year to start, although the schools have not yet attained the rhythm and the levels we wish. However, we want to warn those young teachers not to be influenced by opinions that try to diminish the political and moral value of their gesture and remind them that their main worry should be that of—with the help of our state—proceeding with their own studies to serve their land better. Still with regard to education, both teachers and pupils should act in order to make our schools centers of formation of our youth that should be orientated to love our country, to respect our people, to develop friendship and comradeship and particularly total dedication to the objectives of our Party whose fighters opened new ways to the future generations of our people.

We cannot speak of a history of a trade-union movement in the life of the workers of our land. Towards the end of the 1950's, a group of militants of our party, exposing itself to the sanctions of the colonial police, was able to take the leadership of the trade-union of workers in commerce and industry and tried to put into effect a program of defense of the interests of its members. The results obtained were minimal and we had to conclude, particularly after the massacres of Pidjiguiti that our actions could only harm the clandestine work of the Party. For this reason, the Party separated itself from the trade-union action in order to carry on its activities better.

We have to develop a trade-union movement during 1975, throughout our territory, in order to make of the national union of workers of Guinea an important force in the defense of the interests of all workers in our land: industrial workers, agricultural workers or white-collar workers. The National Union of Workers of Guinea should also be a force to promote the level of professional and civic consciousness of the workers that should become sensitive to our programs of development, for which their



School in the liberated zone of Guinea-Bissau.

Credit Stephanie Urdang

conscious participation is indispensable.

At the beginning of this new year, we want to reaffirm our friendship and thankfulness to all the governments that have given us help in this first phase of our life, and our wish to strengthen the relations of friendship and solidarity with their countries. We also wish to express our appreciation to the Portuguese Provisional Government on their readiness to develop harmonious links of friendship and cooperation between Portugal and our land, links our Party always wanted to preserve, in the interests of our two peoples, connected by so many centuries of common life and history.


We start today a new year. The glorious flag of our Party, the flag of the fight, is present in all the corners of our land of Guinea, and in the heart of all our brothers in Cape Verde. We have reasons to be proud of all that fighters for freedom of our land, have done and enough reason to face with courage and enthusiasm the tasks ahead of us. Each militant and fighter of our Party should be ready in his post, may it be in the Administration, in the Popular Army or in any other branch of our life, in the attitude that whatever the problems or difficulties may be, we will be able to solve them now, as we were able to build step by step, with our work and our courage, the independence and the freedom of our people. We give ourselves to this fight with the only objective of being free and worthy of our own land, and without expecting any other reward than to be able to fulfill ourselves as children of our people, opening new ways until now closed to our compatriots, creating a just society in which each man is respected because of his work and his values. We should have clear in our minds that independence is not an end in itself. Our independence is the beginning of a new era, during which, after taking power, we are going to establish programs of peace and reconstruction conceived in the line of orientation of our beloved leader, the comrade Amilcar Cabral.

In this new year of 1975, we wish to see back in our land its children that ran away from the war and colonial repression, and took refuge in the neighboring countries. We also wish that those who find themselves in cities and various places and do not have work there, come back to their places of origin so that we can, in the near future see our villages rebuilt and all the families that were separated by the war reunited.

Let us create in our free country a life of peace and harmony, a life of work and progress.

# THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

## THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS



### INSIDE THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

The depressed economic condition of the Cape Verde Islands due to the drought is being helped through development programs of the United Nations. A joint project sponsored by the UN Development Program and the UN Food and Agricultural Organization will grant one million dollars for well drilling and forestation of Sao Tiago, Fogo, and Santo Antao Islands. A \$2.4 million project of UNICEF and the World Food Program will commence after independence on July 5, 1975. Other proposals include development of the water resources of Sao Tiago, Sao Nicolau, and Santo Antao which all have permanent water sources. Santo Antao will also be the focus of sugar and rum industries as well as plans for bottling of mineral water and export of puzolana which is used in making cement. For Sao Vicente and the important harbor at Mindelo there is no water so plans have stressed expansion of the industrial base. For Boa Vista, Maio, and Sao Tiago islands a brick and tile factory is being considered in addition to the production of ceramics. Salt production will be stepped up on Sal island and a textile factory is proposed for Fogo. Tourism and fishing will also play some role in the future development. (AFP, Paris, March 28, 1975; *O Seculo*, Lisbon, April 1, 1975)

UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim has appealed to the international community for \$40 million in aid which is needed "just to maintain a very moderate standard of living". Portugal has already agreed to pay half of this sum. The European Economic Community has promised 3,000 tons of grain and 100 tons of milk; while Senegal has already sent 1,800 tons of maize for Cape Verdean relief. (*O Seculo*, Lisbon, April 7; *West Africa*, Lagos, April 14, 1975)

Plans for the elections on June 30 are moving ahead without any problems. This vote will determine the selection of officials to attend the constituent assembly which has the task of determining Cape Verde's relationship with the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. All of the former governors of the islands will also be replaced by Peoples' Committees once independence is formally declared. (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, March 17, 1975; *O Seculo*, Lisbon, March 25, 1975; *New York Times*, June 8, 1975)

### VISIT TO THE ISLANDS

Tony Ramos, a Cape Verdean video-tape artist has just returned from the Archipelago where he was filming a video archive of life in the Islands under a \$17,000 grant from the Rhode Island Council on the Humanities. Upon his return, Ramos said that the PAIGC spokesperson Pedro Pires told him that those Cape Verdean immigrants who left the Islands showed that they had little concern for the plight of the Islanders and never expressed opposition to Portuguese colonialism. Pires said that they should not meddle with Island affairs now. (*Evening Bulletin*, Providence, May 27, 1975). Nonetheless, Salah Matteos of the PAIGC Support Committee said that Cape Verdean nationals in the U.S. are able to vote in the election on June 30 for the constituent assembly. (*Evening Bulletin*, Providence, May 7, 1975)

### CAPE VERDE TO BE INDEPENDENT ON JULY 5th

On July 5th, Cape Verde will be independent. Elections for the National Assembly will already have taken place on June 30th and power will officially be transferred from the Transitional Government to the National Assembly at independence.



Credit United Nations

Part of a Pro-PAIGC demonstration after April 25.

The following are excerpts relating to Cape Verde, from a speech by Aristides Pereira, Secretary-General of PAIGC, delivered on New Year's day, 1975.

"Evidently seeing the case of Guinea as definitely lost, our enemies and the enemies of our party, had to concentrate their efforts to prevent, or at least disturb, the normal process of decolonization in Cape Verde. While giving evidence of courage and capacity of sacrifice, the militants of our Party were firm in their places of fight and, developing an activity of extraordinary mobilization and organization, achieved brilliant victories, until they revealed the reactionary group of Cape Verde as true servants of colonial fascism and declared enemies of freedom, peace, progress of our people on the Islands.

There will always be marked in the history of our people the glorious days of 27th and 28th September, the forty-eight hour strike that paralyzed the administrative and commercial activity of the Islands, as well as the march of Cape Verdean soldiers through the streets of Mindelo, in support of PAIGC and the population's victims of repression from certain elements of the Portuguese Armed Forces, traitors to the true idea of the movement of the Armed Forces and the highest aspirations of the Portuguese people. . . .

The events of September 28 in Portugal, are now clearer, showing the sordid connections of the so-called "silent majority" in Portugal with the minority of autocrats, federalists and referendists in Cape Verde, traitors of our people.

It becomes clear who are the common enemies of democracy in Portugal and of freedom, peace and progress in our islands. But the enemy as he grows desperate, becomes more subtle and tries to re-organize himself to start new forms of actions. But it collides against the keen vigilance of our militants and our people, who see more clearly each time who the true defenders of their interests are, and always walks on from victory to victory, until the taking of the Barlquento radio and the discovery of the reactionary plans to murder the highest officials of the Party in the Islands.

With that discovery, our people and our militants were able with vigilance and discipline to take the adequate measures and, together with the Armed Forces Movement cut by its roots the criminal plans that were being

proposed, neutralising in an energetic way, the action of its main sources of inspiration.

"With the creation of the transitional government, planning the independence of Cape Verde for July 5, 1975, there is confirmation of what we said in August 3, 1974, referring to the fundamental principles that should inspire the process of unity between Guinea and Cape Verde.

"We said then:

"This unity should be established on the basis of the will freely expressed, of the people of the two territories without any intervention of the Portuguese authorities or any other foreign power. This unity will be defined by bodies of sovereignty freely elected by the populations of both territories. The bodies of sovereignty will not allow the majority of one part over the other and will guarantee the respect to the norms of social conduct in equality and in the respect of traditions and cultural particularities of the populations of each territory.

"The people of Guinea, that is already sovereign, elected the People's National Assembly of Guinea, proclaimed the state of Guinea-Bissau and adopted a constitution where are defined the principles of unity. When considered appropriate the people of Cape Verde, [elections will take place at the end of June-ed.] will elect the National Assembly of Cape Verde, will promulgate a constitution and will define its position according to the principle of unity.

"The two Popular National Assemblies, together, will constitute the Supreme Assembly of Guinea and Cape Verde that will create the bodies of sovereignty of the Union. Our State will be profoundly democratic and will guarantee the participation of all said states, without distinction of color, religion or sex in the conduct of the affairs of the state.

"In Cape Verde, with the Government of transition established, we have the inheritance of chronic abandonment of centuries and more than six years of drought, under the colonial and fascist government, that only worsened the situation instead of working for solutions. The country is in a disastrous situation that we do not consider however desperate because we are sure that we are right and we firmly believe in the triumph of just causes that are never isolated."

# MOZAMBIQUE

## THE NEW MOZAMBIQUE: NEWS IN BRIEF

### Lourenco Marques Re-named.

The new capital of Mozambique is now Can Phumo. The name change is part of an Africanization campaign designed to remove all traces of Portuguese influence.

Lourenco Marques was a Portuguese sailor who landed in Mozambique 400 years ago at the start of Portuguese domination. The new name means "the place of Phumo." Phumo was an African chief who settled in Mozambique in the 16th century.

Also, streets named after Portuguese settlers have been changed and statues of Portuguese heroes have been taken down. (Africa News, Durham, June 12, 1975.)

### Cabora Bassa

Negotiations between Frelimo and the Portuguese government have resulted in an agreement to set up a corporation—Hydro-electric of Cabora Bassa, Ltd.—to run the dam and sell power to South Africa until all investors have recovered their capital. Frelimo will not hold shares in the corporation.

The new company will be headed by the Portuguese government and will include all those who have investments in the project.

By prior agreement, the corporation will cease to exist when all participants have recovered their investment. This may take about ten years and then the dam will become a Mozambican asset.

Commercial power from Cabora Bassa should begin to flow to South Africa by October. (African Research Bulletin, March 14, 1975; Guardian, London May 19, 1975; Inter-African News Survey, April 18, 1975; Star, Johannesburg, May 24, 1975.)

### Building a new Society

Work has already begun in Mozambique on constructing the foundations of a progressive, Socialist society.

A project supported by the United Nations, which has so far contributed \$300,000 has been put into operation to clean up the shanty towns. Levelling on two building sites with an area of 336 acres on the Costa del Sol in Can Phumo (Lourenco Marques) began in April. Nine million dollars will also be provided by the UN to build apartment houses in the Naputo and Beira provinces.

It was recently announced that the defense budget would be slashed to provide more funds for health and education. Education in particular has become a top priority in Mozambique. There is still a 90% illiteracy rate. The new key word is "alphabetization." Slogans such as "to produce is to learn" and "books are our best friends" prevail.

Top Frelimo officials in Mozambique have been ordered to begin implementing a masterplan that was prepared at a party conference held at Morcupa, North Nampula in February. It was drawn up for the government by five working committees. The plan calls for two major campaigns aimed at the need for spreading education and the awakening of public political consciousness. The three key committees which will run Mozambique in the early stages of independence will be



FRELIMO District Office in Lourenco Marques.

the party's central committee, political committee and military committee.

So far, 16 Mozambicans have been expelled from the country since April for their "inability to integrate themselves in the existing social atmosphere and harming the speeding up of the decolonization process."

Other efforts include:

— Attempts to uncover mineral resources to be used for the benefit of the people are being stepped up.

— Frelimo expects to launch a new national radio broadcast system to improve communications to the people in the near future.

— Trade agreements have been signed to generate revenue from the export of cashew nuts and coal.

— Agreements are being finalized for Mozambique to take over the operation of banks from the Portuguese.



— Frelimo diplomatic teams have been dispatched to countries around the world which have offered support for the continued struggle of that country.

— Frelimo continues to broadcast appeals to whites to remain in Mozambique and use their skills for the development of the country. At the same time, it is stressed that there is still a need for profound struggle against ideas of white superiority. So far, 170,000 whites remain in Mozambique (*New York Times*, NY, June 8, 1975; *B. Sun*, June 8, 1975; *Los Angeles Times*, LA, May 18, 1975; *O Seculo* (Portugal) April 8, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, April 19, 1975, May 17, 1975).

#### GOING HOME

Samora Machel, President of Mozambique, returned to Mozambique in late May from exile in Tanzania.

Some 50,000 refugees have already returned to Mozambique with another 50,000 more to come. They had been living in refugee camps in southern Tanzania. Mozambique and Tanzanian officials say the camps should be maintained until after the harvest in July, so that those returning home can bring as much food as possible with them. Careful timing for the homecoming is important since Mozambique is going through a period of severe drought and food shortage.

The Mozambicans who were forcibly removed from their homes by the Portuguese during the independence struggle are also considered refugees, even though they have not crossed a national boundary. (*Africa News*, Durham, May 29, 1975).

#### FOREIGN AFFAIRS

President Kaunda of Zambia, arrived in Dar es Salaam with a large delegation to visit the Frelimo military camp at Nachingwea in southern Tanzania. The camp will be handed over to Rhodesia's African National Council later this year for military and political training of its new army. (*IWP*, May 12, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, May 17, 1975)

Mozambique was admitted to the World Health Organization of the United Nations. (*Daily World*, New York, May 17, 1975).

The government of Finland announced, during a visit to that country of a Frelimo delegation headed by Marcelino dos Santos, that it will triple its aid to Frelimo this year to an amount of \$80,000. (*O Seculo*, Portugal, April 23, 1975).

The Mozambican Friendship Delegation led by Samora Machel visited the Tachai Production Brigade of Hsiyang county in North China's Shanii Province—a front runner in China's agricultural development, to learn about the most efficient way to develop Mozambique. Mozambique is mainly an agricultural country. (*Herald Dispatch*, May 22, 1975).

The Provisional Revolutionary government in Hanoi and Mozambique have established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. (*Tanzanian Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, April 17, 1975.)

The Soviet Union has recognized Mozambique. (*IWP*, May 2, 1975)

In April, a six man Frelimo delegation, led by Vice President Marcelino dos Santos toured Scandinavian countries and Holland for two weeks. (*Tanzanian Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, April 17, 1975)

Sweden has recognized Mozambique and will provide some financial assistance (*Marches Tropicaux*, France, May 2, 1975).

The offices of the Labor Institute in Bulawayo and Umtali, Rhodesia are closed as a result of fewer people from Mozambique seeking work in Rhodesia. (*Noticias* (Mozambique) April 16, 1975).

Mr. Franklin Williams, former US ambassador to Ghana who is also President of the Phelps Stokes Fund said in the Chamber of Afro-American Commerce that Mozambique offered numerous possibilities of mutually useful investment in the future, replacing the exploitative relations of the past. (*Marches Tropicaux* (France) May 9, 1975)

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The US was upset at not being invited to the independence festivities. However, Nathaniel Davis was in East Africa at that time anyway in case of a last minute invitation. (*Africa News*, Durham, June 16, 1975).

#### Mozambique and Britain

Britain has lifted its blockade of the Port of Beira in Mozambique. The British had maintained sea and air patrols off Beira for nearly 10 years to prevent tankers with oil bound for Rhodesia from unloading their cargoes. The Beira patrol was part of the economic sanctions authorized by the UN after the white minority regime in Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence from Britain in November 1975.

The commonwealth conference in Jamaica agreed at the end of May to lobby the UN to obtain aid for Mozambique to compensate for the trade loss it will suffer if Mozambique imposes full sanctions and closes its ports. Under the previous Portuguese government, Mozambique became a vital trade route for the Rhodesians, enabling them to evade the UN sanctions. An estimated 80% of Rhodesia's exports passed through the territory.

The agreement between Britain and Mozambique, settled by Ms. Judith Hart, Overseas Development Minister and Samora Machel, President of Mozambique, includes the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Britain will also give aid to Mozambique by financing the latter's imports from Britain to help the Mozambican foreign exchange situation and will help with developmental projects particularly in rural areas. (*Financial Times* London May 12, 1975; *Guardian*, UK, May 12, 1975, May 14, 1975).

#### US SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARS TESTOMONY ON MOZAMBIQUE

Allen Isaacman, an associate Professor of African History at the University of Minnesota, presented an excellent paper on Mozambique and United States relations from 1945 to 1974 to the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 11, 1975.

In the paper, he said that past pro-Salazar and pro-Caetano ideological and material support had very effectively alienated the Mozambican people from the US.

However, improvements can be made on the part of the US provided that the latter adopts a more progressive attitude.

He also discussed Mozambique's relations with Rhodesia and South Africa. Frelimo is watching the progress of the talks between the African National Council and the Smith regime. Should they break down, the new government might be expected to intensify its efforts against Rhodesia by cutting off all shipments through the port of Beira in accordance with the United Nations sanctions; by providing additional sanctuaries for

the Zimbabwean forces along the 400 mile border and by supplying the liberation movement with the sophisticated weapons Frelimo obtained for its own struggle of independence.

Since Mozambique depends more economically on South Africa, she is likely to be more cautious in matters which affect relationships with that country. However, the African National Congress will probably receive support in the way of offices in Mozambique and some financial assistance in their efforts to free South Africa.

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## REPUBLIC of GUINEA BISSAU

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Aristides Pereira being greeted on a visit to Santiago Island, Cape Verde.

### INSIDE GUINEA-BISSAU

United Nations agencies have been active in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. The following have all initiated development programs: the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Universal Postal Union (UPO), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the International Labor Organization (ILO). In addition the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has ear-marked \$2 million for development funding. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has allocated funds and personnel for port development. Finally a treaty was signed with ECOWAS, the newly formed Economic Community of West African States. Some of the development programs will include dams, and power and water supply which had been badly neglected during colonialism. The central emphasis will rest on agriculture although there are proposals to build factories for the production of palm and coconut oil and to promote a tanning and soap industry. (*AFP*, Paris, April 4, 1975; *Today's Post*, Philadelphia, May 29, 1975)

Guinea-Bissau has sent its first Ambassador to Portugal, Julio Semedo. The new Ambassador was accompanied by

Dr. Vasco Cabral, Minister of Finance who went to Lisbon to discuss the recent aborted conspiracy which sought to overthrow the government in Bissau. Guinea-Bissau and Portugal have signed another agreement, concerned with mutual trade, cultural exchange, and economic aid. Guinea-Bissau also concluded an agreement with the German Democratic Republic for a program of journalism training to be conducted in Germany. (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, April 11, 1975; *Daily World*, New York, June 13, 1975; *O Seculo*, Lisbon, April 7, 1975)

At the Second session of the First National People's Assembly held in Bissau on April 28-30, PAIGC Secretary General Aristides Pereira noted that "the war is at an end, but our revolution is on the march" in a "struggle to eliminate colonialist vestiges and oppose schemes of sabotage by enemies both at home and abroad." In such a spirit Pereira expressed Guinea-Bissau's support for the people in southern Africa fighting racism and for the Palestinian struggle against Zionism as well as congratulating the Cambodian and Vietnamese patriots on their great victory. (*The Black Panther*, San Francisco, May 26, 1975)

## SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

The path toward independence has returned to its course following some disruption of the Transitional Government. Such is the opinion of the High Commissioner, Pires Velose after six dissident members of the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe sought to break down unity. On March 11 the radio

station was briefly occupied and other activities included mobilization of racist sentiments. While complete calm has returned, a problem of 10% unemployment and difficulties in supply have been somewhat troublesome. (*Sempre Fixe*, Lisbon April 12, 1975; *Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, Apr. 3, 10, 1975; *O Seculo*, Lisbon, March 27, 1975; *AFP*, Paris, Apr. 8, 1975)

# Neighbors

## MALAWIAN MINE LABOR

Malawi has continued the suspension of recruitment for the South African mines, with the result that only 60,000 Malawians—less than half the figure of a year ago—are working there now. In September 1974, the Malawi Congress Party called for a permanent end to contract labor supply abroad. Banda asked for time for discussion before taking a permanent decision, but has maintained the suspension despite pressure from the Chamber of Mines and the fact that mineworkers' pay—60 per cent of which is deferred—is a major earner of foreign exchange. An inquiry into the plane crash that killed 74 homeward-bound Malawian miners in Botswana in April 1974 has cleared Wenela, the recruitment organization, of any blame. Morale among Malawians on the mines is reportedly quite low, partly because no new workers are arriving with news of home. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 19, 1975)

## KAUNDA AND ZAMBIA ON ZIMBABWE

A confidential report leaked to the press in Salisbury has done some damage to the reputation of President Kaunda of Zambia. Two prominent Rhodesian farmers, John Strong and Sandy Firks (a past president of the Rhodesian Tobacco Association), wrote the report after meeting with Kaunda in April. They stated that the President supported a qualified franchise in Rhodesia for the immediate future, guarantees of property ownership for Whites and a gradual shift over perhaps ten or more years to majority rule. Further, they wrote that he feared economic chaos and conflicts among blacks more than conflicts across the racial barrier. Edson Sithole, publicity secretary of the African National Council, obtained a copy of the report "by accident" and gave it to the press. Bishop Muzorewa and representatives of the Smith regime urged the papers not to print the document for fear of damaging negotiations. (*The Guardian*, London, April 24, 1975)

Kaunda completely denied the report, saying: "everybody who knows what Zambia stands for would not believe that." Bishop Muzorewa stated that he did not believe it and Mr. Firks said that there could have been a misunderstanding. (*Times*, London, April 25, 1975; *Star*, Johannesburg, April 26, 1975)

At the Commonwealth Conference in Jamaica, Kaunda proposed a six-point assistance plan for Africans in Zimbabwe. Included in his proposals were a call for Britain to invalidate passports of all its citizens serving in the police or armed forces of Salisbury, Commonwealth financing for those Whites wanting to emigrate but trapped by currency restrictions, and the application of the Geneva Convention to the military struggle. (*The Guardian*, London, May 1, 1975)

Some new facts and rumors are coming to light about the struggle among Zimbabwean factions. Fourteen bodies of Zimbabwean nationalists were recovered in Zambia's Eastern Province and brought to Lusaka. The only one identified was that of John Mataure, former political commissar of ZANU. The bodies showed signs of torture and strangulation, according to the *Zambia Daily Mail*. The paper also printed without comment a report by the *Observer* that 155 guerrillas had been killed in internal feuding between Makaranga and Manyika tribal factions, some by ZANU firing squads near the Mozambique frontier; a "Rhodesian nationalist source" suggested that many more had probably died in a "general massacre for those who criticized the ZANU leadership." The *Rhodesia Herald* of Salisbury claimed that perhaps as many as 164 "Rhodesian nationalists" died in Zambia in the first week of May. (*The Guardian*, London, May 7, 1975)

In early June Zambia released the names of some of the Zimbabweans still jailed in connection with the murder of Herbert Chitepo. All are members of ZANU among their number are officials in charge of defense, publicity, external affairs and administration and Chitepo's bodyguard. (*Africa News*, Durham, June 9, 1975)

## KAUNDA IN THE UNITED STATES

In late April President Kaunda held talks in Washington with President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, calling for change in U.S. policy towards Southern Africa. In a startling toast at a White House dinner, Kaunda deplored US indifference to the liberation struggle, saying that American policy had "given psychological comfort to the forces of evil." Upon leaving, the Zambian President said that he was happy with the stands taken by Ford and Kissinger in his talks with them. (*Star*, Johannesburg, April 26, 1975; *Zambia Daily Mail*, Lusaka, April 21 and 24, 1975)

## KAUNDA IN PORTUGAL

For three days beginning May 8 President Kaunda visited Lisbon for conferences with Portuguese officials. The talks concentrated on the situation in Angola, which Kaunda fears could spill over into Zambia, damage Zambia's ability to export its goods and hurt progress in the Zimbabwean negotiations. Lisbon has endorsed the Commonwealth agreement to back Mozambique's closure of its two main ports to Rhodesian traffic after June, but may be unable to contribute much to the compensation fund for the Mozambique government. (*The Guardian*, London, May 9, 1975)

## ZAMBIA RESHUFFLES ITS CABINET

In late May Zambia's Prime Minister Mainza Chona,



two Members of Parliament and a leading party official resigned their posts. Chona has been offered the post of Minister for Legal Affairs but the others are quitting the

government altogether. They could not meet Zambia's new leadership code which requires officials to limit their outside business involvements to avoid conflicts of interest. Foreign Minister Mwaanga was also replaced, in this case by Rupiah Banda, currently UN Ambassador, but Mwaanga joined the Central Committee of the party, ostensibly a promotion. Central Committee member Elijah Mudenda becomes the new Prime Minister. (*Africa News*, Durham, May 29, 1975)

#### SOVIET VISIT TO THE SEYCHELLES

Just one year prior to the independence of the eighty islands that comprise the Seychelles, two members of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee came for a week's visit. In conversations with Chief Minister James Mancham they suggested USSR's willingness to provide some of the aid which the Seychelles so desperately needs for its infrastructure and other problems, perhaps in exchange for some kind of naval facility. They also spoke with members of the Peoples' United Party, rivals to Mancham's pro-British and pro-American Democratic Party. One of the islands was used as a British naval base during World War II and could easily be adapted again. At present the only external use of the islands is an American tracking station on the main island of Mahe. Chief Minister Mancham has said that South African Airways need not fear eviction of its landing rights after independence. (*Star*, Johannesburg, May 10, 1975)

# at the u.n.



#### ANTI-APARTHEID CONFERENCE DECIDES ON JOINT STRATEGY OF ACTION

An important anti-apartheid conference, with the participation of the liberation movements of South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia, the major trade union confederations, anti-apartheid movements from all over the world, the OAU, and various UN bodies and specialized agencies took place at UNESCO headquarters in Paris from April 28 to May 2. Sponsored by the UN Special Committee against Apartheid and by the OAU, the conference was convened to assess the present situation in South Africa and to develop a co-ordinated international strategy of action. Because it was the first major meeting of all anti-apartheid forces since the April OAU Council of Ministers special session in Dar es Salaam, and because it was the largest meeting ever of Southern Africa support groups, the conference was viewed as a particularly significant event at the UN.

A declaration approved unanimously by conference participants endorsed the OAU Dar es Salaam declaration, reaffirming the principle that there can be no compromise on the question of eliminating the apartheid system and no détente with the racist and colonialist régime of South Africa. The declaration called for the expulsion of South Africa from all international organizations and the recognition of the liberation movements as the authentic representatives of the people of South Africa. It also emphasized the need to maintain and strengthen the military, economic, political, cultural and sports boycott of the South African régime, and to give the liberation

movements all necessary aid to continue their struggle "by all means of their choice, including armed struggle." The declaration listed a number of areas for immediate action, in particular: the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter (which contains provisions for the establishment, policing and enforcement of sanctions); the imposition by the Security Council of an oil embargo; the denial of all landing and port facilities to aircraft and ships traveling to and from South Africa; the termination of all public or private aid for emigration to South Africa; a new campaign against collaboration in sports; a campaign for the immediate release of all political prisoners and persons under restrictions; and increased assistance to the liberation movements. A series of recommendations attached to the declaration contain detailed measures which the conference participants recommended to the attention of support groups, international organizations, and governments, for the development of a co-ordinated campaign at all levels. (United Nations A/AC.115/L.402)

One of the interesting things that emerged from the conference was the preoccupation on the part of the OAU—and of several African delegates on the Committee—to dispel the confusion on the question of détente in Southern Africa. A firm distinction was established between negotiations with Vorster over Namibia and Rhodesia, which are seen as a tactical step towards the liberation of these countries, and a generalized "dialogue" with South Africa, which is rejected and condemned. The problem of the enforcement of the boycott against South

Africa by African countries, especially the breaking off of all economic relations, was repeatedly discussed. While the OAU resolution, which the conference endorsed, is still very cautious on this point, statements made at the conference suggest that more positive action might be forthcoming.

The OAU representatives at the conference also emphasized their interest in developing co-ordinated campaigns with all anti-apartheid forces at all levels, whether inter-governmental, governmental, or non-governmental. A representative of the OAU Bureau of Sanctions was present at the conference specifically to establish a working relationship with the non-governmental organizations attending, especially concerning the exchange of information on the activities of multinational corporations and banks. The OAU is also planning to set up a system for providing aid to support groups for their anti-apartheid campaigns.

The problem of how to develop and co-ordinate joint campaigns at different levels and in different countries was one of the most discussed at the conference. One of the recommendations most likely to be followed up soon concerns the mounting of a concerted campaign against selected multinational corporations with substantial investments in South Africa. The need for certain groups with access to relevant information to act as clearing houses in specific campaigns was emphasized: for example, SAN-ROC was appointed to perform this function in a strengthened sports boycott.

Because of the difficulties inherent in any United Nations undertaking of this kind, the conference did not accomplish much in the way of establishing a concrete co-ordination network. As many similar conferences in the past, it limited itself to adopting the general declaration of principle already described and a set of recommendations whose usefulness is restricted by the lack of machinery to implement them. Many of the organizations present, however, used the opportunity to establish contacts with groups which they might not have easily met otherwise (groups from Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the United States, and most countries of Europe were present). There was a widespread feeling that co-ordinated campaigns involving groups in many countries are now possible and that they enjoy the support of the United Nations, the OAU, and at least in some countries, substantial sectors of public opinion. It was clear, however, that specific strategies would have to be discussed in a different, more informal and private setting than a United Nations conference, and the groups agreed that they themselves would organize a meeting with this purpose as soon as possible.

#### **WESTERN POWERS AGAIN VETO ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA**

The three Western powers on the Security Council—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—have again vetoed effective United Nations measures against South Africa. The Security Council voted on a draft resolution that would have imposed a mandatory embargo against South Africa on the grounds that its continued occupation of Namibia is a threat to international peace. The proposed sanctions would have remained in force until South Africa pulled out of Namibia. The draft resolution also reaffirmed the legal responsibility of the United Nations over the territory and called for United Nations-supervised elections by 1976. As have a series of United Nations decisions in recent years, the draft also

condemned South Africa for its racist and oppressive policies in Namibia and for attempting to fragment the territory through the creation of "Bantustans".

The Security Council met on the question of Namibia as a follow-up to a decision taken last December asking for a public commitment by the Vorster regime to withdraw from the territory and to transfer power to the Namibians with the help of the United Nations. The Council had set a May 30 deadline for South Africa to comply with its request. In an eleventh-hour maneuver to confuse the issues and forestall an unfavourable vote in the Council, the South African Foreign Minister, Hilgard Muller, wrote to Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim proposing new talks with a representative of the Secretary-General. The South Africans also said they would welcome a visit to the territory by African leaders as well as discussions with the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and a special committee of the OAU. The South African statement was promptly rejected by SWAPO President Sam Nujoma who denounced it as a maneuver to gain time while the Vorster regime is continuing the exploitation and oppression of the territory. The President of the Council for Namibia and several African leaders who spoke before the Security Council also rejected the South African offer as a ploy.

Predictably, the delegates of the Western powers declared that they did not consider Namibia as a threat to the peace, and seized on the South African statement to state that they favored "a fresh diplomatic move" as a step towards independence. Last October, the three Western powers saved South Africa from expulsion from the United Nations through their veto in the Security Council. The new veto shows once again that they continue to consider the survival of white minority rule in Southern Africa as essential to their economic, political and strategic interests in the area. (UN press release WS/712)

#### **SOUTH AFRICA SUSPENDED FROM MORE UN BODIES**

South Africa was suspended from the World Meteorological Organization in May, with a vote of 66 in favor and 25 opposed, and 14 abstentions. The move indicates that diplomatic action against South Africa in the world body is continuing unabated. Over the past few years, South African membership rights were terminated, suspended or otherwise reduced in 9 specialized agencies of the United Nations. South Africa retains full rights only in the International Atomic Energy Agency and the economic bodies affiliated with the United Nations, i.e. the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as well as the less important International Finance Corporation and International Development Association. It is expected that another strong attack against South Africa will be mounted at the next session of the General Assembly in the fall. (*The Star*, Johannesburg, May 10, 1975)

#### **DECOLONIZATION COMMITTEE HOLDS SPECIAL SESSION IN LISBON**

The Committee of 24 (on decolonization) held a special session in Lisbon, at the invitation of the Portuguese Government, from June 12 to 18. The session was the first ever held by the Committee in Europe. It was attended by United Nations representatives as well as by

representatives of the Southern African liberation movements and some liberation support groups.

At the session, the Committee adopted a consensus on the territories under Portuguese administration, another one on Rhodesia, and one on Namibia. The consensus on the Portuguese territories included a request that the Government of Portugal "ensure that the national unity and territorial integrity of these countries are preserved" (an obvious reference to Angola, over which the Committee had expressed its concern in the past). Concerning the Cape Verde islands, the Committee requested all governments and organizations in the United Nations system "to render all possible assistance to the people of the territory on an emergency basis." In its consensus on Namibia, the Committee urged the Security Council to take mandatory action against South Africa under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and recommended that the Council impose a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. It also called on South Africa's major trading partners and on corporations collaborating in depleting Namibia's resources to cease all such support and collaboration with South Africa. In its resolution on Rhodesia, the Committee expressed firm support for the demand by the ANC that a constitutional

conference be held to work out a settlement relating to the future of the territory. It also recommended that the Security Council initiate an assistance program for Mozambique, to enable Frelimo to apply sanctions against Rhodesia fully and effectively. (UN press release GA/COL/1634)

#### **SANCTIONS COMMITTEE CALLS FOR INFORMATION ON VIOLATIONS**

The Security Council's Sanctions Committee regarding Rhodesia has appealed again for information from non-official sources about possible violations of the UN embargo against the Smith regime. The Committee said it would particularly welcome reliable information on trade, financial or investment transactions, foreign travel by Rhodesians, emigration or tourism to Rhodesia, Rhodesian activities abroad, and links, official or unofficial, with Rhodesia. The Committee said it wanted closer contact with non-governmental organizations, and invited groups to send information directly to the Secretariat of the Committee, United Nations Headquarters, New York. The sender's identity, it said, would be treated as confidential if this was desired. (UN Press release WS/711)

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# **UNITED STATES and SOUTHERN AFRICA**

## **SENATE SOUTHERN AFRICA HEARINGS OPEN**

In June the newly-reorganized Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began a series of hearings on southern Africa. The hearings are designed to provide "introductory information" about the region and US policy towards it for the Subcommittee, and especially for its new chairman, Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa).

Clark initiated the series on June 11 with a statement noting the relevance of US southern African policy to our relations with black Africa, and the disappointment expressed by black Africa over that policy thus far. He questioned US resistance to a UN mandatory embargo on arms to South Africa, and said: "The United States cannot continue to merely give verbal support to these principles [majority rule, self-determination, racial equality] while undercutting the efforts of other countries to further them. We must come up with some positive proposals of our own."

The first two hearings (June 11 and 13) focused on Mozambique. On the 11th three scholars testified: Allen Isaacman (Minnesota), Thomas Henriksen (SUNY-Plattsburgh), and Norman Bailey (CUNY). They presented historical summaries of Mozambique's colonial past and of FRELIMO, as well as speculation on the FRELIMO government's likely policies after it attains independence on June 25. Isaacman and Henriksen strongly advocated a progressive and sympathetic policy towards the new state—as Henriksen put it, the US should, finally, "come down on the side of national independence and colonial revolution."

Two days later, Nathaniel Davis, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs whose recent appointment drew vigorous opposition from anti-apar-

theid forces and African leaders, made his first appearance before the Subcommittee. He stated that "United States policy towards Mozambique has been predicated on the principles of self-determination and majority rule," and claimed the US had "established an embargo on arms shipments to both sides in the Portuguese colonial wars" in 1961. In the question period Clark asked for Davis' response to several proposals for US policy drawn from the Isaacman testimony. Davis said the Administration welcomed and intended to recognize the independence of Mozambique, in the full knowledge that the government there would probably be "socialist and Marxist" as well as non-aligned. He left unanswered the question of establishing diplomatic relations; these require consent on both sides. The Assistant Secretary said the US sought to assist in Mozambique's development, and in fact had prepared a favorable, detailed response should it receive a wheat request from Mozambique under P.L. 480. In regard to contributions to a UN fund to compensate Mozambique for financial losses when that country applies sanctions to Rhodesia (as it is expected to do), Davis said the Administration has no position because no such request had been received. This puzzled Clark, who found it strange that the US had worked out a firm response to one kind of possible aid request, but not to another.

The hearings continued on June 16, when another scholars' panel—Gerald Bender (UCLA), John Wheeler (New Hampshire), and John Marcum (UC—Santa Cruz)—testified on Angola. The witnesses described the origins and present state of the divided nationalist movement, and were unanimous in stressing that the US should strictly *avoid* intervention—direct or indirect—in support of any party or faction. Perhaps the most

interesting development was Clark's response to Bender's call for an investigation of the role of Gulf Oil in the current turmoil, since it is frequently alleged that Gulf is in fact supporting one (or more) of the rival movements. Clark interrupted to say he considered the proposal "a wise one", and would take it up with the Subcommittee on Multinationals, of which he is a member.

Thus far the "Subcommittee" has consisted largely of Clark alone; he has been the sole Senator present through most of the proceedings. Future hearings will deal with Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia, and a wrap-up on the Africa region. Persons or groups interested in testifying should contact the Subcommittee.

#### **SOUTH AFRICA'S CHIEF PROPAGANDIST VISITS US**

South African Minister of Information and Interior, Dr. Cornelius Mulder, paid his second visit to the United States during June. While the stated purpose of the visit was to meet with Information Department officials assigned to several US cities, Mulder's main objective as South Africa's chief propagandist was to make personal contacts with "opinion formers and decision-takers" on the east and west coast.

Mulder's current six-week trip to western and Asian countries is part of an expanding, no-holds-barred campaign by South Africa to white-wash Apartheid and sell South Africa's friendship and strategic importance to any non-Communist country which will buy it.

Mulder's US trip was marked by considerable secretiveness. From the available information, it appears that Mulder was less successful in making significant new political contacts than he was in January, 1974, when he met with then-Vice President Ford, an official responsible for international military affairs at the Pentagon, and Congressional leaders of both parties. (see *Southern Africa*, April, 1974) However, the visit also demonstrated that Mulder is developing a cadre of politicians and newsmen who can perhaps prepare the way for future inroads. Mulder was also the target of public protest for the first time in this country. (see *Action News and Notes*)

Mulder made his main public pitch in a speech before the National Press Club on June 10, which was broadcast live over more than 600 public radio stations across the country. While none of his arguments were new, it was clear that his overall objective was to make South Africa appear to be a liberal country as open to criticism and improvement of its "race problems" as the United States. Mulder's central message was an invitation to any western country to fill the military vacuum left by the British Navy withdrawal from Simonstown, which he claimed would require no support for Apartheid. As he said at the Press Club, "Our navy has expanded to an extent where it satisfies our medium power needs. We do not need others to do *our* work, but we do require our friends in the Western world to shoulder their own responsibilities in the oceans around us."

Mulder also made a point of announcing that the Transkei "bantustan" will be "fully independent" next year, claiming that it "will be a sovereign country, as independent as Australia or France." While several questioners tried to expose this and other flagrantly untrue apologies for Apartheid, Mulder went through most of the questioning smoothly, since there was no chance for follow-up questions or rebuttal.

Mulder claimed in an interview in New York that "the general climate [of opinion about South Africa] is much

better than it was 18 months ago," and that South Africa's "detente" moves have paid off. (*Star*, Johannesburg, June 14)

In Washington, Mulder met with Assistant Secretary Nathaniel Davis, although a circuitous effort to meet with a lower-ranking policy planner failed. He also met with several dozen members of Congress at events hosted by Senator Goldwater and South Africa's newly-won friend, Democratic Congressman John Dent, who toured South Africa under the guidance of the Department of Information in April. The guests at the dinner hosted by Goldwater were already friendly toward South Africa for the most part. Names of the eighteen members of Congress who attended the luncheon hosted by John Dent were kept secret both by Dent and by the South African Embassy. While there is no indication that Mulder met with officials at the Pentagon, he may have met with Navy personnel during a four-day otherwise unexplained stay in Honolulu, which is the headquarters of CINCPAC, the Navy Pacific command which is responsible for the Indian Ocean.

It appears that Mulder's efforts to meet with Americans unsympathetic to South Africa were not very successful. The Congressional Black Caucus rejected a request to meet with Mulder, and two Black Los Angeles City Council members who were to have sat with Mulder at a meeting of the World Affairs Council decided not to associate themselves with an official of the South African government.

Although Mulder will probably not be back in the United States for another year, his staff will undoubtedly continue South Africa's propaganda effort through an \$80,000 a year lobbying operation in Washington, a growing visitors program and an expensive series of newspaper ads. On May 23, the Information Ministry reported that it spent \$269,000 for the "current year" on advertising in the US, Britain and Austria. Ads in seven major newspapers and three major news magazines in the US probably account for the bulk of this budget. (*Hansard*, May 23, 1975)

#### **DIGGS CONTINUES FOCUS ON AFRICA**

Six months into the 94th Congress, Congressman Charles Diggs, Chairman of the former House Subcommittee on Africa, is still taking an active interest and leadership in US-Africa policy. Diggs is currently on his second trip to Africa this year. He is in Mozambique as an individual guest of Frelimo at Mozambique's independence celebration, where he will be the most senior US politician present, since Frelimo did not invite a representative of the administration.

Just before Diggs left Washington, he held one day of hearings in his Subcommittee on International Resources, Food and Energy on "Resources in Namibia: Implications for US Policy." Assistant Secretary Davis revealed practically no new information in response to specific questioning by Diggs. He consistently ducked responsibility, claiming ignorance due to his recent appointment or lack of jurisdiction. For example, he refused to comment on the issue of tax credits for US companies operating in Namibia, deferring to the Treasury Department, and he deferred to the courts the question of the UN Council for Namibia Decree for the protection of the national resources of Namibia.

Diggs plans to hold several hearings on "US Policy and Relations with South Africa" in late July. In the May Congressional Black Caucus newsletter, "For the People",

Congressman Diggs indicated that the hearings will in part consider a bill he introduced in April prohibiting transfer of nuclear materials and technology to countries, including South Africa, which have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (A different version of the Diggs bill was considered and defeated by the House on June 20.) (see *Southern Africa*, June 1975)

### RHODESIA SEEKS US MERCENARIES

Since February, Rhodesia has been advertising for US mercenaries through an American soldier of fortune, Robert K. Brown of "Phoenix Associates," Arvada, Colorado.

Brown claims that he has received some 300 inquiries in response to his ads, which have appeared in such magazines as *Shooting Times*. (See February issue, page 84) If the customer sends in \$10 Brown sends him a whole Men-of-Action packet: pamphlets on a career in the Rhodesian Army, the British South Africa Police (BSAP) or the Special Air Squadron together with enlistment forms and a medical form. A four-page article on "Rhodesia's War" by Brown himself gives a sketch of the war against the "terrs" based on a three weeks' visit Brown made last year. In a sheet entitled "Additional Information" Brown demonstrates that the pay and privileges are good. One Vietnam veteran is now a section leader of the BSAP and earning \$1600 (US) a month, which he puts in foreign banks. BSAP will pay your air fare to Rhodesia, provide you with a Rhodesian passport and there is no income tax for two years.

The State Department claims that it is trying to discourage people making inquiries about going and warns applicants that they may lose their citizenship. But so far State has acted as if it agrees with Brown that he is not doing anything illegal. While State has referred the matter to the Justice Department for investigation, Justice professes to see no reason to suppose that Brown is an

agent of Rhodesia's regime. Furthermore, the Administration has not acted to halt the violation of sanctions involved in providing airline tickets to Americans bound for Salisbury and in shipping salaries out to foreign banks. The Rhodesian Information Office, of course, is not turning away customers but claims that Brown is no agent of theirs.

Brown's political ties have swung from left to right since the 1950s. He claims he fought with Castro in the Cuban revolution, broke with him over Communism, joined anti-Castro exiles in their plots and then plotted with Haitians to overthrow Duvalier. In 1967 he served in Vietnam as an intelligence officer, Special Forces Team Leader and Political Warfare Officer. After 14 months in Vietnam, he says he has "observed revolutionary movements in the Caribbean, South America, Spain and Portugal."

Such a history suggests that Brown may have worked with or for the CIA on a number of occasions. But it seems questionable that so public an operation as the one Brown now runs would be a CIA front.

Currently, in addition to promoting Rhodesia's challenge to men of action, Brown is starting *Soldier of Fortune*, a journal of Professional Adventurers. His promotional flier advertises a first issue with articles about "Mad Mike" Hoare and his "Mercs" attempting to invade Angola, American Mercenaries in Africa and "Urban Street Survival". From Pretoria, Al J. Venter will report on "chaos in Africa" and the fight of South Africa against "communist-sponsored 'liberation fighters'".

Notwithstanding his enthusiasm for Rhodesia's "nasty, violent and cruel" war, Brown doubts that the outcome will favor the whites. To quote from his article in *Knight* magazine, "Sometimes good fighting is not enough. The blood of the soldier seldom outweighs the breath of the politician on the scales of history." (*New York Times*, June 23, 1975.)

## ACTION NEWS and NOTES

### POLITICAL ACTION

#### ZANU REPRESENTATIVE IN US ARRESTED Tapon Mawere issues statement

On June 7, 1975, I personally experienced American racism, American police brutality and the worst punishment methods in the maximum security prison cells at Delaware Adult Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware.

While on my way to a speaking engagement in Norfolk, Virginia, where I was to speak about the racism and brutality of the Rhodesian police in the murder, June 1, of thirteen of my people, the Zimbabwe people, I and my comrade, Mr. Synos Mangazva became victims of police racism and brutality here in the southern United States.

My companion was attacked by an unidentified plainclothes policeman without provocation while waiting in People's Service restaurant in Harrington, Delaware for our Trailways bus, which had broken down, to be replaced.

Two plainclothes policemen and four other uniformed police pushed Mr. Mangazva through the plate glass door, breaking it. They arrested him and pushed him into an unmarked car while beating and kicking him. I insisted on going with him but the police pushed me away. However,

I managed to jump into the car before the door closed.

At the Harrington police station after I began to write down the policemen's names and the particulars, the police asked me who I was. After telling them my name and my position as Chief Representative in the United States of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), they started checking on some records and after about ten minutes told me I was under arrest and proceeded to handcuff me. One of the police officers spoke about calling the immigration officials to come and pick us up.

We were taken to Dover jail where our jailers put us into maximum security cells and stripped us of all our clothes, except shorts, and where we had to sleep on a slab without covers with the windows open. My comrade, Mr. Mangazva, spent the night under these conditions while badly in need of medical attention with a deep gash in his shoulder as a result of being pushed through the glass door in the restaurant.

By Sunday morning our friends raised bail for our release.

Hearings in court are scheduled for June 13, at 1 p.m. in Court 7, in Dover, Delaware.

We look to United States citizens to struggle to end these atrocities that are happening in the state of Delaware and elsewhere in the U.S.



## **BLACK LAWYERS SUPPORT UN EXPULSION OF SOUTH AFRICA**

The National Conference of Black Lawyers has announced their support for the campaign to expel South Africa from the United Nations and for its total international isolation. The NCBL calls for the immediate release of Nelson Mandela, who is incarcerated on Robben Island and all other political prisoners in South Africa.

The NCBL also supports the initiative of the World Council of Churches in demanding that the western banking consortium European American Banking Corporation (EABC) stop granting loans to the South African government. EABC provided secret loans totalling \$210 million since 1970, representing 20 percent of South Africa's foreign loans.

## **ANNOUNCE N.Y. CAMPAIGN TO EXPEL SOUTH AFRICA**

On May 7, five Black New York union and political leaders held a press conference to announce the start of a city-wide campaign to expel South Africa from the U.N. The aim is to collect 100,000 signatures to be presented at the opening of the next General Assembly session in September.

Present at the news conference were Percy Sutton, Manhattan Borough President; Lincoln Lynch, of the Committee of Concerned Black Academics; Roosevelt Rose, of the Black Affairs Committee of District 65; Anges Willis, of the United Electrical Workers and the Coalition of Trade Unionists and Gerald Horne, of the National Anti-Imperialist Movement in Solidarity with African Liberation.

Further information about the petition campaign is available from the Anti-Imperialist Movement in Solidarity with African Liberation at 156 Fifth Avenue, Room 405, N.Y.C.

## **ECONOMIC ACTIONS**

### **IBM STOCKHOLDERS CRITICIZE ROLE IN SOUTH AFRICA**

Members of fourteen religious denominations, all IBM stockholders, submitted a resolution at the company's annual meeting in May calling on IBM to get out of the computer business in South Africa. The company's Board of Directors urged defeat of the resolution which would have barred the selling, leasing or servicing of computers in South Africa.

Rev. Powell who introduced the resolution, stated that by selling computers to South Africa, IBM helped the "white minority government run the apartheid system more smoothly, build up an aggressive military might and maintain its political power more effectively."

Congressman Diggs and 19 other congresspersons sent a message in support of the resolution which enumerated the ways computers are used in South Africa which included all major government departments including the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (where it aids in South Africa's development as nuclear power).

### **STRONG PROTEST AT ANNUAL ITT MEETING**

Over the last five years, multinational corporations, faced with the possibility of dissident voices at their annual stockholder meetings, have tried to locate the affairs in small "backwater" towns to avoid or undermine the current crop of protesters. This year ITT held its annual meeting in Charlotte, North Carolina. But despite the venue, the corporate managers probably had to spend

more time and money on security and intelligence than at any time in the past. In addition to its own security people, ITT also used "off duty Charlotte police officers [who] prowled the corridors and grounds of the gleaming ITT-owned Sheraton Center. . . ." (*Charlotte News*, May 7, 1975) ITT was so wary that it confiscated several newsmen's photographic equipment and instituted a new rule to limit the number of proxies allowed to enter the meeting from three to one. ITT's excuse was lack of seating capacity, but it turned out there were 75 empty seats at the meeting.

The Durham-based People's Coalition against ITT was the cause of ITT's super security. The Coalition had for several months been involved in local and state wide education about ITT's international role. It included a wide range of groups such as the Venceremos Brigade, Southern Africa Committee of Durham, American Friends Service Committee, the February First Movement (a black anti-imperialist group), the African Liberation Support Committee, the Greensboro Assn. of Poor People, the Greensboro Peace Action Center, American Committee on Africa, the North Carolina Alliance against Racism and Political Repression, Red Hornet Mayday Tribe of Charlotte, NC Joann Little Defense Committee, the Corporate Action Project (Washington, D.C.), Youth Against War and Fascism and other church/community groups. The Coalition publicly announced eight demands to ITT:

- 1) an end to the production of equipment, components and services to the electronic battlefield,

- 2) an end to ITT's business with the apartheid government of South Africa and the illegal government of Rhodesia,

- 3) that ITT issue a public statement that it helped to overthrow the constitutionally elected government of Salvador Allende Gossens in Chile,

- 4) that ITT adopt a resolution it will never again intervene in the affairs of another country or conduct its interference through any government agency, such as the CIA,

- 5) an end to ITT's Science Research Center in Chile,

- 6) an end to ITT's huge profits based on the exploitation of human labor here in the United States and in the Third World,

- 7) an end to the search for cheap foreign labor which results in runaway shops and denies jobs to workers in the U.S., and

- 8) that ITT provides higher wages and better working conditions for its workers in the U.S.

The evening before the meeting on May 7, Coalition members picketed a local country club where ITT and North Carolina officials were dining, and on the 7th they leafleted downtown and 40 demonstrators gathered in front of the Sheraton before and during the meeting itself. Because of ITT's limitations on the number of persons who could enter as proxies, the Coalition had only six members inside. But the Coalition's representatives successfully monopolized the questions which had to be fielded by ITT Chairman Geneen, who at one point stated that the meeting was becoming a "forum for the Department of State." The meeting had been stuffed with ITT workers and adherents, but one neutral shareholder commented at the end of the meeting, "I have the feeling you've been evasive all along . . . giving very general answers and no details," to which Geneen replied that he couldn't carry the details in his head—he is known for his photographic memory. (*Coalition press release*). Most of

the coalition's questions focused on ITT in South Africa, its Chile involvement and its production of military equipment. Because of the offensive nature of the security precautions the meeting received rather good press from the local and state media, and also AP coverage nation-wide.

(For more information contact the People's Coalition Against ITT, 702 Cypress St., Greensboro, N.C. 27405.) (*Charlotte News*, May 7; *Greensboro Daily News*, May 8; People's Coalition Press Release by S.B. Goldstein, May, 1975).

#### **AFRICAN LIBERATION DAY DEMONSTRATIONS**

The third annual African Liberation Day (ALD) demonstration was held in major cities throughout this country and Canada on Saturday, May 24. On that day thousands of individuals and organizations marched to show their support of the continued struggles against imperialism and colonialism in southern Africa. ALD 1975 also stressed local conditions of Blacks and minorities in this country.

The first ALD was held May 26, 1972. It was organized by the African Liberation Support Committee to show support and raise funds for liberation movements in southern Africa.

In the weeks preceding ALD, local African Liberation Support Committees sponsored cultural programs, political forums and street rallies on African, Middle East and Third World Liberation movements and domestic struggles within this country.

On ALD in New Orleans, 90 demonstrators marched to the home of South African Consul General Herman Martin with signs and chants demanding an end to South African apartheid.

#### **CELEBRATION OF MOZAMBIQUE INDEPENDENCE**

June 25, 1975 was the date of independence for Mozambique. On that day groups that had long supported FRELIMO in its efforts to end Portuguese rule came together to celebrate the birth of a new republic. The American Committee on Africa sponsored an evening of FRELIMO music and poetry. The New York City African Liberation Support Committee gave a celebration block party in Harlem. On June 28, the Mozambican students sponsored a reception and dance with delegates from the UN and OAU as honorary guests. In Toronto a celebration program was sponsored by ALSC, the Toronto Committee

for the Liberation of Southern Africa, and the Portuguese Canadian Democratic Association.

#### **CAPE VERDE SUPPORT GROUP PROVIDES DROUGHT RELIEF**

The recently formed organization called Tchuba (Creole for Rain) has already moved ahead in its relief efforts for Cape Verde. Some 40 tons of food and supplies will leave shortly and will reach the Islands in early July. At Tchuba's June meeting in Boston the Granja Project was launched. This project is for an agricultural and training center to be supported on Sao Tiago Island through the offices of the Cape Verdean Institute for Solidarity. An Emergency Art Heritage Project has also been initiated in order to preserve the traditional textile and dyeing industry and to promote Cape Verdean Arts and Crafts. Tchuba spokesperson Ray Almeida noted that "in Cape Verde, when a man is hungry it's not enough to give him a fish. Teach him how to fish for himself and you've taught him how to live for himself!" Almeida also pointed out that Tchuba was not a PAIGC "front" as had been alleged, but only that he and other Cape Verdeans who are sincerely interested in the Islands realize that the PAIGC has great popularity in the Islands and Tchuba must work through these channels. The Boston meeting showed that Tchuba has a very broad base and has grown rapidly under its hard-working leadership. Meanwhile the reactionary Cape Verdeans continue their efforts to disrupt independence and unity. Cape Verdeans in the New England area indicate that the Cape Verdean American Federation Convention held at Brown University on June 27-29 may be the scene of some quiet struggles between the supporters of both Tchuba and the PAIGC, and those Cape Verdeans who have been misled by Aguiinaldo Veiga and Roy Texeira. For those wishing more information about Tchuba you may write to them at: One Joy Street, Boston, Mass. 02108.

Since the declaration of a government-in-exile by Aguiinaldo Veiga and his followers, he has been to Washington to meet with Senators Brooke and Kennedy and sought to speak with Secretary of State Kissinger in hopes of stirring anti-Communist fears and marshal support for his "movement". Reliable sources have told of a meeting with Department of Defense and AID officials over this matter of independence for Cape Verde and Unity with Guinea-Bissau.

## **UPDATE**

#### **STEPPED-UP WAR LIKELY IN ZIMBABWE**

In what could be a signal that the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe will heat up again, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere says he no longer believes that the dispute between black and White Rhodesians can be solved through dialogue.

Supporting his view are reports that young Africans in large numbers are leaving Rhodesia, to join liberation movement armies in neighboring Mozambique. A BBC correspondent in Salisbury says it is difficult to know just how many young people are secretly leaving their homes and schools, but he says both women and young men are leaving by "the scores" every day.

Nyerere made the statement during an official visit to Somalia, where he had talks with Somali President Barre, the past Chairman of the Organization of African Unity. According to Radio Mogadishu, Nyerere said the need for

a war of liberation is increasing daily, and that Tanzania will provide both moral and material support for the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.

Nyerere and several other African heads of state met with leaders of the African National Council, in early July, in an effort to reconcile factional disputes that have hindered the ANC in recent months. Despite pledges of ANC unity produced by the summit, little is known about the current ANC position on talks with the Smith regime, and it is believed that ideological differences within the Zimbabwean guerrilla coalition continue.

In Salisbury, meanwhile, Prime Minister Ian Smith hinted to the Rhodesian Parliament that his government is not placing all its hopes on the long-awaited Constitutional Conference with the ANC.

Smith told the country's predominantly white legislature that stronger measures against African na-

nationalist guerrillas will be necessary. The Prime Minister also announced the formation of a commission that will study ways of ending "unnecessary" aspects of racial discrimination in Rhodesia. Smith said his government had postponed this move in the past, in the hope that the proposed Constitutional Conference would resolve some of the same issues.

### **GREEN BERET DENIES RECRUITING MERCENARIES FOR RHODESIA**

Rhodesian efforts to recruit foreign mercenaries for its war against nationalist guerrillas have come onto hard times in the United States, at least temporarily.

Alleged Rhodesian recruiter Robert Brown, publisher of *Soldier of Fortune* magazine, says he has stopped distributing informational packets on how to join the Rhodesian armed forces.

Brown, who is under investigation by the Treasury Department, says he has stopped handling the Rhodesian material on the advice of his attorney. But the former green beret and army intelligence officer insists that his prior attempts to publicize employment opportunities in the Rhodesian Security Forces were "strictly within the letter of the law."

### **JACKSON ISSUES AFRICA POLICY STATEMENT**

Democratic Presidential hopeful, Senator Henry Jackson, beat opponents to the punch in staking out his position on U.S. policy towards Africa.

Jackson told a New York-based African business association that America has for too long backed the wrong side in Africa. He said that the U.S. should have supported African nations that had to fight for independence and self-rule, just as Americans did.

### **THREAT OF CIVIL WAR STILL HANGS OVER ANGOLA**

Despite a July summit meeting of leaders of Angola's three liberation movements and a series of unity pledges aimed at ending months of factional violence, sporadic fighting continues in the richest of Portugal's African territories.

Over 300 people were killed and a thousand wounded in a mid-July battle over the capital city, Luanda, as troops of MPLA drove FNLA soldiers out of the city and attacked FNLA camps in nearby towns. MPLA established firm control of Luanda and the highway routes leading into the city in this showdown, and some observers expect the FNLA to withdraw from Angola's transitional government as a result.

The Portuguese government has said it might call on the United Nations to intervene in Angola, to prevent the outbreak of full-scale civil war. But the three liberation movements participating in the transitional government still oppose any outside intervention.

### **INDEPENDENT CAPE VERDE CONSIDERS UNIFICATION WITH GUINEA BISSAU**

July 5th marked the end of 500 years of Portuguese colonialism and the beginning of independence for the Cape Verde islands, located off the coast of West Africa.

Despite the islands' economic plight, the mood at independence was one of hope and anticipation. A high voter turn-out elected the new national assembly, following a week of intense political activity and independence celebrations.

A major question facing the new government is the islands' relationship with mainland Guinea Bissau, also newly-independent from Portugal. All candidates in the

Cape Verde election were members of the PAIGC, the independence party that fought Portuguese control on both the islands and the mainland. But the Party is moving towards unity cautiously, with the Republic of Tanzania the most talked-about model.

### **U.S. ARMS EMBARGO OPPOSED BY CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATIVES**

More evidence emerged in recent weeks that Conservatives in Congress are actively working to change U.S. policy towards South Africa—and the arms embargo in particular. In July, six Senate Republicans co-signed a letter to Secretary of State Kissinger protesting the State Department's refusal to allow exportation of nearly 4000 flares. The Senators said the South African Air Force, which ordered the flares from a Utah firm, has a good record of mountain, flood, and sea rescues, and that the flares would be used for humanitarian purposes.

The Senators—Helms of North Carolina, Garn of Utah, Curtis of Nebraska, McClure of Idaho, Scott of Virginia, and Thurmond of South Carolina—are not limiting their activities to flares. A Helms aide is coordinating the Senate side of the effort to end the embargo entirely. Four of the letter's signers, plus Senator Hansen of Wyoming, sent their aides to South Africa earlier this year. And Senator Curtis went there himself as guest of the South African Agricultural Union.

House members, too, have gotten into the campaign. Florida Democrat Bob Sikes, in a recent speech, called for a complete turn-about in U.S. policy towards South Africa, from criticism to open friendship. And Illinois Republican Philip Crane told his House colleagues that military cooperation with South Africa is vital to Western Security. Crane was among the six House Members who visited South Africa in January and toured many military installations.

The assault on the arms embargo bothers not only South Africa's active critics in the U.S.; it even has the State Department worried. An official there told *Africa News*, "The arms embargo is the cornerstone of U.S. policy towards South Africa. Take that away, and we *have* no policy."


### **MACHEL EXHORTS INDEPENDENT MOZAMBIQUE TO HARD WORK**

At ceremonies marking Mozambique's formal independence from Portugal, FRELIMO president Samora Machel said that all Mozambicans will be expected to work hard and sacrifice to overcome the legacy of poverty and inequality left by Portuguese colonialism.

Citing the redistribution of land as a major task of the new government, Machel said land will not be taken away from a person because of their color, but some landowners, whether black or white, will have to accept a smaller portion.

Machel said Mozambique will not have a national election for at least another two years. In the interim, a People's Assembly with representatives from each province will rule the country.

The 18-member FRELIMO cabinet includes three whites and a woman, who will head the Ministry of Education and Culture. Top posts went to FRELIMO Vice President Marcelino Dos Santos, now Minister of Development and Economic Planning, and Joaquim Chissano, Minister of Foreign Affairs.



Note new rates for 1975 listed below:

- |  |         |
|--|---------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Individuals:                | \$6.00  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Institutions:               | \$18.00 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Optional ½ year (7 months): | \$4.00  |
| Airmail (postage only, add subscription rate):       |         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> South and Central America:  | \$9.50  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Africa, Asia and Europe:    | \$12.50 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prisoners:                  | Free    |

If you are unable to send \$6.00, please write to us for other arrangements  
60¢ per issue; \$1.00 per double issue

- New  
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 Gift  
 Change of Address (\*enclose label)

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

From (if gift) \_\_\_\_\_

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Fifth Floor  
New York, N.Y. 10001

6  
Northwestern Univ Lib  
Serial Dept  
Evanston IL 60201

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