


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# southern africa



Vol. VII No.11

December 1974



NATO's New Allies in South  
Africa - A SPECIAL REPORT

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**DID YOU RENEW YOUR SUBSCRIPTION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA?**

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# Letters to the editor....

Southern African Collective:

As a regular reader of *Southern Africa*, I commend you on your efforts to publicize the plight of the people in Southern Africa and the heroic struggle they have been waging for the last decade.

True to their patriotic and militant history, the people of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, and Mozambique, have brought an end to Portuguese fascism and a new era in the African peoples' struggle against Colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism.

The victory achieved by PAIGC and FRELIMO is the outcome of correct political line and a reliance on the people as the fundamental force behind the liberation struggle. The course they have chartered as well as those people in other parts of the world who have successfully achieved the final victory is a point of reference, a vantage point from which one can draw lessons regarding the charting of ones own liberation.

Given that the victories achieved by the African

Liberation movements have been tremendously successful, *Southern Africa's* reporting must also reflect these fundamental changes brought about by these movements against the forces of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. Since the declaration of independence by PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, one year ago, *Southern Africa still*—on the front page map of Africa, shows Guinea-Bissau as a colony of Portugal. This is a serious error which must be corrected.

I hope that when I buy the next issue, that this change will be made so that the graphic image will reflect the objective condition of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. In this manner, it will be both visually and ideologically clear where the last bastion of imperialism and colonialism has entrenched itself.

Sincerely,  
Fassil Demissie  
Oakland, California

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Cover: Collage of South African Military Activities

feature

# The Drift Towards NATO Intervention in Southern Africa

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has now begun to develop direct military links with South Africa. NATO has begun contingency planning for "war" and "crisis" situations in the southern African region. Influential groups inside NATO are pressing for the use of the South African facility of Simonstown as a NATO base. There has been a marked acceleration in joint air and naval maneuvers, usually on a "bilateral" basis, between NATO and South African forces. There is now open talk in Washington of the need for South African forces in a joint western naval task force in the Indian Ocean. In addition to all this, there has been an unusual intensification of political and military consultations between the NATO powers and South Africa.

The extension of Alliance activities into the southern hemisphere represents an important departure from past western defence policy. Western defences have until now been organized around the protection of Western Europe and North America. But the Ottawa Declaration, which was signed on the 25th anniversary of the Alliance in June, extended the scope of NATO. The NATO powers now formally recognize that events in "troubled areas of the world" outside the Treaty area are a matter of intimate concern to them. The Alliance is thus beginning to extend its defence activities *openly* into the Third World in order to protect what they see as their legitimate interests. This is making NATO into a formal imperial defence organization. The new developments in southern Africa, which appear to have been influenced by the collapse of Portuguese fascism, are the first clear signs that NATO is prepared to move rapidly in this direction.

These new NATO moves are clearly very dangerous. They do not constitute, in and of themselves, massive military backing for the South African regime in the confrontation with liberation forces. That is not the point. The real danger lies in the future. The first stage in the liberation of southern Africa is now nearly over. In the next stage the direct military pressure on the Republic will increase greatly. And South Africa will eventually have to confront both external military pressure and internal upheaval. If by that time NATO has had its way, if the more conservative forces in the Organization predominate, the NATO powers will be faced with an almost impossible dilemma. South Africa will have been incorporated, on an ad hoc basis at least, into the western defence system. This could make it exceedingly difficult for the NATO powers to leave South Africa to the mercies of fate. There will be a strong tendency to provide every possible assistance to the Republic, for it will by then be seen as an ally.

This is, of course, exactly how the United States became involved in Indochina. No one decided to fight a major war on mainland Asia. But many small, or apparently small, decisions were made which eventually made it impossible to avoid fighting one.

The drift towards intervention in southern Africa began many years ago. And the British Conservative Party establishment, reflecting the concerns and interests of British and other multinational corporations, has been the leading force working for close ties with South Africa. Sir Alec Douglas Home, for instance, now shadow Foreign Minister and an elder statesman of the Party, has been pressing for years for the extension of the "NATO umbrella" to southern Africa. The argument is usually that the western countries must be able to protect the Cape route, which carries 80 per cent of Europe's oil, in the event of war. Those who have been involved in the intensive lobbying for South Africa, however, know that the "Cape route" argument is little more than a smokescreen. South Africa's supporters have merely used it as a way of presenting an apparently acceptable argument for co-operation with that country. In private they acknowledge that they are looking for ways to "come to the assistance of our potential allies." The now famous Conservative Commonwealth and Overseas Council document of February 1970, for instance, spoke openly of the need to prepare for the "defence of the Cape Route and Southern Africa."

The second step was the organization of massive and persistent pressure within NATO itself to move towards co-operation with South Africa. Again, this pressure was usually organized around arguments about "the Soviet maritime threat" in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic. The South Africa lobby inside NATO came into the open with the appointment in 1972 of a subcommittee on this "threat" in the NATO Assembly. At its annual meeting in the fall of that year in Bonn the Assembly passed Recommendation 22, which requested the NATO Council to authorize contingency planning for the protection of the Cape route. This was only a recommendation by an advisory body of NATO parliamentarians. But it was an important political step. For many knew that the real purpose of the recommendation was to carry NATO towards closer ties with Portuguese colonialism and the Vorster regime.

The passage of Recommendation 22 elicited some concern in a number of western parliaments and among other observers. Enquiries were made. Each time, however, the answer was that nothing had happened, that no action had been taken. In early 1974 the truth began to come out. The authors of a report prepared for the United Nations Committee on Decolonization discovered that the NATO Defence Planning Committee had actually acted on the Assembly's recommendation and that contingency planning was well under way. They discovered, furthermore, that consultations had taken place in early 1974 on the means of implementing the recommendation. Senior NATO officers were clearly indicating that once contingency plans had been drawn up, NATO would have to proceed to bring adequate forces to a state of readiness if

the Cape route was to be protected. And this, it was said, would necessarily involve South Africa. For no plan to police the southern oceans or protect the Cape route could be implemented without South African bases, communications facilities and even naval and air units.

All these activities, as well as apparent plans for the future, remained secret until the spring of this year. It was hoped that the United Nations Committee on Decolonization would publicly call attention to the matter and give some warning to those in a position to help prevent further military involvement with the white regimes. This proved a vain hope. Western missions at the United Nations exerted direct pressure on the Secretariat and the report, notwithstanding the sympathetic reception from certain delegations, was suppressed.

In May, however, the report surfaced in the Dutch parliament. There was a small storm in western European newspapers and a parliamentary enquiry was called for by the Dutch. On 14 May the NATO press Secretary in Brussels publicly admitted that SACLANT (Supreme Allied Command in the Atlantic) had in fact been secretly authorized to proceed with contingency planning. He indicated at the time that SACLANT planners were considering not only the possible options for NATO in wartime but also the options in "crisis situations". Dutch members of parliament were unable to clarify the meaning of this term in the subsequent enquiry, despite the fact that both the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Defence Minister provided full confirmation at the time of the facts revealed in the UN report. It is worth noting that the Department of Defense in Washington was denying the existence of any such plans at the very moment when a major row was developing in Europe. A real effort was being made, not only in the US but in Great Britain as well, to keep the whole affair out of the limelight. Western governments seemed to be very anxious to avoid the opprobrium of involvement in a tacit alliance with the white regimes.

During the past summer the situation changed radically. Official spokesmen no longer tried to prevent discussion of the NATO commitment. They actually went out of their way to brief journalists and others on what was going on. More and more reports of NATO activities, of maneuvers with South African forces and of consultations with the South African military were accepted as a matter of course. Listeners and readers in western countries were increasingly exposed to the news that NATO was moving south. What was particularly striking was the apparent attempt on the part of western military circles to *gather support* for the extension of military commitments to South Africa.

An article by Drew Middleton in the *New York Times* of July 24 provides a rather striking illustration of the point. Mr. Middleton is the *Times* defense correspondent, and he is close to the Pentagon. His article, entitled "NATO's Vulnerable Sea Lanes", makes a number of exceedingly important points. The first is that the "primary problem facing the Atlantic Alliance" is to ensure the supply of oil and essential minerals in the event of war. The second is that, because of this, the sea lanes around southern Africa from the Persian Gulf "have become the most important naval area in the world." The third is that in the event of a "crisis", the "most likely development" would be "an undeclared war by Soviet submarines against Western shipping around the Cape of Good Hope." This last, of course, is sheer military nonsense and was described as such by the Director of the


CIA in Congressional testimony earlier this year. (See the *New York Times*, August 3, 1974.) Nonetheless, Mr. Middleton was moving towards the obvious conclusion. This was that North Atlantic planners were moving towards "the establishment of a working relationship with South Africa on the protection of the (Cape) route". This means precisely what the Pentagon denied contingency planning meant. It means that "the protection of the southern oceans" must involve South African bases, communications facilities and, probably, naval and air units. Mr. Middleton speaks with authority and his article must be seen as reflecting a view which the US Department of Defense is now prepared to see discussed openly.

What is surprising is that so far almost nothing has been said about the matter by anyone in a position to raise effective objections. And this despite the obvious lessons of the collapse of Portuguese power in Africa and of the tragic path of US involvement in Indochina.

Events are now moving very rapidly. It was revealed in London on September 1 that the NATO Military Committee, which advises Secretary-General Luns, has taken a secret decision to negotiate with South Africa about the use of Simonstown as a NATO base. The Military Committee is headed by Admiral Peter Hill-



South African Troops: New NATO Allies?



Norton, former Commander of UK Combined Services, and a strong advocate of closer relations with South Africa. Hill-Norton, in fact, believes that the extension of a "NATO umbrella" to South Africa is absolutely essential to Great Britain and other European powers. This move is being made at a time when conservative circles in Britain have scored more than one important success in the battle for closer ties with the apartheid Centurion on the southern approaches. In August they somehow persuaded the UK Cabinet Defence Committee to over-rule the Minister of the Navy, Frank Judd, and to authorize the Royal Navy to send a nine-ship force to engage in joint maneuvers with South Africa. Judd had been able until then to resist pressures to undertake such maneuvers under the terms of the Simonstown agreement. South Africa, however, had threatened to terminate the agreement. In the last two weeks the Royal Navy has undertaken further maneuvers with South Africa, this time on a larger scale and with "informal" official hospitality.

A great deal else is happening, but the proposal to make Simonstown a NATO base seems at this time the most important issue. If those who now press for such an arrangement are successful, South Africa will have achieved a major victory in its campaign to draw the western powers to its side as allies in the coming confrontation in the region. The recent Labour Government decision to "abandon" the Simonstown agreement must be seen against the background of these negotiations. If the NATO Military Committee is successful, then the Simonstown agreement naturally becomes redundant. British forces can always use the base under a NATO agreement as opposed to a bilateral one. There is a real possibility that the Labour Government, which is known to be reluctant to break ties with South Africa, is trying to achieve a propaganda victory while protecting its flank, as it were, by permitting NATO to dig in where it fears to tread.

Whatever happens, one thing is certain. The NATO powers, publicly and secretly, are developing a dangerous, tacit alliance with South Africa. ■



Simonstown: South African Naval Base

# South Africa



*As the liberation movement came to power in Mozambique, some white residents in the capital fled to neighboring South Africa. Above, Africans search outgoing cars for weapons and contraband.*

## POLITICS

### Rallies and crackdown

The ascent to power of the revolutionary black nationalist organisation FRELIMO, in neighbouring Mozambique has already begun to spawn political unrest in South Africa. Barely a week after a FRELIMO-dominated government was installed in Lourenco Marques black sympathisers in South Africa began preparing for political rallies to demonstrate the solidarity of the black consciousness movement with the new government. Rally organisers included the South African Students Organisation (SASO) and the Black Peoples' Convention (BPC). SASO spokespersons sent out the word that four FRELIMO members were being "smuggled" into the country to speak at the rally in Durban.

Presumably afraid that the rallies would aggravate the already tense situation in South Africa after the upheaval in Mozambique the Government reacted swiftly. Two days before the rally, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Kruger announced the banning of all meetings anywhere in South Africa organised by SASO and BPC until October 20 under the Riotous Assembly Act. The Minister further warned that anyone entering the country illegally would be arrested. Despite the ban the joint SASO-BPC leadership pressed ahead with their organisation and of the four rallies initially planned two eventually materialised.

Hours before the scheduled start people began gathering outside the closed gate of the stadium in Durban. The crowd of about 400 chanted pro-FRELIMO slogans raising arms in the black power salute. The police gave several warnings for the crowd to disperse but when the

crowd started surging towards the police ranks they moved in with teargas, batons and dogs. Scores of people including many policemen were bitten. More than 300 policemen are believed to have been held in reserve in side streets to assist in case the situation became uncontrollable. 12 people were arrested and released on bail for organising the rally.

There was more violence at the University of the North in the Northern Transvaal, an all black student campus. Police turned up in 15 riot vans and five squad cars and ordered about a thousand students to leave the University hall in 15 minutes. The students left the hall but regrouped on the sports field where, according to the police, they began throwing stones at the police and at some cars on the campus. After firing a gas pistol and some scattered gun fire a police officer ordered a baton charge. In the ensuing melee four white members of the academic staff were injured and one student was treated in hospital for a gash on the head.

As a result of these rallies a nationwide crackdown against black political activists was begun. The police initiated a wave of arrests, searches and interrogations. Many leading members of BPC, SASO and the Black Allied Workers Union were detained under the 180 days detention clause, others were still being sought, at least one officer has reportedly fled to Botswana. The Johannesburg office of the BPC were broken into and the SASO headquarters in Durban was raided. Police broke up a Transvaal Youth Organisation meeting in the black town-



SASO Organizer with Township Residents

ship of Soweto near Johannesburg.

Raids in which searches were conducted also took place at homes near Durban, in African and Coloured townships near Johannesburg, Germiston, Kokstad and King Williamstown. Several of the homes raided were those of people who had already been banned.

The English-language Press expressed concern about the treatment meted out to the editor of a Durban-based newspaper *The Daily News*. Mr. J.O.W. O'Malley was arrested on the night after the rallies while attending a wine tasting party, at a hotel. He was released the following day on bail after a brief appearance in court. Both Mr. O'Malley and his deputy have been charged under the Riotous Assembly Act and were ordered to appear in court on October 11. They were accused of having advertised the banned FRELIMO meeting in Durban. The "Daily News" had a front page report on the day of the rally which stated that a banned pro-FRELIMO rally was to be held despite the prohibition. Detectives are also investigating charges against the *Argus* and *Die Burger*, two Cape town newspapers in English and Afrikaans respectively.

A woman reporter on the *Daily News*, Joan Dobson, fled to Lourenco Marques to avoid having to give evidence against the members of SASO and BPC who were arrested during the rally in Durban. In a letter written to her editor after fleeing she explained that the Special Branch has ordered her to become a state witness against people she had liked and considered as friends. She felt that there was a strong possibility that she would have faced charges herself if she did not cooperate. Four of the people charged have already appeared in court.

Political arrests have become very common again in South Africa. Recent years have brought growing black labor protest against the oppressive reality of apartheid and increasing repression to counter such protest. There were more arrests and prosecutions resulting from labor disputes in the first six months of this year than during the whole of 1973. This may be partly because black unskilled workers have had to suffer exceptional hardships due to ever-spiralling inflation. Politically aware blacks know that the situation in South Africa is not very different from that of neighbouring Mozambique prior to its liberation. Events there have boosted the confidence and morale of black political activists tremendously. Not the least of the government aim at banning the rallies was to prevent the endemic labor unrest from taking an increasingly political turn.

(*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 28, Oct. 5; *Guardian*, London, Sept. 26, 27, 1974; *Times*, London, Oct. 2, 1974; *Daily*

*News*, Tanzania, Sept. 27, 1974; *New York Times*, Oct. 1, 1974)

### Refugees

The flood of Portuguese refugees leaving Mozambique slowed down to a trickle in October when the South African Government moved to reinstate the visa regulations which had been suspended during the weeks immediately following the riots in Lourenco Marques. Although refugees were not being deported they were being requested to turn back if they did not have visas. Despite this, hundreds of people are still entering the country on holiday permits and scores are entering South Africa without travel documents through the Kruger National Park. A possible reason for the curbing was provided by an immigration official who suggested that exaggerated reports of killing and atrocities had been used by many people who had fled as an excuse to be allowed to stay and work in South Africa. Mr. Jose Ramos, who is in charge of the refugee center in Johannesburg, after speaking to many recent arrivals came to the conclusion that many people had fled not because they were afraid but because they saw no future for themselves under a FRELIMO Government. They could not hope for the perpetuation of the privileged positions which they had enjoyed under the colonial system. Many people who arrived on holiday permits may plan to wait and see what developments take place in the coming weeks.

South African immigration laws are highly selective even as far as White applicants are concerned. Regarded as the most suitable are those who can most easily be assimilated into the conservative Afrikaaner linguistic group. However, the critical shortage of skilled labor in South Africa may tempt the government into granting residence to qualified artisans. Industrialists in the eastern Transvaal have told the department of Immigration that jobs are available immediately for skilled artisans. ISCOR, the state owned iron and steel corporation has also indicated that it can take on artisans. Some refugees have already been placed in jobs.

Meanwhile, the Portuguese Government has let it be known through its embassy in Pretoria that it will take all the responsibilities for the refugees. Those who have refused to return to Mozambique and are not accepted by the South African Government will be repatriated to Portugal. Many penniless refugees who had fled at the height of the riots were prepared to return and the Portuguese consulate was busy arranging seats on flights to Lourenco Marques.

(*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 21, 28, 1974; *Times*, London, Sept. 18, 1974)





Even the photographs published by the South African Department of Prisons cannot disguise the grim conditions in which South African political prisoners are forced to live. Right: the entrance to Port Elizabeth prison. Left: prisoners roll up the mats they are given to sleep on at Pollsmoor Prison.

#### Controversies inside the National Party

Traditionally, the Afrikaans newspapers support the Government and the ruling National Party. However, since the changes in Mozambique, it is being observed that some of these papers are to some extent criticising the Government on its racial policy and are urging the Government and the White public in general, to adopt a more liberal posture: The recent arrest of the editor of a Durban paper, the exclusion of Blacks from the staff association of UNISA (University of South Africa), the exclusion of Africans from the conference on African labor have been criticized in the Afrikaans press. One Afrikaans paper has also urged improved living conditions for urban African workers.

Another controversial issue in National Party circles has been the question of integrating the Coloureds with the Whites. While a section of the Party's supporters welcome the idea, the Party's student organization in the University of Pretoria has launched a campaign against such a suggestion. The student organization has, however, criticized the Government for its lack of interest in creating a Coloured "homeland".

The Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr. Janson has announced that the Government is trying to simplify the procedures regulating the movement of Africans in "White Areas" in an attempt to reduce the harassment of Africans.

As usual optimistic observers are interpreting these moves as an indication of possible change in the Party's policy.

#### Commission to inquire into penal system

The Government has announced the appointment of a

commission, headed by a Supreme Court judge, to inquire into the penal system. The two opposition parties generally welcomed it, although Mrs. Helen Suzman of the Progressive Party expressed disappointment over the fact that the question of retaining the death penalty was specifically excluded from its term of reference.

The establishment of the commission follows the sentencing in September of three prison warders, two white and one black, to 18 months each for assaulting a prisoner who later died and causing bodily harm to another black prisoner. Two other warders were given suspended sentences. The judge in his concluding remarks described these assaults as "barbaric, cruel and inhuman" and said that the trial had shown the "serious evils" in the prison department.

Since the introduction of the Prisons Act (which put the onus on the newspapers to prove allegations about prison conditions) and the conviction of the "Rand Daily Mail" under the act five years ago, South African newspapers have been wary of criticizing conditions in the prisons. The recent trial has sparked off a flurry of press comments and has received wide publicity.

(*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 21, 28, Oct. 5, 1974; *Comment and Opinion*, Sept. 20, 27, Oct. 4, 1974; *Guardian*, London, Oct. 9, 10, 1974)

#### South African Government Exposes its Dishonesty

The South African Government consistently maintained that the Bantustans and their legislative bodies

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Rural African School

provide the appropriate vehicle, for the Africans to have their say. As a corollary, the African workers, working in "white" areas were advised to channel their economic demands only through their respective Bantustan bodies. Now it seems that the Government is caught in its own game. In a recent letter to the Kwazulu (one of the eight Bantustans) cabinet, the South African Government warned it against interfering in the industrial dispute concerning black workers in the "white" areas. This has brought sharp criticism from the Kwazulu chief executive officer Gatsha Buthelezi, who said that the cabinet has decided to defy the warning.

Vorster's Government, however, is trying hard to show that it really wants to stick to promised independence for Bantustans. Recently it announced that one such Bantustan, the Transkei, will get complete independence in five years. This has brought warm praise from the Afrikaans press which contrasted the "peaceful transition" in Transkei with bloodshed in Mozambique. This year's delegation to the UN included Transkei Chief Minister Kaizer Matanzima, as an observer. (*Star*: Johannesburg, Sept. 14, 28, Oct. 4, 1974; *Comment and Opinion*: Sept. 20, 1974)

### Black Education

Recently released government statistics reveal the massive gap between money spent on white and black schoolchildren. The per capita expenditure on black schoolchildren in "white areas" in the year ended March 1974 was \$43. For black children in the "white areas" of "South West Africa" (Namibia) it was \$75.75. The amount spent on the education of the other race groups was: Whites \$725; Coloureds \$136; Indians \$183. The number of African schoolchildren had increased from 1.7 million to 3.3 million during the decade 1964-74 despite the fact that education for Africans, unlike that for Whites is neither free nor compulsory. However, the high dropout rate meant that only a few thousand Africans graduate from high school each year. Fifty per cent of the

black work force is still unable to read, write or do simple arithmetic.

Because of the high cost involved, university education is reserved for only the most fortunate. For instance during the period November 1974 to April '74, only 21 Africans qualified as doctors. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 28, Oct. 5, 1974; *Times*, London, Sept. 29, 1974)

### Sports

India has refused to play South Africa in the final round of the Davis Cup Tennis competition because of South Africa's apartheid policy. South Africa can thus claim a Davis Cup victory. Before entering the final round South Africa beat Italy who had also initially refused to play South Africa. Italy, however, retracted its decision and finally agreed to play in Johannesburg. India faces possible censure or disciplinary action for its refusal to play the finals.

International pressures and South Africa's continuing isolation in the sports field is forcing the government to adopt a more and more conciliatory attitude towards its black sportsmen. However, such minor modifications are primarily aimed rather at warding off pressures than bringing about a real change which would allow sports at all levels on a non-racial basis. Among the concessions made recently were:

- 1) White, African, Coloured, and Asian soccer teams are to compete against each other in a "Champion of Champion" series.
  - 2) A Black boxer will now be able to become a South African champion.
  - 3) A new dispensation in cricket is under way.
- (*Comment and Opinion*, Oct. 28, 1974; *New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1974)

## FRANCE AND SOUTH AFRICA: SPECIAL REPORT

The Africa Bureau in London has published a detailed

paper on the economic relationships between France and South Africa. The major points in the paper are quoted below.

Following the election of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to the French presidency, *"Le Monde"* disclosed that the South African navy had ordered five submarines from French naval shipyards. Almost at the same time, it was announced that a French-American consortium, Framatome, was going to build a nuclear power plant in South Africa. It is likely that the negotiations for the two orders were initiated before the death of President Pompidou. So far, however, his successor has done nothing to cancel the two contracts.

French-SA co-operation in the atomic and space field dates from 1963, the same time that the French government decided not to honor the UN Security Council resolutions inviting member states to stop selling arms to SA. As a result trade relations between the two countries, which were hitherto confined to the sale of South African wool to French manufacturers, were given a new impetus.

"... Paris was at the same time paying lip-service to the UN condemnation of apartheid, and stressed that French sales excluded weapons which could be used against the black population in case of internal strife. Otherwise, the French government proclaimed it was strictly following [its] policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, just as the SA government did during the Algerian rebellion.

#### Arms and Trade

"The list of French arms sales to SA covers a wide range. First, at the time of the Algerian war, came the supply of armoured cars manufactured by Panhard and Levassor. These were soon to be built under licence in SA itself, although engines were still to be shipped from France. Then, in 1963, Paris delivered supersonic fighter-bomber planes, the Mirage... and the Alouette helicopters... In 1968, the French... received an order for three Daphne type submarines and... radar missile. Other types of helicopters, a transport aircraft, various rockets and missile, as well as gun-boats were also added to the shopping list..."

"... In 1970... Paris promised to stop the sale of armoured cars and helicopters [in response to a plea for this action from President Kaunda]. But two years later, it was announced that Mirages were going to be built under licence in SA.

"In the space field, Paris obtained the right to build a satellite tracking station near Johannesburg. SA uranium sales to France escaped notice for a long time, until they were exposed as a violation of the rules of Euratom (the European nuclear energy-controlling agency). The matter was brought to the European Court of Justice, but with no concrete result. France and SA never signed the international treaty against the proliferation of atomic armaments. In fact, a close cooperation between atomic scientists of both countries closely followed the first sales of arms.

"Simultaneously, the general trade between the two countries increased rapidly. It remains however, difficult to assess its real importance, for the three main items of French-SA exchange—arms, gold, and uranium—are not included in the official statistics published by Paris and Pretoria.

"... France is one of SA's six major trading partners... and if military goods were included, French would probably be second in the list.

#### South Africa as a trading partner of France in million francs

	Imports		Exports	
	1972	1973	1972	1973
total	135.741	166.123	131.528	159.714
Africa	8.425	9.721	8.362	11.078
S.A.	646	980	988	1.071

#### Balance of trade between France and South Africa (excluding arms, uranium and gold).

in million francs

Year	S.A. exports	France's exports	balance
1960	249.8	163.7	—86.0
1961	271.8	144.5	—127.2
1962	322.6	179.3	—143.3
1963	344.8	272.3	—72.5
1964	349.8	326.9	—22.9
1965	331.5	434.4	+102.9
1966	376.0	422.5	+46.4
1967	342.2	472.0	+129.8
1968	331.5	506.2	+174.6
1969	446.9	719.8	+272.9
1970	416.5	1,049.6	+633.0
1971	440.0	1,002.3	+562.3
1972	646.0	928.0	+282.0
1973	980.0	1,071.0	+91.0

"Manufactured goods and heavy machinery represent a large proportion of French exports to SA... Many of the important orders placed in France come from government controlled firms or government agencies. For example, the P.K. Leroux and Hendrik Verwoerd dams were built by French consortia. [Other important orders have been placed by] the SA Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM)... the Iron and Steel Corp. (I.S.C.O.R.), and by the South African railways... The French firm Thomson Houston Hotchkiss Brandt, which manufactures a wide range of goods (missiles, mortars, radars, electronic devices etc. is also a good supplier of SA industry, having built, for example, the military radar network along the SA frontier.

"... The deficit in SA's balance of trade with France has been reduced in recent years. Important contracts involving coal and fertiliser have contributed to redressing the imbalance..."

"There are no recent official figures about the importance of French investment in SA... It is reliably estimated that France is in third place after Great Britain and the United States... Investment is in SA gold mining and the automobile industry.

"... French oil companies... take part in the vast oil-prospecting program launched by the SA government... To this list must be added important French interests in the wool and textile industries.

"It is a remarkable fact that no French firm disclosed its policy towards African labor like American and British firms did following pressure from black politicians in the United States and a press campaign in the UK. No French firms announced either wage increases or training schemes.

#### No End to the Dialogue?

"There is no military alliance, no political pact, not

even a commercial treaty between France and SA, but the development of trade has been greatly encouraged by both governments. . . . Only a few weeks after the election of Giscard d'Estaing, a trade mission went to SA to pave the way for the visit of a French minister. The rise in the price of oil has hit France very severely, and this it seems, is no time to neglect any foreign market. The voice of the French left . . . will not weigh much against profitable trade. The protest of the French opposition against torture of political prisoners in Iran during the recent Shah's visit did not hinder in the least the signing of the most important economic agreement ever passed between Paris and Teheran. One of its most important clauses provides for the building of five nuclear power stations in Iran by French firms.

"The new French president has never displayed any special interest in SA affairs. . . . It remains to be seen whether the failure of the "dialogue" policy between Pretoria and the African states—a policy warmly supported by French diplomacy—will induce Giscard to have second thoughts about his country's close friendship with South Africa."  
(Africa Bureau Fact Sheet, London, No. 38, July, 1974)

#### IRAN / SOUTH AFRICA / FRANCE

The South African press has begun to speak of a new developing trade axis: South Africa, France, Iran. France is building nuclear power stations in Iran and SA. South Africa is supplying uranium to France and Iran. And the role of Iran is the currently crucial one of supplying oil to its trading partners.

SA's Minister of Economic Affairs, Senator Owen Horwood has recently visited Iran and France. South Africa has won several large orders from Iran, which include cement, bricks, and steel piping. And it was in Paris that the Shah of Iran said in a press interview that co-operation with South Africa was in his country's long term interests.

Iran has shown an interest in the western part of the Indian ocean, where France holds important strategic positions in Djibouti and Reunion. The French fleet uses the naval facilities in Simonston, SA, and South Africa is very anxious to involve others in committing themselves to defend the Cape route. The countries of the axis clearly have enough overlapping interests to suggest that the axis will be a significant factor in the future. (X-Ray, London, Vol 4, No. 10, July 1974)

#### NEW MINERAL DISCOVERY

Diamonds, and then gold in prodigious quantities supplied the wealth to transform South Africa from a simple agricultural country into the complex industrial nation that it is today. Without this wealth, the rest of the world would hardly have taken notice of the land at the tip of the African continent. The presence of that wealth and the economy it finances has created the present hypocrisy in South Africa's international economic relations. Other nations verbally condemn apartheid while they expand their investment and trade.

It is unlikely that the situation will be altered, as more and more mineral wealth is being discovered. The Phelps Dodge Corporation has announced the presence of massive ore bodies of copper, lead, zinc, and silver in the North-Western Cape. Estimated worth of the metals is more than \$1,400 million a year.

The North-Western Cape and southern Namibia represent a major new metallogenic province. Twenty-six companies are exploring the area, which is vast and inhospitable. In order for the metals to be extracted, an adequate physical and social infrastructure will have to be provided.

In Namibia, a large copper ore body has been discovered by a subsidiary of Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. Their chief executive, Alistair Macmillan says it is not yet known if the find is commercially exploitable. (Star, Johannesburg, Sept. 14, 1974; Wall Street Journal, New York, Oct. 15, 1974)

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### DID YOU RENEW YOUR SUBSCRIPTION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA?

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#### SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS TO NORDIC COUNTRIES

The November issue of *Southern Africa* reported on growing trade between South Africa and Scandinavia. The following chart gives the details of this trade. (R1 equals \$1.40)

(SAFTO, Vol. 11, No. 7, July, 1974)

#### SOUTH AFRICA'S MAIN EXPORTS TO THE NORDIC COUNTRIES

(By BTN section, in R000's)

	Denmark		Finland		Norway		Sweden	
	1972	1973	1972	1973	1972	1973	1972	1973
	(10 mths)		(10 mths)		(10 mths)		(10 mths)	
1 Live animals, animal products . . . . .	160	108	2	—	—	5	67	—
2 Vegetable products . . . . .	647	701	979	812	1 111	1 562	6 384	5 767
3 Animal and vegetable fats, oils, etc. . . . .	—	—	2	—	207	18	11	—
4 Prepared foodstuffs . . . . .	1 034	1 031	8 088	3 590	1 271	1 344	1 126	745
5 Mineral products . . . . .	2 423	2 011	174	102	1 809	2 791	716	694
6 Chemicals and allied products . . . . .	103	163	50	70	22	26	395	492
8 Hides, skins and leather goods . . . . .	1 333	5 667	224	171	111	79	908	814
11 Textiles and articles . . . . .	6	11	9	5	1	—	170	210
15 Base metals and products . . . . .	475	864	187	278	6 326	6 611	1 863	1 338
16 Machinery and parts . . . . .	137	34	4	24	257	224	311	304
Others . . . . .	62	110	18	19	34	47	103	111
<b>Total . . . . .</b>	<b>6 380</b>	<b>10 700</b>	<b>9 737</b>	<b>5 071</b>	<b>11 149</b>	<b>12 707</b>	<b>12 054</b>	<b>10 475</b>

Source: S.A. Department of Customs and Excise



South African "Integrated" Delegation to UN, from left Botha, Matanzima, Naidoo, Hanekon, Ulster (Credit UN)

## FOREIGN POLICY NEW INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES

The South African regime has recently adopted a new international strategy which it hopes will undermine growing public criticism in the Western countries of its apartheid policies. Concerned about this opposition, the South African regime wants to deceive the Western public by attempting to build up a false image that "well-considered, gradual and evolutionary" change is actually occurring within South Africa. This image does not at all reflect the real situation of Blacks inside South Africa—since political repression is increasing, not decreasing—but has as its basic objective to "help to strengthen the faith our [South Africa's] friends [for example, the governments of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and West Germany] have in us [the South African regime]" (*Die Bruger*, Cape Town, Sept. 12, 1974)

A method the South African regime will be using to create this "new image" will be the presentation to the world of an "integrated" Diplomatic Corps. In the first week of October, the South African Minister of Information, Dr. Connie Mulder, announced in the House of Assembly that African Information Officers—that is, Africans who are willing to betray their own people—will be soon serving at the South African Information Service offices in London, New York City, Cologne, and Paris. Additionally Minister Mulder stated that beginning in January 1975 his Department will be operating a training program for information officers from the African, Indian, and Coloured communities. He noted that the African information officers will be chosen after consultation with the heads of the "Bantustan" governments. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 5, 1974)

The first unveiling of this new propaganda strategy of the South African regime occurred at this year's United Nations General Assembly meeting. Included as observers in this "integrated" delegation from South Africa were Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima (Chief Minister of the Transkei "Bantustan" government), Mr. M. B. Naidoo (a member of the Executive Committee of the South African Indian Council) and Mr. D. R. Ulster (a Coloured who is the principal of the Batswood Training College). These three Black observers do not in any way represent the political aspirations of the Black majority oppressed by

the Apartheid regime. They are individuals who are willing to betray their own people and collaborate in maintaining the South African regime's oppression of the Black majority in order to achieve personal gains for themselves.

Although Chief Minister Matanzima claims to be the "representative" of the people living in the Transkei, certain facts belie this claim: Since 1960 the Transkei has been under a State of Emergency—"Proclamation 400". The Transkei "Bantustan" government has the power—which it frequently uses—to banish its opponents to remote places, far from their families, and to detain them for indefinite periods of time. In other words, Kaiser Matanzima maintains his position of power in the Transkei through the exact same type of repressive police-state system which the White South African government uses to maintain its power in the whole of South Africa. Chief Minister Matanzima, like the apartheid regime of South Africa with which he collaborates, would not remain long in his position without this police-state apparatus. Therefore, no one should regard Kaiser Matanzima as a spokesperson for the Africans of South Africa.

Besides the use of a politically repressive apparatus through which Kaiser Matanzima aids the maintenance of the apartheid system, he assists the South African government—in particular its propaganda machinery—in another way. Chief Minister Matanzima's call for the "independence" of the Transkei is being advertised around the world by the South African regime as an example of the "fact" that the apartheid system is "evolving" and that both Black and White can "benefit" from apartheid. (*Comment and Opinion*, Sept. 20, 1974; Oct. 4, 1974) What would this "independence" of the Transkei actually mean for its African residents? There is a severe shortage of land in the Transkei, which is badly overcrowded. Each year around 53 per cent of the African workers living in the Transkei are forced, in order to survive, to work as migrant laborers in the "White" designated areas of the Republic. (F. Wilson, *Migrant Labour in South Africa*, 1974, p. 98) The South African regime uses the excuse of the existence of the "Bantustans", which it created, to deny political rights to

Africans. If the Transkei is granted "independence" it would be a sham independence—having only a flag and a national anthem, but no political or economic power—which would enable the South African regime to condemn the workers from the Transkei to the permanent status of migrant wage slaves who lack all political rights. In this regard, one must note that historically the "Bantustans," formerly called reserves, were limited to so small an area of South Africa (13.7 per cent of the total land area) in order to guarantee that the White economy would be able to obtain its necessary quota of very cheap African labor. Hence, the promised "independence" of the Transkei, while not meaning any improvement in the political, social, or economic condition of the African people, is simply a propaganda device being used to prolong the existence of the apartheid system.

Mr. M. B. Naidoo, the Indian Observer on the 1974 South African "integrated" UN Delegation, as a member of the Executive Committee of the South African Indian Council, is a supporter of a sham institution created by the South African regime in order to attempt to divert the attention of the South African Indian community from challenging the apartheid regime. (This institution has been rejected by a majority of the Indians in South Africa.) The role Mr. Naidoo was expected to play in falsifying the real situation inside South Africa is indicated by his statement, reported in the *Star* (Johannesburg, Sept. 21, 1974): "Although I [M. B. Naidoo] will be an observer, I will, if asked to do so, clear the unfair picture created about the country [South Africa]. In South Africa, there are two sides—the good and bad. Outsiders seem to know only about the bad side and nothing at all about the good. If the people at the United Nations consult with us, we will definitely give them the facts of our true position." In effect, Mr. Naidoo was brought to New York City in order to paint a rosy picture of the methods used by the white South African government to maintain its political and economic dominance.

The third Black observer, Mr. D. R. Ulster, the "representative" from the South African Coloured com-

munity, is reported not to be affiliated with any political party. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 21, 1974) The reason for this is that the South African regime is possibly finding it increasingly difficult to recruit collaborators from the politically conscious members of the Coloured community. (See *Southern Africa* Oct., 1974, for a report on the government suspension of the Coloured Representatives Council).

As indicated by the announcement of the South African Minister of Information, Dr. Mulder,—reported above—we will be seeing more examples of these "integrated" delegations from South Africa. Such Black members of these South African propaganda teams should be viewed not as spokespeople for the Blacks of South Africa, but as people who are willing to collaborate in maintaining the oppression of the Black majority. Historically, oppressive regimes have been able to recruit collaborators from the community they oppress. For example, during W.W. II, certain groups of Jews developed an infamous reputation for collaborating with the Nazi regime in rounding up the Jewish people for internment in the concentration camps.

However, the use of Black collaborators in its Diplomatic Corps is not the only method the South African regime plans to use to create a false world image. It was reported in the *Star* (Johannesburg, Sept. 21, 1974) that the South African Department of Information is and will be involved in "unconventional or undercover diplomacy." The concern of the Department of Information will be to use all methods and tactics, including "bribery, suspicion-mongering, denigration, undermining, indoctrination, persuasion and propaganda of a religious, scientific, political, and economic nature... to reach, convince and influence opinion-makers and decision-takers across the whole spectrum of public life in all countries that are of importance to us [South Africa]." The specific targets of this South African propaganda tactic will be the political leaders and elected representatives of the countries considered vital to the South African governments' ability to maintain the status quo.

# Namibia

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## NAMIBIAN EXILES COME TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Five Namibians who recently escaped from South African oppression in their homeland have just arrived at the United Nations. Three women and two men—all young active members of the South West Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) and including the legendary John Otto—are in the United States for a month or more.

They are testifying at the UN and are available for speaking engagements, along with SWAPO representative at the UN and in the Americas, Theo-Ben Gurirab. Inquiries should be made to: Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab, 657 West 161st Street, Apt. 3F, New York, N.Y. 10032.

Mr. Otto, the SWAPO Secretary General, is by profession a teacher who was convicted in the first Terrorism Trial of 37 Namibians in a South African court. Mr. Otto was detained for two years before the trial and received a three-year suspended sentence. He has been banned and for years was constantly under police

surveillance.

Ms. Taati Ithindi of the SWAPO Youth League is a student. Ms. Netumbo Nandi and Ms. Uilitala Namweya are teachers and active SWAPO members. They were part of a delegation, headed by John Otto, that met with UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim during his brief visit to Namibia two and a half years ago. The three were subsequently detained without trial for three months and later given three-year suspended prison sentences.

Andreas Nuukuawo is also a teacher, was SWAPO treasurer in the northern region of Namibia and was arrested numerous times by the South African political police. Mr. Nuukuawo was publicly flogged—16 strokes with the steel-like makalani palm leaf rib on his bare body—on October 25, 1973, because of his activities and on orders of tribal authorities acting on instructions from South African occupation officials. He was unable to walk



(Credit UN)

Namibian Observers at UN

for two weeks.

The five SWAPO members fled into Angola last June and reached Zambia. They are part of the exodus of 3,000 Namibians—400 of them women—which is still continuing.

### SOUTH AFRICAN SCHEMES

*Africa News* of Durham, N.C., reported on October 17 that Jannie de Wet, South Africa's "Commissioner General of Indigenous Peoples in South West Africa", proposed that northern Namibia, once known as Ovamboland, and called by the South Africans by the Bantustan name of "Owambo" be united with southern Angola to form an independent state. De Wet explained further that the retention of the other Namibians as a scattering of mini-states was envisioned with the approximately 90 thousand Whites hanging on to two-thirds of Namibia—the richest in mineral wealth.


The London *Observer* of October 13 carried a story from Stanley Uys in Cape Town, entitled "Vorster's Ploy To Hold On To Namibia", stating that the Whites would invite the homelands to join them in a loose confederation. If this is rejected, "the whites might seek to link up with South Africa."

The partition plan dredged up from the past runs head into the determination of the Namibian people for one nation and the UN's pledge of a unitary state. De Wet's kite flying caused considerable unhappiness among National Party people in Namibia, drawing repudiations from A. H. du Plessis, party leader, and Dirk Mudge, legislative assembly boss. The latter "made it clear that he was critical of Mr. De Wet expressing his views shortly after the announcement by the SWA National Party that there are to be talks among all the race groups in South West Africa and that all options are open to them" (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 19, 1974) Mr. De Wet also said it was only his personal opinion. The influential newspaper, *Die Suidwes-Afrikaner* of Windhoek on October 16 called for the commissioner not to be retained in office. De Wet retorted he wasn't stepping down, but by October 22 *The Windhoek Advertiser* reported that De Wet "did not resign but he simply would not be available for a second

(five-year term." It was confirmed the commissioner would leave his post on April 21, 1975 (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 26, 1974).

South Africa, having sacrificed Jannie de Wet, is preparing for just such an eventuality as partition. The South African Government gazette of October 11 carried a Proclamation by State President J.J. Fouché dissolving the Owambo legislative council and fixing general elections there for January 13, 1975. The August, 1973, elections saw only 1,300 out of 50,000 eligible voters in the showpiece bantustan casting ballots, as a result of a SWAPO boycott and despite an intensive campaign to get out the vote by Owambo officials and their front, the Owambo Independence Party.

SOUTH AFRICA'S PLANNED REDISTRIBUTION OF THE AFRICAN POPULATION OF NAMIBIA INTO SO-CALLED BANTUSTANS.



## SWAPO Reaction


In London, Mr. Peter Katjavivi, SWAPO representative in the United Kingdom and Western Europe, said: "We regard this as a manoeuvre to annex the richest parts of the country, leaving Owamboland as a buffer against the north, with the mini-states at the mercy of South African manipulations." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 19, 1974) A SWAPO representative in Windhoek is quoted as saying that "when the time arrived" the movement would call for a boycott of elections (*Times*, London, Oct. 4, 1974)

## BUSINESS IN NAMIBIA

The London *Times* story of October 4 also says that "some business and commercial sources in Johannesburg claim that South Africa is preparing to get out of South-West Africa in a hurry." The dispatch relates that a withdrawal is anticipated within 12 months.

## UN, SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

Namibia figured in the UN Security Council consideration of a resolution to expel South Africa from the world body. The document scores "South Africa's refusal to withdraw its police and military forces, as well as its civilian personnel, from the mandated Territory of Namibia and to co-operate with the United Nations in enabling the people of Namibia as a whole to attain self-determination and independence." This "immediate expulsion" resolution was vetoed by the United Kingdom, France and the United States on October 30.



Sean McBride UN Commissioner for Namibia

## COMMISSIONER FOR NAMIBIA WINS NOBEL PEACE PRIZE

Sean MacBride, U.N. Commissioner for Namibia, was on October 8 awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1974. The 70-year-old former secretary-general of the International Commission of Jurists and once chairman of Amnesty International was cited for his "many years of efforts to build up and protect human rights all over the world."

The selection of the one-time I.R.A. leader and foreign minister of Ireland is a recognition of his personal life-time commitment and is another indication of the increasing prominence of Southern Africa and of Namibia in the eyes of the world.



Diamonds, an Example of Namibia's Natural Wealth

## COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA ACTS TO PROTECT NATURAL RESOURCES

The Council for Namibia has taken a further step in its battle to wrest control over the territory from the apartheid regime. In its first legislative act since its founding, the Council adopted a decree on the natural resources of Namibia. The decree states that no exploration, exploitation or export of natural resources can be undertaken without the prior consent of the Council; that concessions granted by South Africa are to be considered null and void; that any natural resources taken out of the territory without permission of the Council may be seized and shall be forfeited and held in trust for the people of the territory; and that any vehicle, ship or container found to be carrying resources from Namibia shall also be subject to seizure and forfeiture.

The Council, in another action, approved a plan to establish an Institute for Namibia in Lusaka. The institute is to provide Namibians with education and training to prepare them for the administration of their country after liberation from South African rule. (UN document A/AC.131/33; *New York Times*, Sept. 29, 1974).

## US OIL COMPANY WITHDRAWS FROM NAMIBIA

The mission boards of the United Church of Christ announced in a press release dated October 31 that Continental Oil Company (CONOCO) has informed them that it has decided to withdraw from oil explorations off the shores of Namibia.

A spokesman, the Rev. Dr. Howard Schomer, said: "We understand that Continental Oil Company is in the process of making contractual arrangements with its partners in this particular venture, Getty Oil and Phillips Petroleum, for the re-assignment of its interest and has so notified the South African government".

The United Church filed shareholder resolutions in 1973 and 1974 asking CONOCO to wind up all business activities in Namibia and adjacent waters "under purported concessions obtained from South Africa, until a government approved by the United Nations is established".

The press release says that "this is the first time that a multinational corporation, faced with mounting shareholder concern about its investment in a white minority-ruled part of Africa, has chosen to withdraw from the area".



# Zimbabwe

## ACTION AND REACTION: THE GUERRILLA STRUGGLE

Guerrilla activity in the northwest has been intensifying in recent months. Two South African soldiers in Rhodesia were killed and three members of the Rhodesian security forces were injured. The Rhodesian government has made a formal protest to the Zambian Government about guerrillas crossing over the western border. Rhodesia claims that armed Zambians have fired on South African police boats in Rhodesian waters of the Zambezi River. (*Guardian*, London, Oct. 7, 8, 1974; *Evening Standard*, London, Oct. 7, 1974)

The coming rainy season will provide cover for a new offensive in the northeast, center of the hottest fighting. A white district officer and his African assistant were killed by a landmine which exploded in the Chiweshe reserve. Four enemy soldiers were killed by freedom fighters in the area in early October. Rhodesia claims 15 guerrillas were killed during the same period. ZANU reports increased activity in Mt. Darwin, Rusambo, Gwangwana, Bindura, Shamva, Mrewa, Centenary, Mazoe, Sipolilo, and Umvukwesi districts where enemy troops, vehicles, aircraft, farm buildings, and command posts have been destroyed. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 5, 1974; *Daily Nation*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 4, 1974; *Africa News*, Durham, Oct. 3, 1974; *Zimbabwe News*, Lusaka, Sept., 1974)

The weaponry and training that went into FRELIMO's struggle for freedom will soon be at the disposal of ZANU. New anti-aircraft techniques and heat-seeking missiles will aid ZANU greatly in the battles against Rhodesian aircraft. One Portuguese Major in Mozambique said, "By next spring ZANU will be able to lob bazooka shells into the High Street in Umtali from the safety of Mozambique if they want to . . . Rhodesia cannot afford hot pursuit against a country that carries so much of her trade to the sea. Even if they could afford it economically, are they really going to risk provoking FRELIMO?" (*Guardian*, London, Oct. 4, 1974)

Smith said it would be suicide for FRELIMO to close their ports to Rhodesian goods. South Africa provides 99% of the trade through Lourenco Marques and Rhodesia provides 80% of the Beira trade. Smith said the color of the neighboring government was of no concern to Rhodesia. "We hope they're going to be sane and responsible, that's the crux of the matter." (*Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, Aug. 3, 1974)

The Zimbabwe African National Union headquarters in Lusaka were destroyed by a blast on October 1. Three rooms of the Liberation Center, which houses the offices of all liberation movements in Lusaka, were wrecked. It may have been caused by a time bomb which was meant to go off when people were present. No one was injured by the blast or fire which followed. ZANU records and office equipment were destroyed. Eight months ago a bomb exploded in the South African National Congress offices in the Center, killing John Dube. ZANU officials said the treacherous act was a result of the Smith government's offer to pay people to sabotage liberation movement efforts and eliminate nationalist leaders. (BBC broadcast "Focus", Oct. 5, 1974; *Guardian*, London, Oct.



ZANU Guerrillas in Northern Zimbabwe

3, 1974; *Washington Post*, Oct. 2, 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 5, 1974.)

Three men, reported to be Rhodesian police, have kidnapped Edson Dube, an official of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, who was in an apartment in Francistown, Botswana. Dube is believed to have been recruiting fighters from among the Rhodesian refugees there. He was taken by force to a car and driven to Rhodesia. On the same day, BBC radio reported the arrest in Rhodesia of twenty officials of the African National Council. All of these men were living in the area across from Francistown when Dube was kidnapped. Some sources say the Rhodesian government believed it had found a ZAPU ring and hoped to break it up. (*Africa News*, Durham, Oct. 21, 1974)

Other desperate moves by Smith's government add to the proof that the forces for liberation are on the offensive. The major African newspaper, *Moto*, was banned by the Rhodesian minister of justice who said the paper was too antagonistic toward the government. The paper was published by the Catholic Church offices. It had a circulation of 25,000, in English and vernacular editions. (*Guardian*, London, Sept. 27, 28, 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 28, 1974)

The Smith government has begun jamming radio broadcasts from Zambia in an effort to stop communication between the liberation movement based in Lusaka and the people of Rhodesia. (*Daily World*, Oct. 23, 1974; *Africa News*, Durham, Oct. 10, 1974)

Discontent is spreading within Rhodesia. *Zimbabwe Review*, the organ of ZAPU, reports student unrest in schools, culminating in a demonstration at Goromonzi Secondary School in early July. Riot police were called to quell the disturbance. More than twenty Zimbabwean students expelled from the university for demonstrating against racial discrimination have arrived in England to

continue their studies. Voluntary agencies, the Ministry of Overseas Development and the Commonwealth Secretariate sponsored their move. (*Guardian*, London, Oct. 4, 1974)

Mass removals of people in the northeast continue in an effort to create a highly regulated "no go" zone. Removals within Chiweshe Reserve were completed recently, and more removals within the Madziwa tribal trust area are under way. A security spokesman said if the people do not move voluntarily by the end of October, they will be moved forcibly. This is a futile Vietnam-type effort to keep the villagers from aiding the guerrillas. (*Christian Science Monitor*, Philadelphia, Sept. 19, 1974)

#### RHODESIA TAKES HARDLINE

With an income tax increase on 10% imposed only shortly after the "election" which Smith dominated, with severe drains on foreign exchange, and with recent statements by FRELIMO that they would honor UN sanctions against Rhodesian trade, white Rhodesians are no longer asking how long they can survive, but if they can survive. The rail link to South Africa does not promise to meet current needs, especially with the possibility of increased loads from the Botswana line if Botswana does indeed take-over control of that portion of the Rhodesian Railways in her land. A second direct rail link to South Africa is being discussed. (There is also a rail line which runs through Botswana and is therefore subject to pressure)

While South Africa is talking of pulling back support from Rhodesia, and urging a settlement, Smith has taken a hard line, saying that he will not give priority to a settlement if African leaders continue to boycott his constitutional conference. The ANC has refused to attend and other black organizations which had shown interest initially have now decided not to participate. (*Guardian*, London, Oct. 3, 1974; *Times*, London, Sept. 19, 21, 1974) In London, Zambia's Foreign Minister, Vernon Mwaanga called on Britain to convene a constitutional conference to work out a method of transferring power to an African majority government. (*Daily Nation*, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 4, 1974)

Added to the transportation and defense problem, Rhodesia has an alarming rate of unemployment among Africans. Dr. John Hanks of the University of Rhodesia, said that Rhodesia's annual rise in Gross National Product



Dotted Lines Indicate Rail lines with New Link Between Rutenga (1) and Beitbridge (2)

is one of the lowest in the world. Zambia has an annual growth per head of 7.1%. Rhodesia's is 0.4%. Dr. Hanks addressed the Rhodesian Chamber of Commerce and predicted that Rhodesia would be "swamped by poverty and social discontent" if jobs were not found. The birth rate is far higher than increased job opportunities; while 42,000 jobs were created in 1973, the African population increased by 215,000. He said the Tribal Trust Lands are satiated and cannot absorb any more subsistence dwellers. (*Rhodesia Herald*, Salisbury, May 9, 11, 1974 in *X Ray*, London, Oct. 1974)

Bubonic plague has been reported in the northwest, near the Wankie National Park. Three are known dead, plus two Namibians employed in near-by migrant labor camps. (*Africa News*, Oct. 14, 1974; *Washington Post*, Sept. 30, 1974) ■



Rhodesian students expelled from Salisbury for demonstrating against racial discrimination

# portugal and africa


## angola

### FROM INDEPENDENCE IN TWO YEARS TO TWO MONTHS

The future of Angola still remains uncertain six months after the Portuguese coup which has resulted in independence for Guinea Bissau and Mozambique. It seems everyone wants a piece of the enormously rich pie that is Angola, which last year alone had a GNP of \$1.5 billion from its oil, diamond, coffee and iron resources.

Prospects for an independent Angola have increased with a new date for the formation of an independent government by the end of this year. The change in policy occurred in Portugal after the resignation of Antonio de Spínola. Originally the plan was for independence within two years including the formation of a provisional government representing whites and all of the liberation movements, elections and the eventual transfer of power from Portuguese appointed officials to elected Angolan rulers. All of the liberation movements rejected this proposal, and the white minority Angolans feared the political effects of one man-one vote.

The new policy calls for the formation of a coalition government comprised of representatives of the African liberation movements and black and white political parties to take control of Angola by the end of the year. (*New York Times*, Oct. 8, 1974) At this writing there is no reaction from the various liberation movements to the plan. Fernando Falcão has emerged as the leader of the predominantly white FUA (United Front for Angola), a party which he formed immediately after the change in policy was announced in Portugal with the specific purpose of working jointly with the liberation movements. There is some question as to whether Falcão, a white progressive, nationalist and ex-political prisoner of Salazar's PIDE, will be able to unite the white Angolan population. (*Star Johannesburg*, Sept. 12, 1974; Sept. 28, 1974; *Report from Portuguese Africa*, Luanda, Sept. 6, 1974) Already Falcão is under pressure from white groups demanding a concrete detailing of the say white parties will have in Angola's future. However, the appointment of Falcão to the high post in the provisional government is said to be popular in southern Angola where his anti-fascist activities are well known and respected. Falcão claims to have contacts with MPLA and UNITA already established and is preparing to form the coalition government. (*AFP Interafrican News Survey*, Sept. 20, 1974) Early in October Falcão flew to Zaire for talks with President Mobutu aimed at building an alliance between centrist Whites and the Zaire-based FNLA. (*Star Johannesburg*, Oct. 5, 1974) Curiously, before his resignation Spínola and Mobutu met in the Cape Verde Islands to discuss Angola's future, while Spínola never met with any of the Angolan liberation leaders. (*Zambian Daily Mail*, Lusaka, Sept. 24, 1974) Zaire is slated to open a consulate



Wall Painting in Luanda

general in Luanda soon, and Portugal is opening a consulate office in Kinshasa. (*Washington Post*, Oct. 20, 1974) It is clear that whenever Angolan independence negotiations actually begin, Mobutu will have a large hand to play in them, perhaps even hosting independence talks in Zaire.

Meanwhile efforts to unite the three African liberation movements continue to be mired in personality clashes and a hostile political atmosphere of accusation and counter-accusation. A "tacit ceasefire" which is now in effect between Portugal and MPLA, FNLA and UNITA should have set the stage for independence negotiations.

In September FNLA announced that it was waiting in Kinshasa for the arrival of MPLA's new leadership to build the Common Front as soon as possible. (*AFP Interafrican News Survey*, Sept. 10, 1974) MPLA Vice-President Chipenda arrived in Kinshasa in September. FNLA has apparently entered into formal negotiations with the Portuguese and set up an office in Luanda. (*Guardian*, New York, Oct. 30, 1974). FNLA leader Holden Roberto reportedly has said that "after the Brazzaville Agreement which reconciled the three MPLA factions, there is no longer anything which honestly stops us . . . from creating a common FNLA-MPLA front." (*AFP Interafrican News Survey*, Sept. 10, 1974) Yet the factions merged by that agreement seem to still have major complications. It is reported that MPLA President Neto is preparing for an independent entrance into Luanda moving MPLA headquarters there from East Africa. (*New York Times*, Oct. 2, 1974) This as well as other unresolved problems could

undermine the already fragile unity of Brazzaville. Yet as MPLA spokesman S. Mingas made clear when speaking at the UN in October: "The divisions within Angolan nationalism must not be used as a pretext for speaking of the 'difficulties of a solution'" to the granting of full independence to Angola. FNLA representative, M. Tulu, stated that it was Portuguese lack of realism which thwarted a negotiated agreement. (*Guardian*, New York, Oct. 30, 1974)

The apparent transfer of the MPLA headquarters from Lusaka and Dar es Salaam to Luanda has triggered more conflict within MPLA that could undermine the extremely fragile unity demonstrated in Brazzaville in September.

Meanwhile UNITA is actively campaigning against MPLA and FNLA with considerable assistance from the conservative white sectors of Angola. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 21, 1974) In a situation that is frequently confusing and full of contradictions, UNITA spokesman, Jorge Samgumba, still claims that it wants a common front with its rivals. (*AFP Inter-African News Survey*, Sept. 27, 1974)

Another contingent of Chinese military advisers arrived in Kinshasa to train FNLA troops at the military base of Kinkuzu (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Switz., Aug. 9, 1974), and a "large quantity of arms and equipment" from Rumania has arrived as part of an aid agreement reached in Bucharest last January between Holden Roberto and President Ceacescu. (*AFP Inter-African News Survey*, Aug. 28, 1974) This growing international aid for the FNLA military and the reports of increased numbers of FNLA troops remains an important factor in the complex machinery of politics that is seeking independence for Angola.

Still the FRA and RUA reactionary white organizations have not been dismantled, and MPLA has noted the danger that the "Flechas", DGS-trained African troops, have similarly not been disbanded. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 14, 1974) Any serious effort from the right could easily rely upon the support of such groups.


## TALK OF CABINDAN INDEPENDENCE CONTINUES

A FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) spokesman has told an Angolan newspaper that no Angolan political group has the right to represent Cabinda in independence negotiations with Portugal. (*Africa News*, Oct. 24, 1974) Two groups, one based in Kinshasa under the leadership of Luis Ranque Franque and the other in Brazzaville under Augusto Tchioufou, claim to be the legitimate FLEC organization representing the Cabindan people. (*Washington Post*, Oct. 11, 1974) None of the liberation movements formally supports Cabindan independence, although MPLA's vice-president Chipenda is on record as supporting the right of Cabinda to self-determination. (see *Southern Africa*, November, 1974)

A spokesman for the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal has said that Portugal would never accept any partitioning of Angola and here the reference was to independence for Cabinda. (*New York Times*, Oct. 10, 1974) Speculation concerning Gulf Oil's role in supporting the Cabindan independence movement is running high, and MPLA and FNLA spokesmen in New York have stated that FLEC was created and financed by Gulf Oil. (*Guardian*, New York, Oct. 30, 1974) Gulf denies any role in Cabindan politics; "We will not attempt in any way to influence the ultimate outcome in Angola or Cabinda", Gulf Vice-President Paul Sheldon told a congressional sub-committee recently. (*Africa News*, Oct. 24, 1974)


## UPDATE ON JULY RIOTS

As a result of the July racial violence in Luanda in which more than a hundred Africans were killed and a handful of whites died, it is reported that 40,000 people have left Luanda returning to their homelands in southern and central Angola and the Cape Verde Islands. (*Radio Reports*, Luanda in English, Aug. 27, 1974) A further interesting development is that the US Consulate General in Luanda has denied rumors that "American secret



Luanda Townships Site of Recent Violence

Photo Credit: Charles Brewster



agents" were involved in the instigation of the violence. (*Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, July 27, 1974)

#### **FNLA OCCUPIES UIGE COFFEE REGION IN ANGOLA**

A large force of Zaire-based FNLA troops (estimated to be roughly 1,000 men) have penetrated the Uige district in northeastern Angola along its border with Zaire. They have moved to a point 180 miles from the capital, Luanda. The penetration generally was peaceful and went unopposed by the Portuguese, and now both the FNLA and the Portuguese are operating openly in the district. Violence in the occupation was limited to an attack on a civilian truck in which eight contract workers and a white driver were killed. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 4, 1974)

This military move has been expected since FNLA controlled almost minimal territory within Angola, and the movement derived most of its strength from Angolan refugees in Zaire. The move is similarly not surprising since talk of a joint Mobutu-Roberto military penetration of Angola has been rife for almost a year. The build-up of FNLA's army has intensified since the Portuguese coup. Clearly this action puts FNLA in a better negotiation position in any future independence talks.

#### **COUP ATTEMPT IN ANGOLA**

It has been learned from *Africa News* that the Christian Democratic party in Angola made a coup attempt October 27. In Portugal Admiral Coutinho announced that the coup attempt had been thwarted and that the leaders have been arrested. Coutinho further indicated that the coup makers were planning a UDI. The arms apparently had been smuggled into Luanda aboard fishing boats. Radio reports from Angola now indicate that all is quiet.

## **mozambique**

#### **FULL INDEPENDENCE IS NEAR**

On August 29, 1973 Portuguese troops abandoned four main garrisons in Mozambique. The following week in

Lusaka, Zambia after 500 years of colonialism and ten years of armed struggle, formal freedom talks began between Portugal and FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) with responsibility for the final negotiations assumed by FRELIMO President, Samora Machel and Mario Soares, Portugal's Foreign Minister.


There will be two stages to the transfer of power outlined in the Lusaka Agreement. The first is a transitional government. Joaquim Alberto Chissano was sworn into power as Prime Minister September 20. Chissano is said by some sources to be "able, diplomatic and moderate." (*The Times*, London, Sept. 21, 1974) On September 16 he arrived in Lourenco Marques along with 80 other FRELIMO leaders. Many FRELIMO military units were also flown to LM.

Some of the tasks of the leadership will be the implementation of policies involving the very structure and posture of the new state, including the creation of a one-party democracy, the establishment of a non-racist society and the development of noninterference relationships with neighboring countries.

Mozambique's freedom fighters fought against colonialism and not the Portuguese people; Chissano has stated that no distinctions will be made between Black and White. (see Machel's address to the nation in *Southern Africa*, November 1974) (*Star*, Johannesburg, Oct. 5, 1975, Sept. 21, 1974; *Guardian*, London, Aug. 8, 1974, Sept. 18, 1974; *New York Times*, Aug. 18, 1974; *Nation*, Nairobi, Sept. 3, 1974)

The second stage of the transfer of power to FRELIMO is full sovereignty, expected to occur on June 25, 1975. This date will be the 13th anniversary of the founding of FRELIMO.

The main points of the Lusaka Agreement are: the creation of a transitional government with six of nine cabinet positions held by FRELIMO and three by the Portuguese (see list); a ceasefire controlled by a joint military commission; a Mozambican police force; joint defence of Mozambique's borders by Portuguese and FRELIMO troops; acceptance by FRELIMO of financial obligations undertaken by Portugal if deemed in the territory's interest; creation of a central bank with funds given by Portugal; (*The Times*, London, Sept. 9, 1974) and a society in which racism plays no role. (*Le Monde*, Paris, Sept. 1974)



**FRELIMO President Samora Machel**



Associated Press

Premier Joaquim A. Chissano of Mozambique reading oath of office. Behind him, in naval whites, is Rear Adm. Victor Crespo, Portuguese High Commissioner.

Several African political groups have attempted to challenge FRELIMO, including the Mozambique National Coalition Party led by Uria Simango, a one-time FRELIMO leader and COREMO led by Paulo Gumane, but neither group has achieved any validity inside Mozambique. Also GUMO and several other counter-revolutionary groups which were developed after the April 25 coup in Portugal have disappeared from the political front. (BBC News of the African World, Aug. 24, 1974)

**The composition of the transitional government is as follows:**

- Prime Minister: Mr. Joaquim Chissano (FRELIMO);
- Minister of Justice: Mr. Rui Baltazar dos Santos Alves (FRELIMO);
- Minister for Home Affairs: Mr. Armando Guebuza (FRELIMO);
- Minister for Economic Co-ordination: Mr. Mario Madungo (FRELIMO);
- Minister of Information: Mr. José Oscar Monteiro (FRELIMO);
- Minister of Education: Mr. Gideon Nbo Digo Ndoe (FRELIMO);
- Minister of Labor: Mr. Mario Matsinhe (FRELIMO);
- Minister of Communications and Transportation: Mr. Eugenio Picolo (Portugal);
- Minister for Health and Welfare: Dr. António Paulino (Portugal);
- Minister of Public Works: Mr. Luis de Alcantara Santos (Portugal);

At the ceremony of investiture of the transitional government of Mozambique three important statements were made, one by the Portuguese High Commissioner, Admiral Víctor Crespo, another one by the President of FRELIMO, Mr. Samora Machel, and the third one by the new Prime Minister of Mozambique, Mr. Joaquim Chissano. A statement was also delivered in the evening, at the banquet that followed the ceremony, by Mr. Tang Ming-chao, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Decolonization, who represented the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the investiture.

**INSIDE MOZAMBIQUE**

**Whites Revolt**

In early September Whites protested the Lusaka Agreement which gave FRELIMO control of the territorial government. As a result of the protest approximately 200 persons were killed. "Of the first 45 confirmed deaths, only nine were White." (*International Bulletin*, Sept. 20, 1974) Portuguese soldiers captured the airport at Lourenco Marques and the Freedom of Mozambique (MFM) radio station. Also the central jail was raided and 200 members of the former PIDE (eliminated by the new Portuguese government) were freed.

Africans retaliated against the white settler rebellion, which was aimed, in part, at preventing FRELIMO from playing a role in the new transitional government. The retaliation was also against white vigilante groups who had toured black areas in cars, shooting at Africans. No Blacks were seen in white areas. "One black Mozambican was dragged from his car, shot, and then set on fire by a group of whites." (*Guardian*, London, Sept. 11, 1974)

Hundreds of Portuguese began fleeing to South Africa. Since it is annual leave time for Whites in Mozambique many were only in Mozambique temporarily, making the emigrant figures difficult to interpret. (*Star*, Johannesburg, August 24, 1974)

Admiral Crespo, Portugal's high commissioner of the transitional government, said that only about 20 people were responsible for the attempted white coup, and that among a white population of 70,000 in Lourenco Marques and Beira, Mozambique's two principle cities, only a minority supported the poorly planned coup "for emotional reasons and because they feared for the future and were ill-informed." Of the nine million people in all of Mozambique, only 250,000 are White or of mixed ancestry. (*The Times*, London, Sept. 13, 1974)

Many of the white counter-revolutionaries seemed to be members of 'Fico' (meaning "I stay" in Portuguese) working with a group of former Portuguese commandos calling themselves "the Dragons of Death." FRELIMO leaders would not retaliate against the handful of "emotional" Whites, but the leaders will be tried. FRELIMO is exercising "moderate, responsible authority" to combat lawlessness and to calm anxious Whites. (*New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1974)

During late September through mid-October tensions inside Mozambique diminished. All appeared to be



Aftermath of Violence in Lourenco Marques

accepting the protection from FRELIMO patrols. But a month of calm was disturbed on October 21-22 when a Portuguese soldier pushed a black youth who was wearing a shirt displaying the FRELIMO flag. Shooting broke out, but by dawn the situation was controlled.

This small incident spread rapidly in a wave of violence which led to the death of fifty people and dozens injured. In this second episode of hostilities in a month FRELIMO has indicated that the guilty will be tried. More than 1,200 people have been jailed in sweeping arrests although many have already been released. (*Africa News*, Durham, Oct. 28, 1974)

### The Economic Scene

Whites fear the loss of economic privileges more than simply a new context of race relations. The lack of proper management under colonialism has failed to develop Mozambique's natural and human resources. For Africans there was only modest education and few social services. Businesses and valuable property belonged predominantly to Whites. White-owned cotton plantations, tea estates, and sugar cane fields that seem to spread for miles in the fertile agricultural zones of south and central Mozambique may come under government control to be reorganized as cooperatives or state farms. (*Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 12, 1974)

Mozambique depends heavily on tourism, and the use of its port facilities at Lourenco Marques, Nacala, and Beira which play important roles in the transfer of goods to the interior of Southern and Central Africa. Mozambique has several other problem areas in its economy. Many of the country's troubles arise from a shortage of development capital and the payment of excessive debts with the small reserves that do exist. Three thousand striking civil servants have put additional pressure on the economy when they were granted salary increases, while thousands of others are unemployed. The departure of many Whites will also dislocate portions of the service and clerical sectors of the economy. However, new jobs are expected to come with the building of the new Mozambican society. (*New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1974; *Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 12, 1974; *Guardian*, London, Aug. 22 1974)

To help resolve some of these ills, FRELIMO has already put a freeze on food prices and has provided emergency foodstuffs.

### MOZAMBIQUE'S NEIGHBORS

The changes in the Mozambican government have had necessary implications to the minority white settler regimes to the south and west. The South African press has carried dozens upon dozens of articles seeking to interpret the events in "PEA" (Portuguese East Africa). The central theme of these articles is a sense of caution, skepticism, and nervousness which stresses the inevitability of the decline of Portuguese rule. The "wait-and-see" attitude has sparked talk, in some areas, of leaving South Africa. Some South African journalists have spoken of impending chaos under FRELIMO control and the possibility of "another Congo". (*Comment and Opinion*, Johannesburg, Sept. 13, 1974)

The popular feeling of caution has also been carried by the leaders of apartheid but is expressed more in the image of "walk softly and carry a big stick". Indeed, the South African military is one of the mightiest in all of Africa. Pro-FRELIMO and anti-South African slogans have appeared in the city of Johannesburg. Newspapers

carrying stories of the new government in Mozambique were sold out immediately—pro-FRELIMO rallies were crushed.

Mozambican Prime Minister Chissano has responded by stressing a foreign policy of "non-interference", saying that FRELIMO "will not be the savior or the reformer of the South African policy. That belongs to the people of South Africa." (*Washington Post*, Sept. 18, 1974) South Africa claims that it is looking toward the "closest possible economic relationships" with Mozambique and will also not interfere unless attacked; there is no intention of invading Mozambique. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 7, 1974) Chissano has emphasized that FRELIMO has not been fighting for ten years just to provoke another war. (*Le Monde*, Paris, Sept. 19, 1974)

In the context of avoiding any harsh words South African Prime Minister has said that he will aid Mozambique to the best of his ability. (*Financial Times*, London, Sept. 16, 1974) Again FRELIMO has reciprocated by releasing some South African personnel it had captured in the northern war zones. Two days later South African Airways provided fast transport for a representative of General Spínola who had to hurry to Lourenco Marques. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 2, 4, 1974)

Presumably much of this good behavior rests upon the desire of South Africa to receive a new source of hydroelectric energy from the Cabora Bassa project, labor from Mozambique to work in South African mines, and the use of Lourenco Marques. Without cheap labor and energy South Africa would be severely cramped in its economic growth.

South African troops have moved close to the 350-mile border with Mozambique just as FRELIMO soldiers are searching private cars for weapons concealed by anti-Mozambique types near the border town of Komatiport. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 21, 1974) South African Foreign Minister Muller has insisted that his government was not involved in the recent disturbances in Mozambique and that no mercenaries will be recruited in South Africa. (*Guardian*, London, Sept. 12, 1974) Even the well-known capitalist, Jorge Jardim, has indicated that he is not considering mercenary operations although it had long been rumored that he advocated such activities. (*Guardian*, London, Sept. 5, 1974)

In neighboring Rhodesia the situation is much the same. This minority regime has sent a gift of milk, flour, beans, and medical supplies to Lourenco Marques as a token of good will, but the Salisbury government is deeply concerned about FRELIMO's past support to ZANU fighting in the northwest of Rhodesia. (*Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, Sept. 24, 1974) Bishop Muzorewa, leader of the ANC in Rhodesia has congratulated FRELIMO on its great achievement (*Washington Post*, Sept. 18, 1974) Meanwhile it is reported that Voice of America radio equipment based in Rhodesia has been jamming broadcasts of Voice of FRELIMO. (*Noticias*, Mozambique, Aug. 24, 1974) Yet on the other hand the Beira-Umtali and Beira-Tete railways have been opened up for tourism or transport to Rhodesia; they had been under attack until late August. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 24, 1974)

It is likely that this "tit for tat" relationship will continue until June 1975, but at that point it is not unlikely that the contradictory positions of African nationalism and white settler colonialism will ultimately clash.

**DID YOU RENEW YOUR SUBSCRIPTION TO  
SOUTHERN AFRICA?**

# republic of guinea-bissau

## THE CONSOLIDATION OF INDEPENDENCE: THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

This flat, marshy country of Guinea-Bissau has long been pillaged by colonialism which has left 70 per cent of its economy relegated to agricultural production of peanuts, rice, and palm products. Some bauxite and oil may be available. While the economy has yet to be developed the PAIGC has been building the nation for the last decade during which time educational and medical facilities were initiated and expanded, and a barter economy integrated the liberated areas. With the armed struggle at an end, the PAIGC now faces a long road to travel from guerrilla opposition to the problems of holding state power.

The United States was the long-time ally of Portuguese colonialism in Africa having done much to finance and equip the Portuguese armed forces. Now President Ford, Senator Humphrey and others are calling for support to the new nation in meetings its agricultural, medical, scientific, and economic needs. While the majority of the world's nations granted diplomatic recognition soon after the 1973 declaration, Spain, Japan, Austria, and New Zealand have just added themselves to the list.

Guinea's membership in the Universal Postal Union, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the UN's Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) is now more meaningful. The FAO, the example, is prepared to give \$1.3 million in emergency foods to Guinea-Bissau to provide nourishment for some 90,000 children during the next six months. Britain, Portugal, Canada are also planning to aid the country.

During the war some 300,000 inhabitants of Guinea-Bissau fled to the neighboring countries of Gambia, Senegal, and the Republic of Guinea (Conakry). These refugees have begun to return and the PAIGC is actively seeking to integrate them in the new society, while regulating the flow of returnees so that the minimum disruption occurs. A program of rural resettlement is being stressed so that the over-crowded city of Bissau will not become more so. Well intentioned Portuguese are invited to come to Bissau if they are willing and interested in working for the country. (*New York Times*, Aug. 26, 1974; *Sunday News*, Dar es Salaam, Aug. 11, 1974)

Aside from a few minor disturbances the transfer of power went without incident. In fact, General Spínola, President of Portugal at the time was said to have been annoyed by the lack of fanfare. All prisoners of war from

both sides have been exchanged, some of whom had been held for up to three years. By the end of October all Portuguese troops had been evacuated as well as all of their moveable equipment and supplies. (It is said that the Portuguese sold some South African canned fruit to Guineans, but they carried away their excess wine.) (*AFP* Sept. 17, 1974; *New York Times*, Aug. 28, 1974; *Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 27, 1974)

Portugal's new relations with its African territories and with African nations has now given it the chance to overfly African countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, and Mali rather than take a longer route through the Cape Verde Islands as was the case during the war. (*Guardian*, London, Aug. 28, 1974)

## In Full Power

Inundated with a flood of letters and telegrams the PAIGC began its full operations controlling all parts of the nation. The Portuguese *escudo* will remain in circulation for a period of three years before the new Guinean currency, the *peso* is introduced. Some of the first programs include rural electrification and the installation of rural piped water systems. (*Africa News*, September 12, 1974) The development program will also include agrarian reform, local industrial development, and diversification of foreign aid. The PAIGC educational program will be continued and expanded. The forest schools which have long functioned can now give way to more permanent constructions. The Portuguese military camps and forts will be turned into schools. The new school year will commence on November first. Some 500 PAIGC students are currently receiving higher education overseas. (*Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, September 14, 1974) Increased rice production may soon show a favorable balance of payments after years of having agriculture interrupted by war.

## INSIDE THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

### Acts of Repression on Cape Verde

On August 28 the official PAIGC delegation to the Cape Verde Islands arrived in Sao Vicente to set up their offices. They were greeted with a warm welcome and open support by 20,000 demonstrators (of a town of 35,000 people) who carried banners and placards proclaiming "Down with colonialism!", "Down with neo-colonialism!" "Immediate Independence with PAIGC", "Unity with Guinea-Bissau". It was the first of regular such demonstrations of support that were to take place in the following month, a testament to PAIGC's assertion that the people of Cape Verde are behind them and want to unify with the mainland country.



The demonstrations grew more enthusiastic as September 24 neared—the first anniversary of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the day on which PAIGC was to celebrate victory in its fight against Portuguese colonialism. When General Antonio Spínola, then President of Portugal visited the islands he was greeted by a huge demonstration at Sal airport, some distance from the nearest town, calling for unity with Guinea-Bissau. His visit occurred shortly before his forced resignation and at a time when he no doubt anticipated that he would be able to entrench himself and rightist forces in Portugal. No sooner had he left, when armed police and Portuguese soldiers began to retaliate against the unarmed demonstrators.

In a speech to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations on October 10, Abílio Duarte, Commissioner for

Sharing the Harvest in Guinea-Bissau







Cape Verdean Affairs for the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, gave a summary of what had happened.

"On September 21 there had been a confrontation between the people and the armed forces and police, who had been given orders to fire on the defenceless inhabitants. On September 22 a force of about 1,000 armed soldiers had conducted a search operation in the town of Mindelo, entering the homes of the inhabitants, breaking windows and leaving a number of seriously wounded among the civilian population.

"On September 23 another search operation had been conducted at Ribeira Bote, where the aggressors had again opened fire.

"On 25 September there had been confrontations between Cape Verdean and Portuguese soldiers at army headquarters in Sao Vincente. The Cape Verdean soldiers had demanded the weapons which had been taken away from them and they had then been fired upon. The people had taken the side of the Cape Verdean soldiers, provoking new confrontations with the military police which had left several persons wounded.

"In protest against those colonialist-type acts of aggression a general strike of employees and workers had been declared on Sao Vincente. Similar strikes were declared by the inhabitants of other islands, and on several islands people's assemblies had been held to adopt motions condemning the repression."

By the end of these events, numerous people had been critically wounded and a number were dead, including two militants of PAIGC.

"The situation on the islands is very tense", a member of the Guinea-Bissau Mission to the United Nations told *Southern Africa* on October 17. "Many areas could be considered 'liberated' as Portuguese troops are isolated and will not go into these areas during the day or night." He said further that PAIGC's position is to maintain calm in the area. "There is no question that PAIGC is the strongest force on the islands. The people are behind the Party and want unity and independence immediately."

In a telegram to the United Nations, Aristedes Pereira,

Secretary-General of PAIGC, made accusations that the "Portuguese colonial police and armed forces are attempting in vain to halt progress of our people towards genuine independence, persisting in exercise of savage repression of population . . . [This] constitutes flagrant violation of letter and spirit of Algiers agreement signed between our party and Portuguese government on August 26."

The Portuguese ambassador to the United Nations Simao denied these accusations by responding that the troops had only acted to maintain public order and that the government is not opposed to a majority movement.

During this period of repression there has been a build up of war materiel on the Islands. Eight warships, five frigates and three torpedo boats arrived in the harbors. It was also rumored that much of the war materiel that should have returned to Portugal from Guinea-Bissau had been shipped to the Cape Verde islands instead. (Interview with representative from Republic of Guinea-Bissau Mission to the UN on October 17, 1974 by *Southern Africa*; UN documents: A/9788; A/9796 (Oct. 7, 1974); A/C.4/SR.2088 (Oct. 14, 1974) *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam Sept. 27, 1974)

#### Political events

Since the Cape Verde Islands were not included in the negotiations for full independence with Guinea, much speculation has occurred regarding the fate of this strategic archipelago in the Atlantic Ocean. The PAIGC talks in Algiers resolved that while self-determination was not negotiable it must be up to the Cape Verdeans to determine the means for themselves. It is widely assumed that a referendum would definitely call for independence from, rather than federation with, Portugal. The PAIGC has proposed that a constituent assembly be formed in the Islands to parallel the national assembly in Guinea. A supreme PAIGC assembly would then link these two bodies.

For the first time in history the Portuguese have installed a Cape Verdean national, Duarte Fonseca, as the new Governor of the Islands (*Le Monde*, Paris, Sept. 24, 1974). This coincided with the first anniversary of Guinea's independence.

Commenting on this, Abilio Duarte (in the speech at the United Nations quoted above) said: "The only step taken by the Portuguese Government to carry out its promise of decolonization of the Cape Verde Islands was the investiture, for the first time in history, of an indigenous Cape Verdean as Governor, an event which had taken place at Lisbon on September 21. Perhaps the Portuguese Government had thought that by appointing an indigenous Cape Verdean to govern the Territory—an individual who, it should be noted, had not been chosen by them—it could convince them that it was taking a step towards decolonization. That investiture was, however, most inopportune, for the appropriate course of action at the current juncture was to reach agreement with PAIGC on ways and means of enabling the Cape Verdeans to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence as recognized by the United Nations and by the Portuguese Government itself."

While the Algiers agreements have not been made public, the PAIGC maintains it is the only legitimate representative of the Cape Verdeans. The PAIGC has elaborated by saying that the people on the Islands are primarily concerned about their own welfare and would seek a policy of non-alignment. The "popular consultation" or referendum promised by Portuguese Foreign

Minister Mario Soares and former President Spínola has still not come to pass. (*Portuguese Times*, October 17, 1974)

Meanwhile, on the Islands, linked by culture and history to the mainland, there are several groups which oppose the PAIGC. The UPCV (Popular Union of Cape Verde) has claimed that the PAIGC would permit the Islands to be used as a Soviet military base. PAIGC Commissioner Duarte has insisted that no foreign military bases would ever be allowed in Guinea-Bissau or on the Islands. (*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Aug. 15, 1974) The UDC (Democratic Union of Capeverde), headed by the lawyer and leading capitalist, Joao Baptista Monteiro, has also expressed concerns similar to those of the UPCV. Both movements are opposed to unification with Guinea-Bissau.

Although the Islands are very poor, proper development of fishing, salt processing, tourism, bunkering of ships, airport facilities, and local commerce could prove to make them self-sufficient.

The prime importance of Cape Verde to people outside the Islands is the strategic role that they may play. South Africa has used the Islands to refuel its domestic airlines and its military ships and planes. Since the turbulent events of this past year, South Africa has begun negotiations with Spain to land on the Canary Islands. An underwater telephone cable between South Africa and Europe passes through Cape Verde.

The CIA has been nervously studying the situation in Portugal and it is reported that US Secretary of State Kissinger has said "the US is not opposed to independence for Guinea-Bissau, but would not stand for the Portuguese giving up the Cape Verde Islands to the Guineans." (*Le Canard Enchaîné*, Paris, mid-October, 1974) Another senior US diplomat said "it's not that we want the Islands for ourselves, but we don't want the Soviets to have them either." (*Africa News*, Oct. 7, 1974) It is apparent that considerable behind-the-scenes negotiations are underway

from many quarters. Even President Mobutu of Zaire accompanied by a FNLA representative, had a brief visit with former Portuguese President Spínola in the Cape Verde Islands only a few days before the latter was thrown out of the Portuguese government for his right-wing tendencies. (*Times of Zambia*, Lusaka, Sept. 24, 1974) President Senghor of Senegal has summed up the situation very well by pointing out that Guinea will only be free when the Islands are included in its territory. (*O Seculo*, Lisbon, Sept. 19, 1974)

#### SAO TOME and PRINCIPE

Like the Cape Verde Islands, the islands of Sao Tome and Principe have long been occupied by the Portuguese. All of these islands figured importantly during the period of slavery. Sao Tome and Principe are in the Gulf of Guinea off the coasts of Nigeria and Cameroon. Since the coup d'etat in Lisbon in April 1974, the new rulers of Portugal have promised the right to self-determination to these tropical islands. (*Zambia Daily Mail*, Lusaka, August 5, 1974)

On September 5 demonstrators for independence swept across the islands led by the MLSTP (Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe). As a result several people were killed and many wounded. The Portuguese authorities have declared a "state of siege" following these disturbances and said that they would not "tolerate acts of vandalism and violence which had endangered lives and property." (*AFP* Sept. 10, 1974; *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Sept. 9, 1974)

More recently workers on the larger island of Sao Tome have threatened a general strike unless negotiations between the MLSTP and the Portuguese Government are initiated. The MLSTP Secretary General hopes to meet Portuguese Foreign Minister, Mario Soares at the United Nations. (*Provincia*, Luanda, Sept. 6, 1974) ■

## LESOTHO, SWAZILAND and BOTSWANA

### LESOTHO POLITICAL TRIAL

The Lesotho Government has announced that 32 members of the opposition Basutoland Congress Party will go on trial for treason in November. They are alleged to have been involved in attacks on police posts last December and January. Observers believe that the trial is a response by the government to criticisms of repression and detention without trial, particularly before the UN Commission on Human Rights. (*Africa News*, Durham, October 17, 1974; *Washington Post*, October 11, 1974) The new leader of the Basutoland Congress Party is Gerard Ramoreboli, who took over after the former leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, fled the country at the time of the January events. Ramoreboli has proposed a government of national unity with the participation of King Moshoeshoe II in response to Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan's suggestion that elections might be held in 1975. All political activity has been suspended in Lesotho since 1970, when Jonathan invalidated the elections in which the BCP defeated his party. (*Africa*, September 1974) Lesotho Oil Drilling.

After 18 months of preliminary geological study, Westrans Petroleum Inco of New York has recently begun

exploratory oil drilling at Mohobong in the Leribe district. The 2,700 meter shaft will take six months to sink at a cost of \$210,000. The company also plans to drill at Mazenod and Mohales Hoek. All of Lesotho's fuel and oils now come from South African refineries. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 24, Sept. 7 and 14, 1974)



New Swazi Money

### NEW SWAZILAND CURRENCY

In September on the sixth anniversary of Swaziland's

independence, a new currency was introduced. Expressed in Emalangeni (sing. Lilangeni) notes and Cents, the new currency is based on the South African Rand and will have a parity of 1 Lilangeni to 1 Rand. King Sobhuza II appears on all of the notes and some of the coins. Lesotho and Botswana, as well as Swaziland, have quit the South African monetary union and are considering introducing their own currency as well. (*Standard Bank Review*, August 1974; *Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 24, Sept. 7, 14, 21, 1974)

#### SWAZILAND AND THE NEW MOZAMBIQUE SITUATION

During the recent talks in Lusaka involving Kaunda, Nyerere and FRELIMO's Samora Machel, Prince Minister Makhosini Dlamini took part, marking the first overt contact between a liberation movement leader and a Swazi government official. Dlamini's Private Secretary termed the discussions "extremely fruitful." (*Africa*, August 1974).

The Swaziland Government has declared Jorge Jardim, the Mozambique financier-politician, a prohibited immigrant. Jardim has had good relations with Kaunda and Banda and was recently Malawian consul in Mozambique, until he fell afoul of the new regime which issued a warrant for his arrest. When Malawi granted him refuge the Portuguese broke off relations with Banda. Jardim has been variously reported as organizing a mercenary force to intervene in Mozambique, lobbying at the independence talks of right-wing forces in Mozambique for inclusion in the provisional government. He, and the Black Frecomo movement said to be linked to him, have been in Swaziland several times recently, their movements always cloaked in secrecy. Swazi police guarded Jardim's hotel on his last visit and the government has paid the hotel bills of the Black Frecomo members. The reasons for Jardim's being banned are not clear. (*Star*, News Service, Mbabane, Sept. 7, 1974) Swazi exports are being held up by strikes and disturbances in Lourenco Marques. The pulp wood of the Usutu Pulp Company, as well as sugar, iron and oranges have been affected by a reduction of railroad hauling to about half the normal capacity. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 28, 1974)

#### THE BOTSWANA ECONOMY

Canada is providing Botswana with \$4.6 million out of a total loan of \$34 million needed for the road linking the

country to Zambia, and stretching 530 kilometers from Kazungula to Francistown. Italy is providing Botswana with technical assistance in vocation training, rural development and health services. Botswana's Assistant Minister of Finance announced hopes for establishing an \$122 million salt and soda ash mine in the Nata Area. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 17, 24, 1974)

Because of "various technical problems and other difficulties," the cost of developing the nickel and copper ore deposits at the Selebi-Pikwe project of Botswana RST Ltd. have increased, according to Amax Inc., which owns almost 30% of Botswana RST. Amax estimates that \$286 million may be needed to complete the project, in contrast with earlier estimates of \$153 million and \$214 million. The other major shareholders of Botswana RST are Anglo-American Corp. of South Africa and Charter Consolidated Group Co. (*Wall Street Journal*, New York, Sept. 1974.)

#### BOTSWANA POLITICS

President Seretse Khama dissolved Parliament in early September and announced elections for October 26. His ruling Democratic Party is expected to remain in power (holding 24 out of 31 seats now). Its opponents are the People's Party, the Independent Party and the National Front. Khama has been criticized for giving too many mineral rights to South African companies. He recently announced that a new national currency would be created within two years. (*Africa News*, Durham, Sept. 9, 12, 1974) ■



President Seretse Khama

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
# UNITED STATES and SOUTHERN AFRICA

#### PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT ASKS FORD FOR AID

In a meeting on October 18 with President Ford, which Costa Gomes termed "extraordinarily important," the new President of Portugal asked for large amounts of US economic aid to help the "Portuguese people in the development of the democratic process now in course." The request for aid appears to be in exchange for a five-year renewal of a US base in the Azores islands.

Costa Gomes lauded the US and NATO during his visit to the United Nations and Washington, perhaps in an

attempt to assuage American fears about the recent political moves to the left in the Portuguese Government. According to the *New York Times* of October 21, "Kissinger, in particular, was understood to have been worried about the possibility of a Communist take-over not only in Portugal but in Spain and Greece as well." Perhaps a more important indication of US distrust of the new government is a recent decision to cut Portugal off from certain highly classified military information normally available to all NATO members.



New Portuguese President Costa Gomes

While trying to reassure the United States of its political stability, the Armed Forces Movement is also quietly reminding the US that Portugal's political future is its internal affair. In the wake of several press reports on continued CIA involvement in Portugal since the coup, an official Armed Forces Movement bulletin, in an apparent reference to the United States, spoke of their responsibility "to establish and defend democracy in Portugal . . . principally against the inexorable offensive of world imperialism." (*New York Times*, Oct. 21, 1974, *Washington Post*, Oct. 9, Oct. 26, 1974)

#### **SOUTH AFRICA'S LOBBYISTS URGE MILITARY CO-OPERATION**

Members of the Washington law firm of Collier, Shannon, Rill and Edwards have recently filed a six-month report with the Justice Department describing their work as foreign agents for the South African Ministry of Information. (see *Southern Africa*, July-August, 1974)

Donald de Kieffer and Thomas Shannon, the two registrants, have spent about 30 hours a week lobbying on a wide variety of issues including: "the South African sugar quota, domestic political developments within South Africa, liquification and gasification of coal, uranium enrichment, US private investment in South Africa, leadership exchange programs and monetary affairs." They have contacted five Administration Departments, 10 Congressional Committees, the press, labor, and industry on these matters.

De Kieffer and Shannon are veteran industry lobbyists and veteran contributors to political campaigns. While their individual contributions appear to be in small amounts, they form a pattern of supporting Congressmen who have been helpful to the South Africans and the anti-Rhodesian sanctions forces. (They also hold a contract for the industry association orchestrating opposition to the Rhodesian sanctions bill.) The two men contributed to the campaigns of Congressman Wyman, who set up a meeting for Minister of Information Cornelius Mulder at the Pentagon in January, 1974, and Congressman Bauman, who arranged a dinner in May with 17 US Navy Admirals for South Africa's Admiral Biermann. A contribution went to Congressman Bob Wilson, who arranged a Congressional luncheon in October for Secretary of Information Eschle Rhoodie. They also gave funds

to Congressmen Dent and Derwinski, who have taken a leading role in fighting sanctions against Rhodesia, and to Congressmen Morgan, Yatron and McSpadden, who were considered "swing" votes on the sanctions bill in the Foreign Affairs and Rules Committees.

A major focus of de Kieffer's work has been on US co-operation in the security of the Cape Route. In May and June, de Kieffer mailed 65 copies of a booklet on this topic to Congressional offices and civic groups. The booklet, entitled "The Republic of South Africa and the Southern Hemisphere: Political and Military Strategic" (sic), was authored by South Africa's Admiral Hugo Biermann in 1972. It presents a lengthy analysis of South Africa as the "focal point of strategic importance" in the "world conflict between the East and West." Admitting that Western powers "are loath to be associated with the defense" of apartheid South Africa, Biermann tries to establish a case for Western military involvement in the Indian Ocean not only in order to protect Western oil trade around the Cape, but also to stop the "Communist pursuit of world domination." The booklet posits that the only way the Communist concept of "indirect strategic attack" can be prevented is by the establishment of a Western permanent maritime force in the Indian Ocean, requiring the use of South African ports. The booklet concludes that "it is imperative that a super power should be involved in the strategy for the southern hemisphere" and a specific invitation to the United States: "The USA has already on occasion demonstrated that the Monroe doctrine is still in force and that she will not tolerate outside interference in the affairs of Latin America; her interests in the Pacific and South East Asia could also be taken as a reasonable assurance for the defense of Indonesia and Australia. It is only Southern Africa and its surrounding ocean areas, therefore, that are deprived of this deterrent umbrella and where there is a vacuum in Western prior presence."

#### **TWO SA GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS VISIT WASHINGTON**

Two high officials of the Republic of South Africa visited Washington in late September and early October, spending considerable time making friendly contacts with American political leaders and being feted by Congressmen.

Foreign Minister Hildgard Muller came to Washington from the United Nations and was honored at a dinner given October 10 by South African Ambassador R. F. Botha. The Embassy would not reveal their guest list for this dinner, but it included a number of Congressional Representatives. Mr. Muller also visited Senators Mansfield and Fulbright. He attempted to meet with Secretary Kissinger as he has in the past but, despite South African protest, was denied access to the Secretary of State and met instead with Deputy Secretary Ingersoll.

Dr. Eschel Rhoodie, Secretary of Information in Cornelius Mulder's Ministry of Information, preceded Mr. Muller, making individual visits to Senators Kennedy, Muskie, Tallmadge, Tower, Sparkman, and Harry Byrd. Rhoodie also met with a number of Congressional Representatives at a luncheon given for him by California Congressman Republican Bob Wilson at the Capitol Hill Club October 3.

On September 30 Rhoodie addressed legislative assistants whose Congressmen belong to the Republican Steering Committee, a tax-exempt, unofficial group of conservative Republican Congressmen. Rhoodie was

speaking to one of the Republican Steering Committee's regular Monday morning private sessions on assorted current topics. The group's conservatism is reflected in legislative director, Mr. Lewis Ingram's response to our inquiries. He said in a telephone interview that he feels the Republic of South Africa represents the last bastion of Western, Christian civilization and refused to give any information on the contents of Mr. Rhoodie's remarks. Mr. Ingram is one of the six legislative aides who were taken on a tour of South Africa last spring where they met with Nationalist Party leaders, all as guests of the South African Government.

Rhoadie seemed to be having some success with his new approach to winning US friends by approaching moderates as well as conservatives, but his schedule of meetings also reflects a continued heavy reliance by South Africa on conservative-to-reactionary US politicians. ■



South African Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller Visits Washington Credit UN

# at the u.n.



## IMPERIALIST POWERS VETO EXPULSION OF SOUTH AFRICA

On October 30, the Security Council took a historic vote on a resolution sponsored by Kenya, Mauritania, Cameroon and Iraq calling for the immediate expulsion of South Africa from the world body because of its racist policies, its illegal occupation of Namibia and its support for the Smith regime in Rhodesia. The resolution was vetoed by three permanent members of the Security Council which have consistently supported the racist regime: the United States, France, and Great Britain. This was the first time that the question of the expulsion of a member state was brought before the Security Council, and the first time that three vetoes were cast to defeat a resolution. The move for expulsion, however, had the overwhelming support of the non-permanent members of the Council and of the General Assembly. Ten Council members voted in favor of the resolution (two abstained), and the vast majority of the speakers who addressed the Council on the issue called for expulsion. The General Assembly resolution requesting the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa "in light of the constant violation of South Africa of principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights", was adopted by an overwhelming vote of 125 to 1 (South Africa), with only 9 abstentions.

The Security Council decision represented the culmination of efforts made by African and other Third World countries at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly to step up the attack against South Africa. At the beginning of the session, the Credentials Committee of the General Assembly voted to reject the credentials of the South African delegation on the grounds that the white minority government cannot claim to speak for the majority of the people of the country. This was the first time that South Africa's friends failed to muster a majority in favor of South Africa in the Credentials

Committee. Subsequently, the General Assembly also voted to reject the credentials of the South African representatives, as it has done every year since 1970. Although the negative vote does not automatically affect South Africa's rights of membership, the result this year was that the South African delegates withdrew from the general debate in the Assembly rather than force a ruling from the Chair which would probably have been against them.

For the first time this year, the General Assembly also decided to grant observer status to the OAU-recognized South African liberation movements, the ANC and the PAC, in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly, the body which deals with the question of apartheid during the annual session. The decision was taken by the General Assembly without a vote and without objections. Earlier this year, the two movements had been granted observer status with the Special Committee on Apartheid, a standing committee of the General Assembly. These decisions came in the wake of a resolution adopted by the Assembly last year, which states that the South African regime has no right to represent the people of South Africa and that the liberation movements recognized by the OAU are the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people. The liberation movements obtained further recognition in the world body when they were invited to speak before the Security Council on the issue of expulsion of the Apartheid regime.

In another move against South Africa that may eventually have considerable impact, several countries have signed the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, which was adopted last year by the General Assembly. The Convention which has so far been signed by 21 countries and ratified by 3 countries, declares apartheid a crime against humanity and places international criminal responsibility on individuals, organizations and States which

commit the crime or co-operate in the commission of the crime. Persons charged with the crime could be tried either by a national tribunal of a State party to the Convention or by an international tribunal. The Convention will come into force after ratification by 20 countries.

An eleventh-hour South African move to ward off a strong challenge by its opponents at the current session of the General Assembly by sending a racially mixed delegation (which included Chief Matanzima of the Transkei, a Coloured and an Indian as "observers") fell flat as country after country denounced this as a manoeuvre to mislead international public opinion. A statement issued by the so-called Nationalist Party of South West Africa concerning the supposed readiness of the Whites to hold multi-racial talks between the various "peoples" of the Territory on the constitutional future of Namibia, and timed to coincide with the General Assembly debate on the credentials of the South African delegation, was also categorically rejected as a ploy. (United Nations document A/PV.2248, s/11543, S/PV.1797-1808, A/9779, A/AC.1316/6, A/RES/3207(XXIX), A/RES/3151G(XXVIII); *Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 1, 1974; *New York Times*, Oct. 13, 31, 1974)

#### PORTUGAL PLEDGES TOTAL DECOLONIZATION

In a telegram addressed to the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General of the PAIGC, Aristides Pereira, denounced the Portuguese military build-up in the Cape Verde archipelago and police attacks against unarmed demonstrators on Sao Vicente Island. The same charges were made in the Fourth Committee (on Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories) by Abilio Monteiro Duarte, Guinea-Bissau representative, who warned of attempts by the Portuguese to apply a neo-colonialist


solution in the Cape Verde. He placed responsibility on the Portuguese Government for the repressive policies of the local government in Cape Verde.

The representatives of the MPLA and FNLA, which have observer status in the Fourth Committee, also accused Portugal of stalling on decolonization. They said that Portugal was taking advantage of divisions among the liberation movements to delay independence negotiations.

General Francisco da Costa Gomes, President of Portugal, sought to counter these accusations in his address to the General Assembly on October 17. He pledged his Government to full compliance with the United Nations Charter and fulfillment of all its international obligations, and stated that Portugal had embarked upon an "irreversible and definitive" process of decolonization in the Territories. In a letter to the Secretary-General on the question of the incidents on Sao Vicente Island, the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations also stated that the Portuguese Government pledged unconditional respect for the future Constitution of Cape Verde, to be drafted by a Constituent Assembly elected from all political parties. The Portuguese Government also issued a joint communiqué with the Movimento para Libertação de Sao Tomé and Príncipe, which recognized "the necessity of promoting the immediate decolonization of the territory as the only way of solving the colonial conflict between the people of Sao Tomé and Príncipe and the Portuguese Government." The Portuguese Government urged a quick withdrawal of all the embargoes and restrictions on Portugal by the United Nations and its specialized agencies in view of Portugal's new policies. (UN documents A/9788, A/9796, A/C.4/SR.2088, A/C.4/778, A/PV.2269) ■

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# action news and notes



#### UNITED STATES ECONOMIC

#### "NO TOURISM TO RHODESIA" CAMPAIGN LAUNCHED

The National Council of Churches through its Inter-faith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) has called for national and local action aimed at fourteen travel agencies most heavily involved in itinerating Americans to Rhodesia. (See *Southern Africa*, October, 1974). The campaign is the result of work done by the Center for Social Action of the United Church of Christ. They informed more than 1,000 travel agencies of the

illegality of transferring funds to Rhodesia and using Rhodesian airlines. Many agencies responded favorably to the church request to end all tourism with Rhodesia (based on United States legal regulations which regrettably the government has failed to implement). Others, however, are known to want to continue the lucrative tourist link. For example, Ronald Harris, President of the Los Angeles firm, Travelworld, replied to the Center for Social Action: "You have caused a great deal of unnecessary turmoil [sic] and as a result of your actions I feel that not

DID YOU RENEW YOUR SUBSCRIPTION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA?

only we, a major operator, but also my competitors will strengthen their endeavors to that country [Rhodesia]".

The ICCR Brief which reveals this information as well as the background, historically and legally, to the tourist issue in Rhodesia, rightly states that "it appears that only concerted action by concerned individuals and groups can insure that the white minority regime in Rhodesia does not continue to receive American money to support its racial oppression."

Because of the growth in guerrilla activity in Zimbabwe, tourism has declined over the last several years. However, US tourists have increased to an estimated 20 per cent of all visitors to the country. At least 16,500 persons from the US were booked on group tours alone via Air Rhodesia in 1974 bringing in at minimum \$16 million in foreign exchange to that beleaguered white minority regime. Tourism is important to Rhodesia. Thus action to end American tourism, says the ICCR Brief, is key. ACT NOW.

For more information get the ICCR Corporate Brief, 5th Floor, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, New York 10027.

Because of lack of US Government action, ICCR is calling for action against firms in New York, Washington, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Kansas City (Missouri), Delray Beach (Florida) and Milwaukee. (See list below)

#### WHAT TO DO:

1. Write to Don Morton (UCC-CSA) Room 621, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10027 to obtain information about specific target travel agencies (see below) or others in your own area concerning their involvement in Rhodesia.
2. Write or phone the tourist agency explaining your concern; request a meeting urging an end to its business with Rhodesia.
3. Depending upon agency reaction, use publicity and other measures to urge "no tourism" to Rhodesia.

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#### LIST OF AGENCIES

"Ask Mr. Foster" Travel Service  
31 Public Square  
Cleveland, Ohio 44113

"Ask Mr. Foster" Travel Service  
1627 K St., N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006

Diners Fugazy Execitove Travel  
Box 117A  
Detroit, Mich. 48232

Exprinter Tours  
500 5th Ave.  
New York, N.Y. 10036

Hemphill Travel Service  
1201 W. 4th St.  
Los Angeles, Calif. 90017

Linblad Travel Service  
133 E. 55th St.  
New York, N.Y. 10022

Maupintour Travel Service  
Box 13205  
Commerce Tower 1905  
Kansas City, Mo. 64199

Merriman & Finnerty Associates Travel  
15 E. 48th St.  
New York, N.Y. 10017

Percival Tours, Inc.  
5820 Wilshire Blvd.  
Los Angeles, Calif. 90036

Red Carpet Wares Travel and Tours  
1051 E. Atlantic Ave.  
Delray Beach, Fla. 32074

TRAVCOA  
111 N. Wabash Ave.  
Chicago, Ill. 60602

Travelworld  
6922 Hollywood Blvd.  
Los Angeles, Calif. 90028

Unitours, Inc.  
60 E. 42nd St.  
New York, N.Y. 10017

World Travel Service, Inc.  
624 W. Mitchel St.  
Milwaukee, Wisc. 53204

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#### U.S. ACTION TO STOP COAL IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA.

The United Mineworkers of America and the State of Alabama have initiated proceedings before the United States Commissioner of Customs to bar the importation of South African mined coal into the U.S. The Mannesmann Pipe and Steel Corporation has commenced importing coal from the Transvaal for supply to the Southern Power Company, for use in power utilities in the South, and an initial shipment of 23,000 tons was the subject of a complaint to the Commissioner of Customs. The complaint was made under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which prohibits the importation into the U.S. of any product or good which is mined, produced or manufactured by forced labor, indentured labor under penal sanction or convict labor, provided the U.S. can meet its domestic consumptive demand for the product from U.S. sources.

The Documents filed by the complainants demonstrated that under South African laws such as the Bantu Labour Act of 1964, breaches of contract by black workers are punishable as crimes, thus bringing the coal within the prohibition of the Tariff Act. The complainants also demonstrated that there is sufficient coal available within the U.S. to meet the "consumptive demand" requirement.

The Commissioner did not take action to prohibit the offloading of the coal. Instead, on August 22nd he held a hearing attended by the importing company, the Southern Power Company, a representative of the Transvaal Coal Owners' Association and an official of the Bureau of Mines. The complainants were not notified of this hearing.

After protesting this irregular procedure a further hearing was held at which testimony was presented on behalf of the United Mineworkers and the State of Alabama. This included a statement by Congressman Dent of Pennsylvania opposing the importation of South African coal. Expert legal evidence was presented on the meaning of Section 307 of the Tariff Act and on the content of South African labor legislation by Douglas P. Wachholz and Michael Davis, a South African lawyer in exile. In addition there was evidence from expert witnesses and the coal producers in Alabama on the availability of local U.S. coal.

The testimony was presented by Ms. Goler Butcher acting on behalf of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, as counsel for the co-complainants, the United Mineworkers of America and the State of Alabama.

The Commissioner of Customs has not yet made a ruling on the complaint.

## POLITICAL/EDUCATION

### NEW YORK TIMES WINS IN STATE COURT

The New York State Supreme Court Justice, Nathaniel T. Helman, ruled in late October that the *New York Times*, could carry classified ads for employment in South Africa voiding an order issued by the New York City Commission on Human Rights against such advertisements because they are implicitly discriminatory. The decision was apparently leaked to the press prior to the complainants or their lawyers knowing about it. It appears likely that the Commission will appeal the ruling. Justice Helman's decision stated that since none of the ads directly made reference to race, the *Times*, did not involve itself in discriminatory practices. (For background, see *Southern Africa*, Feb., September, October, 1974)

## INTERNATIONAL

### AUSTRALIAN AID FOR AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

In the budget announced by the Australian Government on Sept. 17 the foreign aid item includes \$200,000 to provide humanitarian assistance to liberation movements in Africa.

Following the highly successful Australian visit of Ms. Potuse Appolus, central committee member of the South West Africa Peoples Organization, (SWAPO) who discussed this question with the Prime Minister Dr. Jim Cairns, the aid will almost certainly go through the Organization of African Unity which may also set up an information office in Canberra. PM Whitlam also promised to send a planeload of emergency aid for the 2,000 Namibian refugees now in Zambia.

There are, however, likely to be some problems with the proposals for aid to the liberation movements getting through the Senate where the Labour Party does not have a majority and where several opposition Senators are sympathetic to the Smith regime.

### DEPUTATION TO SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR

On October 22 a deputation consisting of two government members of Parliament, Senator Arthur Geitzelt and Mr. Gareth Clayton, together with Rev. George Garnsey, ecumenical chaplain of the Australian National University and Ian McDonald, President of the Australian Union of Students met with the South African Ambassador Mr. J.B. Mills at the Embassy in Canberra.

The Ambassador refused to see Neville Curtis, former President of NUSAS, who was to have accompanied them. The deputation protested the detention of the 16 black student leaders recently arrested in Durban under the Terrorism Act who have been held incommunicado indefinitely.

The Ambassador agreed that "there was much in South African law which was inequitable" and said he was concerned about South Africa's poor international reputation. He invited the deputation to return "in view of the meeting's unsatisfactory conclusion." Senator Geitzelt and Gareth Clayton both said they would raise the matter in Parliament and students from the Australian National University staged a demonstration outside the Embassy to publicize the arrests. (*Canberra Times*, Canberra, Oct. 23, 1974)


## LIBERATION SUPPORT

The independence of Guinea-Bissau, the approaching independence of Mozambique, the negotiations in Angola, and the new situation in Portugal itself have prompted a number of international actions. Heads of State of East and Central Africa, who recently met in Congo, have called upon Western countries to take steps to prevent any of their citizens from becoming involved in mercenary activities in Africa. Fear of such action is growing at the same time that negotiations are taking place between Portugal and the African movements. (*Diario de Noticias*, Lisbon, June 8, 15, 1974; *Globe & Mail*, Ottawa, Aug. 13, 1974; *Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, Sept. 5, 1974)

There is also the recognition that there continues to be a great need for liberation support in southern Africa. The Government of Japan has made three contributions to the UN: \$100,000 to the UN Educational Training program for Southern Africa, \$10,000 to the UN Trust Fund for South Africa, and \$10,000 to the UN Fund for Namibia.

## BOYCOTTS, CAMPAIGNS, SANCTIONS BUSTING

The Prime Minister of South Africa John Vorster, has stated the case with great clarity: "Every time a South African product is bought, it is another brick in the wall of our continued existence." (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 26, 1972) This is the principle behind all the boycotts and campaigns, both economic and cultural, against South Africa. In a special "Ban Bulletin" printed by the Boycot



Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam



Outspan Aktie Pasteurstraat in Holland, a good summary of the Dutch campaigns is presented. (First edition, Feb. 1974; second edition, June 1974) Boycotts and campaigns against South African goods continue in England, sponsored by the Anti-Apartheid Movement, Young Liberal, and other groups. The British National Union of Students has played a big part in opposing British links with Southern Africa, and its 600,000-strong membership is backing a boycott of Barclays Bank, more support for the liberation movements, fund-raising campaigns, and research into university and corporate involvement in Southern African minority regimes. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, October, 1974)

South Africa has lost its representation on the boards of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Rumania barred South African delegates from the world population conference in Bucharest last August and South Africa was also excluded from an international conference on the world's water problems in Paris (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 24, Sept. 7, Oct. 5, 1974).

Australia and New South Wales are taking steps to comply with UN sanctions against Rhodesia. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 17, 1974) In West Germany, Austria and at the UN, action is being taken to stop the support that has been pouring into Rhodesia to finance the expansion of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company's plant at Que Que. Documents proving the sanctions-busting were presented to the UN in April, and it is hoped that the enterprise will be stopped completely in the very near future. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, June, 1974)

#### CHURCHES

The Australian Council of Churches and the Catholic Church's National Commission for Justice and Peace have called for the closure of Australia's two trade commission offices in South Africa. (*Zambia Daily Mail*, July 29, 1974) The Presbyterian Church of New Zealand has voted to withdraw its church investments from Southern Africa. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Aug. 17, 1974)

#### TRADE UNIONS

Three Netherlands trade union confederations have asked Dutch firms investing in South Africa to recognize the rights of Africans in South Africa to establish trade unions, to abolish job reservation, to open trade training to all races, and to pay equal pay for all races in South Africa. British anti-apartheid movements are in opposition to some of the recommendations made by a delegation from the Trade Union Council that recently returned from South Africa—namely the encouragement of investment in British subsidiaries in South Africa that "encourage" black unions, and the continued support for TUCSA (Trade Union Council of South Africa), long after it has been discredited in the eyes of black workers. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, June 1974)

#### SPORTS, CULTURE

The Edinburgh Town Council has refused permission for a South African-Rhodesian hockey team to play at Edinburgh's stadium. The Cambridge University Rugby Club has decided to call off its tour of Rhodesia. Following the model set by Malawi and Kenya, Zambia has asked the national sports council and all national sports associations to cancel arrangements with British teams as long as these teams continue to tour South Africa. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, June, 1974) The

New Zealand Amateur Fencing Association has decided to allow the national foils champion to compete in an international invitation tournament in Johannesburg (*New Zealand Herald*, Oct. 1, 1974) despite New Zealand anti-apartheid groups' campaigns against it. New Zealand's Prime Minister Rowling has also said that the visit of New Zealand's softball club to South Africa was "exercising the right . . . to move freely about the world." (*Evening Post*, NZ, Sept. 24, 1974) and that New Zealand's policy of non-cooperation in sport with South Africa "was hurting the blacks there." (*Press*, NZ, Sept. 19, 1974) A row has also arisen over an "unannounced" cricket tour of a New Zealand team to Southern Africa (*The Bulletin*, Sept. 21, 1974; *Press*, Sept. 26 and Oct. 1, 1974).

The International Amateur Athletics Federation's Congress has rejected South Africa's application to be readmitted to international athletics, and the Japanese Racing Association has turned down an invitation to send a Japanese jockey to ride in South Africa. (*Anti-Apartheid News*, London, October, 1974) South Africa and Rhodesia remain suspended from membership in the International Swimming Federation. (*Star*, Johannesburg, Sept. 21, 1974)



Target of Australian Protest Golfer Gary Player

#### ANTI-APARTHEID ACTION AT MASTERS GOLF TOURNAMENT IN SYDNEY

Plainclothes policemen were protecting South African golfer Gary Player during the Masters Golf tournament at the Australian Golf Club in Sydney on Oct. 26 and 27. Anti-apartheid demonstrators had painted "Racist Go Home" in lime on the 12th green and about 30 of them followed him around the course.

An aboriginal demonstrator was arrested on the Saturday, simply because he happened to cough as Gary Player was putting. He was brutally escorted from the course amid shouts of "Why are you arresting our black brother? This is racism." The following day was more violent and seven people were arrested. In order to promote an anti-racist image Gary Player had brought with him an African golfer, Vincent Tshabalala. But Mr. Tshabalala has done nothing to criticize the South African government's policies of apartheid in sport and merely echoes Gary Player's support for his government's policies. (*Herald*, Melbourne, Oct. 26, 1974; *Age*, Melbourne, Oct. 28, 1974; *Australian*, [national] Oct. 28, 1974)

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## books and pamphlets received...

Thomas P. Melady, *Burundi: The Tragic Years*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1974.  
Quentin Jacobsen, *Solitary In Johannesburg*. Levittown, N.Y.: Transatlantic Arts, Inc., 1973. 256 pp. \$9.50.  
Al J. Venter, *Africa At War*. Old Greenwich, Conn.: Devin-Adair Co., 1974. 185 pp.  
United Nations, *A Trust Betrayed: Namibia*. N.Y.: UN Office of Public Information, 1974. 43 pp. \$2.00.  
PAIGC, *Cabral on Nkrumah*, speech delivered by the late Sec. Gen. of PAIGC, Amilcar Cabral, at a symposium organized by the PDG, Guinea, in memory of Nkrumah

at Conakry, May 13, 1972. N.J.: Jihan Productions, 1973. 8 pp. \$1.25.  
From LSM Information Center, LSM Press, Box 94338, Richmond, B.C., Canada.  
*The Mozambican Women in the Revolution*, 28 pp. \$.85.  
*Guinea-Bissau: Toward Final Victory!* (Selected Speeches and Documents from PAIGC). 98 pp. \$1.25.  
Interviews in Depth Series:  
*Namibia, SWAPO '1'*, Adreas Shipanga. 27 pp. \$.75.  
*Zimbabwe, ZAPU '2'*, George Silundika. 26 pp. \$.75.

## resources

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**ARTICLES ON THE BANK CAMPAIGN.** Two articles describing the process and politics of a church/community coalition organizing around Maryland National Bank's \$2 million loan to South Africa. See *Engage/Social Action*, August, 1974 (United Methodist Church/United Church of Christ, 100 Maryland Ave., NE, Washington, 20002. 50 cents); and *New World Outlook* October 1974 (United Methodist Church, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10027)

**TAPE SHOW ON GUINEA BISSAU, "GUINEA BISSAU WINS INDEPENDENCE"**. Gil Fernandes, Guinea-Bissau's representative at the United Nations discusses his country's future and outlines past US intervention on behalf of Portugal in the 12 year struggle. Buddy Andrade of the PAIGC-USA, talks about activities of the PAIGC Support

Committee among the 250,000 Cape Verdean Americans in the United States. TIME: 14:07. Available from "The Rest of the News", 306 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Tape is reel-to-reel, (7½ or 3¾) or on cassette. Cost \$6.00. Order a catalogue of other programs from "The Rest of the News" as well.

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# UPDATE

## **SOUTH AFRICA VOTED OUT OF UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

UN General Assembly President Bouteflika has ruled that South Africa cannot participate in the current session of the United Nations General Assembly. The ruling, says Bouteflika, reflects the spirit of an earlier General Assembly resolution that rejected South Africa's credentials and referred Pretoria's membership in the world body to the Security Council. The Assembly then voted 91 to 22 (19 abstained) to uphold the ruling.

The African move to totally expel South Africa from the UN was killed in the Security Council by a triple veto by the United States, Britain, and France on October 30.

Bouteflika's action bars South Africa from participating in General Assembly debate for the duration of the session ending December 17. The ruling leaves open, however, the status of South Africa's UN membership. South Africa immediately recalled UN Ambassador Botha for consultations and froze its one million dollar budget contribution.

## **ANGOLA'S PROBLEMS PERSIST**

Angola's capital city of Luanda suffered the worst violent outbreak in several months during the weekend of November 9th when over 100 persons were killed and many more wounded in several nights of fighting. Perpetrators of the violence seemed to be persons unaffiliated with any of Angola's three main liberation groups. All three now have offices in Luanda and all quickly condemned the clashes.

In Cabinda, the oil rich province to the north, Portuguese troops were moved in several days before the Luanda violence, following an apparent attempt by the Front for the Liberation of Cabinda (FLEC) to launch a major armed offensive. The Portuguese authorities have stated their opposition to autonomy for Cabinda, as have all three liberation movements. However, the BBC correspondent in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania reported on November 11 that diplomats and government officials there believe President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and the President of the National Liberation Front, FNLA, have made a deal to hand over Cabinda to Zaire after Angola's independence. Mobutu's alleged role is to support FNLA leader Holden Roberto as President of Angola.

On the day of the BBC report, Tanzanian President Nyerere was in Lusaka for talks with Zambian President Kaunda. High on their agenda was Angola and the continuing disunity among the liberation movements there. Also attending were Frelimo President Machel, Botswana President Khama, and Lesotho King Moshoeshoe. Notably absent was Mobutu, who has been involved in numerous discussions on Angola with Nyerere and Kaunda in recent months. His absence seems to support the view that Kaunda and Nyerere are unhappy about his actions—the reported deal over Cabinda and his support for Daniel Chipenda as MPLA leader.

## **BLACKS MOURN RHODESIAN ANNIVERSARY**

African leaders in Rhodesia called for a day of mourning, and vowed to intensify the struggle against

white rule, while the Smith regime celebrated its ninth year of illegal control. At a ball on November 9th, the Prime Minister led white dignitaries through festivities which included the ringing of an "independence bell."

On behalf of the African National Council, Bishop Abel Muzerewa issued the call for mourning, declaring, "We look forward to the day Zimbabwe will be free and independent." ZANU and ZAPU both vowed to accelerate the armed struggle.

## **CRACKDOWN AGAINST BLACK LEADERS IN SOUTH AFRICA CONTINUES**

Nine more members of the South African Students Organization (SASO) and the Black Peoples' Convention (BCP) were arrested under the Terrorism Act on November 7. Nearly thirty others from SASO, BCH and the Black Allied Workers' Union were detained under the same law in late September following the announcement of a series of rallies planned to show solidarity with the people of Mozambique in attaining their freedom. Another 19 people were arrested and charged for unlawful assembly in connection with a pro-FRELIMO rally held in Durban. The wave of arrests is one of the largest concentrated crackdown against black leaders since the early 1960's and indicates white South Africa's growing insecurity about the future of white supremacy in southern Africa.

## **US OFFICIAL TOURS 10 AFRICAN STATES**

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Donald Easum, undertook a 10-nation four-week tour of eastern and southern Africa last month. After initial stops in Zaire, Tanzania, and Malawi, America's highest-ranking official for Africa attended Zambia's 10th anniversary independence celebrations.

In South Africa he met with a cross-section of individuals. Leaders of the Coloured Representative Council, as well as black student leaders, told Easum they were disappointed in the US Security Council veto which helped keep South Africa in the UN. White politicians from all political parties expressed their gratitude, but Easum warned that the vote was not an endorsement by the US Government of South Africa's racial policies. He predicted major changes in the country soon, and emphasized the US desire for Pretoria to observe UN rulings on Rhodesia (observance of sanctions and withdrawal of South African troops) and Namibia (recognition of UN sovereignty)

Also on Easum's itinerary were Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, and Angola. ■

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