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REMINDER

ON

THE ANGOLAN QUESTION

FOR

THE AUO CONFERENCE

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTERS



PRESENTED BY THE

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF ANGOLA

—≡ (MPLA) ≡—

Lagos, February, 21, 1964

A SETTING APART OF MPLA
WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE SUPREME INTERESTS
OF ANGOLA

1. M.P.L.A.: Principles. Methods of action.
Activities. Followers throughout Angola

MPLA was the first Angolan political organization to give to the Angolan people the watchword of "direct action" against Portuguese colonialism, at a press conference on December 6, 1960, at the House of Commons in London, sponsored by the Movement for Colonial Freedom.

MPLA launched the armed insurrection in Angola on February 4, 5 and 6, 1961.

Those two events, which mark the first irreversible rupture of Angolan nationalism with the Portuguese colonial regime, have confirmed the Angolan people's political maturity and placed, no doubt, MPLA at the head of Angola's revolutionary movement.

The fact that MPLA has been the first Angolan nationalist organization to develop an intense political activity among the masses inside the country is proved by its foundation within the country itself in 1956 and by being the political organization which was most hit in all its levels by the colonial repression. Most nationalist trained people who are in the colonialist prisons today belong to MPLA.

MPLA has about 70,000 enrolled members with cards and several other thousands who, because of underground conditions do not have their cards. Affiliation to MPLA itself has a national feature and vocation.

The Fifth article of MPLA Statutes, concerning affiliation, says,

" All Africans from Angola who approve MPLA Program and Statutes can become MPLA members by engaging themselves to execute MPLA policy through their daily activity."

Thousands of MPLA militants are fighting side by side with the people in all regions where the war is going on against Portuguese colonialism. Rather than a party, MPLA is a Movement. However, it cannot be defined as an ideological, class, regional or tribal movement. MPLA is a national movement called to represent the universality of the Angolan nation by its members's real composition. It has always been determined to be a

AIM OF THIS REMINDER

At each grave moment of the Angolan nationalism and according to one of the basic principles of its policy which advocates an African solution and nothing else than African for Angola, the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (M.P.L.A.) has always informed the African governments and brotherly countries on the development of the Angolan situation.

These informations have always reflected MPLA direct interest toward a coordination of efforts with the African countries as through detailed information, the African Leaders are fitter to examine the situation and take the fairest positions.

Recommendations from the Goodwill Mission of the Coordination Commission for the Liberation of Africa are a new and important matter in the development of the fight for Angola's liberation.

Thus, while expressing a firm reserve about the procedure and even the activity of the Goodwill Mission, the MPLA Steering Committee considers as its duty to bring to the African Leaders's knowledge the objective analysis of the new situation created, in order to assure the defence of the Angolan people's higher interests.

Then the aim of this reminder is

- I - To show the fact that any kind of attempt to set MPLA aside from the Angolan political scene is contrary to the higher interests of Angola and to the normal evolution of the national liberation movement - political and military movement that demands by itself a more and more solid unity of action of all the Angolan people without any discrimination according to one's tribe, religion, race or political affiliation.
- II - To inform the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) on negative incidents of the evolution of the Angolans's fight after the precipitated conclusions of the Goodwill Mission which led to the recommendations from the O.A.U. meeting of Ministers (Dakar). At this moment we request O.A.U. to guard against the dangerous consequences from such a step. They are dangerous both for Angola and for Africa.

a democratic movement by definition, its methods and goals. It is a movement that built its doctrine upon the foundation of experience of anticolonialist fight from all African peoples.

Its program sets, for a free and independent Angola of tomorrow, the need of assuring the most basic freedoms and rights defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Right of private property, cooperation of all Angolan social classes based on social justice, a state with a democratic structure and function, a government from national coalition which respects the principles of the United Nations Charter and carries on an independent foreign policy in the sense of African Unity.

MPLA could establish the concrete bases to overcome the difficulties which, since February 4, 1961, hinder the nationalist forces development.

In our case, negative aspects of the insurrection have the following features: a localized resistance, absence of a unique commandment, lack of fight in the political sense and division of the nationalist movement. It was then necessary to plan an action able to allow to change the conditions in which the Angolan masses were fighting and rise up the level of the political-military fighting. At the same time, it was necessary that the groups which, within Angola, bear the weight of the colonial army, maintain a consequent and positive military activity.

Thus, MPLA has speeded up the training of military people, brought in guerrilla techniques, political and military engagement of the people and reinforced the organization structures inside Angola.

Moreover, MPLA has achieved a true mobilization of its militants for the armed fight, established a military structure adapted to the conditions of the struggle development and it has carried on its organic reinforcement over the national territory.

Several regional chiefs affiliated themselves to our organization. Clandestine activity is increasing each day in the Angolan towns despite constant arrestations.

In more than 50 villages, thousands of members under MPLA flag, maintain active the resistance nucleus and using all kinds of weapons and ammunitions which, despite all difficulties, the Popular Liberation Army of Angola (EPLA) carries to them.

Their permanent activity helps to maintain most of the colonialist army at the Angolan Northwestern region.

EPLA has created an Operational Command which has guerrilla unities to train civilians. People from all national levels participate in these unities and MPLA has had them trained in Algeria, Morocco, thanks to our brethren's solidarity.

Since January, 1963, MPLA has another battlefield in the Cabinda enclave, at the Congo-Brazzaville border. Guerrilla activities in this region have already proved their military capacity through the battles they have fought against the Portuguese colonial army.

The statement according to which, "MPLA fighting forces are much inferior to UPA" has not any true foundation at all and it does not correspond to the objective reality of the situation of the fight in Angola. In fact, and after the generalization of

the fight in March, 1961, two tendencies sttled themselves among the uprisin people. One of them under UPA influence occupies a triangle reaching S. Salvador, Bessa Monteiro and Bembe, exclusively made up of Kikongo speaking Angolans. The other tendency under MPLA flag involves regions around Luanda and has its most inland large concentrations in Nambuanguo and Dembos and in towns and some villages in the center and south sections of the country.

Obstruction carried on in Léopoldville
to MPLA activities
UPA fratricide activity

If UPA activity seems more visible, one finds explanation on one hand, in a fallacious propaganda which constant contradictions do not take into consideration arithmetic laws and on the other hand, in the attitude of the Congo-Léopoldville government which has always supported UPA activities in a unilateral way. Thus, the Congo-Léopoldville government forbid the publication of a MPLA organ - "Angolan Unity" - has prevented transit of MPLA guerrilla men on Congolese territory, for several times it seized MPLA weapons, ammunitions and militants on their way to Angola.

MPLA requested from the Congo-Léopoldville government a military camp for training of thousands of nationalists who enlist themselves into its army. Despite repeated promises, the Congolese government never granted this camp which, on the contrary, UPA has since 1962.

Concerning weapons, MPLA has been denied to renew the supply assured by brotherly African countries after having met all requirements and guarantees asked by Mr. Adoula, as condition to allow their receipt and transit in Léopoldville.

Some UPA armed groups have devoted themselves under orders from their leaders, to a fratricide activity which MPLA has denounced several times. Those who did not believe it could evaluate truth when, last April, the Léopoldville press saw the survivors from a UPA ambush to two MPLA columns carrying supplies to our maquis at the Nambuanguo region. Moreover, not only MPLA soldiers must avoid UPA groups fratricide activity. Girls and boys coming from inside the country to join MPLA ranks must not only avoid the colonialist patroll forces but also UPA groups because, falling into the hands of either, they have the same fate: torture and death.

One must say that up until now, MPLA has abstained itself from any reprisal which could increase the already heavy figures of casualties among our people, only in the colonialists' interests.

In spite of difficulties created by the Congo-Léopoldville government and UPA fratricide activity, MPLA could exploit more than 2,000 kilometers of the Northern border of Angola. Thus, it established the minima conditions for a deep fight and to carry on the action against colonialism both at Nambuanguo and in Dembos regions.

EPLA forces had other big encounters near the Kwango river, in the Malange

region, in the section between Malange and Luanda. Other minor fights were launched at Lobito (center) and Porto Alexandre (South).

MPLA and the World

In order to pursue her war of extermination against the Angolan people, Portugal obtains moral and material support from her NATO allies, South Africa and other countries. Some of these allies, by their agreed investments, are true masters of important sectors of our country economy. This fact shows in one hand, Portugal's underdevelopment and places Angola, on the other had, at the center of a controversy on the Western world level.

MPLA diplomatic action made efforts to reflect the Angolan problem evolution in all its context.

Denunciation of the Portuguese ultra colonial regime, defence of a policy in agreement with popular aspirations search of a wide support for national liberation have been the major concern of MPLA delegations abroad.

First of all, demonstration of our solidarity with nationalist movements fighting Portuguese colonialism go back to 1958, with the creation of MAC (Anticolonialist Movement), later on FRAIN (African Revolutionary Front for National Independence), organizations that coordinated the struggle of people from Angola, Guinea (Bissao). Later on, in April, 1961, at a conference in Casablanca, CONCP (Conference of Nationalist Organizations from Portuguese Colonies) was created and it included for Angola: National Union of Angolan Workers (UNTA) and the People's Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA). For Guinea and Cape Verde: the African Party for Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and the Liberation Movement for Guinea and Cape Verde (MLGC). For Goa: the People's Party of Goa, the National Congress, the Liberation Council and the Goa League. For Mozambique: the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDEMAMO) and later on the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO). For São Tomé and Príncipe: the Liberation Committee of San Tomé and Príncipe (CLSTP).

MPLA has always inserted the Angolan problem into the African context. It has been concerned with placing the Angolan question beyond all divergences among our African brethren. This fact is proved by the many visits payed to African countries and our presence at several inter African and African-Asian meetings at the level of heads of states, political and trade union organizations.

MPLA political delegations participated as observers at the Conference of heads of states in Monrovia (May, 1961), in Lagos (January, 1962), at the Conference of non-aligned countries in Belgrade (September, 1961), at the meeting of the political committee of the "Casablanca group" (June, 1962), at the Conference of UAM Heads of States in Libreville (September, 1962) and in Cotonou (August, 1963) at the Constitutional Conference of OAU in Addis Ababa (May, 1963) and that of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Dakar (August, 1963) as well as to the 16th and 17th sessions of the United Nations General Assembly.

MPLA has actively participated in the Pan-African Conferences in Tunis (January, 1960) and in Cairo (1962). In the Africa-Asian Solidarity Conferences in Conakry (April, 1960) and in Moshi (April, 1963). To both Freedom Fighters' Conference called by President

Nkrumah at Winneba (June, 1961 and 1962) as well as to the Seminary of the Young Workers about Portuguese colonies in Casablanca (April, 1962), at the Pan-African Youth Conference in Conakry (May, 1962), at the World Assembly of Youth in Aarhus, Denmark (July, 1962), at the Seminary on rural exodus in Cotonou (November, 1962) and at several assemblies of the WAY, COSEC and UIE.

The Woman's organization (OMA) was at the first Conference of West African Women in Conakry (June, 1961). The Angolan writers participated under MPLA leadership at the 1st and 2nd Conference of Black Artists and Writers in Paris (1957) and in Rome (1959) and at the African-Asian Conference of Writers in Cairo (March, 1962). Angolan lawyers were at the 2nd African-Asian Conference of Lawyers in Conakry (October, 1962). MPLA journalists were at the 3rd meeting of Journalists in the Mediterranean (September, 1963).

MPLA militants represent Angola at the Secretariat of the African-Asian jurists and at the Secretariats of the Organization of African-Asian Solidarity and of Pan-African Organization.

In cooperation with MPLA, supporting committees for Angola have been formed in France, Western German, Belgium, Italy, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Brazil and in India.

Philanthropist organizations from Sweden, England - among which "War on Want" - Brazil, reinforced their concrete aid to the refugees by cooperating with the Angolan Volunteer Corps for Refugee Relief (CVAAR).

Since the genocidal war of the Portuguese ultra colonialists against the Angolans threatens international peace and security, the UNO through its resolutions and the setting up of special committees, brought in a positive contribution to Portugal's isolation at the world level. Movement of the forces engaged in the solution of the Angolan problem affirm, on one hand, their dedication to self-determination right and to Angolan people's independence and, on the other hand, they head to aggravation of contradictions from the imperialist countries of the Western Alliance.

Our diplomatic activity also aims at deepening these contradictions and aggravating conflicts among Portugal's allies.

Toward the Africa-Asian countries and generally the UNO member countries, MPLA has made efforts to isolate Portugal more and more.

MPLA has always stood with insistence near the African Heads of States for the adoption of a coordinated action by all African countries against Portuguese colonialism.

Addis Ababa Conference has been the consecration of this effort of MPLA. Since then, both diplomatic and economic boycott of Portugal was decided by the OAU member countries.

To emphasize at the external level the agreement of our policy in favour of unity of the Angolan fighting forces, several African Heads of states offered, under our suggestion, their good offices in order to approach the tendencies of Angolan nationalism. They know that it is not MPLA that opposes itself to Unity of Angolan nationalism.

About the manoeuvres of which Angola is already at stake, we do not follow the Angolan nationalist movements which claim exclusively the choice of Western aid.

It is a fact that all these divisions, manoeuvres and misunderstandings have created false ideas about MPLA foreign policies. That is why it is necessary to explain our position about this question:

We came from the unity of nationalist forces inside Angola and from all struggling forces against colonialism. It is a proof of the already accomplished work with our active cooperation within the Conference of the Nationalist Organizations from Portuguese Colonies (C.O.N.C.P.) and the coordinating action since a long time with the organizations within PAFMECSA.

At the moment when the African countries themselves make their efforts to consolidate African unity, MPLA is itself also concerned with this problem. We go forward with the African forces which place as their fundamental task unity, cooperation and solidarity taking as base a common history and conditions.

What we propose to the independent African countries is that they only intervene in the Angolan affair to reinforce the potential of nationalist forces and not to deep the existing division.

There is no question of engaging our policy in either bloc which are trying to share the world between themselves. Our only attitude related to the blocs is to make sincerely our efforts to eliminate the attempts of installation of an atmosphere of cold war among the Angolan nationalists and prevent complications of international manoeuvres in tomorrow's Angola.

We are pursuing the mobilization of international opinion against our direct enemy, Portuguese colonialism, and the campaigns of appeal to solidarity of all anti-colonialist organizations.

Thus, we adopt the same attitude as most governments.

The non-alignment of our foreign policy does not hide any deliberated choice of an ideology and should not be considered as a blackmail tactic. On the contrary, it is a realist affirmation and the only possible behaviour in a world heavy of threats, in which people still under foreign domination would have much to lose if they become prisoners of the game of competition between the blocs.

Finally, our diplomatic action is also based in our stubbornness toward Portuguese colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism.

Social activities achieved by MPLA

Technical training

In face of the tragic situation of more than 300,000 refugees, MPLA created in Léopoldville the ANGOLAN VOLUNTEER CORPS FOR REFUGEE RELIEF (CVAAR) which has among its technical personnel eleven Angolan doctors with an indiscutable professional experience whose names follow: Dr. Agostinho Neto, MPLA president, omniscient practitioner who worked in

Lisbon and in Luanda. Dr. Eduardo Santos, internship in Lisbon hospitals, specialized in heart diseases. Dr. Américo Boavida, internship in gynecology at the Faculty of Medicine in Barcelona, with an intense professional activity. Dr. Hugo Menezes, omniscient practitioner who, in 1961, worked at Donka hospital in Conakry. Dr. Mário Almeida, omniscient practitioner. Dr. Gentil Traça, othopedist, internship in Paris. Dr. Manuel Boal, pediatrician, internship at Lovanium hospital. Dr. Manuel Videira, surgeon, internship at Lovanium hospital. Dr. Edmundo Rocha, omniscient practitioner. Dr. Vieira Lopes, omniscient practitioner. Dr. Carlos Pestana, omniscient practitioner.

In addition to this, 40 Angolan registered nurses and some teachers form the CVAAR personnel which since 1961, has developed a large activity to lessen the Angolan refugees's tragic social condition in the Congo, since the beginning of the armed fighting.

CVAAR set up two main dispensaries in Léopoldville and in Matadi and 22 medical and school stations along the Congo-Angola border. These dispensaries and stations assisted, free of charge, thousands of refugees by carrying on medical consultations, aiding with medicines, injections, and other treatments, by distributing clothing, food and by achieving an intensive activity of basic education and professional training.

Where the Congolese dispensary did not exist, CVAAR ~~HELPED~~ Congolese patients too. Some provincial governments, among which the Kwango one, have manifested their deep concern to Mr. Adoula for difficulties risen to MPLA and CVAAR, which caused an acute dissatisfaction among the provincial populations.

Foreseeing Angola's needs in technical training, MPLA has in several European and American countries more than three hundred students who, with those already technically trained (the majority belongs to MPLA) will be the intellectual base to assure Angola's economic, cultural and social development tomorrow.

2. MPLA efforts for Unity of Angolan Nationalism

The idea of a united front has always been a constant political action of MPLA. In press statements, communiqués for Angolan militants and people, to the UNO, in Memoranda addressed to Heads of states and governments, MPLA has never ceased to express with force its firm decision to develop its action in favour of a Liberation United Front.

For example, one can read the following passage in the Memo addressed to the Conference of Heads of States from non-aligned countries (Belgrade, September, 1961):

" At this phase of the Angolan people's liberation fight, MPLA considers as a first need the increase and rising up of the fighting militarily and politically.

But this action must be lead by an Angolan Liberation Front which modalities have to be set up with the other nationalist formations. MPLA itself does not cease to appeal to all responsible people from the Angolan nationalist movements for the holding of a

Unity Conference.

We think that Angola's independence, if it is achieved in the present conditions of armed fight based upon a United Front, will have better chances of liberation from all foreign domination and exploitation".

It is always convenient to remind MPLA efforts for the setting up of a Liberation Front.

In January, 1960, there were talks between MPLA and UPA. The latter did not carry on the agreements.

In April, 1961, two MPLA leaders, duly accredited had talks with UPA, ALLIAZO (today PDA) and MLEC leaders, about the project of a front. UPA president and some of his leading colleagues opposed themselves from the beginning to the idea of a front itself.

On June 23, 1961, a new MPLA step did not find a favourable echo from UPA.

On August 23, 1963, however, under pressure from the masses, UPA announced in a communiqué that it admitted the idea "of constitution of a front under UPA leadership" what could not be accepted by the other Angolan nationalist organizations.

Few time before the formation of FNLA - which gathers UPA and PDA - Mr. Matumona, then PDA Vice President warned already,

" Certainly for reasons of opposition, UPA did not want to associate itself with ALLIAZO (PDA). But observers well informed on the Angolan problem see in the eventual cartel UPA/ALLIAZO the formation of a "Northern force" against the "Southern force" incarnated by MPLA. Once formed such a cartel, then UPA would conquer the whole country and impose there its law." (See "Courrier d'Afrique" of February 5, 1962).

On March 27, 1962, PDA and UPA associated themselves into a cartel named FNLA.

On April 5, 1962, loaders of this "Front" proclaimed the setting up of a "government" of the Angolan Republic in Exile"... MPLA was neither warned nor invited to any of these two operations.

On May 3, 1962, Mr. Cleophas Kamitatu, former Minister of the Interior of Congo-Léopoldville government, with the Angolan nationalist organizations tried to find a platform for their "unity". Mr. Kamitatu himself could be aware of the goodwill of the project of a front presented by MPLA and witnessed the stubborn position of UPA leaders who wanted to impose a front under their leadership.

On June 6, 1962, at the Freedom Fighters's Conference in Accra, President Nkrumah presented his "VIEWPOINT" on unity of the Angolan nationalist forces to MPLA, UPA and PDA delegates. It planned a "military alliance", the creation of a Unified military command and of a "national council" formed by representatives from the three political organizations.

This "VIEWPOINT" should be discussed in Léopoldville what was done without the last positive result on August 5, 1963. Dr. Agostinho Neto, who had just escaped from Lisbon where he had been deported, participated in that meeting. At this occasion UPA president refused to meet Dr. Neto, with the excuse that there were offensive terms on the letter that Dr. Neto had written him.

On January 25, 1963, when an Algerian goodwill mission, led by Commander Slimane was in Léopoldville, UPA refused all meetings aiming at unity. One of the meetings should even be held in the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Congo-Léopoldville, then Mr. Justin Bomboko.

FDLA Formation

The systematic refusal of UPA/PDA (FNLA) cartel to study a platform of common action with the other Angolan nationalist organizations, the increasing demoralization of the masses facing the existing division, led MPLA to undertake talks with other Angolan nationalist organizations, since January, 1963, in order to conjugate their efforts for the liberation fight.

Addis Ababa decisions reinforced this determination which was well founded upon the revolutionary principle of gathering all energies capable of contributing to the fight for national liberation.

At the meeting of the Committee of Nine in Dar-es-Salaam (June, 1963), MPLA was accompanied by a representative of one of these organizations according to the decision of a common action in all domains, adopted by the Unity Committee madated by the participating organizations.

In July, 1963, in order to facilitate the task of the Goodwill mission sent by the O.A.U. committee for Africa's Liberation to "stimulate harmony and achieve unity among the several nationalist movements with a common aspiration of liberation". (See Final Communiqué of the Coordinating Committee for Africa's Liberation, Dar-es-Salaam, June 4, 1963). The Unity Committee of these organizations brought into being the Democratic Front for Angola Liberation (F.D.L.A.) formed by MMA, NGWIZAKO, UNTA and MPLA.

This Front did not reject a priori the eventual adhesion of other Angolan nationalist organizations, ready to engage themselves to act according to the following adopted principles:

- I - Definitive liquidation, by all means, of Portuguese colonialism in Angola.
- II - Consolidation of national independence through the practice of a non-aligned policy.
- III - Fight neo-colonialism under all its forms.
- IV - Setting up of a democratic regime in Angola under which all Human Fundamental Rights will be guaranteed.
- V - Admission into the Front of all nationalist organizations which request it, after discussion at the same level of equality.
- VI - Increasing of both the armed and political fight.
- VII - Formation of a political council which must approve all opinion expressed on behalf of the Front.

- VIII - Formation of one Liberation Army under one Command.
- IX - Formation of one organization for social relief and mass education.
- X - Condemnation of fratricide fight and all manifestations of tribal, regional, racial and religious hate.
- XI - Increase of brotherhood and mutual aid among the Angolans from all social levels.
- XII - Constant defence of national unity and the country's territorial integrity.
- XIII - Solemn and active engagement to the achievement of African Unity in the spirit of the Addis Ababa Charter.
- XIV - Respect of personality of each organization participating in the Front.

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At a press conference held in Léopoldville on July 10, 1963, by Dr. Agostinho Neto, FDLA expressed its readiness to negotiate without any previous condition with FNLA (formed by UPA and PDA) in order to have only one Front. Up until today FDLA has not yet received any answer from FNLA.

3. Activity and Failure of the Goodwill Mission

Here we are at the turning point of the history of Angolan nationalism. Crossed by several vicissitudes, the Goodwill Mission recommendations only consecrated division of Angolan nationalism and established conditions for the entrance into our country of political and economic formulas incompatible with our people's aspirations of democracy and freedom. Nothing efficient can be accomplished with solutions devoted to drive MPLA aside from Angola's independence fighting.

Calling forth procedure reasons, the Goodwill Mission could not evaluate with all its rigour the importance, decisive rôle played, since 1956 and from inside Angola, by MPLA, a role still played today in orientation and development of the struggle for national liberation.

MPLA president presented himself to the Goodwill Mission on behalf of FDLA. The Mission refused to hear him under the pretext that it had only been commissioned to hear MPLA and FNLA.

For any wise observer, FDLA was in the stream of unification of the Angolan nationalist movements and that was the reason why they created those difficulties. M. Diop Dembe known by his positions in favour of UPA was forced to admit himself,

" FDLA setting up will facilitate the task of the conciliators sent by the Addis Ababa Conference which, instead of having to deal with a multitude of parties, will be able to concentrate its efforts into two big Angolan organizations". (See "Jeune Afrique" number 144, 22/28 July, 1963).

Since its task was "to stimulate harmony and achieve unity among the several Nationalist movements with a common aspiration of liberation", one clearly understands that argument from the Goodwill Mission.

MPLA president having been commissioned by FDLA for the conciliation sessions, could not agree with the Goodwill Mission exigences. However, in order to prevent the fact that the Mission hears only one side, FDLA agreed that its president's intervention should be made on behalf of MPLA.

Thus, the following day, July 17, Dr. Agostinho Neto in a letter addressed to M. Jaja Wachuku, Chairman and to the members of the Goodwill Mission, requested that they "on one hand, hear MPLA President's intervention as such and on the other hand, smooth the procedure in order to allow FDLA participation in the research of a platform of agreement among the Angolan nationalist organizations."

That would provide the Goodwill Mission with more important data on the present situation and which knowledge is indispensable for a fair evaluation of Angola's national liberation struggle.

The Goodwill Mission refused to fulfill this request pretending that it was no longer possible to hear the nationalist organizations for hearing time was up. Such a decision is contrary to the Mission spirit expressed by its own president who said in his opening speech,

" On behalf of this Mission, that of the Coordinating Committee I appeal to you - Angola leaders - so that you place yourselves beyond your personal ambitions and that you throw out the foreign ideological engagements which eventually you have had in the past. Each moment think of the 5,000,000 Angolans. Think of Africa and do your best to prevent repetition of what happened in this country in which we are today."

The refusal of the Goodwill Mission prevented it from seizing the bottom of the Angolan problem and of realizing the misleading argument of most statements from the other side.

Thence, the Goodwill Mission could only base its conclusions upon the "facts" provided by only one of the two sides to be reconciled, the FNLA.

In fact, MPLA President's comments at one of the sessions about partial statements from an ex-militant of the Movement recently expelled, when he abusively spoke on behalf of MPLA, could not be considered as a normal exposition on MPLA political and military importance both inside and outside the country.

Thus, the research of truth from the Goodwill Mission was jeopardized. Therefore, its conclusions to the prejudice of our people's legitimate interests that "FNLA fighting forces are far much more important, they are the most efficient and are the only battle-front in Angola," is not true at all. It must then be revised. In our opinion it cannot be accepted neither by the Coordinating Committee nor by the OAU Minister Council nor by anyone who knows the Angolan problem and is sincerely devoted to the Angolan people's liberation.

No sentence, no word from Mr. Holden Roberto's statement neither even the question-answer game addressed to him and written down on the Minutes of the sessions of

the Goodwill Mission allow anyone to conclude that "FNLA fighting forces are far more important and more efficient..."

The Goodwill Mission undertook no inquiry either along the border or near the provincial governments having common frontiers with Angola. Those are authorized witnesses about the Angolan movements. However, the Mission heard Mr. Adoula's representatives (confidentially) and Mr. Adoula himself.

In Angola, efficiency of a fighting force for national liberation can in no way be reduced to the dreamy size of militar columns stationed outside the country as one understands from Mr. Holden Roberto's statements.

What the Goodwill Mission

did not take into consideration

The Goodwill Mission was aware of the granting by the Congo-Léopoldville government of a training camp to FNLA at Kinwouzou and the facilities granted for transit of weapons.

Yet, it did not take into consideration the fact that a promise in that sense had been said several times by Mr. Adoula to MPLA leaders. After MPLA fulfilled all the requirements which even went so far as to bringing over the personal representative of a highly held head of African state, in order to warrant that his government was ready to send the weapons needed by MPLA under Mr. Adoula's conditions, the Congo-Léopoldville Prime Minister found a formula to postpone sine die the solution of this urgent problem.

By attributing to itself the task of decreeing about the value of such and such organization, the Goodwill Mission ignored the fact that MPLA military activity was suffocated by Mr. Adoula's government which meanwhile stated against MPLA military worthiness.

What can one think of the goals of those who, on one hand oppose themselves with all their power to MPLA reinforcement in weapons and ammunitions (the question of a training camp is a secondary one) and on the other hand, they deny MPLA military activities?

No doubt, the Mission had a difficult task. Since the beginning it faced itself Mr. Adoula's irrevocable position. At the garden-party offered at the Mission arrival, Mr. Adoula warned its members against any attempt to make him revise his decision. For him "there is nothing else but FNLA/grae".

Delegates from the Mission warned MPLA about their difficulties to overcome Mr. Adoula's rigid standing.

The Mission chose the easiest way. However, the one which attempted against the real development of the Angolan people fight. The Mission could have worked for conciliation despite the opposition it found. It would have saved its noble task. It could have deserved the gratefulness of a giftng people which hopes much from African solidarity.

The fight in Angola being both political and military one, efficiency and importance of the struggling forces are the a function of the degree of political framing of the

military forces. We mean that both depend on the degree of control over the military forces from a political organization solidly structured, active and rooted in the masses.

Otherwise, one does not reach the necessary politization of the masses, one does not achieve the enthusiastic enrollment of militants and guerrilla men. The fight stops or even draws back.

In order to be efficient, the fighting forces must be in measure of increasing among the people. Their growth is a direct result of their political and military level.

MPLA HAS AFFIRMED ITSELF AS A TRUE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT. ITS ACTION IN ALL DOMAINS IS ABOUT TO CREATE THE CONDITION WHICH WILL ACCELERATE DEFEAT OF ITS EVER ENEMY - PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM - AND WHICH WILL GUARANTEE IN THE FUTURE THE MAINTENANCE OF AN INDEPENDENCE CONCERNED WITH THE PEOPLE'S HAPPINESS AND WELL-BEING.

ALL ATTEMPTS TO DRIVE MPLA AWAY FROM THE ANGOLAN POLITICAL SCENE IS THEN CONTRARY TO THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE'S SUPREME INTERESTS AND THUS IT WILL FIND A FIRM OPPOSITION FROM THE ANGOLANS AND FROM MPLA MILITANTS.

II

DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES OF A SIMPLE ACCEPTANCE OF THE GOODWILL MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

Angola Liberation Movement is not only a revolutionary explosion. It is not only the expression of rage and hate of humiliated people. Its roots are buried into the ground slowly accumulated during centuries of history of a permanent resistance to Portuguese occupation.

For several times, the Angolan people stood up against colonialist violence and exploitation. If since February 4, 1961, the process of Angola national liberation got a faster rhythm it is because, for the first time the Angolan people carries its battle with a doctrine, a philosophy of freedom and democracy. Regional political organizations with a very narrow social foundation, without revolutionary roots and contents cannot reach the goal set by our people.

The goals of the battle undertaken by the Angolan people are indeed national independence, happiness, unity and integrity of Angola. It is nonsense to think that the Angolans can let themselves to reject the goal of their struggle. Well, all methods and attempts to impose to the Angolan people a "government" which does not come normally from the dynamics of the fight can only create conditions to instill in Angola what is known as "congolization" which opens to colonialists all kinds of possibility to put again their hands in one way or the other, upon a country already nominally independent.

1. What UPA and PDA represent indeed?

UPA and PDA and, therefore, FNLA are tribal and regional organizations with neither solid structures nor a program capable of assuring the support of most Angolans.

Mr. Holden Roberto, giving evidence before the Goodwill Mission, stated himself, "... The Union of the Angolan People (UPA) was founded on July 10, 1954, in this city of Léopoldville itself by Angolan emigrants..." (See Minutes of sessions of the Goodwill Mission) and he added later on, "... The leaders of the Union of the Angolan People decided to unite their efforts to those of Angola Democratic Party, another mass movement of Angolan emigrants in the Congo (see the same Minutes). And Mr. H. Roberto ended, "Thence the Angolan Liberation National Front was born".

After visiting Léopoldville, Mr. Russel Warren Howe wrote in "Toward Freedom" (Volume 6, June, 1961 - Chicago, USA).

" UPA is mainly a Bakongo party."

On the same article, Mr. Russel W. Howe warned,

" If, as it is possible, Mr. Roberto imposes himself as the country's main authority, many things will depend on his hability of establishing his authority without recurring to measures which would attract his tribal enemies' hate."

Also, in the American "Time Weekly Magazine," in an article titled "Blood ties", one could read,

" Offer of cooperation from Andrade (then MPLA president) was rejected by his implacable 35-year old foe, Holden Roberto, member of the big Bakongo tribe from which the Union of Angolan People receives a considerable support". (See "Time Weekly Magazine" of May 31, 1963).

French journalist Eric Rouleau who had contacted UPA leaders in Léopoldville in March and in October, 1961, could notice that "most of UPA leaders are Bakongo" (See "Le Monde" of March 15, 1962).

But let us see a little deeper some realities about UPA and PDA.

First of all, UPA comes from the "Union of Angolan Norther People" (UPNA), organized in Léopoldville by Mr. Barros Nekaka - who considered himself descendant of King D. Pedro VII of Congo - died in 1954. Holden Roberto who, according to his own statements live in the Congo since when he was 2-year old, took the party in 1955 and changed the UPNA into UPA. His education, at a Presbyterian school in the Congo, has contributed much to the fact that Mr. Holden Roberto be completely foreigner to Angola realities and at the same time it enabled him to have the material and technical support from "the American Committee on Africa".

UPA executive board has the active and permanent cooperation from foreign "advisors" apparently connected with trade union, youth and social relief organizations. These "advisors" are not strange to the sudden formation of the so-called "government of the Angolan republic in exile" which a bureaucratic error from the Congo-Léopoldville authorities has labelled "Angolan revolutionary government in exile".

The so-called government is mostly formed by bakongo people born in the Congo where they live since their childhood. Therefore, they are not known in Angola. Even

among the Bakongo (15% of the Angolan people) only those from São Salvador and a part from Maquela do Zombo have a real influence upon it. In other words, the so-called "government" is led by an individual completely unknown in Angola and it is made of men who represent at the best guess, a region of about 200 km long and 60 km deep into South of the Lower Congo border. In fact, the so-called "gouvernement" results from less than 2% of the Angolan people. Its party, UPA has an essentially authoritarian orientation. It does not recognize the other political movements except a small satellite organization, PDA, made of some families from Northwest Angola and settled from many years in the Congo. Holden, being able to handle large amounts of money, exiges that the other groups submit themselves to his will.

About PDA, it is the former ALLIAZO (Alliance of Zombo nationals). Zombo is a small region of Northern Angola, bordering Congo-Léopoldville. Alliance of Zombo Nationals Statutes, made in Léopoldville on August 1st, 1960, stated,

"DENOMINATION

Article 1 - Following wishes expressed by most people, the former mutual Association of Zombo Nationals, then known as ASSOMIZO, is changed on this first day of August, 1960, into Alliance of Zombo Nationals - ALLIAZO.

" AIM

Article 2 - The Alliance of Zombo National - "ALLIAZO" - a non-profit organization, aims at gathering in a spirit of agreement and solidarity all Zombo nationals in order to safekeep their common interests and support firmly African solidarity.

.....

ADMISSION

Article 17 - However all people not coming from Zombo can be admitted as supporters if they want it.

In the "Alliazo Preliminary Program before independence", one can read,

"Therefore, beyond territorial consideration, ALLIAZO will attach itself to make understand that from MBATA to UIGE there is only one people, the MUZOMBO people. In fact, in the history of the former Congo kingdom from which we all come, there is no word about the Maquelains, the Kibo-Kolois, the Dambains, the Sanza-Pombo, etc.... There is word about one bloc only, the BAZOMBOS, as we far as we are concerned. Then down with regionalism! Down with rivalries and useless quarrels. Down with the Portuguese colonialists' divisions who divide us to rule better over us!
LET US UNITE; BAZOMBO COUNTRYFELLOWS!

These excerpts (of which we underlined some passages) thought referring themselves to a big African entity or the fact that they denounce quarrels among the Zombos, witness in fact their narrow political views aiming at the creation of a micro-nationalist mind of Zombo nationals. The proof is that in 1962, contrary to the deposed Statutes, ALLIAZO leaders began to get rid of the denomination "Alliance of Zombo Nationals" for another "Angolan Alliance of Zombo Nationals" (See article "Possibilities of formation

of an Angolan common front", by ALLIAZO General Vice-President, A. Matumona (See "Courrier d'Afrique" of February 3-4, 1962).

One cannot say that the change of names of "Alliance of Zombo Nationals" into "Angolan Alliance of Zombo Nationals" and from the latter into "Angolan Democratic Party" have been pushed by its increasing regional influence inside Angola. In fact, immediately after ALLIAZO became PDA, this party General Vice-President, Mr. Matumona stated,

" As you know, ALLIAZO, one of the Angolan political organizations, national by its name (sic) is a local and tribal party, if you wish. Its Statutes advocate for the next Angolan structures, federalism, a strong and efficient decentralization of power. A unitarian Angola for ALLIAZO leaders is a utopia, it is an aberration" (See "Courrier d'Afrique" of February 5, 1962).

MPLA does not want to judge the Angolan organizations of tribal or regional features - either acknowledged or pretended by those organizations.

But MPLA is convinced that it is impossible to state and prove that UPA and PDA (former ALLIAZO) are truly national organizations, having an influence over most national territory and ruling over most Angolan people.

Indeed UPA and the ex-ALLIAZO are organizations with a very limited influence in Angola both at the demographic and the geographic level.

Besides their origin foreign to the country, UPA and BDA and, therefore FNLA, have not yet proved neither by documents nor by their activities that they are fighting for truly African, patriotic arms corresponding to the deepest aspirations of the Angolan masses.

The almost absolute silence kept by Mr. Holden before the Goodwill Mission about the grave problem of Unity of Angolan nationalism reveals particularly his "concern" for tomorrow's Angola.

Moreover, this is Mr. Holden Roberto's constant attitude when he must say something about key problems of the national liberation fight: either silence or uproar...

For several times and a little bit all over the world, the press has denounced the reasons which hide such a behaviour.

PDA Vice-President himself said,

" American pressure exist upon UPA, Roberto Holden's party. In fact, it escapes no longer to observers that UPA material and financial support comes almost totally from the United States, namely from the American Committee on Africa.

This financial aid (...) would be conditioned to the non-rallying of UPA to MPLA. The American circles label the latter as communist. This fact explains Roberto Holden's radical stubbornness to rally MPLA or any other Front in which MPLA is." (See "Courrier d'Afrique" of February 5, 1962).

On an article of the "Observer", Colin Legum says,

" MPLA is generally considered as a leftist revolutionary movement (it is called communist by Holden). UPA is considered as a nationalist movement. Everyone knows that UPA receives support and funds from the USA (See "Angola Rebels turn guns one another" in "The Observer" of March 18, 1962).

About the pressing problem of relief for thousands of Angolan refugees in the Congo, enormously aggravated after the present interdiction imposed upon the MPLA, Mr. Holden has not yet said one word expressing his organization concern for this situation.

This striking silence is however in contradiction with the uproar from FNLA leaders about the amount of their actions and their soldiers which are, according to statements from Mr. Holden Roberto or his co-workers, 2,000, 3,000 and even 4,000 advanced as that of soldiers undergoing training at Kinkouzou, but they say also that 2,000 soldiers are trained every two weeks.

Figures like 10,000 15,000, 25,000 or 30,000 men inside the country are offered as making up UPA or FNLA "army"...

Reality is quite different...

Such statements show how the policy of UPA/PDA, rather FNLA, rather "grae" aims at deceiving world and African opinion, raising up ambiguities that allow them to be timely considered as the only valid spokesmen, toward a Portugal also subject to an "opportun" pressure from her NATO allies.

In face of their submission to non-African interests neither UPA nor its "grae" cannot guarantee the functioning of democratic structure in our country nor neutrality and unity only recently defined at Addis Ababa as the essential principles of the policy of each African state.

In face of their lack of program, their regional feature and therefore their very narrow social base, neither UPA nor its "grae" can assure political stability, territorial integrity and national unity of Angola.

In face of the foreign character of most of their leaders and their lack of structure and a precise policy of action, neither UPA nor "grae" can assure continuity of the national liberation fight in a way that safekeeps the Angolan people's deepest interests and aspirations.

Despite the enormous support that UPA and consequently FNLA receives from the American organizations, the government of Congo-Léopoldville and some African governments, up until today they did not reveal the least capacity to develop the process of the Angolan people's national liberation.

On the contrary, they only rise aversion rather hate from most of its own members in Congo-Léopoldville and along the border, who wonder about the fate of weapons and the aid given to their organization.

It is not a secret the fact that UPA leaders have been chased and beaten by their supporters themselves along the border - where, moreover, their president has never been.

Also, it is no longer a secret that the Kinkouzou cam (granted by Mr. Adoula's government) has been lately the theater of frequent mutinies which have already caused casualties. They have even forced the Congolese authorities's intervention to assure order there.

MPLA presence on the Congo-Léopoldville - despite all obstacles risen up by its government each day - was the guarantee of pursuing the fight for Angola national independence.

2. Evolution of Angolan nationalism

after the conclusions

of the Goodwill Mission

Mr. Adoula's guarantees

Congo-Léopoldville government had upset general opinion on June 29, 1963, by recognizing the FNLA "government". The most important people in Africa politics did not hide their disagreement, rather distrust, toward a "manoeuvre against the still recent decisions of the African Heads of states in Addis Ababa on May 26, 1963"...

In fact, through its Resolution, Point 1 of the agenda - DECOLONISATION - the Conference,

" UNANIMOUSLY SURE of the imperious need of coordinating and increasing its members' efforts in order to accelerate the unconditional accession to national independence of all African territories still under foreign domination,

§ 10. EARNESTLY INVITES all nationalist liberation movements to coordinate their efforts in order to create common action fronts wherever it is necessary to reinforce the fighting efficiency and the rational use of the concrete aid which will be given to them;

§ 11. DECIDES to create a Coordinating Committee made up of Algeria, Congo-Léopoldville, Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Senegal, Tanganyika with headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanganyika). It will be responsible for harmonizing the aid provided by the African states as well as for handling the special funds set up for that aim..."

The unilateral decision of the Congo-Léopoldville government already attempted without the least success at the conference of Heads of states in Addis Ababa, is against the solemn desire of this conference of rather dealing with organized common fronts of the liberation movements.

Vigorous reactions against such a decision took Prime Minister, Mr. Adoula, to an explanation on July 2, 1963, when he said,

" Recognition of president H. Iden Roberto's government is not at all directed against the political parties settled on this and which will continue to have our hospitality. But today the Angolan people's struggle reached a stage which requires more method and

cohesion. Only a union of all efforts is able to hasten the independence hour."

And Mr. Adoula added,

"... Recognition of the Angolan Revolution government in exile, does not mean any intention of future advantages..."

Such guarantees about hospitality that other political parties would continue to have become dead words...

Repeated ingerence

of the Congo-Léopoldville government

Without any comments here are some acts of the Congo-Léopoldville government that show eloquently how much the conclusions of the Goodwill Mission and the recommendations of OAU Minister Council in Dakar have favoured and are favouring imperialist intervention in the process of Angola national liberation:

In March, 1963, two columns of MPLA guerrilla men, on their way to Angola by a region that connected Léopoldville to an important resistance zone of MPLA forces in Lundá (Angola) were arrested and physically mistreated by the Congolese government forces and then transferred under inhuman conditions to Luluabourg. Their military equipment, relief material for the Angolans evacuated in the Lunda jungle were seized. All Angolan money that these columns were carrying was stolen and shared by the Congolese at the very sight of our brothers!

In June, 1963, the gendarmes under orders of the Congolese National Security searched quarters of MPLA army in Binza-Léopoldville and seized both weapons and explosives.

In September, 1963, MPLA president, Agostinho Neto and a member of the Steering Committee, Lúcio Lara, were arrested for "using false documents.." since they had passports from African brotherly countries!

In the same month MPLA was charged to pay fines because of the weapons seized in June!

Still in September, under orders of Léopoldville authorities, Luiz d'Azevedo Júnior, MPLA responsible for affairs with the Congo-Léopoldville government was arrested without the least justification.

In October, 1963, an armed force of police sudden closed down the dispensary of the Angolan Volunteer Corps for Refugee Relief (CVAAR). MPLA headquarters in Léopoldville was closed down in November, under the pretext that MPLA did not belong to the "parties forming the government in exile".

On November 22, an armed force brutally arrested in a CVAAR residence in Léopoldville, the president of Angolan youth, Daniel Chipenda, as well as a MPLA military responsible member, António Candeias, under UPA instructions.

Since November 22, Congolese police and gendarme forces have not stopped their

arrestations, brutalities and all kinds of humiliation against the Angolans living in Léopoldville and suspected of belonging to MPLA.

At the end of the National Union of Angolan Workers (UNTA) Congress, on February 4, 1964, the General Secretary of this tradeunion organization was arrested by the Congolese security, under request of Mr. Holden and then he was set free on caution.

All this hate, all these persecutions mean **DIRECT INTERFERENCE** in the Angolan people's political orientation. All this is only the concretization of the imperialist policy of intervention at Africa's key points.

DAKAR RECOMMENDATIONS CONFIRMING THE GOODWILL MISSION CONCLUSIONS, HAVE ENCOURAGED AND MADE LEGAL, AT LEAST APPARENTLY, ALL THIS BIAS AND DISORDER AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ANGOLA'S AFRICAN PEOPLE!

Incidences at the Angolan national level

Since July 1963, when the Goodwill mission met until today when the African states then gathered in Addis Ababa are ready to carry on the Dakar recommendations, some facts happened and revealed clearly the injustice meant by driving away MPLA from the Angolan political scene (outside Angola...) and the FNLA/gra's inefficiency as the "only force fighting for Angola liberation."

Today Portuguese arrogance increases despite FNLA ridiculous and desperate noise about "... thousands of Portuguese soldiers killed in dozens of battles, tanks and war planes put out of order, prisoners, tons of bazookas, obus and machineguns seized from the enemy."

In face of the error made in Dakar about Angola, Portugal deeply hardened her position by trying with a formal smoothness, to keep us all - Africans - in the pit where we have fallen.

Certainly, the collective boycott imposed by our older brethren to Portugal is not harmless at all. That is one of Addis Ababa main victories.

However, at the 18th session of the UN General Assembly the Portuguese delegates' trick succeeded in provoking talks between the African group and Portugal during which one part of our brethren convinced itself of Portugal's goodwill whereas the other part, after having understood the uselessness of such talks, broke them.

Reaffirming the fact that it is up to the Angolan political organizations to discuss Angola's future with our people's oppressor, MPLA declares its indignation toward the fact that the resolution of the 18th session concerning Angola was one of the weakest ones of Angola history at the United Nations.

Portugal knows that FNLA, incapable by its anti-democratic nature and limited by its condition of foreign, in no way can lead the Angolan people to victory. Rather FNLA will desperately and each time more obviously search for a negotiated solution because of the colonialist's relative advantage of force. Such measure would bring about a deceiving

internal autonomy or an independence of the neocolonial type.

FNLA more recent statements about the "good settler" are a flagrant proof of demobilization planned by Holden Roberto's forces.

At the internal point of view, UPA ("grae") is losing the masses' trust. Its leaders can no longer freely move about at the places where UPA used to be very popular. Its training camp became a home of mutinies caused by tribalism or other bias which have already casualties among themselves.

Facing the enemy, the people have always been wondering about the destiny of the weapons offered to UPA by the brotherly countries.

MPLA cannot be set apart without causing a dangerous drawing back of the Angolan nationalist forces because of its true national origin, its policy of defence of the Angolan oppressed majority's interests, because of its non-aligned policy, its character mainly African and turned toward progress, its serious military and political activity, its democratic structures and the quantity of technical and political people already trained and being trained.

CONCLUSION

What was written serves to prove how much Angola is near a deep abyss similar to the one into which the Congo has fallen.

MPLA would prefer not to address itself to the brotherly countries about internal problems of Angolan nationalism. At this point of the situation MPLA is nevertheless forced to warn its elder brethren of the grave errors that Africa is risking to make about Angola as well as their responsibility in putting far away this danger.

Aware of the realities of the struggle for the Angolan people's liberation, the MPLA General Conference held from January 3 to 10, 1964, in Brazzaville, in its final Statement

- " Solemnly CALLS the attention of the ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY and of each African state in particular, to the grave incidences already noticed in our liberation fight, because of the biased and non realistic choice of a group, which is far from representing the Angolan people and call itself "grae", as the only valid deposit of the aid provided by the Africans for the Angolan people;
- EARNESTLY REQUESTS the brotherly countries and governments to analyze deeply the situation thus created to Angolan nationalism. Already one notices the same manoeuvres carried on the Congo-Léopoldville in order to make Africa's Southern part the right plot to achieve the plans of the big trusts.
- APPEALS to the governments of the brotherly countries to intercede near the government of the Republic of Congo-Léopoldville to allow MPLA to resume its activities there. MPLA has widely proved to be worth of the trust that the

Angolan people has in it and able to cope with the exigences of the national liberation fighting."

* * * *

MPLA belongs to the Angolan people who, definitively will defend it as it has defended its own life.

Aware of its responsibilities toward the Angolan people who gave it a mandate signed with blood and suffering, MPLA reaffirms its positions of principles,

"THE DAKAR RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT ANGOLA MUST BE REVISED.

MPLA REASONS MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. IN SUCH A GRAVE CASE, PURELY FORMAL ARGUMENTS MUST NOT BE AN OBSTACLE TO THE REVISION REQUIRED BY REASON! DECISIONS ALREADY TAKEN SHOULD NOT HARM THE AID TO BE GRANTED, WHICH MUST BE FOR ALL VALID MOVEMENTS OF ANGOLA.

Any other attitude will only aggravate the already deteriorated conditions of Angolan nationalism.

In July 1963, President BEN BELLA, questioned by a press correspondent about the recognition of the so-called "grao" by Mr. Adoula's government said,

" All depends on the meaning given to this recognition. If one thus wants to orientate the aid in favour of Angola's liberation movements to the only profit of this "government", it is dangerous. Such a measure risks to compromise the unity of solidarity movements prescribed by the Addis Ababa spirit, were that the intention of Mr. Adoula's government. Nevertheless, if it only is a recognition not to harm the aid to be provided, it will only encourage our Angolan brothers". (See "Jeune Afrique" number 143, July 15-21, 1963, page 7).

May these balanced and realist words inspire the African leaders in their noble task of helping the Angolan people to free themselves.

LONG LIVE UNITED, FREE AND INDEPENDENT ANGOLA!

LONG LIVE AFRICAN UNITY!

Brazzaville, February 12, 1964

MPLA POLITICAL COMMITTEE