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
# SOUTHERN AFRICA

## Focus on Namibia

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MAY 1979

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Corporations cover  
 Uranium and Diamonds  
 INTENSIFY THE STRUGGLE  
 SWAPO leader interviewed  
 SOUTH AFRICA  
 Tricks and treats in the

Tanzania 8shs. Mozambique 35esc.

# SOUTHERN AFRICA

Volume XII Number 4

MAY 1979

## Why No April Issue

Dear Readers,

Unfortunately we could not bring out an April edition of the magazine. We didn't have the money to pay printers or type-setters. Added to that we had to move to new offices—because our rent was being doubled.

We are not yet able to cover our basic monthly budget from subscriptions alone, so that our income has to be supplemented by grants.

We already have large debts, and when it became clear that our April income would not come near covering the cost of producing the magazine, we were forced to miss an issue.

We plan to keep going, and have been working hard looking for grants. But our future really depends on our ability to increase our subscription list to 10,000. That would give us a strong enough economic base to support our monthly operational expenses. Fundraising could then be directed towards special projects, promotion and further improvements.

If each of our present readers encouraged two others to subscribe, or bought two gift subscriptions, we would come close to reaching that goal.

We know from your letters that you think the magazine is important. Please help us keep it alive and growing.

A luta continua  
The Southern Africa Collective

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Young SWAPO supporter  
(credit: SWAPO Information)

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# Update

## Solomon Mahlangu Executed

Despite widespread internal and international protest, on April 6th the South African government executed by hanging Solomon Mahlangu, a young black political prisoner. Mahlangu, a member of the banned African National Congress, had been convicted of complicity in the shooting of two white men in Johannesburg in June 1977.

The shooting occurred as Mahlangu and two companions fled from police who had found a hand grenade in one of their bags.

Although Mahlangu was present at the scene of the shooting, the judge said in court that he accepted that Mahlangu had not fired the fatal shots. They were fired by Mondy Motloung, who was so badly beaten up by the police after the deaths that he was found unfit to stand trial.

Solomon Mahlangu, 22 at the time of his execution, had joined the African National Congress soon after the Soweto uprising in 1976. He left South Africa for military training and returned shortly before his arrest.

## Front-Line States Hail Amin Downfall

Last November, when Idi Amin sent Ugandan troops across the Tanzanian border, among the strongest voices raised in support of Tanzania were those of Mozambique and Zambia. An official Mozambican statement linked the attack to Tanzania's role in support of liberation movements in southern Africa, and accompanying news articles noted Uganda's role in training military personnel for Rhodesian "internal settlement" leader Sithole.

When the Ugandan National Liberation Front proclaimed a new government on April 11, the "front-line states"—Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola—were among the first African states to grant recognition. The future of the new governing coalition in Uganda may be uncertain, but at least the key state of Tanzania no longer has the debilitating distraction of a hostile Ugandan government. And some at least among the new Ugandan leaders are known for their strong

support for liberation struggles in southern Africa. Ugandan Minister of State for Defense Yoweri Museveni was one of seven students from the University of Dar es Salaam who in 1968 spent four weeks travelling in the liberated areas of Mozambique with FRELIMO, and subsequently played an active role in training anti-Amin guerrillas.

## "Christian League" Linked to Info Scandal

According to information received by the *Guardian* (England), the South African government channeled perhaps as much as half a million dollars to the Christian League of Southern Africa, a right-wing church group which has organized a propaganda campaign against the World Council of Churches and its aid to liberation movements in southern Africa. In November last year, a Christian League representative had admitted to *Christian Science Monitor* reporter June Goodwin the receipt of about \$26,000 from US publisher John McGoff, who had been accused of active involvement with the South African Information Department efforts in the United States. But the *Guardian* report is the first confirmation of suspicions that the group was receiving South African government funding.

Christian League head Rev. Fred Shaw denied the *Guardian* report, but said, "If we receive money from the South African government and it is given to us so that we don't know who gave it to us, and with no strings attached, then the South African government must be praised as the most Christian government in the world."

## South Africa/US Quarrel Over Spies

The South African and US governments last month engaged in an exchange of angry gestures, posing new problems for Western diplomatic efforts premised on South African cooperation. First, South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha announced on April 12 the expulsion of three US military personnel attached to the US embassy, charging that the Ambassador's plane had been fitted with a spy camera to photograph sensitive South African installations. In retaliation, then, the US expelled two South African military attaches stationed in Washington.

US officials did not bother to make a comprehensive denial of the South African

charges, but rather implied that South Africa had long known about these relatively low-level, routine intelligence operations. The expose, officials hinted in off-the-record remarks, was probably intended to distract from South Africa's internal information scandal and to provide an excuse for a more belligerent stand in Namibia (and in Zimbabwe).

It is no secret that the US has long been capable of monitoring South African terrain via detailed photographs provided by its satellite system.

Some observers have thus expressed concern that the US plane's mission may have had more to do with searching out the movements of liberation forces, than with seeking out major South African government installations.

## Rhodesia Times New Raids to Election

Following the April 10 vote by whites, the first stage in Rhodesia's internal settlement selection, Rhodesia mounted yet another series of raids on neighboring African states Botswana and Zambia (fighting has been virtually constant in areas of Mozambique adjoining Rhodesia). The ferry linking Botswana and Zambia at Kazungula was destroyed, and 14 ZAPU officials kidnapped from Francistown, Botswana. Refugee and allegedly guerrilla camps were attacked in northern Zambia on two successive days, reportedly killing several hundred people. And in two raids into the Zambian capital Lusaka, Rhodesian commandoes destroyed Liberation Center, which houses movement offices, and several residences belonging to ZAPU, including the house of its leader Joshua Nkomo, who escaped injury.

Characteristic of the raids in Lusaka and Botswana was the disguise of Rhodesian troops in the uniforms of Botswanan and Zambian soldiers, a technique that has also been frequently used on raids into Mozambique.

The attacks, as did an earlier raid on Mozambican oil storage tanks, emphasize the military vulnerability of the African states aiding Zimbabwe's guerrillas, and pose the prospect of escalation of the war into a wider conventional conflict.

Particularly ominous for the future is the low-key international reaction to the Rhodesian raids, indicating that they have almost come to be accepted as normal occurrences. □

**UPDATE** this month was jointly prepared by *Africa News* and *Southern Africa*.

# SWAPO Ready to Continue the Struggle

**South Africa is seeking a way out of allowing free, UN supervised elections in Namibia. Recognizing this, SWAPO is preparing for a protracted people's war of liberation.**

*Hidipo Hamutenya has been a militant with SWAPO since 1961. Now at the age of 39, he sits on SWAPO's central committee and executive. He lives in Lusaka, Zambia and teaches history and politics to SWAPO cadres at the Institute for Namibia.*

*Hamutenya was a member of SWAPO's delegation to the most recent round of "proximity" talks on Namibia in March. While in New York, he spoke with Southern Africa about current developments inside Namibia and the prospects for the future as SWAPO sees them.*

**Recent months have seen considerable reporting on the Namibian diplomatic process, but there has been little or no news about the war there. What's happening on the ground inside Namibia?**

There has in fact been an intensification of guerrilla activities. The South African government itself has of late adopted the tactic of not reporting what has actually happened, except when it happens on such a large scale that it is impossible to cover it up. They only report when they feel obliged to justify some of their own activities, such as going into Angola or Zambia, ostensibly to strike at SWAPO bases.

But in general the intensity of guerrilla activity has been pretty high in recent months.

**What types of activities has SWAPO been engaging in? Are there attacks on South African outposts, or are there actions in the cities as well?**

There are both. There has been an ongoing penetration by our units into the country, and they have been engaging South African troops in their own camps and on patrol duty. There has also been contact with the people and underground work at an organizational level which has reached far into the towns.

The South Africans have been admitting that a lot of sabotage—blowing up bridges and railways—has been going on in the

Windhoek and Swakopmund areas, some 500 miles away from the border with Angola. This gives proof that guerrillas are deep inside the country and gives the lie to the nonsense that SWAPO only has bases in Zambia and Angola. The truth of the matter is that there are many units active deep inside the country.

The South Africans recently announced that they found a depot of arms, explosives, and weapons in three different farms in the Keetmanshoop vicinity, some 100 miles south of the Angolan border.

**The South Africans say that their defense forces have been keeping a low profile in Namibia in recent months, and they have blamed all the violence on SWAPO. Have they been keeping a low profile?**

Of course, they don't keep a low profile. They are constantly looking for SWAPO. They are terrorizing the local population. They are engaged in border patrols. They are torturing people, trying to find out the whereabouts of SWAPO guerrillas. They are very busy.

Many more troops have, in fact, been brought in recently. It seems that the South Africans had decided that in case there was a chance to implement the UN plan or to come to a ceasefire agreement, they wanted to have the upper hand on the eve of the signing of the agreement. So they have been pouring in troops and tanks throughout Namibia, and in particular in the northern parts.

**How many troops do the South Africans have there now?**

Previously, the estimate was 50,000. Now the number is closer to 65,000, an increase of more than 10,000 men in uniform.

**How can this be reconciled with the terms of the UN plan which calls for a withdrawal of South African troops?**

There is a contradiction here. The South Africans are worried, and wrongly so, that SWAPO will throw thousands of armed

men into the country, and they are trying to prevent that from happening.

This is wrong because our people are already inside the country. It's a waste of time and effort for them to pretend that it is now that they can block off the penetration of our forces into Namibia.

We are saying: let the ceasefire be announced and the world will know. We will be able to call our units to regroup inside Namibia at the time of the ceasefire. They will be able to see with their own eyes that our forces are there inside the country.

**What effect has this long period of negotiations—a year to agree to a plan and now almost a year to implement it—had on SWAPO's struggle inside Namibia?**

At a political level, many of our cadres have been arrested and detained to neutralize and weaken SWAPO just in case an election comes. But as they arrested our cadres who are organizing more or less publicly, there were many more underground activities going on, organized mainly by PLAN, SWAPO's Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia.

If the South Africans finally decide to go against the UN plan, we know they will round up all our people who are publicly active. So we have organized alternate lines of mobilization through our underground network.

We are pretty certain that whatever they do—even if the plan fails—we will be able to function in our underground organization.

**If the UN plan succeeds SWAPO will have to surface a complete political organization inside Namibia to participate in the elections. Is SWAPO's political structure in good shape? Can it mount an effective campaign?**

We are absolutely certain of that. We believe that we not only have the organizational structure but also the relevant political platform to win the election. We

think that we are the only organization which will not be ashamed to admit that we intend to seize the resources of Namibia and put those resources at the service of the working people of Namibia.

We will not compromise on that. We have not made any deal with the ruling system. We think the people of Namibia will see who is talking in their interest. Medical, housing, whatever problems must be solved immediately—we feel we are the only organization which has a clear program.

**The past year has seen many confusing events in Namibia—constant negotiations, the December internal elections, the formation of other political groups. What's been the reaction of the ordinary Namibian?**

Ordinary Namibians know one thing: they have lived under South African rule. They understand or at least feel the anomaly of being dominated by South Africa. And they also understand the position of the groups sponsored, organized and maintained by South Africa. They are clear on that.

We think that once the doors are wide open for us to state clearly and categorically our position and tell the Namibian people what we are prepared to do for them to gain control over the economic life of our society—in terms of dispossessing the forces of the multinational corporations controlling the economic life of our society, in terms of improving the educational, medical, cultural facilities of our society—we are very confident that the people will choose us over anybody else.

**What happens if South Africa doesn't accept the UN plan and proceeds with its own internal settlement?**

We believe that is what will happen. We agreed to come to these talks fully aware that South Africa is not prepared to see a SWAPO government in Windhoek. The implementation of the plan—the way it is now—will definitely mean a victory for SWAPO.

So South Africa will find a way out, a way to wreck any chances of implementing the plan.

That being the prospect, we have never relented in our preparations for a protracted people's war of liberation. We are doing everything—training is going on, recruiting. We will continue the struggle.

We are confident that we have a reliable rear base upon which we can always count in Angola and Zambia. We also see our struggle not just as an isolated incident. We see it as an integral part of the overall struggle in southern Africa.

Some people would like us to believe that it's an impossible task to try to confront South Africa, but our answer is that just as much as Guinea-Bissau could play its part

in the destruction of the Portuguese fascist system, we are doing just that job. We are not alone. We are allied with the people of South Africa and Zimbabwe, and we are confident that on all these fronts, the ruling group in South Africa will be confronted. We are only doing our part, and we are very certain that when pressure is on, South Africa will have no choice but to abandon at least one of the fronts, and that will be Namibia. We will make it extremely costly for them to maintain Namibia.

The puppets cannot last for South Africa. Their installation will make no difference. We will be fighting the same South Africa we are fighting now. The puppets will be in Windhoek, but they will not be able to carry on the war on their own. And we are also certain of continued and increased material assistance from socialist countries and progressive African countries.

**What do you think the West will do if, as you expect, South Africa doesn't go along with the plan?**

We know one thing. The Western countries will not impose economic sanctions on South Africa. That is very clear. They are not in a position to cut their own throats. The multinational monopolies will never allow the governments in Washington, London, Paris, Ottawa, and Bonn ever to carry out economic sanctions against South Africa. In a recent interview with Botha by a journalist in one of the London dailies, Botha states clearly that he knows that sanctions will not only hurt South Africa, but other countries as well—referring of course to the West.

Now, the West will find an excuse. They are trying to blackmail us with all sorts of ridiculous demands, one of which is that SWAPO must not be allowed to have bases in neighboring countries which are not monitored by UNTAG. The other is that SWAPO should not be allowed to have bases inside Namibia. These are things they have agreed to during the talks.

We have made our position clear that our forces will be monitored, confined, and controlled in bases within Namibia. Now they are pretending that it wasn't clear during the talks. But it was clear.

They are trying to find an excuse so that they can justify their failure to get the cooperation of South Africa. They now have the option either to let South Africa confront the situation alone or to choose to pump money, agents, weapons, into the puppet regime that South Africa is going to set up in order to be able to fight "communist infiltrators from Angola."

They have tried that in Vietnam and in many other parts of the world, and they failed. The tide of history is on the side of what's right, and what is right is that South Africa and its neo-colonial plans in Namibia must be defeated.



# Right Turn in UK and US

In Washington and New York, foreign policy analysts are beginning to wonder out loud how long Andrew Young, Donald McHenry, Richard Moose, and the rest of the Carter administration's Africa policy "regionalists" can hold their jobs.

In London, no one is asking this question. Everyone assumes that Foreign Secretary David Owen and his associates, who have worked closely with their American counterparts on the issues of Rhodesia and Namibia, will be out of a job on May 3, the date of the British elections.

Conservative opinion, and power, is growing in both countries. On Africa policy, that growth in influence translates into what may become overwhelming pressure to reverse a policy that many conservatives regard as "tilted" toward the liberation movements of Rhodesia and Namibia.

Representatives of both liberation movements in New York and Africa don't see it that way. But conservatives do, and they have successfully made Africa policy an issue in both England and the US.

The present Labor government in London will not stand or fall because of its positions on Namibia or Rhodesia. Local issues are much more significant. But as the campaign got off the ground, Conservative Party officials quickly made it clear that if they are elected, Great Britain's policy in southern Africa will change.

By mid-April Conservative leader Margaret Thatcher had already outlined her party's strategy. It includes:

- Lifting economic sanctions against Rhodesia.
- Recognizing the internal government in Rhodesia if the election there "takes place in reasonably free and fair conditions and with a reasonable turnout."
- Dismissing completely the possibility of imposing sanctions on South Africa.
- Urging the US and the UN to "tilt" away from "favoring" SWAPO in negotiations over Namibia.

Francis Pym, the Conservative Party's foreign policy spokesman and likely candidate for Foreign Secretary in a Conservative government, said that his party was



**Margaret Thatcher—  
planning to lift sanctions**

taking these positions because "the situation has gotten worse" during the past year and a half in southern Africa. Pym attributed this to the "diplomatic failures" of the US and the Labor government.

The US and the Labor government made a "diplomatic error," Pym said, by "prejudging" the April elections in Rhodesia. He criticized their failure to send observers to Rhodesia. The Conservative Party has sent a six-member team, headed by Viscount Boyd, a member of the party's right wing.

Like many conservatives before them, Pym and Thatcher believe that the threat of communism is the single greatest danger facing Africa. They have expressed alarm at the "substantial footholds" that the Soviet Union and Cuba have established in Africa. "The communist threat has never loomed larger," Pym said not long ago.

Needless to say, the South African government is overjoyed at the prospect of a Conservative victory. The apartheid regime has kept a keen eye on developments in Britain, widely publicizing the statements of Pym and Thatcher. It is believed that South Africa is stalling on Namibia until

after the British ballots are cast.

In the United States, pressure to change policy is coming most directly from Congress. Pro-Ian Smith sentiment in the Senate is now very strong, and it is no longer restricted only to conservatives.

Senator Jacob Javits (R.-NY) said recently that his purpose in sponsoring last year's Case-Javits amendment, which sets out conditions for the lifting of Rhodesian sanctions, was to supply arms to the internal settlement regime. "The two guerrilla leaders have promised a bloodbath and to shoot people who dare to go to the polls," Javits said in recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings. "The question is: shall the United States aid the government which results from this election by giving it the necessary arms to defend the people of the country if that is our decision. We asked the president to do that."

But the Senate is only the most overt manifestation of growing pro-Salisbury sentiment. Less public is Pentagon thinking on the subject. A recent article in *Military Review*, the monthly magazine of the US Army Command and General Staff College in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, argues that all the Rhodesian army needs is a healthy dose of aid to expand its training facilities and programs, and it could defeat the Patriotic Front in ten to eighteen months. The author, Capt. James Bruton, a former intelligence officer now with army reserve, says that Western nations should help Rhodesia in its war effort by lifting sanctions.

And if *Business Week* is any barometer of current thinking among corporate executives, they, too, are questioning Carter policy, falling back on easy Cold War-style pronouncements. "No one would argue today," wrote *Business Week* in early April, "that the Cubans are a stabilizing influence in Angola, as [Andrew] Young did eighteen months ago. Even Carter liberals are learning that Soviet influence in southern Africa has become part of a worldwide pattern of confrontation between Moscow and Washington." □

M.S.

# South Africa Blocks Settlement

When the vice president of SWAPO, Mishake Muyongo, was in New York the week of March 19 for the last round of "proximity talks" on Namibia, someone referred to Namibia as the UN's "baby." "Namibia has been the oldest baby that has never walked," shot back Muyongo.

Now more than a month after those talks, South Africa still refuses to accept the UN independence plan, the Western five are showing some signs of flagging enthusiasm for the negotiating process, and the constituent assembly in Windhoek, led by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), is threatening to declare independence on its own. The baby may soon walk, but its first steps could turn it into an orphan.

Called together by the five Western nations that had negotiated the plan for Namibian elections under UN supervision the proximity talks opened March 19, just four days after a ceasefire monitored by UN peacekeeping forces was supposed to go into effect. And they were over almost as soon as they had begun.

In the past the negotiations—labeled proximity talks because SWAPO and South Africa never spoke face-to-face, but only negotiated near each other through the mediating Western five "contact group"—included just the two warring parties. But this last round of talks had been greatly expanded by a Western invitation to the foreign ministers of the front-line states and Nigeria to attend as well.

And there were more. Encouraged by South Africa, representatives of almost every political grouping in Namibia—from the DTA to the most right wing faction of the White Nationalist Party, the HNP—were on hand. In all there were at least ten groups represented, bringing the number of parties participating in the talks to more than twenty.

## South African Intransigence

The main obstacle to the implementation of the UN plan was the intransigence of South Africa. The apartheid regime would not "renegotiate" the plan, Foreign Minister Roelof Botha emphasized from the beginning. South Africa refused to accept two key provisions of the plan: the

establishment of SWAPO bases inside Namibia and the reliance on Angola and Zambia to monitor guerrilla bases in those neighboring countries.

Although Botha met with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance late Sunday night before the talks officially began, he did little talking over the next two days. Instead, he turned his attention to a meeting of the UN Security Council that began just as the talks were getting underway across First Avenue at the US Mission to the UN. The meeting was at the request of Angola, which had endured throughout the previous week continual South African bombing attacks and troops incursions in its southern provinces. Angola, to the surprise of the Western five, had also refused to take part in the proximity talks while South African planes bombarded its territory.



Botha was furious that the Security Council meeting was running opposite the Gang of Five's Gala Show across the street. "I find it incomprehensible," Botha wrote to the president of the Council, "that on the very day that the 'proximity talks' are to begin, a meeting of the Security Council is called ostensibly to condemn South Africa." Botha went on to attack SWAPO for what was, in effect, its continuing war against South African forces in Namibia and to suggest that the Council condemn SWAPO "for its violence against the people of South-West Africa."

Over the next two days, the Western five did hold meetings with all the parties at the

talks. The internal Namibian political groups—whose transportation and expenses in New York were paid by South Africa—told the five that they opposed the establishment of SWAPO bases inside Namibia, while the front-line states reiterated their support for SWAPO's position. Three representatives of Namibia's Council of Churches told the five that the UN plan "presents a fair compromise and lays a good ground for further practical arrangements leading to a United Nations supervised election."

Efforts to determine who else representatives of the Namibian parties may have seen while they were in New York were unsuccessful. Aside from entering and leaving the US Mission, individuals such as the DTA's Dirk Mudge were practically invisible.

It is known, though, that the UN made a special effort to convince two of the parties, SWAPO-D, a recent split-off from SWAPO, and the Namibian National Front, to accept the UN plan. But neither Secretary General Kurt Waldheim nor his special representative Martti Ahtisaari could break through the groups' unanimous opposition to SWAPO.

Incidentally, there are some groups that weren't invited to the talks. Among them are two all-white Ku Klux Klan-type vigilante groups recently formed in Namibia, which, according to the *Windhoek Observer*, have pledged "an armed revolt should it become an exigency." One is known as *Blankswa*, composed of young Afrikaners. The other, known as *Wit Weerstandsbeweging*, is German-speaking—remember Namibia was once a German colony—and committed to the use of armed force. Its stickers displaying a three-pronged, swastika-like symbol with the slogan, "Onward White South Africa in South-West," have been appearing around Windhoek. The *Observer* says this group has compiled a "death list" of its enemies, with black church leaders "ranking prominently."

## Electronic Monitoring Equipment

The proximity talks didn't really end; they sort of dissolved away. After meeting finally with the five, Botha announced that



South African troops on desert patrol

he was returning to South Africa. Only then was it learned that the five had made at least one proposal to attempt to erase South Africa's opposition to the plan. The US had offered to provide sophisticated electronic monitoring devices to the UN to keep watch on SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia.

By the end of talks, SWAPO representatives were still bewildered as to why they had been invited to attend in the first place. As SWAPO's Muyongo tells it, the contact group did little or no mediating between the two antagonists. "We are ready," Muyongo stated. "SWAPO is prepared to implement the plan tomorrow. Is South Africa ready? Can the five tell us that South Africa is ready?"

"We would like to trust the Western five. But they still have to do a lot of ground-work to convince us. They have not managed to deliver South Africa. They said they were going to do that."

Despite the public optimism of the five after the talks broke up, SWAPO was convinced that South Africa was not going to accept the plan. "The South Africans are nowhere near the word honest. They are nowhere near sincerity," Muyongo said bitterly. "They are just a bunch of thugs." Muyongo said South Africa was just "pretending" to seek a peaceful settlement

in Namibia. "They want a regime they can control—a regime of quislings."

Muyongo insisted that the Western five never directly informed SWAPO of its offer to provide electronic monitoring equipment. Muyongo said that the first he learned of the suggestion was in press accounts and that when he asked the five to confirm or deny the offer, they wouldn't.

SWAPO opposes the use of such equipment ("We are not going to have a Vietnam in Namibia") and also continues to oppose any Western participation in either the UN peacekeeping force or its logistical support systems. "Let them leave other countries to participate," Muyongo demanded. "They have to stay out and support the plan so that if it breaks down, they aren't found within it, and they can help put it back together. We don't want to think that they put together this plan for other motives."

But obviously SWAPO believes the West does have other motives. One SWAPO official said privately that the West's eagerness to involve its forces, coupled with the introduction of electronic equipment, could mean the direct extension of NATO military influence into southern Africa.

#### Whose Deviations?

The electronic equipment was one way

the West had tried to ease South Africa's anxieties about the UN's so-called deviations from the original plan. But who is really deviating? The Western five back the plan, and South Africa's own, influential weekly, the *Financial Mail* has admitted that South Africa is "on rather shaky ground" in accusing the UN of deviations. The *Mail* quotes Western sources that say the plan implicitly restricts SWAPO personnel inside Namibia at the time of the ceasefire to bases there. "It is not logical to send Namibians outside their country after a ceasefire," said a Western source. Other sources told the *Mail* that South Africa's current interpretations conflicted with its "negotiating history."

South Africa's intransigence has not gone uncriticized in the West. "The whole exercise is slowly dying," commented the West German ambassador to the UN in April, adding that the only thing left to do was to refute South African "lies" over how that came about. A senior US official recently characterized South Africa as "the only obstacle" to an immediate settlement.

Since the talks ended, South Africa has avoided giving the UN a definite answer, choosing instead to bombard the UN press corps almost daily with what it calls accounts of SWAPO "terrorism." It's clear now that the apartheid regime is stalling for all the time it can get, hoping to reassess the situation after the internal elections in Rhodesia and the British elections early in May.

#### An Internal Solution

But at the same time, and clearly not without South Africa's tacit approval, the constituent assembly is beginning to move toward an independence of its own. DTA chairman Dirk Mudge announced in early April that his party favored the establishment of an interim government in Namibia by mid-May. Mudge said he had "lost confidence in the Western powers" to bring about a settlement in Namibia and that the DTA was ready to "go it alone." Mudge also vowed tough action against SWAPO since that interim government was established.

That sentiment appears to be spreading to the other internal parties in the territory. By mid-April the South African Broadcasting Company was reporting that Aktur, a small rightist party, had submitted a formal request to the South African government proposing negotiations among the Namibian groups "to work out a process whereby the independence process could be concluded in a way that was orderly and as representative as possible." The proposal is said to have the backing of the Liberation Front, the Namibian Christian Democratic Party, the Namibia People's Liberation Front, and the Rehoboth Democratic Par-

*continued on page 14*



# Corporate Interests Prepare for UDI

**The expectation that a SWAPO government will seek renegotiation of existing mining contracts is proving a powerful incentive for vested corporate interests to back a DTA regime.**

by a Special Correspondent

After the inconclusive "proximity talks" held in New York at the end of March on the initiative of the Western "contact group," the likelihood that South Africa will opt for a UDI solution for Namibia has substantially increased. Indeed many African diplomats who have watched the course of the two-year negotiation effort are convinced that South Africa has already taken the decision in principle and is only waiting for the most propagandistically suitable moment to make the announcement.

Plans have already been made for the rapid transfer of government powers in Namibia to the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), led by the ex-National Party deputy leader in Namibia, Dick Mudge. The Administrator-General, Justice M.T. Steyn, has shown increasing partiality towards the DTA and has declared that the constituent assembly, set up last December after the South African-sponsored elections in which the DTA "won" 80 percent of the registered vote, is a valuable advisory body which deserves more powers.

While even the most sanguine South African officials realize that a unilaterally established DTA regime will win almost no international recognition, even from Western countries, they expect that this disadvantage will be offset by the willingness of overseas financial and corporate interests to place their eggs in a pro-private enterprise, DTA basket. With this in mind, Justice Steyn has been gradually building up the institutional nucleus for a separate Namibian entity.

During 1978, a number of government departments, controlled since the 1969 South-West Africa Affairs Act by Pretoria, have been retransferred to Windhoek. Large numbers of South African economists and government advisers are currently in Windhoek where they are working with Steyn's

officials to establish separate institutions for the main sectors of the economy.

In addition a number of South African parastatals active in Namibia have been redesignated as Namibian. Thus the former Bantu Investment Corporation is now retitled the First National Development Corporation of SWA/Namibia. Such measures are designed to give the formal appearance of self-government, while retaining South Africa's strong control over the major sections of the economy. Indications are that this ploy has the backing of the leading multinational firms already in Namibia, as well as a host of would-be investors.

## A Profitable Place


The attractions for the private corporation are considerable and were recently outlined in the first issue of "Rossing," a glossy tri-annual magazine published by Rossing Uranium Ltd., the operator of the world's single largest uranium mine which has now reached the production stage in Namibia. The article is authored by Leon

Kok, editor of the *Windhoek Advertiser*, the only English-language daily in Namibia, which was purchased by the DTA in 1978. Its former editor, Hennes Smith, claimed that South African government slush funds were involved in the deal.

Kok frankly refers to the "abundance of labor" as one of the main assets of the Namibian economy and claims, without any evidence, that economic ties between Namibia and South Africa are necessary to ensure "progress and stability."

In fact the evidence of recent research (see footnote) suggests the opposite, that Namibia's industrial development has been held back by the dominance of the South African economy, while Namibia's production of primary products, notably gem diamonds, base minerals, canned fish, and karakul sheep, has provided South Africa with an average some 10 percent of its total foreign exchange earnings in recent years.

The high rates of return on individual investments, particularly in the mining industry, where foreign mining companies such as De Beers (SA), AMAX (US), New-



Consolidated Diamond Mines: creating wealth for the South Africans

mont (US), Rio Tinto Zinc (UK), General Mining (SA), Falconbridge (Canadian) and Consolidated Gold Fields (UK/SA) are dominant, coupled with the low rates of taxation (with the exception of the hugely profitable gem diamond production) and the absence of any restriction of repatriation of profits and dividends, currently cost the Namibian economy some 30 percent of its estimated GNP of \$1 billion.

The expectation that a SWAPO government, with the assistance of sympathetic experts from the UN and British Commonwealth organizations, will seek renegotiation of existing contracts as well as much tighter fiscal arrangements is proving a powerful incentive for vested corporate interests to back a DTA regime.

In recent months, Windhoek has played host to a variety of potential investors,

business consultants, and representatives of international financial interests. The keenest have been executives from British, West German and US interests. With the approval of the federal government in Bonn, the Kreditanstalt Fur Wiederaufbau of Frankfurt is studying multi-billion mark loans. Cape Town financial executive Gideon Nel estimated that up to \$750 million

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## ROSSING URANIUM LIMITED

PERMITS TO VISIT THE MINE SITE ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS WILL ONLY BE ISSUED DURING WEEKDAYS AT THE RECEPTION OFFICE. PERSONS ENTERING WITHOUT PERMITS WILL BE PROSECUTED

PERMITTE OM DIE MYNTERREIN OP SATERDAE EN SONDAE TE BESOEK IS ALLEENLIK WEEKSDAE VERKRYGBAAR BY DIE ONTVANGSKANTOOR. PERSONE WAT DIE GEBIED SONDER TOESTEMMING BETREE SAL VERVOLG WORD.

DER PLATZ IST AM SONNABEND UND SONNTAG GESPERRT. AUSGABE VON PASSIERSCHHEINEN VON MONTAG-FREITAG AN DER RECEPTION WIDERRECHTLICHES BETRETEN DES GELANDES WIRD GESETZLICH VERFOLGT

Mining precious uranium for the British

# Uranium—Vital for Western Energy

Events over the past several months have dramatized the tenuous connection between the West and the areas on which it relies for energy resources. As the price of Middle Eastern oil increases and its availability diminishes, Western nations have been scrambling to develop alternative energy sources, focusing primarily on nuclear energy. While nuclear energy safety is under question in the United States, the countries of Western Europe are already committed to a nuclear energy policy, and are thus seeking to guarantee secure supplies of uranium—the necessary fuel for nuclear reactors.

In this respect, Namibia, with its abundance of uranium, has recently gained in political significance to the West. Namibia will shortly become the world's fifth largest major uranium producer (after the US, USSR, South Africa and Canada). The Rossing uranium mine, which is owned by British, French, West German, and South African interests, will be the world's largest single uranium mine when it reaches full production at the end of 1979. Situated northeast of Swakopmund, the mine will produce 5,000 tons per year of unrefined uranium oxide, worth an estimated \$230 million. Uranium in this form has been separated from the ore but still has to be treated and enriched before it can be used as a fuel element, processes for which no facilities currently exist in Namibia.

There are strong indications of further uranium reserves worth developing in Namibia, and at least six major mining companies have begun uranium prospecting

recently. Already South Africa's General Mining has found an ore-body similar to the Rossing deposit at Langer Heinrich, southeast of Swakopmund, and has begun design work on the mine. At Trekkopje, 12 miles northeast of Rossing, Gold Fields of South Africa has discovered a recoverable deposit but has not yet disclosed any production plans. Canada's Falconbridge Corporation, a French subsidiary of the aquitaine oil group, and other South African companies, have also joined the new "rush."

### Rossing Ownership

The UK's Rio Tinto Zinc corporation holds 45.5 percent of Rossing's equity directly, with Rio Algom, RTZ's Canadian associate. Other major shareholders are the South African state-owned Industrial Development Corporation (13.3 percent), Minatome of France, Urangesellschaft of West Germany, and South Africa's General Mining Corporation.

South Africa's IDC actually exercises greater control than is suggested by the above figures, according to Roger Murray, one of the authors of *The Nuclear Axis*, a recent study of South African nuclear power development. Rossing's equity structure is divided into "A" and "B" shares, the former having greater voting rights. IDC is a major "A" shareholder, and according to Murray actually has the power to control Rossing policy decisions.

Rio Tinto Zinc began producing uranium in Namibia in 1976, after ten years of surveys, tests, and construction. In 1968 the

British Atomic Energy Authority contracted to buy 7,500 tons of uranium from Rossing between 1977-82. The existence of this and other highly secret forward contracts was essential to the viable development of the mine.

Other major purchasers of Namibian uranium include British Nuclear Fuels in the United Kingdom and the Kansai Electric Power Company from Japan, which distributes it to nine electric power companies. The French government-owned company, Total, and the German company, Urangesellschaft, each receive ten percent of the uranium oxide produced at Rossing.

According to a paper prepared by Ruurd Huisman and presented to the Dutch Parliament in 1978, Rossing is under contract to deliver 7,600 tons of uranium oxide to British Nuclear Fuels (BNF) between 1976 and 1982. BNF supplies enriched uranium to the "Group of Utilities," a joint concern involving a number of British utility companies. West Germany's largest industrial firm, VEBA, has also contracted to buy Namibian uranium from Rossing.

The uranium that these European interests purchase from Namibia is enriched at Urenco, the joint Dutch, British, and German enrichment facility at Almelo in the Netherlands. Urenco also owns another enrichment facility at Capenhurst, England. Almelo enriches uranium for the Dutch and West German clients, while Capenhurst enriches for the British.

Currently, uranium oxide from Namibia is being flown to France at the rate of 70 tons per week—close to the mine's entire production. It then goes for treatment to the hexafluoride plants at Perralette in France and Springfield in the UK. Urenco Almelo has already begun to store uranium hexafluoride on its property and will soon start the enrichment process for delivery under contracts in the 1980's.

It seems certain that an important component of the powers' interest in Namibia stems from the desire to avoid political and military events that would result in an interruption of the production and transportation of key minerals, especially uranium. As the West's dependency on nuclear energy increases, so does the political and economic significance of Namibia's ongoing national liberation war. □

W.S.

# Voting at the Point of a Gun

It was clear from the first day of balloting in the Rhodesian internal elections held April 17-20 what was of primary concern to Rhodesian officials.

It wasn't who Rhodesia's blacks voted for that was important. What was important was how many of the almost three million black Rhodesians eligible to vote could be counted at the polls. Only with a large turnout could Rhodesian whites hope later for some international recognition of the government.

"Who runs the country is a matter of supreme indifference to these people," Maj. Andre Dennison, military commander of the Chibi area, said of black Rhodesians casting their ballots. "Basically, all they want is to be left alone with their cattle and families, getting along as they always have."

The fact is that if this were truly the case, Ian Smith would never have entered into even the internal settlement with three black leaders last March, and he would never have then proceeded to the five-day internal elections. Only massive black pressure has driven Rhodesian whites to these desperate survival maneuvers.

According to officials, Rhodesians turned out en masse at the polls. Initial cautious projections of a total turnout of 40-50 percent jumped to more than 70 percent by the third day of voting. There is little doubt that Rhodesian authorities consider the elections a resounding success.

## Propaganda Campaign

But the Rhodesian elections were orchestrated from the beginning almost as precisely as an Irving Berlin musical comedy.

Before the elections, the propaganda campaign mounted by Rhodesian authorities was massive. Besides the use of films and radio broadcasts, at least 30 million leaflets, ten leaflets for each eligible voter, were airdropped before voting began.

"One-man, one-vote is here," the flyers proclaimed. "Use your vote, because you and your vote can make these things things happen: majority rule, peace, more jobs, better education, prosperity, more opportunity, more hospitals and clinics, equal rights, international sport."

"We are all going to vote," concluded each leaflet. "That is what the people

want."

But the campaign avoided any detailed explanation of the constitution upon which the elections were based. That constitution guarantees, in effect, a disproportionate percentage of the seats in parliament for whites and continued white control of the significant reins of government for at least another decade.

The Patriotic Front vowed to disrupt the elections, and its leaders had called black voters to boycott the polls. Most of Rhodesia was under martial law before the elections began, but security provisions for the elections were so tight that even by Rhodesian standards, the country was unusually bristling with weapons. Rhodesian whites voted the week before the black balloting, presumably so that during the black elections, authorities could beef up normal police and military forces. Up to 100,000 men were mobilized, including every available white man between 18 and 50 and many younger and older.

Rhodesian authorities also detained an unknown number of persons believe to be Patriotic Front sympathizers.

It was an odd facet of these elections that whites could vote twice. They voted first for white candidates in the 20 white constituencies which cover the whole country. But they also had the privilege of voting for the 72 black candidates as well. Blacks did not have the reciprocal right. They could only vote for candidates whose skin color

matched their own.

## Rhodesians Hit ZAPU

Hoping to prevent the Patriotic Front from disrupting the balloting, Rhodesian forces intensified attacks on Front camps in neighboring Zambia and Botswana, while continuing incursions into Mozambique.

## Zimbabwe Errata

On page 7 of the March issue a crucial "not" was left out of our report of a discussion with Callistus Ndlovu, ZAPU's permanent representative at the UN. The sentence should have read: "Ndlovu said that it had always been ZAPU's policy not to discuss the progress of the war in detail." Our apologies to Mr. Ndlovu, ZAPU and our readers.

(See Update). Early on the morning of April 13 commandos, probably members of the Selous Scouts, attacked the home of ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo in Lusaka, Zambia. Dressed in Zambian army uniforms, and driving land rovers with Zambian markings, the raiders wrecked several buildings in the Zambian capital and killed at least ten people. Nkomo was not home at the time.

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Rhodesian soldiers delivered voters at gunpoint

# Information Scandal Revelations Continue

**Press reports have focused attention on conflicts between white power groups. A closer look suggests that it was black pressure which produced the massive political eruption. The entire Rhodiegate affair is only a series of aftershocks.**

How much can you buy with \$73 million? Five or six newspapers? A couple of seats in the US Senate? A few Japanese labor unions? A political party in Norway? A piece of a US presidential candidate?

Ask Eschel Rhoodie. The former South African Ministry of Information official says he has at least some of the answers locked away in safe deposit boxes



Eschel Rhoodie

somewhere in Europe.

The safe deposit boxes contain Rhoodie's life insurance policy—in the form of documents and 41 tape recordings detailing his ministry's secret, multi-million dollar campaign to win friends and influence people for the apartheid state.

It may be awhile before Rhoodie lets anyone listen to those tapes. So far, apparently nobody has offered to meet his \$200,000 asking price, aside from a mysterious South African millionaire named Josias van Zyl. Van Zyl jetted into Paris and promised Rhoodie a lucrative lifetime consultancy in exchange for a pledge to keep the tapes under lock and key and his mouth shut.

But the previews of coming attractions Rhoodie gave out in the course of several interviews with South African newspapers and a television interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation have set reporters from Johannesburg to Sacramento chasing down dozens of hot new leads.

In the United States, Rhoodie's latest revelations have fueled investigations on several fronts.

In addition to bank-rolling right-wing publisher John McGoff's bid to purchase the *Washington Star* (see *Southern Africa*, December 1978), South Africa is now known to have offered to bail out the short-lived conservative New York daily *The Trib*, to the tune of \$5 to \$10 million. Other South African funds are alleged to have been used for McGoff's purchase of the *Sacramento Union* in California and for an attempt that "came within a whisker of buying a California television station."

But South Africa didn't limit its efforts to those who report on the news. It also went after the people who make it. Recent reports in the South African press suggest that:



Connie Mulder

- the South African government may have secretly poured up to \$3.9 million into Gerry Ford's unsuccessful 1976 presidential campaign. Ford didn't make it back to the White House, but he did make it to Houston last year to give a speech at a business seminar, where he denounced moves to restrict US investment in South Africa. For that speaking engagement, Ford received a \$10,000 check from the South African Foreign Trade Organization;

- large sums of South African money


may have helped unseat former Senate Africa subcommittee Chairman Dick Clark last November. Reports suggest that funds to defeat one of the Senate's most knowledgeable and outspoken opponents of apartheid may have been channeled to his Republican challenger Roger W. Jepsen through anti-abortion "right to life" groups;

- substantial cash payments may have been made to prominent American union leaders to win their opposition to a one-week shipping blockade of South Africa called by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions;

- South African money may also have helped S.I. Hayakawa win the Senate seat of former California Senator John Tunney. Since arriving in Washington, Hayakawa has spoken out loudly and frequently in favor of closer ties with South Africa and Rhodesia.

Buying into a California Senate seat, a California newspaper, and a California television station may all have been just small parts of a far more grandiose scheme. As diligent students of the American scene, Rhoodie and Co. are said to have made California "the object of very special attention."

Exactly what that attention amounted to



General van den Bergh

has not yet been revealed. But one South African report in the *Johannesburg Star* has charged that it included attempts to gain influence with top aides of California Governor Jerry Brown in anticipation of his rumored 1980 presidential campaign. And that too may be just another fragment of a "California plan" described by one of Rhoodie's ex-colleagues as "mind-boggling."

"If they [the California plans] were revealed, they would wreck South African-American relations," Rhoodie's one-time associate told Anthony Sampson of the *London Observer*.

That comment echoed repeated threats by Rhoodie himself that revealing "the nature of the operations, the methods that were used, and the people that were in-

involved would have disastrous consequences" for South Africa and "a number of major Western countries." Rhoodie has made it clear that the US would definitely head the list of those "major Western countries." But he has also made it clear that other countries were not neglected.

If \$11.5 million of the Information Ministry's slush fund was allocated for McGoff's bid to buy the *Washington Star*, comparable amounts must certainly have been provided for reported attempts to buy control of the British newspapers, the *Guardian* and *The Observer*, or the French magazine *Paris-Match*.

If South African money helped buy the defeat of US Senators Clark and Tunney, it is also reported to have bought the services of two Labor members of the British parlia-

ment to spy on anti-apartheid activists and to have financed the creation of a right-wing political party in Norway that went on to win four seats in parliament.

If Gerry Ford banked \$10,000 for delivering one pro-South African speech, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, during his days as Finance Minister, is alleged to have actually read a speech written for him by Eschel Rhoodie.

And, as a report in *The Observer* noted, "While there seems little doubt that a sum in excess of \$100,000 was distributed among a number of American labor leaders, there is also good reason to believe that General van den Bergh—on the direct instructions of [then Prime Minister] Vorster—handed over a sum in the region of \$200,000 to two Japanese MPs who are closely connected

## Running Interference in the US

When Eschel Rhoodie made his revelations on British television in March, he admitted that his agents had frequently tried to disrupt anti-apartheid activities in England.

"If certain organizations, for example, were out to arrange an anti-South African rally," Rhoodie said, "or were trying to get companies to withdraw investment in South Africa, we would perhaps send out notices and documents canceling the meeting so that the other party wouldn't know what is going on."

That tactic was used in the US as well. But it seems likely that, in order to achieve its ends in this country, the "Ministry of Misinformation" also engaged in far more violent activities than the mailing of false notices.

What happened to Richard Lapchick, long-time campaigner against all sports links with South Africa, appeared to be a case in point.

Early in 1978 Lapchick was deeply involved in a campaign to prevent South Africa's participation in the March 1978 Davis Cup tennis tournament, scheduled to be played in Nashville, Tennessee.

Lapchick, then national chairperson of the American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sport and Society (ACCESS), was working with other groups such as NAACP to have the tournament canceled, and, if that failed, to mount a massive demonstration outside the Nashville tennis courts. By mid-February the campaign was progressing extremely well, causing the South African regime a considerable headache, and it looked as if the Davis Cup matches in the US might well be canceled.

Then Lapchick was brutally assaulted in his office by two masked men.

Many prominent leaders immediately blamed South Africa for instigating the attack. One of these was Franklin Williams, a


former US Ambassador to Ghana now president of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, and leader of the Committee for Justice in South Africa. Williams stated categorically that "South Africa was responsible" for the attack.

But it was not only supporters of ACCESS that made the link. Apparent confirmation came from a surprising source: the Ministry of Information itself. When the scandal surrounding ministry operations was beginning to break in South Africa, a ministry official spoke at a meeting in New York and was pressed to justify the department's continued existence. In response he stated that its work had met with several recent successes. Asked to elaborate by a correspondent for a South African newspaper, the official cited a few instances. "The destruction of Richard Lapchick" was among them.

In fact the attempts to "destroy" the leader of ACCESS were decidedly unsuccessful, and Lapchick continues to be an active opponent of apartheid. In light of the recent revelations about South Africa's influence-buying in the United States, it is worth recounting in greater detail what looks to *Southern Africa* to be an attempt by the South African government to destroy at least one aspect of the burgeoning anti-apartheid movement in this country.

On February 14, 1978, Lapchick returned to his home in Virginia Beach from Nashville where he had been helping organize demonstrations against South Africa. He had every reason to feel pleased with the campaign's progress. Thanks to the efforts of ACCESS and other groups working on the campaign, NLT Corporation, the financial backer of the Davis Cup, had announced that it was withdrawing its support.

Trying to catch up on his teaching load, Lapchick worked late that evening in his of-



Richard Lapchick

ice at Virginia Wesleyan College. Then masked intruders burst into his office. Calling him "nigger lover" and saying he "had no business in South Africa," they assaulted him with a metal statuette and carved a misspelled "niger" on his abdomen with a pair of office scissors.

As a result of the attack, Lapchick suffered kidney and liver damage, a hernia, and a concussion.

While there was widespread horror at this assault, it apparently struck a sympathetic chord in some quarters where racism is a continuing custom. Local Virginia Beach police, who began to leak information casting doubts on the attack, asked Lapchick to take a polygraph test. A local state medical examiner called the press to say that the wounds were definitely "self-inflicted," despite clear evidence to the contrary, backed up by all three doctors who attended him in the hospital.

The local press—and even CBS—implied that Lapchick was guilty because he refused the lie detector test. In fact, he had refused

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with the trade union movement."

Nor did the Information Ministry confine its efforts to "major western powers." In fact, the majority of the \$73 million secret fund was spent on the African continent itself. The most expensive of all the Information Ministry's projects was located in Johannesburg, with \$37 million plowed into starting a pro-Government English-language daily, *The Citizen*, and keeping it afloat. And substantial sums were spent in conjunction with South Africa's attempts to maintain bulwarks of white supremacist rule to the north in Namibia and Zimbabwe.

"Among the most extravagant secret political investments made by Rhoodie's outfit," *The Observer* reported, "were in Rhodesia, designed to influence the black Rhodesian nationalist leaders in Ian Smith's transitional government." At least one million Rhodesian dollars were said to have been handed over to associates of Bishop Abel Muzorewa "in an initial transaction." Muzorewa later benefited from a second transaction, before South Africa reportedly switched off and started putting its money into the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. Two South African businessmen who figured prominently in negotiations with one of Muzorewa's lieutenants, as well as in several of the other secret projects, are now in voluntary exile in Britain.

In Namibia, where South Africa has been battling SWAPO guerrillas and diplomatic pressures while trying to install a pro-apartheid government, Information Ministry funds were used to transmit fake SWAPO radio messages from a ship cruising off the coast. The ship was provided by the South African Navy. The Defense Minister at the time was P.W. Botha, now trying to ride out the storm as prime minister, while insisting that he never knew about any of Rhoodie's 180 secret projects.

#### Move to Press Censorship

Botha has pledged that he will step down if it is shown that any of his cabinet members knew about the secret projects before they started reading about them in the papers. But when Rhoodie called his bluff by brandishing what he claimed was a document signed by Botha's Finance Minister Owen Horwood, the prime minister did not rush to fulfill his promise. Instead, he pressed ahead with several bills designed to clamp down on the press and continued what *Observer* reporter Sampson described as a shift toward "the buying of weapons rather than opinions." This new, belligerent stance, characterized by many observers as a retreat into the white *laager*, was further emphasized by Botha's expulsion of three members of the US Embassy staff in early April.

Rallying the *volk* against foreign foes has long been a staple of Afrikaner politics. But this time it was being called into play at a

time when the white population and the National Party itself were more severely divided than ever before. Predictions about Botha's chances were as varied as interpretations of the differences underlying the unprecedented political bloodletting that has already felled what one prominent writer on Africa referred to as "a powerful triumvirate . . . [which] had decided in the early 1970's to take over the effective government of the country."

One member of that triumvirate, Rhoodie, has been on the run, living out of suitcases across South America and Europe while trying to trade his information for a promise that criminal charges against him would be dropped. The second, his former boss, Connie Mulder, who only last fall came within six votes in a National Party caucus of becoming prime minister, has now been drummed out of both his cabinet post and the National Party. He has also now begun to speak up in support of Rhoodie's charges against such people as former prime minister, now president, John Vorster. And in this he has been joined by the third member of the triumvirate, the former head of South Africa's secret police, General Hendrik van den Bergh.

In attempting to explain the downfall of the Mulder-van den Bergh-Rhodie triumvirate, newspaper Africa experts have gotten bogged down in a morass of political and personal differences within the ruling circles of the National Party. John Burns of the *New York Times*, for instance, credited much of the political blood-letting to the Nationalists' extreme right wing, citing as evidence the rapid rise of ultra-right Transvaal party leader Andries Treurnicht. As the man most likely to succeed Botha should the prime minister be forced to resign, Treurnicht has become a born-again convert to the freedom of the press, with a series of speeches opposing any barriers to continuing newspaper investigations of the scandal. Burns attributes this to the right wing's drive to "recapture the party from . . . 'compromisers' like Mulder.

Writing in *The Observer*, Colin Legum developed the theory of the Mulder-Rhodie-van den Bergh triumvirate: "Flushed with power and money . . . they planned to form a strategic planning group in a new-style cabinet made up not of Nationalist Party stalwarts but of the brightest South Africans they could win to their side." Exactly what "their side" was Legum doesn't specify.

As pieces of an analysis, both interpretations make fairly good sense. But neither explains why differences that had existed within the National Party for years suddenly touched off a no-holds-barred brawl. And neither addresses the crucial role played by the English-language press itself. The papers have long been vehicles for criticism of the apartheid regime, but they

actually belong to business interests which have prospered during 30 years of Nationalist rule, while favoring certain modifications in apartheid.

Indeed, the one group that distinctly has not prospered under Nationalist rule figures only tangentially in any of these interpretations. Yet a closer look suggests that it was precisely that group that produced the massive political eruption of which the entire Rhodiegate affair is a series of aftershocks. It was the Soweto uprising and subsequent upsurge of diplomatic and economic pressures that gave real urgency to efforts to polish South Africa's badly tarnished image abroad. And as Burns notes at one point, it was the Soweto rebellion that magnified the differences between factions and personalities as "Vorster . . . seemed to lose his grip and began shifting between vague promises of reforms and pledges that nothing fundamental would be changed." As growing black resistance heightened pressures on the apartheid system, differences about strategy that had previously been discussed intramurally suddenly became grounds for vicious public feuds.

Blacks in South Africa have shown little interest in or enthusiasm for what has become a white national past-time—the game of "Have you heard the latest?" Whatever the outcome of the internal white power plays, the perpetuation of apartheid is not in question. But for blacks the issue is achieving political power, not siding with one or other faction of the enemy.

Yet two significant things have emerged from this scandal. Firstly the very wildness of some of the schemes reflects the desperation with which apartheid's white defenders felt they needed to win international friends. Nothing could better illustrate the vulnerability of their rule to real foreign pressures, such as oil embargoes and economic sanctions.

Secondly, and perhaps most psychologically damaging for the white *laager*, it has become clear that men who were at the very pinnacle of power in South Africa and most directly involved in trying to preserve apartheid had serious doubts about their chances of success. What has shaken white South Africa profoundly has been the realization that many of their "leaders" were taking out insurance policies against the future, by smuggling large sums of money out of the country for their own use "comes the revolution."

In the short run this may simply produce a swing towards the most "pure" and right-wing elements in the white body politic. In the long run, it will add to the blows being delivered to the white supremacy mentality by black armed victories in Zimbabwe and Namibia, and the daily pressure of black militancy and growing organization at home in South Africa. **A.M.** □

# The Limpopo Valley: From Colonial Settlement to Socialization of the Countryside

*The floodgates of the Massingir Dam in southern Mozambique near the South African border were opened for the first time last December. This is part of an important project for utilization of the hydraulic resources of the Limpopo Valley which will eventually permit irrigation of 965 square miles of arid land.*

*Fernando Lima of the Mozambique Information Agency describes what is happening there. . . .*

December and January are the hottest months in Mozambique, and there is also plenty of rain then. After the long dry spell the rivers begin to swell and, in the rainiest period, the waters wander from their original course, spreading over the plains and into the valleys.

Along the Incomati, the Limpopo, the Buzi, the Pungoe and the Zambezi rivers, generations of peasants know the scourge of the flood cycle.

When the dry season is long in the Limpopo Valley, devastated by floods two years ago, there is also the problem of salination of a considerable area of the arable land.

These two problems—flooding and salination—associated with the rise and fall in the volume of water in the Limpopo, will be

at least partially resolved by the regulating effect of the Massingir Dam, the floodgates of which were opened in December.

The Massingir Dam straddles the main tributary of the Limpopo, the Elephants River, about 42 miles from the confluence of the two rivers and 17 miles from the South African border.

Work on the \$24 million dam began in 1972, when Mozambique was a Portuguese colony, with a variety of economic, ecological, social and political objectives. It was to have provided 347 square miles of irrigated farmland in southern Gaza for Portuguese settler families who would constitute a strong bulwark for the consolidation of colonialism in Mozambique.

Similar settlements were created in other parts of the territory by resorting to the recruitment of poor peasants and farm laborers in Portugal.

In the Limpopo Valley a settlement of nearly 2,000 Portuguese families was established on the basis of a dam built a few miles from the town of Chokue.

Today, most of the settlers have abandoned the Limpopo Valley. The Massingir project continues, however, with the economic factor now dominant in a zone which used to be considered one of the most

arid in the country.

What is being done with the land abandoned by the Portuguese settlers?

What is the best way to take advantage of the new irrigation possibilities from Massingir?

The People's Republic of Mozambique faced an important policy question at Massingir. Should the settlers simply be replaced by Mozambican farmers, or should an attempt be made to advance toward new organizational forms of production?

## Reorganizing Agriculture

The floods two years ago brought the question into sharp focus. Thousands of people had lost their crops and their houses. That was the big boost for the movement to communal villages and organization of collective production in the area.

The face of the Limpopo Valley changed. In the irrigated zone alone, a powerful state sector has emerged with 54 square miles, while cooperative peasants occupy an area of 12 square miles. Bank credits to the state, cooperative and family sectors for 1977-78 season reached about \$11.4 million.

Rice, wheat, tomatoes, potatoes, onions,

*continued on page 20*



More and more people are getting involved in collective farming.

# House Kills Observer Plan

**Widespread protest defeated the observer move—  
but a fight over sanctions lies ahead.**

When Ian Smith came to the United States last October, he extended a cordial invitation to the US government to send observers to the elections that had been scheduled for mid-April. It was clear then why he did so. Official observers at the elections would help him establish that Rhodesia would meet the conditions of the Case-Javits amendment adopted in August. That amendment provided that sanctions must be lifted if the president determines both that the Rhodesian government has committed itself to negotiate in good faith at an all-parties conference and that a government has come into existence in Rhodesia as a result of free elections in which all population groups and all political parties have been allowed to participate "with impartial, internationally recognized observers."

With all compromises, the ambiguities that make them acceptable at the time return to haunt their creators. At the time the amendment was passed, Senator Dick Clark, chairman of the subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, projected the United Nations and the OAU as likely sources of such observers, a projection he must have known to be unlikely. In fact, it is even more clear now than it was then that no reputable international body is prepared to dignify the Rhodesian elections by observing them.

Yet despite the overwhelming evidence that the international community had rejected the idea of the elections in Rhodesia as legitimate and would not provide observers to render them acceptable, early in 1979 the new chairman of the Senate Africa subcommittee, George McGovern, teamed up with arch-conservative Senator Hayakawa to establish an "impartial" observer force of 25-50 private individuals.

Senator McGovern justified his action on pragmatic grounds, arguing that if he did nothing, Congress would inevitably move to lift sanctions on the basis of election reports originating from conservative politicians. By setting up a theoretically "objective" group headed by professionals, he hoped to head off a move to which he is deeply opposed.

While the Carter administration has no intention of creating problems for its own credibility with Africa by sending

observers, it also had no intention of fighting McGovern. In effect, the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Africa, Richard Moose, left it to Congress to decide what should be done.

Others, both in and out of Congress, were not so accommodating about the McGovern-Hayakawa plan.

In the Senate, Senator Paul Tsongas, the freshman from Massachusetts who had been the key House sponsor last year of a cutoff of Export-Import Bank relations with South Africa, prepared to do battle, with the full support of TransAfrica, the Washington Office on Africa, the American Committee on Africa, and many other interested non-governmental groups. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted for the McGovern-Hayakawa resolution by an 8 to 1 margin, however, the resolution seemed destined for almost unanimous passage. But on March 28th, the Senate voted by only a 66-to-27 margin to approve it, with Senator Ted Kennedy and majority leader Robert Byrd lending their weight to the Tsongas position.

More important still, the House subcommittee on Africa under the shrewd leadership of Congressman Stephen Solarz began hearings on the observer proposal that surfaced objections both on the part of witnesses and also among a majority of the subcommittee members. Doubts were solidified into opposition when the committee met privately with a group of African ambassadors who expressed dismay at the proposal. Therefore, when the Hayakawa-McGovern resolution came to a vote in the subcommittee on April 2, it was unanimously rejected 9-0.

Because the House subcommittee is known to be one of the most liberal in Congress, ways and means of circumventing its judgement were bound to be sought. Solarz had obtained McGovern's agreement not to appoint observers with only Senate approval of the resolution, and he had Representative Clement Zablocki's agreement not to allow the full Foreign Relations Committee to overturn the subcommittee's judgment.

That meant that a House floor amendment to some other bill would have to be made to keep the move alive. Accordingly, on April 9, Representative Robert Bauman

of Maryland, one of the most skillful and articulate of the House's far right members, offered an amendment to the foreign aid bill calling on the president to send observers and to allocate \$20 million out of \$68 million in assistance for southern Africa to Rhodesia. By skillfully marshaling his forces, Congressman Solarz was able to engineer a defeat of the proposal by a margin of 10 votes.

This encouraging result was the outcome of quick and thorough mobilization of forces. The volatility of American political life at this time dictates establishing a tone early so that a momentum and mood is not set that will be difficult to overcome later. However, the more important question is still the matter of lifting sanctions. Washington watchers believe it will be much more difficult to stop the lifting of sanctions than it will be to stop the sending of observers. Without maximum citizen mobilization, sanctions will be lifted, but with it, there is a good chance that sanctions will remain. **E.L.□**

## Settlement Blocked

ty, all very small political groups.

As the weeks drag on and events develop ominously, officials and observers around the UN have grown pessimistic. Many have concluded that it is just a matter of time before South Africa makes it clear it will pursue its own internal solution in Namibia. One well-placed UN official called the situation "disastrous." Projecting a "worst possible" scenario, this official expected a South African internal solution, possible recognition from a new Tory government in London, and a subsequent heavy crackdown on SWAPO activists and sympathizers inside the territory. More attacks on Angola were likely to follow, this official said, as SWAPO prepared to increase the tempo of its guerrilla war.

US officials, who have relied on the Namibia negotiations as the centerpiece of the "new" Carter African policy, have sought to maintain an optimistic appearance throughout these weeks of delay, but despite this, little has occurred to dispel the feeling that there are dark days ahead for Namibia. **M.S.□**



## Interference in the US

because he had no intention of being cast in the role of defendant when he was the victim. He later changed his mind, when, back in Nashville to continue the campaign, he found that he was becoming the issue at stake and not apartheid and the South African regime. He submitted himself to the lie detector test and to an examination by a prominent forensic pathologist. While these confirmed his innocence, his accusers did not back down.

The Davis Cup matches were ultimately played at Nashville, although successful demonstrations kept all but a handful of spectators away. But the end of the tournament did not bring an end to the harassment. The Lapchick family received almost daily death threats on the telephone. Their car was broken into three times and the engine tampered with once. His office was burglarized and all his South African materials removed. When he received threatening calls about his children a few weeks later, he called home to find that his five-year-old son was not there. Although it was discovered later that the child had been

taken on an outing by a neighbor, during the two and a half hours that he and his wife feared their son had been kidnapped, Lapchick called the police. The call was returned two weeks later!

Lapchick's friends say that it was this event that finally convinced the family that they could no longer live in Virginia.

Still the harassment did not halt. The threats followed Lapchick to New York, where he moved to take up a consultancy with the Center on Apartheid at the United Nations. The day before he was to be joined by his family, an anonymous caller warned him: "It is a mistake for your family to move here tomorrow."

The following week he was scheduled to speak at the University of Rhode Island. Shortly before he was due to leave New York, he received a call saying that the lecture had been canceled. Suspicious of the "commonwealth-related" accent of the caller, he checked with the university and found that he was still expected. It turned out that a South African Ministry of Information official, named Vorster, had also been invited to speak at the university, and

an announcement of Lapchick's impending visit had been made in his presence—just one hour before the cancellation call was made.

Friends of the activist have told *Southern Africa* that even now, more than a year later, he continues to receive threats. He has avoided discussing these with the press. Besides wishing to protect his family, he is particularly concerned that the press should focus on the issues that are central and not on the case of one individual.

Anti-apartheid organizers are convinced that the South African government was directly involved in the threats and see this campaign of intimidation as part of Rhodie's sanctioned activities in the United States. Sam Ramsamy, the exiled Chairperson of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee, with which Lapchick and ACCESS worked closely, is insistent that this is the case. "There is no doubt in my mind that Lapchick's case was part of the ministry's operations in the US," Ramsamy said. "The only question is when and if all the details will be revealed." **S.U.□**



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
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# action news notes

## Thousands Demand US \$ Out Now



Militant student strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations, pickets, and public forums highlighted an unprecedented national week of action in solidarity with African liberation, April 4-11. Called for last fall by regional conferences of anti-apartheid activists in the Northeast, Midwest, Southeast, and West Coast, the week evoked a flurry of simultaneous local actions. These were directed primarily against universities refusing to divest holdings in corporations and banks that continue to invest and lend money in racist South Africa.

Beginning on the anniversary of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., the actions sought to express solidarity between the struggles for liberation in Africa and the US. European anti-apartheid groups, taking their cue from the US activists, internationalized the week with a series of demonstrations in Britain, Germany and Switzerland against banks loaning to South Africa.

### Brandeis Occupation

At Brandeis University near Boston, 300 students occupied the administration

building April 5 for four days when trustees refused to consider their demands for divestment. An estimated 80 percent of the student body there stayed away from classes that day. At Princeton University, about one-third of the student body chose to participate in a day of alternate workshops and rallies featuring liberation movement representatives, rather than follow the regular class schedule. One day earlier, hundreds of representatives from black student organizations throughout New Jersey participated in a conference to build greater awareness and action on southern Africa.

At Oberlin College in Ohio, one-third of the College's 2500 students boycotted classes for one day following university threats against 90 demonstrators outside the college trustees meeting April 5. The college administration claimed the demonstrators were creating too much noise for the trustees to continue, but the student strike quashed plans to take punitive action against the students.

### Banks Hit

"Redline South Africa, Not New York"

was the slogan of a spirited demonstration of 150 persons outside Citibank headquarters in Manhattan on April 11. Community activists and students from surrounding areas joined forces in bank demonstrations held outside First National Bank of Chicago, First National Bank of Boston, and the Provident Bank in Philadelphia as part of the week's actions. The actions in Chicago joined southern Africa support groups with those opposing bank loans to Chile.

The actions in Boston, outside the First National Bank of Boston's shareholders meeting March 29, underscored the Boston coalition's opposition to a "compromise" worked out with church stockholder executives in which the bank stated a commitment opposing new loans to the South African government, but said nothing about corporate and trade-related financing.

The actions in Philadelphia capped a week of community workshops held in church and union halls on the US and southern Africa sponsored by the United People's Campaign Against Apartheid and Racism. The city-wide actions in Philadelphia were called at a successful Delaware Valley conference of campus and community activists held at the end of February.

In Minneapolis, Clergy and Laity Concerned organized a "run on the bank"—supporters running two miles between branches of the Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis, to protest the bank's involvement in loans to South Africa.

In Eugene, Oregon, with support from groups in Salem and Portland, People for Southern Africa Freedom initiated their participation in the national campaign April 4 with a press conference announcing the withdrawal of the funds of local church, community, and union groups from the US National Bank of Oregon. The groups included two locals of the American Federation of Teachers. Their week of activities featured a speech on US corporate involvement by Dumisani S. Kumalo, an exiled black South African journalist who was speaking at West Coast campuses as part of a ten-week tour sponsored by the American Committee on Africa.

Prior to spending two weeks on the West Coast, Kumalo addressed forums at a score of colleges in the Northeast and at black colleges in the Southeast. These included Harvard, MIT, Boston U., Amherst, Williams, Smith, Dartmouth, Syracuse, Brown, the University of Rhode Island; and community forums in Waterbury, Conn. and Worcester, Mass., regional meetings of the Association of Black Journalists in Philadelphia and Boston, and a statewide conference of SUNY Colleges in Albany, New York. Other locations included

Tougaloo, Rust, Talladega, and Huston-Tillotson, all black colleges in the Southeast, Oberlin, Cornell, SUNY Brockport, Yale, and a statewide anti-apartheid conference in Hartford, Connecticut.

On the West Coast, forums featuring Kumalo coordinated by the South Africa Catalyst Project were held at universities in Pullman and Seattle, Washington; Willamette and the University of Oregon; Stanford, Mills College in Oakland, and University of California campuses at Berkeley, Santa Barbara, Claremont, and Riverside.

#### California Referendum

Following a church day of concern on the bank loan issue on April 1, California activists in the bay area devoted major efforts to raising support for a Berkeley ballot referendum on April 17 for divestment of city funds from South Africa-related in-

vestments. With the support of national figures such as Julian Bond and Harry Belafonte and local support including the Republican Party in Berkeley, the initiative seems certain to pass. It may form the basis for a future statewide ballot for divestment.

In Atlanta, teach-ins were held at Georgia State University; a demonstration of 50 occurred outside Coca-Cola headquarters. Organizers in Knoxville, Tennessee stepped up efforts to collect medical and clothing supplies for Zimbabwe refugees.

Other actions during the week included series of forums culminating in demonstrations in the five college area at Amherst, Massachusetts, and at Columbia University in New York. At Dartmouth College in New Hampshire, a series of meetings and demonstrations linked racism at home and in South Africa. A coalition of campus groups, led by minority students, issued a series of demands for affirmative action

and divestment of South Africa-related stocks.

At press time, reports were still coming in of actions around the country. It was too early to assess the impact of the nationwide week of activity—but one thing is obvious. Despite complex corporate, university, and other "administrative" type arguments that defend staying on in South Africa, students and community activists are not confused. Loud and clear, they are raising a very direct demand: "US \$ out now." □

—Paul Irish

*Appeal to activists: Please send your reports, newsclips, graphics, and assessments of the week of action to us. We plan a major review in the June issue. Send to Southern Africa, Action News, 17 W. 17th Street, New York, NY 10011.*



#### Steve Biko, Black Consciousness in South Africa

Edited by Millard Arnold  
(New York: Random House, 1978)  
\$12.95.

#### Biko

Donald Woods  
(New York: Paddington Press, 1978)  
\$10.95 (Clothe).  
(New York: Vintage Books, 1979)  
\$2.50 (Paper).

by Michael Martin

Government security police gave their answer to questions about the importance of the political role played by the black consciousness movement in South Africa when they chose to murder Steve Biko in September 1977. Donald Wood's political biography, *Biko*, and the testimony of Biko at the 1976 SASO trial gathered together by Millard Arnold in the book *Steve Biko* provide some additional clues.

Neither book, however, succeeds in capturing the full political meaning of the black consciousness movement, though both record a number of Biko's views. In part, perhaps, the books fall short because the meaning and force of black consciousness lay outside what the movement could or would say about itself. From both books we get an overly literal gloss on black consciousness based on the movement's formal positions or on impressionistic deductions

from their personal qualities and experiences of its leaders. Neither gives an analysis based on the movement's place in South Africa's long historical experience of liberation politics. The volume edited by Arnold remains literal by design (it only records courtroom testimony by Biko about black consciousness). Wood's book clings to a narrow, highly personal interpretation, one suspects, for want of any broader consistent perspective on the part of its author.

The main attractions of *Biko* are its readability and its low price. Woods has given the anti-apartheid movement a mass market resource that will introduce tens of thousands of readers to some South African realities. Most of those readers will make it through all 431 pages because the pages read so smoothly. In addition, Woods' personal sketch of Biko is moving in places. Incidents illustrating Biko's selflessness, exuberance in the face of danger, and political insight are combined to produce a vivid character as the narrative progresses. This portrait can then be read against the trial testimony collected by Arnold to get a feel for Biko's revolutionary personality.

Woods' perceptivity, though, is always in conflict with his self-regard, a preoccupation with himself that at times sends the reader reeling. To be true to the contents of *Biko* its cover should give Woods close-to-equal billing with Biko and carry his picture as well, though this may be a comment less on Woods' personal character than on the nature of South African society. Where else but in South Africa would a discussion of the black struggle for self-liberation be so overlaid with the personality and self-importance of the white sympathizer doing the writing? Where else but in South Africa would the intrusion be so unconscious?

Yet despite these faults it is worth focusing on the light this book and the Arnold

volume shed on the black consciousness movement.

Like all good mass organizers, Biko was concerned with the lasting transformation of consciousness, not with mobilizing people by manipulating symbols. Black consciousness was not a slogan or pamphleteering gimmick but a challenge to black people in South Africa to look at themselves in a new way. It was this concern with transforming consciousness that led Biko to break with liberal whites and found the movement in the late sixties.

At this time one of the larger, token anti-apartheid movements operating above ground in South Africa was in the integrated National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). Dominated by liberal whites, the group had as its leading motif not so much the urgency of destroying racial oppression in South Africa as the importance of posturing against apartheid because this was the upright, British, constitutional thing to do. More sophisticated liberals acted in opposition to apartheid in recognition of the reality that blacks would inevitably rise and in the hope that they would then, as oppositionists, be able to control the direction, speed, and extent of the black challenge.

When the NUSAS leadership called a meeting at Rhodes University in 1967 without ensuring that interracial lodging would be provided, Biko, one of the leading black members, finally became convinced that the desultory charade had to be brought to an end. Under South Africa's special conditions, most liberal whites could not be depended on to fight with determination for racial equality because they partook of the privileges given to whites by the system. This fact polluted all integrationist politics, since blacks almost invariably fell or were put into subordinate positions

in integrated organizations.

Black people, Biko argued, had to learn to depend on themselves, to form themselves into a self-reliant political bloc, and for this reason he founded the all-black South African Students Organization. The organization's "exclusivism" arose not from reverse racism but from political exigencies that required that blacks trust themselves thoroughly because they were the people who would win or lose the struggle.

The leading theme of the movement was thus shaped by the odds against the movement's success, the isolation of blacks from power, and it was much the same with its political practice. In Biko's view self-reliance was difficult to teach to blacks in South Africa when all important institutions were controlled by whites. Black consciousness emphasized community projects: the building and staffing of clinics and recreational facilities, the creation of a system of Black community education, and similar undertakings. Behind this was the constant political message speaking of a society open to and largely run by blacks, together with the examples of black consciousness cadres who refused to sacrifice any of their dignity to the mechanisms of white domination.

The important benefits to blacks lay not in the specific services provided but in the demonstrated power of collective self-assertion. At a time when South African security measures had all but succeeded in choking off such explicitly revolutionary activity as the initiatives of the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress, black consciousness began building a new spirit in the black community that could complement the work of those organizations. As Biko remarked in one interview: "I do not want to give the impression that the relation between [ANC, PAC and Black Consciousness] is one of competition. There will be one movement of revolt against the system of injustice."

This, and a good deal more of value, is recorded and suggested by Woods in his biography, and by Biko in the trial testimony. But at this stage the analysis breaks off. Woods concludes rhetorically with a sentimental peroration which recognizes no clear role or program of action for blacks in South Africa. He hints, additionally, that racism in South Africa is not so much a matter of whites exploiting blacks and black labor as a conspiracy foisted upon blacks and defenseless English-speaking whites by the Afrikaners after 1948. This view will not stand up to any serious examination of English-speaking politics in South Africa or of the conditions of labor exploitation instrumental in South Africa's economic development along racist-capitalist lines, a process largely organized by English-speaking whites.

Woods suggests that the answer for the oppressed majority in South Africa lies in the paternalistic concern and aroused moral fervor of western civilization, which will lead it to ostracize the white government of South Africa and choke off the country's economy. No where is it suggested that any moves the West makes in this direction will come as a result of black agitation, or the threat of it, in South Africa. Woods displays the typical resistance of his "tribe" and class to the lessons of the black consciousness period in South Africa.

Biko suggested privately to Woods after the Soweto uprising that this revolt demonstrated the power and influence of black consciousness among South Africans. This connection between black consciousness and the coming black revolt in South Africa, which Woods resists, really provides the important legacy of the movement. People do not revolt simply when they are pushed beyond a certain threshold of exploitation. They revolt when they begin to change their conception of themselves and of the role they can play in society. The South African government was quick to learn this lesson, and for this they killed Biko.

**The Emancipation of Wakefield Clay** by Randall Robinson, Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications Ltd, London, 1978. (Address: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, 5a Chignell Place, London, W 13 OTJ, England) £2.

*The Emancipation of Wakefield Clay* by Randall Robinson should be in every library, especially those frequented by young people: high schools, movement centers, community centers, etc. It should be given for birthdays and Christmas. In a word, it should be read.

It will be read because the plot is fast moving and exciting. It tells the story of Wakefield Clay, a black American soldier who is just weeks away from discharge and marriage to the woman he loves. He will do nothing to upset his plans and makes no protest when his unit is flown to South Africa ostensibly to evacuate Americans from the mining center of Phalaborwa, which has been attacked by African Liberation Front guerrillas. It is also the story of Noka Matabane, a black South African guerrilla who is responsible for the attacks at Phalaborwa. Clay is captured by Matabane and, at the book's climax, must decide which side he is on.

There are things wrong with this novel. There is a simplistic division of good and bad along racial lines, which is accounted for by the book's didacticism. The characters exist too much to give speeches. Thus at the very end the climax is postponed in order for the two soldiers to talk to each

other, the African explaining to the American exactly why he is fighting, while the white liberal who is also in captivity tries to explain why foreign investment is "good other, the African explaining to the American exactly why he is fighting, while the white liberal who is also in captivity tries to explain why foreign investment is "good for Africans."

In order to make their points, the characters sometimes are made to appear naive. Matabane expresses shock that a black American would fight in South Africa. This is too much to believe from a sophisticated guerrilla whose own father was killed because he exposed a black stooge, a man who would know of the existence of blacks in Smith's army in Rhodesia, a man who is ideologically not a racist, who understands class oppression.

Still, as Randall Robinson says himself, this "modest novel" has a political purpose. It is an excellent place to begin to learn about South Africa. It makes the case strongly and clearly that whatever can be done to prevent American military involvement in southern African must be done. It does not romanticize the guerrillas or their struggle but illustrates the cost of resistance, and the necessity of paying that cost because existing conditions are intolerable for humans to endure.

I am reminded of the 1975 FRELIMO New Year's message, written by a Mozambican poet:

"I wish I were able to write a poem which is as beautiful, as exalting, as inspiring and profound as our people's victory."

The same impetus motivates this novel and makes it valuable. It is not a great novel, but if it warns the unsuspecting black soldier, as Robinson hopes, it will have been a significant part of the struggle for the "people's victory." □

—Gail Morlan

#### CORRECTION

Review by Prexy Nesbitt.

The book review of *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976* by John Marcum published in the February issue was written by Prexy Nesbitt. His name was left off in error.

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# Corporate Interests

in German capital has already been provisionally allocated on a collective basis.

## New Surveys Multiplying

Economic consultant George Low, representative of the British P-E Consulting Group, claims that international agencies and mining groups are keen to bankroll the \$30 million job of conducting a corner-to-corner geological survey of the territory. P-E is one of a consortium of British/South African companies which recently began a feasibility study of a so-called "Trans-Kalahari Railway" from Botswana to Namibia.

The self-financed study focuses on the benefits to Botswana of a new export route to the well-equipped Atlantic port of Walvis Bay. The plan is to link Namibia's eastern railhead at Gobabis by a 600 mile line to Gabarone at a cost of \$1 billion. Companies involved include Maxwell Stamp and Associates, P-E, Mott Hay & Anderson, Henderson Hughes & Busby, all of the UK, and the SA consulting geologists Partridge de Villiers & Associates. They hope to persuade international development agencies to help sell the project to Botswana and Zambia.

The main lure for the corporate decision-makers is the phenomenal mineral wealth of Namibia. In the developing scramble putting a foot inside the door has already become the main priority. Namibia is already the fourth largest producer of minerals by value in Africa—after South Africa, Zaire, and Zambia, with a total production of some \$700 million a year.

Since 1919, mining has been dominated by the production of gem diamonds from the alluvial deposits along the coast just north of the Orange River. Diamond production is dominated by Consolidated Diamond (CDM) a wholly-owned subsidiary of South Africa's diamond giant, De Beers. Recently CDM's contribution to the overall profit of the De Beers group has risen as high as 40 percent. Namibian production has been stepped up in recent years to over 2 million carats a year. Although in global terms that is less than other major producers such as South Africa, Zaire, and the USSR, the Oranjemund deposits are unique in the high gem content, averaging 98 percent of the total, which makes Oranjemund one of the most profitable mines in the world, with post-tax profits reaching over \$50 million in some years. Under agreements reached with South Africa after the ousting of the former German colonial authorities, De Beers has rights over the deposits until the year 2010, although they are expected to be largely worked out before the end of the century.

In 1977, shrewdly preparing for some form of Namibian independence, De Beers head, Sir Harry Oppenheimer announced the transfer of the CDM head office from Kimberley, De Beers century old South African home, to Windhoek. A new CDM subsidiary was established to make investments in non-diamond mining sectors.

## US Interests

Namibia is also the source of a variety of important base minerals—chief among them copper, lead, zinc, vanadium, tin, silver, lithium ores, and cadmium. The major producer in this sector is the US/UK-controlled Tsumeb Corporation. Tsumeb has four mines in operation and also controls the only processing facilities in Namibia, producing both its own blister copper and refined lead for export, as well as smelting metals from other mineral producers in the country.

Tsumeb represents by far the largest US investment in Namibia, through its ownership of American Metal Climax (AMAX) and Newmont Mining. A third important co-owner of the venture is Selection Trust (UK controlled), and there is also some South African participation. But Newmont and AMAX are the dominant interest holders and Tsumeb, which accounts for approximately 80 percent of base mineral production in Namibia and 20 percent of all mineral export earnings, has traditionally provided the US corporations with healthy net earnings—averaging \$18 million a year between 1963-1972.

Although gross profits have been down in recent years because of the fall in world copper and lead prices, the company has continued to expand its operations, particularly in smelting and refining concentrates from other base metal mines in Namibia. Blister copper and refined lead are shipped to a number of Western countries, mainly Japan, West Germany and the US.

As with De Beers/CDM, Tsumeb's foreign owners have been "Namibianizing" their operation recently, so that in 1978 Newmont gave up responsibility for managing the operation, and AMAX relinquished control of sales operations. But the US corporations retain their ownership of Tsumeb equity.

Bethlehem Steel, Zapata Corporation, and Nord Resources Corporation are other US investors now actively involved in operating mines in Namibia.

But the major Western interest is centered on uranium. When the Rossing mine, owned by Rio Tinto Zinc (45 percent) in association with the South African Industrial Development Corporation, Minatome of France, and Urangesellschaft of West Germany, reaches full capacity at year's end, Namibia will become the world's fifth-largest uranium producer.

(See p. 7/8). South Africa's Anglo-American and DeBeers, and Canada's Falconbridge are among the western mining groups currently prospecting a wide area of Namibia for uranium and two other uranium mines are already at the feasibility stage. Most analysts believed that resources are sufficient to provide for up to 10,000 tons of uranium oxide a year, which would make Namibia a bigger producer than South Africa and add an estimated \$500 million to existing production value of the mineral industry.

For these reasons, while the political realities would seem to argue against the success of any Namibian UDI, South Africa feels increasingly confident that the investor response will be sufficiently encouraging to permit the continued funding of a large military effort to confront SWAPO's expected guerrilla onslaught against a DTA regime. □

Note: Two recent reports provide very valuable material on Namibian economic questions. *The Mineral Industry of Namibia: Perspectives for Independence*, was prepared by Roger Murray for the Secretariat of the Commonwealth. Write Commonwealth Secretariat, Marlborough House, Pall Mall, London SW1, England. And *Manpower Estimates and Development Implications for Namibia*, by R.H. Green, prepared for and obtainable from the United Nations Institute for Namibia, Lusaka, Zambia.

## Rhodesian Elections

The following day, Rhodesian planes attacked ZAPU camps in Zambia, and Rhodesian authorities claimed to have killed 90 guerrillas. Apparently embarrassed at his raiders having missed Nkomo the night before, Lt. Gen. Peter Walls, Rhodesia's supreme military commander, denied that the raid had been aimed at killing or kidnapping Nkomo. "If we wanted to kill Nkomo we would have done so," boasted Walls.

But the Rhodesian raids may have had another purpose in mind. ZAPU's representative at the UN, Callistus Ndlovu, who returned to New York from Lusaka just before the elections began, said the attacks were meant primarily to bolster sagging white morale. "ZAPU has been stepping up the war rapidly and Mr. Smith feels the pressure from the fighters in the field," Ndlovu said. "He is trying to reassure the white minority that even if the war is escalating in the field, he still has the capacity to hit ZAPU wherever it is based."

Although there were few guerrilla attacks on polling places during the elections, Patriotic Front guerrillas did retaliate for the Rhodesian raids by attacking an oil depot in Fort Victoria. The fire, which burned for seven hours, destroyed about 250,000 gallons of fuel. M.S. □

# Letters

Dear Friends,

We have received the February 1979 issue of *Southern Africa* and have read with interest the article "Splits in World Church Ranks over Liberation Support".

We are of course glad to see that you give attention to the Programme to Combat Racism in your publication, but have to indicate that the article gives a somewhat distorted picture of the PCR and of the decisions taken by the last meeting of the central committee in Jamaica. There has always been controversy about PCR, and no central committee meeting has been without strong debates, ever since our programme was started ten years ago. The Jamaica meeting was no exception and the grant to the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe provided a new occasion for confrontations.

However, what you say on p.9 "But it did so only with the provision that its critics be given a stronger voice in grant approvals" is simply not true. The special fund as one part of PCR was clearly reaffirmed by the central committee in spite of the criticism, and the fund is normally in business.

Furthermore, the central committee received a very clear document about the convictions which led the WCC and the member churches to play the role they did in southern Africa. The last paragraph in Truman Dunn's article does not do justice to this.

Baldwin Sjollem  
World Council of Churches  
Commission on the Programme  
to Combat Racism  
Geneva, Switzerland

*Editor's Note:* We apologize for any inaccuracies in our report on decisions taken at the World Council of Churches central committee meeting in January.

We note that among the recommendations approved by the meeting were the following proposals, designed to support the ongoing work of the Programme to Combat Racism:

1) The central committee endorses the view of the Review committee that the administration of the special fund "has so far been in accordance with the established and accepted criteria set by the central committee," and that the PCR should be encouraged to continue its work in situations of racial discrimination in the world today and that the special fund be continued with clearer interpretation to increase comprehension in the churches.

2) The central committee further resolves, in the light of changing circumstances and escalation of racism, to accept the proposal of the general secretary that a process of consultation, to be set in motion as soon as possible, on how the churches may be involved in combating racism in the 1980's, be given priority. In doing this, account should be taken of the experience gained, the questions raised, and the criticisms made during the ten years of existence of this program.

Copies of the very important "Background Paper on Southern Africa," which clearly restates the rationale for the PCR's concerns and actions can be obtained in English, French, and German from the PCR, P.O. Box 66, Ch-1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland.

## Limpopo Valley

and alfalfa are among the main crops in the valley.

Massingir will be part of a continuing process of transformation—creating in the countryside a strong wage-earning work force at the same time as the cooperative movement expands among peasants hitherto engaged in subsistence family farming.

The overall plan for regulating the flow of the Limpopo River includes the construction of a dam on the Limpopo itself at Mapai, about 100 miles upstream and northwest of the Limpopo-Elephants confluence.

Mapai is about 50 miles from the border with Zimbabwe and has been frequently attacked by the Rhodesian armed forces.

A Soviet-Bulgarian technical team is working on the plan for Mapai, which will be four times the size of Massingir. The plan should be ready next year.

When complete, the hydraulic projects in the Limpopo Valley will enable irrigation of an area covering 965 square miles, making it one of the richest in the country.

Hydro-electric power stations are also planned for Massingir and Mapai, with an annual production of 240 million and 300 million kilowatt-hours per year respectively.

### Industries Created

At present, the Limpopo Agro-Industrial Complex near Chokwe has factories for rice husking, tomato processing, sausage mak-

ing, dairy products and cattle feed. With the energy produced by the two power stations, it will be possible to accelerate basic industrialization through processing of the region's farm produce.

This year, 46 square miles of land in the Limpopo Valley should come under irrigation, and the Massingir power station is due to be completed in December.

### Bringing the Miners Home

The population, for their part, are organizing themselves. With the support of Frelimo party structures and the government, the Limpopo Valley residents are setting up the first communal villages along the irrigated zones.

Massingir is an area much affected by emigration—especially men going to work in the South African mines.

Today there is a movement in the opposite direction. The miners are coming home to stay, not just to make a brief visit.

By building solid alternatives, the links of dependency are gradually disappearing, rendering unnecessary the emigration of thousands of Mozambicans to the mines of "Jone"—the miner's name for Johannesburg and the Rand.

Today they can till the land in the valley without exploitation, without fear of expulsion to make way for foreign settlers. And Massingir, once a weapon to ensure consolidation of colonial settlement, is now a weapon in the hands of the Mozambicans: technology is being politicized to meet the people's needs. □

## Cable Reprints Available

The confidential cable sent by US Ambassador to South Africa, William Bowdler, to the State Department which reveals black hostility to US investment in South Africa and which *Southern Africa* published in April is being made available as a reprint. To obtain one or bulk copies, write to *Southern Africa*, 156 Fifth Avenue, Room 707, New York, NY 10010.

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# News briefs



**SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMED FORCES** have been expanded considerably over the past two years, according to a recently released South African government white paper. Leading elements of the expansion include the creation of a parachute corps as a "quick reaction force," the construction of a new military air base, and an increase of 29 percent in spending to enlarge and upgrade the physical stock of the country's navy. Overall defense budget for the coming year is \$2.3 billion, the highest ever.

The white paper takes special care to point out the urgency for the white regime of making the military self-sufficient, on the chance that outside suppliers of weapons and technology will honor the arms embargo more stringently. "[South Africa] is past the stage where it is only self-sufficient in respect of internal security," the report says. "The conventional and advanced technological fields [for military weapons] have been successfully entered, and in many cases we have succeeded in moving through initial development and industrialization phases to line production."

Pass law arrests in South Africa continue to make a mockery of claims that "things are getting better"—the frequently heard corporate defense for staying and making profits. In 1978 272,887 Africans were arrested for influx offences in the main urban areas—figures for the rest of the country have not been revealed. Professor Marius Wiechers, head of the University of South Africa's department of constitutional law, recently estimated that about 1000 blacks a day are arrested for pass law offences.



**LINKS BETWEEN A UNITED STATES CORPORATION** and a South African manufacturer will mask the South African origins of padlocks on the European and American markets. Viro Locks (SA) has struck a deal with the Master Lock Company of Milwaukee whereby Viro locks will be sold in Western countries under the Master Lock banner. Fortified by this arrangement, Viro is hoping to export 1.5 million locks a year and is expanding its

plant in Robertsham at a cost of almost \$300,000 so that output can be increased accordingly.

Citibank, already the largest US lender to South Africa, with participation in over 33 loans worth \$1.27 billion, has found a new way to help apartheid's economic well-being.

Early in April it became the first major US bank to attempt to mass market gold certificates to investors—and it did more than \$1 million worth of sales in the first week.

The certificate offered in denominations of \$1000 and up, is an investor's receipt for a specific quantity of gold bullion. Citibank buys the bullion and stores it for the customer.

South Africa is eager to increase worldwide demand for gold. Greater demand means higher prices, and higher prices are now particularly important because South Africa is being forced to pay very high prices for the oil it imports. The apartheid regime is likely to run into serious foreign exchange shortages if it cannot increase its own foreign earnings.

Don't overpay your African servants. Be careful not to be kind to them "in excess." And please, don't refer to black South Africans as "Bantus." They consider it offensive.

This is the gentle but firm advice contained in a guidebook distributed by the United States consulate in Johannesburg. Written by members of the American Women's Club of Johannesburg, the book is a "how to" guide for families of American executives, facilitating their adjustment to the South African way of life. And while proffering this advice, the book refers to black South Africans using the hated word "Bantu."

The Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, a not overly generous body, pegs the minimum amount required for an African family of five to live in the city at \$193 per month. The book counsels that the families of domestics employed by the Americans can get by on \$115 per month. Families pay-

ing Africans higher wages than this, the guidebook scolds, risk offending their white South African neighbors. Besides, says the president of the Women's Club, Jane Penn, "They [African servants] do have a tendency to take you for granted. If you give your boy a Coke on a hot day, he'll want three the next day."



**CHINA IS GIVING BOTSWANA** an interest-free loan and technical advice to assist that country's program for achieving self-sufficiency in food production by 1988. The loan, totaling about \$18 million, was initially agreed upon in 1976 during a meeting between President Seretse Khama and Hua Kuo-feng. Chinese advisors have recently visited the country to help identify areas where irrigation schemes and other improvements could most profitably be carried out. If the Botswana government opts to run the program as a state farm, Chinese advisers would stay on and get involved in production. If the program is handed over to local farmers, the Chinese would concentrate on giving technical advice. □

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