

S O U T H E R N A F R I C A

A Monthly Survey of News and Opinion

Published by the Southern Africa Committee, University Christian Movement, Room 758,
475 Riverside Drive, New York, New York 10027

Vol. I, No. 9

November 1968

CONTENTS	PAGE
1. Editorial: "Is Brittania a Moral Lady?"	1
2. Inside the Portuguese Territories:	
A. FRELIMO continues the War of Liberation	2
B. The Second Congress of the Mozambique Liberation Front, July 20-25, 1968	4
3. Events in Namibia: The Windhoek Relocation	5
4. United States Commerce in Southern Africa	7
5. Change in Portugal?	9
6. Progress in Zambia	10
7. Rhodesia and Britain Talk Again	10
8. As Hemlines Rise in Africa, So do Voices of Outrage	11
9. New Refugee Bill Signed by President Johnson	12
10. The United States in Southern Africa	12
11. Now That the Olympics Are Over	13

EDITORIAL

"Is Brittania a Moral Lady?"

It is sad but true that politics is about power. And it is clear that behind the obscurities of the tussle between Ian Smith and Harold Wilson over Rhodesia it lies in naked essence.

There is considerable pressure on Mr. Wilson to settle the Rhodesian issue before the next election and the Tories attack its old wounds. Yet to sell the Africans, to be the Judas of Zimbabwe, means to wreck the Commonwealth and to be covered with immoral shame at the United Nations.

Mr. Smith sees dark shadows on his right. He has beaten the immediate challenge, but as long as sanctions continue and the constitutional links remain, the fanatical right-wingers will prowl in those shadows. To the South, the heavy browed Vorster cajoles him, so that South Africa may be free of her burden north of the Limpopo.

So they are forced together. Basically irreconcilable, yet blown by winds of necessity to Gibraltar to make a deal. Smith cannot agree to a transfer of power to the Blacks even over a decade. White control and white "civilization" (translate as repression) must continue forever. Ian Smith cannot move from this; it is the center pin of all white South African politics. The right would depose him the instant he did.

Wilson knows that the franchise is the key to power and that if he is out to sell the Africans he must ensure that they comprise the majority of the electorate and that they can elect the majority of legislators. He knows the whites will cheat if left to themselves, so there must be external controls. But most important, he is trying to make a revolution. He is trying to change the nature of society in part of the white south. This is the issue, the real issue. Who will have power in the south? The Whites or the Blacks?

Will Mr. Wilson sell out? He may. But if he does, he will have taken Southern Africa one step closer to the War of the Races in the area. And the Problem of Rhodesia will be sobered by savage war, by the freedom fighters who came across the Zambezi.

INSIDE THE PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES


FRELIMO Continues the War of Liberation

September 25, 1968 marked four years since FRELIMO launched their war against the Portuguese in Mozambique. In spite of the superior Portuguese military forces, this was felt to be the only alternative left. With about 200 trained guerrillas, the war began in four provinces of Mozambique - Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Zambezia, and Tete. Due to the lack of cooperation from Malawi, and, at that time, Zambia, it proved impossible to provide supplies to those fighting in the last two provinces, and they were ordered to withdraw or to go underground. From late 1964 until March of 1968 the fighting was largely confined to Cabo Delgado and Niassa.

In these zones FRELIMO forces were at first limited to placing mines and setting ambushes for Portuguese troop columns. Even so, the immediate result was a withdrawal of the Portuguese civilian administration, and the confinement of the Portuguese presence to military posts and main population centers. The Portuguese military headquarters was moved to Nampula, closer to the northern provinces, and an attempt was made to set up a strong barrier just north of Nampula, along the Lurio River.

The FRELIMO build-up over the last four years has not included many advances beyond this barrier, and periodically a journalist or the Portuguese point to this fact and say that the war is just about finished; FRELIMO has been stopped. It is a common allegation of the Portuguese that only the Makonde tribe north of this area is involved, and that the other tribes will have nothing to do with FRELIMO. The supposed "primitive savagery" of the Makonde is continually emphasized. The attempt has been made, of course, to play on past tribal hostilities for all they are worth, and propaganda among the Macua (in Mozambique province, around Nampula) has even portrayed Mondlane as a Makonda (he happens to be from the south, of a completely different

tribal origin). FRELIMO admits that tribal divisions could be a source of weakness, and that the Portuguese try to exploit them. They deny, however, that this is the reason for the delay of advance further south. Dr. Mondlane points out that of the four top military leaders in Cabo Delgado province (largely populated by Makondes), one is Makonde, one Macua, one Njanja--from Niassa province, and one from Inhambane in the south. One-third of the troops fighting in Cabo Delgado are from other provinces.



MOZAMBIQUE

The real reason is quite different. It is primarily the difficulty of supplies, secondarily a more difficult terrain. The area not yet under sustained attack is more than 10 days march south from the Tanzania border, and all transport is by head portage - it should be remembered that Mozambique is more than 1,000 miles in length. Until the area in the north is so secure that a steady flow of supplies can be maintained further south (and this also means

the necessity of a larger volume of supplies), it is not possible to open up sustained action in Zambezie and Mozambique provinces. It is also true that the terrain as one comes down from the Makonde plateau is more open and cut by large numbers of small rivers difficult to ford.

The advance and growth of the war that has taken place has been primarily within the two northern provinces. From the first mines and ambushes, FRELIMO has moved to the use of heavier weapons including mortars and bazookas. Since 1967 attacks on military bases have become more and more frequent, as well as the destruction of enemy planes. This August, 12 of the 13 planes at the Mueda airbase (main base in Cabo Delgado) were destroyed on the ground, and the fuel dump set on fire. These represent almost a third of all the planes (39) FRELIMO claims to have destroyed during four years of war. It is still quite rare, however, to shoot down a plane in the air, as the anti-aircraft FRELIMO has is inadequate. However, two were shot down in the week immediately following the Mueda attack.

The degree of FRELIMO control in the areas of the north can be estimated by the fact that FRELIMO Central Committee members are continually in and out, that an OAU military delegation spent 10 days in Niassa province this spring, that Anders Johansson, a Swedish journalist for Dagens Nyheter, the main Stockholm paper, traveled with Dr. Mondlane in Cabo Delgado province, and probably most important of all, that the second congress of FRELIMO, although announced ahead of time, was held in Niassa province without the Portuguese being able to prevent it.

Increased cooperation from the Zambian government made possible the reopening of the front in Tete in March of this year. The strategic importance of this province, principally because of the Cabora Bassa dam project and its more southerly location adjacent to Zimbabwe, is emphasized by the presence there already of approximately two battalions (600 men) of South African troops. The level of the struggle at present is indicated by the fact that FRELIMO attacks in Tete are already at the stage of attacks on bases, and that the attacks take place in all parts of

the region north of the Zambezi River.

Portugal continues with the predominance of military force, with over 60,000 troops in Mozambique, counting those engaged in support functions (about 45,000 combat troops). FRELIMO still has only about 10,000, with others trained but without arms. Portugal is already over-extended; counting Angola and Guinea, Portugal is already spending 5 times as much per capita on her wars in Africa as does the United States in Vietnam (Patrick Keatley, Manchester Guardian, July 25, 1968). If the U.S. had proportionately as many troops in Vietnam as does Portugal in Africa, there would be 2,500,000 there (William Forrest, The Standard, DSM, September 27, 1968). In Guinea the nationalists control more than half of the territory; and in Angola the eastern front in particular is increasingly active. FRELIMO, on the other hand, does all its basic training now inside the country, and is able to augment its number of troops as rapidly as arms can be supplied (2,000 new troops trained annually at present - Anders Johansson, Sunday News, DSM, Sept. 1, 1968). In the long run, the population ratio, and the continuing support from African and eastern countries, is in FRELIMO's favor, as is, of course, the fact that they are fighting a war for the people, not against them. The entry of South African troops may delay, but is unlikely to be able to stop the advance.

Note on casualty figures: These are always a sore point in any war, and such is the general skepticism that neither side has much possibility of really convincing the wider public that their figures are accurate. FRELIMO communiques are usually accompanied by such circumstantial detail, however, that one is inclined to put a general trust in their accuracy; and whenever possible they are checked with the Presse Lusitania which FRELIMO gets regularly. Portuguese figures of how many wounded are not presented in these, however, but only in year-end totals. According to the Johannesburg Star, (quoted in Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, April 1968), Portuguese casualties in Mozambique average about 100 a month, which may actually be a little more than FRELIMO claims (a total made from the communiques referring to April 1968 is approximately 70, together with several indefinite references to "several" or "many" killed). Portuguese figures are of

course quite a bit smaller; they admit, for example, a total of 77 killed and missing in the three month period February-April 1968. The Sunday Nation (Nairobi) of September 29 reports that six Johannesburg surgeons have gone to Lourenco Marques to help care for Portuguese soldiers indicating that there are evidently a large number of wounded as well. FRELIMO comments that those Portuguese dying of wounds are reported in communiques by the Portuguese as having died of sickness.

The Second Congress of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), July 20-25, 1968.

"This Congress reinforced the unity of the Mozambican people. It proved that all Mozambicans are united in the same will to be free, and work together to regain their freedom. This second congress was a decisive step towards our final victory."

The Nationalist, Dar-es-Salaam, Aug. 3, 1968, quoting Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, President, FRELIMO.

Niassa Province, in the northwest corner of Mozambique, was the site for the Second Congress of FRELIMO held for five days in late July 1968 - almost four years after the initiation of the armed struggle, led by FRELIMO, against the Portuguese colonialist rulers. Four years earlier the First Congress was held in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, and thus the progress of the liberation struggle was embodied in this Second Congress conducted on Mozambican soil. 170 delegates and observers came to the meeting, including representatives from the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization, the Angola Liberation Movement (MPLA), the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), and historian Basil Davidson (Anti-Apartheid News, October 1968).

In summary, the Congress, as highest organ of the party, reaffirmed the armed struggles as the means of liberating Mozambique, while recognizing the protracted nature of the fight. "It was decided to intensify the mobilization and politicization of the masses, to recruit in areas not

yet affected by the armed struggle, to increase the number of militias, to expand the women's detachment, and to apply the Policy of clemency to captured enemy soldiers."

The following are excerpts from Resolutions on the Armed Struggle of the congress:

"2. ... "All these factors put together build the existing imbalance of forces between us and the enemy. Though politically stronger, we are militarily weak. In order to get our victory, we have no other way out but to change the direction of this imbalance; we will do it, but for that a great effort is required from us. Our war will therefore be a hard and long one."

"6. Prisoners of war have a political importance for us. We should treat them well. Through them, we can obtain information on the enemy. We should re-educate them as much as possible, and, according to our interests, eventually let them free. We may also use prisoners as hostages to be exchanged for our comrades who may be in the Portuguese colonial prisons. In this way, we would be showing to the world that we are fighting against Portuguese colonialism and not against the Portuguese people; we would be breaking the fighting morale of the enemy's army, and encouraging its soldiers' desertions."

Organization of Frelimo: - Central Committee.

The Central Committee was expanded from 20 members to 40, with elected provincial members, Provincial secretaries, representatives of mass organizations, and members elected by the Congress. The Central Committee has a legislative function. In a report to the Congress, President Mondlane described the method of work of the Central Committee as one of "democratic centralization". "...all members have the right to take individual positions on all questions, discussions are guided by a unified proposal, and members must be ready to cede to the decision of the majority, which must then be defended."

Executive Committee. Executive functions passed to this committee composed of the President, Vice-President and Secretaries of the various FRELIMO departments. The Congress elects the president and vice-president, upon proposal by the Central Committee.

A new political and military committee was also created.

In a press conference after the Congress, Dr. Mondlane, explaining some of the decisions of the Congress, said that FRELIMO was calling for the repopulation of Mozambique's liberated

zones by refugees now living in Tanzania and elsewhere. It was decided to consolidate political and administrative power, to increase production in these areas, to build more schools, train more teachers and expand medical and social services. (The Standard, August 3, Dar-es-Salaam).

Military: The basic training of the military forces is now conducted within the country by Mozambicans. A new military structure initiated in early 1967, reported Dr. Mondlane to the Congress, has led to the increased facilitation of supplies and

information. Support for the struggle has come from training facilities offered by the USSR, the Peoples Republic of China and Cuba; by war material, clothes and medicine provided by Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia; para-military equipment, provisions, clothing and medicines from the German Democratic Republic, and clothes and provisions from North Korea. Humanitarian organizations in Europe and North America aid the movement and the O.A.U.

Dr. Mondlane was unanimously re-elected as President of FRELIMO.

EVENTS IN NAMIBIA - The Windhoek Relocation

According to the October 3 summary compiled by the Secretariat of the UN Council for Namibia, there has been a virtual news blackout concerning the refusal of hundreds of residents to move out of their old location in Windhoek (capital of Namibia, or South West Africa) by the August 31 deadline. Starting Sept. 1, the old location was to have been demolished, all of its residents having moved, willingly or not, to Katutura (Herero for "we have no place of our own"), the new location which the South African administration began constructing in 1958.

From 1958 to the present, opposition to the removal has been strong. Consenting to move would represent capitulation to the claim of the South African administration that it may move Africans here and there at will. In addition, Katutura rents are as much as ten times higher than in the old location; residents have difficulty getting to work because of the increased distance from town; activities are strictly restricted in Katutura; residents are supposed to live within segregated tribal groupings; because of lack of housing, single men must live in groups of 100 or more, barracks-style. And in short, moving to Katutura means an acceptance of apartheid.

At first opposition took form in boycotts and demonstrations. In December 1959 a demonstration culminated in the killing of 11 Africans and injuring of 44. Pressures on the people to move increased. Those who stayed in the old location were faced with loss of jobs, hospital and school services and water supply.

In June, July and August of this year, the last pleas were heard. Early in June,

Herero Chief Designate Clemens Kapuno wrote to the UN Security Council for help. On June 31, 600 Africans attended a protest meeting and sent communications to the UN and the press. Late in July Kapuno spoke desperately on the telephone with one of U Thant's executive assistants. But there was no help to be had. And since that time communications have been cut off. We can only imagine what happened September 1 when bulldozers pushed down the houses of people who refused to leave.

SWAPO Press Conference

At the second anniversary of the armed struggle against South Africa, SWAPO officers in Dar-es-Salaam disclosed that

"rivers, dams and wells in the northern and eastern sectors of Namibia had been poisoned by South Africa to deprive guerrillas of water supplies. Consequently, they said, countless innocent villagers had died. The officials also disclosed that over 200 troops of South Africa had been eliminated since the struggle commenced near the Angolan border in August 1966. Moreover, they took credit for strikes by Ovambo stevedores and factory workers which they attributed to the effectiveness of their underground organization in urban sections of Namibia." (Times of Zambia, August 27, 1968)

SWAPO Publication Banned in Namibia

The SWAPO Information Bulletin, published

in Dar-es-Salaam and London, has been banned by the Publications Control Board in South West Africa. Also banned was "One For the Road" (Vol. 0, No. 0, June 1968) published by the University Christian Movement of Southern Africa (The Windhoek Advertiser, Sept. 16, 1968). (See the editorial in last month's news summary.)

Contribution to Portugal's War Effort

On request from the local women's Agricultural Association in South West Africa, the local fishing industry contributed no less than 70 cartons of canned pilchard to go to the Mozambique Fighting Soldiers Comforts Fund as contribution to Portugal's war efforts in the African territories. (Namib Times, July 19, 1968)

SWA Administration Succumbs to Pretoria's Embrace

The Rand Daily Mail of June 4, 1968 reports:

"The blue-print for South Africa's big take-over of most of the government of South West Africa was announced in Parliament yesterday. It will leave Windhoek as little more than a modified provincial capital... South Africa already controls these portfolios in SWA: Defense, Foreign Affairs, Police, Bantu Administration, Interior, Information, Immigration, Customs and Excise, Audit and major aspects of Transport..."

These are some of the functions that will be transferred to the SA government: Revenue, excluding personal income tax, and a few minor sources of income. Health. Commerce, industries and labour; agriculture, justice, lands, and the Land and Agricultural Bank of SWA. Coloured Affairs. Mining and Roads.

"Dealing with the status of the territory, the White Paper said that South Africa was granted full power of administration and legislation over SWA by the Mandate. It says this is to be done as though the territory was 'an integral portion of South Africa' and there can

be no question of incorporation or a change in the territory's separate international status' - - quoting Mr. Vorster's Windhoek speech last year as supporting this."

Then, on June 6, the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Bill was adopted, emasculating further the powers of the SWA administration in Windhoek.

SW white opposition to both these measures came feebly. Senators Horak and Louw of the Opposition United Party objected to the "bantustans" on the grounds that the government's commitment to their eventual independence would be binding on future governments. J. P. Niehaus, leader of the United National SWA Party, decried the measures as marking the end for any independence for SWA and violating the spirit of the Mandate. Actually what the SWA whites now realize is that by succumbing to Pretoria's embrace they are losing the important advantage of political and economic autonomy. But it's too late now.

International Events With Regard to Namibia

U.S. and U.K. Strategy Meeting. The Johannesburg Sunday Times (July 14) reported a meeting of George Ball with British Ministers and British Foreign Office officials to discuss strategy with regard to Namibia at the UN. Eventually the Security Council may be called upon to evoke Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and compel South Africa to surrender control of SWA to the world body. The problem is: which of the Great Powers should exercise its veto when and if the situation arises. According to the Times, the problem remains unsolved.

Termination of the Mandate Supported by Botswana. The ruling Botswana Democratic Party adopted a resolution during its annual congress which supported the UN demand that South Africa terminate its Mandate over the territory. The Party also went on record as "highly concerned about the inalienable right to self-determination and independence for the people of South West Africa." (Spotlight on South Africa, Vol. 6, #26, June 28, 1968)

ECONOMIC NEWS IN BRIEF

Oil.

The search for oil continues and expands

in relative secrecy. SWAKOR is the public utility company which will coordinate the various efforts in sea and land. Among the searchers is a team of 13 employed by the Geophysical Company of America, a subsidiary of Litton Industries. Commissioned by the Chevron Oil Company, they have been searching for off-shore oil between Walvis Bay and the Angolan Border (Windhoek Advertiser, Sept. 18). Caltex is also supposed to be prospecting for oil and natural gas in the Marine Diamond Sea Concession (Sn. Af. 5/27).

Zinc.

By the end of the year SWA will be producing zinc in a \$8.4 million plant at Rosh Pinah. This boom town in the Namib desert has grown up near the place where large deposits of zinc have been found. The expected result will be South Africa's independence from foreign zinc imports. (South Africa Digest, Sept. 27)

Meat.

A Zambian mission has visited Windhoek to discuss arrangements for importing meat.

Power.

The first stage of a project to satisfy SWA's power needs will be a central thermal power station of 60-90 Mw near Windhoek, and distribution lines to Tsumeb and Walvis Bay, which will be completed by 1972, according to SWA Water and Electricity Corp. The second stage will include the Kunene hydro-electric project. (WA 6/29). A \$5.6 million contract for construction of the 15 billion gallon Namate Dam near Keetmanshoop, South West Africa, has been awarded to Concor Construction by the SWA Administration. The dam is scheduled for completion in mid-1970. (News from South Africa, 8/21; Johannesburg Star 8/24)

UNITED STATES COMMERCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Gold

The annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund opened in Washington, D.C. with a united stand against South African attempts to force the price of gold upward (London Times, Oct. 1). The central banks of the major industrial countries held in reserve a "secret weapon" to counter SA's plan to withhold newly mined gold. This would involve according to Peter Jay's report, a new informal gold pool of the leading central banks who would sell from their own monetary reserves at the going free market price, month by month, the equivalent of the new gold withheld by SA, thus SA would not be able to force up the price of gold on the open market.

Secretary of the Treasury, Henry J. Fowler, is pushing the idea that gold is a commodity, like copper or rubber (Wash. Post, Sept. 30). He is attempting to undercut SA's insistence that the price of gold in the free market have a fixed floor at \$35 an ounce. Fowler's view that the price of newly mined gold fluctuates in a "commodity market" may actually point to a realistic goal in the near future. Joseph R. Slevin predicts that industrial users and private hoarders will be buying all the newly mined gold by the early 1970's, thus placing SA gold in the same price competitive framework as diamonds - a virtual monopoly. In the last ten years, according to a New York Times report (Sept. 16), industrial use of gold has tripled to reach 22 million ounces in 1967. It is estimated that such use could rise in 1973 to more than the total output of the "free" world. Thus, the private sector could provide the

solution to a rather sticky situation stemming from the US and SA positions on the price of gold.

U.S. Empire Marches On

Oil, hotels, credit cards, and locomotives head the lengthy list of American penetrations. In Mozambique, the Mozambique Oil Company and the Pan American Oil Company are slated to spend \$8 million for prospecting within the next 30 months (African News Digest, published by Farrel Lines for Sept.). The concession is for an 18,600 square mile tract. In South West Africa, the Southern Oil Exploration Corp. has received application for exploration of 8 concession areas covering some

90,000 square miles, including another surge in SWA Oil exploration. Exploration thus far in SWA in 1968 has cost a minimum of \$38 million. The Fluor Corp. of Los Angeles has been named as prime contractor for a refinery to be built at Sasolburg, South Africa, at a cost in excess of \$70 million (Wall Street Journal, June 18). Fluor heads a consortium with Luigi Gesselschaft fur Mineraltechnik of Frankfurt, West Germany.

Only 14,000 Americans visited South Africa last year, out of a total of 275,538 visitors (South African Digest, July 19), but American Express and Holiday Inns are decidedly encouraging more Americans to come. American Express has undertaken an arrangement with The Netherlands Bank of South Africa to enter the fast-growing credit card market (Wash. Post, Aug. 20). An instantaneous line of credit for \$700 will be provided, the first of its kind outside the U.S. Holiday Inns (Memphis, Tenn.) and Amalgamated Hotels Ltd., SA, are planning a hotel project to cost \$40.6 million (Wall Street Journal, Sept. 17). The project would consist of 31 hotels in South Africa, Lesotho, Mozambique and Rhodesia as well. American businessmen can then use their American Express credit cards at Holiday Inns--just like back home!

American Express' entry (Diners Club is already in SA) blends neatly with the computer business, a fact pointed out by IBM's managing SA director, Morris Cowley (Johannesburg Sunday Times, July 7). Forecasting a 25% computer growth

in a year, Cowley foresaw the day of the cashless society in which credit cards, run through computers, might replace the personal check and even cash itself. In the area of criminology, he also foresaw the SA police using computers to scan fingerprint files in several countries via South Africa's future communications satellite and match them with the suspect in a matter of minutes.

Braniff Airlines plans to fly more people to South Africa via South America (Braniff is the leading air carrier between the U.S. and South America), according to a Wall Street Journal report (Sept. 16). Braniff has applied to the Civil Aeronautics Board for routes from Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro to Johannesburg. Currently, passengers from Brazil must fly to New York en route to South Africa. Expected flying time from Rio to Johannesburg is 8 hours. For the "beautiful jet-set people", Ben Kahn of New York advertises the "Swakara", a cognac-dyed karakul lamb coat from South West Africa (New York Times, Sept. 28).

The South African General Electric company completed the first of 90 main line diesel-electric locomotives, ten months after the contract was signed (South Africa Digest, July 21). The locomotives are locally produced using imported GE engines and South Africa made parts and bodies.

Autos. Ford leads GM in

South African sales during the first six months of 1968, Ford having 21% to 18% of the market for GM (U.S. News and World Report, Aug. 19). But the top three (Chrysler added) trailed their year-ago six month sales, while Volkswagen boosted its sales. Ford has built itself a 22-storey "Ford House," tallest building in Port Elizabeth. To assist in South Africa's transportation problems, Prof. Donald Berry, head of the civil engineering dept. at Northwestern was invited to conduct a winter course on urban transportation planning at Wits Univ. (SA Digest, July 5). He was in SA on a similar mission in 1960, but there are more Ford and GM cars on SA roads these days!

The Texas State Fair, having been opened on Oct. 5 in Dallas by Gov. Connally, is hosting a 2,000 sq. ft. "Industrial South Africa" exhibition--a major fair participant (News from SA, Oct. 2). This is the biggest exhibit by SA in any state fair to date, with more than 30 SA concerns having their products on display. (For you jet-setters, the Swakara coat will be on display.) Oct. 7 was the time set aside for a SA ceremony, with the raising of the SA flag and playing of the national anthem, to which some 200 prominent Texans were invited.

Finally, Prof. Maynard Amerine of Calif., upon his visit to SA at the invitation of the wind industry, has said that SA wine could be profitably promoted in the US. He is considered an authority on wine and wine production (SA Digest, 9/20).

Note to ALL Readers:

PLEASE NOTIFY US OF ANY CHANGE OF ADDRESS, INCLUDING ZIP CODE.

CHANGE IN PORTUGAL ??

Portugal has changed leadership after thirty-six years of stable, austere, absolute rule by prime minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. The economic and political future of Portugal is a mystery. Nowhere deeper than in Portugal itself, for the Portuguese people do not know what to expect after four decades of supine existence.

Opposition to the regime that has occasionally appeared in Socialist or Communist guise has been systematically isolated and made ineffective by the strong man in control during these years. The outgoing regime, strong on law, order, and financial responsibility, was socially stultifying.

The Successor.

Marcello Caetano, the 62-year-old heir to the largest remaining colonial empire is expected to make haste slowly. Most observers believe that he will move in the direction of liberalization by easing the harshest censorship of literary and political opinion and increasing foreign capital inputs to the Portuguese economy. But Mr. Caetano was a life-long friend of Salazar. He is the chief architect of the corporate state which gave control a new name but did not lessen it.

Once a journalist, once a law professor, Caetano has indicated some small un-freezing by choosing Jose de sa Viano Rebelo, a temperate man, for Defense Minister, and promising to release Mr. Soares, a lawyer now exiled, who was chief of Delgado's attempt to run in opposition at the last general election.

It remains to be seen however if even this slight departure from the status quo can be engineered successfully, given the necessity to pacify the powerful conservative army officers.

Portugal Overseas.

Portuguese Africa is the most difficult problem for the new Prime Minister. After taking possession of his office, Caetano said, "So long as the armed forces are fighting in Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique and in the chancellories and international bodies, Portuguese diplomatic policy is faced with so much misunder-

standing one has no right to weaken the vigilance of the home front."

The African Nationalists in the Portuguese territories have of course provided the major revolt against the dictator's rule. The African Nationalist will have to become much more effective in political and military actions before they can bring about the loss of Angola and Mozambique to Portugal. But there is another more subtle danger inherent in the closer relationship of the white people in these two territories to Rhodesia and South Africa. A visiting mission to Angola from the Afrikaanse Handel Institut from South Africa exchanged views with Angolan leaders in the vein that it has become necessary for South Africa to look to Angola for defense and supplies and Angola must of necessity look to the South. South Africa looks East too, where Durban housewives are organizing aid to the armed forces of Mozambique because, as they say, "The growing power of communist countries and their influence in this territory."

Sir deVilliers Graaff, the leader of the opposition, warned that South Africa would be involved with terrorists in a matter of weeks of the Portuguese territories should succumb to the nationalist forces. He suggested that greater economic unity with these territories could eventually lead to an African common market.

Both South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portuguese leaders in Angola and Mozambique see Zambia as the clue to the onerous problem of attacks on their territories by African nationalists. For example, Angolan white leaders speaking to a visiting journalist from South Africa mentioned their possibilities of getting rid of the MPLA action in the south-eastern part of Angola if they had as many as ten helicopters. They are presently using three alouette Mark III helicopters from France, but they could really see no end to the war short of occupying western Zambia.

On the Eastern coast, Mondlane of Frelimo is urging that 15,000 refugees in Tanzania from Mozambique return home. Some of the dimensions of that political tangle can be seen in a recent denial by West Germany of giving aid to Portugal and in return Nyerere of Tanzania has assured Western Germany that his government would not recognize Eastern Germany.

PROGRESS IN ZAMBIA

Engineering Triumph Brings Oil to Land-Locked Zambia.

Much needed relief for oil-starved Zambia is now flowing along a newly completed 1,058 mile pipeline from Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania to Ndola, Zambia.

Since Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, Zambia has experienced far greater hardship than Rhodesia as a result of the sanctions policy, especially as regards oil, for while the Rhodesian needs have been amply supplied via South Africa, Zambia has had to rely on supplies brought in mainly by lorry along the 1,200 mile "Hell Run" from Dar-es-Salaam.

In December 1965 Zambia's President Kaunda asked British Prime Minister Wilson to urge a British concern to build the oil line, but the British government said that the cost would be too great and the construction time would be impossibly long. At that time Wilson was promising to bring back Rhodesia to legality in "weeks rather than months". But though this hope faded with the passing months, Britain remained hostile to the pipeline project.

Construction was, however, undertaken by 1,200 Tanzanians, Zambians and Italians, under contrast to Snam Progetti a subsidiary of the Italian state-owned oil firm, E.N.I. The cost was approximately \$39,220,000. Finance came from Medio Banco, a consortium of Italian medium credit banks, and the pipeline will be owned by Zambia (2/3) and by Tanzania (1/3).

The eight-inch steel pile, buried three feet deep, came from Italy and Yugoslavia and is among the toughest in the world. It was pushed through rivers, over 6,000 feet high mountains, over rocks and through thick bush, often in appalling weather. Where machines could not forge a way through, the men working on the project did - with their bare hands.

Construction was completed in 17 months -- well ahead of schedule. The pipeline can pump 450,000 tons at a time, which can be increased to 650,000 tons by adding two more boosters.

The main significance of the construction is the greater independence it brings Zambia from the white-dominated south, and therefore also the greater viability of a policy of confrontation rather than acquiescence in present power relations in southern Africa.

(Information from Rand Daily Mail, Aug. 8, 1968)

RHODESIA AND BRITAIN TALK AGAIN

The talks aboard the British warship "Fearless" at Gibraltar, between British Prime Minister Wilson and illegal Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith, last month were described in the Canadian Globe and Mail as "no more than a charade on the grand scale" (Toronto, Oct. 15).

The same could indeed be said of the entire course of British-Rhodesian relations since Ian Smith's UDI three years ago to preserve white supremacy. Never, however, has Wilson performed more brilliantly than in this most recent round of talks.

A news report in the Globe and Mail (Oct. 15) observes that throughout the talks the British Prime Minister "has maintained an air so relaxed that many have been mystified." It was generally assumed that he expected a settlement, yet he "showed no irritation or even surprise at the failure to agree."

The reason for Wilson's lack of surprise is, however, no great mystery. He did not enter the talks with the expectation of reaching a settlement with Smith. Such an outcome would have been highly embarrassing and inconvenient, both for Wilson's position of leadership in Britain's Labour Party, and for Britain's international relations.

Wilson's purpose was rather to counter pressures and criticisms at a number of fronts. He faced the dilemma of satisfying the strong and growing insistence in Britain that Whitehall should come to terms with the Rhodesian UDI which has survived for three years, and at the same time forestalling the alienation of the left wing of the Labour Party, a storm of protest at the U.N., and a crisis at the Commonwealth meetings in January next year should he appear to acquiesce in the course taken by

white Rhodesia.

Mr. Wilson has handled the dilemma by means of an adroit type of brinkmanship. This has consisted in going almost all the way towards accommodating the Smith regime but pulling up short of a total betrayal of the African majority. Whereas formerly the Wilson government insisted on no recognition of independence before majority rule, all that separated the two parties in the recent talks was Wilson's insistence on guarantees against impeding African progress to majority rule and on the retention of the British Privy Council as the highest court of appeal.

Wilson gambled shrewdly that even these watered-down conditions would be unacceptable to Salisbury. For while British opinion has moved steadily to the right on the issue, so also has white Rhodesian opinion. For the latter the question at stake is no longer the rate of progress to majority rule, but on the contrary, whether to adopt an outright policy of apartheid immediately or by stages within the next five years. Smith has so far succeeded in warding off attacks on his position from the right, but to move left at Britain's behest would be political suicide.

The Smith government's predictable rejection of the "Fearless" proposals leaves Wilson stronger on all fronts. He is no longer vulnerable to Conservative charges of stubborn intransigence. At the same time he is able to project an image of principled resistance to racialist extremism. He could assert at a press conference in Gibraltar that "very, very deep differences" still divide Rhodesia and Britain on conditions for independence, and later in the House of Commons could brand the Smith government as "an irresponsible, illegal group of men" and Smith as "a prisoner of some very racist and Fascist-minded people." (Globe and Mail, Oct. 15)

Meanwhile nothing fundamental has changed. The total sanctions called for by Britain through the U.N. are causing the Rhodesian economy to stagnate but not to collapse, thanks mainly to South Africa and Portuguese support of Rhodesia.

The only serious question mark hovering over this convenient stalemate is the extent to which the guerrilla penetration

by the African liberation movements will increase in the near future. The British government reserves the right to intervene militarily if "law and order" (i.e. white control) threatens to break down in Rhodesia. But in this respect too, South Africa can be relied upon to hold the white Rhodesian fort, and Britain will doubtless continue to turn a blind eye to the presence of foreign security forces in territory still held to be legally British - unless they should turn out to be Soviet or Maoist instead of white South African. But that is not likely!

AS HEMLINES RISE IN AFRICA, SO DO VOICES OF OUTRAGE

The mini-skirt already may be passe' in some fashion centers of the world, but it still stirs passions in Africa. The Malawi News, official organ of President Hastings K. Banda's Malawi "Congress Party" said: "All we want is the nakedness to stop at once. We will not tolerate anyone who comes here to corrupt our girls. Proper dress is necessary for the moral health of the nation." Mini-skirts were outlawed four months ago in Malawi.

Conservative governments in Africa view the mini as a left-wing symbol of revolt. Left-leaning governments say it exemplifies right-wing decadence.

South Africa's Natal Province still has an 1880 law on the books providing for three days in jail or a fine of not more than \$2.80 for anyone appearing in public not covered from neck to knee.

The Public Morals Commission of South Africa's sternly Calvinist Dutch Reformed Church recently asked local authorities to crack down on overexposure in public. This set attorneys checking the law books to see how such a demand might be enforced.

One Pretoria lawyer reported that a successful prosecution under common law for wearing too scanty a skirt would depend on proof that it had a depraving effect on the morals of others.

It also would be necessary to prove that it was done willfully, the lawyer said. In other words, the wearer of an abbreviated costume would need to INTEND to deprave and not just be following custom.

Mini-skirts have been branded "un-Zambian" in Zambia. Militant youth-wing

members of the ruling United National Independence party campaigning against the fashion have been known to rip mini-skirts from girls in city streets. (From Buffalo Evening News, Sept. 6)

NEW REFUGEE BILL SIGNED

This newsletter has noted in the past the presence in the U.S.A. of a number of South African students (approximately 120) who are without any legal status. Most of these students were brought to this country sponsored by the State Department, and now have no valid travel documents in order to return to independent Africa. They cannot, of course, return to South Africa for fear of detention, imprisonment or persecution.

Attempts to persuade our government to allow them to secure political refugee status have so far failed. For the most part these students are unable to continue further studies, cannot work legally, and yet cannot leave the country because they have no travel documents. The sort of "limbo" that such a "statusless status" creates is almost as dehumanizing as the apartheid system from which these students escaped.

However, some hope looms on the horizon with the signing on October 15 of a new international treaty by President Johnson representing a bill of rights for refugees fleeing to the United States. In the past such bills have almost always applied only to persons fleeing communist-controlled countries, and, interestingly enough, to persons of the Caucasian race.

The New York Times quotes President Johnson as saying that the treaty principally provided "the prohibition against expulsion or return of refugees to any country in which they would face persecution." He said other guarantees include freedom of religion, free access to courts, the protection of copyright and elementary education. The President expressed the hope that his signing of the treaty, adopted by the United Nations Jan. 31, 1967, would "encourage like commitment by nations whose refugee protection and guarantees are presently less generous than our own." while increasing its "suppression of

The Times squib (Oct. 16), however, makes no mention of the many other considerations revolving around the issue of political refugee status. First, if South African students are able to secure political asylum, will it mean that they will necessarily eventually be expected to naturalize as citizens of the U.S.? This would negate their ever being able to return to their home if and when it is freed. Second, does such a status require that they register for the draft? Would we then require South African victims of racism to carry out our own pogroms for us in other parts of the world?

Perhaps if all of us wrote our Senators and Representatives and asked them some of these questions, some day there may be an answer.

THE U.S. AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Goldberg: Disengage to Defend U.S. Interests

The U.S. should take immediate steps to "visibly disengage" and to lend practical support to those who are working toward the reconciliation and equality of races in South Africa, according to Arthur J. Goldberg, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Such action would be in the interests of the U.S. He feels that such an action would protect our moral and political position in the world and strengthen the defense of American interests in the rest of Africa and the non-white world, which now substantially exceed U.S. economic interests in Southern Africa. As examples of "fast-growing, large-magnitude economic American interests" in African countries, he cites oil in Libya and Nigeria, copper in Zambia, rubber and iron ore in Liberia and bauxite in Ghana.

This point of view is expressed in the sixth of a series of articles by Mr. Goldberg on "A New Foreign Policy for America" published in the Washington Post (Sept. 13). As a major spokesman in the U.N. for a policy of persuasion and compromise as opposed to the stronger measures constantly urged by the Afro-Asian nations, his change of view has special significance.

He states that the U.S. has long sought to induce changes in South Africa's policy but that "the South African government has ignored United States representations while continuing to build its repugnant system of total racial segregation - apartheid" and

democratic liberties for its people, blacks and whites alike." In other words, the method of dialogue through diplomatic channels (and others) so often urged in the U.S. as an alternative to sanctions is admitted to have failed.

Major Steps Proposed.

The following "major governmental steps" are therefore proposed:

- ***stricter enforcement of the South African arms embargo including a ban on sales of American dual purpose items, the closing of loopholes such as the sale of component parts for military equipment and the use of American influence to halt such sales by Japan, France and other countries.
- *** the closing of U.S. missile and space tracking stations in South Africa
- ***careful re-appraisal of the U.S.-S.A. nuclear cooperation agreement
- ***avoidance of South African ports by American official ships
- ***Government disallowance of Export-Import Bank loans and investment guarantees for South Africa, government discouragement of private loans and investments by American banks and businessmen, discontinuance of trade promotion publications for South Africa and an end to the sugar quota for South Africa.

Similar disengagement is urged in regard to the Portuguese-ruled territories of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea, including the rejection of AID investment guarantees and Export-Import Bank participation in these areas. At the same time support for the U.N. embargo against Rhodesia should under no circumstances be relaxed.

Force Rejected.

Mr. Goldberg advocates such "peaceful action" in preference to the use of force, which he rejects. While these proposals go much further than the policies of the State Department, they still fall short of what is necessary to undercut the power of the three racist regimes in Southern Africa. There is no mention of an extension of the total embargo against Rhodesia to include South Africa and the Portuguese territories, nor

even of the possibility of an oil embargo, which would attack them at their most vulnerable point.

U.A.W. Slams Investment in South Africa.

A special resolution of the United Automobile Workers roundly condemns the "brutal grip of apartheid" as well as American corporations which "have joined with a primitive white bigotry in a massive attempt at spiritual genocide."

According to the resolution, U.S. investments in this slave state are now rising toward \$700 million. Among them, Ford, General Motors and Chrysler produce over 60% of all cars sold in South Africa. The Union charges that the "power of greed" is suggested by persisting average net profits of well over 25%. As reprehensible as the eagerness of U.S. corporations to do business with a mortal enemy of democracy, their "supine collaboration with apartheid's policies of racial segregation and degrading wage discrimination" is scored as even worse.

NOW THAT THE OLYMPICS ARE OVER

The following are excerpts from reports of an involvement in the recent Mexico Olympics by Jim Bouton, formerly a pitcher for the New York Yankees. Jim Bouton, as a member of the American Committee on Africa, went to Mexico with Steve Mokone, a South African soccer player now at the Univ. of Pennsylvania, and were met by Dennis Brutus, and Chris DeBroglie (both South Africans) of SAN-ROC.

"On October 12, 1968 a football hero from South Africa named Steve Mokone, and myself, a professional baseball player from New Jersey, left New York for a week of lobbying at the Mexico City Olympics. We were met there by the other half of our team, Dennis Brutus, a former South African cricket player and President of SAN-ROC (South African Non-Racial Open Committee for Olympic Sports) and Chris DeBroglie, a South African weightlifter who is also a member of SAN-ROC.

"Our long range goal is the elimination of racism in South African sports. Our immediate goals in Mexico City were to influence and educate the sports delegates and the public from all over the world to

apartheid that exists in South Africa and the ways in which they should contribute to the solution of those problems as they affect athletics. Our appeal was directed to the International Olympic Committee and to the various world sports federations which control international competition in such sports as boxing, basketball, track and field, swimming, and most other sports. Since these bodies are responsible for setting and upholding the standards of international conduct in athletics we felt that a direct appeal to them was a logical step. Most of the international sports federations as well as the IOC itself have charters and constitutions which forbid discrimination based on race. Unfortunately these anti-discrimination provisions have always been interpreted loosely and in favor of the ruling white South African sports organizations. We felt that if we could get the IOC and the world sports federations to adhere to their own charters they would then have to suspend South Africa from international competition because of her well-known violations of the provisions on discrimination. Knowing how important athletics is in the life of South Africa, we felt certain that if she were suspended

from international athletic competition in a significant number of sports then she would be forced to change her apartheid policies, at least in the area of sports.

"The most astonishing obstacle we faced was the direct opposition of the U.S. Olympic Committee officials to our presence in Mexico City. The American press chief, Bob Paul, refused to allow us use of the bulletin board so we could announce press conferences, and he claimed we were at the games to disrupt the athletes. The president of the U.S. Olympic Committee, Douglas Roby, even suggested that we were 'being paid by the Russians' or were 'mixed up with the Commies.'

"In spite of difficulties, including much hostility, the IOC did decide to review the South African question at their next meeting in Warsaw, Poland. A combination of an increased awareness of the issues because of our keeping them raised will, hopefully, force the changes necessary in South Africa. A lot of groundwork has been laid for the future."

We hope your optimism is right, Jim. But so much more has yet to be done.

Southern Africa Committee
University Christian Movement
Room 758
475 Riverside Drive
New York, N. Y. 10027

November, 1968

Committee of Concerned Scientists
Box 304
Cooper Station
New York City 10003