

MOZAMBIQUE REVOLUTION



FRELIMO
25 June
1962-1972

**MOZAMBIQUE
REVOLUTION**

Official organ of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)

April - June, 1972

No. 51

*Department of Information
P.O. Box 15274
Dar es Salaam Tanzania*

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EDITORIAL



25th of June—the starting point

Ten years ago, on 25th June, 1962, the three main Mozambican political organisations which then existed agreed to join together and to form a front. Thus the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), was born. Since then, that date has been celebrated by us as a symbol of our unity.

It is true that the unity which was established in 1962 was extremely fragile. The existing, externally-based organisations which joined hands to form FRELIMO at that time did so reluctantly, and largely at the urging of younger, unattached militants with more direct and recent experience of the harsh realities which existed inside Mozambique itself. The causes which kept these organisations separate in the past — namely tribalism, regionalism, lack of a clear and detailed set of goals and of agreed and relevant strategies — continued to exist. The only thing which was common to them was their opposition to Portuguese colonialism. On all other particulars, including the actual aims of the struggle, the mode of military activity to be undertaken or the very definition of the enemy, there was no consensus.

It is obvious that under such conditions no real unity could be achieved. And this very soon became all too apparent. Thus, the early days of FRELIMO were marred by mutual recriminations, expulsion, withdrawal, as between exile politicians who refused to give up the dead, futile in-fighting of an irrelevant brand of nationalist politics.

It was such politicians who also tried to obstruct the efforts of the newer recruits to organised nationalism to elaborate a programme, analyse carefully the nature of the enemy, and prepare for protracted struggle. The old guard's model of an anti-colonial campaign lay elsewhere, in the more restrained manifestations of mass nationalism which characterised neighbouring British-held territories. Such men would inevitably become increasingly irrelevant to the kind of political and military activity dictated by sustained confrontation with the realities of Portuguese-styled colonialism.

However, the pace of the Mozambican revolution was soon to be forced by the younger group. The role of this more militant and politically aware nucleus cannot be over-emphasized. It was they, for example, who encouraged Dr. Eduardo Mondlane to take a leading role in guaranteeing genuine



unity (which he came to do so effectively), at the very moment when the established organisations were hesitating to place even their existing material possessions in a common pool for the benefit of the new movement. It was also they who, in September of the same year (1962), pushed forward a programme for FRELIMO. This programme made crucial advances — in defining our anti-imperialist stance, for example, and in stressing the principles of people's struggle and national reconstruction for the first time. It served as a foundation stone for our further ideological and practical development. In fact, it was precisely what was needed in order to give depth and meaning to genuine unity. Linked to such a programme, the seed planted in June, 1962, could be brought to full fruition.

But such advances also sounded the death-knell of the old guard. Most of them, because of their ideological background, could not adapt themselves to the revolutionary situation and were gradually rejected by the revolution.

Today, when we look back from the vantage point of ten years of successful struggle and try to analyse the events of 1962 critically, we see that this experience taught us fundamental lessons. First, that unity is crucial; we have good reason to celebrate June 25th and take pride in the achievement of that day. But secondly, and even more important, we now know that for unity to be real and effective, it must be based on an ideology and on a programme relevant to the needs of the struggle. Moreover, such unity is not merely to be understood as a formal act, nor as an event which can be identified by a date or easily located in space and time. Rather it is the expression of a long, complex and difficult process. Thus, when we celebrate the 25th of June as the day of unity, we celebrate it primarily as a *starting point* for developments which have led to the much stronger unity of our present organisation and of the Mozambican people as a whole. This was the greatest contribution of the 25th of June.





Train derailed by FRELIMO fighters on the railway line Beira - Moatize.

WAR COMMUNIQUE

CABO DELGADO

During the period February - May, FRELIMO guerrillas in Cabo Delgado shot down an aircraft, launched 5 artillery attacks against enemy posts and undertook a number of sabotage operations and ambushes. The posts which were attacked were badly damaged; more than 180 enemy soldiers were killed and 14 vehicles destroyed.

aircraft shot down

An aircraft belonging to the Portuguese military Police flying from Mueda to Nangololo was shot down by one of our anti-aircraft units on the 1st February, 1972. It crashed in the zone of Lukohe.

posts attacked

Our most important attack was launched against the post of Nangololo, on the 19th April. The post was occupied by

two companies of Portuguese soldiers. It was equipped with an airfield and a hangar able to take 7 aircraft of the «Noratlas» type. A large part of the post was destroyed.

Other posts and camps attacked were those in Nazombe, Sofala (in the region of Palma), Sikalanga and Namatili.

NIASSA

From January to April FRELIMO guerrillas shot down an aircraft; destroyed a helicopter; attacked 5 posts; destroyed 3 bridges; and launched a number of ambushes and sabotage operations in which 11 vehicles were destroyed and more than 70 enemy soldiers were killed.

helicopter destroyed

On 28th March, 1972, FRELIMO fighters destroyed a helicopter in the locality of Ngueni. The helicopter was bringing sup-

plies for a platoon which had landed in that place the day before. Our comrades waited until the helicopter had touched the ground and then opened intensive fire. The helicopter managed to lift off the ground but when it was about 10 meters up, it burst into flames and crashed. For three days the enemy platoon could not leave Ngueni as it was encircled by our forces and subjected to constant attacks. It was necessary for the enemy to send a great number of bombers and helicopters to evacuate the Portuguese soldiers, who were already completely demoralised.

reconnaissance aircraft shot down

At 4 p.m. on 13th April, an aircraft left Vila Cabral on a reconnaissance mission in the Western zone of the Unangu District. It was flying very low and slowly. Our guerrillas and militia opened fire on it. The aircraft began trailing smoke. It tried to return to Vila Cabral but failed and crashlanded on the outskirts of the town. At 6 p.m. several other aircraft

bombed the zone where our action had taken place, but without damaging our forces.

posts attacked

- Massangulo, on the 23rd February. Most of the barracks were burnt out.
- Lussanhando, on the 1st March. The houses were destroyed.
- Luvila, on the 14th March. The garrison of this post fled after our first shots. We entered the post and captured several guns, ammunition, food and uniforms.
- Nova Coimbra, on 3rd May. This attack lasted 20 minutes and resulted in 10 houses destroyed.
- Lunho, also on the 3rd May. Several houses and the fuel depot were burnt.

bridges destroyed

Three important bridges were blown up on the 4th and 12th April. One of the bridges was on the road between the posts of Candulo and Chamba. The other two were on the road Luitize - Nova Vizeu.

TETE

During the months of December, 1971 - March, 1972, FRELIMO fighters in Tete Province shot down two aircraft; sabotaged 7 trains; attacked 16 posts and camps; sabotaged 2 bridges; launched 6 ambushes on the Mozambique section of the international road Rhodesia - Malawi; and undertook 94 ambushes and sabotage operations. Over 400 Portuguese soldiers were killed, and 38 vehicles were destroyed.

aircraft shot down

An aircraft was shot down on the 15th January when flying over the region of Mague, in southern Tete. It crash-landed on the northern bank of the Zambezi River.

On the 15th February, 1 reconnaissance plane was shot down by a FRELIMO unit on a mission on the banks of the Zambezi River. The plane had left the post of Mague and was flying over the region of Gossa. It was hit by our fire and fell into the Zambezi River.

railway line beira - moatize

7th December, 1971, zone between Caldas Xavier and Mecunga: one train was blown up.

7 December, 1971; zone between Doa and Mecito: the engine and all but one of the wagons were destroyed. The train was being escorted by jet fighters.

21 December, 1971; zone between Caldas Xavier and Mecunga: a train was derailed by a big stone placed on the rails.

24 December, 1971; mines destroyed a number of wagons of a train which was leaving Mocito.

2 January, 1972; zone between Chueza and Mocito, in the region of Chief Gundana: the train was blown up.

27 January, 1972; zone between Doa and Moatize: many wagons blew up.

On the 19th March a train comprising a locomotive and 7 loaded wagons was destroyed with explosives on the railway line Moatize - Mutarara, in the section between Mocito and Chueza. It took the enemy 6 days to repair the line.

operations on the international road rhodesia - malawi

On the 26th January, 1972, a convoy was ambushed in the region of Mussacama. One lorry was destroyed, one soldier was killed and several others were wounded.

On the 3rd February, a convoy of 5 lorries going from Tete towards Zobue was ambushed. One lorry (Berliet) was destroyed and another damaged. Ten enemy soldiers were put out of action. On 5 and 14 February, between Changara and Rhodesia, 2 ambushes against



convoys resulted in one lorry destroyed and several enemy soldiers killed.

On the 18th February a convoy left Moatize for Zobue and was ambushed: two lorries were destroyed and a number of enemy soldiers were killed.

On the 23rd February, in the same zone between Moatize and Zobue, 10 Portuguese soldiers were killed when 2 lorries were hit and destroyed by our fire.

posts and camps attacked

- Mucanha, a concentration camp, on December 14, 1971: the enemy suffered 6 killed and abandoned the hamlet.
- Nhachenje, in Makomba region, on December 20, 1971. A number of Portuguese soldiers were killed.
- Jale, region near river Chinamozi, on 3rd January, 1972. Five of the enemy garrison were killed.
- Jale, another camp in the same region, on the 11th January. Three Portuguese soldiers were killed.
- Mkanga, region of Cachomba on 31st January. Six houses were destroyed.
- Uncinha, a former Catholic Mission turned into a military camp, on the 3rd February. Eight houses were destroyed and 11 of the enemy were killed.
- Dique, on 3rd February. We destroyed eight houses and killed 15 enemy soldiers.
- Jale region, in Chinamozi, on 3rd February. Several tents were destroyed and 7 of the enemy were killed.
- Benga, a concentration camp on the banks of the Zambezi River, on 10 February. Many soldiers from the garrison were killed, other fled.
- Jale, region of Nsolo - Wanhate on 11 February. The camp was burnt out.
- Muhamad, on 14 February. In this post was garrisoned a Portuguese company reinforced with 30 puppet soldiers. 5 houses were destroyed and 10 Portuguese soldiers killed.
- Cachombo, on 15th February. Five enemy soldiers were killed.
- Chibwja, on the 19th February. The camp was partially destroyed.
- Nguanzen, on 29 February. Three houses were destroyed.
- Manje, on 6 March. Several enemy soldiers were killed.
- Chibwja, was again attacked at the end of March. Almost all the tents were destroyed.

ALLIANCE AGAINST IMPERIALISM



The 1st Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of the G.D.R., comrade Erich Honecker, welcomes the President of FRELIMO, comrade Samora M. Machel.

Last April a FRELIMO delegation led by President Comrade Samora Moises Machel, visited the German Democratic Republic at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of the GDR. The main objective of the visit was to strengthen the relations between the SUPG and FRELIMO, as well as to hold discussions on concrete forms of political and material support. At the end of the talks a joint communique was issued giving the position of both parties on each of the subjects discussed. We quote from the communique:

In the course of the discussions both parties noted the great need for joint action by all the anti-imperialist forces, for mobilising their potentialities and possibilities in the struggle against the machinations of imperialism and reaction and strengthening co-operation between all the anti-imperialist forces and the Socialist States, to ensure success in the common struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racial discrimination.

FRELIMO expressed its esteem for the creative policy of the SUPG in implementing the decisions of the 8th Congress of the SUPG, appreciating the great achievements of the workers of the GDR in building a socialist society in the GDR. FRELIMO considers the successes of the GDR to be an effective contribution towards the consolidation of the forces of peace, liberation and socialism in the

worldwide confrontation between socialism and imperialism.

The FRELIMO delegation ensured the SUPG of the staunch solidarity of FRELIMO and the Mozambican people for the struggle of the people of the GDR both to strengthen the socialist power of the workers and peasants and to reinforce the position of the GDR internationally.

The SUPG delegation expressed its high regard for the heroic struggle of the Mozambican people, under the leadership of FRELIMO, for liberation from the brutal domination of Portuguese colonialism. It noted with satisfaction that FRELIMO had already liberated extensive regions of the country, inflicting ever greater defeats on the Portuguese colonialist mercenaries and their accomplices.

The SUPG confirmed the fraternal solidarity of the CC and members of the SUPG and of all the GDR workers with the just struggle of the Mozambican people.

The two delegations condemned the close collaboration between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portuguese colonialism and the criminal participation of the FRG as Portugal's main support in the colonial war against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guiné. Both parties expressed their equally determined opposition to the Bonn-Pretoria axis and to the support given to the racist Salisbury regime by member States of NATO. They agreed to continue to step up political, moral and material solidarity with the peoples of Southern Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe who are fighting for their freedom and independence.

The two parties concurred in believing that the admission of the GDR to the UN and its specialised agencies was a precondition for the fulfillment of the principle of universality and for more effective activity by that World Body.

The SUPG and FRELIMO delegations agreed to develop and deepen their relations and co-operation in the interest of the common struggle for national and social liberation, for peace and socialism.

VISITORS IN FREE MOZAMBIQUE

The liberated regions of Tete Province last March hosted a West German photo-journalist, Gerard Klijn. On his way back he held a Press Conference on his impression of FRELIMO's work.

Frelimo's ZAMBIA DAILY MAIL 16-3-72 a winner!

Newsman tells of progress in freed areas

FRELIMO is making gigantic progress towards rehabilitating people in the liberated areas of Mozambique, a West German journalist returning from the war zone said in Lusaka yesterday.

The journalist, who refused to disclose his name for security reasons because he might visit some of the colonial territories again, said that life had returned to normal in large areas of Mozambique where freedom fighters were setting up schools and hospitals.

He said that after spending 16 days in the Tete province he concluded that the Portuguese had no chance of winning the war and although the freedom fighters were faced with many difficult problems they would eventually triumph.

Wearing a guerrilla uniform and looking tired after a marathon trek through the bush, the journalist said that he had set out for Mozambique in a bid to discover the progress the freedom fighters were making. The newsman said he worked for several magazines and newspapers in West Germany and he had been assigned to go to one of the colonial territories ruled by an oppressive regime who were being supplied with military weapons by West Germany.

He added that his mission was not to witness a military confrontation between the freedom fighters and the Portuguese troops and he did not want to prove whether or not the Portuguese were using Nato weapons against the Africans.

The journalist added that the freedom fighters have woven a tight knot of friendship with the people and this was making their work easier. He said that the Portuguese were scared to venture into the heart of the mainland and the only evidence of the Portuguese presence he saw in the colony was one reconnaissance aircraft.

"The situation is still very bad but from what I saw during the 16 days that I visited the territory I am convinced that the Portuguese had no chance whatsoever. Life has returned to normal and there is freedom and activity everywhere," he said.

One of the problems the people were facing was malnutrition which has been estimated by the World Health Organisation to be the highest in Africa, at the rate of 50 per cent. The people were lacking medical and educational supplies, he said, and one of his duties when he returned home would be to persuade West German charity organisations to offer help which could be of great value to the struggle.



10th ANNIVERSARY

FRELIMO 1962-1972



INTRODUCTION

It is impossible to express in figures the sum of our efforts, our difficulties and our successes. It is not enough to list our number of enemy soldiers put out of action, vehicles destroyed, roads sabotaged and posts captured. For a people's struggle is something more than a matter of mere numbers.

Thus ten years of FRELIMO are also ten years in the life of its militants. Who were we who on the 25th June, 1962 were powerfully moved by the call to struggle against foreign oppression but remained only dimly aware of the enormity of the task and the formidable forces concealed behind the administrator, the sepoy and the overseer on the plantation? What did we know of the outside world, most of us confined to the narrow horizons of the colonial night? Could we imagine this new frontierless world of solidarity and human fraternity to which we are now proud to belong?

Our tenth anniversary embraces all of this. All of these transformations, both within ourselves and outside of us.

From our ignorance we have created schools, from our disease we have created hospitals.

A single tool: The power of the united people, overcoming the communication barriers born of lack of knowledge about each other, born of tribal differences, and born of artificial divisions created by colonialism.

In 1962, foreign domination extended throughout the country. Everywhere our people were oppressed and exploited and deprived of any political organisation through which to express their true voice. The plunder of our resources and labour power took various forms, one more loathsome than the other, from forced labour to forced cultivation and exportation of labour. Education was either nonexistent or else confined to a minority whom the colonial masters hoped to rely on to perpetuate exploitation. Disease, malnutrition and lack of medical care were decimating Mozambicans by the thousand.

It was against all this that the people rose up in arms.

The past ten years have witnessed, first and foremost, the building of the nationalist movement as an instrument for action and the consolidation of revolutionary national consciousness. It was in the course of these years that the political programme outlined in the resolutions of the first Congress took form and contributed to the forging of our political line in action and through action.

Today the Mozambican people have an active fighting organisation which has consolidated itself in the course of a rich and deeply lived political experience. Many stumbling blocks made our path difficult and many vital choices had to be made; but it was in the course of making such choices that we have found our strength and affirmed our purpose.

Today colonial domination has been completely eliminated in vast regions of our country. A new life and a new society are taking shape in these regions, built through the efforts of the people, based on participation of every man and woman as full citizens. The social and material foundations have

been laid in the fields of production, health and education, despite the difficult conditions of the war and the savage repression of an enemy seeking desperately to destroy the example and attraction that these regions and this new life represents for the population in the regions still under their control.

In the dominated areas, despite the campaigns of repression unleashed against nationalist militants, ever more people have come to see FRELIMO as the rallying point for the identification and commitment of all Mozambicans the country over. They take pride in the victories achieved in the struggle: they see them as their own struggle.

This progressive trend is the predominant feature of the situation: the continuous expansion of our action to the whole country and the swelling of our forces as new areas are affected by the armed struggle.

At the same time, the enemy forces are showing signs of having reached stagnation point and this in turn explains the feeling of frustration prevailing in the Portuguese military establishment. The extension of the period of compulsory military service and the use of women and the disabled in auxiliary army services reflects the steady widening of the battlefield and the mounting losses suffered there. Moreover the enemy's human resources are being diminished by the considerable number of young men who avoid conscription and the flow of emigrants to European countries. This is happening at a time when our struggle is already seriously hitting the economic foundations of colonial exploitation.

The 25th June, 1962 is an important moment in this combined process of increasing our forces and progressively whittling away those of the enemy. Much has already been said and written about our struggle and it would be impossible and perhaps superfluous to give a full statistical account of it here. We have thought it better to describe the process of political growth which started on the 25th June, 1962 by seeking to show how the people's armed struggle has determined its development.

First we show the process of bringing into being structures and organs for the implementation of the programme of action, including the first steps taken in establishing the people's liberation forces: indeed special space has been devoted to the latter, both because it provides a particularly good example of this work and because its successful realisation has been decisive to the further development of our movement.

In the second part we try to show the process of political and ideological clarification from another point of view: that of the work of national reconstruction undertaken in the liberated regions. Born of the successes of the armed struggle in the liberated areas have become a practical testing ground which gives rise to complex problems; the solutions to such problems have in turn determined the nature of our activities and, in certain cases, the way in which we have pursued the war. In this manner they have helped to make our choices clearer and have led to a more precise definition of the aims of our struggle.

THE FIRST STEPS

With the creation of FRELIMO, the Mozambican nationalists laid out a new definition of tasks, now at national level. These tasks required organs of action of a new type and methods of work completely different from those of the previous organisations. It was here that the 25th June really marked a rupture with the precedent period and opened a new phase in the history of Mozambican nationalism.

The first process which merits examination is that of the structuring of the movement. As President Mondlane said in his report to the 2nd Congress, the first task we had to face was that of constituting an executive body capable of putting into effect the programme of action drawn up at the 1st Congress. True, a Central Committee with executive duties had been created, as well as departments, each headed by a secretary, in some cases aided by an assistant.

But what remained to be determined was not only the internal structure of each department, but also the allocation of duties of the various members of the Central Executive, and the division of labour between the Presidency and the departments; the latter was a particularly crucial problem because it raised the whole question of the degree of centralisation of leadership which is necessary at certain phases of the struggle. In short, the organisational methods best suited to the concrete fulfillment of the programme drawn up inside our country remained to be determined.

These were problems which could not be solved theoretically; their solution was largely dependent on the nature and the extent of our experience. Of course, we did know that a revolutionary struggle could not be led using anti-democratic structures, without collective methods of work. We were aware that a popular programme requires a revolutionary structure. But what sort of tradition had we built up in this respect?

organisational shortcomings

This calls for a keen appraisal of the organisations which had existed previously and which came together to form FRELIMO. They all displayed the same

weaknesses, reflecting their similar origin and tradition.

First, both the leadership and the rank and file consisted mainly of people who had lived abroad for a long time, either as refugees or as migrant workers in adjacent countries. Thus MANU operated in Tanganyika, bringing together people from the northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, most of whom worked on the sisal plantations of British settlers. Their principal activity was holding meetings with these workers, issuing membership cards to them and collecting funds. However, they lacked any clear perspective on concrete work inside the country, apart from the distribution of membership cards, which was done in Cabo Delgado Province.

Similar features characterised UDENAMO, though it grouped together people from the centre and the south of the country. These Mozambicans were, on the whole, rather more urbanised and they lived in Rhodesia, either as refugees from Portuguese campaigns of repression or as employees in the service sector. A substantial part of UDENAMO's activity involved recruiting militants inside the country and sending them to Tanganyika or helping political refugees to go north. As for UNAMI, it had somewhat limited activity in Nyasaland and Tete.

A second feature followed: the very fact that most of the members of these organisations had lived abroad for some time meant that they had no very deep understanding of the true conditions prevailing in the country. Not only was there a loss of direct contact with the living conditions and the feelings of the people, their information being garnered instead from reports and from the stories told by the refugees, but above all, there

was scant knowledge of the true nature and dimensions of the enemy's machinery of repression.

Thirdly, and this is perhaps the most relevant point in our analysis, because they lived abroad these parties were greatly influenced by the kind of organisation typical of the British colonial tradition. Therefore, in their structural organisation and in their very concept of the work to be done, the example of the NDP in Rhodesia, the Malawi Congress Party or TANU was followed.

"winds of change"

Carried away by the euphoria of the «wind of change» and by the achievements of these parties in neighbouring countries, they believed in the inevitability of change. They therefore misinterpreted the political and economic nature of fascist Portuguese colonialism, ignoring the fact that it could never accept any degree of political freedom or peaceful evolution to independence. Under such conditions it is not surprising that the decisive role bringing the three organisations together and in shaping the new organisation, came to be played by other militants coming from inside the country where they had been working clandestinely. Undoubtedly, the political consciousness and, above all, the concrete knowledge of this latter group was much surer, though it is also true to say that they lacked the tradition of organisation which the special conditions of clandestine struggle had never allowed to develop.

Such, therefore, was the sum of experience that nationalist militants from various backgrounds could draw upon in structuring a political party at the time of FRELIMO's creation.

The constituent Congress drew up a programme which can be summed up in three points:

- mobilising the people and heightening national consciousness;
- launching an education programme to increase combat effectiveness;
- drawing up a plan for military action taking into account the nature of Portuguese colonialism.

It was through the implementation of these programmes that FRELIMO was going to transform itself into something entirely new in relation to the organisations that preceded it.

no illusions

The last point was decisive. While appeals for a peaceful solution to the problem were made from international platforms, we could not be under any illu-

sions: war was already being waged in Angola, and in Mozambique the enemy was reinforcing his police and army apparatus.

It was under such conditions that the military programme took concrete form. We needed a sound and consistent programme, and this presupposed both a detailed study of the country, and of the control established by the enemy and, at the same time, a survey of the political and social traditions of each region. Another aspect of this task was the creation of a body which would be able to ensure the recruitment and training of a large number of solidly united and well-organised militants to spearhead the programme of armed action.

But the manner in which this organisational and operational stage was tackled was decisive. Our people had already



The making of a freedom fighter



«I think I am 53 years old. I was born in Marromeu, Province of Manica e Sofala. I suffered very much all my life, under the Portuguese colonialists.

I worked first in a British company, the Sena Sugar Estates. They have big sugar plantations and big factories. Like most of the other workers, I had been arrested and given to the company to work. Every day we were given a certain amount of work, which we had to finish in time. Those who did not finish were beaten with palmatoria and did not get paid for the day. We received 70 esc. per month (the equivalent of US \$ 0.35 per day). The man who was responsible for furnishing the Sena Sugar Estates with workers was ad-

ministrator Afonso Ribeiro. Another very cruel administrator who came later was Joaquim Palhota. The people nicknamed him «Cinquenta» (fifty) because he always ordered 50 strokes of the palmatoria. He oppressed the people of our region between 1950 and 1955.

thrown out

Now this administrator Palhota had a friend, a farmer called Barreto. Barreto wanted more land.

Palhota then came with his policemen, arrested us and sent us out of our shambas. I myself had a piece of land where I grew pineapples, cashew and oranges. I lost everything. Our huts were burnt and the land given to Barreto. Some of us were absent, on forced labour in other regions. When we returned we did not find our homes, and we did not know about the whereabouts of our families. It was the case with me - I had been in Rhodesia. All this happened in Chaima, region of Chief Mbwazi in 1950 or 1951. So when I returned from Rhodesia and was surprised to

find my home gone, I was arrested by the Portuguese and sent to Morrumbala to work on building roads. I found my family there - all the people from the expropriated land had been sent there, to work in government projects - with absolutely no pay. For many years it was like this - constantly arrested and sent to work for government projects or in Company plantations for periods of 6 months to one year.

In 1959 I got a job as a waiter in the wagon-restaurant of the Nyassaland Railways that went between Beira and Malawi. I earned about US \$ 70 per month. I worked there until 1964, when I was arrested by PIDE. I'll explain how it was.

In October, 1962, I met on the train a comrade who told me about FRELIMO. I did not know anything; he explained to me that FRELIMO was fighting to bring freedom to our country. I met him several times after that - and each time he explained more in detail.

I decided to join FRELIMO.

I was given two tasks: first to make propaganda for FRELIMO - that is, to explain to other people about FRELIMO - its aims, the need for everybody to join the struggle; second, to help bring out those nationalists who were being persecuted and those who wanted to receive training in FRELIMO. I helped many people pass - some into Mozambique, those who were sent by FRELIMO for clandestine work. I also helped others out of Mozambique. I carried propaganda material for the FRELIMO militants in Mozambique.

no trial

I was arrested by PIDE on the 20th May, 1964. The sister of one of those I helped to escape could not stand the interrogation and denounced me. After the arrest I was taken to a room where there were 6 whips and 2 palmatorias hanging on the wall. I was told to undress. I was badly beaten. The colonialists started by asking if I knew what FRELIMO was. I answered «yes, I know, FRELIMO is freedom». They insulted me. They said, «you



had bitter and painful experience of mass demonstrations, strikes and peaceful protests which ended in repression and massacre. It was therefore vital to create an organ capable of undertaking consistent and effective action against the colonial military apparatus. We had learned that it was not sufficient merely to have right on one's side when confronting Portuguese colonialism!

The aims and scope of our activity having thus been defined, political organisers who were already established inside the country were entrusted with the task of mobilising and recruiting young people wishing to take up arms; there was a large and enthusiastic response to this call. From that moment political action ceased to be the prerogative of a restricted group and for the first time involved a great number of militants. In fact because they thus demonstrate the process

of affirming the popular content of the movement through the growing participation of the masses, it is worth describing these first phases of the formation of the liberation army in some detail. In this process we can also see a clear example of the way in which our overall programme of activities has been put into effect ever since in the formation of the army; there the three elements of our programme — mobilisation, education and the training of cadres — were all combined in one. Finally, the whole process and the way in which it has unfolded, also explains much about the present character of our movement.

The initial steps were relatively straightforward. Militants were recruited and sent to friendly countries for military training. But on their return there was the very much more complex task of structuring all these militants into a

are stupid, you don't even know how to write. What do you want independence for? » I answered, «we have those who know, they will teach us». They asked how I took people out of the country. I said, «I don't take them. It is the train who takes them. You have guards, police at the border, PIDE agents everywhere. If with all this you cannot stop people from passing, it is your problem.» Together with me, 14 people were arrested. We were all badly tortured. Comrade Jojuente was suspended by his hands for so long that the skin broke off. Agosto Pinto Jeremo was whipped with a whip with iron points, and a palmatoria with nails instead of the usual holes. The same happened to old Jossia. I was in prison from 1964 up to 1971. I was never taken to any court, never tried.

On 14 December, 1964, I was transferred to the Penitentiary of Lourenço Marques, where I stayed until the 1st February, 1965. I was then taken to Machava Prison. When I arrived there we were about 200 prisoners. In Ap-

ril 400 more arrived from the island of Ibo.

In Machava the conditions were terrible — many people died daily because of tortures and bad food. In my ward alone, an average of 2 — 3 people died every day. But the prisoners who arrived from Ibo told me that there it was even worse.

3,000 political prisoners

On the 12th July, 1965, I was taken to a new jail in Mabalane. When we arrived we were 200 and soon 65 more came. In 1966, 370 more were sent there. In 1967 there were 1,006 prisoners in Mabalane alone. By that time, in Machava and Lourenço Marques the political prisoners numbered more than 3,000. In November I was again transferred to Machava.

We were very well organised in all the prisons, we had meetings to discuss and solve our contradictions. We kept our discipline as FRELIMO militants, we had a high morale. In our wards there were never fights: on the contrary in the criminal's wards they

even fought with knives among themselves. The colonialists tried to destroy our political consciousness using a combination of three weapons: tribalism, terror and corruption and murder. Through tribalism they attempted to separate the Makondes from us. They started to give classes only for the Makondes. But they failed. Then they created a magazine called 'Ressurgimento', where the prisoners were forced to write articles insulting FRELIMO, and eulogising the PIDE. Those who refused were punished. A few of us betrayed from fear, but they were very few. We also begun mobilising the prisoners from the criminal wards. Some of them adhered to FRELIMO.

Aware of our strength in the prisons, the PIDE resorted to other tactics: they infiltrated agents provocateurs, Cunjane and Luis Ferreira in Machava and Caetano Souza in Mabalane. Those traitors succeeded in identifying 30 of our comrades, who were immediately isolated in special cells. They were never allowed to leave the cells. They were given food once a week

— a cup of cooked beans. No water. 23 of them died before this regime ended — among them were comrades Joel Guduane, Juma Salimo, Agostinho Xitete, Alexandre Nhocoma. I saw with my own eyes the bodies of 20 of the murdered comrades. These comrades are great heroes, none of them betrayed, none of them denounced who were the other militants of the FRELIMO clandestine network.

In spite of their deaths, FRELIMO continued very much alive in the prison, in our hearts. We organised ourselves better, more carefully, in the wards and cells.

portuguese soldiers

We also collaborated with white and Asian prisoners, who had been arrested for supporting FRELIMO, including some Portuguese soldiers.

I left prison in 1971, but many thousands of patriots still remain there. I am working with FRELIMO. For the first time in my life I feel free. We have to continue fighting, to extend this freedom to all our people.

homogenous body imbued with the movement's political line, which they had to be able to interpret and represent among the masses.

This was an immense task, given the differing experiences, geographical backgrounds, customs and traditions. In most cases the only common denominator among the militants was the fact of their being oppressed by Portuguese colonialism and having a common desire for liberation. Although these shared feelings made it possible for people to take a stand, they were nonetheless insufficient foundation for sustained action. It therefore became necessary to go to the very roots of unity, to explain the size and complexity of our country and the logic of having people from different linguistic and tribal groups live together. Such discussions made it possible for old divisions and antagonisms exacerbated by colonialism to be collectively analysed and overcome.

forging unity

It became essential for each militant to be thoroughly acquainted with the lives and customs of other groups. In this way militants came to identify aspects of the enemy's activities which differed from what was known in their own regions,

and this enabled them to fight the enemy anywhere.

These efforts were decisive to the consolidation of national unity, even though they required more time and more thorough work and despite the great temptation to take the easy way out and send each militant to fight in his own region.

Thus, the first task was above all to consolidate national unity within the movement itself. It was important to bring together all the separate experiences of militants — in villages, in plantations in mines, in prisons and in towns — in order to gain an overall picture of the colonial system. This made it possible at last to define accurately the scope of the war, the many faces of the enemy and the need for unity.

But experience had already taught us that mere talk could not give rise to an effective political line. Theoretical courses and discussions, however profound, could never make up for lack of experience or efface the marks left on us by the evils of colonial society. A new social morality, a new way of life, had to be internalised and fully exemplified in our behaviour and our day-to-day activity.

This need to confront this further challenge also arose out of the very character which our struggle had come to assume. It was clear that at the start we would never be able to mobilise an army of militants capable of confronting the colo-



onial machinery of repression with equal tactical forces. The then few dozen militants armed with light arms would have to draw their strength from the people and act on the basis of this strength in order, through the development of their potentialities, to change the existing balance of forces.

Hence, it was necessary to reinforce the popular character of the army. This was to a great extent ensured by the deep interpenetration between the movement's structures and the people out of which the army had come. But to strike deep roots

"MOZAMBIKAN PEOPLE, let us fight united, with no tribal, racial or religious divisions, all of us against the common enemy — Portuguese colonialism and imperialism."

Dr. Eduardo C. Mondlane, 1st President of FRELIMO



among the people, it is not sufficient to have come from the people. In its behaviour, methods and structures, the army had to be a people's army. Only in this way would the rules of revolutionary conduct be observed in relations with the people and their full confidence and support ensured.

Realising this goal meant defining and establishing new relations within the army and developing a spirit of criticism which would eliminate lack of confidence and create a collective method of work. Many meetings were held for this purpose at which such methods of work, as well as military preparedness and individual comportment, were thoroughly discussed. Each militant recounted his own experience and described the traditions of his region. This served to supplement the work of our reconnaissance teams of course, but the chief importance of this kind of discussion was in helping to perfect the type of relations which would be established with the people.

In order to strengthen in the army the

feeling of belonging to the people, and counter the tendency for membership of the army to become a privileged position, productive work was made a part of the army's programme of work from the very start. Later on, when the progress of the struggle led to a considerable increase in our numerical strength, this practice proved extremely valuable in that it prevented the army from being too much of a burden on the people where food was concerned.

protracted war

Of course, this programme also had to do with the need to prepare for a protracted war and to mobilise ourselves for such a war. Faced with such a challenge, it was necessary to clarify the aims of our struggle in terms other than those slogans which might be useful for purposes of rapid mobilisation. For some militants for example, the initial feeling was one of hatred for the white man as the source of all ills. This feeling had to be transformed into political awareness of the

need to fight oppression and to direct our weapons against the system of oppression, not against mere skin colour.

We saw that it was only with this type of mobilisation and on the basis of this level of political awareness that it would be possible to sustain a protracted war, one which would enable us progressively to mobilise all the resources of our people and country and to liquidate, little by little, the enemy's material and human resources, their economy and their morale.

Developing national consciousness, strengthening the movement's popular character and clarifying the political line were therefore, the first tasks that our army and our movement as a whole, had to face. These are undoubtedly the first steps many nationalist movements have had to take in their political activities. But, over and above programmes and formal statements, in them we have come to find the essence of an increasingly progressive political line and the direction for the advance of our movement, our militants and our people.



SHAPING THE POLITICAL LINE

It was only with the launching of the armed struggle that the contents of FRELIMO's political programme were to become, in the course of action, more precisely defined. The necessity of taking up arms to destroy Portuguese colonial domination was itself never a point of controversy among us. However differences of opinion appeared — subsequent events would reveal just how deep-seated these differences were — regarding the relationship of the armed struggle to the overall revolutionary process in our country.

By mid-1964, when the Central Committee met to establish a date for the launching of the armed struggle, some of the

members defended the proposition that it was of little importance to study conditions carefully; once the armed struggle was launched, they argued, the people would support it, whether it was well-organised or not. Moreover, it was said to be unnecessary to linger over such details because obviously the armed struggle would not be a long one. Once we had fired the first shots, these members continued, the Portuguese would be forced to yield because the international political conjuncture favoured our winning of independence. They further argued that Portuguese troops in northern Mozambique were few and scattered; we could therefore expect to defeat them quickly and easily.

This type of reasoning revealed a grave lack of knowledge and a dangerous underestimation of the enemy's strength. It also revealed an even more negative aspect: that there were among the leadership people who accepted the principle of armed struggle, but considered it to be merely a technical and mechanical expedient. Such leaders, in effect, refused to consider armed struggle as a process of people's participation and as the fundamentally political undertaking which it is.

The cleavage could not but have very negative consequences in the future. In fact, it would be difficult for an organ which did not assume such an integral approach to the armed struggle to lead it. This is immediately obvious if one considers an important corollary of this position: that the army is merely an executive body assigned the task of liquidating as many enemy soldiers as possible but not concerning itself with politics!

the armed struggle

An agreement on the necessity of armed struggle having been reached, however, preparations for its launching were begun — including the mobilisation of the people by the Department of Internal Organisation and the creation of logistical and tactical pre-conditions by the Department of Defence.

On the 25th September, 1964, the armed struggle was launched. The first combat took place in Chai in Cabo Delgado Province and was quickly followed by operations in the other provinces of Zambezia Niassa and Tete. Acting with flexibility, undertaking operations against targets far apart from each other, the first guerrilla units succeeded in frustrating the enemy's plans for repression which had been laid out long before. It was these militants, badly equipped, but with a high sense of determination and patriotism, who created the conditions for the consolidation of the armed struggle.

The increased number of ambushes, the attacks against isolated Portuguese posts, the fact that these fighters held the initiative and attacked the enemy in many different places without becoming targets themselves, immediately placed the Portuguese on the defensive. They were forced to concentrate their troops in a limited number of places in order to diminish their vulnerability; they abandoned the small isolated administrative posts; they reduced the circulation of vehicles on the mined roads where our fighters were active. In this way they lost control over increasingly large regions and consequently our fighters could circulate freely, openly

The first combat


«On September 20, 1964, we were informed that the Central Committee had decided that the armed struggle should start on the 25th. I was one of the operational leaders in Cabo Delgado and I was entrusted with the task of directing the attack on the post of Chai.

My unit had 16 weapons: 6 sub-machine guns, 6 rifles and 4 automatic pistols. We selected a group of 12 comrades and set out to our target. On the morning of the 25th we arrived at the township of Chai. We went barefoot for fear that we should be discovered because of our boots.

I told one comrade who was in uniform to put on civilian clothes and go out to reconnoitre the township. I bandaged his foot so that he could feign illness. He came with the necessary information — where the post and the house of the Chefe do Posto were located.

I made a plan of attack. One machine-gun would neutralise the African troops in the secretariat. I decided to concentrate the attack against the house where the Chefe do Posto and the officers were. I gave each comrade his position for the attack. They were to remain under the mango tree camouflaged. At 1600 hours we came out into the open, at 1800 hours we were at the post, in position. At 1900 hours we advanced until we reached the house of the Chefe do Posto.

Sometime later, a Portuguese guard came and stationed himself at the door of the house, seated on a chair. I approached the guard. My shot would be the signal for the other comrades to attack. At 2100 hours I fired at the guard and killed him. When the Chefe do Posto heard the shots, he opened the door and came out — he was also killed. Apart from him, 6 other Portuguese were killed in this first attack.



contact the population and develop the organisation necessary to successful armed struggle.

This development did not come as a surprise to us. What we did not foresee at first was the fact that, a few months after the launching of the armed struggle, we would have had to assume so vast a number of tasks regarding the people.

Thus, the Portuguese, unable to get at the guerrilla units, had concentrated their repressive actions against the civilian population. They carried out endless bombings in order to prevent the population from moving and cultivating, with the aim of creating famine in the liberated regions. Moreover, they evacuated all the colonialist traders from these regions in order to remove the source of those manufactured goods indispensable to the lives of the people, a situation which was aggravated by the fact that the forced labour and the forced growing of cash crops introduced by the colonialists had

'We women have the right to fight'



«My family is from Namau, district of Mueda in Cabo Delgado. We were seven children, and life was very difficult for us. My father worked in the shop of an Indian trader, where he earned 195 escudos (US \$6.50) per month. We had a very small piece of land, but we hardly had time to grow any crops on it, because we were forced to work in the fields of the companies, growing cotton.

Even the priests were bad. My cousin Jose Lucas was a teacher in the Lipelua Mission. Once he was ill and could not take classes for 2 days. At the end of the month the priests refused to pay his wages, alleging that he had missed work for two days. My cousin then refused to work in the mission any longer. In reprisal, the priests sent the police to arrest my cousin.

The Portuguese are very bad. They used to come to our villages, enter our houses and steal chickens, cereals, anything. If anyone dared to protest, he was arrested and beaten.

abused

There was a time when they launched a campaign for the children to go to the mission's school. But it was a lie; they wanted the children in order to put them to work on the mission shambas and in the colonialist's houses.

Women were not respected, even married women were abused in front of their husbands. If the husband reacted or she refused, both of them were badly beaten.

The colonialist's argument was that it was an honour for a black woman to be wanted by a white man. I could tell you many more evil things to which we were subjected by the colonialists.

In 1962, when I was in the hospital at the Imbuho mission, an old man came who talked to us secretly, saying that the Mozambicans had created an Organisation called FRELIMO to fight the Portuguese and win back our freedom. We listened very attentively.

Later in 1963, my father came. He called me and my sister, and explained to us about FRELIMO, warning us to maintain absolute secrecy.

In 1964 there was already a great deal of FRELIMO activity in our region. The FRELIMO organisers told us that we should prepare everything to go to the bush because soon the Portuguese would start arresting and massacring the people owing to our support for FRELIMO.

Two days later we went to the bush. And some days later, on the 25th of September, the war started in our region.

The people were given the task of blocking the roads with big trees and holes. We also cut telephone wires and cut down the poles.

Since that time I have been very active in FRELIMO. The first mission that I and the other girls were sent on was to go through the villages and explain and mobilise the people for war. We explained what FRELIMO is, why we have to fight and who are the enemy. We also encouraged

the boys and girls in the villages to join our forces. Later on the late Comrade Kankhomba taught us reconnaissance and security work, to detect enemy agents who tried to infiltrate our zones.

When we girls started to work there was strong opposition against our participation. Because that was against our tradition. We then started a big campaign explaining why we also had to fight, that the FRELIMO war is a people's war in which the whole people must participate, that we women were even more oppressed than men and that we therefore had the right as well as the will and the strength to fight. We insisted on our having military training and being given weapons.

the women's tasks

I was in the first Women's Detachment which was given military training in 1967. Our Central Committee had supported our full participation. Since then, the Women's Detachment has been very active fighting, transporting material to the advanced zones, organising production and par-

ticipating in the health services.

I have already taken part in many battles. Some of the most important were: an ambush against a convoy on the Namaguanga-Muidumbe road on 15th July, 1967, where we destroyed 2 lorries and killed many of the enemy. An artillery and infantry attack against the Nangololo post: 2 houses were destroyed and their helicopter came 4 times to collect the dead and take the wounded to the hospital at Mueda. During the 1970 enemy offensive, I participated in 2 ambushes, one on the Mueda-Mocimboa da Praia road, the other on the Nacatar-Mueda road, resulting respectively in 4 lorries and 3 lorries destroyed. Last year (1971) my unit destroyed 3 lorries in an ambush on the Muatide-Mueda road. I also took part in one big attack against the Muidumbe post in 1971, in which our artillery and infantry forces destroyed many houses. The helicopter came 7 times for the dead and wounded. Shortly after that attack the enemy evacuated the post definitively.



almost completely erased the artisan traditions of the people. Finally, to accentuate insecurity and terror, colonialist soldiers made incursions into our regions, and quite simply murdered people. Such a situation determined new tasks for the guerrillas, tasks which had not been fully envisaged previously.

It was necessary in the first place to ensure the security of the population without which they would find themselves in the dilemma which the colonial army sought to create: either to seek refuge en masse in neighbouring countries, or be captured and herded into 'protected villages' which the Portuguese were creating based on the American model of strategic hamlets.

The first measure which our fighters took was to transfer the population from their traditional villages which were open and therefore vulnerable to air attacks, into new villages deep in the bush. Afterwards it was necessary to regulate the movements of the people: escort them on their way to the fields or to get water and also to control their circulation to prevent the infiltration of enemy agents.

In order to undertake these tasks, it was necessary to create a structure which could ensure internal organisation and the diffusing of directives from the leading organs of the organisation. Because of the many unexpected tasks which appeared, it was not possible to establish a new structure able to cope with all these problems. For this reason, the same structures that were used for the work of mobilisation were used. As leaders among the people, we placed those who had done the mobilisation work during the

preparatory phase. But in fact those people had no political formation and had limited themselves to mobilising the people according to the model of neighbouring countries. Even the name by which they called themselves was taken from the neighbouring ex-British colonies, «Chairmen». With the development of the struggle and the growing participation of the masses, the «chairmen» were invested with large responsibilities for which they were not prepared.

mass engagement

Nonetheless, the people were participating more and more. At the level of the liberation army, the appearance of large regions wrested from the control of the enemy facilitated the establishment of training camps where young people who wanted to join the liberation army flocked in large numbers. Simultaneously, the free contact between the army and the people allowed for growing popular support, for example, in the field of obtaining information regarding enemy movements. The development of the struggle, the extension of the war to new fronts, meant moreover, that larger quantities of material had to be transported; the support of the people in this field was invaluable. Thus, for anyone entering the semi-liberated regions for the first time, the most striking impression would be the sight of a long line of people — young, old, men and women — continually on the line, loaded with supplies for the front, under the escort of guerrillas.

At the same time, combat techniques were being perfected and new weapons introduced. In fact, the development of the combat capacity of the liberation



«I was called from my base to the provincial base on the 9th of July 1968. When I arrived, I was told that I was to command a unit in an artillery attack against Mueda. The main target was to be the airfield. The plans had already been drawn up by the Provincial Section of Operations. We studied the plan together. Then I went with my unit to the artillery base. We requested mortars and cannons and a large amount of ammunition, and informed the Chief of Operations that we were ready.

The whole unit went to a pre-determined place and we sent a group for reconnaissance. The reconnaissance group came back and suggested a place from where to launch the attack. It seemed to us that it was too far from the target: we therefore sent a 2nd unit. I myself went with the 2nd group. We located a better position, much nearer the airfield. I called the heads of the platoons for a final discussion on the plans for the attack.

On the 16th August, at 8.00 a.m. I went to the position with the platoon and section commanders. I told them the places their soldiers should occupy.

At 2.00 p.m. the whole unit joined us there carrying the mortars and cannons. As the position was very high and visible, we mounted the cannons below and left them there. At 4.00 p.m. all the platoons were in place. We lifted the cannons up. At 5.00 p.m. all the groups and weapons were in position, ready. At 17.31 we started the attack. It lasted about 35 minutes. The place we had chosen was very high, and we could see exactly where the shells were falling. The enemy was caught absolutely by surprise. For several days they had been concentrating their forces in Mueda; we believe it was in order to launch an offensive in Muatide. There were many planes in Mueda on that occasion. When we arrived, the first reconnaissance unit reported 1 reconnaissance plane and 5 bombers. Later on 8 more planes arrived, while we were preparing the attack.

12 aircraft were set aflame. We saw them from our observation post. The enemy did not react, only much later, when we had already left the place.



«At the beginning of July (1971) my unit was called to the Cabo Delgado Provincial Base. My being called had to do with enemy movements in the area. We arrived at the base on the morning of the 14th July. Everybody was ready to go out on a combat mission. I presented myself to the chief of the base, who told me that my group should join one of the artillery units which was leaving for Mtumbate. So we went. We were carrying several mortars. When we arrived the people told us that the day before a reconnaissance aircraft had been flying over that area for a long time and that it was possible that the enemy could be planning an attack.

We therefore took positions. Sometime later enemy aircraft arrived. The head of my platoon ordered that when the helicopters tried to land, the mortars should be aimed at them. There was only one cleared place where the helicopters could possibly land; everywhere else around there was trees. So our artillery men aimed the mortars at that spot.

First came one reconnaissance aircraft, followed by 4 jets, 6 bombers and 6 helicopters. They started bombing the area. We knew already their tactics — we waited. One helicopter came lower. It



was landing exactly at the spot we had foreseen. Our comrades fired the mortars. One shell fell very near the helicopter and destroyed it. Another helicopter about to land, on seeing the first one destroyed retreated. The aircraft bombed and strafed the area with machine-gun fire. They wanted to force us to leave the area, so that they could collect the wreckage of the helicopter. But we remained firmly in our positions and threatened them with our anti-aircraft fire. Finally the enemy had to go away. We together with the population then took the wreckage to a safe place in the bush after having taken photos which would enable us to identify the helicopter. It was an «Alouette 3» French-made. Next day the enemy returned but could not find anything.

forces through the augmentation of their numbers and the utilisation of heavier weapons enabled the guerrilla to pass to a new state in the struggle. Important Portuguese posts, which until then had only been sealed off, could now be attacked directly by our artillery forces equipped with mortars and later with cannons. A great number of posts were assaulted in this manner and we were at last able to capture large quantities of military material from the enemy. This development was of great importance.

Contrary to the myth that the enemy soldiers abandon their weapons in order to escape more easily, the Portuguese soldiers deploy great efforts and even risk their lives in order not to leave on the battlefield any weapons which can be used by the guerrillas. Moreover, the enemy supply convoys used dozens of lorries at one time. Under these conditions it was difficult for us to capture material unless we deployed considerable forces which were not always available for an ambush.

This situation changed in this second phase of the struggle — the launching of large-scale attacks on Portuguese posts and their total destruction. Now with weapons that we captured, we could start training the population and distribute weapons to them; this was a programme determined by the need to defend the liberated regions and extend the struggle. The creation of people's militias derived from the development of the military situation and from the opportunities which arose for the organisation of the masses; this measure in turn, having secured the defence of the liberated zones against enemy incursions, freed the guerrillas to extend the fighting to new zones.

the challenge

The development and consolidation of liberated regions, the creation of zones where colonialism had no control nor possibilities of influence, led to the constitution of a new life, of a society which at the beginning was constructed alongside the old, but which gradually dis-



placed it. Ironically, it was the colonialists' programme of intimidation, outlined above, which accelerated this process. If their intention had been to force the population to flee or to go to the protected villages, the fact is that the challenge so presented led the people and the organisation to restructure the whole of their lives on a new basis.

If, as we have seen, the first measures of necessity concerned the very survival of the population, soon other forms of social life also took shape.

Following on the organisation of the peoples militias, we set up exchange centres where the people could bring their agricultural produce and exchange it for manufactured goods imported from the exterior, like clothes, agricultural tools, matches, soap, etc. Commerce with the exterior was not possible without large agricultural surpluses. Moreover, war conditions such as the intensification of air bombings, and the need to introduce new crops, imposed the necessity for reorganising production. Thus, side by side with the traditional methods of agriculture, we established collective fields, where new production techniques could be introduced and the protection of the peasants could be better assured.

In 1965, in Niassa Province we found on a Portuguese officer killed during the fighting, written orders which indicated that the only objective of the operation under his command was the destruction of the people's crops. This scorched earth policy became systematic. A Portuguese deserter confirmed that the colonial army had generalised the classification of «death zones» to all areas no longer under their control. However, the accent given to the development of production work over-



The President of FRELIMO with Portuguese prisoners and deserters in liberated Mozambique.

came these terrorist methods and from 1966 the people were able to produce more food for themselves. At the same time, production work took on an important political role: the collective work of the people from different regions and tribes reinforced unity. For the cadres and militants of FRELIMO, production became a means of strengthening liaison with the masses. As Comrade Samora Machel, President of FRELIMO said «Production is a school because it is one of the sources of our knowledge, and it is through production that we correct our mistakes. It is by going to the people, that we both learn and teach the people.»

'They wanted me to kill my brothers'

I was born in Montepuez, Cabo Delgado. I attended the St. Maria de Namune mission school for three years. I went to Nampula in 1966 looking for a job. In 1968 I was conscripted into the Portuguese army. After 6 months training in Nampula, I was sent to Marrupa, in Eastern Niassa. I was there for about 6 months, until I got wounded. I was in a «Berliet» lorry, carrying combat rations to the Marrupa post. We were 10 altogether, 7 Africans and 3 white soldiers. The lorry hit a mine and was blown up. Four African soldiers and 2 whites were killed. The other white man and myself were seriously wounded. We were taken to Vila Cabral. They could not treat me there - I had many pieces of shrapnel in my body and the hospital had very deficient equipment. I was sent to the Nampula hospital. I stayed in the hospital for about a year. In June 1971, I left hospital and was sent to Tete, to the Manje post. In December of the same year (1971), I ran away from the post and came to join FRELIMO.

many killed

The situation in the Portuguese army is very bad because of FRELIMO. For example, at the Manje post du-



ring the 5 months I was there, 7 «Berliet» lorries, one Unimog and one jeep were destroyed. When I ran away, there remained only 2 «Berliets», 3 Unimogs and 1 land-rover. And each vehicle destroyed meant many killed and wounded. In the case of the jeep, for example, one sub-lieutenant, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals and one private who was driving were killed. All were whites except the driver. The jeep was blown up by a mine on its way from the post to a shop. When the news of the deaths reached the post, it caused total demoralisation. The post commander - Captain Serafim - telephoned Tete and talked with the District Commander - a colonel. The captain asked for his company to be moved to another place, as they were all dying there. The colonel refused - he just said: «you have to hold on». Next day, during parade, one Portuguese soldier accused the captain, saying: «This is your

war, you, (meaning the officers) send us to the bush but you do not go there. Why don't you give up this dirty war and let us go back to our country?»

The captain ordered his arrest, but the soldier took up his gun and aimed it at the captain. The latter wanted to call other soldiers to arrest him, but some of them, who were also on parade, also took their guns and aimed at the captain. The captain did not insist; he went to his house. A few days later he went away by plane. We never saw him again; we heard he had returned to Portugal.

Most of the African soldiers are only waiting for an opportunity to run away. We follow the activities of FRELIMO through the radio. The Portuguese try to mobilise us by saying that we are fighting against Chinese who want to occupy our land because they are many and don't have a place to live. Or then they use tribalism - for example in Montepuez, in my region, which is inhabited by people of the Macua tribe, they say that the war is being fought by the Makondes, who want to oppress and dominate the Macuas. They have several times killed the people of one village and called the people of the neighbouring

villages to go and see. They tell them that this was done by the FRELIMO Makondes. These «mobilisation» sessions took place at the post every time there was a FRELIMO operation in the area.

'pamphlet at my door'

I ran away on the day when I went to visit my wife. On leaving the house in the morning, I found a FRELIMO pamphlet saying «Mozambican soldiers in the Portuguese army, you are suffering for nothing. . . you are our brothers, equally oppressed, we must all join in the same cause. . . FRELIMO is fighting to win back freedom and independence from the Portuguese colonialists who enslave our people. . .» I hid the pamphlet and went around the villages asking where the FRELIMO were. Nobody told me anything; everyone looked at me suspiciously. But I knew where the region controlled by FRELIMO was. So I went into the bush. On my way I was arrested by members of the population, who took me to the FRELIMO base. I explained who I was, and what I had done. I was heartily welcomed by my brothers.

I am now in the FRELIMO army, fighting for the liberation of my people.



That is why production became an important element in the life of our militants and it is part of our theoretical and practical school programmes. The military units also have the task of producing when conditions enable them to do so. With the exception of the advanced zones where the enemy is still strong, all military units produce their own food. We also established the basis for internal trade; under the protection of the fighters, the population of the coast zones produced salt which they exchanged for agricultural products.

crucial choice

It was in this field that the first decisive choices had to be made. With the improved living conditions and the coming into being of forms of economic development, there arose a tendency among certain elements to try to restore economic practices of a capitalist type — based on the colonial model — for their own personal benefit. This was particularly apparent in the organising of trade.

At the same time, a similar attitude which was merely another facet of the same mentality, appeared in the chairmen who, as we have already seen, had assumed the responsibility of organising and guiding the people. Whether through lack of political awareness or out of ambition, in their relations with the people these chairmen started to copy the practices of the traditional chiefs or, much worse, of the Portuguese administrators who had been driven out. Although in some cases such imitation was due to their ignorance of any form of organisation other than the colonial one, for others it was well and truly a question of putting into effect a concept of the liberation struggle which meant merely replacing whites by blacks, an approach with which the name of Lazaro Kavan-dame is closely associated.

The decision on the position to be taken in these two respects constituted both the background and the most outstanding aspect of the crisis which took place in 1968-69.

Owing to the popular character of the war, there could be only one outcome to this confrontation; that which safeguarded the interests of the masses and opposed the resurgence of exploitation in our areas. The popular and revolutionary content of our movement and our political line were thereby safeguarded, ensuring the continued support of the masses and the pursuit of the armed struggle. The fact that any other position

PRODUCTION AND TRADE

«Twenty-two kilos of sesame, fifty-three boxes of cashew nuts. Here's the voucher for Mzee Saidi. You can go over there now for whatever you want to buy».

At the textile hut, voucher in hand, Mzee Saidi was able to choose between about thirty different kinds of goods, including six different types of cloth and wraps, underwear, cooking pots, machets, axes and hoes, knives, salt, matches, paraffin soap, needles and thread. He could also place an order for any of thirty-five other goods, to be picked up on his next trip, which are on a list which includes such varied articles as scissors, lamps, batteries, fish nets, razor blades and note books.

The houses used as shops are simple huts thatched with palm leaves. Perhaps on his return six months later Mzee Saidi would not have found these huts at all, but just goods displayed on planks fixed to trees. However, Old Saidi knew that he would not be cheated on weight or measure, as in colonial times. He was in a FRELIMO shop.

This everyday picture shows how the Portuguese trading system has been replaced by institutions set up by FRELIMO to solve the problem of providing manufactured articles. This is only a temporary

measure as far as certain goods are concerned, because the development of handicrafts will make it possible to solve certain problems internally. Indeed, in Cabo Delgado Province, fewer and fewer axes and hoes are being sold because the old blacksmiths, freed from the constraints of forced cotton cultivation or forced labour, have resumed their iron-working with fragments of shot-down planes and helicopters and destroyed vehicles. Agricultural implements are being made, weapons are being repaired and certain traditional weapons such as the «canhangulos» (wait-a-bits) charged with gunpowder, are also being made.

cash crops

Furthermore, not all the articles sold in the shops are imported. Salt and fish, for example, are produced by people living by the coast and lakes who are specialised in salt mining and fishing.

However, the vast majority of the goods on sale in the co-operatives are obtained by trading our exports, which include a relatively broad range of products. Among the principal exports are cashew-nuts sesame and groundnuts and also wax and tobacco. Groundnut exports are decreasing, since more and more are



being used either in food or else for oil extraction, so as to concentrate on exporting those products which have the highest commercial value.

The following table gives a picture of the changing pattern of exports of principal products from Cabo Delgado:

	1969	1970	1971
Groundnuts (Kgs.)	53,041	77,589	55,082
Sesame	414,782	288,230	526,163
Cashewnuts	530,159	608,734	648,099

Trading takes place in the FRELIMO shops and we plan to extend the network of shops to all the liberated regions as we solve the major problem of transport. The monthly record of goods received at trading post C. gives an idea of the turnover of goods:

Number of persons	3,405
Goods received	Kilos
Sesame	19,968
Groundnuts	2,964
Cashewnuts, 1st quality	41,824
Cashewnuts, 2nd quality	8,421
Castor seeds	4,119
Wax	15
Tobacco	1,253

Increased exports are due both to the expansion of the liberated areas and to improved agricultural techniques. This is the work of the Political Commissars aided by the cadres in the Department, who include economists and agronomists. New crops have also been introduced. Cassava

was introduced in Tete for the first time in 1970.

As for the forms of organisation, there are three:

- FRELIMO farms, or national fields, organised by the Liberation Army, the Village Committees, the Women's Detachment, schools, hospitals and other FRELIMO bodies in order to solve the problem of feeding the militants. In some of these fields all the workers are volunteers from the local population. Part of the produce is sent to the advanced regions where the fighters are not yet in a position to grow crops.

- Co-operatives where the peasants are organised on a co-operative or mutual aid basis, under the aegis of the Political Commissariat. This is the method encouraged, since collective work

makes for greater security against enemy incursions and also more rapid technical advance.

- Individual plots on which the cultivator works alone or with his family.

Handicraft is organised along similar lines, with craftsmen's co-operatives which also serve as apprenticeship centres. This is the case for blacksmiths, potters and sculptors. The sculptors are organised in co-operatives which operate in relation either to the military bases for sculptors who are members of the Liberation Army or to the Village committees. Both these forms of organisation and the new social framework out of which they have grown are reflected in the content of artistic work which, together with traditional subjects, now depicts the new themes inspired by the revolutionary war.



would have served the interests of the enemy was more than demonstrated when Kavandame, having failed to achieve his purposes, went over to the Portuguese.

However, the social reconstruction of the liberated regions was not limited to the organisation of the vital needs: equally important was organisation of education, one of the key-points of our programme. Soon after the launching of the armed struggle a group of old men went to President Mondlane and spoke in these terms: «We know that the war will be a long war and we are already old. We don't ask anything for ourselves, but it is necessary that our children go to school. We are ready for all sacrifices, this is the only thing we ask from FRELIMO.»


starting from scratch

The setting up of an education programme entailed immense difficulties. The few schools which existed in our country were run by missionaries whom the Portu-

guese evacuated from the war zones at the beginning of the struggle in order to turn the buildings into barracks. We had practically no teachers, we had to access to those who knew only how to

read and write in order to start our courses. It was only slowly, through a system of seminars, that we succeeded in developing and raising the standard of new teachers.

The need for an educational programme was felt even in the military field. In fact, at a certain stage of the development effort, the administration of the commercial centres, all the many and varied tasks of national reconstruction could not be implemented without the spread of a certain level of knowledge. Thus, simultaneously with the literacy courses in the army, we organised accelerated courses of 6 months, one year and two years in order to enable the more capable militants to finish primary education and take on bigger responsibilities. Afterwards, people were selected to go to our secondary school on the basis of the level of political consciousness which they had demonstrated, on their dedication to the revolution and on their intellectual capacity. This system of selection proved



Principal exports, comparative figures (1969 - 1971)

highly successful; it reduced dramatically the number of failures as compared with those students who had attended more conventional schools.

The contents of the curriculum also demanded deep reflection and further elaboration. It was obvious that we had to eliminate subjects with a clear colonialist colour. (The history of Portugal for example). But the development of the educational work also showed that we could not organise our system by a mere touching-up of an essentially Portuguese system. Our general line had to be conditioned by more fundamental questions: what is the objective of our education? In what way does it distinguish itself from the two other forms of education prevailing in our society, i.e. traditional and colonial education?

Again the answer to these two questions had to come from the general development of the struggle and from the political growth of the organisation. It was the need for a new life and a more precise definition of our objectives in the liberated zones which gave to our education programme, its form and content. Our education, as our President said in the message he addressed to the Second National Conference of the Department of Education and Culture in August, 1970, «must give us a Mozambican personality

We have achieved important successes in Eastern Niassa in the field of Education. Recently we opened 2 more schools, one in Marrupa and another in Lugenda. In the pilot school we have 166 pupils. Last year (1971) there were about 100, out of which 88 took examinations, 29 pupils passed into the 2nd class; 20 passed into the 3rd class and 10 to the 4th class. 29 failed their examinations. We still do not have teachers for the 4th class in Eastern Niassa. We therefore sent 6 of the 10 students who finished 3rd class to Turduru Camp, to continue the 4th class. We selected the best students. The other 4 were given some training in pedagogy and were placed as teachers of the 1st class. Each one opened a new school. While they teach they can continue studying, and later on they will attend the 4th class.

The teachers have a very heavy work — they are also responsible for the cultural programmes, participate in military action in emergency situations, are agents for health propaganda among the people (at this very moment there is a health education course for teachers going on), organise production activities in the school, etc. Besides the pilot centre, we have 11 more schools in Eastern Niassa.

which assumes our reality and assimilates critically and without servility the ideas and experiences of other people of the world at the same time transmitting to them the fruit of our reflection and practice».

It is necessary in turn to identify precisely the content both of traditional and colonial education in order to fight against their effects in our mentality and in our social life.

In traditional society, given the low level of knowledge which characterises it, superstition takes the place of science and blocks any scientific analysis of the physical and social milieu in favour of the supernatural. Through one of its mechanisms for survival, traditional education aims at creating in the new generations passivity and respect towards acquired ideas; it encourages the belief in the infallible wisdom of the older generations personified in the elders. With regard to women, tradition tries to justify historically women's submission to men.

mental scars

Colonial education is concerned with teaching only to the extent that it facilitates further exploitation. It aims at reinforcing division within the colonised society by separating those who are educated and those who are not. Among the former it encourages a feeling of shame and later a despising of their culture and traditions. The marks left by this type of education is an even greater obstacle in the establishment of the new types of relations we want to create among people. Moreover, even when the struggle against the policy of assimilation does become clear on the plane of principle, it retains many more subtle effects and manifestations. For one may strongly reject the idea of becoming «a black Portuguese», but it is nonetheless certain this idea will continue to breed inferiority complex among many Mozambicans. The conviction that our traditional culture has no value has been for a long time deeply imbedded in the minds of many of our people. For these reasons it has been necessary to launch an intensive and self-conscious combat against such a mentality. It was with this aim in mind that the Department of Education and Culture organises cultural seminars where an inventory is made of the cultural wealth of our people.

Today a new culture is being developed based on traditional forms with a new content dictated by our new reality. This reality is constituted first of all by the



liberation struggle itself, but also, by the common effort of Mozambicans originating from different places and tribes who are united in the struggle for the construction of a new Mozambique. From this point of view, culture plays an important role in the reinforcement of national unity. The dances which are performed today in the liberated regions are no longer dances of Cabo Delgado, or Tete or Niassa. The militants from other regions there bring their way of living, their dances, their songs, and from this a new culture, national in its form and revolutionary in content, is born.

"destined leaders"

Revolutionary education must aim at destroying the corrupt ideas and habits inherited from the past; develop the scientific spirit in order to eliminate superstition; promote the emergence of a national culture; liquidate individualism and elitism.

These are not abstract problems: a hard struggle had to be waged inside the organisation against those tendencies when a superiority complex which was the result of an elitist mentality developed in our secondary school. Imbued with the ideas acquired in the colonialist society that those who had education were destined to be leaders, some pupils of the secondary school, contemptuous of the masses, refused to participate in the war which they considered as a non-intellectual activity, they preferred to sit back and wait for victory in comfort.

The problem which is posed today is whether the progress of our country is the task of a few or whether it must be the result of the effort of the whole people. The answer which springs from the practice of our liberation struggle is obviously the latter. Without the active and responsible participation of the masses what could the few dozen FRELIMO militants have done? Our choice leads us also to reject formal academic education as the only legitimate kind of learning and to emphasize instead broader and more permanent forms of education. This shift in emphasis is also necessary if we are to undertake the general education activity which is implicit in our political programme.

It is obvious that such cultural conceptions bring potential political contradictions to the fore, both domestically and on the international plane. For the «enlightened» minority which would lead our country would be the best guarantee of the maintenance of exploitation and

Social assistance for war victims

«One of the first problems we tried to solve in the field of social assistance, was the case of children whose parents had died in the war, or whose parents had no conditions to take care of them. It is a serious problem, because if they are given to their uncles or other relatives, the children will be used as cheap manual labour. It was thus traditionally, before the war in this region of Eastern Niassa.

In 1970 we registered all orphans and old people who had nobody to look after them. We gathered all the children in a place with some women to take care of them. But we had no experience — we limited ourselves to giving them food.

When comrade Josina Machel was appointed Head of the Section of Social Affairs, she came to our Province and we studied together the situation. She gave us a very precise orientation — and it was on the basis of those directives that we founded the children's centre which is called today «Josina Machel Infanterior».

We started with 8 children. At the beginning we had problems — the population could not understand the importance of the Centre. But gradually they understood. The first children were 3 — 10

years old. As they were already of school age, we sent them to the pilot school, where they became boarders. At the Centre we now receive only small children. When they are 7 years old, they are transferred to the pilot school. The main problem is food, specially baby's milk. Here we are much dependent on external aid.

The disabled and sick people without a family also get special attention from FRELIMO. It is the District Committee or the Local Committee that looks after them. If they have a shamba, the Committee ensures that it is conveniently treated. They receive all they need — food, clothing and necessities such as salt, soap, matches, etc.

Our aim regarding the military people who are mutilated but not completely disabled is to rehabilitate them socially. But we are still not in a condition to have rehabilitation centres. Therefore, we take them to the most secure zones and place them in schools, hospitals or artisan centres. While they help in the general work, they learn how to read and write and acquire some notions of nursing or any artisan skill.

the preservation of foreign interests in Mozambique. It is therefore not surprising that, as with other fighting organisations, Mozambican students in the western countries are subjected to all the reactionary pressures and influences which promote elitist sentiments. This remains for us a continuing problem.

One method which we have adopted in order to discourage the development of such elitist ideas is the encouragement of a liaison between the student and the masses. Thus, one of the most important innovations in our school syllabus has been the introducing of productive activities. Moreover, this has a second benefit beyond the crucial socio-political aspect which we have been underlining; it also ensures that primary education is at least partly operational, i.e. that it brings some benefits to the students and to their families by including the teaching of such artisan skills as carpentry, mechanics, tailoring, etc.

The education programme faces other difficulties as well, among them the resistance on the part of parents to sending their daughters to school. Parents tend



to consider their daughters in terms of the wealth they will gain from dowries at the time that the girls marry. The risk that the girl's chance for a profitable marriage will be spoiled by her going to school makes many parents refuse to send their daughters there. And initiation rites have a similarly negative role. In many regions, after the initiation rites, the girls must stay at home awaiting marriage, a practice which means the definitive cessation of their education. The Political Commissariat and the Women's Detachment are involved in the work of mobilising people and explaining the advantage of education in order to change this negative attitude of the parents towards their daughters.



The health programme which has been developed began with the first medical units attached to the guerrillas. That unit's main task was to treat the wounded fighters. But it soon became apparent that the most serious health problems were among the population. In large areas of Mozambique, the people had never even seen a nurse, let alone a doctor. Medical personnel were always concentrated in areas with a high density of Europeans.

The enemy air bombings which caused casualties amongst the people considerably aggravated this situation, and forced our health units to concentrate their efforts on the population. It was immediately evident that their numbers were much too small for this task, and we had to organise rapid courses to train first-aid personnel. Only later were we able to organise courses for medical assistants. Once again, in elaborating our program-

THE HEALTH SERVICES

The old lady who came with her daughter-in-law for treatment at the N. . . . First Aid Post had been hit the previous day by projectiles fired from a Portuguese helicopter, and it was only due to the immediate arrival on the scene of militiamen that she had come out of it with two minor injuries. Her old husband had fared rather worse with a broken leg, and was being transferred to the Central Provincial Hospital. Close by the two women, a fighter had just had a slight battle wound treated.

Despite their misfortune, they were still lucky to happen on a good period, since the post had medicines in stock. Indeed, despite the distinct progress made regarding supplies, the medicines and health equipment available are very scant for tackling the serious situation inherited from colonialism, which has been further aggravated by the repression.

Added to the diseases most prevalent in the areas which are today liberated — beriberi, malnutrition, anaemia, parasitic diseases, conjunctivitis, scabies, ringworm, trachoma, dental caries, malaria, yaws, tuberculosis, leprosy, sleeping sickness, smallpox, hydrocele, rheumatism, measles, goiter, bilharziosis — there are now war wounds and their after-effects, tetanus, etc. These are a result of battles or, much more often, of enemy bombing and strafing directed against the people.

The FRELIMO Health Services are facing up to this situation with both preventive and curative programmes. The former includes a permanent health education campaign which is carried out throughout the liberated regions with the active participation not only of the Health Services, but of all FRELIMO bodies — military bases, village committees, schools, etc. During the holidays school-children accompanied by teachers go into the villages armed with health education handbooks to tell the people the essential precepts of preventing the infectious diseases most common under tropical conditions. In addition, patients who are hospitalised are given training which enables them to become active health education agents in their villages on their return home.

The Health Services also organise mass vaccination campaigns for the militants and the people, especially those freed from enemy «aldeamentos» (strategic

hamlets), where health conditions are more than precarious and epidemics abound. Besides large-scale smallpox vaccination which has already been given to hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of the liberated areas, smaller vaccination campaigns have also been organised against tetanus, measles, poliomyelitis, tuberculosis, typhus and cholera. The greatest difficulty in this respect is the lack of equipment for this type of campaign, like vaccinators and refrigerators.

Still in connection with preventive medicine, patients suffering from such contagious diseases as leprosy are isolated and two quarantine stations have been established for them in Niassa Province.

It has proved possible to reduce the very high infant mortality rate to some extent by eliminating two of its major causes: umbilical tetanus and post-natal malaria. Other causes, such as the lack of proper foods, can be eliminated only in the long run by improving the diet of newborn babies and advancing the work of the child care centres.

the network

Curative medicine is provided at the health centres set up throughout the liberated areas. The first Provincial Hospital was established in Cabo Delgado Province in 1968, soon to be followed by the establishment that same year of other mobile regional hospitals in the western and eastern regions of Niassa Province. The Regional Hospital in the southern region of that province was later established. After the struggle was launched in Tete Province, a Provincial Central Hospital was established in that province.

These hospitals, which are the main health centres, completed the network of medium-sized and smaller health posts already created. These are the stationary or mobile District Medical Posts (PMD) and First Aid Posts (PPS). The establishment of such posts depends on the population density. For instance, in the eastern and western regions of Niassa Province there is in each region:

- 1 Regional Central Hospital (HCR)
- 7 District Medical Posts (PMD)
- 9 First Aid Posts (PPS)
- 1 quarantine station

whereas in Cabo Delgado Province, with

its very much greater population density, we have:

- 1 Provincial Central Hospital (HCP)
- 17 District Medical Posts (PMD)
- 60 First Aid Posts (PPS)

The medical and para-medical staff in that province (Cabo Delgado) alone, ranges between 325 and 340 persons. If we recall that in 1968 the total number of health workers in all the provinces was less than 400, we will get an idea of the progress that has been made.



Statistics on patient attendance during the last quarter of 1971 give a picture of a hospital's activity:

Men	1,879
Women	2,284
Total	4,163
Cured	1,008
Condition improved	1,800
Condition unchanged	83
Deceased	5
Transferred to another Hospital	3
Continued the treatment	1,050
Tooth extraction or minor surgery	214
Intramuscular injections	4,350
Intravenous injections	3,382

At the M. . . . District Medical Post a total of 583 patients attended during that same period.

In more serious cases our Health Services used to avail themselves of the cooperation of hospitals in friendly countries to which the wounded and seriously ill were evacuated. However, with the progress of the war and the expansion of the liberated areas, our Health Services started to feel the need for a FRELIMO hospital abroad, which could also serve as a training centre.

On 16 June, 1970, ten years to the day after the Mueda massacre in which six hundred Mozambicans were slaughtered

in cold blood by the Portuguese, the President of FRELIMO opened the Américo Boavida Hospital, named after the first Angolan doctor to fall on the field of honour. With a staff of 37 persons including two doctors, one of whom is a surgeon, the Américo Boavida Hospital permanently cares for dozens of patients with its infirmaries, laboratory, pharmacy, operating block and outside consultations.

The progress of the Health Services, however, is being held up by the shortage of material and of qualified staff. In order to alleviate the latter shortage, we have sent students to study medicine in various countries and organised our own nursing courses, which train an average of two batches of 20 pupils each year, as well as rural medical aids and first-aid assistants.

mes we adapted the teaching to meet our present requirements.

There were additional health difficulties created by the transfer of people into new villages in the bush for security reasons, at the time of vicious enemy incursions. And to further complicate matters, a smallpox epidemic broke out in 1965 which could only be controlled by a massive inoculation campaign. However, in its first phase alone, the campaign witnessed the vaccination of more than 100,000 people. This success based on the high political level of the masses and the solidity of our structures, far exceeding any similar project that the Portuguese had undertaken!

In spite of all the difficulties, we were thus able to establish a stable network of facilities inside the country, starting with the health posts at district level and later with central hospitals at provincial or regional level. At the same time we developed mobile and semi-mobile health units to reach a wider number of people.

An important part of our health system is that the sick people are not passive when they are in hospital. If his physical condition and course of treatment permits, the patient is engaged in productive work, or follow a course in hygiene which enables him to become an agent of hygiene propaganda when he returns to his locality. By integrating the patient in the process of reconstruction, we eliminate at the same time, the negative and depressing effect of passivity which is the traditional attitude of the patient.

science and superstition

We had to face many other difficulties as well, namely the strength of traditional medicine which in some regions was the only one being practised. The fight against anti-hygienic and anti-scientific practises was made difficult by the resistance offered by the witchdoctors who saw their monopoly threatened. Much explanation and concrete work was necessary to demonstrate the advantage of the scientific medicine which was being brought by FRELIMO. This is an important moment in the confrontation between science and superstition.

Thus, the work of national reconstruction represents originally an answer to concrete needs and situations. But the political implications of the whole process go far beyond.

For, first of all it enables us to give a concrete content to the political programme formulated by the first Congress.

Health in eastern niassa



The Health Services started in Eastern Niassa in 1965, with only 2 centres due to lack of cadres and medicines. Only in 1967, were we able to increase the number of posts and create a real structure. The structure comprises today one Central Hospital, 7 District Medical Posts and 9 First-aid posts. The District Medical Posts are in direct liaison and depend on the Central Hospital. The First-aid Posts come directly under the P.M.D. The general co-ordination is done by the Central Hospital.

As for Health Officials in the Province, there is a Regional Chief and his deputy, who, together with the secretary and the Chief Medical Assistant, constitute the Permanent Health Committee. The Committee studies the medical cases of the region, the disciplinary problems of the health personnel, and orientates the programme of the Health Services in the Province. In each medical centre there are an average of 2 medical assistants

except in the Central Hospital where there are 6.

Nearby the hospital there is a military base, with soldiers who patrol the region, defend the patients and evacuate them in case of enemy incursion. Soldiers and medical personnel work side by side in almost all the programmes – including patrolling and production. On the other hand, everybody is subject to the discipline established by the military base.

The daily programme at the hospital, under normal conditions, is as follows:

Waking up at 4.00 a.m.
Cleaning up to 5.00. From 5 – 6 physical exercises. At six we disperse, according to our tasks. The medical assistants and nurses go and treat the hospitalised people, sterilise the syringes and prepare all the material. The people coming for consultation and treatment start arriving at 7 a.m. In the afternoon it is time for work in the fields. At night we have political or

medical classes, talks on hygiene, and literacy classes for the internees who want and can attend them, and for the soldiers at the base. The medical assistants who arrive from the exterior must undergo three months of practical work in the Central Hospital for us to know their political and technical level: afterwards they are placed in different posts according to their qualifications.

In each hospital there is an on-duty officer who supervises the work of the Hospital and is on call for 24 hours. There is also a Chief of Supplies and one comrade responsible for cooking. The first is responsible for the distribution of food to the Hospital and base. He works in collaboration with the medical assistants on the question of diets.

rooted in the people

Our Central Hospital has already been in the same zone for three and a half years. This means that it is deeply rooted in the life of the people. Besides the out-patients, numbering about 20 – 30 persons a day, we have about 30 beds for in-patients. These are divided into several categories:

- 1) Those who come from very far, sent by the First-aid posts because they cannot be treated there.
- 2) The very serious cases.
- 3) Those who have to follow a certain course of treatment – like tablets or injections several times a day at fixed hours, or special diets.

The 30 beds are insufficient and we are working to increase their number.

One important point is that the people of this region had never known a hospital or

experienced any kind of medical – scientific treatment during the colonial time. The nearest hospital was 5 days away. This has resulted in the problem of our having to fight the tendency of the population to go to the witch-doctors rather than consult the Hospital. In this respect, the comrades of the Women's Detachment have played a very important role, convincing the people to come to the Hospital. The women also participate in the campaign of health education launched by the Health Services in the Province.

many diseases

The most frequent diseases in the Province are bad nutrition, bronchitis and skin diseases. There is also leprosy in this province. In 1969 we started to tackle this problem. We identified and registered all the cases of leprosy. In 1971 we created a leprosarium – a place where the lepers live and receive medical care. We are faced with a social problem: the families do not want to live apart from them. But while the results of the treatment are apparent, the situation becomes better – now the lepers themselves ask for treatment and insist on going to the leprosarium.

Even more serious is sleeping sickness. It is very difficult to diagnose and its external symptoms appear only in the advanced phase. We are studying the problem.

From November 1971 to January 1972, we identified 112 cases of Bilharzia – in the zone of the Central Hospital alone. But we know that the number of people affected by this illness is much higher. The fight against it is linked with the health education and hygiene campaign we have launched.

FOREIGN POLICY

At the same time, the liberated regions reinforce unity and homogeneity. At the beginning of the struggle, when elements from other regions came to participate in the struggle, they were considered as strangers — even if as strangers who came to help. Yet in the process of the struggle and in the contact among the people which it demanded, the population started to feel that there were no foreigners, but that we were united in a common struggle.

However, the situation became absolutely clear only in the process of concrete national reconstruction. It was not a question of being united to destroy. We were united in the construction of our country, even when participating in the development of a region which was not originally our home.

It is not surprising then, that today the people have come almost to take this unity for granted; now no one asks that the leaders be from their own region: the only criterion is that such leaders be seen to have the interests of the people at heart.

Such achievements have also enabled us to present, through the practice of FRELIMO militants and the activities of the masses, a progressive model of society. At the same time, the possibility to openly organise, to freely circulate, to exchange experiences, enabled a more homogeneous development of the organisation and of our country, further weakening the danger of unequal development of the regions or of different sectors of activity.

strength and cohesion

Moreover, at a level of the liberation army, the liberated regions enabled us to considerably enhance the strength of our organisation and to reinforce cohesion and internal discipline, thus preventing military units from becoming mere roaming bands. And the liaison with the masses was being reinforced through reciprocal solidarity.

This progress is obviously important for a number of reasons. Such liberated regions serve, for example, as an attractive and convincing alternative to the people in regions still controlled by the enemy and are a source of encouragement to them. But above all, the basic point remains: the liberated zones are playing a vital role in the clarification of our political line and thus the shaping of the Revolution in Mozambique.

If you ask a FRELIMO representative abroad what most struck him in the course of his work, he will no doubt tell you that it was the widespread ignorance among the general public of the nature, and even of the existence, of the colonial situation in Mozambique.

Breaking the curtain of silence intentionally thrown around Portuguese colonial rule, exploding the myth of overseas provinces juridically as part of Portugal, a mystification which Portugal had little difficulty in selling to the world community until the beginning of the sixties, and establishing friendly relations of solidarity with the anti-colonialist countries and forces in the world — these were the objectives FRELIMO set itself at the international level, since they affected the immediate implementation of its programmes.

Portuguese action in the fifties was based on a mixture of propaganda on the unique brand of multi-racialism they claimed to be practising and a policy of deliberate silence aimed at not attracting too much attention. This explains why the 1951 constitutional reform in which the colonies were renamed overseas provinces, so as to prepare the way for Portugal's entry into the UN, took place without arousing much comment. There not being much curiosity at that time, few foreign observers penetrated the curtain of silence, apart from journalists in the service of colonial propaganda, like those entrusted with theorising on «Luso-tropicalism».

FRELIMO's information work, therefore started from scratch. It had to make known the existence of the country, its geographical position and the predominant features of colonial exploitation. Even today some of our publications carry basic facts on our country which are still little known. This work was indispensable, since one cannot show solidarity for what one does not know.

During this period such international platforms as the UN through its Committee on Decolonisation, and various international meetings like the conferences of mass people's organisations, offered a valuable forum for informing the world. At the same time, publications addressed to world opinion were brought out in foreign languages. The regular publication of Mozambique Revo-

lution, organ of FRELIMO, aimed at making our country and our struggle known, dates back to that period.

The most resounding blow to colonial silence was, however, the launching of the armed struggle for liberation in the three colonies. World opinion was deeply affected by the horrors of the ensuing repression and the spotlight thrown on retrograde colonialism.

However, the prime objective was essentially that of launching an armed revolutionary process which would lead to the complete liberation of the country. Owing to the concrete conditions of Portuguese colonialism and the experience of repression, the predominant if not unanimous conviction within our organisation was that action at the international level should play a subordinate role and that while it was of course important, it should always be secondary in our struggle.

These, therefore, were the content and limits of our work abroad: denouncing colonialism and developing relations with countries and peoples who supported our struggle, in order to create the conditions for launching and developing the armed struggle.

Such relations were important, since it was thanks to this solidarity that we were able to train the first fighters and obtain the first arms.

the main support

In this first phase, the support of two forces was decisive as regards external aid: the African countries and the socialist countries. The creation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 and the inclusion in its programme of the liberation of Africa as a priority objective constituted a powerful lever for international protest action.

African countries have given substantial help since the start of our struggle, materially but especially logistically. The OAU has always recognised FRELIMO as the only representative of the fighting Mozambican people and fruitful relations of co-operation were established with the OAU Liberation Committee. However, it is to be hoped that new organic forms of co-operation will be found within the Organisation of African Unity, reflecting

the fact that the struggle we are waging is a common struggle.

We look upon the socialist countries as our natural allies. Because of their political line, their experience of struggle and their principled anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist stand, they as a whole have given us considerable political and material support, without which our struggle would not have reached its present stage. Developing these relations is, for us, one of the cardinal points in our external relations, within the framework of strengthening the ties between all the anti-imperialist forces.

With the launching of the struggle and the changed conditions, it was essential to further mobilise friendly countries, so that their help should develop along with the development of the war. From this point of view, the successes achieved on the battlefield were a measure of the seriousness of our organisation and the determination of the fighters.

nato — a major obstacle

At the same time, one conclusion had to be drawn. Portugal was not in a position to pursue a war on three fronts relying only on its own resources. Aid from western countries, either bilateral or through NATO, became one of the mainstays of the prosecution of the colonial war. As the situation developed, this aid was to become one of the major obstacles standing in the way of our country's liberation.

Moreover, with a view to strengthening these bonds and more closely involving its imperialist allies in the colonial war, Portugal had made some changes in its colonial economic policy. Large territorial concessions and taxation facilities were granted to foreign companies. The flow of investments that followed drew western countries into closer association with Portuguese colonialism.

Denouncing this multiform western capitalist aid to Portugal therefore became an urgent task at the international level.

This was to a large extent the work of the Support Committees set up in most of the western countries, made up of progressive militants, trade unionists, political parties and young people of all creeds who were deeply disturbed by the role of their country was playing in perpetuating colonialism. Remarkable results were achieved in some cases, as in the campaign against Swedish participation in the Cahora Bassa scheme, for example.

Even where collusion between economic enterprises and the armaments factories and bourgeois governments partially frustrated these campaigns, public opinion was nevertheless informed of the kind of interests at stake and of the support that their governments, under the influence of private economic interests, were giving to a colonial government. Furthermore, these campaigns made it possible to launch programmes to inform people about our country and our struggle and created the foundations for militant friendship and fighting identification between our people and the progressive masses in capitalist countries in the struggle against the common enemy: imperialism.

At the same time, in certain countries a public which had been thus mobilised made governments with traditional ties with Portugal dissociate themselves from its colonial policy and give a certain amount of material support to the liberation struggle, as was the case with the Scandinavian countries and Holland. Among the new forces which have associated themselves with the fight against Portuguese colonialism, mention should be made of the World Council of Churches, which has given moral support and granted financial aid to the liberation movements.

people's solidarity

But perhaps the most significant aspect of this solidarity — in any case that which moves us more and has more far-reaching political effects for our struggle — has been the development of forms of

popular aid through the establishment of direct relations between our people and the peoples of certain western countries. There has been the twinning of the Cabo Delgado Central Hospital in a liberated region of Mozambique and the Santa Maria Nuova Communal Hospital at Reggio Emilia in Italy, which significantly strengthened the ties between the masses of the people in both our countries. A similar initiative was taken with the establishment of a friendship pact between the commune of Bologna and FRELIMO's Education Centre at Tunduru.


Relations of correspondingly far-reaching political importance have also developed with the democratic anti-colonialist Portuguese forces. From the very outset we considered that our struggle was directed against Portuguese colonialism and not against the Portuguese people. It was therefore natural that relations of co-operation should be established with progressive Portuguese forces on the basis of full recognition of our right to immediate and complete independence. Apart from exchanging information, the first concrete forms of co-operation took place in connection with deserters from the colonial army who presented themselves on the battlefield and were evacuated in co-operation with the forces opposed to the war. These organisations also did important work in denouncing the colonial war which, despite the harsh conditions of police repression, proved effective. Indeed, tens of thousands of young men have emigrated abroad to escape conscription. This solidarity was decisively strengthened by the direct action of anti-colonialist Portuguese militants against the colonial war machinery, which started in October, 1970.

The very nature of our war makes it a part of the general struggle of the peoples for independence and freedom. Our full solidarity is therefore for all the fighting peoples, from Angola to Indochina and Latin America. The closest relations are without a doubt, those developed with the peoples of the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Guinea Bissau, with whom we are united by organic ties within the framework of the CONCP — Conference of Nationalist Organisation in the Portuguese colonies. Relations are also being strengthened with the peoples and fighting organisations of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, relations born of a common destiny but also as a consequence of the close co-operation which exists between the white powers in Southern Africa, which has already reached the stage of military co-operation and direct intervention.



Geografia

2ª classe



front cover of a geography book for second year primary schools written and published by frelimo

"We are mobilised to fight and win a protracted people's war. We are in a position increasingly to transform our growing political consciousness into a material force which will crush the enemy, no matter how powerful they may be. The unity achieved among us, the dividing line that has been drawn between us and the reactionary elements, the clarification of our political line and the purification that has taken place within our ranks, have given our organisation new vigour, strengthening the masses' confidence in FRELIMO and the leadership, making the people deeply aware of the objectives of the struggle".

SAMORA MACHEL. 25-9-1971

