The counter-revolutionaries regarded the shock battalions as a force which might prevent the disintegration or the army and which, if necessary, could be utilised against the revolution in the rear. Within the army itself, the reactionaries endeavoured above all to retain the support of the officers.
Under the immediate influence of the February Revolution the generals had tried to retain the support of the rank and file of the army by creating joint committees of officers and men.
But nothing came of this. Order No. 1 prescribed the creation of committees consisting solely of representatives of the lower ranks, and this served at once to undermine the position of the officers in the army.
The counter-revolutionaries found another way. A Chief Committee of the Alliance of Officers of the Army and Navy was formed at General Headquarters, ostensibly with the purpose of protecting the professional interests of the officers. In point of fact, the Alliance became one of the most important political organisations of the counter-revolutionaries. It heartened the officers, who had for a time lost their bearings in the stormy days of revolution, laid down a political line for them, and gave material support to officers who had been driven out of their regiments. The rules of the Alliance defined its chief purpose as being
“to combat the propaganda of all persons and groups designed to disturb the foundations of the army and navy and to resist the actions of individuals and groups designed to disturb the foundations of the army and navy. . . .”(1)
The activities of the Alliance were centred on the fight against the Bolsheviks. The Chief Committee of the Officers’ Alliance issued manifestos and resolutions in thousands of copies calling for a fight against “Bolshevik anarchy.” Officers sympathetic to the Bolshevik Party were proclaimed enemies of the people and traitors and were blacklisted. The Chief Committee wired all the armies requesting to be supplied with the names of Bolshevik officers.
It should be noted that the Alliance, which was ostensibly a public organisation, addressed itself directly to the Chiefs of Staffs, and in doing so made no concealment of its political aims. The Chief Committee took it for granted that the persons it was addressing, because of their very position, shared the views of the Alliance. When, however, the staff of the Sixth Army appeared to have doubts as to this procedure, the Chief Committee passed strictures on it:
“The Chief Committee of the Alliance of Officers can only express its astonishment at your refusal to supply it with information regarding officers who have disgraced themselves by their Bolshevik activities.”(2)
The Chief Committee sent a copy of this stricture to General Headquarters so as to draw the attention of the higher authorities to the refractory State of the Sixth Army.
In general, the Alliance enjoyed exceptional influence at General Headquarters. Not a single political document was issued from General Headquarters before the Chief Committee had given its opinion on it. Thus, the Committee of the Twelfth Army—which was by no means Bolshevik—wired General Headquarters:
“According to information at our disposal, all projects which are in the least degree democratic in spirit, when submitted to General Headquarters emerge therefrom in a mutilated condition under the immediate influence of the Officers’ Alliance.”(3)
The Chief Committee became the legislative body of General Headquarters. It was not for nothing that the chairman of the Alliance was General Alexeyev, former Chief of Staff under Nicholas II.
The Alliance terrorised officers and threatened to boycott those who refused to become members. In this way it managed to enrol a large number of officers and to function as an important organ of counter-revolution. Not a single reactionary measure was taken either in the army or in the rear in which the Officers’ Alliance did not have an active hand. For instance, when the question of restoring the death penalty was mooted, the Alliance issued a veritable flood of telegrams, threats, petitions, reports and letters insisting on the immediate introduction of the death penalty. When it was necessary to create a name for the general who was destined for the post of dictator, the Alliance acted as his publicity agent, circulated a biography of the general, sent him telegrams of greeting and promised him every possible support. And all this was done in the name of all the officers, although a section of them did not approve of the reactionary policy of the Alliance, and some of them had long ago parted way even with the compromisers.
The Officers’ Alliance developed an intensive campaign in connection with the preparations for the Kornilov revolt and took a most active part in the conspiracy of the generals. The Alliance negotiated with the Cossack commanders, sent representatives to the Alliance of the Knights of St. George and established contact with the reactionary bourgeois organisations in Petrograd and Moscow. Some idea of its activities may be gathered from a resolution adopted at an extraordinary joint meeting of the Chief Committee and a conference of Knights of St. George on August 10, 1917:
“At the very outbreak of the Russian revolution, certain persons unknown to the fatherland, led by ‘friends’ coming from Germany, made the proposal to extend a ‘fraternal’ hand to the camp of our mortal enemies—the Austro-Germans. Our enemies, their hands stained in Russian blood, grasped the extended fratricidal hand, and crossing into the land of our fathers, trampled down the graves of millions of warriors who had honourably fallen in Russia’s cause. For five months our fatherland has suffered in the fratricidal fire and has become the laughing-stock of the whole world. . . .”(4)
And so on, and so forth, in this same jingoistic, pogromist strain. The resolution ended with a vow the officers took to fight
“until Russia, protected by our powerful Alliance, arises in honour from her shame, victorious from her defeat, imperishable in her greatness and freedom.”(5)
This resolution was dispatched from General Headquarters to all the armies. The incompetent generals, who had led the army from defeat to defeat, swore to be victorious, if only they were permitted to restore the old feudal system and régime in the army. Corrupt commissaries, thieves who had robbed the soldiers, swore to restore the honour of the army, if only they were once more allowed uncontrolled disposal of the soldiers’ rations.
The collapse of the Kornilov revolt exposed the counter-revolutionary nature of the Officers’ Alliance; it revealed that this “democratic” organisation was controlled by the generals. A wave of protest swept through the army, which had long been anxiously watching the activities of the Alliance. Numerous resolutions demanded that this nest of generals should be dispersed and that the ringleaders should be put into the dock together with Kornilov.
The Provisional Government, however, had no intention of dissolving the Alliance. It knew that the flood of resolutions from the army committees could not injure the organisation, and that it would hold its ground. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who vacillated between the command of the army and its rank and file, and who feared the former more than the latter, often adopted resolutions under the pressure of the masses. One had to sit tight and wait until the paper torrent subsided. But such was not the case with the spontaneous explosion of hatred of the soldiers against the Officers’ Alliance. At times the protest of the soldiers went to the length of lynch law on the officers. Scores were shot by the soldiers, and in particular the sailors shot scores of the more detested officers.
But here the Government came to the assistance of the Chief Committee of the Officers’ Alliance. The records contain an extremely interesting minute of a conversation which took place over the direct wire between Baranovsky, Chief of Chancellery of the Minister of War, and General Lukomsky, a prominent counter-revolutionary leader. Baranovsky admonished General Lukomsky:
“I consider it necessary to add in my own name that, knowing the work of the Officers’ Alliance, I am convinced that Kerensky and the Committee of the Officers’ Alliance are following the same road, but the methods of traversing this road differ profoundly, and, in particular, the way chosen by the Committees is absolutely impossible and impermissible, because it only complicates the situation and places difficulties in the way of Kerensky’s activities; and it spoils things for itself, because the impression is created in Petrograd, not only in democratic bodies but in all circles, that the Committee of the Alliance is playing a strange game and is a nest of reaction. . . .”(6)
It appears, then, that Kerensky, the leader of “revolutionary democracy,” and the Committee of the Officers’ Alliance were “following absolutely the same road.” All that displeased Baranovsky was that the Chief Committee was too headlong in its preparations for a dictatorship, thereby placing “difficulties in the way of Kerensky’s activities.”
The government could not and would not consent to the dissolution of the Alliance. Such an act might alienate the generals, who regarded Kerensky with suspicion as it was. The Officers’ Alliance was left unmolested. Its leaders discontinued recruiting new cadres for the time being, hoping soon to play a big part in political affairs. The Officers’ Alliance, operating at General Headquarters under the protection of the government, became transformed into a sort of recruiting and dispatching centre for counter-revolutionary forces. The Chairman of the Alliance, General Alexeyev, actively organised the muster and dispatch of White Guards to the Don and the Kuban, where they were placed under the command of the Cossack Ataman, General Kaledin. Delegates from the Alliance sent on the pretext of official business, visited the armies.
As the tide of revolution rose, the activities of the Alliance became more and more energetic and unconcealed. Recovering from their recent defeat, officers in places began to advocate Kornilovite demands. Officers’ congresses were held in a number of armies. Commanders demanded more effective measures against the Bolsheviks and the cessation of the campaign against the officers. How bold the members of the Alliance became may be judged from a resolution adopted at a congress of officers of the Tenth Army:
“Since the chief cause of the general disintegration in the army is distrust of the officers sown among the soldiers, the Provisional Government must clearly and definitely, in a special statement, once more declare its confidence in the officers, who are honestly performing their duty to the fatherland and the revolution. . . . The officers are not enemies of the soldier, but friends of the Russian revolution. There should be no political struggle within the ranks of the army, but members of society are free to belong to any political party they please. . . . We appeal to the Provisional Government to help us by carrying out the above-mentioned measures and by waging an effective fight against Bolshevism, utilising for this purpose the army units which have not lost their fighting capacity. Otherwise even this new feat of the officers will not achieve its purpose.”(7)
Sensing the imminence of a decisive conflict, the officers began to speak in the language of the man who had recently inspired them, General Kornilov.
Particular mention should be made of the work of the Officers’ Alliance in the junkers’ schools and ensign schools. There were twenty-six junker schools in the old army. The majority of them were located in the large cities—eight in Petrograd, four in Kiev, two in Moscow and two in Odessa. It is difficult to establish the actual number of junkers owing to its frequent fluctuations. But, in general, the schools turned out over 3,000 officers at each graduation.
There were thirty-eight ensign schools. They were located in the same towns as the junker schools or in the vicinity. Nearly 19,000 ensigns were turned out by these schools at each graduation.
Isolated as they were from the revolutionary influence of the soldiers, the junker and ensign schools offered a very favourable field for the activities of the Officers’ Alliance.
Having first recruited the instructors of these schools, the reactionaries rapidly won over the junkers themselves. Counter-revolutionary sentiments predominated in these schools. Even the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks constituted a minority, and as to the Bolsheviks, there were only individuals here and there. The junkers had no need to conceal their views behind the screen of the “Socialist parties.” The junkers formed the most reliable shock battalions of counter-revolution and were the first to take up arms against the dictatorship of the proletariat.
[1] Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the South-Western Front, File No. 142-220, folio 10.
[2] Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Rumanian Front, File No. 320-423, folio 119.
[3] Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Executive Committee of the South-Western Front, File No. 56-833, folio 269.
[4] Central Archives of Military History, Records of Headquarters of the Third Army, File No. 311-314, folio 308.
[5] Ibid., folio 309.
[6] Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1588S, folio 30.
[7] Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—General-Quartermaster’s Department, File No. 2066, folios 2-3.
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