As has already been stated, the revolution ripened at a speed which outstripped the counter-measures taken by the bourgeoisie and the landlords. The revolution gained the support of the masses, penetrating to all parts of the front, spreading far into the interior of the country, to the backward regions, and making its way to the very heart of counter-revolution—the Cossack regions.
Regiments which had only recently vowed their allegiance to the black and red flag of the bourgeois shock battalions, now refused to obey their commanders.
The regimental committee of the Semyonovsky Guards Regiment—which had gained notoriety for its ruthless suppression of the uprising of the Moscow workers in 1905 boasted that “the whole regiment would assume the lead of the storm troops”(1); but a few days later the Semyonovsky Guards refused to go into the trenches.
The regiments of the II Corps of Guards at first expressed a wish to be counted as storm regiments, but later whole regiments refused to obey orders.
In reference to the Polish Uhlan Regiment and the Czech regiments, which Kornilov proposed should be the first to be launched against the revolution, Dukhonin gloomily made the following notation on Kornilov’s memorandum: “General Headquarters do not consider them absolutely reliable.”(2)
There was suppressed unrest among the Cossacks at the front, who resented having to perform police duties. Ataman Bogayevsky reported that the Cossacks at the front had sent a protest against the decision of the Cossack Grand Council to form an alliance with the Cadets in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Representatives of the Cossacks at the front sharply protested against the decision of the Kuban Cossack Rada to proclaim the Kuban an independent republic.
The conflict between Cossack commanders and men at times assumed an acute form. A resolution adopted by the Omsk Soviet of Cossack Deputies on the night of October 4 proclaimed the Grand and Minor Councils of the Siberian Cossacks counter-revolutionary; their Chairmen were arrested and a guard was placed over the headquarters of the Councils. “The Cossacks have adopted an irreconcilable attitude—they refuse to fight the Bolsheviks,”(3) is the way General Dukhonin summed up the spread of the revolutionary spirit among the Cossacks.
There was a danger that the last fighting forces of the counter-revolutionaries might slip from their hands. Sensing that a crisis was approaching, they decided to assume the offensive. This was openly admitted by General Brusilov at the Congress of Public Men in Moscow:
“Everybody is talking about a strong government. But a strong government will appear only when the majority of the people and the soldiers realise the full depths of the country’s decline and when they say: ‘Enough of dis-organisation; we want order, we want to enjoy our liberty, we do not want anarchy.’ When this occurs a strong government will appear.”(4)
Brusilov’s appeal to resort to open action against the revolution was supported by Ilyin, another delegate. Asserting that there were now only two parties—the party of disruption, headed by the Bolsheviks, and the party of order, headed by Kornilov—Ilyin insolently declared:
“We are the party of order. If the revolution consists in everybody grabbing what he can, then we are counter-revolutionary.”(5)
Kornilov was again becoming the ideal of the counter-revolutionaries.
“We regard the name of Kornilov,” Struve, that out-and-out reactionary, declared at a meeting of the Pre-parliament, “as an absolutely honest one, and for this honest name we are prepared to lay down our lives.”(6)
Struve’s statement was greeted by stormy applause in the Pre-Parliament, the body which, according to the plans of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik traitors, was to represent the will of the people until the Constituent Assembly met.
The continuation of the war bound the government hand and foot in its fight against revolution; and the Provisional Government took the path of the tsarist Ministers who before the February Revolution had endeavoured to arrange a separate peace with the Germans. At a confidential meeting of the government held on October 11, Tereshchenko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, advanced a new slogan—“War As Long as the Army is in a Condition to Fight!”—in place of the slogan, “War to a Victorious Finish!”(7) The new slogan would render Russia’s participation in the war purely conditional: at any moment it might be proclaimed that the army was not in a condition to fight, and Russia would withdraw from the war.
But the preparation of public opinion did not stop there. On October 21 Burtsev, the editor of a yellow sheet, Obshcheye Dyelo, announced that the question of concluding a separate peace with the Germans had been discussed at a meeting of a commission of the Pre-Parliament on October 20. The paper was immediately suppressed on Kerensky’s orders, not for libellous statements, however, but for—publishing information about a confidential meeting of the Commission.
The government was anxious to conclude peace and to start an offensive against the revolution. Almost simultaneously, on October 9, the Menshevik Nikitin, the Minister of the Interior, sent out an order instructing that special committees should be formed under the aegis of the Provincial Commissars of the Provisional Government, consisting of representatives of local government bodies and of the judicial and military authorities. The purpose of the committees was to muster the local forces that were prepared to support the Provisional Government. The committees were endowed with plenary powers.
On October 11, the Minister of War issued an order that the army should be enlisted “in the fight against anarchy.” Armed forces were thus placed at the disposal of the counter-revolutionary Committees.
The Mensheviks seconded the efforts of the bourgeoisie. On October 15 they submitted to the Pre-Parliament a draft of “Provisional Regulations for Combating the Pogrom Movement.” The draft provided for the creation in all localities of plenipotentiary Committees of Public Safety consisting of representatives of various organisations and of the military and judicial authorities. The Pre-Parliament, to which were submitted the proposal of the Mensheviks and that of the Menshevik Minister, Nikitin, for the creation of committees under the Provincial Commissars, endorsed the draft proposed by the Mensheviks, for in that guise the counter-revolutionary nature of the committees would be less obvious. It was the Mensheviks who were responsible for creating the Committees of Public Safety which assumed the leadership of the counter-revolutionary forces immediately after the October Revolution broke out.
Cavalry units were hastily transferred to the rear from the front. On October 4, on the orders of the Ministry of War, a cavalry division was dispatched to the Donbas from the Rumanian Front. The purpose of this transfer was precisely defined in a telegram sent by General Dukhonin to General Shcherbachov on October 12:
“For the purpose of maintaining order in the Donetz district, urgently [the word ‘urgently’ was inserted by Dukhonin when he signed the telegram—Ed.] dispatch a mounted division to be placed at the disposal of the Commander of the Odessa Military Area at a point to be designated by him.”(8)
The division was dispatched, notwithstanding that the front had been almost stripped bare, and notwithstanding the objections of General Shcherbachov, the Commander of the Rumanian Front.
While transferring troops to such disturbed areas as the Donbas, the reactionaries also sent reliable troops to reinforce the garrisons in the large key cities. Thus, on the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front, a Don Cossack infantry brigade was hastily transferred to Kiev. A previous order for the withdrawal of the 17th Don Cossack Regiment from the city was countermanded at the request of the local authorities.
Reinforcements were sent to such important key cities as Bryansk and Smolensk. The 4th Siberian Cossack Regiment was hastily dispatched to Smolensk.
Urgent measures were taken to strengthen the garrison in Moghilev, where General Headquarters were located. The latter, insisting on the reinforcement of the garrison in Moghilev, sent the following demand to the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front:
“Send us the 1st Orenburg Regiment. It is recommended by the Petrograd Cossack Congress. October 19.”(9)
This it was which determined the political reliability of the regiments!
The whole area in the neighbourhood of the front was inundated with cavalry, which was furnished with a definite plan of action. An idea of this plan can be obtained from the following document sent from the South-Western Front:
“For the protection of the rear there have been placed at the disposal of the chief of supply of the Army on the South-Western Front the 6th and 7th [a mistake in the text; apparently the 5th is meant—Ed.] Don Cossack divisions and the 1st Regiments of the 1st Horse Guards Division. The entire 6th Cossack Division has been quartered in the area west of the Dnieper, and of the 5th Cossack Division 1 1/2 regiments east and 2 1/2 west of the Dnieper, 1 1/2 in Kiev and 1 in Vinnitsa; a regiment of the Horse Guards Division has been quartered east of the Dnieper. The whole rear area has been divided into regimental protection sectors. The Commander of the 6th Cossack Division has been appointed commander of all the troops designated for the protection of the area west of the Dnieper, and the Commander of the 5th Cossack Division has been appointed commander of all the troops designated for protection of the Kiev area and the area east of the Dnieper. The commanders of both divisions have been subordinated to the Chief of Supply of the Army on the South-Western Front through the Commander of the Kiev Military Area. In addition, there has been placed at the disposal of the Chief of Transport of the Army on the South-Western Front three regiments of the 1st Horse Guards Division and six separate squadrons for the protection of the railway. No. 2659086/793. Stogov.”(10)
More careful military measures were taken against the internal foe than against the external foe. At the front, hastily-formed units were driven into action, often without plan and without any regard for the fighting spirit of the soldiers. But in the rear, the plan was worked out in every detail. Areas were divided into sectors. Every commander received precise instructions beforehand. The troops were carefully selected; they were passed through several filters.
The reactionaries devoted particular attention to Moscow. When new preparations for an offensive against the revolution were undertaken, General Headquarters decided to dispatch a cavalry division to Moscow. On October 2 Dukhonin wired the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front:
“The Supreme Commander has given orders for the immediate transfer by rail of one of the regular cavalry divisions to be placed at the disposal of the Commander of the Moscow Military Area as he shall instruct. Please wire which cavalry division is assigned.”(11)
In connection with the dispatch of the division, orders were given to withdraw the 7th Cossack Regiment from Moscow, but the Moscow authorities decided that a bird in the hand was worth two in the bush. Colonel Ryabtsev, the Commander of the Moscow Military Area, urgently requested that the regiment be allowed to remain in Moscow. General Headquarters consented. Furthermore, it ordered the transfer of the 4th Siberian Cossack Regiment to Kaluga, in closer proximity to Moscow.
But revolutionary events developed with such speed that even these forces proved inadequate. Moscow kept asking from day to day when the division would arrive, and on October 20 the following telegram was sent to General Headquarters:
“The resolution adopted by the Bolshevik Soviet on the immediate seizure of the factories, and the decree anticipated in connection therewith, render action by the Bolsheviks and the seizure of government and public institutions in Moscow highly probable in the immediate future, perhaps to-day. There is information that Moscow will be the centre of the revolt. For the preservation of order in Moscow the forces at my disposal are adequate . . . but in the area, where similar action is anticipated at many points, it is possible that your assistance will be required, chiefly in the form of cavalry and horse artillery, of which the Minister of War has been informed. Acting Commander of the Moscow Military Area, Colonel Kravchuk.(12)
The Moscow counter-revolutionaries apparently knew of the letter in which Lenin stated that the insurrection might start in Moscow. The reactionaries did not wait for the insurrection and took precautionary measures. This casts light on the subsequent events in Moscow, where the insurrection dragged on for several days: the Moscow counter-revolutionaries had managed to accumulate considerable forces.
Dukhonin made the following notation on the telegram signed by Colonel Kravchuk:
“Preparations should be made to dispatch, if not a division, at least a brigade with horse artillery. Dukhonin.”(13)
That same day, October 20, General Headquarters informed Moscow:
“Orders have been given to prepare a mounted brigade and a battery for dispatch to you from the South-Western Front on receipt of intimation from you that they are required.”(14)
In the light of these facts, how groundless, how childishly and naïve is Trotsky’s “theory” that the refusal to allow troops to be withdrawn from Petrograd pre-determined the issue of the October insurrection.
“The result of the insurrection of October 25,” Trotsky says in his Lessons of October, “was three-quarters pre-determined, if not more, at the time we resisted the withdrawal of the Petrograd garrison, set up the Revolutionary Military Committee (October 16), appointed our commissar to all military units and institutions, and thereby completely isolated not only the staff of the Petrograd Military Area but also the government. This was virtually the armed insurrection. . . . The insurrection of October 25 bore only a supplementary character.”(15)
In the light of the above documents, this treacherous legend melts away like snow in the sun. The refusal to allow the regiments to be withdrawn from Petrograd was nothing but a challenge to the counter-revolutionaries cast by the revolutionaries. And it was after this that the counter-revolutionaries developed such feverish activity in their attempt to forestall the impending insurrection. If the Bolshevik Party had believed even for a single moment that the refusal to allow the garrison to be withdrawn from Petrograd was “virtually the armed insurrection,” the success of which was rendered certain by this refusal, it would have fallen into the trap set by the counter-revolutionaries. What Trotsky’s “lawful,” and “peaceful insurrection” would have led to was that the counter-revolutionaries, having mustered their forces, would have crushed the “peaceful” victims.
And this was completely borne out by the subsequent course of events.
The counter-revolutionaries completed their preparations: general staffs for crushing the revolution were set up in the various localities, in the shape of the notorious Committees of Public Safety; these committees were endowed with plenary powers; reliable troops were summoned from the front; the detachments which had long been held in readiness in the rear were now brought to a state of military preparedness; large reinforcements were sent to important points and to the big industrial cities, while in Petrograd itself all measures were taken for the suppression of an armed uprising.
On October 14, the day after the plenary meeting of the Petrograd Soviet had sanctioned the formation of a Revolutionary Military Committee and had instructed it to assume its function immediately, Kerensky summoned a meeting of members of the Provisional Government. General Bagratuni, Chief of Staff of the Petrograd Military Area, informed the Meeting of the measures taken to deal with a possible uprising. The Provisional Government, which did not believe that the impending uprising would be a “peaceful” one, endorsed these measures and gave instructions that the defence of the city should be entrusted to the Military Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. The following day, Polkovnikov, the Commander of the Petrograd Military Area, forbade all demonstrations, meetings and processions, no matter by whom they were arranged. His order ended with the words:
“I hereby give warning that I shall adopt the most extreme measures to suppress any attempt to disturb order in Petrograd.”(16)
At a confidential meeting of the Provisional Government held on October 16, Polkovnikov reported on the preparations being made to deliver a counter-blow. Polkovnikov stated that the junker schools in the neighbourhood of Petrograd had been summoned to the capital and that part of an armoured car battalion had been quartered at the Winter Palace. Endorsing the measures proposed, the government considered it necessary to transfer the control of the militia from the district Dumas of the city directly to the government. The armed forces of the capital were brought under centralised control.
Another meeting of the Provisional Government was held the following day. Reports were made by Kerensky, Verkhovsky, the Minister of War, and Nikitin, the Minister of the Interior, who had all just returned from the front. Kerensky announced that all necessary measures had already been taken: the guard at the Winter Palace and Mariinsky Palace, the seats of the government and the Pre-parliament respectively, had been reinforced; two ensign schools had been summoned from Oranienbaum near Petrograd to protect the post-office, telegraph office and telephone station; an armoured train and a number of military units had been summoned from the Rumanian Front; the militia had been reinforced. In a word, Kerensky assured the meeting the available military forces were quite adequate.
How preparations were proceeding within Petrograd itself may be judged from the following facts.
On October 3 unreliable companies of the 1st Reserve Brigade of Guards, which formed part of the garrison of the Fortress of Peter and Paul, were replaced by four companies of a cycle battalion. On October 10 the First Oranienbaum Ensign School arrived in Petrograd to guard the Winter Palace. On October 16 the Second Oranienbaum Ensign School arrived. On October 17 orders were given to place at the disposal of the Commander of the Petrograd Military Area sixteen Fiat armoured cars and one Harford armoured car for the protection of the Winter Palace and government buildings.
The decisive moment was at hand: the revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries faced each other in battle array.
The first blow was struck by the counter-revolutionaries. Believing that the Bolsheviks would raise the standard of revolt on October 20, the date originally proposed for the opening of the Second Congress of Soviets, the Provisional Governments, on the day before the opening, i.e., October 19, again issued orders for Lenin’s arrest. The government prosecutor instructed all authorities to make a search for Lenin, to arrest him and to deliver him to P. A. Alexandrov, Court Investigator on Important Cases.
That same day, a government Commissar named Galin, arrived in Kaluga with the Cossacks, issued an ultimatum to the Kaluga Soviet demanding that its Soldiers’ Section should be dissolved and the garrison disarmed. A punitive detachment surrounded the Palace of Liberty—where all the sections of the Soviet held their sessions—fired on the building, wrecked the headquarters of the Soviet and arrested the Bolshevik deputies. The Cossacks who wrecked the Soviet said that they had been instructed to disperse another twelve Soviets which held Bolshevik views, including the Moscow Soviet.
In Kazan, the Commander of the Military Area ordered the disarming of an artillery battalion which supported the Bolsheviks.
In Tashkent, General Korovnichenko had the barracks, which were occupied by revolutionary-minded soldiers, surrounded by Cossacks and junkers supported by two armoured cars.
In Petrograd, the streets were picketed by strong detachments of junkers and Cossacks, while reserves were concealed in various parts of the city, ready to go into action at a moment’s notice. The militia was ordered to hold itself in readiness; half the force was constantly kept on duty at headquarters. The city was heavily patrolled by Cossacks.
A secret order was issued to the Petrograd garrison:
“In view of the fact that the principal objects of seizure will be the Winter Palace, the Smolny Institute, the Mariinsky Palace, the Taurida Palace, the staff headquarters of the Military Area, the State Bank, the Treasury Printing Office, the Post and Telegraph Office and the Central Telephone Station, all efforts must be directed towards retaining these institutions in our hands. This entails occupying the line of the River Neva on one side and the line of the Obvodny Canal and the Fontanka on the other, thus preventing the rebels from gaining access to the central part of the city. . . .”(17)
Then followed detailed instructions as to how the regiments should act in the event of armed action by the workers.
This order was intercepted by the Commissar of the Finland Reserve Regiment and delivered to the Revolutionary Military Committee.
As we know, the insurrection did not take place on the 20th; nor was the Congress of Soviets held that day. The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik traitors manœuvred, and at the last moment decided to postpone the Congress for another five days, hoping in the meantime to increase the number of their supporters among the delegates. A not unimportant motive was the desire to defeat the plans of the Bolsheviks at the last moment. The petty-bourgeois politicians also believed that the insurrection had been planned to coincide with the Congress and by postponing the Congress they hoped to postpone the insurrection.
But, having taken the offensive, the counter-revolutionaries persisted in the execution of their plans.
On October 20 the Second Peterhof Ensign School was summoned to Petrograd to replace the First Oranienbaum School at the Winter Palace. On October 21 the First Peterhof Ensign School arrived in the capital and occupied the Anichkov Palace.
On October 23 the Staff of the Petrograd Military Area was instructed to transfer to the city a shock battalion from Tsarskoye Syelo, the artillery of the Guards from Pavlovsk and a number of units from the Northern Front. On October 24 a company of the 1st Petrograd Women’s Battalion arrived to reinforce the garrison at the Winter-Palace. The Third Peterhof Ensign School and the Ensign School of the Northern Front, each man supplied with 100 cartridges, were due to arrive in Petrograd on October 25.
As we see, the Provisional Government did not trust the army. The core of the troops transferred to the capital was made up of the military schools—“the bourgeois guard,” as Lenin called them. The class instinct of the government did not err: even some of the picked units, as, for example, the Colt Machine-Gun Battalion and the Cycle Battalion, not only failed to give armed support to the Provisional Government, but even joined the insurrectionary Petrograd workers.
Finally, the government armed the sections of the population whose support it thought it could rely on.
On October 18 the Chief of Staff of the Petrograd Military Area gave orders that “20 revolvers and 400 cartridges be issued to Drankin, Commander of the Students’ Motor-Cycle Detachment.”(18) On October 20 orders were given to issue 100 revolvers and rifles and 3,000 cartridges to the Bank Employees’ Committee. On October 24 orders were given to issue arms to “a company of maimed and wounded soldiers, escaped prisoners of war,”(19) organised by V. Orlovich. On October 24 a similar detachment was formed and armed by Ensign Frolov. On October 24 a machine-gun was issued to the sailor Chaikin, Chairman of a Petrograd regional Volunteer recruiting committee.
Attention was principally devoted to the defence of the Winter Palace—the headquarters of the Provisional Government. The selection of a mixed detachment to serve as the garrison of the palace proceeded from October 10 to October 23. The selection was made with the greatest care. The main body of the detachment consisted of the military schools with picked students. When rank-and-file soldiers were asked for, it was with the reservation that they must be “reliable men.” Thus, an order was given on October 17 to the commander of a machine-gun battalion to send “reliable” machine-gunners to man the two Colt guns and two Maxim guns in the palace. Other orders were of a similar tenor.
The composition and arms of the detachment assigned to guard the Winter Palace were as follows (on October 21):(20)
| Unit | Officers | Junkers | Soldiers | Guns | Armoured Cars | Machine-guns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Second Peterhof Ensign School | 10 | 300 | 6 | — | — | — |
| Second Oranienbaum Ensign School | 22 | 330 | — | — | — | 9 |
| Mikhailovsky Artillery School | 2 | 66 | — | 6 | — | — |
| Armoured Car Battalion | 2 | — | 15 | — | 5 | 10 |
| 4th Company, 1st Cycle Battalion | 1 | — | 54 | — | — | — |
| 37 | 696 | 75 | 6 | 5 | 19 |
In the course of the next few days the mixed detachment was reinforced by shock troops from Tsarskoye Syelo, a company of the 1st Petrograd Women’s Battalion, junkers from the Ensign School of the Northern Front, three companies of Cossacks, junkers from the Engineers’ School, and several other units, a total strength of 1,600.
From October 16 to October 24 junker detachments gradually occupied the government buildings and the most important strategic points in the city.
On October 16 cyclist observation posts were placed “until further notice” on Millionnaya Street and the Politseisky Bridge and in the Alexandrovsky Park opposite Gorckhovaya Street and the Vozhcsensky Prospect.
On October 17, junkers were sent to reinforce the guard of the Kresty Prison, the Second City Railway Ticket office and other places. That same day armoured cars were stationed at the Treasury Printing Office, the State Bank, the Central Post Office, the Central Railway Telegraph Office and the Nikolayevsky Station. Orders were given that all the armoured cars were to have twelve belts of machine-gun cartridges.
On October 20 the non-commissioned officers’ training company of the Izmailovsky Reserve Regiment arrived to guard the Nikolayevsky Station. On October 24 junkers occupied the Central Telegraph Office, the Central Telephone Station, all the railway stations, the Chief Railway Ticket Office and the government buildings. That same day junker pickets were posted at the corners of the larger streets and began to stop and direct to the Winter Palace all automobiles not provided with proper passes.
On October 24 junkers occupied the bridges across the Neva.
On October 24, too, the troops from the front were expected in Petrograd.
“At my orders,” Kerensky subsequently wrote, “troops were urgently to be sent from the front to St. Petersburg, and the first troop trains from the Northern Front were to arrive in the capital on October 24.”(21)
It was on this day, too—October 24, the day before the Congress of Soviets opened—that the last, decisive blow was to be delivered—the Smolny was to be attacked and occupied.
“Immediately after the meeting of the government,” Kerensky relates in reference to the meeting in the Winter Palace at 11 p.m. on October 23, “the Commander of the Military Area and his Chief of Staff came to see me. They proposed that an expeditionary force should be formed from all the troops remaining faithful to the Provisional Government, including the Cossacks, to seize the Smolny Institute—the headquarters of the Bolsheviks. Evidently, this plan received my immediate approval and I insisted on its being put into effect at once.”(22)
[1] Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the South-Western Front, File No. 142-004, folio 414.
[2] Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—Adjutant-General’s Office, File No. 76-084, folio 366.
[3] A. I. Denikin, Sketches of the Russian Revolt, Vol. II, Paris, 1922, p. 138.
[4] “The Conference of Public Men,” Russkiye Vedomosti, No. 235, October 14, 1917.
[5] “The Second Moscow Conference,” Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, No. 197, October 14, 1917.
[6] “The Council of the Republic—P. B. Struve’s Speech,” Dyelo Naroda, No. 186, October 21, 1917.
[7] “In the Provisional Government,” Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, No. 195, October 12, 1917.
[8] Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—General-Quartermaster’s Department, File No. 673, folio 142.
[9] Ibid., folio 186.
[10] Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—General Quarter-masters’ Department, File No. 673, folios 156-57.
[11] Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—General Quarter-masters’ Department, File No. 673, folio 105.
[12] Ibid., folio 198.
[13] Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—General Quarter-masters’ Department, File No. 673, folio 200.
[14] Ibid., folio 200.
[15] L. Trotsky, “Lessons of October,” Collected Works, Vol. III, Part 1, Moscow, pp. xlix-1.
[16] “Announcement,” Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, No. 199, October 17, 1917.
[17] Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 2003s, Folio 46.
[18] A. Dregen, “The Petrograd Garrison in October,” Krasnaya Letopis, 1927, No. 2 (23), p. 113.
[19] The Bolshevisation of the Petrograd Garrison Materials and Documents, Leningrad, 1932, p. 337.
[20] A. Dregen, “The Petrograd Garrison in October,” Krasnaya Letopis, 1927, No. 2 (23), p. 115.
[21] A. F. Kerensky, From Afar, Paris, p. 195.
[22] A. F. Kerensky, From Afar, Paris, p. 300.
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