


SOUTHERN AFRICA



A Monthly Survey of News and Opinion

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EDITORIAL

"A Numbers Game"

Angus MacDonald, who has been making a film for Granada Television on anti-Rhodesian guerrillas, gave a short summary of his observations obtained during a visit to a ZAPU guerrilla camp, in the Observer (London, 1/4 1970). He says that ZAPU claims that the border from Lake Kariba to Mozambique is manned by white South Africans. It is patrolled by boats, helicopters and Buccaneer jets. The South Africans have large camps, five miles apart, manned by about 30 men. The camps are linked by roads and backed up by other camps to their rear.

If this description of the system the South Africans use to guard the border is accurate and is also the general prescription for guarding the whole Black-White border in Southern Africa, we can play an interesting numbers game. This game should be able to estimate the number of men involved in guarding the border and give some idea of the cost of maintaining them there. The border from Lake Kariba to Mozambique is about 150 miles long, so that it would require 30 camps spaced at five mile intervals and require about 1,000 men to man them. Suppose that Lake Kariba is impenetrable for the guerrillas because of the boat and plane patrols; this still leaves another 150 miles

from the eastern end of the lake to the Namibia-Botswana border. That requires another 1,000 men in camps. And so one can go on along the whole boundary from the Atlantic Ocean to Malawi. For instance, the Tete Province of Mozambique has a 220-mile border with Zambia. It is where the Cabora Bassa dam is planned to be built. This border requires a bit more than 1,000 men.

Suppose again that for every man at a border camp, only one is needed behind the lines as support and that it costs the South African government about \$10 a day per man (one twentieth of the cost to the United States for each man in Vietnam). Then as the whole border is about 1,500 miles long, one needs about 20,000 men and something like \$75 million a year to pay for them. Just the Rhodesian border alone would require about 4,000 men and \$15 million.

In recent years South Africa's Defence Budget has been about \$300 million per year. The numbers game suggests that it really hurts to keep those guerrillas out, even if the cost is shared with Rhodesia. At \$50,000 per mile per year, it hurts!



INSIDE
SOUTH
AFRICA

Trial of 22 Africans Continues

(See December 1969 issue for background.)

The trial of 22 Africans under the Suppression of Communism Act at the Old Synagogue in Pretoria, was adjourned for Christmas recess and will reconvene in February. All of the defendants have pleaded not guilty. However, Mrs. Mandela, wife of Nelson Mandela, the former African National Congress leader who is serving a life sentence for plotting revolution and

planning a military invasion of South Africa, refused to plead, because, she said, "I have been detained for the past six months under the Terrorism Act. This Act I regard as unjust and soul corrosive. I find it difficult to enter any plea. I regard myself as having already been found guilty." A plea of not guilty was entered for her by the judge.

There is heavy security at the trial. Police armed with machine guns guard the court entrances (London Times, 12/2/69). Three press photographers had their cameras confiscated by the police as they tried to photograph a group of black and white supporters of the defendants who were waiting outside the Court (Johannesburg Star, 12/6/69).

A number of witnesses have been heard. One, an African employee of the United States Information Service, explained how he allowed Mrs. Mandela and two other women to use the printing machines of the USIS to print some 2,000 secret documents on a Sunday. He did it without knowledge of his superiors because they were his friends (N.Y. Times, 12/3/69).

The first prosecution witness was the British economist Philip Golding who has been held in detention without trial since May. He said he donated \$210 to the African National Congress and had been prepared to support an invasion by guerrilla fighters. Golding said he had met Samuel Tholotho, one of the defendants, in 1967 and became friendly with him. It was through him that he made contacts with the ANC, as Tholotho was a member. The judge explained to Golding that if he gave evidence satisfactorily he could be immune from prosecution in the terms of the relevant legislation (London Times, 12/2/69).

Another witness, Shanti Naidoo, said that she had been arrested on June 13 and held in solitary confinement. She had to sleep on the floor. After a 5-day interrogation during which she was allowed no sleep, she had made a statement under oath. Her interrogator had also threatened to arrest her entire family if she refused to make a statement, she said. She refused to testify, saying that two of the accused were her friends and that she would not be able to live with herself if she did testify. The result of her refusal was that she was committed to jail to serve a prison sentence. She will have another chance to testify in February

and will be jailed again if she refuses.

A similar story was told by Nombwe Vriline Makhala, who also refused to testify. She was jailed in May. No friends or members of her family were allowed to see her. From the time of her arrest, she was questioned and made to stand for long hours. She became exhausted from standing and eventually made a statement. She said that she had been promised by the police that if she made a statement she would be released. That had not happened. For that reason and for the reason that she did not want to testify against her friends, she refused. She was also committed to prison (London Times, 12/16/69).

Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP)

The Herstigte Nasionale Party hopes to nominate at least 125 candidates in the April general election for Parliament. This expectation was expressed after the party had been in existence for little over a month. Party leaders say that they are more than satisfied with the success and speed of growth of the party (Johannesburg Star, 11/29/69).

However, they continue to have problems at public meetings. In Bloemfontein, hecklers threw eggs and tomatoes at Dr. Hertzog and Mr. Marais. The latter tried for two hours to speak, was prevented from doing so and finally closed the meeting rather than subject Dr. Hertzog to the same treatment (Johannesburg Star, 12/6/69).

Dr. Albert Hertzog on Trial

The extreme right wing leader of the newly formed HNP (see above), and one of his supporters, Mr. Jaap Marais, are to be prosecuted for refusing to give evidence before the commission of inquiry into matters relating to the security of the state.

Dr. Hertzog has attacked the new Bureau of State Security, because he believed that it will be used against "fellow Afrikaners." He took his stand after learning that the Government had used security police to identify the authors of a letter attacking the Nationalist Party (N.Y. Times, 11/16/69). He also alleged that the B.O.S.S. operating costs would be \$70 million a year. The government has said it will only cost \$5.5 million. Hertzog was asked to substantiate his claim on funding and refused to do so. It is this that has led the government to prosecute him. Hertzog could receive a fine of \$140 or a maximum of 6 months' imprisonment, or both (Johannesburg Star, 12/6/69).

THANK YOU, READERS

We are most grateful for the response to our October request for funds. So far we have received \$800, which will help the Survey considerably. The Editors were pleased to receive numerous comments on the Survey and suggestions for improvements. Thank you.

Any reader still wishing to send contributions are encouraged to do so.

Keep in touch and tell us of friends, organizations, libraries that might find the Survey helpful.

LINKS BETWEEN TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA SABOTAGED

Tanzania and Zambia moved jointly to tighten their security measures as a result of the sabotage of the oil and road links between the two countries which took place at the end of December. Both countries believe this sabotage marks the beginning of a tougher policy against them by Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa.

Although Portugal and Rhodesia have been suspected of undertaking sabotage operations against Zambia and Tanzania, there has been nothing as ambitious, or as carefully planned, as the blowing up of the pumping station on the 1,058-mile long oil pipeline, severing Zambia's crucial fuel supplies. Damage is estimated at \$240,000.

It is thought that the damage cannot be repaired in less than a month. Zambia's oil reserves can last at most for six weeks. The attack on the station, near Iringa, the main town in Tanzania's Southern Highlands, was carried out with considerable skill. It came simultaneously with a less successful attempt to destroy a vital bridge near Mikumi on the highway linking the two countries.

The attack was seen as clear evidence of a carefully thought out plan to halt the growing cooperation between Zambia and Tanzania. The pipeline, built by Italians for \$38.4 million, was opened only last September.

There is not much doubt in either Dar es Salaam or Lusaka that the saboteurs, probably Africans, were agents working for the Portuguese and their allies in Southern Africa. (London Observer, 12/28/69).


Removals, South African Style

Dr. Carel de Wet has recently announced that no group area will be assigned for Indians or Coloureds in Zululand. They will remain there on permit, implying eventual removal. That is logical: non-Zulus cannot live in Zululand. However, there are a considerable number of whites in Zululand. The white areas will remain white. That is logical because it is the whites who vote and the government dare not leave whites in the same insecure position that the Indians and Coloureds are in. It also means that the Bantustan idea is nonsense (Johannesburg Star, 11/26/69).

The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M. C. Botha, has made some truly incredible statements: "The Bantu people like being moved. It appeals to them and we have a long waiting list for future schemes. The demand for resettlement is increasing." (Johannesburg Star, 11/22/69). He said that there have been about 20 major removals so far and 20 smaller ones. Some 900,000 Africans have been moved in the last decade and he claims that all the removals were voluntary. This statement could be attacked on many levels, but one needs simply to ask, "why is it necessary to have influx control, to tear down old beloved communities like Sophiatown and Alexandra if Africans like to move so much?" (Johannesburg Star, 11/22/69). (See the article on "Morsgat" in the December 1969 issue.)

"The telephones of very many persons are being tapped on the Government's orders or with the Governments' consent..." (Dr. Albert Hertzog, Jo'burg Star, 11/22/69)





(The following article appeared in the London Observer on Jan. 4, 1970. It was written by a reporter who had visited a training camp on the Zambezi.)

The guerrillas in hooded battledress and green face masks lay patiently on the north bank of the Zambezi and watched for enemy activity. Two hundred yards away across the river was the first outpost of Ian Smith's Rhodesia - an observation post in the "Maginot Line" which white Africa is building along the Zambezi to keep out black guerrillas.

The guerrillas were themselves Rhodesians - black Africans in exile, now soldiers in the command of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). After three years of operations, I was the first outsider allowed into a ZAPU guerrilla camp to report the campaign against the Smith Government.

The men on the river bank were part of ZAPU's reconnaissance wing. Their chief, Comrade Love, is a small, lively man with a shaved and glistening head, who used to be a schoolteacher in Salisbury. The Rhodesians now knew of his role, he said. His father had disappeared without trace.

The reconnaissance squads also monitor enemy activity on the Rhodesian side of the river and travel in and out establishing caches of food and weapons along the guerrilla infiltration routes. Finally, they lead the other kind of ZAPU soldiers, the combat infiltrators, perhaps 100 miles on foot through the rugged uninhabited bush towards the populated African areas.

In August, 1967, the ZAPU guerrillas, together with soldiers from the South African African National Congress (ANC), first joined battle with Smith's troops in the Wankie game reserve. Since then the South Africans have moved in to help Smith to fight off two more invasions by guerrilla groups 50 and 100 strong.

Because of early reverses, tactics have been changed, says James Chikerema, vice-president of ZAPU. Men are now infiltrated in ones and twos. Their instructions are not to fight unless engaged and to move swiftly towards the villages where they change to civilian clothes to recruit, train and arm a ZAPU underground for a future rebellion. The overthrow of the white minority is now seen in a longer perspective.

The ZAPU men are well equipped. Each soldier has four different camouflage suits to match changes in season and vegetation. The standard weapon is the Kalashnikov AKM7 automatic rifle - Russian designed, Chinese made, and tested and proved by the Vietcong. Pistols, carbines and hand grenades are usually Czech. Other equipment includes bazookas, incendiary bombs and powerful radio transmitters.

The reconnaissance base camp was simply a dried-up river bed, heavily screened by trees, with a supply tent at each end. Military formalities were rigorously observed, and weapons constantly stripped and cleaned. Sentries posted round the camp used an elaborate system of whistle signals as patrols came and went, and supplies arrived from other camps near by. But the atmosphere was easy. They have no badges of rank, and each day a different guerrilla is made "man on duty", with authority to run the camp.

Morale seemed high and all the men had had at least 9 months' intensive military training. Two had trained in Russia and three in Cuba, but now, we are told, new recruits went only to African countries like Algeria and Tanzania for training under ZAPU instructors. The only pay is a weekly ration of three packets of cheap Russian cigarettes per man. There is no leave, partly for security reasons.

Two of the older men in the camp claimed to have operated successfully as combat infiltrators inside Rhodesia for a year after crossing the Zambezi in August, 1968. Some of their squad were killed, but they trekked through to the villages. They hid by day and travelled by night from village to village, training and arming ZAPU civilian cadres. At weekends they took off their uniforms and travelled into the towns to contact the underground.

The guerrillas generally have a low opinion of Rhodesia's white settlers as bush fighters. But they gave grudging respect to the South Africans - the Boers, they call them - as altogether a much tougher breed.

ZAPU now claims that the whole white defence line from Lake Kariba to Mozambique is manned

by South Africans and patrolled by their boats, helicopters and Buccaneer jets. They explained that reconnaissance patrols along the 500-mile frontier found the South Africans based in large camps five miles apart, each manned by a platoon of about 30 men. Between these were smaller transit camps. A few miles farther back, roads had been built and other camps established.

When we left the camp, our squad was preparing an important mission to reconnoitre new river crossings many miles away. The rainy season had started, the elephant grass had begun to grow and the combat infiltrators were ready. Soon they would see action again. They did not seem to be afraid.

****A F R I C A T O D A Y
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INSIDE RHODESIA

U.S. Consulate in Rhodesia: Significant or Not?

Opinions on the significance of the American consulate in Rhodesia and the Nixon administration's position toward Rhodesia continue to differ.


According to John Jordi of the Toronto Globe and Mail (11/22/69), the American and Rhodesian governments have made a discreet agreement that Rhodesia will not embarrass the U.S. by harrassing the U.S. consul into shifting his formal accreditation from the Queen to Mr. Smith's own acting head of state now installed at Government House. The U.S. administration, now under attack from liberal "Africa lobby" congressmen, argues that its controversial consulate in Salisbury is simply part of overall U.S. representation in Britain and its possessions.

Several other nations are taking their cue from the U.S. line. In the absence of formal diplomatic recognition from anyone--even South Africa--the degree of acknowledgement implicit in these consulates is invaluable to Ian Smith. For this reason, writes Jordi, Smith is seen as being in no hurry to establish his republic and anxious to make no fuss about it when he does. When Parliament has passed enabling legislation and Smith has won the general election that will follow, Rhodesia may simply slide into republican status without any formal declaration.

After the June referendum Britain closed its Salisbury mission and made it quite plain that it expected other nations to follow suit. The State Department recommended to the White House that the U.S. do just that, but a decision on the matter has been held up by Nixon's national security staff, headed by Dr. Henry Kissinger.

Africa Confidential in London (12-13-69), in contrast to Jordi's commentary, contends that the U.S. consular presence is without lasting significance.

Their report states that, according to a U.S. diplomat who handles administrative matters for the Salisbury mission, the present consul holding the fort in the consulate-general, Mr. W. Paul O'Neill, will not be replaced when his tour ends in a few months' time. With him will go his American secretary-cipher clerk. The three Rhodesian junior staff will be dismissed. The consul's consular task (passport renewals and so on for 900 Americans in Rhodesia--mostly missionaries) will be transferred to Ambassador



Rountree in Pretoria. The consulate's intelligence work will be shared by Pretoria, Lusaka, and Blantyre, which all regularly send staff driving through Rhodesia.

When Britain asked Washington to close the consulate in September, the White House instructed Ambassador in London Walter Annenberg to calm Prime Minister Harold Wilson with reminders that the consulate-general had originally been kept open at Britain's request to show that "nothing" had officially changed and to argue that since the illegal republic had not yet been declared, there was no specific need for Washington to take action yet. The Nixon non-move, the report states, was a gesture to the South African lobby.

Since UDI the U.S. consulate-general staff has been reduced from about 20 to approximately a half dozen.

VICTIMS OF FASCISM

According to figures recently released by Rhodesia's "Ministry of Law and Order," some 3,518 people were detained and/or restricted in Rhodesia in the period 1964-1969 for committing or "threatening" to commit political offences. (These figures do not include the hundreds of freedom-fighters presently serving long jail terms in prisons throughout Rhodesia.)

Of the detainees and restrictees, 1,441 were placed in restriction under sections 50 and 51 of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act; 2,077 were detained under the complementary Emergency Powers Act.

Among those restricted were eight whites and seven Asians and Coloureds. Seven whites were detained. (Zimbabwe News, 11/29/69)

A DOSE OF MEDICINE TO WHITES

A young mixed couple accused by Immigration Officer Pieter van Der Byl of "letting physical love destroy their national pride and the law" have been deported. Persons who asked, "How could this happen here?" were answered by a spokesman for Ian Smith, who said the couple was unwanted in Rhodesia because Mrs. Schwartz was Chinese.

Rhodesia's railwaymen, all white, wanted a pay increase or threatened to call a nationwide strike. That strike never came to pass. The regime simply threatened jail terms of up to five years for anybody guilty of striking. The Emergency Powers Regulations, originally


enacted to terrorize African freedom-fighters, were taking their toll among what a spokesman of the anti-black Railway Amalgamated Engineering Union described as "people who have loyally supported and fought for this country through thick and thin." Hence: "We feel Rhodesia has been transformed from a democracy into a dictatorship overnight!" (Zimbabwe News, 11/29/69)

ATTENTION - NEW FROM THE ANC

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The U.S. and South Africa

Tires for Apartheid

Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, working in complete cooperation with the South African government, recently announced plans to build a \$10 million factory at Brits in South Africa's Transvaal Province. The plant is to be built in a border area adjacent to what are euphemistically called tribal reserves. The practice of locating

industries in border areas helps to legitimize South Africa's Bantustans, provides subsistence living standards for the "natives" and of course labor relations couldn't be better--from Firestone's point of view. Firestone will thus have ready access to an incredibly cheap pool of labor, and the South African government will have increased industrial production without threatening the status quo.

When Harry Oppenheimer, President of the Anglo-American Corporation, recently declared South Africa's economy to be headed for economic suicide because it "deliberately sets out...not to make proper use of 80% of its potential working population" his concern was about the inefficiency of the system and not its inhumanity.

The establishment of border industries is an important facet of the government's apartheid policy. It is so important that the government provides financial compensation for firms locating in border areas.

South Africa's Propaganda Outreach

In the October, 1969 Progressive, Leslie Whitten reviews materials circulated in the U.S. by the South African government. The facts he reveals about the sums of money involved are striking.

Last year, in one six month period, the South African Information Service spent \$210,000 for films and printing alone.

The South African Foundation has recently opened a government-sponsored office in New York "to promote international understanding of South Africa, her achievements, her problems and her potential; and, by so doing, to advance the welfare of all her peoples."

John Chettle, the South African head of the office, received a \$20,000 salary and used \$18,000 of government funds to set up shop.

On the American scene the publicity and literature battle between American organizations is on a miniscule scale compared to government expenditures. Opposing apartheid is the American Committee on Africa with a budget of \$165,000; while the American-Southern African Council, a pro-apartheid group headed by former Youth for Wallace chairman, John Acord, operates on \$200,000.

Perhaps it is not surprising that when Americans are asked what they think about when they hear of South Africa, they say sun, surf, lobster tails, and not apartheid.

In his New Year's message, South African Prime Minister Vorster stated that again for another year, South Africa has experienced "enmity on all fronts from religion to sport." His speech was interpreted by some to mean that South Africa did not plan to "relax" its sports policy, in spite of mounting pressure from "liberal" white sportsmen, particularly on the Arthur Ashe issue, as well as the prospects of a "multiracial" (i.e. one picked on merit) cricket team to play outside South Africa. Vorster said further, "We have never yet forced our way of life on the world, but on the other hand we cannot be dictated to as to how we should run our affairs in South Africa." (N.Y. Times, 1/1/70)



THE
LIBERATION
MOVEMENTS

Recent Events in FRELIMO

On November 5, 1969 Uria Simango, member of FRELIMO's three-man Presidential Council, issued a 13-page statement to the Tanzanian press attacking the other two members of the Council, attributing to them and other "southerners" a plot to kill him and others in FRELIMO. President Nyerere of Tanzania met with the three members of the council, as did representatives of the OAU Liberation Committee. An editorial in the Tanzanian party newspaper, The Nationalist, commented on 11/7: "The circular (of Simango) underlines the existence of personal differences and mutual

suspicion in the FRELIMO leadership. To some extent the existence of these differences is to be expected. Leaders cannot be expected always to agree, and sometimes it may take them a long time to work out a formula for accommodating each other. But it is certainly reprehensible that these differences should have come out into the open in the manner they have. Public mudslinging between leaders of liberation movements cannot but give strength to the movements' enemies.... It is questionable whether all the avenues open to Rev. Simango and those fellow aggrieved among FRELIMO's leadership were fully explored.


"The basis of Rev. Simango's charges is that his fellow leaders are ruthless in their pursuit of power for themselves at the expense of the democratic processes. His contention is that they are bent on eliminating him, so that they assume untrammelled control of the movement. Yet on the face of things, and the strength of his circular, Rev. Simango could stand charged of similar intent. For he calls on his fellow leaders, whom he condemns as criminals, to step aside and be tried. It does not want much imagination to see that the result of such action would be to leave Rev. Simango in unchallenged and untrammelled control of the movement!"

The following day FRELIMO's nine-man executive committee issued a communique deeply deploring Simango's statement and the fact that he had chosen to present his problems in the press rather than within FRELIMO. The communique went on to reject totally the contents of the pamphlet and to suspend Simango from membership of the Presidential Council until the next meeting of the Central Committee. The Executive Committee reaffirmed its determination "to assure the continuation of the revolutionary armed struggle for national liberation, until final victory."

Aquino de Braganca, writing in the new third world newsweekly Africa (11/24/69) traced the origins of the Simango split. Several times, he recalls, Simango had expected the top position, and wound up with second. In the formation of UBENAMO, Adeline Gwambe took first place; and when FRELIMO was formed, Dr. Eduardo Mondlane on his return became the obvious choice for President. At the 2nd FRELIMO Congress in Mozambique in July, 1968, Simango was re-elected

Vice-President as a result of the personal intervention of Mondlane. After Mondlane's death, the April, 1969 Central Committee meeting was reluctant to appoint him to sole leadership, and created a troika consisting of Simango, Samora, and dos Santos. Disaffected with this position, and apparently unable to gain support for his view within FRELIMO, he finally appealed to intervention by the OAU and the Tanzanian government through his pamphlet. They refused to intervene, and he was suspended from the Presidential Council, though not from the Central Committee nor from the party. Further developments await the full meeting of FRELIMO's Central Committee.

1968 and 1969 have proved extremely difficult years for FRELIMO. FRELIMO has already shown its resilience in recovering from the assassination of President Mondlane, continuing the war in three provinces, including the new front in Tete opened up in 1968. Indications are that the Simango split, though delighting the Portuguese, will also be unable to stop the momentum of the struggle for national liberation of Mozambique.



Map of Mozambique

Communist vs. non-communist debate

Occasionally the U.S. press carries items on the Southern African liberation movements. On Nov. 27 the Chicago Tribune ran a Reuters release (datelined Dar es Salaam) on the "nationalist" (as opposed to Communist) orientation of the liberation movements. The article points out that Communist nations provide the movements with much needed arms, money and training, and quotes Jorge Rebelo of FRELIMO: "We are sympathetic to communism - partly as a reaction to the conditions created by capitalism in our country." Yet it goes on to show that FRELIMO also receives aid from Western Europe (including the Swedish Social Democratic Party), and is believed to be the only movement receiving both Soviet and Chinese aid. The article goes through the normal (and simplistic) classification of the movements as either in the Russian or Chinese camp, but contends that most of the liberation movements see the experience of the Chinese revolution as more relevant for their struggle than that of the Soviet Union. The article fails in many respects: - to analyze the progress of the struggle, the maintenance of western support for racist regimes and counter-revolution, the movements' developments in liberated areas of some sections, - but most important the legitimacy of the revolution is underplayed to stress rather a Communist/non-communist or Russian/Chinese debate.

GUINEA-BISSAU - some new developments

Cape Verde activity: The Portuguese news service reported that a military court has sentenced four men with up to five years imprisonment and deprived another of his "political rights" for 15 years. The accused were members of the PAIGC and evidence liberation activity on the strategic Cape Verde islands, cited by the West as a second Azores (Daily Telegraph, 11/3)

Senegal and the PAIGC: Apparently disturbed by intensified Portuguese attacks across the Guinea-Bissau border into Senegal, the Senegalese government sent troops to its southern border in mid-December (Casamance Island area in the southwest). "The sending of the troops was aided by French Army units." One explanation of the Portuguese artillery and air attacks on Senegal is that Portugal wants to "sabotage" the attempt by Dakar to open up talks between moderate Guinean nationalists and the more liberal elements in the Caetano government. Le Monde cited contact between the leader of the non-OAU-recognized FLING, Benjamin Pinto-Bull, and Prime Minister Caetano himself last summer, although in 1963 Mr. Bull also apparently met with Salazar. Le Monde

interprets Senegal's motives as supportive of the liberation movements but desirous of a non-violent process of leading Guinea-Bissau toward independence. Yet it appears from the Portuguese reaction, that Portugal "knows better" (or in fact realizes that the fighting forces of the PAIGC are in fact the real future of Guinea, not the moderates sitting in Dakar) (Le Monde, Weekly Selection, 12/17) West Africa's "Griot" (11/29/69)

expands on this issue citing a report in a new Paris magazine, Continent 2000, that President Senghor via General de Gaulle made contact with Salazar of Portugal, but that the latter refused courtesy. Now an approach has been made to Caetano. The magazine, published by a former Jeune Afrique writer, Mohammed Behri, claims that Senghor has informed the liberation movements of his action and told them "whilst continuing their armed conflict, they should not exclude the possibility of solving their problems by negotiation." The French article concludes that "the warmth with which they thanked the Senegalese President would appear to encourage him to continue his efforts." Senghor, the West Africa article points out, also has an eye on the Cape Verde islands... Another source cites the presence of 1,100 Senegalese troops in the border of Guinea-Bissau stationed to cope with Portuguese infiltrators and artillery fire. The fact that Portugal fired on the Senegalese town of Samine (11/25/69), resulting in the Security Council action mentioned under this issue's section on the U.N., is interpreted as the beginning of a new Portuguese offensive to try to regain the vast areas (estimated at 2/3 of the country) held by PAIGC. Some Senegalese believe that Portugal's aggression may be an attempt to force them to put tighter screws on PAIGC. Senghor's peace attempts are outlined as involving a cease-fire, a ten-year period before complete independence, and the evolution of a "Portuguese Commonwealth."



PITTSBURGH, U.S.A./PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT, LISBON

BLOOD BROTHERS IN OPPRESSION

The giant Oil Corporations of England and America were among the first Corporate Empire Builders of the 20th Century. Their empires reached across the face of the globe, but until recently Latin America and the Middle East were the main sources of petroleum supply; it was from those areas that the corporations drew their massive super-profits, exploiting the people and making and breaking rulers and governments to suit their balance sheets. Now, with recent new discoveries, their attention has shifted to include Africa, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Portuguese held Angola and Mozambique as major areas of activity.

Gulf Oil, the world's third largest Oil Corporation, and among the top ten U.S. Corporations of all kinds, has been quick on the scene in Africa. It has had no scruples about the nature of the allies it uses to capture its profits.

GULF IN ANGOLA: OPERATION CABINDA

Cabinda, the Portuguese ruled enclave wedged between Congo-Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville to the north of Angola, ruled by Lisbon as part of Angola, has so far proved the most profitable oil venture in Portuguese Africa; by the end of 1969 Cabinda was ranked Africa's fourth largest petroleum producer. Gulf Oil controls it all, being the sole oil concessionaire in Cabinda. Gulf got its first oil strikes in 1966 and had spent probably more than \$125 million by the end of 1968 when it went into production. It has expansion plans which will require considerable new investment in the near future. World Petroleum reported in 1969 that Gulf would spend more than \$76 million on facilities for producing 150,000 barrels per day (bbpd) by 1970. The corporation already had 30 wells under exploration by February, 1969. Major production and main exploration areas are both off-shore.

By June, 1969, the daily output from Cabinda Gulf was already 30,000 bbpd and rising rapidly towards the 150,000 bbpd target. Figures below will indicate the enormous revenue that the Portuguese government is deriving from these Gulf activities; but probably more important even than the

money to Lisbon is the actual oil. Current total Portuguese import of oil (there are no internal sources) is 75,000 bbpd. By 1970 Portugal will be able to secure all its needs from Angola thus guaranteeing itself a "safe" source of supply in the face of potential international embargos, and incidentally saving itself foreign currency. (Not only Portugal, but also Rhodesia and South Africa have had their ability to obtain strategic oil infinitely improved by the Gulf Cabinda operation).

Cabinda oil reserves are vast. They have been estimated at a minimum of 300 million tons, so annual production could go well beyond 150,000 bbpd if this were "necessary." Indeed Robert F. Ward, Texan Manager of Cabinda Gulf, has already indicated that Cabinda "represents one of the major growth areas in the Corporation."

APPROPRIATION OF THE PEOPLE'S WEALTH

As is to be expected, the tremendous wealth extracted from Angolan natural resources is not going to the people of Angola. With each renewal of the contract, the Portuguese government has continually raised its "price" to Cabinda Gulf, thus increasing government revenue from the oil operation. Gulf in turn has acceded to the new demands because of the profitability of the venture. But the Angolan people get nothing, not even some crumbs in the way of new jobs. Although the new oil field is supposed to employ about 2000 people, of these, 400 jobs have been specifically reserved for Portuguese citizens recruited for specific technical jobs; other jobs will go to technical and engineering personnel recruited from Gulf subsidiaries in the rest of the world. The chances of an Angolan being given such a job are slight, considering that the rate of illiteracy in Angola is still 90%. So the revenue derived from Angolan oil will be shared between an American corporation and the colonial government of Portugal.

There has been some debate about the exact size of the Portuguese government's revenue from the Gulf Cabinda operation. The elements involved in this income are best shown by a brief reference to the last con-

tract drawn up between Gulf and the Portuguese government in 1968, by which time it had become clear that the wells were going to be significant producers.

The contract laid down inter alia:

1. Surface rent terms: considerably higher than those in the 1966 contract.
2. Minimum investment: approximately \$2,625,000 annually for prospecting.
3. Royalties: to be paid by Gulf to the Portuguese government at the rate of 10¢ per barrel in currency actually earned. By 1970 at 150,000 bbbpd this alone should yield the Portuguese government a daily income of \$15,000.
4. Income Tax: 50% on net profit. The government induced Gulf to pay the estimated amounts due for 1971-73 in advance, thus reaping a quick \$7 million by July 1, 1969.
5. Direito de concessao: which gives the Portuguese government the right to 12 1/2% of all petroleum produced, or its value.

Thus it is difficult to estimate precisely the revenue the Portuguese government will get. Lisbon made estimates of about \$17 1/2 million annually. The 1969 revenue was probably even greater (The U.N. estimates almost \$20 million) mainly because the Portuguese government clearly made a great effort to get as much as it could as quickly as it could. Thus several payments were extracted in advance, providing the embattled government with desperately needed funds (\$20 million is almost exactly half the total military budget for Angola, which was estimated at 1,125 million escudos /\$46,375,000/ in 1969).

GULF AND THE WAR

According to Portuguese military bulletins, there has been constant guerrilla activity in the Cabinda district for several years. A large contingent of government troops has been stationed there since 1967 to protect the Cabinda Gulf operations. Under the 1966 and 1968 agreements, the Portuguese government "agrees to undertake such measures as may be necessary to ensure that the company may carry out its operations freely and efficiently, including measures to permit the company the use and free access to public land and such measures as may be necessary to prevent third parties from interfering with the company's free exercise of its contractual rights." Thus a major American corporation has sought the aid of the Portuguese colonial government to protect it against the mass of the people of the country in which it is operating.

Portugal's eagerness to protect the oil fields is no doubt re-inforced by the agreement with Cabinda Gulf under which the Portuguese government has retained the right to take all crude oil that is produced, or the equivalent in refined products, should her military or political needs dictate it. Robert Ward, commenting on the implications of this said recently to a New York Times reporter, "Well, let's just say it will never come to that."

In fact the continued existence of Gulf in Cabinda must be seen as contributing significantly to the strength not only of the colonialist Portuguese government but also of the whole oppressive racist bloc in Southern Africa.

Quite directly, this bloc needs oil and is now assured of a friendly supply. Less directly, whatever strengthens one member of the alliance strengthens all the members. And Portugal's gains from Cabinda are obvious:

- Oil
- Income to pay the army
- Income to buy guns and napalm
- Income to build roads
- Even income to build a few schools and clinics in the "resettlement areas," the current Portuguese equivalent to the U.S. pacification hamlets in Vietnam, which have forced many Angolans off their land.

The muscle that comes from having a giant U.S. corporation on your side.

It's just one more time when the people of a country fighting for liberation find American power lined up with the army of the enemy.

(Much of the information in this article is taken from an Africa Fund Bulletin: "American Oil Investments in Angola and Mozambique." Copies can be obtained from The Africa Fund, 164 Madison Ave., New York City, 10016.)

GULF AND BOLIVIA

In October, 1969, after the Ovando regime in Bolivia announced the expropriation of Gulf's Bolivian oil-fields, Gulf Oil board Chairman E.D. Brockett called for imposition of the Hickenlooper Amendment cutting off U.S. aid to Bolivia.

POSSIBLE ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO GULF OIL

A campaign against Gulf Oil is being launched this spring by a number of organiza-

tions, including the Committee of Returned Volunteers (a "movement" organization made up of ex-Peace Corps types and the like). A booklet exposing Gulf's international activities will be produced. Possible actions include demonstrations and leafleting at various Gulf offices in the country and a "happening" at the Gulf stockholders meeting on April 28.

If you are interested in participating in this campaign, consider the following questions:

- 1) Do you own any shares of Gulf stock?
- 2) Does an institution (e.g. university, corporation, etc.) with which you are affiliated have Gulf stocks?
- 3) Do you know of foundations, schools or any other "worthy causes" which receive substantial funds from Gulf?

Please let us know about questions 2 and 3. And for more information, write either the Editor of Southern Africa or the Committee of Returned Volunteers, New York, Southern Africa Committee, P.O. Box 380, Cooper Station, New York City, 10003.

GULF AND IRAN

"There is no doubt at all that the C.I.A. organized and directed the 1953 coup that overthrew Premier Mohammed Mossadegh and kept Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi on his throne. But few Americans know that the coup that toppled the government of Iran was led by a C.I.A. agent who was the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt.

Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt...is still known as "Mr. Iran" around the C.I.A. for his spectacular operation in Teheran more than a decade ago..." Kim Roosevelt "later left the C.I.A. and joined the Gulf Oil Corporation as 'government relations' director in its Washington office. Gulf named him a vice-president in 1960."

--The Invisible Government, Wise and Ross, p. 111.

(Ed. After the overthrow of Mossadegh, all oil properties were not restored to the old holder Anglo-Iranian; a new corporation was given control of the properties and 8% of the holdings went to each of the five major U.S. oil corporations, including Gulf.)

that all corporations, or agencies using the University facilities guarantee "absolute equality of opportunity in all facets of its operations, domestic and foreign, and in all branches, subsidiaries or affiliates under its control and responsibility." If a corporation did not comply it would mean "immediate termination of its option to conduct job placement interviews on the university campus."

On November 25, the University Senate, with 30 members absent, held proceedings on the Resolution and defeated it 35 to 17. The UCONN FREE PRESS commenting on the vote headlined an article, "UCONN SENATE SAYS 'NO' TO RACISM BUT VOTES 'YES' TO APARTHEID-TO SOUTH AFRICAN REICH-TO THE 407 U.S. CORPORATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICAN HOLDINGS-TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM-TO EXPLOITATION OF BLACK WORKERS." (12/10/69, UCONN FREE PRESS)..

During the Senate discussions some students sat in on the proceedings. Overheard were such faculty comments as: "This resolution will not do away with racism in South Africa... We should do something more meaningful such as boycotting all products made by American firms, because they all have something to do with racism!" "I'm terribly concerned with the purity of the University.... Are we supposed to give attention to every moral issue that arises on our campus? When are we going to get back to our basic job of insuring academic freedom and the true calling of the scholar?" "...How about conferring with the Placement Advisory Committee and see about the feasibility of submitting the whole thing to a student referendum - not binding on anyone of course."

In addition, the paper reprinted a letter from the Dean of Engineering to various faculty members: In this letter the Dean said: "...No matter how devoutly I might believe in the validity of the issues, it is my conviction that a University can imperil its existence as a 'community of scholars searching for the truth' and its basic concepts of academic freedom if it tries to let political bias on current national or international issues govern its own policy decision...."

All of these and other well-known comments indicate the present unwillingness of academia to deal with the issues of racism, of Southern Africa, or corporate exploitation even, as phrased in the UCONN. resolution, in its most mild and liberal form.

At the U. of Conn. the prime movers of the campaign, many of whom were involved in

Recruiters for Racism- University of Conn. Model

Beginning in the fall, a core group of interested students and faculty posed the issue of institutionalized racism at the university through developing and lobbying for the University Senate to pass a resolution demanding

support of the GE strike, are now working on the building of a base and the "slow educating and converting" of students. They have seen many of the pitfalls of a parliamentary approach to the Southern Africa issue (which can be seen as simply a logical consequence of the present American system), and feel that more basic educational work must be done.

A campaign aimed at campus recruiters from corporations involved in southern Africa must be seen as part of the conscious-building program itself - as a way of concretizing the issue. In certain cases the legalistic approach may lead to a success. If so the banning of such recruiters would provide significant precedents for the movement as a whole.

CABORA BASSA: PORTUGAL AND ITS ALLIES

On December 5, the South African Digest reported that the first convoys had left South Africa for the Cabora Bassa site. (See map page 9). Globe Transport of Germiston, S.A. plans three convoys a week over the next five years. A large drilling rig, compressors, four-wheel drive trucks for on-site communications and timber and building materials are among the items in the first convoys.

But the project is not without its difficulties. The withdrawal of the Swedish firm A.S.E.A. from the consortium (see article in Southern Africa, October, 1969) marks the first serious break with Portugal of a western European country. Sweden is, with Portugal, a member of the European Free Trade Association, and it is likely to move further in its conflict with Portugal over the colonial issue. In October Marcelino Dos Santos of FRELIMO and Amílcar Cabral of PAIGC, were guests at the Swedish Social Democratic Party Congress. Later a grant of financial aid to the two movements was approved unanimously by Parliament. (See "La Suede Conteste le Portugal", Africasia, 24/11/69.

ASEA was to supply mercury valves for the long-distance power transmission lines, a technology in which it excels. The competition now includes English Electric, which has a know-how sharing agreement with ASEA,

and the German companies Siemens and Brown Boveri, already involved in the ZAMCO consortium, which maintain that their new advanced thyristors can replace the mercury valves. ASEA's reason for withdrawing was that the project involved violation of Rhodesian sanctions. Such involvement would be particularly blatant in the case of a British company, and might invite reprisals by Zambia against the English Electric subsidiary there. The Germans, already involved in the consortium, are unlikely to be troubled by such considerations.

(For a detailed article on Cabora Bassa and its significance in the Southern Africa struggle see High Stakes at Cabora Bassa, Sechaba, December, 1969.)

BRIEF NOTES:

MALAWI AND PORTUGAL are solidifying their relationship with the establishment of the Malawi Embassy in Lisbon and an exchange of visits between the Governor-General of Mozambique and Dr. Banda. Governor-General Rebelo de Sousa visited in November; Dr. Banda is to reciprocate ~~this~~ year. A new Commercial Bank of Malawi is to be established, Malawi having 40% of the capital, Portugal 60%.

IN SEPTEMBER 1969, FRELIMO shot down an American plane with markings of Bendix Aviation Corporation, Pioneer Division, as it was raiding a village in Cabo Delgado province. The American Embassy in Tanzania has sent an inquiry to the United States State Department.


THE JOINT SOUTH AFRICAN-PORTUGUESE Kunene hydroelectric scheme on the Angola-South West Africa border is due to begin soon. The whole scheme will cost around-L- 35m. The first phase will give South West Africa all the power and water it needs until the turn of the century. The irrigation potential is enormous, and already some South African ranchers have settled in southern Angola.

A SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY has been awarded the contract for extensions to the Petrangol oil refinery in Angola. Once Babcock and Wilcox of Africa have completed the extensions, the refinery will fully satisfy Angola's requirements for gas, oil, liquid petroleum, jet fuel, fuel oil and petrol. Petrangol is 1/3 Portuguese government, 1/3 Portuguese private capital, and 1/3 owned by the Belgian company Petrofina.

JAPAN-SOUTH AFRICA WIDEN TIES

10,000 tons of manganese ore will be shipped by the African Metals Corporation to the Mizushima Ferro-Alloy Company plant where it will be smelted. If the test is a success, Amcor will contract with the Japanese to build a furnace in South Africa to produce high carbon ferro-manganese (to be used in steel). (News From South Africa, 11/26/69)

SOUTH AFRICA HAS DISCOVERED COPPER in a remote area. What may prove to be large quantities of the metal has been found by the Anglo Transvaal Consolidated Investment Company. The site is in the Northern Cape Province, and it is believed that geologists are more optimistic than has officially been disclosed so far. The United States Steel Corporation has a 15% share in the operation, representing an investment of \$7.4 million. U.S. Steel has the option of another 15% in February. (New York Times, 12/6/69)



Although written for a British readership, the section of his article which follows is a partial rebuttal to American right-wing proponents of a similar alliance with South Africa.

"As a result of our peacetime naval planning with South Africa, and naval exercises which are conducted with the South African Navy, the Government are perfectly satisfied that no threat exists in the South Atlantic or south Indian Ocean for which there is not at present adequate provision. The Conservatives have yet to explain how some extra alliance with South Africa would take care of this situation in a way different from now.

"One point which is frequently forgotten by those who raise the spectre of the Russian fleet and the likelihood that it would attack, harass and obstruct our merchant ships is that shipping lanes are not and can never be given a kind of static protection provided by warships sailing up and down them like sentries. If shipping comes under attack it has been proved time and again that the most effective method of protection is to form convoys and position one's warships where they can protect a mass of merchant shipping, rather than to dissipate them along the whole route which our shipping has to sail.

SOUTH AFRICA AND DEFENCE

An increasingly popular argument in support of friendship with South Africa by right-wing Americans with racist leanings has been South Africa's strategic naval importance. Strom Thurmond recently inserted in the Congressional Record a copy of a three page article contending that Russian naval activity in the Indian Ocean more than justified a strong and friendly link with South Africa, whose ports and facilities could be badly needed in the future to counter-balance growing Soviet naval power in that area of the world.

(You may wish to write Senator Thurmond for his approach to Southern Africa. His comments are fascinating and might well rival those of Smith or Vorster if put in print.)

In a lengthy analysis in the London Times of November 5, 1969, Charles Douglas Home, right-wing analyst and son of the Conservative Party's shadow foreign secretary and former prime minister, wrote an assessment of South Africa's strategic importance to Britain.

New U.N. PUBLICATION

OBJECTIVE JUSTICE: Vol. 2 #1 January, 1970, OPI/380, \$1.00.

In response to General Assembly resolutions calling for substantial publicity on Apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism, the U.N. Office of Public Information has turned out the second of a series of magazines on Southern Africa. A compilation of much of the Special Committee on Apartheid's work, this issue of Objective Justice contains articles by Mary Benson and Bishop Ambrose Reeves on events inside South Africa, Eliot Zupnick on trade boycott, and Robert Resha, an ANC representative on the U.N.

Ashe Seeks Entry to South Africa

Arthur Ashe, who has faced controversy for having competed against South African white tennis players, has formally applied for a visa to play in that country's championships next March. He would be the first black athlete to compete individually against whites there. In his statement to the press recently, he was careful to point out that he would be visiting South Africa "to play tennis and only to play tennis, although it's natural that I have a desire to see the country first hand, too."

Ashe claims the support of the United States Lawn Tennis Association; Secretary of State William P. Rogers; The South African Lawn Tennis Union (which has accepted his entry); Owen Williams, who directed this year's U.S. Open; and Cliff Drysdale, who represents a group of South African tennis players. The top-seeded American appears to be serious in wanting "to make sure everything goes through the proper channels with no mistakes."

The South African government, however, has indicated that it is unlikely Ashe will get the visa. Frank W. Waring, the Minister of

Sport and Recreation, has charged that Ashe's intentions are "to engage in political activity" and that he has shown "an outright unfriendly and threatening attitude to South Africa."

Ashe concedes he has made anti-South African statements, "but only in relation to the original issue in which I am involved: as a black athlete excluded from competing in South Africa solely because of his color." He said he is seeking entry as an American citizen and "not to expound my political beliefs about South Africa, but simply to play my best possible tennis."

Professional tennis players in South Africa have warned that if Mr. Ashe is turned down it could be "catastrophic for South African tennis," according to the N.Y. Times of December 21, 1969. "South Africa is now excluded not only from the Olympics, but also from table tennis, soccer, amateur boxing, weight-lifting, fencing and judo." Furthermore, says the Times correspondent, "if he is granted a visa it could be a tremendous gain for South Africa in world sport. If not, it will mean almost certain exclusion from the International Tennis Federation, the Davis Cup and international tennis in general."

South African teams "are still accepted in but are in danger of being forced out of the pentathlon, wrestling, gymnastics, and squash. They are accepted, but on a restricted basis, in swimming, hockey, rugby, cricket, tennis and golf."

With an eye to the international events this year, pressures are mounting against South African participation in the last four sports in particular, the four closest to the hearts and egos of most white South Africans.

Vorster Comments on International Sport

"The Prime Minister warned the world last night that international sport was degenerating, that is, was being recklessly exploited by people with political motives, and that if this continued, sports would soon serve no purpose whatsoever." (STAR, 11/11/69)

What political motives and what purpose, Mr. Vorster?

In South Africa the RAND DAILY MAIL, November 18, 1969, offers editorial opinion in response to such attitudes:

Whether we like it or not, the world has undergone a moral revolution in our time. And one of its results is that racial discrimination is widely regarded as degradation.

...We proudly believe that we do South Africa a service by bringing it that message. And as for the stupid charge, made by the Prime Minister among others, that we would like to see a sports tour wrecked, this is the simple answer: We should like to see our sportsmen accepted in international competition all over the world. We should like to see them playing and competing with anybody and everybody--abroad and in South Africa. It is not our attitude that is making matters difficult for them. It is the Government's.

The irony of this debate is not even subtle considering the official policy of the government with regard to international competition in sport with South Africa. Initiated in 1967 it is as follows:

- 1) Politics should be kept out of sport and the team selection should not be politically influenced.
- 2) Sport should not be used as the thin end of the wedge for other motives.
- 3) The side selected should not create any internal difficulties in South Africa for the Government. (STAR, 11/21/69)

New Zealand Rugby Tour Still Uncertain

The Johannesburg Star of November 21, 1969, quotes the Minister of Information, Social Welfare and Pensions and Immigration, Dr. C. Mulder, as having stated categorically that South Africa would only decide after the New Zealand selectors had named their team, whether the team would be acceptable to the Republic. The three conditions (see above article) are the preconditions which will determine the final decision on whether Vorster's qualifying "but..." will become an unqualified "yes."

Dr. Mulder said, "Like a good tennis player, Mr. Vorster had put the ball into the New Zealand court. It was now up to New Zealand to hit the ball back over the net. If it hit the ball into the net and it fell back on its side, Mr. Vorster was fully entitled to say to New Zealand: 'You do not want to play tennis. We are wasting our time.'"

But the RAND DAILY MAIL, four days later, quoted Dr. Mulder as saying that "It has been finalised that the Maoris can come. If there is not political interference they will come." He said the decision was made final on the basis of the three conditions outlined by Mr. Vorster in 1967.

Casting devious analogies aside, why not simply call a political football a political football?

At the United Nations

On December 22, 1969, the Security Council of the United Nations voted a motion of censure against Portugal for "violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Guinea." The decision, passed 9-0 with six abstentions (including Portugal's NATO allies France, U.K. and the U.S.A.), was "without much punch," according to several U.N. analysts who noted that six abstentions badly weakened its impact.

Perhaps encouraged by the number of abstentions, the Portuguese representative declared the text "entirely one-sided" since it did not reflect the situation created by the international conspiracy "to provide aid for the armed attacks launched from Guinea.

The resolution deeply deplored "the loss of life and heavy damage to several Guinean villages inflicted by the Portuguese military authorities" operating from bases in Portuguese Guinea. It further warned Portugal "that if such acts were to be repeated in the future, the Council would have to seriously consider further steps to give effect to this decision."

The Guinean representative thanked the Council for its support and stated that as long as Portugal, a "sick person," had proved "allergic to medicine," only surgery was possible, and the forces of national liberation had undertaken this. He asked the allies of Portugal to appeal to it to undertake a dialogue with the freedom fighters.

Before the vote, those who explained their abstention said that there was not enough evidence to enable them to take a position on the conflicting allegations.

NEW PUBLICATIONS

The following new International Defence and Aid Fund Publications are available from:

ACOA
164 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10016

SOUTH AFRICA: THE VIOLENCE OF APARTHEID

by A. Sachs: 75¢ An examination of South Africa's penal system, law enforcement, punishment by decree, racial laws, security system, prisons and prisoners.

SOUTH AFRICA: "Resettlement"--The New Violence 60¢ The South African government's massive uprooting of hundreds of thousands of Africans to make South Africa's "white spots" white.

SOUTH AFRICA: WORKERS UNDER APARTHEID by Alex Hepple. 90¢ South Africa's racial code showing how discriminatory laws and practices affect employment, wages, trade unionism.

SOUTH AFRICA: THE BOSS LAW 25¢ South Africa's "new instrument for maintaining white supremacy" is framed in the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). This new bureau is "designed to intimidate the opponents of apartheid and suppress the ugly truth about the treatment of political victims".

RHODESIA: WHY MINORITY RULE SURVIVES. 50¢ Background leading to U.D.I., negotiations with Britain, Rhodesia's alliance with South Africa, sanctions, international financial interests, Rhodesian lobby. (the above annotations taken in part from the Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa bulletin Christmas, 1969).

BOOK REVIEW

SOUTH AFRICA'S DEFENCE STRATEGY by Abdul S. Minty. Published by The Anti-Apartheid Movement, 89 Charlotte St. London W.1. 30¢

A study which reveals ways in which, despite the official U.N. arms embargo,


Western Governments aid South Africa's mighty military machine, particularly in allowing South Africa to purchase licenses and blueprints for military equipment. An example, cited in the Observer's review of Minty's booklet (Nov. 2, 1969) is that of engines for South Africa's Impala aircraft. The engines are of British design (Rolls Royce Bristol Division), although South Africa is making them under license agreement with an Italian firm. In addition, the booklet reveals that the British Marconi Co. built a military radar system along the northern border of South Africa (1965), while in 1967 Decca Co. helped with a radio navigational system (at the cost of £ 3m.) covering the coastline of South West Africa to the South African Natal Coast.

The booklet goes beyond the question of British complicity to outline South Africa's relationship with the rest of Africa, Portugal, the "South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO)" plans, and includes appendices on military forces and expenditures.

Selected List of U.N. Publications

- Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa: No. OPI/316 \$1.00
 - Segregation in South Africa
 - Questions and Answers on the Policy of Apartheid: No. E.69.1.15 50¢
 - The Effects of Apartheid on Education, Science, Culture and Information in S.A. No. 67.1.6 40¢
 - Foreign Trade Statistics of Africa-Series B, No. 13; Trade by Commodity: No. E/F.68.11.K.3 \$5.00
 - Foreign Investment in the Rep. of South Africa No. E.68.11.K.8 50¢
 - Apartheid and Repressive Measures in S.A. No. OPI/265 15¢
 - Apartheid and the Treatment of Prisoners in South Africa: OPI/279 \$1.00
 - Action Against Apartheid No. OPI/364
 - Foreign Economic Interests and Decolonization No. OPI/370 30¢
 - Military and Police Forces in the Rep. of S.A. No. E.67.II.K.25 50¢
 - Repressive Legislation of the Rep. of S.A. No. E.69.II.k.8 \$2.00
 - Apartheid-A selective Bibliography on the Racial Policies of the Rep. of S.A. ST/LIB/22
 - The ILO and "Apartheid" Nov. 1969
 - Eleventh Report on the Special Committee on Apartheid (under publication)
- Order: Sales Section, United Nations, N.Y.
Room LX2332

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