

What Kind of Independence for Angola?

The political crisis within the ranks of those fighting for the independence of Angola from Portuguese colonial rule is not only a well-known international scandal, it is also a tragedy for Angola and for all of Africa. The nine-nation Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity has already made its choice of Holden Roberto's Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (G.R.A.E.) as the sole body to receive African material and moral support in the struggle against the Portuguese, but the authority of the "government-in-exile" outside its tribal base in northern Angola remains nebulous and the prospects for an Angola even nominally free from Portuguese rule are far from bright. But the Angolans themselves, except for Holden Roberto, have remained silent, permitting the most fantastic speculations to circulate. Now at last one of the principal actors in this drama speaks out, 35-year-old Viriato da Cruz, former Secretary-General of the "Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola" (M.P.L.A.) and a poet and writer of great talent. Cruz, one of the founders of the M.P.L.A. in 1956 and considered the leader of its leftwing, was removed from all functions at the M.P.L.A.'s final national conference in Leopoldville in September 1963, which reshuffled leadership positions in a high-handed and undemocratic fashion. Now, with this article in REVOLUTION, Cruz is the first Angolan leader to speak out and open the way for a confrontation of views that alone can aid the Angolan national liberation movement in a struggle that will surely be long and difficult, but whose victory is nonetheless certain.

The impact of the colonial system on the traditional African societies in Angola on the eve of the beginning of the armed struggle presented the following social aspects:

On the African side (4.5 million inhabitants):

Two million five hundred thousand producers were more or less integrated within the market economy.

One hundred fifty thousand were employed in trade (34,000), transformation industries (57,000), the mines, civil construction and the colonial administration.

Approximately eight hundred thousand were employed in farming, transportation, public work and domestic services.

On the European side (200,000 inhabitants):

Group I — About 5% who made up the colony's richest group.

Group II — 17% were administrative civil servants, technicians in industry and commerce, well-to-do tradesmen and farmers, members of the liberal professions.

Group III — 28% were medium and small tradesmen, permanent salaried employees in industry (6,000), commerce (9,000), agriculture, and civil servants.

Group IV — 10% were unemployed.

All these groups were and are politically privileged, however the first two were the most privileged economically.

That was the very precarious table of the active African and European populations within the framework of a single capitalist economy. The result of the blow to the traditional African structures was not sufficiently analysed if one takes into consideration the 350,000 Africans who emigrated to the urban areas and the annual wave of some 100,000 Africans who clandestinely left for the countries neighbouring Angola.

Altogether more than 2 million Africans, thrown out of their social and geographic environment by the disintegration of traditional societies, by the theft of land and violence, hung on to life outside their customary frame of life, in areas of insecurity and despair, deprived of ancient solidarities.

It is obvious that the million Angolans who went abroad (almost all of them under Belgian, British and South African super-exploitation), the 800,000 wage workers in the rural areas and the 350,000 Africans living, in conditions of underemployment, in the urban areas, constituted the focal point of the tensions and conflicts in Angola. The geo-social radius of these conflicts must inevitably include, as well as Angolan territory, the Congo, the Rhodesias and South West Africa.

Defending the Status Quo

Portuguese methods of integrating Africans in a vaster social and economic system explain, to a certain extent, the nature of the awakening of the anti-colonial consciousness of the Angolan masses, as well as the forms taken by the insurrection, its insufficiencies and its problems.

But these methods are in turn explained by the determining factors of the old establishment of Portuguese fascism, which found itself faced with the necessity of working out a compromise between, on one hand, the wealthy Catholic monarchists and the liberal republican capitalists (who were especially interested in colonial exploitation) and, on the other hand, the Portuguese bourgeoisie and the rising fascism in Europe. The principal aim of this was to exploit the colonies, to "effectively occupy" them and through this to attempt to ward off the threat of their loss to other imperialisms.

Hence the Portuguese bourgeoisie could not escape hoping to accelerate the rhythm of accumulation of capital and trying to overcome as rapidly as possible the great relative delay in making this accumulation. Considering that foreign capital already largely dominated Portugal, the aims of the country's bourgeoisie required the increasing concentration of capital, the suppression of political freedoms for the middle classes and their condemnation to exploitation, the refusal of all rights to the working class doomed to merciless exploitation, the unchecked centralization of power, finally the intervention of the State in all fields of national life.

Within this framework, violence and arbitrary measures are the logical means by which the dominant classes ward off any threat to the status quo.

Thus, it can be understood that the taking on of these necessary measures by the State should end in legalizing and putting into general practice in the colonies the annihilation of Africans—at the same time continuing the hypocrisy of assimilation—brutality, ferocious exploitation, obstination in the non-recognition of the movement of history.

Because of the scope of the radical oppression of the Angolan masses caused by this kind of colonialism, there could only emerge, affirming its necessity by dialectical reaction, radical violence, a sharp class instinct, the



impatient assault of the exploited against the external aspects of their alienation.

One thus has an idea of the subjective conditions of the masses at the moment of the beginning of the armed movement.

The socio-political and cultural consequences of Portuguese "assimilation" played and still play an important role in the development of Angolan nationalism, because its principal leaders are classed in the category of the "assimilados."

In order to understand the relations between Angolan parties and leaders, it is important here and now to note that the assimilated sector does not, in general, have a homogenous socio-economic and ethnic content. Through mere observation, one can divide the sector into two groups: the purely functionally assimilated group, and the assimilated group destined, in the colonial context, for social and economic success. In the first group are the civil servants, employees in trade and industry. In the second group, the "assimilated" who, thanks to State scholarships, missions or the privileged situation of their families, specialize in different professional branches in Portugal. Because of their social situation, their education, their psychology, and by the social functions for which they prepare, the majority of the members of this group behave in the same fashion as the petty-bourgeoisie.

Whereas the the majority of the "assimilated" of the first group, because they are exploited in the colony, refuse colonialism in their active behaviour; the majority of the "assimilated" of the second group, sent to Portugal while

youths, sheltered from direct exploitative relationships, and more integrated into Portuguese society than any other African group, oppose colonialism for patriotic reasons, or for self-interest or because of solidarity.

Each of these two groups of "assimilated" leans therefore towards different solutions to the colonial problems, in keeping with their respective interests and social situations.

More for the first group than the second, Portuguese culture plays the role of a privileged system of reference.

For the Independence of the Congo

The violent incidents which took place just before the beginning of the armed struggle in Angola, and in which Angolan masses took part were the riots of January 4, 5, 6, 1959 in Leopoldville. During those days, shops of Portuguese tradesmen were sacked, mainly by Angolan nationalists.

Moreover, the Bakongo of Angola had been affiliated with the Abako of the Congo since 1950 and were in agreement with the aims of that association.

However, well before the founding of the Abako, Angolan emigres in the Congo had created mutual aid associations on an ethnic basis. It may well be that the opinion of some Angolans that—perhaps because of their situation as proletarians and emigres—the Angolans were the forerunners of this type of association in Leopoldville.

From the development of several Angolan Bakongo associations, bound up with the appearance of nationalism in the Congo, was born the "Union of Populations of the North of Angola," which became, after the 1958 Pan-African conference in Accra, the party of the "Union of Populations of Angola" (U.P.A.).

During the Congolese struggle for national independence, the Bakongo of Angola, as well as Angolans of other ethnic groups, realized that independence for the Congo would sound the deathknell of colonial domination in Angola. They sent funds—by the millions—to the treasuries of the principal Congolese parties.

Thousands of Angolans also took an active political role at the side of the Congolese.

For the Angolans—those living within the country as well as those abroad—the independence of the Congo meant above all an irreparable breakdown of the repressive State apparatus in Angola. And, in fact, a considerable number of Angolans, after the independence of the Congo, shuttled back and forth between Luanda and Leopoldville on political missions.

The violent incidents in Luanda in February 1961 inaugurated a new migratory current: the growing stream of Angolan political emigres to the Congo.

The Angolan parties then existing in Leopoldville installed some of these political emigres in posts of leadership.

All during that month of February, a series of violent incidents erupted in Angola's Cuanza-Norte district.

The Congo districts in Angola and Cuanza-Norte were indeed a powderkeg. These are the two main coffee-producing regions of Angola (80% of the total production of coffee, representing 39% of the total value of Angola's exports in 1959).

Fifty-two per cent of the total number (2,012 in 1961) of European coffee producers are concentrated here, holding land representing 75% of Angola's

coffee-producing land. Thirty per cent of the active African population of Cuanza-Norte and 8% that of the Congo district were wage-earners on these coffee plantations.

A large mass of expropriated Africans, victims of social injustice and poverty, were concentrated in these two regions of northern Angola.

Not only can the motives of the strength of the armed resistance of the masses of these regions be understood, but also how were formed the ties uniting in the common struggle for national independence the Angolan masses living within Angola and those living in the Congo.

The Angolan nationalist organizations were born in the cities of Luanda and Leopoldville.

After 30 years of activities in the two legal associations, the majority of "assimilated" Africans in Luanda observed with anxiety that their economic and social situation was continually growing worse.

Almost all of the African population of Luanda at that time made up one poor mass, composed of the dispossessed and the ruined.

In 1955, the European population had increased 12 times in relation to 1900, and more than twice in relation to 1940.

The competition of the settlers progressively brought the economic and social conditions of the majority of Africans urbanized for several generations down to the level of the conditions of the peasants recently emigrated to the cities, where they found only underemployment, unemployment and insecurity.

The rivalries between African and European workers, abetted by the capitalist firms in Angola, also aided in developing all sorts of discrimination and racial conflicts, because the fact that the great majority of Portuguese settlers belonged to the lower social strata encouraged them all the more to try to benefit from their "racial quality."

Portuguese authorities foiled the attempts (beginning in 1948) of young Africans in Luanda aimed either at developing literary trends of an indigenous and nationalist character, or at integrating the non-assimilated masses in the legal African associations.

However, contacts between young Angolans and young Brazilian writers resulted in the clandestine introduction into Angola of books and magazines which committed a part of the youth to debate on the great postwar problems: the social question, fascism and democracy, colonialism and the self-determination of peoples, etc.

Seeing that channels of effective legal activities were barred, learning moreover from its failures, a part of the youth began clandestine political action in 1955, with national independence as their aim. Thus was born the M.P.L.A.

The independence of Ghana, the acquaintance of the nationalist youth of Luanda with the manifesto of "**Conscience Africaine**," published in July 1956 by a group of Congolese in Leopoldville, strengthened the conviction of the youth that Africa had entered irreversibly the era of national independence.

The almost complete liquidation of the social gap between a large number of the purely functionally "assimilated" and the masses who were constantly leaving the countryside for the shanty-towns, aided in establishing the M.P.L.A. on a large scale in Luanda.

However, waves of arrests in Luanda, beginning in March 1959, made it impossible for the M.P.L.A. (in other words, the proletariat of Luanda and other Angolan cities) to effectively lead the armed peasant movement.

From Racial Conflict to Class Conflict

By the very nature of colonial domination over Angola—an economic exploitation by interests with different origins—the Angolan revolutionary movement was destined to clash with a “front” of powerful imperialist interests.

In this particular case, it was indispensable for Angolan nationalism to have the concrete support, and not merely in words, of the world revolutionary forces and, especially, that of the Portuguese proletariat and people.

However, this concrete support has been practically nil.

The only illegally organized party in Portugal is the Communist Party, and it is relatively small in numbers and has notorious deficiencies. “The majority of (Portuguese) political trends have not been transformed into structured parties. There exists a large number of anti-fascist groups and individuals enjoying a more or less large influence (1).”

The Communist Party of Portugal has, however, had no appreciable influence, neither in the preparation nor in the launching of the Angolan revolutionary movement.

The Portuguese Patriotic Front, formed at the end of 1962, bringing together socialists, communists, republicans, Catholics, progressives and liberal monarchists, shows major weaknesses in organization and it seems as long as that there are also problems of leadership (2), there will to be no reasons to believe that this Front would benefit less from the struggle of colonial people if it were to give them concrete support.

The settler community (except for several exceptions) replied with extreme violence, in deeds and psychologically, to the beginning of the African insurrection.

After the riot of February 4, organized groups of civilian settlers competed with the State repressive forces in terror against the indigenous population.

The murderous fury of the settlers took on a clearly racist aspect.

From March to May 1961, in northern Angola, settlers, organized and armed, outdistanced the forces of the colonial army in the number of killings and repressive violence. It was not rare to see civilian settlers shoot down African landowners and tradesmen with the sole aim of eliminating business competitors.

Beyond its racist aspect and that of defending privilege, this war of colonial reconquest marked a return to the motives and the procedures of the primitive accumulation of capital.

Faced with this reaction, and because of the fact that Portuguese colo-

(1) Perspectivas do Desenvolvimento da Luta Nacional contra a Ditadura Fascista—Portuguese Communist Party, January 1963.

(2) Mr. Cunhal, secretary general of the Communist Party of Portugal declared, on June 23, 1963, over Radio Free Portugal: “The Portuguese Communist Party makes no pretension of leading the Patriotic Front. But, as a member of the Patriotic Front, it has every right to hope that the others will also make no such pretension.” Therefore, which party, which class directs the Front? In Portugal, is history no longer the result of the class struggle?

nialism and the settler community virtually monopolized class domination and exploitation, it is understandable that, in the consciousness of the peasant masses, the conflict between Africans and settlers (seen from exterior, different races) won over the naked class struggle as the manifestation of colonial domination.

However, despite the objective impossibility of the peasants to become aware of the economic basis of their struggles, the truth is that in Angola the capitalist process of exploitation only spared a microscopic African bourgeoisie, which moreover was without political influence.

Dominant classes, privileged conditions and race were, therefore, one and the same.

A Naive and Adventurous Policy

For more than a year now, important changes have taken place within Angolan nationalism. The most notable external sign of these changes was the recognition by numerous African countries, beginning on June 23, 1963, of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (G.R.A.E.), formed in March 1962 by the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (F.N.L.A.)

As is known, the most important of these changes was the progressive degradation of the M.P.L.A. over the past year. Among the causes of this decomposition are:

1) Struggle between the interests of different social strata. Indeed, the M.P.L.A. was the Angolan organization which united, quite visibly, people from all African social strata, black as well as mulatto Angolans.

The M.P.L.A., in particular, brought together an even more visible number of intellectuals and "assimilados" destined to social and economic success.

The development of the Angolan Revolution could not prevent that, on the basis of their interests, origins, social situations and respective political and social aspirations members of the M.P.L.A. gathered themselves into blocs, each with different solutions to problems of organization and ideology, problems of tactics, of the united front, of external alliances, of the socio-economic structures of Angola after independence, etc.

Moreover, after the beginning of the armed struggle, when faced with Portuguese colonial propaganda concerning the alleged "basically racist" character of the armed movement of the masses, the various Angolan strata and social groups reacted differently.

Not seeking to look directly at the inhuman colonial conditions which had shaped the Angolan peasants; struck by a stronger affirmation on the part of the peasants of the values and symbols of their traditional cultures; incapable of understanding that—as Marx had observed—"the tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language (3)." Incapable of understanding all that, a number of intellectuals and students, members of the M.P.L.A. panicked before the

(3) Karl Marx, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*, F.L.P.H., Moscow, n.d.

movement of the masses and voiced excessive criticism of the "racist excesses" of the fighting peasants.

2) Struggle for the leadership of the M.P.L.A. Certain intellectuals and "assimilados" became convinced that, in order to lead the revolution along a "decent" road, to avoid the excesses of the peasants and in order to guarantee the "progressive" result of the revolution, their presence in the leadership of the M.P.L.A. and the revolutionary movement in general was indispensable. This conviction was not based on the fact that these nationalists had rid themselves of the deficiencies and prejudices of their colonial education or that they had shown the capability for directing the revolution and were really linked with the masses. For them, a diploma in the professions and the idea that they held of themselves were valid criteria. For these nationalists, the "salvation" of the revolution would be guaranteed basically by the union of the "spirit" (a group of educated and "assimilated" individuals) with the "mass without spirit" (the ignorant peasantry and proletariat). This was the old arrogant and reactionary duality.

Some nationalists, fearing that the popular revolution would end in the upheaval of the conditions in which they had acquired privileges and advantages, avoided overtly defending their privileges, either by arguing the indispensable nature of the Portuguese "cadres" (basically, a part of the social basis of Portuguese colonialism in Angola) or by contesting the value of the nationalist parties and leaders which were more linked with the masses, under the pretext that the revolution underway would not result immediately in socialism.

These demagogic positions served in reality, as motivation for fractional activities aimed at seizing the leadership of the M.P.L.A.

3) Struggle to impose new tactics. As is well known, there has been no success in uniting in a single front the Angolan parties, in particular, the M.P.L.A. and the F.N.L.A.

As for the F.N.L.A., it hid its real motives—its interest in utilizing for the benefit of strengthening itself the hegemony it held in a part of northern Angola, refusal to help make easier the crossing of the northern frontier into Angola by the M.P.L.A., attachment to certain aims, values and alliances incompatible with those of other Angolan parties, etc.—and its avoidance of a front with the M.P.L.A., while always maintaining that the M.P.L.A. had no military forces within Angola.

The M.P.L.A. was, hence, confronted with a difficult problem: the augmentation of its military forces required means of penetration into Angola, but that depended upon an understanding with the F.N.L.A., which, however, refused such an agreement. Therefore, it was only left to the M.P.L.A. to work harder to overcome its difficulties.

Nevertheless, before these perspectives, certain cadres and leaders of the M.P.L.A., themselves holding the positions cited above, defended the view that the M.P.L.A. should use new tactics whose objective would be the seizure of power in Angola by the M.P.L.A. The supporters of this view put forward two arguments: 1—The F.N.L.A. would constantly increase its military forces and 2—the Western supporters of the F.N.L.A. would aid it openly, at the proper moment, to take power in Angola.

The new tactics consisted, in general, of blowing up by propaganda the military exploits of the M.P.L.A., to seek strong support in the West for the M.P.L.A. and to obtain the end of the aid to the F.N.L.A..

4) The use of myths. Because of the exaggerated propaganda that the M.P.L.A. had made for two years about the liberation of Dr. Neto, his personality had assumed the proportions of a myth for a great number of leaders and members of the M.P.L.A. After his flight from Portugal (May 1962), Dr. Neto, while maintaining his own myth, accepted the new arguments and the new tactics, giving them an authority that only the accumulation of failures could, a year later, reduce to its true limits.

The representatives of the new arguments and tactics finally took over the effective domination of the organization, seizing the funds of the M.P.L.A. and legalizing their new situation by the national conference held in Leopoldville in December 1962.

However, by pushing through its electoral list, by 39 votes out of 70 delegates, the bloc in question made official the division within the M.P.L.A. and provided additional reasons for an opposition to its new policy.

The renewal of old relationships between several of the new leaders and several of a certain Portuguese "Left" linked with the revisionist trend, once again mobile, aided the acceleration of the division within the M.P.L.A.

Members were constantly being suspended and expelled—due to the arbitrary methods of the new disciplinary principle called "synthesis of the political and the military"—and were presented by the diplomats of the M.P.L.A. as adversaries of the political trends, parties and interests from which the new leadership demanded support. Thus, intrigue played an increasing role in this policy.

The National Political Council (the organization's highest body) and the Control Commission, created by the conference of December 1962, were never set up. The group responsible for the external relations of the movement seized the material means of the organization, with the intention of appearing, at the moment when it would be at the head of the M.P.L.A., as a genuine driving force. It was in this sense that were taken, between the month of August and the end of the conference of December 1, important military measures. However, the profound division of the M.P.L.A. was already well known in Leopoldville and the chances of resolving those problems disappeared during the month of January 1963.

The situation thus created obliged scores of well-trained soldiers of the M.P.L.A. to enlist within the ranks of the F.N.L.A., where they taught the use of arms to thousands of Angolan peasants.

The F.N.L.A., therefore, benefited indirectly from the decomposition of the M.P.L.A.

The recognition of the G.R.A.E. by the Congolese Government—a foreseeable event after the joint communique of June 8 of Abbe Youlou and Mr. Adoula—further pushed the leadership of the M.P.L.A. into a policy that was both naive and adventurous.

Observing the state of division of the M.P.L.A. and its isolation from the masses, the leaders of that organization, on the eve of the meeting in Leopoldville of the Committee of Conciliation appointed by the Committee of Coordination in Dar es Salaam, then tried to create the appearance of mass support by forming, on July 8, a Front (F.D.L.A.) with four Angolan groups, including two long known for their contacts with the Portuguese colonial administration.

It can then be understood why, by the use of false accusations, the ruling group of the M.P.L.A. led elements of the Congolese police to arrest,

on July 8, 43 Angolans belonging to the group of the M.P.L.A. that, three days earlier, had withdrawn its support for the policy of the ruling group and had proposed a plan of rapid recovery and reunification of the organization. These activities of the leaders of the M.P.L.A. had, in fact, for result the mortal lowering of the moral and political authority of that organization in the eyes of Congolese authorities.

In considering the F.N.L.A. as the only Angolan fighting front, and by recommending the recognition of the G.R.A.E. to African States, the Committee of Conciliation certainly based itself on the fact that the state of decomposition of the M.P.L.A. prevented it from satisfying the pressing demands of the armed struggle.

It would obviously be false to conclude only that Angolan intellectuals cannot or must not play a role in the revolution. They have their place; and the importance of their positive contribution to the struggle depends only upon their re-education in a revolutionary sense.

In our opinion, the historical significance of the upheavals that have taken place within the M.P.L.A. is that of a primary and elementary clarification of the problem of the driving forces and the directing force of the revolution, and in the confirmation that the ideology and the policy of the petty-bourgeoisie are without power to advance the revolution.

Perspectives

The motivating force of the national liberation movement of Angola lies in the violent social contradictions provoked by the establishment and development of capitalism in that country.

Although the armed struggle of the masses plays a leading role and is progressive and revolutionary, it is not, in itself, sufficient to guarantee "full success."

The particular position of Portuguese colonialism, in the context of the struggle between the powers that have risen to the highest rank after the last imperialist war (U.S.A., West Germany...) and the powers which have descended in rank to second place (Britain, France...), not only explains, in a certain measure, the delay in the setting into action of the process of decolonization of the Portuguese colonial empire, but explains also, in part, the nature of the results obtained in the first phase of the struggle of the Portuguese colonies against colonialism and imperialism.

Among the colonial powers of the 19th century, Portugal, as a semi-colony of Britain, held already a place in the second rank and, truthfully, it was not a competitor of the monopoly capitalism of the first-ranking powers of that time. It is correct to state that "the role of foreign capital in Portuguese colonialism is unique", and that "no other colonial system ever permitted such dispossession from within." (4) [Retranslated from the French.]

Although Angola is the direct State and juridical dependency of Portugal, it is also the financial and economic dependency of a large number of non-Portuguese interests: British, American, West German, Belgian, French, Dutch, Swiss, the Vatican, Brazilian, South African, etc.

The Portuguese "open door" policy does not excite the violent envy of absent financial groups—or those insufficiently present—either on the market or the exploitation of raw materials and means of production of Angola.

(4) Perry Anderson, *Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism*, London, 1962.

The present position of several powers on the Angolan market is as follows:

ANGOLAN IMPORTS

(In percentages)

Countries of origin	1958	1961
Portugal	46	43
United Kingdom	11	12
U.S.A.	11	10
Federal Germany	9	8
Belgium - Luxemburg	5.3	2.9
France	2.8	2.6
Sweden	1.1	1.6
Holland	1.3	1.5
Italy	1.1	1.5

ANGOLAN EXPORTS

(In percentages)

Countries of consumption	1958	1961
U.S.A.	25	21
Portugal	18	19.2
United Kingdom	16	19.2
Holland	12	10
Federal Germany	6.5	7
Italy	0.7	2.4
France	3.3	1.8
Belgium - Luxemburg	3.5	1.5
Sweden	0.2	0.1

Source: Repartição de Estatística General de Angola - 1951.

Portugal's credit has not been damaged. Quite to the contrary, the colonial war can only continue because of credit from diverse sources. Besides the more than 100 million dollars lent in 1962 by American, West German and French banks, Portugal obtained 25 million dollars credit from the World Bank.

If this latter loan has the significance, according to the opinion of the Portuguese Minister of Finances, of a value judgment, on the international scale, of the "economic and financial stability" and the "available resources" of Portugal, one is led to believe that Portugal does its best to reconcile with its own domination over its colonies, their economic annexation by the international monopolies.

Moreover, the external market of Angola only stimulates the production of the colony's principal products. Coffee production (principal markets: the U.S.A. and Holland), in 1962, was the highest of all time.

The foreign trade of Angola between January and May 1963 rose 39% by comparison with the same period in 1962.

The fragility of Portugal's economic structures, its genuine impossibility to safeguard its commercial, industrial and financial positions, its powerlessness to find positions to withdraw to, should it be evicted from its African domains, and to enchain by subsidies its colonies that had become independent, all that explains sufficiently the Portuguese conceptions of self-determination: "The consentment or adhesion of the population [of the colonies], expressed

by long-term administrative and political measures, to a determined form of State and government (5)." In brief: to do everything to prevent this self-determination from ever becoming independence.

Considering, however, that the Angolan sub-soil may reveal important minerals for modern industry, that Angola offers a strategic situation of the first order for the exploitation and the economic future of the Congo as well as for the imperialist battle for the "copperbelt," that the antagonism between various monopolies arises over the control of the most profitable sectors of the economy of Angola and over the conquest of a dominant position in this colony, etc., it is certain that the deals that Portugal is trying to make at present will never produce a stable result.

Moreover, a certain opposition, already open, between the policy of the Salazar government and that desired by Portuguese economic circles attached to the colonies, has encouraged them to exploit the ideological corruption of the Portuguese "left" within the framework of a front aimed eventually at overthrowing Salazar. The "social peace" under neo-fascism in Portugal would correspond with a neo-colonialism in Angola and Mozambique.

Until now, nothing leads us to believe in a decisive contribution of the majority of African States (and with reason!) to the Angolan Revolution.

Following the latest talks at the United Nations between Portugal and the African countries, the Foreign Minister recognized that the real obstacle to the colonial aims of Portugal did not lie in the "moderation" or in the "constructive spirit" of the "left" or the "right" of Africa, but in the "extremism" of a small African "extreme left."

Experience has already shown that the revisionist trend will only poison the Angolan Revolution.

Considering that, on one hand, the "front" of imperialist interests who are opposed to Angolan nationalism and, on the other hand, the present crisis of the world revolutionary movement and the absence of concrete support, either from the Portuguese proletariat, or from the majority of African States, the immediate future of the Angolan Revolution will depend, as in the past, almost exclusively on the internal development of Angolan nationalism.

The monopolies selling arms to Portugal, obviously interested in continuing the colonial war in Angola, will certainly not be prevented from manifesting their poisonous "support" for the Angolan nationalists.

Considered as the sole Angolan fighting front, the F.N.L.A. is the sole responsible, since August 1963, for the future of the Angolan Revolution. Will it succeed in uniting all the Angolan revolutionary forces? Will it transform itself into a vast organization, solid from a political, ideological and organizational point of view, functioning well and serving as an effective base for the armed struggle? Will it succeed in transforming the peasants, raising their level of revolutionary consciousness? Will it succeed, during the very course of the armed struggle, in resolving the vital problems of the peasantry, the principal source of fighters? Can it spread the armed struggle throughout the entire territory of Angola? Will it have the courage to bring to the benefit of the people of Angola the support of a sincere revolutionary internationalism? These are the questions now raised by all the fighters of Angola.

(5) *Diário de Notícias, Lisbon*, November 28, 1963—press conference of the Portuguese Foreign Minister.

Viriato da CRUZ