

Southern Africa REPORT

Vol. 14 No. 4

August 1999

The Costs of Reconciliation



Also inside:

**The Truth about the
Region**
by John Daniel

**Observations following
the elections in South
Africa**




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Southern Africa REPORT

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First, the Good News

Some readers have complained that recent *SAR* editorials have been just too negative about developments in the new South Africa. Please give credit where credit is due, they say.

Let's concede, for starters, that the correct balance on these matters is difficult to strike. It is true, nonetheless, that as editors we tend to assume the premise recently given considerable analytical depth and resonance in a *Monthly Review* article (Summer issue, 1999) by John Saul and Colin Leys. "The result of recent developments, global and continental, for Africa," they argue, "is relegation to the margins of the global economy with no visible prospect for continental development along capitalist lines ... This simply means that Africa's development, and the dynamics of global capitalism, are no longer convergent if ever they were."

This is seen by such writers to be as much the case for South Africa itself as it is for the rest of the southern African region and, indeed, for the continent as a whole. Thus, as Saul and Leys also suggest, "the ANC's decision to abandon the more directive and mobilizational 'growth through redistribution' model that initially drove its project has produced a market-driven, export-competitive, neo-liberal strategy that ... has limited promise of growth and even less promise of delivering substantial returns to the vast mass of South Africa's own impoverished population." Indeed, they conclude - echoing the words of the distinguished theorist of the new world order, Manuel Castells - that "the real problem for South Africa is how to avoid being pushed aside itself from the harsh competition in the new global economy."

If capitalism, especially in its all too unmodified neo-liberal guise, is not a developmental option of real promise for southern Africa either pessimism or anger become the most plausible responses. Pessimism in the face of a global capitalist system that allows so little room for manoeuvre for Africans in the current epoch. Anger at those African leaders who seem often to struggle more to advance their own privileges than to carve out space, domestic and international, for realizing the positive transformation of the lives of the destitute and demeaned in their own countries.

Take, in this regard, the recent South African elections. First the good news. As David Pottie argues below, at one level these elections have seemed a promising consolidation of liberal-democratic, multi-party practices, an apparent "nor-

malization" of the South African political system after decades of turbulent, authoritarian and violent interactions. And yet (the bad news!), as our electoral coverage also suggests, the fact is that the ANC's hegemony has been won in the name of precisely the kind of neo-liberal strategy that has so little promise of bettering the lives of most ordinary South Africans. Or take the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, so dramatic in "its emotional, cultural and symbolic power" (Colin Bundy's phrase) and in the deeply human truths about apartheid that it has revealed. Again, there is this good news. Nonetheless, as Bundy reminds us below, there is also the fact of the TRC's own very narrow premises. Haven't these premises threatened to reduce, for too many whites, the resonance of the systematic horror of the apartheid era to the baroquely evil acts of a handful of rogue cops? And haven't they tended, in this way, to obscure the full meaning of an era that embodied the wholesale degradation -

for purposes of guaranteeing capitalist profits and white privilege - of an entire people? How much less pressing, his article seems to ask, is the urgency of redressing the chief legacy of that period - the deep-seated socio-economic inequalities it created - if mere police brutality (however horrific) is what is primarily to be remembered?

Equally ambiguous in its import is another emphasis of the TRC report that John Daniel's lead article in this issue underscores: the regional impact of the South African state's assault on its neighbours in defense of the apartheid system. To its credit - again, the good news - the report has devoted considerable attention to this reality. How bad the news then that such findings have been virtually ignored in the South African press and by the current government? How sad (as Daniel also emphasizes) that, as migrants continue to move from their once destabilized and still war-torn countries to South Africa in search of work, they become

the target of xenophobic backlash from precisely those poor South Africans who should be their allies in mounting the demand for a better life.

A better life? We return by this route to the issue of how bad, really, is the news about neo-liberalism. What if, as Saul and Leys predict, this strategy fails to deliver? Then surely the question they raise, in the course of their continental survey, regarding South Africa is equally à propos for all of southern Africa: "Just what [will] the fallout of hopes denied in South[ern] Africa ultimately be: political decay, heightened criminality, increased authoritarianism - or reactivation of the popular struggle to realize humane and genuinely developmental socio-economic outcomes?" Note, however, that putting things in this way does imply the existence of alternatives. Perhaps it is not so very negative after all to pose the question - as *SAR* itself seeks to do - in some such terms.

S A R



Mozambican crossing to South Africa under border fence designed to keep out illegal immigration

Henner Frankenfeld - PictureNET Africa



James Stejskal - PictureNET Africa

Nyanza genocide site in Rwanda. 6,000 were massacred near here in 1994

The Truth about the Region

BY JOHN DANIEL

John Daniel, who until recently, was a Senior Researcher with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, is currently in the Department of Political Science at the University of Durban-Westville.

Rene Dumont, the noted French anthropologist, recently described the twentieth century as 'one of massacres and wars.' Nobel Laureate William Golding called it 'the most violent century in human history.' No doubt, they had the nuclear and other horrors of World Wars I and II in mind, and the genocidal slaughters of the Armenians of Turkey, Jews of Europe, the Indians of Central and Latin America and the Tutsis of Rwanda.

Almost certainly they will not have included apartheid South


Africa's 30-year war on its neighbours amongst the century's great crimes. The primary reason is because that onslaught was largely hidden and portrayed in mainstream Western political opinion as a legitimate counter to an imagined Soviet offensive.

Worst violations outside SA

South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission took a different view. Its volume on the state as perpetrator (vol. 2) gave primacy to those gross human rights violations committed outside South Africa. The most significant finding was that from 1960 to 1994, the majority of gross human rights violations "occurred not internally but beyond the borders of South Africa" (vol. 5, p. 257). Consequently, "the majority of the victims of the South African government's attempts to maintain itself in power were outside

of South Africa. Tens of thousands of people in the region died as a direct or indirect result of the South African government's aggressive intent towards its neighbours. The lives and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of others were disrupted by the systematic targeting of infrastructure in some of the poorest nations in Africa" (vol. 2, p. 43).

To illustrate this, the Commission cited an UNICEF report that found that between 1980 and 1985 more than 100,000 Angolan civilians died as a result of war-related famine. The rate of death escalated after 1985 to the point where UNICEF concluded that an estimated 330,000 children died of unnatural causes in the 1980s. In Mozambique, the SADF and its surrogate army, Renamo, blazed a similar trail of death and destruction. By 1990, they had reduced Mozam-



Adil Bradlow - PictureNET Africa

bique to the poorest country on earth.

In its report, the Commission argued that the damage inflicted on these countries was wholly disproportionate to the threat posed by the socialist-orientation of their post-independence governments and their hosting of the armed wings of SWAPO and the ANC. At the time of their independence in 1975, the Commission noted that both countries were severely underdeveloped as a result of "centuries of colonial exploitation [which] had left them with a legacy of poverty and without the skills to manage a modern economy" (vol. 2, p. 43). It concluded that neither country "posed a credible military threat" to South Africa.

The Commission sought to understand why South Africa wrought terror and destruction on these, and (albeit to a lesser degree) five

other states in the region. It acknowledged that many in the security and political hierarchy articulated a cold-war discourse and genuinely regarded their campaigns across southern Africa as "good and just wars, part of the West's resistance to a perceived Soviet global offensive." The Commission rejected this as a sufficient explanation, however. Instead, it concluded that the primary motive was racism and that the regional onslaught was essentially an attempt to maintain white minority privilege.

The Commission also found that the conduct of the South African security forces in the region was largely driven by racist factors. It argued, for example, that "it is difficult to believe that Koevoet (the police counter-insurgency unit which operated in northern Namibia) would have been allowed to op-

erate on a bounty basis, or that the SADF would have killed over 600 people, many of them children and women, at the Kassinga camp in Angola, had their targets been white" (vol. 2, pp. 43-4). This racism, the Commission felt, was encapsulated in the words with which the SADF camp commander in northern Namibia greeted a new batch of conscripts in 1974: "Boys, hier gaan julle duisende kaffirs doodskiet" ("Boys, here you will shoot thousands of kaffers").

TRC finding ignored

The Commission concluded that had though apartheid had been as a form of systemic oppression inside South Africa, what was done outside to the people and economies of the region was worse. Dramatic as this finding was, domestically it was ignored both by the media

and the government. In the seven months since the report's release there has not been a single media piece discussing, for example, the Commission's report on the Kassinga and Chetequera massacres on May 4 1978, the worst atrocities of the entire apartheid era. The Commission held former premier John Vorster, then-Minister of Defence P.W. Botha, SADF Chief Magnus Malan and army and air force chiefs Constant Viljoen and RH Rogers accountable for a breach of international humanitarian law (vol. 2, pp. 46-55). The fact that the Commission's version of events at these two camps is different in important respects from the SWAPO and official UN accounts also received no comment – probably not even noticed due to South Africans' ignorance of anything that happened before the 1980s.[†]

[†] SWAPO and the UN claimed that Kassinga was a refugee transit facility while the SADF argued that it was a major military base. Both versions had an element of truth but each was incomplete. Kassinga was a large, multi-purpose facility. Part was a civilian facility but another part housed the SWAPO military planning headquarters where senior officers, including military chief Dimo Amaambo, were based.

Even more extraordinary was that ANC speakers did not mention the findings in the parliamentary debate on the final report. Many owe their lives to the sanctuary afforded them by the peoples and governments of the region. Yet some of the ANC leadership still harbour animosity towards the Commission due to its negative findings regarding abuses in the Angolan camps. Their mistaken perception is that the Commission drew no distinction between gross human rights violations committed in the struggle against apartheid and those in defense of it.

The findings chapter (vol. 5) reveals instead that the Commission found that although gross human rights violations were committed by all parties to the conflicts during the 34 years under review, they could not be held equally culpable. Responsibility rested overwhelmingly with the former state and its security and law-enforcement agencies. The Commission also accepted the international position that apartheid constituted a crime against humanity and that the ANC had engaged in a just war. It argued, however, that a just cause does not vindicate all and every action committed in pursuit of that cause: "A just cause does not exempt an organiza-

tion from pursuing its goals through just means" (vol. 5, p. 211). Violations committed in the course of a just end had to be subjected to the same rigorous scrutiny as violations committed in defense of an unjust order. Some in the ANC have been unable to accept this argument.

Dirty tricks in region

Apartheid South Africa's involvement in the region expanded during three decades from occasional cross-border abductions of refugees in the early 1960s to SADF involvement in various levels of warfare with six southern African states in the 1980s, with covert units conducting frequent raids into Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. In the early 1980s, security and intelligence forces also attempted to overthrow the government of the Seychelles and co-funded a mercenary force of so-called Presidential Guards in the Comoros, becoming the de facto ruling authority. Covert operations were mounted in Western Europe and Scandinavia as well.

The SADF only waged a conventional war in Angola. An SADF-backed surrogate – UNITA – supplemented even this effort. Elsewhere, the SADF applied a post-Vietnam model of counter-insurgency or indirect warfare (var-



1989 – Angolans haul firewood to trade for food in the context of destruction by the South African army

Fernando Lima – AIM

iously called counter-revolutionary or contra-mobilization warfare) borrowed from the United States, Israel and military dictatorships in Latin America (Chile, Argentina and Paraguay). This strategy placed a premium on terror and brutality ("do to them what they do to us - but better") rather than the old-fashioned "winning hearts and minds" approach.

The SADF employed a variety of overt, covert and clandestine methods. In the Namibian theatre a largely orthodox counter-insurgency war was waged, but elsewhere in the region surrogacy was central to the contra-mobilization strategy. Modelled along the lines of Israel's South Lebanon Army, the SADF sought out opposition groups in the four countries most closely aligned to the ANC (Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho and Zimbabwe) and took them over, lock, stock and barrel.

Surrogacy was a common SADF strategy in the 1980s, but the Commission found earlier evidence of surrogacy in the apartheid arsenal. In 1971, Commandant Jannie Breytenbach, head of the SADF's first special forces unit, trained Zambians for operations against the Kaunda government. Over an 18-month period, some 200 Zambians were trained in the Caprivi as part of Operation Plathond (flatdog) and deployed in south-western Zambia to "harass SWAPO bases and Zambian army garrisons which gave them support." Plathond was abandoned in 1973 but immediately after the Portuguese coup of April 1974, South African intelligence took over a group of Portuguese-trained Zambians led by Adamson Mushala and moved them to a security base at Oshakati in northern Namibia. The SADF-backed 'Mushala Gang' engaged in political destabilization and criminal banditry in western Zambia until Mushala was killed in 1982.

UNITA and Renamo

In 1976, following the failed South African invasion of Angola, the SADF launched Operation Silwer

to rebuild UNITA's shattered army and turn it into an effective surrogate force. In late 1979, with the independence election looming in Rhodesia, the SADF agreed to take over Renamo, then an instrument of the Smith regime. In the months after March 1980 the Renamo army was redeployed to bases inside South Africa and its leadership was moved to a farm near Pretoria. Several hundred black members of Bishop Muzorewa's auxiliary force were also moved south.

By this time a separate division within Military Intelligence, the Directorate of Special Tasks (DST), managed South Africa's surrogate armies. One section of DST handled UNITA and had a field office in Rundu in northern Rhodesia. The other section managed the other three forces from bases disguised as farms in the northern and eastern Transvaal, eastern Free State and northern Natal. In the mid-1980s, they launched Operations Marion and Katzen supporting Inkatha and anti-UDF/ANC groups in the eastern Cape respectively. Brigadiers C.J. 'Neels' Van Tonder and Cornelius van Niekerk, both later defendants in the abortive 'Malan' trial, headed DST.

The addition of a domestic arm testified to the effectiveness of the surrogacy strategy. Renamo and UNITA were the means by which the apartheid government destroyed the socialist projects in Mozambique and Angola. By the same means, the Lesotho Liberation Army so weakened the authority of the pro-ANC Jonathon government that it was toppled in a coup in 1986.

Groups of SADF-backed Zimbabwean dissidents operating in Matabeleland in the early 1980s sowed the seeds for the chaos and violence that engulfed southern Zimbabwe when President Mugabe sent the Fifth Brigade into ZAPU's strong-hold. These largely former members of the Rhodesian military were trained on farms in the north-

ern Transvaal and infiltrated into Zimbabwe through Botswana. They concentrated on sabotaging military and economic targets. Four one-time Rhodesian soldiers (three white and one black) were killed in one of these raids on August 18 1981 when their 18-strong party was ambushed in Matabeleland. Their target was a military base close to the Mozambican border and their main task to destroy its helicopter fleet. At the time, the SADF put out the lie that the group was on a private trespassing mission to free former colleagues held in a prison camp in Matabeleland. This was in fact a second authorized objective of their mission.

Military files destroyed

Mary Beech, the mother of one of those who was killed, refused to accept the SADF version and campaigned for years to have the SADF acknowledge that her son had died in the line of duty. Eventually she appealed to the Truth Commission for her son's reputation to be cleared. By accessing the personnel files of the three white officers killed (Beech, Berry and Wessels - the SADF never acknowledged the death of the black operative), the Commission found that the group was involved in Operation Drama, a clandestine program of destabilization against the Mugabe government. They and several hundred black former Rhodesian servicemen were housed at a secret base in Venda from which they launched regular sorties into Zimbabwe. The Commission found that their superior officer (another former Rhodesian) had authorized this particular raid and that the SADF's original account had been misleading. It recommended that the Ministry of Defence issue a correct public statement of the events and clear the reputations of those involved. At the time of writing, the Ministry of Defence had not implemented the recommendation.

This investigation pertaining to the SADF was one of the Commission's rare successes. On the whole, it singularly failed to access the mil-



Alfredo Mueche - AIM

1992 - Mozambican troops on the march

itary's records. The SADF generally adopted an obstructionist attitude to the Commission. It blocked access to its archives for more than half of the Commission's life and even when granted, access was circumscribed. As well, a huge part of that record was systematically and criminally destroyed prior to the 1994 election.

By way of example, the Commission submitted a list of more than 150 DST files with names and numbers, which it had received from Roland Hunter, to the SADF archives. During his military service in 1983, Hunter had been an aide to Cor van Niekerk. Working within DST, Hunter supplied the ANC with information on the unit. Arrested on spying charges, Hunter's defense was refused access to these same files. As a result, he was able to plea-bargain to reduce the charges and served only a five-year sentence. When the

Commission requested these same files, it was told that all had been destroyed along with all DST documentation. These formed a small part of the more than 40 tons of security documentation destroyed in 1993 alone. President de Klerk ordered the destruction, in probable violation of the Archives Act. Of course, it was an attempt to cover up the full extent of apartheid crime in the region.

No reparations

The Commission's governing Act restricts the payment of reparations to South African nationals. While obviously unjust, such a provision probably makes fiscal sense. Imagine the burden on the treasury of compensating every UNITA and Renamo victim, not to mention the region's landmine casualties! The post-apartheid government has returned Walvis Bay to Namibia, repudiated the apartheid debts of Na-

mibia and Mozambique and negotiated a special fee for SADC nationals to undertake tertiary-level education. Laudable though these measures are, they have done nothing to compensate for the sufferings of those in the region that bore the fullest brunt of the apartheid onslaught - its rural poor. It is they who constitute the bulk of illegal migrants now streaming into South Africa. Here, they encounter a rising tide of xenophobia instead of gratitude. Foreign Africans have been tossed to their deaths from commuter trains. Migrant hawkers eking out a pitiful living endure periodic purges from pavements. Many have suffered police brutality. The prospect looms, therefore, that the primary victims of apartheid's war on the region will become the victims of the frustrated rage of South Africa's post-apartheid poor as well.

S A R

Truth . . . or Reconciliation

BY COLIN BUNDY

Colin Bundy, a noted South African historian, is currently Vice-Chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand. This article is drawn from a presentation given recently by Dr. Bundy at a meeting organized by the Harold Wolpe Trust.

One of the difficulties of discussing the TRC analytically is that one can too easily overlook or fail to recognize its power. I am referring to its emotional, cultural and symbolic power: above all to the potency and intensity of the testimony it elicited – both in the public hearings and in the written statements dictated and painstakingly transcribed in their thousands. To revisit these in five volumes of the TRC report, or to have encountered them on radio or television during live broadcasts, is a confrontation with the human condition; it requires each of us to come to terms with the worst and best in our fellow citizens. There is horror in the testimonies, and grief and pain and anguish; there is courage, cowardice, resilience, self-knowledge and denial. The cumulative account provides an explicit and terrible record of torture, vindictiveness and brutalization.

And in addition to the TRC report and the great body of documents now handed to the State archives, we have the extraordinary account by Antjie Krog [1998]: reportage and autobiography woven together with poetic language and insights. As will be quite clear, I am not trying here to add to this kind of analysis of the TRC. Nor am I going to deal with the legal and political dispute to which the TRC process and its report have given rise.

My focus is on history and the TRC. I want to make some comments on the nature of the Commission and its report in relation to

the discipline of history. The TRC raises direct epistemological issues concerning historical evidence, and historical understanding. It poses in virtually unmediated form questions of how the past is constructed and presented, how it is contested, and what the role of history is in shaping values and institutions in civil society. All of these aspects have been analyzed and debated by others – and much of what I have to say draws upon their work.

The TRC in history

How does one begin to think historically about the TRC? How might one locate the Commission within a broader account of contemporary South African history? In particular, how might one characterize it in fairly conventional social science terms – as an item of legislation, as a political and social process, and in relation to other political and social processes? In other words, if analysis distances itself from the TRC as political drama or morality play, and eschews rhetorical celebration or denunciation of the Commission, what are we actually dealing with?

Basically, it is impossible to make much sense of the TRC unless one relates it to the political settlement arrived at between 1990 and 1993. The TRC was not merely a legal by-product of the political settlement, but in a more fundamental sense a crucial element of that settlement. And to take one further step back in time, any account of the settlement necessarily depends upon the circumstances which led to it.

One of the earliest, most influential and durable analyses of those circumstances was written by Harold Wolpe. In his *Race, Class & the Apartheid State* [1988, p. 103], Wolpe identified the prevailing conjuncture as one of an unstable equilibrium *in which the white bloc, while holding state power and having at*

its disposal the armed and security forces, was unable to suppress the mass opposition which, in turn, did not have the immediate capacity to overthrow the regime and the system. In this situation a space was opened up for initiatives for a reformist solution to the country's crisis on the basis of a "negotiated settlement."

This was prescient – and a far more useful starting point for understanding the negotiations process than many on offer. It is instructive to begin where Wolpe pointed – which was also where the government and the ANC found themselves in 1989. The state was unable to reimpose order from above; the oppositional forces were unable to seize power from below – and both had come to a reluctant recognition of this stalemate. Mandela's letter to P.W. Botha in March 1989 (the crucial section of which proposed that: "The key to the whole situation is a negotiated settlement") and de Klerk's speech to parliament on February 2nd 1990 voiced the same logic. Although neither leader said so, their forces resembled the armies in *Macbeth*: "As two spent swimmers, that do cling together." Having both conceded, under enormous pressure, that a negotiated settlement was the only viable option, together they clung to the process.

To appreciate the tenacity of their grip, it is worth recalling the series of disclosures and disasters that threatened: Operation Vula, Inkathagate, Sebokeng, Boipatong, Bisho, and the seemingly endless killings on the East Rand and in Natal. Despite these, to a degree and at a pace that surprised many observers, the broad outlines of the settlement actually emerged quite rapidly. And they could do so because both the National Party and the ANC agreed on terms that deviated quite significantly from their initial negotiating positions. In par-

ticular, in November 1992 the ANC adopted its "Strategic Perspectives" on negotiations. This committed a post-election government to a form of power-sharing for five years; entrenched the posts of white civil servants; and agreed to a form of amnesty which indemnified politicians, soldiers and security agents from civil or criminal prosecution in return for disclosure of their crimes.

Underpinning these explicitly political concessions – Hein Marais [1998, p. 89] argues – was a retreat by the ANC with arguably longer term implications. The ANC retreated from economic and social policy positions that would threaten, weaken or dismantle the structural foundations of a two-nation society. Blade Nzimande [quoted in Marais, 1998, p. 90], citing the Mexican sociologist Carlos Vilas, was one of few to warn at the time that transitions initiated by previous regimes "do not project into the economic sphere," and do not impact on income redistribution, employment and living conditions.

During CODESA, verily, the ANC sought first the political kingdom. The form of state (the balance between central and provincial powers), the terms of power-sharing (in the GNU), the details of entrenched legislation and veto powers, and the sustained efforts to bring the IFP and the Afrikaner right into electoral politics were the main focus of negotiations. There was an understandable concern with attaining, defending and reshaping state power – but concomitantly there was a tacit acceptance that negotiations would leave the structures of production, property, wealth and poverty virtually intact. From 1992 onwards, the ANC backed off from redistribution and state regulation, dropped demands like progressive taxation and a restructuring of the financial sector; and accepted a property rights clause sponsored by big business. In the process, it was assimilated into a web of institutional relations, systems and practices that historically

had served white privilege and capital accumulation.

The ideology of the historic compromise dealt increasingly with the "new" South Africa, with nation-building. "The dominant discourse" (writes Marais [1998, p. 93]) "came to orbit around postulated common interests and destinies – rather than difference, contradiction and antagonism – as the fundamental dynamics at work in society." Tutu's "rainbow" metaphor translated this aptly into a folk or popular register.

Viewed within this reading of the negotiated settlement, the TRC emerges as a crucial element of the historic compromise. It balanced off demands for justice with those for a blanket amnesty. "Dissected by political parties in a process that saw twenty drafts," the Promotion of National Unity & Reconciliation Act was drafted less by lawyers than it was "founded on compromises thrashed out in the steamy, often

late-night sessions which brought the country a political settlement" [Davis, p. 6]. The trade-offs in the Act which created the TRC "neatly matched those of the political settlement itself – defusing the threat of 'counter-revolution' by harnessing opposing social and political forces into agreements aimed at stability and national consensus" [Marais, 1998, p. 258]. The process of appointing its members was a two-act play in nation-building: the nominations and public hearings, and the submission of a short-list of 25 names to the President – and then the last minute addition of Rev. Khoza Mgojo and Adv. Denzil Potgieter in order to give greater representation to Kwa-Zulu Natal and to appease apparent unhappiness over the absence of coloured people on the list [Krog, 1998, p. 20].

The TRC and historical understanding

This background helps underpin the basic point I wish to make here in evaluating the TRC (and I do so in the knowledge that the point has been made, in related terms, by a number of others, perhaps most effectively by Mahmood Mamdani). This seeks to evoke the way in which the TRC has the potential to shape historical understanding, and in so doing to narrow, to constrain and even to distort such understanding. I am not referring merely to the researchers of the TRC, the writing of the report, and the deposit in the state archives of the evidence it collected. I am referring also to the Act which constituted the Commission, its mandate in terms of this legislation, and above all the ways in which this mandate delimited the drama of the TRC. The TRC, as you all know, was charged with the objective of promoting national unity and reconciliation by:

establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights from 1960 to



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1993, including the antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of such violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and the motives and perspectives of the perpetrators.

Certainly, the Report is uncomfortably aware of the narrowness of this investigative mandate. It notes that the systemic and all-pervading character of apartheid provided the background for its investigation. It speaks of the difficulty of concentrating only on those who had been killed, tortured or severely mistreated against awareness of "systematic discrimination and dehumanization." It says that a strong case can be made that the violations of human rights by pass laws, migrant labour, forced removals, Bantu Education and so on had "the most negative possible impact on the lives of the majority of South Africans [TRC, 1998, vol. I, pp. 62-64]" Yet, despite these important caveats, the TRC report is not in any important sense shaped by an intellectual or political critique of its mandate, nor by analysis that extends or transcends that mandate.

Look, for example, at the very beginning of the five volume report, the Foreword that appears over Tutu's signature. In paragraph two, it accepts the time-frame of the Act uncritically. Contemporary history "began in 1960 when the Sharpeville disaster [sic] took place" and "it is this history with which we have had to come to terms." It is arguable that the years 1960 to the early 1990s constitute an identifiable historical period: one in which apartheid policies were most expansive and aggressively pursued; in which the state made a decisive shift towards more overtly authoritarian forms of social control and political repression; and in which mass transgressions of human rights in South Africa became internationally notorious.

But to treat this period as "the history with which we have to come

to terms" effectively frees us of the obligation to arrive at a similar reckoning with any other history. The high noon of human rights violations was preceded by a long dawn: a pre-history of dispossession, denial, and subordination. Colonial conquest took 200 years. Racial identities ascribed by colonial rule were rewritten - italicized - by a distinctive form of industrialization based upon the cheap labour of disenfranchised natives. Segregation policies, long before 1948, drew deeply discriminatory lines across housing, jobs, education and welfare.

What the TRC threatens to do is to uncouple these histories: to define three decades of the past in terms of perpetrators and victims and tightly defined categories of wrong, and to suggest that this is "the beast of the past." Let me illustrate the general point with a sub-theme, but a telling one. A substantial body of the testimony collected by the TRC dealt with torture at the hands of South African police officers. The Report provides a brief but chilling history of how torture was professionalised within the police, but especially in the Special Branch: how certain officers received training in torture techniques in France in the early sixties, and subsequently in Argentina, Chile and Taiwan. It details the legislation which drew new zones of penal license - permitting solitary confinement and detention without trial. It quotes Joe Slovo: "However firm the old type of policemen were ... they were not torturers ... In a sense, up to about 1960/1, the underground struggle was fought on a gentlemanly terrain. There was still a rule of law. You had a fair trial in the courts." And while it demurs slightly - it received evidence on extensive forms of torture during the Pondoland Revolt of 1960, and it notes in a throwaway line that "such methods were widely used in criminal investigations before the 1960s" - the Report essentially confines its account of violence at

the hands of policemen to the years after Sharpeville [TRC, vol. 2, pp. 194-7].

This is poor history. Without trying to make a full case for a different history let me provide a couple of snapshots. In 1930, working in the locations of East London and Grahamstown, the anthropologist Monica Hunter [1961] noted: "In collective dreams, I found that by far the most frequent motif was a police raid." In 1937, a Police Commission of Inquiry appointed by Hertzog's government warned of the "attitude of mutual distrust, suspicion and dislike" between police and black South Africans. This was due to the "unnecessary harshness, lack of sympathy, and even violence" used by police during the constant location raids to enforce tax, liquor and pass laws. These had "a brutalizing effect on the police [quoted in Simons, 1949, p. 75]" As Jack Simons [1949, p. 76] drily noted "It is a short step from brutality to illegality" - and, he added, "In specific cases, policemen were shown to have flogged prisoners, beaten the soles of their feet, or ducked them in water until they were nearly unconscious."

The short memory span of the TRC in this specific instance is symptomatic of a more far-reaching incipient amnesia. Analytically, how helpful is it to focus on police torture and ignore bureaucratic terrorism? By bureaucratic terror I mean the use of state power against individuals and groups who are politically rightless, socially discriminated against, and economically subordinate. I refer to the rote, routine, relentless denial of first generation human rights; the quotidian and unthinking realities of a social order that took root long before 1960. When Hannah Arendt coined the phrase "the banality of evil," she concluded that "The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, but they were, and still are,

terribly and terrifyingly normal ... This normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together."

It is this terror that escapes the TRC. By focusing so selectively on some of the horrors of the apartheid past, its hearings, paradoxically, have the effect of diminishing the full iniquity of the past. By highlighting the trauma of families of activists, the Commission unwittingly silences the lived realities of the multitude, the thousand unnatural shocks that apartheid flesh was heir to. It defines the resistance by the active challenges of a heroic minority but writes out the stoic endurance of the majority.

As Mamdani [1998, pp. 38-40] puts it, "The TRCs version of truth was established through narrow lenses, crafted to reflect the experience of a tiny minority" of victims and perpetrators. By individualizing victimhood it surrendered the task of comprehending the social nature of dispossession. "Perhaps the greatest moral compromise the TRC made was to embrace the legal fetishism of apartheid. In doing so, it made little distinction between what is legal and what is legitimate, between law and right." The result is laconically expressed by one of the foot-soldiers of the TRC, Mahlubi Mabizela, a member of the research department: "Farm labourers saw the TRCs coming as a sort of Messiah. But the policy decision was that their suffering was not covered by the Act, it was not a gross violation. The statement takers were the ones who had to say sorry, we are not talking to you [quoted in Davis, 1998, p. 8]."

Conclusion

I want to end by referring to an incisive little book by Paul Connerton, called *How Societies Remember* [1989. pp. 1-2]. He begins with a general point about social memory.

All beginnings contain an element of recollection. This is particularly so when a social group makes a concerted effort to begin with a wholly new start ... It is not just that it is very difficult to begin with a wholly new start, that too many old loyalties and habits inhibit the substitution of a novel enterprise for an old and established one. More fundamentally, it is that in all modes of experience we always base our particular experiences on a prior context in order to ensure that they are intelligible at all ... The world of the percipient ... is an organized body of expectations based on recollection.

In very specific cases, the "concerted effort to begin with a wholly new start" takes place when a regime seeks to establish in a definitive manner a new social order. This was true for the regicides of Louis XVI, true for the Bolsheviks in 1917, and true for the Nuremburg trials.

The settlement they seek is one in which the continuing struggle between the new order and the old will be definitively terminated, because the legitimacy of the victors will be validated once and for all ... To pass judgment on the practices of the old regime is the constitutive act of the new order.

The TRC may appear to be passing judgment on the practices of the apartheid regime, but its remit and

its reach are in fact very different. In its origins, in its mandate and in its procedures, it was incapable of that sort of judgment. It could not come to terms with the underlying structures and processes that have determined our identities and patterned our society. At the risk of oversimplifying an already sketchy argument, do we run the risk of defining a new order as one in which police may no longer enjoy impunity to torture opponents of the government, and failing to specify that ordinary citizens should not be poor and illiterate and powerless and pushed around by state officials and employers? Does the TRCs highlighting of individual memories actually facilitate social amnesia? And finally, to what extent is the truth and reconciliation of the Commission not merely the product of a compromise, but historically compromised? Is its form of nation-building one which can only yield a lop-sided structure - two nations disguised as one, a hybrid social formation consisting of increasingly deracialized insiders and persistently black outsiders?

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“Normalization”? The South African Election

BY DAVID POTTIE AND JOHN S. SAUL



Henner Frankenfeld - PictureNET Africa

Voting queues in Alexandra Township, June 1999

John Saul writes:

David Pottie provides us below with a careful and detailed analysis of the inner workings of the recent South African election, one grounded in his own full-time work as a researcher for the Electoral Institute of South Africa. As he suggests, the concept of “normalization” has been much used in conventional circles to describe the consolidation of liberal-democratic, multi-party practices that seems to be taking place in South Africa.

But what does this so-called “normalization” entail, precisely? In this regard, evaluating the recent elections is no easy matter. Do they suggest the political cup in South Africa to be half-empty or half-full? Both interpretations have some plausibility.

Of course, as an observer at both the 1994 and the 1999 elections, I did not expect the 1999 version to have quite the same human drama as was on display in 1994. 1994 was,

after all, the occasion of the Freedom Election, its essence unrepeatably in quite such historically charged terms. But the 1994 election was also carried out in a volatile, even dangerous, atmosphere. The 1999 event was much more decorous: well attended, peaceful, largely respectful as among the parties contesting the outcome. This kind of “normalization” must have seemed no bad thing to South Africans who have witnessed so

much politically-charged carnage in recent decades.

True, some have seen a threat in the fact that what electoral politics has consolidated in South Africa is a one-party dominant tilt, a dominance that is cast, moreover, in primarily racial terms – with the ANC, overwhelmingly, the party of South African “Africans” (except in KwaZulu-Natal where, however, an accommodation between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party seems to be holding) and the Democratic Party, now the official (if relatively small) opposition, having purchased its success in large part by playing the racial (white) card.

Yet far more worrisome, I think, is another kind of dominance: the one-ideology dominant tilt of the elections that have just transpired: the fact that the ANC’s hegemony has been won in the name of a neo-liberal economic strategy – one, it should be noted, that no other party of significant following (least of all the DP) sought to contest during the election – that has little promise of transforming the lives of the vast majority of ordinary South Africans.

Perhaps it was not, strictly speaking, the voters’ intention to so sanction neo-liberalism. But one ANC politician did put the point quite clearly on television as the results poured in: “Our platform was GEAR,” he said. Or, as another argued in the heat of the

campaign: “Fiscal and monetary constraint and liberalized trade and capital movements ... which aim at the structural repositioning of SA’s economy in response to globalization, whatever their long-term benefits, have severe short-term costs for constituencies of voters who are among the chief supports of the governing party. The ANC has, however, indicated that it will persist on its chosen path.” As one British banker put the point, in the wake of the election, to the *Washington Post*: “[New SA President] Mbeki holds things close to the chest and makes decisions in a secretive way. However, he is not a populist and has been a ‘Thatcherite’ in his fiscal ideas. His experience in exile introduced him to the financial world – he is unlikely to abandon the close ties to business developed in those years abroad.”

In his excellent recent book, *Fault Lines: Journeys Into the New South Africa* (University of California Press, 1999) David Goodman finds one of his informants, a brash emergent African entrepreneur named Tumi Modise, stating quite frankly and unequivocally: “Race is not the issue anymore. It’s class.” Yet while this seems to be, to a signal degree, objectively true of the new South Africa, it is still far from being subjectively so. In this election both the “common-sense” of neo-liberalism (normaliza-

tion indeed!) and – probably even more importantly – the continuing resonance of African nationalism (and the ANC’s past political achievements) helped to obscure the fact. Surely the development policy debate must eventually occur in South Africa in much more sophisticated and contested terms than the ANC’s policy programme, and its electoral hegemony, encouraged this time round.

Such, at least, is the “half-empty” reading of the import of these elections, seen, from this optic, as having served to damp down the measure of class consciousness and class conflict that is so necessary to the vast majority of South Africans’ eventually securing their futures. Note, however, the one saving grace of the elections considered in this way. For while it is true that the ANC tacitly played the neo-liberal card and continued to court the international market-place for all it was worth, it did run (as Pottie suggests), in the most public terms it offered, on the platform of “delivery” – a theme that also formed the core of newly-minted president Thabo Mbeki’s inauguration speech. Should its chosen strategy fail to deliver on the promises thus made to its popular constituency, the debate in future elections might well prove to be cast in terms of a much wider range of strategic alternatives.

David Pottie writes:

On June 2 South Africa held its second democratic elections for national and provincial government. These elections were free and fair, levels of political violence were negligible, voter turnout was very high, and the proceedings were carried off in a single day of voting. Ultimately, the election result brings 13 political parties to seats in the National Assembly (up from 7 in 1994) and ushers a substantial realignment of the varying strengths of the opposition parties. The ANC renewed its electoral dominance,

whereas the New National Party (NNP) was reduced from second to a distant fourth place standing in the overall party rankings. In its place, the Democratic Party (DP) has assumed status as the second place party. But aside from these overall rankings, what are we to make of electoral politics in South Africa?

There has been, for starters, the transition both in the leadership of the ANC and in the nation’s presidency from Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki. Much has been made

of the question: “What will happen when Mandela goes?” Now Mbeki’s steady hand seems set to guide the direction of ANC policy. The 1999 election thus brings us, smoothly, into the “Mbeki era” – whatever that may prove to connote.

More broadly, the so-called “second elections” are being seen as a crucial marker in the democratic consolidation process, its affirmation of liberal-democratic, multi-party practices representing an apparent “normalization” of the South African political system. In 1994 the

main issue was the legitimacy of the state and the basic political demand for one person, one vote. In 1999 the elections focused on much more mundane concerns: competing party policy statements and the management of the electoral process itself. In this regard at least, the 1999 elections welcome South Africa to "normal" politics. For some, the South African political transition, at least in terms of multi-party politics, is now complete. According to this thinking, South Africa is well on its way towards full-fledged democratic consolidation.

The electoral process

But whatever the merit of this way of framing the 1999 elections, sustaining free and fair electoral politics is a tricky business and South Africa will continue to face challenges across a number of fronts.

Firstly, the 1999 elections were an expensive affair. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) budget was close to one billion Rand and the combined tally of political party election campaign expenditure is estimated to be over 500 million Rand. Many capital-intensive and high technology applications contributed to these costs and South Africa must evaluate their sustainability. The National Results Centre alone cost close to 100 million Rand and all those computers will need a buyer once the IEC closes up the 1999 election shop. Many voting stations lacked phones, and these have been installed at IEC expense, theoretically as an investment to be available for the next time around. But given the rate of copper cable theft, only time will tell if this was a sound investment strategy.

Secondly, South Africa must now prepare for the second round of local government elections slated for sometime in 2000. It must therefore decide how best to maintain the institutional and financial capacity of the IEC in anticipation of these elections – or else face the task of re-inventing the wheel each time elections come around. Thirdly,

electoral resources remain, like most resources in South Africa, unevenly distributed across the lines of race, class and region. Queues at voting stations, as well as the size and staffing of the voting stations themselves, varied enormously. As evidence, well-resourced voting stations in rich urban neighbourhoods or small towns were able to deal with the flow of voters in their districts and reported results, hours, and in many cases, days, in advance of their less well-resourced township and rural counterparts.

More substantively, it is worth noting, from this recent experience, that electoral politics in South Africa continue to follow the lines of race, and electoral calls for a strong opposition party (prominent in the Democratic Party campaign) came in practice to draw upon just such a cleavage. Significant, too, is the fact that South Africa is now firmly a one-party-dominant political system – although any evaluation of the ANC in this regard must also recognize the diversity of voices, policy positions and options available within the broad base of its structures.

Managing the election

One of the main challenges facing the Independent Electoral Commission in the actual management of the election was to compile South Africa's first common voters' roll. This activity was undertaken over the course of three weekends between December 1998 and March 1999. South Africans were able to register upon presentation of a bar-coded identification book issued by the government. The bar-code identification requirement became the focal point of a series of charges and counter-charges by the political parties, the IEC and the Department of Home Affairs (tasked with issuing the identity documents). Opposition parties charged that their supporters did not have the required documents whereas ANC supporters did, that the Department of

Home Affairs was unable to issue the documents, and ultimately, that the requirement was an unnecessary infringement on the right to vote. Upon review in several High Court cases, the courts ruled in favour of the IEC. In the end approximately 80% of potential voters or 18.5 million South Africans registered to vote.

A second challenge facing the IEC was the introduction of an electoral code of conduct to regulate party activity in the hopes of contributing to free and fair elections. Overall, the election campaign period was free of the kind of political violence associated with the run-up to the 1994 elections. There were instances of violent confrontation, particularly in parts of the former Transkei, in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands region and the North Coast, as well in the Cape Flats outside of Cape Town. But this violence was different from 1994 in at least two important ways. First, the arrival of the UDM on the political scene has introduced another dimension to the ANC-IFP conflict and accounts for the different geographic pattern of violence. There is now a three-way dynamic to consider. Second, the overall level of violence was enormously reduced compared to 1994. So while reducing the high levels of crime remains a priority for all South Africans, there has been a marked degree of success in lowering the levels of political violence.

For its part, the IEC was charged with applying the Electoral Code of Conduct to gain the peaceful and tolerant participation of political parties in the elections. The Code of Conduct specified an extensive list of prohibitions on party behaviour during the election period. These restrictions were designed to contribute to the operation of free and fair political competition throughout the election campaign. As a result, parties and their supporters were prohibited from carrying weapons at political rallies, tear-

ing down posters, preventing rivals from gaining access to voters for the purpose of voter education, collecting signatures, recruiting members, raising funds or canvassing support.

Moreover, in addition to these prohibitions, the Electoral Act also assigned additional rights to parties to formally participate in, and thus take further ownership of, the monitoring of electoral procedures on voting day. As a result, every registered party could appoint two party agents for each voting station; and four party agents for each counting station. The IEC also remained in touch with the political parties through party liaison committees and conflict management committees established through the provincial electoral officers.

Other challenges

In addition to the regulatory framework governing campaigning, effective participation by the political parties in the South African electoral system also requires funding, and the Constitution seeks to address this concern. Section 236 of the Constitution reads: "To enhance multi-party democracy, national legislation must provide for the funding of political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures on an equitable and proportional basis." Government therefore bears a constitutional responsibility to provide some financial support for political parties.


However, state funding of political parties extends only to parties currently represented in national or provincial legislatures - a total amount of R53 million being allocated to the represented parties from public funds. In the run-up to the 1994 elections all parties that demonstrated a threshold of public support through signatures qualified for funding and this experience formed the backdrop for sustained demands by the new parties lining up for the 1999 elections. In the end no new funding was extended to these parties. Of equal concern, private or foreign donations to political

parties are not subject to any regulation. During the election campaign the media reported on substantial foreign government donations to the ANC (e.g. the United Arab Emirate and Saudia Arabia each contributed US\$10 million to the ANC!)

As for campaigns, the top two campaign issues identified in opinion polls were crime and job creation, with housing and education following. Crime held the spotlight in most campaign posters with bald pronouncements from the NNP such as "Hang Killers and Rapists" and "No Mercy for Criminals." The DP's overall campaign slogan was "Fight Back" which var-

iously meant fight back against corruption, against crime, or against the prospect of a two-thirds electoral majority for the ANC.

For its part, the ANC largely campaigned on its record of delivery while in government. It did not actively promote the two-thirds majority goal in its posters, although the benchmark certainly figured in campaign speeches. Nevertheless, the ANC did not claim any desire to amend the constitution. The ANC also refused to be drawn into the death penalty debate. Instead it fought the campaign on its own terms, proud of its achievements in



Shaun Harris - PictureNET Africa

government and raised the bar for itself by promising to carry on with delivery targets for social services and infrastructure delivery, and to address corruption and crime. If this campaign approach seemed rather mundane against the more inflammatory appeals of the opposition parties and, as we will see, in light of the real needs of the electorate, it didn't seem to put off South Africans from voting for the party.

Results

At national level, the election results were never really in question insofar as a simple majority for the ANC was concerned. To be sure, the two-thirds mark was a significant element of opposition efforts to attract voters away from a dominant ANC. But the only other real question mark at national level was who would come second with the NNP and the DP vying for second place. The DP campaigned as if it already was the main opposition party and this approach seems to have paid off, with the NNP dramatically reduced to a distant fourth place finish. The biggest surprise at national level is the strong third place showing of the IFP who at one point on the national results board (owing to an entry error) actually overtook the DP for second place.

Provincial races were more contested and here the results show a wide-range of voter preferences. Two races did meet their expectations. The Western Cape race between the NNP and the ANC has produced a split electorate, with the DP carrying the balance. A coalition government will be necessary there. In KwaZulu-Natal the IFP exceeded all expectations (prior to election day opinion polls placed it at 17% voter support) and actually piped the ANC. However neither party has a majority in the province so there too, a coalition government will be necessary. The race between the ANC and the NNP in the Northern Cape never materialized and the ANC was handed a large majority.

Two former homeland leaders have returned to the scene to form provincial oppositions. In North West, former Bophuthatswana leader Lucas Mangope and his United Christian Democratic Party came second, whereas in Eastern Cape the United Democratic Movement led by Roelf Meyer and former Transkei strongman Bantu Holomisa will form the opposition. The UDM also scored well for a new party in the national elections. Some of the smaller parties will also add controversial figures to the benches of the National Assembly. Rugby supremo Louis Luyt and his Federal Alliance will be in Parliament, as will KwaZulu-Natal-based Amichand Rajbansi, leader of the Minority Front.

But perhaps the greatest electoral slump in this year's elections aside from the NNP is the apparent collapse of the Pan-African Congress (PAC). With just 0.7% of the popular vote the PAC is reduced to three seats in the National Assembly, a sad showing for the party that claims the mantle of Biko and Black Consciousness. AZAPO, contesting its first national election, fared even worse with less than 0.2% of the vote, though even this was enough to capture one seat in Parliament. The Africanist option, for now at least, is dead.

And so it appears that whatever the potential abuses associated with the large electoral majority enjoyed by the ANC, South Africa's system of proportional representation has brought a range of new voices to Parliament. But whether this chorus will play the role of an effective opposition is another matter. The DP has positioned itself for this role and on the basis of its record since 1994 it can be expected to be a capable and vocal critic of the ANC in government.

Conclusions

It is less clear if workable alternatives to ANC policies will be voiced, and once voiced, if they will have any chance of gaining purchase within

the policy machinery of the state. This scepticism is based on two observations. First, party politics remains the prisoner of region and race. The only party with a broad base of appeal is the ANC. The DP now has pretensions of gaining a similar foothold, but for the present it remains largely a party of whites. The NNP, in its reduced fortunes, is a Western Cape party, and a largely coloured party at that. As for the IFP, the UDM and the UCDP, these are all regional parties, mostly tailored for the particular dynamics that prevail in their power bases. We may have to wait for possible divisions in the ANC to produce a splinter of dissent that seeks its fortunes either with one of these parties, or on its own.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the ANC has raised the bar by which it will be judged after 1999. To its credit it sought reelection on the basis of its record of delivery since 1994 and it has set its future prospects against the task of improving on this record. The Mbeki-led ANC has repeatedly stated that it will fight corruption in government, that it will hold to responsible government, that it will fight crime, and continue to set and meet service and infrastructure delivery targets. Failure on any of these fronts will expose it to the kind of criticism that plagued several prominent cabinet ministers since 1994 (for example, Nkosazana Zuma in Health, Nzo in Foreign Affairs and Maduna in Energy and Minerals). With an emboldened DP chipping away without having to worry about gaining government power for itself, the ANC has a formidable challenge on its hands. On the one hand, the ANC will want to remain the standard-bearer of transparent and accountable government, and on the other, it will want to control any damage inflicted upon it by its critics, lest foreign investors and the like get scared away. How Mbeki will manage this balancing act is still unknown.

S A R

A Political Paradox?

South Africa's Trade Unionists

BY A NALEDI TEAM

Conrad Jardine, Vishwas Satgar and Ravi Naidoo of the National Labour and Economic Development Institute developed this article.

On 2 June 1999, the African National Congress (ANC) won its second term of office. Their landslide victory, with a record voter turnout, is a sign that the political machinery underpinning the nation's 'negotiated revolution' remains strong. Equally significant is that the progressive union movement – often critical of the ANC's economic policies – offered its full backing and resources to ensure this landslide victory.

Before the elections, many voices on the left had accused the ANC of adopting an increasingly anti-working class economic program. Yet South Africa's workers and unions remained committed to the 'tri-partite Alliance' with the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), presenting what many observers felt was a rather curious political paradox.

To explore this paradox further the National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI) conducted a survey of worker expectations regarding the Alliance and transformation. This study, undertaken in late 1998, is part of a research project that began in 1994. The survey was completed by 640 Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) members across the country. The survey was a collaborative effort with other South African researchers, particularly those from the Sociology of Work Project at the University of the Witwatersrand.

High-intensity democracy

South Africa's new Constitution describes democracy as: *Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters role, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.*

In South Africa, representative democracy is sometimes considered to be political competition among different political organizations or parties. This democracy is only multi-party competition – nothing more. Some have called it "low intensity democracy."

The political structure at the core of South African politics is much more complex, however.



Siddique Davids – PictureNET Africa

COSATU's relationship with its political Alliance partners, the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), is characterized by overlapping members but also by organizational and political independence. In other words, COSATU, a trade union federation, is not the union wing of the ANC. COSATU's political independence thus enables the federation to influence policy and governance in South Africa through the Alliance. This structure offers the potential to allow organized workers to shape the political priorities of the ruling ANC.

COSATU's membership in a formally constituted alliance with the ANC offers the opportunity for shopfloor level workers to vote for ANC political candidates and to influence policy through their trade union structures. This means that an important centre of worker control within the political arena in South Africa potentially lies within the tri-partite Alliance. To the extent that this alliance works, organized workers can

influence the direction of the democratic transition in South Africa. The arrangement could be described as a 'high-intensity democracy'.

Role of unions

COSATU is not in alliance with the ANC and SACP to advance worker interests exclusively. The union federation has been committed to broad societal change throughout the policy debate and discussion of recent years. In keeping with this, 62 percent of the workers who were surveyed indicated that if a political party with majority worker support is elected, then that party must represent the interests of all its supporters. Thirty percent indicated that the party must represent all South Africans, even if worker interests have to be sacrificed. Only eight percent said that the elected party must represent workers only. This result is consistent with the findings of the 1994 survey.

Even in an electoral sense, therefore, COSATU workers have a commitment to a wider societal project that includes other class forces.

Table 1: Consultation with supporters

Consultation with its supporters on all issues	73%
Consultation with its supporters only on important issues	25%
Consultation with supporters is unnecessary because the party was elected	2.7%

Workers' electoral support for the Alliance was informed by three key factors (see Graph 1). The first factor was the calibre of leadership and their policies. Sixty one percent of workers emphasized that they would vote for the party that had both credible leadership and policies. Interestingly, 25 percent claimed to prefer policies over leadership alone, while only 11 percent preferred leadership. These results suggest that South Africa's politicians cannot expect to manipulate workers with empty rhetoric. They must instead clearly define what they represent for society.

The second important finding was that most workers (54 percent) do not think they can rely on

political parties alone. In line with this view, 93 percent of workers agreed that they will always rely on unions to represent their interests. One might conclude, therefore, that workers consider union participation in governance to be essential.


The third factor informing electoral support for and commitment to the Alliance is the desire to carry union cultures, such as regular consultations and direct decision making, into parliament (Table 1). Seventy-three percent of the workers surveyed indicated that their political party must consult with its supporters on all issues. A further twenty-five percent said that consultation was necessary only on important issues.

In short, COSATU workers consider themselves to be important partners in governance and political decision-making and don't confine their political role to merely casting a ballot. A narrow representative politics, with party leaders alone making decisions, is unacceptable.

Public policy

Over the past five years, the challenge of implementing the 1994 program of the tripartite Alliance – the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) – has driven the policy agenda of South Africa.

The majority of COSATU workers interviewed displayed a high level of awareness and understanding of the RDP (Graph 3). Eighty-two percent of workers knew about the RDP. One might conclude then that workers seem to have voted for the Alliance based on a perception that transformation would benefit society as a whole but would meet the interests of the poor in particular.



Most important factor behind decision to vote

Labour plays a role in shaping public policy at the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). At NEDLAC, representatives of organized labour, government and community organizations sit together to discuss labour, economic and development policy. NEDLAC was created in 1995 largely as the result of a labour movement initiative and offers workers an added voice in the policy process. COSATU has contributed to a number of policy and legislative issues through NEDLAC. The survey indicated, however, that most of the workers interviewed (62 percent) did not know about NEDLAC.

Worker control and involvement in NEDLAC processes has been limited, therefore. This is confirmed by the response from workers that only thirty percent have been at union meetings where there was a report-back on NEDLAC. Sixty-nine percent said that they never had received a report-back on NEDLAC. COSATU may be committed to worker control, but when spaces have opened up for worker intervention, influence and leadership, generally, COSATU workers have not been involved at a grassroots level. Most workers who knew about NEDLAC believed that it was an important channel through which workers could influence national policy, nonetheless.

Thus despite the considerable potential for worker participation in the policy process, public policy making has generally not gone beyond sophisticated interventions made by union leadership. The survey shows that worker control over and involvement in public policy-making is weak. This leads to the conclusion that public policy-making does not filter down to workers as much as it could.

The absence of a "bottom up" practice of contesting policy raises a number of critical questions. Have policy engagements and parliamentary lobbying degenerated into a new kind of elite deal-making that

cannot be driven by working class struggles and ultimately from below? Or are COSATU's leaders dealing with such complex policy issues that they require considerable technical capacity, making it difficult to communicate these issues to workers or mobilize their support? Or is it (as is likely) some combination of these factors?


Whatever the answer to these questions, when the relationship between worker control and public policy-making is weakened, this reduces the potential for worker influence through the Alliance and other policy institutions like NEDLAC.

Struggles to change economic policy

South Africa fell victim to a severe currency crisis in 1996. The South African government adopted a new macro-economic policy (called *Growth, Employment and Redistribution*, or GEAR) in an attempt to address this change in 'market sentiment.' The new macro-economic strategy incorporated many neoliberal features and placated the

markets. For the working class, however, industry and workplace restructuring to meet the 'imperative' of global competitiveness has unfolded at such a pace and to such an extent that workers have become extremely vulnerable. Employers use the high level of unemployment to keep wages low, and along with other strategies like relying more heavily on casual workers and subcontracting, have pushed organized workers to a political crossroads: fight or be decimated.

With union engagement in national policy weakened, unions have instead tried to contest this structural adjustment from below. In 1998 this struggle led to a wave of strikes unprecedented during the democratic transition. The strikes were concentrated in five sectors of the economy - transport, chemical, catering, metal and the public sector. Most were on wage issues. Workers interviewed confirmed this, with 66 percent affirming that they had been involved in strike action since 1994, mainly to improve wages and working conditions.



Does the party you will be voting for have worker interest at heart?

Explanations for the paradox

Eighty percent of the workers interviewed felt that the political party they will be voting for (the ANC) has worker interests at heart (Graph 2). Six percent disagreed and fourteen percent did not know. The overwhelming electoral support for the ANC, in the light of their apparent neo-liberal macro-economic policy framework, suggests a political paradox.

There are several possible explanations. First, most workers may, in fact, approve of government's economic policies. Thus the views expressed by union leaders may reflect only that portion of the union membership that is the most critical of the government's economic policies. This explanation, however, appears implausible since more than half a million jobs have been lost in the past five years, accompanied by a rise in insecurity among most workers.

A second explanation could be that workers feel that there is no important political party to the left of the ANC. If this is the case,

they perhaps support the ANC as the 'least-worst' option. Many left critics of the Alliance certainly have made this argument. Only 3 percent of the workers in the sample supported the idea of setting up a rival workers' party, however.

Third, perhaps most workers may approve of many ANC policies, enough to make them continue to support the ANC despite their unhappiness over economic policy. This explanation is more plausible in view of the advances made in some areas of service delivery and in dismantling apartheid's racist laws.

A fourth possibility is that workers have not made the link between their struggles from below and the rightward shift in the ANC government's macro-economic policy. This explanation is supported by the finding that the majority of workers do not know what GEAR is (see Graph 3).

It is submitted that these last two explanations are the most plausible. The fourth explanation poses the challenge for COSATU of ensuring that policy interventions adopt a more worker-driven, "bottom-up"

character. Although the leadership may be fighting to advance the mandates given to them by their members, most of these members are not familiar with nor actively involved in these struggles. In short, workers remain active on industrial issues, but are only actively engaged in supporting broader policy interventions in a very limited way. Industrial issues do provide an easier basis for organization than does complicated economic policy. But the focus on industrial issues also reflects structural and capacity problems that currently plague the unions. These problems have meant that the union leadership has been unable to facilitate worker understanding and involvement in policy interventions.


Prospects for the Alliance

Notwithstanding the strong electoral support for the ANC amongst workers in the 1999 election, since 1994 there has been a trend towards declining support for the Alliance. In 1994, 76 percent of workers interviewed believed the Alliance should fight the 1999 election. In late 1998 however, only 64 percent of workers interviewed indicated that the Alliance should contest the 2004 elections. This decline in support is relatively small, but the trend could accelerate if the government's economic policies do not meet the expectations of workers after 1999. Once the organized working class begins to confront the underlying policy and political challenges they face over the next few years, this too will have serious ramifications for the Alliance.

With union membership currently rising, COSATU may be able to strengthen its influence over the Alliance and public policy-making. The gap between worker expectations and practice would have to be bridged and the best way for that to happen is through a stronger focus on building union democracy and effective structures. Failing that, South Africa's workers could be in for a rude awakening.

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Graph 3



Worker knowledge of what RDP, GEAR and NEDLAC are

Banking on the Rich

Development Finance in South Africa

BY ANDREW MURRAY

Andrew Murray is a Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, University of Fort Hare, Alice, South Africa. Much of the data underlying this paper is drawn from a study that Andrew Murray recently undertook for the Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council. All viewpoints expressed, however, are his own.

Governments have the opportunity to lend money to the poorest sectors of society that private institutions ignore. The ANC

and lend credence to policies of separate development. Today's DFIs reflect the new anti-statist political landscape which increasingly affirms the role of market forces in allocating resources. Insufficient finances are being directed to poor clients and institutions for fear that their weak management capacities and questionable abilities to generate revenue will mean that many of them will default on loan repayments. Consequently, rather than servicing new clients in order to redress apartheid's socio-economic

ration (NHFC) and Khula Finance Enterprise Corporation. At the same time the government is establishing the National Development Agency (the forerunner of which is the Transitional National Development Trust) to channel funds to non-governmental and community-based organisations.

In order to avoid duplication of spending, the development finance system has been reorganized so that each institution finances its own separate niche market. This is illustrated in the following table:

Development Finance Institution	Niche Market
Development Bank of Southern Africa	Infrastructure development
Industrial Development Corporation	Industrial development
National Housing Finance Corporation	Housing
Land Bank	Agriculture, land reform and rural development
Khula Enterprise Finance Limited	Small, medium and micro enterprise development

has established public development finance institutions to do just that. The private sector tends to avoid investing in socio-economic development that would benefit the poor, because they are seen as high risk and unable to afford the high interest rates of commercial loans. By contrast, loans from government institutions can be targeted to the poor and towards developmental projects. Such loans also extend the government's limited financial resources beyond relying exclusively on outright grants.

Yet development finance institutions (DFIs) have failed to direct many more resources to the poor than the private sector would have done if left to its own devices. Under apartheid, DFIs had served primarily as political instruments to fi-

deficits, DFIs seem locked in established patterns that serve the interests of an historic and wealthy clientele, thereby reproducing patterns of uneven development.

The new development finance system

Since 1994 the development finance system has been restructured to reflect the new policy orientations of the ANC-led government. The restructuring process has involved closing certain DFIs (such as the SA Housing Trust and the Local Authorities Loan Fund), restructuring and transforming others (such as the Land Bank, the Industrial Development Corporation and the Development Bank of Southern Africa), and creating others such as the National Housing Finance Corpo-

In addition to the above institutions, there also exist a number of provincial development corporations, mostly former homeland corporations. To date there has been little progress in transforming these corporations, with no national regulatory framework yet in place. Some of the provinces, such as the Eastern Cape, have taken the initiative and established transitional provincial finance institutions. But the future of these corporations and their role in the development finance system remains uncertain.

The new development finance model

The key player in designing and regulating the new development finance system has been the Department of Finance. It has been assisted by the

Development Bank which has played a significant role in influencing the policies and practices of other development finance institutions. Consistent with the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) and its demands for tight fiscal regulatory control is the notion that DFIs will only be allowed to exist if they are sufficiently oriented to cost-recovery. The Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, has made it clear that he doesn't want DFIs to become permanent items on any departmental budgets. In other words, after initial funding DFIs must be financially self-sustaining.

Consequently DFIs have adopted orthodox banking logic and designed risk management strategies which effectively rule out servicing the poor. This contradicts their new RDP-inspired mandates which suggest that they should be redressing apartheid's socio-economic imbalances and targeting historically-disadvantaged producers and marginalised social groups shunned by the formal banking sector. This risk-aversion logic also means that DFIs are cutting back on expenditures other than loans, such as training and capacity-building. Rather than work with institutions and producers whose weak financial management skills make it unlikely that they could manage and repay their loans, DFIs are avoiding risky borrowers altogether. Where poor borrowers are able to access loans, the high interest rates make such loans 'unaffordable'. These patterns are evident in the following illustration of the role of DFIs in financing infrastructure and industrial development, and in providing financial assistance to small-scale producers.

Financing infrastructure development

The Development Bank's main funding focus is infrastructure, focusing mainly on local government institutions. It concentrates on southern Africa, although some 83% of its loans (ending March 1998) have been to South Africa. Within

South Africa, an examination of the provincial distribution of current funding on bulk infrastructure (which makes up 80% of the bank's 1997/98 disbursements) reveals that more than two thirds of these funds are going to Gauteng. The Eastern Cape gets just 2% and the Northern Province less than half a percent.

It is tragically ironic that the Development Bank is spending less money today in the underdeveloped former homelands than it did under apartheid. This has to do with its risk aversion logic (as outlined in its mandate document) which holds that 'the broader financial base' and affordability of an area should be evaluated before funds are disbursed to borrowing institutions. At the heart of this approach is the notion of 'affordability' - the ability of beneficiaries to pay for services, and for local authorities to collect and manage funds. As such the Development Bank, like private sector investors, will not venture where local authorities are perceived to be weak, and where residents are perceived to be too poor to pay for services. This has the net effect of increasing the pressure on government to cater to the basic needs of the poor, resulting in scaling down service (to so-called minimalist levels, consisting of communal taps, pit latrines etc). This in turn may lead to even less repayment and further bankrupting of local authorities, as poor communities refuse to pay for service levels which fall below their needs and expectations.

Financing industrial development

The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) has the mandate to encourage and finance industrial development. Recently the IDC has included emergent and historically disadvantaged entrepreneurs to its list of mandate clients, and has designed a number of schemes and new products which offer risk sharing and low interest loans for these clients. But despite these seemingly good inten-

tions, a look at IDC financing over the 5 years up to June 1998 reveals that the IDC is still weighted heavily in favour of its traditional client base - large corporations in the minerals-energy-complex (MEC), particularly basic iron and steel, and non-ferrous metals. This is in spite of the poor performance of MEC industries in creating jobs and generating export earnings.

For example, over the past 5 years, the minerals-energy-complex industries have received more than two thirds of IDC investments, but account for a lowly 14% of jobs created over this period. Sectors such as agriculture, forestry and fishing are far more effective in creating jobs, and small and medium enterprises are far more successful than their corporate counterparts in both creating jobs and generating export earnings. Over the past 5 years, small and medium enterprises have received only 15% of IDC finances but have created 66% of the IDC's accredited new direct employment and 26% of its projected annual export earnings. IDC finances are also very unevenly distributed across the country. The greatest proportion (40%) is going to the Western Cape, while a clutch of poorer provinces (the Northern Province, the North West, the Northern Cape and the Free State) are getting less than 7% between them. There are also great disparities within provinces, with the former homelands faring worst. Of the total IDC loan portfolio of R2,741 billion dispensed to the Eastern Cape over the past 5-year period to June 1998, less than 1% (R23 million) went to the former Transkei.

Financing small-scale producers

Part of the Land Bank's new mandate is to provide financial services to small-scale farmers, land reform beneficiaries and the rural poor more generally, for which it has designed a number of new products. But over the past few years the Land Bank has primarily been servicing its his-

toric client-base – white commercial farmers. Emerging farmers and land reform beneficiaries have been paying considerably higher interests than their established commercial counterparts. Recently, after pressure from the National African Farmers Union, the Land Bank has devised a scheme to provide low interest rates to emerging farmers for long-term mortgage loans. However

ing to small businesses through intermediary institutions like NGOs, the recipients get their credit at well above the prime lending rate. This is because the intermediary institutions still have to add interest in order to sustain themselves. So while small producers are at least now beginning to get access to credit, it is on unfavourable terms which may serve to threaten the sustainability

still primarily servicing historic and wealthy clientele. Where credit is being made available to the poor, it is at extremely high levels of interest. But while the development finance institutions must themselves be subject to critical scrutiny and made to account for their practices, to lay all the blame at their feet would be to miss the point. The problem lies in South Africa's macro-economic and financial policies which ultimately set the conditions of cost-recovery that control DFIs, consequently affecting who they lend to and at what rates. We also need to critically examine the impact of globalization, and how the 'internationalisation of finance' has forced the state to battle inflation above all else.

Long term solutions lie in restructuring the country's macro-economic policy to allow for increased social spending on the poor and to reduce the exorbitant interest rates which make it impossible for the poor to access credit (even if this may mean slightly higher levels of inflation). In the meantime, the onus is on government to bring pressure to bear on the development finance institutions, if it is able, to ensure more of their finances are directed towards the poor and incurred on non-loan expenditures such as training and capacity-building. Because these activities will incur extra costs for the development finance institutions, government will have to seriously consider providing targeted grants and subsidies to institutions for lending to the poor through intermediary agencies at below market rates.

Government also has the onerous task of plugging the gaps in the development finance system. Where development finance institutions are not directing credit towards basic needs development for the poor, then it is government which should be undertaking this responsibility. The question is whether it has the capacity and will to fulfil this obligation.

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poor clients are still receiving short and medium term loans (for fertilisers, seed, machinery, stock etc.) at interest rates well above the prime bank lending rate.

The situation for emerging entrepreneurs and small, medium and micro enterprises is no better. Khula Enterprise Finance Limited, established by the Department of Trade and Industry in 1996 to provide credit to small businesses, is still trying to sort out its own teething problems. Because Khula works by lend-

ing to small businesses through intermediary institutions like NGOs, the recipients get their credit at well above the prime lending rate. This is because the intermediary institutions still have to add interest in order to sustain themselves. So while small producers are at least now beginning to get access to credit, it is on unfavourable terms which may serve to threaten the sustainability

Conclusion

As was recently revealed in a number of socio-economic profiles of Eastern Cape towns and districts, access to credit and financial assistance remains the principal constraint that small-scale producers face. Meanwhile, the new development finance system is so far having little impact on the poor. In order to effect their own cost-recovery strategies, development finance institutions are

Township Tours

Packaging the New South Africa

BY SHELLEY R. BUTLER

Shelley Ruth Butler is a graduate student in the Department of Anthropology at York University. She is interested in hearing about readers' experiences of township tours and can be reached by email at: sbutler@yorku.ca.

While living in Cape Town last year to work on an ethnography of museums and contemporary cultural politics, I went on a number of township tours. They were not part of my research plan, but came about as I searched for ways in which Cape Town exhibited recent history, including that of the struggle against apartheid, since there was little space in the establishment museums dedicated to this. My hope that township tours might offer an alternative way of viewing Cape Town was also shaped by my awareness of how segregated the city continues to be. The legacy of apartheid legislation and urban planning is compounded by ongoing economic inequities and a poor public transit system. While black South Africans commute to Cape Town to work, most are strangers to its museums. And white South Africans, as well as tourists visiting the city, stay largely in white areas, allowing them to proclaim Cape Town a European city. They would hardly take seriously the comment that one person said to me: "The real growth of the city is out there, not in the city centre."

I take this comment seriously. Would township tours offer alternative perspectives on the city? Certainly this is their premise and promise. As a brochure for *One City Tours* states: "Do the right thing . . . Get the full picture." Or, as the *Cape Team Tours* brochure notes:

"A tour to the townships will result in an understanding of the evolution of the Mother City. It will also give one insight into the ethnic character of the city. We will visit the most devastating example of forced removals in Cape Town (District 6) and move on to the townships of the Cape Flats where we meet the children of the areas, enjoy refreshments at a spaza (township shop), visit a shebeen (tavern), photograph the "khayas" (township houses) and visit the open-air meat market of Nyanga. This cultural tour will enrich one's thinking and create a better understanding of the Mother City." Similarly, the *Lonely Planet* guide to South Africa, an authoritative source for alternative travellers, states that visiting a township is necessary in order to gain "any kind of appreciation for South African reality." This genre of alternative tourism developed from practices of taking visiting anti-apartheid activists, foreign funders, VIP's, and

more recently, city planners, to see the townships. Now, the tours attract a variety of foreigners, but very few South Africans, a point I will return to below.

Certainly township tours take people beyond conventional monument tourism and mainstream museum routes. But what is the "reality" that they present? Answers to this questions can be found in the subtext of many tour operators' brochures. All of the tours promise tourists interaction with township residents. For instance, a brochure for *Jimmy's Face to Face Tours*, a company based in Johannesburg, promises an "intimate voyage of discovery." However, the majority of the visitors' interaction is only with the guide and other visitors on the tour. Visually, the brochures focus on images of traditionally dressed, or poor, but colourful and smiling, African children and women; clearly what is being offered is an unintimidating, apolitical image of cultural



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and class difference.

This is an important clue to the tours' strategies, since despite variations amongst different companies, township tours consistently situate the tourist as hero, as concerned witness, as empathetic global citizen, and so on. In an outrageous moment with *Legend Tours* in Cape Town, a guide encouraged his guests by exclaiming, "You are the salvation of black people."

Revolving around the needs of the guests – tourism is, after all, about consumer choices – tours begin with clients being picked up at their hotels and guest houses, or at the downtown South African Tourism Board office. The cost for a tour that lasts between three and four hours is usually between R100 and R140, a fee that is clearly geared toward foreigners (similarly, a full fare to Robben Island is R100). Tour groups consist of about six to eight people, who travel together in a marked or unmarked combi. Sometimes a guide uses a small microphone, which adds to the voyeuristic atmosphere.

To their credit, the tours do teach visitors to read the local landscape differently. One points out the proximity of a Dutch Reformed Church to the South African Cultural History Museum, which was formerly a slave lodge. Another points to parallel pedestrian bridges, one covered and one exposed, which served different groups of people during the height of apartheid. Most tours also point out absences, such as the absence of basic services and infrastructure in informal settlements.

All use the remarkable District Six Museum, housed in the Buitenkant Methodist Church on the edge of the razed community. The museum is a convenient place to orient visitors to the history and legacy of forced removals. Using original street signs, maps, photographs, and newspaper clippings, the museum documents in intimate

detail the life of a culturally diverse, densely populated community before it was declared a whites-only area in 1966. To visit this not-for-profit community-oriented museum, the guides pay only R3 per guest. A deal.

Next, it is on to the townships, where emphasis is typically placed on apartheid's legacy of divide and rule policies, the exploitation of migrant labourers, influx control, the current housing crisis, and development projects. Along the way, guests may gain a vague sense of the violence of the South African government and security forces under apartheid. Individual sites might be noted, such as Crossroads, or the road in Athlone where the 1985 "Trojan Horse incident" occurred, in which police hiding in the back of a van opened fire on some 200 people. But brief acknowledgement of isolated sites is quite a different approach to retelling history than a more detailed discussion of political events, community organizing and popular resistance.

There are a number of ways that guides (consciously or not) make their narratives light and oriented toward the tourists' own experience. A slave auction block is likened to Sotheby's; the size of a shack is said to be comparable to a tourist's apartment; strategies of divide and rule are described by using sports metaphors. Or, attention is diverted to the exotic – see the *smileys*, the painted white faces, the singing, and so on. In the case of a white tour operator, a discussion of the death of American Amy Biehl allows the guide to focus on what she sees as her role in providing for the safety of tourists in this "dangerous" place. Some guides focus on providing contact with locals. Most, I think, are sincere in these efforts. The result is usually to shake the hand of a teacher or resident, or to buy children some candy (a predictable scene on one tour).

It is not uncommon for tourists to wonder about the issue of voyeurism – even the *Lonely Planet* guide raises it. Is it alright to take photos, ask the tourists who are armed with masses of high tech equipment? On one tour, when I was without a camera, the guide said, "Oh you're not a tourist. You don't have a camera." And on a tour in Soweto, a man ran beside the combi, laughing and snapping an imaginary camera at us. Tourists are an odd species! Photographing and documenting poverty has its roots in the British tradition of slum journalism, which reflected a bourgeois fascination with the underside of urban culture. Vivian Bickford-Smith describes a similar phenomenon in Cape Town, when the *Cape Argus* ran a series in 1893 on "Unexplored Cape Town," focusing on poor whites.

In response to the issues of voyeurism and the commodification of poverty, tour operators usually stress that they work hard to maintain good relations with the people and organizations that they visit. I was impressed with one guide who brought copies of photos taken by previous tourists to give to the people who were the objects of the shots. While tourists take photos, they are also encouraged to make donations to projects that they visit; this amounts to a sort of liberal charity, which allows tourists to focus on reciprocity and good will, rather than inequality and privilege. Again, this fits with tourism's priority of keeping its paying customers happy, as opposed to offering critical pedagogy. It also amounts to trickle-down economics, where tour operators gain the lion's share of the money that tourists spend. Indeed, few (if any) employment or economic opportunities are generated for people in the communities tours visit. The little money which trickles down flows in predictable and particular routes. For instance, the *Mail and Guardian* reported last year that while over a thousand tourists visit



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SAR editor Carolyn Bassett takes a 'township tour' to Khayelitsha near Cape Town

Soweto daily, tour operators take them to only fifteen shebeens, a incredibly small number when you consider that there are some 5600 shebeens in the area.

Despite the many limitations, problems, and contradictions associated with township tours, it is important to acknowledge that marginalized communities want tourists and their money. The movement of tourists into townships has also been associated with a broader renaissance, where local entrepreneurs develop new services for tourists and for a growing local middle class. But, there were also rumours in Cape Town of a tour group having been stopped and turned back by angry community leaders. Students at the Robben Is-

land Training Programme also spoke of going on a tour where local residents had not been informed about what was happening. The potential for exploitation and disregard is great.

However, I would not want to write off township tours completely. Tour operators of varying backgrounds express disappointment that most white South Africans are reluctant to visit a township. As one person said, "South Africans don't go on tour, and South Africans don't know what's going on." Another commented during a tour, that white South Africans are "comfortable with their privileges and do not want to see." At least township tours cre-

ate possibilities for alternative ways of understanding and seeing the city. Disengagement is by no means a preferable stance.

Significantly, some of the most progressive voices in museums in Cape Town are articulating the need for heritage sites to work together to create alternative routes into Cape Town's cultural and political history. This logic of moving through space to explore history is similar to that of the township tours. But as new cultural centres and commemorative sites are developed in previously disadvantaged areas, communities should gain greater power over the way in which their stories are produced and consumed.

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NewsFlashes - Angola

Notes from the Angola Development Network

Contributions for these newsflashes come from Ian Ketchison, Jim Kirkwood, Joanne LeBert, Ian Spears.

1. The current situation

Veteran supporters of the long struggle for peace and justice in Angola are saying that any progress towards resolution has been set back by years, at least to the period of bloody fighting after the elections of 1992, but perhaps even to the days of debilitating guerrilla warfare and terrorism of the 1980s, before the Bicesse Accord in the early 1990s.

The countryside is emptying, and those who remain starve as crops are stolen by marauding

troops or hungry rebels. Most flee to urban slums in any town big enough to be defended by Government forces. There they scrounge a bare living, almost entirely dependent on international aid and the charity of those who have a meagre salary and/or are family. They barter in skimpy local markets for very basic needs with anything they may have.

There is no clear military victory in sight. The upper hand is with UNITA at the moment and the government's armed forces (FAA) are on the defensive. No one is even mentioning negotiations – not likely at least for the next 18 months or so when, it is hoped, both sides may again accept the fact that no one can win outright. Both Savimbi and dos Santos are slow learners,

however, and apparently devoid of any concept of serving the needs of people they have power over.

The government's on-going military difficulties are said to be particularly embarrassing. The MPLA had expected to regain control over Bailundo and Andulo from UNITA quickly when it began its December 1998 offensive. Now the government appears to have its back to the wall as it tries to recoup the positions that it lost so quickly to UNITA in the first weeks of fighting.

2. Dos Santos and company

While much of the reporting on this most recent return to war appears to be based on rumours and speculation, it is clear that the government is in trouble. Though it seems un-



Homeless and begging in the rain in Luanda's downtown traffic

João Silva - PictureNET Africa

likely that UNITA will capture the capital, a number of reports since March have placed UNITA forces within a few dozen kilometres of Luanda. According to UNITA's Secretary General, Paulo Lukamba Gato, UNITA controls 70 percent of Angolan territory – a figure few objective observers would challenge. Indeed, the government's Chief of Staff, General João de Matos, recently accompanied a group of journalists to Cuito and reportedly gave an extraordinarily honest assessment of the government's current military predicament. He acknowledged that UNITA's offensive and defensive military capabilities had been vastly underestimated.

As noted, there appears to be little hope of an imminent negotiated settlement. Given the failure of both the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol, it is difficult to imagine that the government would be willing to negotiate with Savimbi for a third time: it is no secret that the government would prefer to remove Savimbi from the equation once and for all.

Of course, both sides are heavily armed and the government continues to negotiate "signature bonuses" (payments on exploration licenses) with oil companies for potential offshore "deep-water" wells. Estimates of the revenue the government will be able to divert to arms purchases range from \$500 million to \$1.5 billion for this year alone.

UNITA had long warned the government that military offensives would be met with equal or superior military force. UNITA netted an estimated \$2-4 billion over the last 4 years from smuggled Angolan diamonds and reportedly went on a recent arms buying spree that included tanks and heavy artillery. The new equipment allowed UNITA to defend its central highland cities of Andulo and Bailundo and to launch attacks on the provincial capitals of Cuito and Malanje. There were reports – albeit received with some scepticism – that UNITA

had even acquired sophisticated jet fighters.

Current reports claim that the government is planning yet another major offensive – called Operation Cocimbo – in June against UNITA strongholds in the central highlands. While previous government efforts in December and March failed to capture UNITA headquarters in Andulo, officials hope that its troops will have greater mobility in the dry season, which began in mid-May, and be able to limit the rebels' access to food. The prospects for victory, however, are not promising: the morale of government troops remains low after the string of recent military defeats. Most soldiers are conscripts. Moreover, government troops have been spread thin fighting along three fronts: Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa. There is speculation that the government is again seeking foreign military expertise to compensate for its deficiencies, though the government has denied accusations that it recruited Cuban troops to bolster its military strength.

President Jose Eduardo dos Santos must be feeling pressure for a military victory. There are even reports that speculate on the President's future political demise. Dos Santos fired his prime minister in January, with the statement that "from now on there will be a change in the method and style of government." He took the post himself and hired a "strong-arm general," Kundy Payama, to succeed him as Minister of Defense.

Indeed, if Savimbi and UNITA do not end dos Santos' career, his own government's incompetence might. In early May, the World Bank announced that it would no longer lend money to Angola unless critical economic reforms were implemented, citing corruption, dubious development policy and a dysfunctional economy (save for the oil sector). Other commentators have suggested that unless there is a military victory, ordinary Angolans will

have little time for the governing MPLA, given that so much of Angola's wealth has been diverted from social needs to the war effort.

3. Jonas Savimbi

As for Savimbi, he undoubtedly exercises greater power during times of war than during times of peace – a fact that further undermines the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. One can only speculate on his current political objectives. Savimbi has never been keen on any sort of power-sharing arrangement. True (as noted above), most observers agree that even though he remains an enormous threat he is unlikely to capture Luanda. Yet UNITA's military strength must serve as a future reminder to the government of just how difficult it is to challenge Savimbi's authority in UNITA-held areas.

At the same time, UNITA has appeared, upon occasion, to have few friends left. The movement broke off relations with Portugal after the Portuguese foreign minister blamed Savimbi for the resumption of war, for example. And, at the end of March, foreign ministers from the Organization of African Unity condemned Savimbi and called for his isolation and for the implementation of UN sanctions against UNITA. Indeed, a year ago one could only admire the manner in which the Angolan government appeared to have surrounded itself with friends and allies, thus cutting UNITA off from potential arms suppliers and diamond dealers.

It has also seemed, however, that the seal is not quite watertight. The Angolan government maintains that Zambia, for example, has been a principal conduit allowing weapons and fuel oil into UNITA-held territory and diamonds out. This allegation has touched off a diplomatic row between Luanda and Lusaka. At one point, a report even suggested that the Angolan air force was set to launch attacks into Zambia until diplomatic pressure

from the United States and France halted the operation.

In the meantime, the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation has been disbanded and some of its UNITA members have dispersed. Former Minister of Geology and Mines, Marcos Samondo, has been holed up in New York since "the government decided that I shouldn't continue at the Ministry for political reasons." The government does still include some of the breakaway group of UNITA dissidents known as UNITA-Renovada such as Jorge Valentim, but the faction's political support is uncertain at best.

4. Resources

Of course, it is impossible to discuss the ongoing conflict in Angola without mentioning the struggle to control the country's rich natural resources. Despite the very high rate of poverty and the absence of any form of functioning infrastructure, Angola contains some of the richest deposits of oil, gas, diamonds and other minerals on the whole continent: even after 30 years of almost uninterrupted conflict, Angola contains the potential to be one of the wealthiest countries in the region.

However, the unfortunate irony is that, instead of improving benefits and services for the country, Angola's resource wealth has played a direct role in perpetuating the conflict. As noted, both sides have relied upon these revenues to pay for their military operations, with the establishment and maintenance of control over resources a key strategic goal of both UNITA and the MPLA. On the one hand, the government controls nearly all of the country's oil producing areas and depends upon oil exports for more than 90 percent of its revenue while, on the other, UNITA's activities are almost entirely funded by its production and sale of diamonds.

Angola is the second largest producer of oil in sub-Saharan

Africa after Nigeria. More than 90 percent of this oil is exported. The majority of the production comes from rich deep-water oil reserves located offshore in the northern region of Cabinda. The country's oil production has grown substantially in the last decade and now averages more than 750,000 barrels per day. Production is likely to double over the next five years, once the large deep-water oil reserves discovered in the mid-1990s come on line.

Small wonder that the growth of Angola's oil industry has been such a tremendous boon for the Angolan government, with the International Monetary Fund estimating that Angola oil exports were worth \$4.5 billion in 1997. In addition, recent reports have suggested that the Angolan government could raise an additional \$1.5 billion this year from the sale of new drilling licenses and from loans issued against the country's future oil production.

While the government controls Angola's offshore oil industry, UNITA controls between 60 and 70 percent of its diamond production. Unlike oil production, which flows through official channels to Europe and the Americas, Angola's diamond trade, centred around the Northeastern province of Lunda Norte, occurs almost entirely on the black market. Despite a UN Security Council embargo against the export of "unofficial" diamonds from Angola, the country's high-quality diamonds make their way to

the diamond markets of London and Antwerp. Estimates of the amount of money that UNITA has raised from diamond sales range from \$500 million to \$3 billion per year.


It is true that some firms which have been operating in Angola have either relocated or withdrawn entirely to avoid the violence - including the South African mining firm Anglo-American, the Canadian diamond mining firm Southern Era, and most recently, South Africa's Ocean Diamond Mining. It is nonetheless the case that the country's rich natural resources remain at the centre of its civil war.

5. Displacement of peoples

Hundreds of thousands of people have fled their homes in Angola in an effort to escape the ever-intensifying conflict. A reported 75,000 people have fled into the Democratic Republic of Congo since December 1998, 8,000 into Congo-Brazzaville and another 1,200 into Zambia since June 1998. Within Angola, the number displaced by the war is far greater. It is believed that 1.6 million of an estimated 11.6 million inhabitants are now refugees in their own country - roughly one in seven Angolans - the majority of whom are women and children. Moreover, between 780,000 and 882,000 (and possibly as many as one million) are thought to have been displaced since April 1998 alone. Luanda has received nearly a quarter of a million internally displaced persons in the past two months alone, and the provinces of Malanje and Huambo have seen large inflows compared to other regions.

Unfortunately, the displaced who sought refuge in the Central Highland cities of Huambo and Malanje or in Kuito are under siege and subjected to shelling and other threatening conditions, rendering humanitarian efforts all the more difficult. Over the last few months, UNITA has cut off and controlled strategic roads leading into these cities. Ambushes on lesser travelled roads

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 An ecumenical organization involved in research, lobbying, and advocacy.

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João Silva - PictureNET Africa

Luena, Angola: Children scramble for food scraps dropped during World Food Programme distribution

in the region are increasingly common. This development has forced the World Food Programme to deliver desperately needed humanitarian supplies by air, particularly food items. The World Food Programme reported that its reliance on air delivery increased from 20 percent to 80-90 percent in six months. Their efforts to aid internally displaced persons and local residents, particularly in the Central Highlands, have been further jeopardized by the high cost of air transport, the limited capacity to transport bulky goods and frequent airport closures.

Food shortages and malnutrition threaten the internally displaced and the locals alike. Lack of access to the areas under siege, coupled with the abandonment of fields and the lack of access to affordable markets all contribute to the problem. The Southern African Development Community expects that maize output will fall by about 25 percent in 1999.

Moreover, as internally displaced persons move from rural areas into regional cities and from these cities to Luanda, they aggravate the already dire circumstances and threaten the survival mechanisms of their host populations. Not only is

there a shortage of food, but the sheer number of internally displaced are thought to be placing the health of the host population at risk, particularly in the besieged towns of Kuito, Huambo and Malanje. Measles, malaria and tuberculosis are all on the rise as is wasting due to malnutrition. Luanda's musseques (slum areas) have been particularly hard hit by polio. In fact, Luanda is reporting the largest epidemic to hit Africa since 1995 among the country's displaced. Three hundred and two cases were reported in mid-April, and by early May the number had escalated to 733.

In short, the renewed conflict has caused renewed forced migration and dispossession on a large scale. Both these trends are further straining limited resources and survival strategies. The UN requires, at minimum, safe access to those internally displaced persons and communities most at risk in order to avoid greater loss of life and livelihood.

Self-evidently, this is something that can only be achieved through dialogue between the government and UNITA. In its absence, the international community is becoming ever more tired of the conflict and of the tremendous human needs it

produces even as millions are spent on armaments and as millionaires are being freshly minted among military and political elites. The UN in particular is demoralized (some say disgraced) by its failure here - though many of its humanitarian programmes remain in place in government areas.

Ray of hope?

Hope always comes from the people, but the Angolan people are tired and intimidated by nearly 40 years of instability and ruthless political oppression from one side or the other. Nonetheless, a group of 300 mothers in Cabinda did protest against conscription of all 21 year old males on April 21, for example. Four were arrested and the rest violently dispersed. The next day they protested again for the release of their colleagues and were successful. On International Women's Day, March 8, women marched through Luanda in support of the idea of "an Angola without war"; they then attended an ecumenical mass, swearing to uphold and defend the message: "love one another for the common good." Civil society has some potential to bring the country together if ever given the chance to do so.

S A R



Ferhat Momade - AIM

Maputo, 1992 - a demonstration calling for peace

Mozambique Notes

BY JOE HANLON

Joseph Hanlon is a journalist and writer on southern Africa. He is editor of the Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin (published irregularly; free by contacting j.hanlon@open.ac.uk) and is author of *Peace Without Profit*:

How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding in Mozambique (James Currey, London, 1996).

Mozambique is increasingly held up as one of the "success stories" of the 1990s, but the Washington-based proponents of that line are increasingly having to distort history and

present reality to make their story seem credible.

In these notes I look at three examples: marking the way in which IMF claims about the Mozambican economic miracle present only a false facade; the extent to which Washington-imposed "good governance" actually increases corruption; and the manner in which history is being rewritten in order to prove that Chester Crocker and the United States saved poor Mozambique from the evil communists.

Trickling down to prosperity

The IMF and World Bank are now citing Mozambique as their best success in Africa. On 29 October 1998 the IMF's senior Vice President, Stanley Fischer, held a southern Africa video press conference. In the televised press conference, Salomão Moiane, the editor of the weekly *Savana*, said "Mozambique has been mentioned in some IMF literature as an example in achieving a rapid macroeconomic stability and in keeping inflation at a very low rate. But when we look at the living conditions of the people of the country, we find that they are not improving."

Fischer replied, in effect, that he did not believe Moiane. "I would be very surprised if that rate of growth does not reach down - gradually, to be sure - through the economy ... It's hard to believe that with growth rates like this, which would mean that by the year 2000 the income per capita would be double in real terms [from] what it had been seven years ago, that that doesn't affect everybody in the country in some way, and that you'd be seeing that happening," Fischer said.

But on 16 April the Mozambican Catholic Bishops responded in a pastoral letter which said:

While recognizing the global growth of the Mozambican economy, in reality the conditions of life of the majority of the people have worsened in recent years. In effect, poverty and misery have increased

to the point where people die of hunger.

Unemployment is increasing, particularly among youth. Thousands of citizens have lost their jobs due to the privatization of state companies without any policy to protect the old workers.

Salaries are truly at starvation level and have not accompanied the increasing cost of living. Prices of basic goods are prohibitively high, making it impossible for the majority of citizens to acquire the basic necessities for a dignified life.

All indications are that economic growth is concentrated in the Maputo corridor – Maputo itself and the area along the new toll road to South Africa – which contains the big projects such as the aluminium and iron and steel plants. The signs of prosperity in Maputo are clear – traffic jams, many grand houses under construction, and cable television. But this is growth for those who can afford cars and mobile phones, and not those who must walk and cannot afford radio batteries.

Of course there is some spin-off. More servants are being hired, for example, and peasants near the paved roads in the southern half of the country also have gained a bit. As a result, visiting consultants and IMF officials see what they think is real economic growth. But Frelimo activists in the north of Mozambique know the bishops are right; they are growing worried that when people are worse off than five years ago, they will vote for Renamo.

The IMF's reply came in its 30 June statement on debt relief: "Mozambique has been pursuing a wide-ranging program of economic stabilization and structural reform, which has been reaping impressive results. Market liberalization, completion of an ambitious privatization program, fiscal reform, and progress on public sector reform have contributed to strong economic growth."

The view from Washington is simply that the Mozambican bishops, journalists and Frelimo activists do not know what they are talking about.

Good governance = corruption

To hear the donors and northern parliaments tell it, poor country governments are all corrupt and incompetent. Britain's International Development Minister Clare Short has repeatedly stated that poor countries cannot be trusted with unconditional debt relief or aid because "they" will waste it on Mercedes and palaces." Instead, poor country governments need to be forced to adopt "good policies."

Over the past decade, the International Monetary Fund (and, to a lesser extent, the World Bank) have succeeded in creating the image that the policies they impose are "good policies." The hegemony of this view is now absolute; even relatively progressive northern government ministers, officials and legislators (and many in the south) accept unquestioningly that "good governance" is synonymous with IMF structural adjustment policies.

Yet in Mozambique it is clear that IMF policies have increased corruption and led to poorer governance. In the early 1990s the IMF demanded that front-line civil servants be paid wages below the poverty line (in line with IMF views that to work harder, their own staff and the rich must be paid more, but that poor country workers and the poor in general will work harder if they are paid less). The effect, not surprisingly, was that civil servants had to find other sources of money to feed their families – some stole time and were hardly ever seen as they found other ways to earn a living, others stole government resources (either directly to sell, or, say, in the case of government cars to use as taxis), while others took bribes. The World Bank, IMF, UN and donor community then compounded the process by paying money to civil

servants to work for outsiders on consultancies, or to attend conferences, during time they were supposed to be working for the government. Thus IMF "good governance" created a climate of petty corruption and demoralization.

Next, the IMF said Mozambique could not rebuild after the war until inflation was controlled, and that government – and donors – could not spend money on reconstruction. Donors, particularly the Nordics, had big budgets that they had to spend and also saw that IMF policy was wrong. So they encouraged government ministries to keep the money "off budget" so that it could be spent without the IMF finding out. As the IMF became better at finding hidden money but as, simultaneously, it became ever more obvious that it was essential to spend on rebuilding no matter what the IMF said, the tricks of the donor became more sophisticated. Not surprisingly, some government officials realized that it was easy to take a slice of this "off budget" money for personal use. Now some donors, notably the Nordics (not the same people, of course, because aid staffs change and there is no institutional memory), are complaining about lack of transparency and money going astray. Again, IMF imposition of its view of "good governance" helped create a climate of corruption and dishonesty.

The most recent case in point is the IMF's bizarre obsession with Value Added Tax (VAT, IVA in Portuguese), which it is trying to impose on all African countries (including Rwanda, the IMF announced in June). In principle, VAT is – as the name indicates – a tax only on the additional value at each stage in the process. So if a shopkeeper buys an item at \$9 and sells it at \$10, they pay tax on only \$1. By contrast, flat rate sales tax or turnover tax, as had been used in most African countries, require the first seller to pay a tax

on the wholesale value of \$9 and the shopkeeper to pay a tax based on the entire retail value of \$10 – what is known as a cascading tax because the same item attracts a tax several times, and in later stages there is tax on the tax.

VAT is said to be fairer, and it is said to encourage exports because VAT need not be charged on exports. However, it is a tax designed by accountants – it requires much more complex bookkeeping, because the shopkeeper in fact pays VAT on the whole \$10 but then reclaims the VAT paid on the first \$9.

In African countries, few businesses have standards of record keeping sufficient to make VAT work, and governments also lack the skilled tax inspectors required. In South Africa, for example, the level of VAT fraud is massive, according to the tax authorities.

In the mid-1990s, Mozambique had come to an agreement with the business community to introduce a simplified turnover tax that reduced the cascade effect and would be easier to implement. The main goal was to bring within the tax net the parallel economy – particularly street and market traders and very small workshops – who were not paying taxes but who constitute a big section of the economy.

But the IMF rejected the deal, and said Mozambique must introduce VAT. Government and business both objected, and even the donor community said it was a bad idea. But the IMF said “good governance” demanded VAT. Government dragged its feet, so the introduction of VAT finally became a condition of HIPC debt relief – and it had to be introduced in 11 months. The system was finally introduced in some chaos on 1 June this year, so that Mozambique would qualify for debt relief by 1 July.

It is too early to know the outcome, but many observers predict a boom in corruption. At the sophisticated end will be VAT fraud (mainly

claiming VAT rebates on exports not actually made or inputs not actually purchased). But for smaller businesses and the parallel sector it will mean that they simply cannot cope. This, in turn, will cause a big increase in the kind of corruption that already exists, where small traders are forced to pay bribes to tax inspectors. Thus the IMF has effectively rejected a government attempt to formalize the informal sector, and instead has further pushed it into illegality.

It is hardly surprising that many in Mozambique think that IMF “good governance” means increasing corruption, and assume that their misunderstanding of the phrase “good governance” is because their English is not very good.

Rewriting the history of the war

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the chair of its Board, Chester A. Crocker, are actively engaged in trying to rewrite the history of the Mozambique war and retrospectively justify and inflate the US role in it. The USIP is funded by the US government and its board is appointed by the President of the United States, so its position is clear.

A 1994 USIP book by Cameron Hume (*Ending Mozambique's War*) tried, against all evidence, to argue that the US played a key role in the Rome talks. (Other reports show that the mediators made extensive and successful efforts to keep the US at arm's length.)

Crocker himself gave extensive interviews to Hans Abrahamsson for his published thesis (*Seizing the Opportunity - Power and Powerlessness in a Changing World Order - The Case of Mozambique*, Padrigu, Gotenburg University, 1997), leading Abrahamsson to conclude that Crocker's “constructive engagement” policy in the region was, perhaps, not as bad an idea as we all had thought. In particular, Crocker has convinced Abrahamsson that it was not US pol-

icy that encouraged South Africa into its harder line and attacks on Mozambique in the early 1980s!

Next came the USIP's commissioning of journalist Richard Syngé to write the book *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action 1992-94*. Syngé is a good journalist and he has much new material on the UN in Mozambique. But USIP's choice of a non-Portuguese speaking writer for the study may not be accidental, because it makes him reliant on US and British diplomatic sources for his background on the war. The effect is a subtle rewriting of history, to make the two sides in the “civil war” equal in history, goals and conduct.

This same process goes much further in a USIP-funded study by Stephen Chan and Moises Venancio (*War and Peace in Mozambique*, Macmillan (UK) and St Martin's (US), 1998). Chan and Venancio do not disguise their hostility to Frelimo. They claim that in the late 1970s under Frelimo “people began to disappear in large numbers” and that in the 1980s “government soldiers disguised as Renamo would perpetrate attacks on civilians.” Their references for these claims are no more than the increasing famous unidentified “diplomatic sources.”

USIP is using its money and access to diplomatic and security archives and people to rewrite the history of Mozambique's war – and to retrospectively justify a United States policy that was partially responsible for the deaths of a million people in Mozambique. The Cold War is over, and the winners are rewriting history.

* * *

What we have, in sum, is a growth industry in myths about Mozambique: the Yanks won the war and have imposed good governance and prosperity on the reluctant former communists – and if you can't see it that way, wait a bit so we can rewrite history and build better facades.

S A R



A NEW BEGINNING
A Call For Jubilee

The first year of the Canadian Ecumenical Jubilee Initiative –a three year social justice project of over 30 Canadian churches and coalitions– culminated in the presentation of the Jubilee 2000 debt cancellation petition to the leaders of the G7 at their annual summit, held in Cologne, Germany, this past June. 17 million people from around the world –including 635,000 Canadians– signed this petition demanding the immediate cancellation of the debts of the world’s poorest countries.

The campaign to cancel these debts and build new, just processes of development will continue in the second year of the Initiative –organized around the theme *Redistribution of Wealth*– which will be launched in September 1999.

During the next year, communities will be asked to sign a Jubilee pledge, declaring themselves “Jubilee Communities” and committing to one or more of a number of campaigns and actions which, in the spirit of Jubilee, address extreme inequalities and so seek to redistribute wealth in a world which we believe provides enough for all. The campaigns are:

- Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign
- Global Fair Share Campaign (Improvement in the Quality of Foreign Aid)
- Campaign to Close the Gap (Fair Trade and Fair Wages)
- Campaign for the Year 2000 (Redirection of Security Spending)
- Campaign for the Rights of Migrant Workers
- Global March of Women Against Poverty and Violence
- Agrarian and Fisheries Reform
- Let's Invest in Canada's Children (Elimination of Child Poverty)

The following new publications from the Jubilee Initiative provide many points of reflection as well as strategies for you and your community to deepen your commitment to Jubilee.

- *Proclaim Generosity in a World of Enough*: the Initiative’s third “think and do” poster, which serves as an introduction to this year’s theme.
- *We Are A Jubilee People!* – the Jubilee pledge and a three hour process to “get you there.”
- A 48 page leadership guide from the Jubilee Initiative and Ten Days for Global Justice, which includes contextual materials, liturgy, bible studies, and workshops.
- A book of theological reflections on “redistribution of wealth.”

The Canadian Ecumenical Jubilee Initiative

Churches and Coalitions Respond to the Call for Global Justice in the Jubilee Tradition

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