The Kornilov revolt had accentuated the antagonism and intensified the conflict between the officers and private soldiers. The last remnants of confidence in the officers had been undermined by their direct participation in the counter-revolutionary conspiracy or the open sympathy they showed it. Contact between the officers and the units under their command became more and more shaky. The class struggle in the army entered a new phase.
The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Committee of the Twelfth Army sent the following telegram to Chkheidze:
“The Kornilov plot has left a profound impression. The masses are losing faith in everybody. Distrust in the officers caused by the retreat is being intensified by the Kornilov affair.”(1)
Reports on the state of feeling in the army on the Western Front described the situation in the following terms:
“The action of General Kornilov has almost everywhere destroyed the good relations which had been established between the officers and the rank and file. Agitation against the officers has become more active, particularly where the soldiers had information that some of their officers belonged to the Officers’ Alliance.”(2)
Many of the regiments insisted on the dissolution of the Officers’ Alliance. The soldiers expressed open indignation at the privileges enjoyed by Kornilov and his accomplices while under arrest. They demanded an early trial.
“You, dear comrades, write in the newspapers about Sukhomlinov and about Kornilov,” soldiers on active service wrote to the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders in the middle of September, “that certain witnesses or other are exonerating them. How long you are dragging out this trial, dear comrades! For six months; if we are not mistaken, Sukhomlinov has been awaiting trial, the same is true of Kornilov, and it is clear that they are guilty and that there is no crime with which they could not be charged: they have betrayed us, they have shed our blood. You try them in this way—in twenty-four hours, just as they did to us under the old régime. Yet you, dear comrades, are even allowing them a trial. All the trial they deserve is to have their heads cut off—and let the worms eat them, the swine. And you are fussing with them! Don’t fuss with them, dear comrades.”(3)
The rank and file soldiers were beginning to realise the treacherous role played by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, that they were siding with the bourgeoisie. The soldiers fought the Kornilovites in their own way. They began to drive officers out of the regiments immediately it became known that they had any connection with Kornilov. Commanders were called upon to show proof that they had not supported the revolt. The officers were deprived of their weapons. In certain cases—for instance, in Helsingfors, on the battleship Petropavlovsk and in Vyborg—the soldiers and sailors wreaked summary justice on known counter-revolutionary officers. Eleven officers were killed in Vyborg.
At the same time the process of disintegration spread at the front, which stretched in an almost unbroken line of trenches from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and from the Black Sea to the Persian frontier. The fifteen armies located between the Baltic and the Black Sea were concentrated along the main lines of operation into groups of three or four armies, each under a single command, and these constituted the various fronts. The most important from the strategic standpoint, especially after the fall of Riga, was the Northern Front, which held the approaches to Petrograd. At this period the Western and South-Western Fronts were of secondary importance, because there could no longer be any question of the offensive for which they were intended to serve as the jumping-off ground. But the left flank, the most southern sector, what was known as the Rumanian front, was also of great importance, because it covered Odessa and the other Black Sea ports.
According to available data, on the eve of the October Revolution there was a total on all the fronts of not more than two million men—but this figure must be regarded as only approximate. The front was losing thousands of men daily as a result of spontaneous self-demobilisation, which at that time had become rife even in the staunchest of the regiments. It is impossible to establish the actual number of soldiers at the front at this period. Verkhovsky, the Minister of War in Kerensky’s Cabinet, who resigned a few days before the October Revolution, speaks of the numerical strength of the armies at the front at the beginning of October as follows:
“It was not until the conference at General Headquarters, that I was able for the first time to obtain exact figures as to the size of the army. The figures I had been given at various times fluctuated from seven million to twelve million. Now, at last, the figures are more or less exact. The army along the whole line of the front, stretching 1,800 versts, consists of 1,500,000 infantrymen and 500,000 men in the artillery and other special military units, such as the sappers, aviation, etc.; it is reckoned that there are 3,500,000 in the army establishments in the rear, such as the artillery depots, supply columns, bakeries and so on. In various kinds of organisations—like the Red Cross, the auxiliaries of the Union of Cities and the Union of Zemstvos, and on the building of roads, trenches, etc.—there are 2,900,000 men, and there are another 1,500,000 men in the military areas in the rear, of whom only about 400,000 men are enrolled in the reinforcement companies, i.e., are fit to be dispatched to the front. In all, there are nearly ten million men under arms, of which only two million are on active service at the front, all the remainder serving them in one form or another. In other words, for every actual fighter there are nearly four men serving him in the rear.”(4)
But even these two million men, stretched out in a thin line along the immense front, were totally unfit to fight. The general war fatigue and the disinclination to continue the war, the distrust of the commanders, and the desertions had reached an extreme. In addition, the army was suffering from a grave food shortage and was approaching a state of utter collapse. As Lenin later said, it was becoming a “diseased organism.” Attempts were made to lay the whole blame for this at the door of the Bolsheviks.
“It is they who are chiefly to blame for our defeats,” howled the bourgeois press, seconded by the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary press, which launched an incredible campaign of slander against the Bolsheviks. This cry also formed the burden of the reports submitted by the military Commissars of the Provisional Government. Lieutenant Dolgopolov, Assistant Commissar of the Fifth Army on the Northern Front, stated in his report to the Political administration of the Ministry of War on October 19:
“The morale of the army is steadily deteriorating owing to the vigorous agitation of Bolshevism, and heroic measures will have to be adopted to restore the fighting capacity of the army. A fight—and a ruthless fight—must be waged against irresponsible demagogues.”(5)
And, concluding his report, he reiterated:
“Irresponsible demagogy is fatally affecting the state of the army, and a ruthless fight, must be waged against such actions.”(6)
Richenko, Chairman of the Committee of the 126th Division of the Special Army on the South-Western Front, stated in a report dated October 17:
“The reason why military orders are not obeyed lies in the disintegration of the army caused by the spread of impracticable slogans among the masses.”(7)
Surguchov, the Commissar of the Seventh Army on the South-Western Front, stated in a report dated October 15:
“The situation in the army at the present moment is extremely grave. . . . And a not unimportant part in this is played by Bolshevik agitation, which it is becoming more and more difficult to combat.”(8)
The outcry against Bolshevik machinations was raised even on fronts where the activities of the Bolsheviks were fairly weak, such as the Rumanian Front. In a secret report dated October 29, Tiesenhausen, the Commissar of the Rumanian Front, describing the situation as it existed on that front just before the October Revolution, said:
“The yearning for peace at all costs, which is growing and spreading in an irresistible wave, has begun to sweep more and more insistently over the front, causing nervousness and instability in the life of the troops. This has been contributed to very largely by the activities of the champions of Zimmerwald and Kienthal ideas, people who know the weak strings of the mob and who unscrupulously play on these strings and prate about peace.”(9)
Such assertions, which can be quoted endlessly, only testify to the complete dismay of those who regarded themselves as the leaders of the army and to their refusal to acknowledge the real cause of the collapse. The army was undergoing the same process of disruption as was to be observed in every other branch of national life. In the last analysis, this state of disruption was a vivid testimony to the complete collapse of the bourgeois and landlord system in the country, and to blame the Bolsheviks for it was simply to confuse cause and effect. This was repeatedly pointed out by Lenin.
“All those slanders,” he said, “which were hurled at us by the bourgeois press and the parties that helped them or were hostile to the Soviet power, asserting that the Bolsheviks demoralised the troops, were nonsense.”(10)
Similar nonsense was the assertion that disintegration was greatest in the Bolshevik regiment, or rather in the regiments where the Bolshevik organisation had the support of the mass of the soldiers. The contrary, in fact, was the case. During the fighting at Riga, which strikingly revealed the total inability of the command and the compromising army committees to lead the soldiers, the most stubborn resistance was put up by the Lettish regiments, which were almost completely Bolshevik.
It was the Bolshevik sailors who distinguished themselves by their staunchness during the operations on the Oesel and Dago Islands. The Bolshevik-minded units stood their ground when all the rest fled in panic, including the artillery, which was considered most immune from the “Bolshevik contagion.” The same was true on many other parts of the front.
This “Bolshevik contagion” in every instance acted as a creative and organising force, as was in several cases admitted even by enemies of the Bolsheviks. Savitsky, the Assistant Commissar of the Northern Front, stated in a report to the Minister of War:
“The 1st Lettish Brigade is working satisfactorily, but there have been complaints of bad footwear and clothes and of insufficient food. The vanguard has fought successful engagements and has advanced, capturing in the week over 150 prisoners and ten machine-guns; the Kornilov conspiracy has affected the soldiers’ confidence in the officers. In the 1st Lettish Brigade the distrust extends also to the Provisional Government and the Prime Minister, who is being accused of a desire to seize power. The influence of the newspaper, Latyshsky Strelok [Lettish Rifleman—Trans.] is marked.”(11)
Another witness from the same camp—Stankevich, Supreme Commissar of the Provisional Government—frankly states in his reminiscences:
“It must be admitted that the finest and best-disciplined army, not only on the Northern Front but perhaps on all the Russian fronts—the Fifth Army—was the first to elect a Bolshevik army committee.”(12)
All this goes to show that the Bolsheviks were by no means the disorganisers that the bourgeoisie and its devoted friends, the compromising parties, represented them to be. If the front was disintegrating, it was due to other causes, the chief of which were the home and foreign policies of the Provisional Government, policies treasonable to the interests of the working people. The front was languishing under the burden of an exhausting war, but in the rear, the bourgeois and landlord classes were indulging in a life of pleasure, unbridled speculation and money-making.
“In the rear one perceives no general concern that the army of the free people should be supplied and cared for better than was the case in former years,” Stankevich declared in a telegram dated October 20. “And this is not because the rear has itself become poverty-stricken—after all, the streets of the cities are filled with idle crowds and the theatres and cinemas are crammed to capacity.”(13)
The profiteers, merchants, manufacturers and industrialists were making fabulous fortunes on military supplies and were demanding a “war to a victorious finish.” Everywhere the millions earned so easily were being recklessly dissipated. But at the front the barefoot and hungry soldiers were rotting alive in the mud of the trenches, devoured by vermin, and tensely listening for all news of the situation in the rear. A fierce hatred for those who compelled them to continue the war smouldered in their breasts. The situation essentially remained what it had been before the February Revolution, the only difference being that the soldiers at the front were now more hungry and exhausted than before because of the shortage of supplies and the growing disorganisation in the rear. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the front should steadily collapse. The class character of the war, the selfishness of the ruling classes, and the fidelity of the officers to the ruling classes were becoming increasingly evident to the soldiers.
The steady deterioration in the supply of food and clothing to the army began at length to assume disastrous proportions. On the eve of the October Revolution certain regiments were suffering from actual starvation, being left without bread, meat or cereals.
Reports from Commissars and commanders from all fronts clamoured about the impending catastrophe.
Alexeyevsky, the Commissar of the Fourth Army, reported on October 5:
“In connection with the question of food and clothing, the spirit of the soldiers is growing worse and in places is assuming an alarming character.”(14)
Posnikov, the Commissar of the Third Army, reported on October 7:
“There is a shortage not only of warm clothes, but even of ordinary covering. Lentils and herrings; a short ration of bread. Heroic measures must be taken to improve the supply of food, clothing and footwear.”(15)
Pechkurov, the Assistant Commissar of the Ninth Army, stated in his report that for the period October 7-11:
“The chief cause of discontent is the acute shortage of clothing. The soldiers are clad in summer uniform, the rainy weather has set in and the temperature at night drops to zero. . . . The 166th Division is demanding clothing, because not only are there no shirts, breeches and greatcoats (winter), but even the summer clothing is beyond repair. Whole companies do not appear for drill because their clothing is so threadbare.”(16)
The Commissar of the Ninth Army reported again on October 16:
“There is a shortage of food, footwear, linen and uniforms; in the 37th and 43rd Infantry Divisions there is a high percentage of barefoot soldiers, and in the 37th Division a high percentage of soldiers who have no underwear whatever.”(17)
On October 23, Nakoryakov, the Commissar of the Twelfth Army, telegraphed to the Supreme Commissar:
“The situation is growing rapidly worse, especially with regard to bread. If the supplies of biscuit under way are reckoned, the army has enough provisions to last three or four days. No flour is being delivered from the rear. Under such circumstances, unprecedented excesses are possible.”(18)
The situation grew steadily worse. News of the refusal of regiments and divisions at the front to obey orders and instructions became increasingly frequent. Reports of the Political Department of the Staff of the Supreme Commander on excesses committed in the army during the period October 1-30 present the following picture. During this period there were fifty-three cases of fraternisation, nine attempts forcibly to prevent military action against the enemy and against fraternisers, seven cases of arbitrary desertion of positions, 104 cases of refusal to obey military orders, twenty-four demands for the dismissal of officers, sixty-seven cases of insult to officers, sometimes accompanied by assault and murder, over a hundred cases of refusal to drill or perform work, twenty-two demands for the immediate conclusion of peace, eight cases of insult to Commissars of the Provisional Government and members of army committees, accompanied by assault, etc.
Insubordinate regiments and divisions were disbanded, although the attempt to disband them did not always succeed. Some of the “ringleaders” were tried by court-martial. But this did not help to improve the situation at the front.
On October 12, Sobolev, the Assistant Commissar of the Northern Front, reported to the Minister of War:
“As I have already reported, before the expiration of the ultimatum announced by me, three regiments surrendered their weapons, after which I demanded the surrender of the ringleaders and instigators, who have now been sent for revolutionary court-martial. In view of extenuating circumstances, the 4th Regiment has not yet been disbanded, but its ringleaders have also been sent for court-martial. Measures have been taken for the protection of the court and for the maintenance of order. The case of the 116th Division may be regarded as entirely liquidated.”(19)
But he was obliged to add:
“It is my moral duty to say—and I cannot refrain from saying—that a sinister denouement is approaching, and what it will bring the country and the revolution must be clear to everybody who does not fear to look the truth in the face. To-day we have almost no army; to-morrow we will have no army at all.”(20)
On October 18, Grodsky, the Commissar of the Second Army, reported:
“The mood is very tense and is growing tenser from hour to hour; it may end in an ominous refusal to obey orders. . . . The soldiers say that if peace is not concluded within the next few days they will quit the front. Most persistent rumours are circulating about quitting the front.”(21)
Chekotilo, the Commissar of the Eleventh Army on the South-Western Front, reported:
“Everybody is selling boots, greatcoats and underwear, the idea being that without clothing it will be impossible to fight, and that in this way the soldiers will expedite peace.”(22)
And, finally, on October 22, Zhdanov, the Commissar of the Western Front, summed up the situation in his weekly report as follows:
“The tenseness in the army is growing daily; violations of discipline are spreading from regiment to regiment. The propaganda of the Bolsheviks predominates and is very popular. . . . Confidence in the committees is declining, the men refuse to listen to them, disperse them and beat them up. The scared members of the committees resign without awaiting new elections. Hatred of the officers is growing owing to the widespread conviction that they are dragging out the war. The spirit among the troops at the front is deteriorating. The committees, officers and commanders, oppressed by the disastrous number of violations of discipline, are in a panicky mood. They feel impotent. The collapse is reaching a limit.”(23)
The collapse of the front in the long run marked the breakdown of the entire landlord and capitalist system in the country, of which the old army was a reflection. Created as an instrument of the annexationist ambitions of the ruling classes and for the protection of their privileges, it collapsed with the fall of these classes.
[1] Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Soldiers’ Executive Committee of the Twelfth Army, File No. 412-700, Folio 58.
[2] Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander—Adjutant-General’s Office, File No. 80-097, folios 365-70.
[3] Soldiers’ Letters of 1917, Moscow, 1927, p. 119.
[4] A. I. Verkhovsky, Russia at Golgotha, Petrograd, 1918, p. 123.
[5] Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1932, folios 64-67.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid., File No. 1876, folio 44.
[8] Ibid., folio 45.
[9] Ibid., File No. 1957, folio 27.
[10] Lenin, “Speech at a Meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, February 23 [sic], 1918,” Collected Works (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXII, p. 280.
[11] Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1932, folio 158.
[12] V. B. Stankevich, Reminiscences, 1914-19, Berlin, 1920, p. 246.
[13] Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1745, folio 32.
[14] Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1745, folio 129.
[15] Ibid., File No. 1820, folios 14 and 18.
[16] Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1764, folios 45, 46, 48.
[17] Ibid., folio 13.
[18] Ibid., File No. 2211, folio 1.
[19] Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—1235, The All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Series D 4, No. 179, 1917, folios 135-36.
[20] Ibid., folios 135-36.
[21] Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1876, folio 128.
[22] Ibid., folio 84.
[23] S. Agurski, October in Belorussia, Articles and Documents, Book 1, Minsk, 1927, p. 369.
Previous: Peasant Revolts and the Spread of the National Emancipation Movement
Next: The Navy on the Eve of the October Revolution