The analysis of the course of the revolution given by Stalin at the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party was very soon confirmed by the stormy progress of events.
The treacherous tactics of the compromisers during the July days had unleashed the forces of counter-revolution. The bourgeoisie openly assumed the offensive, trying to make up for lost time. A number of Bolshevik newspapers were suppressed. The revolutionary regiments in the garrisons of Petrograd and other cities were dispatched to the front.
The bourgeoisie hastened to smash the resistance of the proletariat before it could recover from the blow. “Back to the good old days!” was the cry of the counter-revolutionaries.
The supporters of counter-revolution, who had been saved by the compromisers after the July days, started a vigorous persecution not only of the Bolsheviks, but also of the petty-bourgeois leaders. As Lenin had foretold, the campaign was intensified not against the Bolshevik Party alone, but against all the democratic gains, including the Soviets.
The bourgeoisie openly spoke of the necessity of turning back—along the path already traversed by the country.
On August 20, at a “private Conference of members of the State Duma”—that legal centre of counter-revolution—Purishkevich declared:
“Until Russia gets a dictator invested with wide powers, until the Supreme Council consists of the finest of the Russian generals, who have been driven from the front and who have staked their lives for their country, there will be no order in Russia.”(1)
In his rashness, this servitor of the monarchy often blabbed more than he should. And now, too, Purishkevich betrayed the secret of the bourgeoisie. Rodzyanko, the Chairman of the Conference, hastened to correct the mistake of the too outspoken reactionary:
“I decidedly disagree, and I consider that in the State Duma least of all, even at a private conference, is it possible to adopt a standpoint calling for a coup d’état, for a dictatorship of one kind or another, which, as you know, never comes by call, but arises spontaneously when the necessity for it has matured.”(2)
Endeavouring to calm the over loquacious and impetuous counter-revolutionary, Rodzyanko gave him to understand that it was not talk about a dictatorship that was required, but careful preparation for it.
“The country sought a name”(3)—that is how General Denikin expressed the general frame of mind of the counter-revolutionaries. There was a time when Kerensky could have become this “name.” He had dealt very resolutely with the Bolsheviks, had disarmed the revolutionary regiments and had introduced the death penalty at the front. It might have been expected that he would continue to execute the plans of the bourgeoisie. He also seemed acceptable to the Allied imperialists. While crushing the Bolshevik movement and extending his control over the army, Kerensky demanded less of the “Allies” than prospective candidates who stood more Right.
Sir George Buchanan said plainly of Kerensky:
“But, while advocating fighting out the war to a finish, he deprecated any idea of conquest, and when Milyukov spoke of the acquisition of Constantinople as one of Russia’s war aims, he [Kerensky—Ed.] promptly disavowed him.”(4)
With Kerensky’s help, Great Britain might get Russia to continue the war without giving her Constantinople, which the “Allies” had promised the tsar. But the generals and the leaders of the bourgeois parties were opposed to Kerensky. They were afraid of his close connections with the Soviets and did not trust him personally. Rodzyanko and his friends preferred a man of the sword to a politician. General Alexeyev was mentioned, Admiral Kolchak was considered, but when Kornilov was appointed Supreme Commander the search ended. The “name” had been found. Buchanan wrote:
“Kornilov is a much stronger man than Kerensky, and were he to assert his influence over the army and were the latter to become a strong fighting force he would be master of the situation.”(5)
The counter-revolutionaries energetically advocated the candidature of this general.
Kornilov was the son of a tsarist official; he was not a Cossack peasant, as he claimed to be in his manifestos to the people and the army. On graduating from the General Staff Academy, he served with the forces in the Far East and in Central Asia and in 1914 commanded the 48th Division on the Austrian Front. In the Battle of Lvov in August 1914 he lost twenty-two guns, and a large number of his men were taken prisoner. General Dwusilov, who at that time commanded the Eighth Army, even thought of dismissing Kornilov on account of this defeat, but in view of his personal bravery decided to leave him in command of the division. In April 1915, when the Austro-Hungarian army was driving the Russians out of Galicia, Kornilov was unable to organise the retreat of his regiments. A large part of his division was surrounded by the Austrians and ordered lo lay down its arms. Kornilov refused, but made no attempt to force his way through the enemy. Together with his staff, he abandoned the division, which he himself had led into the trap, and took to the woods. Four days later the general surrendered to the Austrians. In April 1915, General Popovich-Lipovatz, brigade commander in the 43th Division, who was wounded in this engagement, told the true story of Kornilov’s disgraceful conduct. But Popovich was ordered to hold his tongue, and General Ivanov, Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front, even petitioned that Kornilov should be rewarded. A “report of victory” was drawn up and Grand Duke Nicholas brought Kornilov’s “feat” to the notice of the tsar. Subsequently, in the autumn of 1916, all the materials relating to the surrender of the division were collected and sent to Kornilov with a request for an explanation. But the general maintained a discreet silence, and only ten months later, after he had already been appointed Supreme Commander, did he submit a report which had been drawn up by the Chief of Staff of the 48th Division. But now nobody dared speak of the ancient errors of the Supreme Commander.
Kornilov escaped from internment by bribing a hospital orderly. The general greatly exaggerated the difficulties of the escape in an account he gave to a reporter of the Novoye Vremya on September 3, 1916:
“I saw how the hut which my companion had entered was surrounded by Austrian gendarmes, and a few minutes later I heard firing—that was my companion exchanging shots with the enemy. But the fight was an unequal one and he was killed.”(6)
As a matter of fact, the hospital orderly, Franz Mrnyak, a Czech, was not killed, and had not even exchanged shots. He ran into a gendarme by accident, was arrested, and at his trial related the details of the flight, stating that Kornilov had promised to pay him 20,000 gold krone in Russia for his services.
Kornilov’s tales had their effect. Having all too little real proof of the bravery of their generals, the tsarist dignitaries “idealised” Kornilov’s escape, and by weaving a legend around it, created a “name” for him. Kornilov was put in command of the XXV Army Corps on the Western Front, where he remained until the Revolution of February 1917. Kornilov was appointed Commander of the Petrograd Military Area and displayed great resourcefulness at the time of the April demonstration: it was on his orders that preparations were made to dispatch artillery against the workers. The bourgeoisie immediately recognised the “abilities” of the zealous general. Perhaps he seemed to them not at all a bad candidate for the role of Napoleon. Sir George Buchanan, who was well informed of what was going on in the government circles, states on the word of Tereshchenko:
“The government were taking steps to counteract this [i.e., the claims of the Soviet—Ed.] by increasing the powers of General Kornilov, who is in command of the Petrograd garrison.”(7)
When he was Minister of War, Guchkov recommended the appointment of Kornilov Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front. At the beginning of May Kornilov was given command of the Eighth Army on the South-Western Front. Kornilov was not devoid of courage, and in a fight could get a small unit to follow him by personal example. General Brusilov, a witness of Kornilov’s martial exploits during the war, described him in the following terms:
“He would make a chief of a dashing partisan band—nothing more.”(8)
He was incapable of commanding large military formations. This was borne out in the Eighth Army at the time of the June offensive. Kornilov did not consolidate his initial success in time, delayed carrying out orders from the front headquarters, and the Eighth Army fled in as great a panic as the rest. Kornilov placed the whole blame for his failure on the revolution. He was supported by the Commissar of the Army, Naval Engineer Lieutenant Filonenko, and, in particular, by the Commissar of the Front, B. V. Savinkov, a Right Socialist-Revolutionary.
Savinkov’s career is a succinct résumé of the whole history of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Savinkov had been a terrorist, a member of a group of action, and had taken part in a number of attempts on the lives of tsarist officials. After the Revolution of 1905 Savinkov retired from political activity and devoted himself to literature. He wrote The Pale Steed, a novel in which the whilom bomb-thrower besmirches the revolution, as did many other intellectuals, who after the 1905 Revolution recoiled from the difficulties of the struggle. The adventurer is best characterised by his own maxim: “There are no morals, there is only beauty.” Savinkov supported the imperialist demand for a war to a victorious finish. After the February Revolution Savinkov joined the extreme Right Wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and demanded a strong government. Sir George Buchanan says of him:
“Savinkov is an ardent advocate of stringent measures, both for the restoration of discipline and for the repression of anarchy, and he is credited with having asked Kerensky’s permission to go with a couple of regiments to the Taurida Palace to arrest the Soviet.”(9)
Savinkov approved of Kornilov’s attempt to lay the blame for the failure of the offensive on the Bolsheviks. The general was also supported by Filonenko.
Filonenko’s type can be judged from a resolution drawn up by the soldiers:
“The general meeting of soldiers and officers of the Ninth Armoured Car Battalion, having discussed the question of Lieutenant M. M. Filonenko, the present Commissar of the Provisional Government at General Headquarters, has resolved:
“To bring to the attention of the Minister of War, Kerensky, the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Congress of the Soviets that all Filonenko’s former activities while an officer in the division consisted in systematically humiliating the soldiers, for whom be had no other appellation than ‘blockhead,’ ‘dolt,’ and so on, and birching them, as, for instance, Corporal Razin. While he was adjutant he ordered floggings without the sanction of the Battalion Commander, relying solely on his position and confident that nobody would dare to prevent him from punching the soldiers’ faces, which he was always threatening and cynically advocating. He had an intolerably offensive attitude towards the soldiers, whom he regarded as inferior beings. And therefore, in view of such conduct, we consider that Filonenko is not fit to occupy the post of a Commissar of the Revolutionary Government.”(10)
Savinkov and Filonenko decided that the general, having been unable to cope with the foreign foe, would display greater ability in combating the internal foe. The two Commissars succeeded in getting Kornilov appointed Commander-in-Chief of the front. Savinkov wrote in this connection:
“With General Kornilov’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the armies on the South-Western Front, a systematic struggle against the Bolsheviks became possible.”(11)
Kornilov justified the confidence of the counter-revolutionaries.
Encouraged by the open sympathy of the bourgeois elements, the general set about restoring the old discipline of the cane in the army. He presented an ultimatum demanding the introduction of the death penalty at the front. Kerensky immediately gave way and on July 12 sent telegraphic orders instituting the death penalty at the front.
Kornilov sent telegrams to Prime Minister Lvov, to Kerensky and to Rodzyanko, categorically demanding the adoption of emergency measures. On July 9 Kornilov gave orders to all commanders of troops to turn machine-guns and artillery on units which abandoned their positions without orders. The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Executive Committee of the South-Western Front supported Kornilov and telegraphed Kerensky:
“To-day the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front and the Commander of the Eleventh Army, with the consent of the Commissars and the committees, gave orders to fire on deserters.”(12)
Kornilov’s telegrams and orders were obligingly printed by all the bourgeois newspapers. The papers spoke of Kornilov as the man who could stop the revolution. The government itself was not averse to taking further steps to smash the revolution, but was afraid of incurring the hostility of the masses. All the more willingly did it greet Kornilov’s candidature for the dictatorship.
“When General Kornilov was appointed Supreme Commander,” General Denikin says in his memoirs, “all further search ceased. The country—some with hope, others with hostile suspicion—pronounced the name of the dictator.”(13)
Having found the “name,” the reactionaries set about preparing public opinion. A pamphlet entitled The First People’s Supreme Commander, Lieutenant-General Lavr Georgievich Kornilov was printed and distributed in a vast number of copies. The pamphlet declared that General Kornilov came of the people, and that now the people had elected him their Supreme Commander. In describing the military feats of the general, the author cast off all restraint. For example, speaking of the surrender of the 48th Division, the pamphlet stated that all that fell into the hands of the Austrians was—
“a small handful of men, seven in all, looking like shadows. Among them was Kornilov, heavily wounded, and a wounded ambulance man.”(14)
As a matter of fact, the documents show that over 6,000 men were taken prisoner, while Kornilov himself, abandoning his division to its fate, surrendered four days later. His wound was insignificant. The author of this eulogy was V. S. Zavoiko, a close friend and colleague of Kornilov’s.
The general himself understood very little of politics, and all his political work was done for him by Zavoiko, the son of an admiral who had been rewarded with an estate in the Podolsk Province. Zavoiko was Marshal of Nobility in the district of Gaissin. There he bought up estates of Poles which were sold under distraint, cleared them of trees and sold the land to the peasants. Zavoiko accumulated a huge fortune by land speculation of this nature. During the 1905 Revolution, this adroit speculator, fearing that his estate might be wrecked, compelled the peasants of the hamlet of Dunayevtsy to register him and his sons as peasants. The local authorities refused to sanction this crafty manœuvre, but by then the necessity for it had passed: the peasants’ movement had been crushed. Zavoiko also speculated in oil, was an agent of the firm of Nobel and managing director of the Emba and Caspian Co. He also engaged in banking operations, and together with Protopopov, published a Black Hundred newspaper, Russkaya Volya (Russian Will) in May 1917, after Kornilov had been appointed Commander of the Eighth Army, Zavoiko joined one of the regiments of the Savage Division as a volunteer, but remained at army headquarters as Kornilov’s orderly. An adroit speculator, connected with newspaper and industrial circles, Zavoiko launched a big publicity campaign. He printed telegrams to Kornilov, published documents of dubious authenticity, fabricated biographies and wrote most of the orders and manifestos of the Commander-in-Chief. Kornilov himself subsequently said of Zavoiko:
“He has an excellent command of the pen, and I therefore entrusted him with the compilation of such orders and documents as particularly required a strong, artistic style.”(15)
But Zavoiko’s “artistry” was not confined to style. Milyukov, although implicated in the Kornilov adventure, frankly stated:
“Kornilov only neglects to add that Zavoiko’s influence did not extend to style alone, but to the very contents of the political documents which emanated from Kornilov.”(16)
In addition to advertising Kornilov, the latter’s political associates engaged in more thorough preparations for a coup d’état. They had been preparing their organisations in the big cities for some time. Everywhere secret societies were formed, in which chiefly officers and junkers were enrolled. The capital swarmed with secret leagues which were prepared to support the counter-revolution from within immediately armed forces approached the city.
Towards the end of July a body called the Republican Centre was formed in Petrograd with the purpose of uniting the activities of all the military organisations in the city. Its membership was nondescript, consisting of officers and government officials. The chairman of the society was a certain Nikolayevsky, an engineer, who served as a screen for the big bankers and industrialists. The latter feared to join the society, but generously provided it with funds. Having plenty of money, the Republican Centre was able to attract supporters. Denikin states in his memoirs that the Military Section of the Republican Centre controlled many small military organisations. At General Headquarters itself a body known as the Chief Committee of the Officers’ League was formed under the patronage of the Supreme Commander. According to Denikin, this committee
“without attempting to draw up any political programme, set itself the aim of creating the soil and the force within the army for the establishment of a dictatorship—the only means, in the opinion of the officers, by which the country could still be saved.”(17)
At the beginning of August, Colonel Sidorin, a member of the Committee of the Officers’ League, was delegated to the Republican Centre with the object of uniting the forces of the two organisations.
A big part in the preparations was taken by the officers’ Military League, the organisation which had hailed Alexinsky when he foully accused Lenin of espionage. The members of the League presented an address to Admiral Kolchak when the sailors drove him out of Sevastopol.
These bodies were the embryo of the future white-guard organisations. Cadres were being mustered for the army of counter-revolution.
But these feverish preparations for a military dictatorship had to be consolidated politically. A strong national centre was required to head the movement and to justify it in the eyes of wider circles. The Provisional Government decided to summon a Council of State in Moscow, as far away as possible from revolutionary Petrograd. Screened by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, this Council in Moscow was to endorse the counter-revolutionary programme of the government and to approve its campaign against the workers and peasants.
The Council was convened in Moscow. The old capital seemed to the bourgeoisie safer than seething Petrograd.
Lenin called the Council of State “a counter-revolutionary, imperialist Council.” On August 3, before the Council of State met, the Second All-Russian Congress of Commerce and Industry opened in Moscow, at which the flower of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie forgathered. Open references were already made at this Congress to the necessity of adopting resolute measures to bridle the workers, peasants and soldiers. Ryabushinsky, a big capitalist, trying to work up the feelings of the audience, cried:
“When will he arise, not yesterday’s slave, but the free Russian citizen? Let him make haste—Russia awaits him. . . . Let the stalwart character of the merchant assert itself to the full! Merchant men, we must save the Russian land!”(18)
The Congress was greeted by Prokopovich, the Minister of Commerce and Industry. The merchants and manufacturers received the Left Cadet Minister with ironical shouts and laughter.
The counter-revolutionaries took advantage of the Congress of Commerce and Industry to set up what was known as the Council of Public Men, which was virtually the headquarters staff of counter-revolution. Its members were prominent leaders of the Cadets, Octobrists and avowed monarchists; Rodzyanko, General Alexeyev, General Brusilov, General Kaledin, General Yudenich and other generals, Milyukov, Maklakov and Kishkin—about 300 in all. The meetings were held in private. Press representatives were not admitted. On August 9, the Council of Public Men sent the following telegram to Kornilov, signed by Rodzyanko:
“In this ominous hour of severe trials, all thinking Russia turns to you in hope and faith. May God help you in your great feat of re-creating a mighty army for the salvation of Russia!”(19)
The Council of Public Men heard reports on the political, financial, economic, and military situation. On the subject of political situation, the Council adopted a resolution containing the following demand:
“Let a central power, united and strong, put an end to the rule of irresponsible corporate institutions in the administration of the State; let the demands of individual nationalities be confined within legitimate and just limits.”(20)
An addendum to the resolution demanded that the Constituent Assembly should meet in Moscow. On the military question, Kornilov’s programme was adopted. The Council elected a standing bureau for the organisation of all public forces. The bureau consisted of Rodzyanko, Ryabushinsky, Struve, Milyukov, Maklakov, Shingaryov, Shidlovsky, Shulgin, Kishkin, Kutler, and Novosiltsev from the Officers’ League. In a word, all the bourgeois and landlord parties joined forces under the cloak of the Council of Public Men. It was this Council that later gave rise to the big counter-revolutionary organisations—the Right Centre and the National Centre—which played so important a part on the side of Kolchak and Denikin.
The Council of State opened on August 12. Its very composition determined its counter-revolutionary character. It consisted of 488 members of the former four State Dumas and 129 members of Soviets and public organisations. The City Dumas received 129 seats, the Zemstvos 118 seats, commercial, industrial and banking circles 150 seats, scientific organisations 99 seats, the army and navy 177 seats, the clergy 24 seats, nationalist organisations 58 seats, the peasants 100 seats, the co-operative societies 313 seats, the trade unions 176 seats, etc. There forgathered at the Council, old generals, higher officers, Cadet professors, bishops, government officials and co-operative functionaries. Representatives of the bourgeoisie were also present, headed by Ryabushinsky, the man who had threatened the people with starvation and destitution if they did not renounce their demands.
The Bolsheviks decided to make a declaration exposing the Council of State, and then to withdraw from it. But the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets excluded the Bolsheviks from the delegation, fearing that they would spoil the effect of the demonstration of the “unity of all the vital forces of the country.”
With the object of exposing and combating the counter-revolutionary Council of State, the Bolshevik Party decided to organise a one-day general strike in Moscow. This was the best form of struggle that could be adopted under the circumstances. The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party issued a manifesto in which it appealed to the workers not to organise street demonstrations and not to succumb to provocation, since the bourgeoisie might take advantage of any such action to resort to armed force against the working class. The Moscow proletarians eagerly responded to the appeal of the Party. Despite the resistance of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik majority on the Moscow Soviet, which forbade the strike, over 400,000 workers downed tools in Moscow on August 12, the day the Council of State opened. The bourgeoisie were able to see with their own eyes who had the following of the working class. The militant spirit of the Moscow proletarians damped the ardour of the representatives of the bourgeoisie. They had fled from the revolutionary storms of Petrograd to “peaceful” Moscow, but in the streets of “peaceful” Moscow they were caught in the same revolutionary storm.
The coup d’état for the purpose of establishing a military dictatorship was timed to coincide with the opening of the Council of State. The press exalted Kornilov and burnt incense to him. The junkers guarding the Grand Theatre, where the Council sat, were issued live cartridges. Cossacks were summoned to Moscow from the front.
The speeches at the Council of State revealed the true aims of the bourgeoisie. Kerensky was not the master mind here. When, hinting at the July events, he threatened all conspirators against the government, whom he discerned “both on the Left and on the Right,” those who were preparing an offensive against the revolution merely smiled ambiguously. Kerensky’s hysterical threats did not frighten the bourgeoisie. It had quite convincing evidence of the complicity of the “Socialist” Kerensky in the preparations for the blow at the revolution.
The real leader of the reactionary forces at this gathering was Kornilov. He arrived in Moscow the day after the Council opened. At the Alexandrovsky railway station he was accorded a triumphant reception. He was carried shoulder high. The Cadet Kodichev greeted him with the words:
“All of us, all Moscow, are united by our faith in you.”(21)
The wife of the millionaire Morozov fell on her knees before Kornilov.
In his speech at the Council, Kornilov plainly threatened the fall of Riga, hinted that he would open the road to Petrograd to the Germans and demanded that discipline should be restored in the army, that commanders should be granted power and the prestige of the officers enhanced. This candidate for the dictatorship recommended that the death penalty should be introduced not only at the front but also in the rear, and that the railways and munitions’ factories should be militarised.
Kornilov was not the sole author of the programme of the dictatorship. It had been drawn up at the end of July at General Headquarters with the assistance of Savinkov and Filonenko. Kornilov first submitted the programme to Kerensky on August 3, and a second time, with additions and amendments, on August 10. But Kerensky delayed his reply.
“It set forth a whole series of measures,” Kerensky subsequently wrote in explanation of his vacillations, “the greater part of which were quite acceptable, but formulated in such a way and supported by such arguments that the announcement of them would have led to quite opposite results.”(22)
On the eve of the Council of State the Cadets brought pressure to bear on Kerensky. On the morning of August 11, F. Kokoshkin declared to him that the Party of National Freedom would resign from the government if Kornilov’s programme were not accepted. A new crisis was averted by the fact that the same day the Provisional Government had in the main adopted Kornilov’s demands of August 3. After this, what was the value of the threats hurled by Kerensky at the “conspirators” against the government? The leader of the “revolutionary democracy,” as he was called by the compromisers, took an advance part in the counter-revolutionary plot.
The programme of the counter-revolutionaries was most fully set forth at the Council of State by General Kaledin. The Cossack Ataman insolently demanded:
“1. The army must hold aloof from politics; meetings and assemblies, with their party conflicts and dissensions, must be completely forbidden.
“2. All Soviets and Committees must be abolished both in the army and in the rear.
“3. The Declaration of Rights of the Soldiers must be revised and supplemented by a declaration of their duties.
“4. Discipline in the army must be strengthened and enforced by the most stringent measures.
“5. The rear and the front are one whole ensuring the fighting capacity of the army, and all essential measures for enforcing discipline at the front must be applied in the rear as well.
“6. The disciplinary rights of officers must be restored, the leaders of the army must be invested with full powers.”(23)
Incidentally, in his speech Kaledin stressed the fact that the Cossacks—the Cossacks who were so often accused of counter-revolution—had saved the government during the events of July 3-5. With soldier-like bluntness, Kaledin blurted out at the Moscow Council of State that it was the “Socialist” Ministers who had summoned the aid of the Cossacks on July 3. And nobody ventured to refute Kaledin, nobody ventured to protest when he sneered at the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.
Exposed by the Cossack Ataman, the compromisers cowered and held their peace.
“The Cossack general spat in their faces, and they wiped themselves, saying, ‘Divine dew!’”(24) Lenin wrote in reference to Kaledin’s speech.
Chkheidze, Tsereteli and Plekhanov spoke at the Council and advocated the old recipes of the compromisers. Kornilov, Kaledin and Rodzyanko were preparing to drown the revolution in the blood of the proletariat, but the compromisers continued to call for a coalition with the grave diggers of the revolution. Tsereteli shook hands with the capitalist Bublikov on the platform, the generals and merchants applauded the fall of the “Socialist,” and greeted the alliance between the Mensheviks and the Kornilovites.
Both on the eve of the Moscow Council of State and at the Council itself, the bourgeoisie carried on back-stage negotiations with Kornilov in preparation for the abolition of the Provisional Government and the seizure of power by the bourgeoisie. But the strike of the Moscow workers showed the reactionaries that immediate action against the revolution would be premature. Milyukov went to see Kornilov on August 13 and proposed that action be delayed. He made the same proposal to Kaledin. Both generals agreed.
The council of State did not justify the hopes placed in it by its promoters. The plot for a coup d’état failed. The people proved to be on the alert. The reactionaries decided to undertake a more comprehensive and efficient mobilisation of their forces.
[1] The Bourgeoisie and the Landlords in 1917, Private Conference of Members of the State Duma, Moscow, 1932, p. 280.
[2] Ibid., p. 282.
[3] A. I. Denikin, Sketches of the Russian Revolt, Vol. II, Paris, 1922, p. 29.
[4] Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs, London, Cassell & Co., 1923, Vol. II, p. 109.
[5] Ibid., p. 260.
[6] “How General Kornilov Escaped,” Novoye Vremya, No. 14546, September 3, 1916.
[7] Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs, London, Cassell & Co., Vol. II, p. 125.
[8] A. A. Brusilov, My Reminiscences, Moscow, 1929, p. 238.
[9] Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs, London, Cassell & Co., 1923, Vol. II, p. 164.
[10] Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—9. Extraordinary Commission to Investigate the Case of General Kornilov and His Accomplices, Register 1, File No. 18, folio 125.
[11] B. Savinkov, “General Kornilov,” Byloye (The Past), 1925, No. 3 (31), p. l88.
[12] P. N. Milyukov, History of the Second Russian Revolution, Vol. I, Book 2, Sofia, 1922, p. 54.
[13] A. I. Denikin, Sketches of the Russian Revolt, Vol. II, Paris, 1922, p. 29.
[14] The First People’s Supreme Commander, Lieutenant-General Lavr Georgievich Kornilov, Petrograd, 1917, p. 35.
[15] P. N. Milyukov, History of the Second Russian Revolution, Vol. I, Book 2, Sofia, 1922, p. 60.
[16] Ibid., p. 60.
[17] A. I. Denikin, Sketches of the Russian Revolt, Vol. II, Paris, 1922, p. 28.
[18] Central Archives, The Council of State, Moscow, 1930, p. xi.
[19] “The Council of State in Moscow,” Rech, No. 186, August 10, 1917.
[20] “On the Eve of the Council of State,” Rech, No. 188, August 12, 1917.
[21] A. I. Denikin, Sketches of the Russian Revolt, Vol. II, Paris, 1922, p. 31.
[22] A. F. Kerensky, The Prelude to Bolshevism—The Kornilov Rebellion, London, Fisher, 1919, p. 72.
[23] Central Archives, The Council of State, Moscow, 1930, p. 75.
[24] Lenin, “From a Publicist’s Diary,” Collected Works, (Russ. Ed.), Vol. XXI, p. 125.
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