While the demonstrators were fervently calling for the power of the Soviets, behind their backs the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were feverishly mobilising forces against the revolution. Troops loyal to the government were summoned to the Taurida Palace. Towards 7 p.m. the Vladimirsky Military School, the 9th Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Cossack Regiment appeared on the Palace Square.
At a joint session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies held on July 5, the Menshevik Voitinsky reported:
“There was a time when we had no forces of any kind. Only six men guarded the entrance to the Taurida Palace, and they were not in a position to hold back the crowd. The first unit to come to our aid consisted of armoured cars. . . . We had firmly made up our minds that if violence were offered by the armed bands, we would open fire.”(1)
Orders were given to the committee of the Fifth Army to dispatch troops to Petrograd. The 14th Cavalry Division, the 14th Don Cossack Regiment, the 117th Izborsky Regiment and other units were immediately dispatched from the front. Lieutenant Mazurenko, a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, was appointed commander of the mixed detachment. Dudarov, the Assistant Minister of Marine, sent orders to the submarines in Helsingfors not to hesitate to sink the revolutionary ships if they set sail for Petrograd.
The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks hesitated less than ex-Tsar Nicholas did in the last days of the reign to withdraw troops from the front to combat the revolution. The infuriated petty-bourgeois proved to be no less reactionary than the generals of the Tsar.
Acting in close alliance with the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, General Polovtsev, Commander of the Petrograd Military Area, gave orders on the morning of July 4 that order should be restored immediately.
In various parts of the city—on the corner of the Nevsky Prospect and the Sadovaya, on the Liteiny Prospect, in the vicinity of the Engineers’ Castle and in other places—rifle fire was opened on the demonstrators by provocateurs and counter-revolutionaries. There were attacks by Cossacks and junkers. The counter-revolutionaries decided to assume the offensive. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee assigned two Socialist-Revolutionaries—Avksentyev and Gotz—to assist the government commission appointed “to restore and maintain revolutionary order in Petrograd.” On the morning of July 5 the offices of the Pravda, and the “Trud” (“Labour”) printshop were wrecked by counter-revolutionary detachments.
Believing that the demonstration was over, the Bolsheviks had already on July 4 called upon the demonstrators to disperse quietly. But in view of the attacks by the junkers and Cossacks the sailors remained in Petrograd. They occupied the Kshesinska mansion and the Fortress of Peter and Paul, and together with the machine-gunners prepared for defence.
On the night of July 5 fresh government reinforcements arrived from the front. Wholesale arrests were conducted in various parts of the city. Premises were searched and wrecked. Petrograd assumed the appearance of an occupied city. The streets were filled with junker patrols. The working-class quarters were cut off from the centre. On the night of July 5 a joint meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants’ Deputies adopted a resolution by which they unreservedly associated themselves with the foul action of the counter-revolutionaries:
“The meeting considers that the measures taken by the Provisional Government and the Military Commission appointed by the Bureaux of both Executive Committees were in the interests of the revolution.
“Recognising the need for further resolute measures to restore and maintain revolutionary order in Petrograd, the meeting endorses the powers conferred on Comrades Avksentyev and Gotz by the Bureaux of both Committees.”(2)
The meeting also endorsed Dudarov’s telegram.
The representatives of counter-revolution began to adopt the language of ultimatums. The delegation from the Kronstadt sailors, which was at that time conducting negotiations with the Military Commission of the Central Executive Committee, was ordered to disarm immediately. The situation on July 5-6 was described by Stalin in a report he made to the Petrograd City Conference of the Bolshevik Party as follows:
“On July 5 negotiations took place with the Central Executive Committee, represented by Lieber. Lieber stipulated that we [i.e., the Bolsheviks—Ed.] should withdraw the armoured cars from the Kshesinska mansion and that the sailors should return to Kronstadt. We agreed on condition that the Soviet would protect our Party organisations from possible raids. In the name of the Central Executive Committee, Lieber assured us that our stipulations would be observed by the Central Executive Committee and that the Kshesinska mansion would remain at our disposal until we received permanent quarters. We kept our promises. The armoured cars were withdrawn and the Kronstadt sailors agreed to return, only with their arms. The Central Executive Committee, however, did not keep a single one of its promises. On July 6, Kozmin [Assistant Commander of the Petrograd Military Area—Ed.] telephoned to the Kshesinska mansion demanding that the Kshesinska mansion and the Fortress of Peter and Paul should be evacuated within three-quarters of an hour, otherwise, he threatened, armed forces would be dispatched against them. . . . The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party delegated me to the Fortress of Peter and Paul, where I succeeded in persuading the sailors present not to accept battle, since the situation had taken such a turn that we were being faced by counter-revolution, by the Right wing of democracy. In my capacity as representative of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets I went with Bogdanov to see Kozmin. He had everything ready for action: artillery, cavalry and infantry. We argued with him not to resort to armed force. Kozmin resented the fact that civilians were hampering him by their constant interference, and it was only reluctantly that he agreed to comply with the insistent demand of the Central Executive Committee. It is clear to me that the Socialist-Revolutionary military men wanted bloodshed so as to give a ‘lesson’ to the workers, soldiers and sailors. We prevented them from having their way. . . . The Central Executive Committee, scared by the Bolsheviks and the counter-revolutionaries, has concluded a shameful alliance with the counter-revolutionaries and is complying with their demands, namely, to surrender the Bolsheviks, to arrest the delegates from the Baltic Fleet and to disarm the revolutionary soldiers and workers.”(3)
On July 4 the Provisional Government had instructed the Commander of the Petrograd Military Area, General Polovtsev, “to clear Petrograd of armed people.” The instructions went on to say:
“At the same time you are instructed to arrest, as participators in the disorders, the Bolsheviks occupying the Kshesinska mansion, to clear it and occupy it with troops.”(4)
On the morning of July 6 the Fortress of Peter and Paul was occupied by a detachment of cyclists, and a little later troops occupied the Kshesinska mansion, which they wrecked. That same day, July 6, the Provisional Government issued orders for the arrest of Lenin.
A savage campaign was launched against the Bolshevik Party and its leaders. Lenin was slanderously accused of being a German spy. This absurdity was fabricated from the “testimony” of a provocateur, a certain sub-Lieutenant Yermolenko of the 16th Siberian Regiment, supposed to have been dispatched by the German command to the Sixth Army to agitate for the conclusion of peace with Germany. The Provisional Government had been in possession of this “testimony” ever since April, but had with-held it until a more suitable moment. On July 5 these libellous fabrications were published in a yellow sheet, Zhivoye Slovo (The Living Word), by G. Alexinsky, a former Social-Democrat and member of the Second Duma, and V. Pankratov, at one time a member of the Narodnaya Volya Party. The Provisional Government hesitated to publish these “documents” in its own name, and instead entrusted them to the persons mentioned.
Dan, the Menshevik leader, giving evidence before the Investigation Commission, declared that he did not believe in the complicity of the Bolsheviks in German espionage, but nevertheless permitted himself to make the provocative statement that German agents had taken part in the demonstration of July 3-5.
“While I am profoundly convinced that agents of the German General Staff hitch on to all movements of the character of the movement of July 3-5, nevertheless, I have never accused any of the Bolsheviks, still less the Bolshevik Party as a whole, of German espionage.”(5)
The counter-revolutionaries demanded that Lenin should be brought to trial. Lenin did not await arrest, and went into hiding. Some Party members (Rykov, Nogin and Kamenev) declared that Lenin should appear for trial. Trotsky, too, demanded that Lenin should give himself up to the authorities. But this was vigorously opposed by Stalin, who declared that there was no guarantee that Lenin would not be brutally done to death.(6)
How correct was Stalin’s estimate of the danger that threatened Lenin is best shown by the testimony of General Polovtsev, who played a leading part in the July massacre.
Polovtsev later wrote in his memoirs, Days of Eclipse:
“The officer who set out for Terijoki in the hope of catching Lenin asked me whether I wanted this gentleman delivered whole or in pieces. . . . I smiled and said that arrested men often attempt to escape.”(7)
Lenin himself expressed the following opinion regarding this trial:
“The court is an organ of power. The liberals sometimes forget this. It is a sin for a Marxist to forget it.
“Where, then, is the power? . . .
“There is no government. It changes daily. It is inactive.
“It is the military dictatorship that is active. Under such conditions it is ridiculous even to speak of a ‘trial.’ It is not a question of a ‘trial,’ but of an episode in the civil war. . . .
“‘I have done nothing unlawful. The court is just. The court will examine the case. The trial will be public. The people will understand. I shall appear.’
“This reasoning is naïve to the point of childishness. Not a trial, but a campaign of persecution against the internationalists is what the authorities need. To imprison them and hold them is what Messrs. Kerensky and Co. want. So it was (in England and France), so it will be (in Russia).”(8)
On July 7 the Provisional Government decided to disband all military units that had taken part in the demonstration of July 3-5. This decision was preceded by analogous demands from Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, which were transmitted to Tereshchenko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on July 4. Buchanan considered it necessary to:
“1. Re-establish the death penalty throughout Russia for all individuals subject to military and naval law.
“2. Require the units who took part in the unlawful demonstration of the 16th and 17th(9) to give up agitators.
On July 8 orders were issued dissolving the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Sailors of the Baltic Fleet—the Centrobalt, as it was called for brevity. Instructions were given to arrest and send to Petrograd for interrogation all the ringleaders in the disorders among the garrison of Kronstadt and the crews of the warships Petropavlovsk, Respublika and Slava, whose names, the lackeys of the bourgeoisie asserted, were “besmirched by counter-revolutionary actions and resolutions.”
“3. Disarm all workers in Petrograd.
“4. Establish a military censorship of the press, with authority to confiscate the machinery of papers inciting the troops or the population to conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.
“5. Establish a ‘militia’ in Petrograd and other large towns under wounded officers from soldiers who have been wounded at the front, choosing preferably men of forty years and over.
“6. Disarm all units in Petrograd and district who do not agree to the above conditions and transform them into labour battalions.”(10)
That very same day Kerensky circulated a lying radiogram which stated:
“It has been ascertained beyond doubt that the disorders in Petrograd were organised with the help of German government agents. . . . The leaders and persons who have stained themselves in the blood of their brothers and by a crime against the country and the revolution, are being arrested.”(11)
The “Socialist” Ministers—who constituted the majority in the government after the resignation of the Cadets—realised that open counter-revolutionary actions on the part of the government might arouse the resistance of the masses. While not desisting from crushing the revolution, the Minister compromisers decided to pass several “revolutionary” measures as a sop to the people. It was proposed to proclaim Russia a republic, disperse the Privy Council and the State Duma and to draft agrarian legislation. On July 7 Kerensky outlined this programme at a meeting of the Provisional Government. In reply, Prince Lvov resigned and left the meeting.
The alarm was sounded in bourgeois circles. The Provisional Committee of the State Duma declared that it considered
“its removal from the work of forming the new Provisional Government politically disastrous.”(12)
That evening Prince Lvov sent a letter to the government protesting against the programme outlined. In his opinion, all the clauses were
“in the nature of casting State and moral pearls to the masses for the sake of demagogy and in order to satisfy the demands of their petty self-conceit.”(13)
Intimidated by the bourgeoisie, the “Socialist” Ministers abandoned their intentions. On July 8 the Provisional Government endorsed Kerensky as Prime Minister, he at the same time retaining the posts of Minister of War and Minister of Marine. Nekrasov was included in the government as Assistant Prime Minister. The Ministry of the Interior was presented to Tsereteli. That same day the government published its programme, which contained not a single one of the recently proposed measures. The government’s declaration reiterated the declaration of the first coalition government of May 6, and directly referred to this declaration several times. The Provisional Government promised to bend every effort in the fight against the foreign enemy and also to convene the Constituent Assembly at the time appointed and to draft agrarian measures. At the same time it was stated that in the sphere of labour policy “bills are being drafted for an eight-hour working day and for comprehensive labour protection,”(14) and so forth. For the purpose of combating economic disorganisation, the government would set up an Economic Council and a Chief Economic Committee to evolve a general plan of organisation of national economy and labour.
Like previous declarations, the new programme contained nothing explicit. Ex-Tsar Nicholas wrote in his diary of the new government and its declaration as follows:
“Saturday, July 8. There has been a change in the government: Prince Lvov has resigned and Kerensky will be President of the Council while remaining Minister of War and Minister of Marine and in addition taking over control of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. He is the right man in the right place at the present moment: the more power he has the better.”(15)
The government had the whole-hearted support of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. On July 9, a joint meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants’ Deputies proclaimed the new Ministry to be a “government for the salvation of the revolution”:
“It is invested with unlimited powers for the restoration of organisation and discipline in the army and for resolutely combating every manifestation of counter-revolution and anarchy.”(16)
Having invested the Provisional Government with emergency powers, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries indicated where the blow should be struck so as to smash the revolution most surely. At a joint meeting of the two Executive Committees held on July 13, Dan made the following statement:
“What Comrade Kerensky called upon us to do, we have already done. Not only are we prepared to support the Provisional Government, not only have we delegated plenary powers to it, but we demand that the government should use these powers. . . . This morning, at a meeting of the fraction of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks . . . a resolution was adopted which we submit to the meeting and are assured it will adopt. . . .”(17)
The resolution was then read. It demanded that the Bolsheviks should be tried, that Lenin should appear for trial, that all persons summoned for trial should be expelled from the Soviet and that all members of the Soviet should implicitly obey the decision of its majority.
This resolution revealed to what depths the petty-bourgeois parties had sunk. But it was not the only act of its kind. On July 8 an article appeared in Novoye Vremya a reactionary bourgeois paper, demanding that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries should take
“decisive steps to dissociate themselves from criminal Bolshevism and to place themselves above the suspicion of according comradely protection to Lenin.”(18)
And on July 11, to the glee of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks published an appeal to the members of the party in the name of the Organisation Committee, which acted as the Menshevik Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. This appeal stated:
“The criminal adventure instigated by Lenin’s headquarter staff was able to attain the proportions it did and become a menace to the cause of revolution only because this staff had the support of large sections of the workers and because Social-Democracy proved too weak to paralyse demagogy by its organised intervention. . . . It is time to declare loudly and clearly that ‘Bolshevism,’ the Bolshevism of which Lenin is the mouthpiece and leader, has diverged so far from Social-Democracy, has become so permeated by anarcho-syndicalist ideas, that it is only by some misunderstanding, by force of inertia, that it still screens itself by the banner of the R.S.D.L.P.”(19)
The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had achieved the full circle of their development and had crowned the period of compromise with the bourgeoisie by definitely deserting to the enemies of the revolution.
On July 12 the government restored the death penalty at the front and established military tribunals to deal with the revolutionary soldiers. Decrees were also issued introducing preliminary military censorship, closing down the Bolshevik papers (Pravda, Okopnaya Pravda, etc.), and providing for the disarmament of the workers. The programme outlined by Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador, was carried into effect in its entirety. Not without good reason did Sir George Buchanan later write in his reminiscences in reference to the Provisional Government:
“But, black as was the outlook, I was nevertheless inclined to take a more hopeful view of things. The government had suppressed the Bolshevik rising and seemed at last determined to act with firmness. . . . On my calling on him a few days later, Tereshchenko assured me that the government was now completely master of the situation.”(20)
While pursuing a vigorous counter-revolutionary policy, the Provisional Government tried to divert the attention of the masses by throwing them sops. At the meeting of the government at which the death penalty was introduced, a bill was adopted forbidding the purchase and sale of land. The Petrograd garrison was disarmed, but on July 13 Polovtsev, the man who had smashed the July demonstration, was removed from his post of Commander of the Petrograd Military Area.
As soon as it became clear that the July demonstration had failed, the Provisional Government decided to reform the Cabinet once more. On July 11, I. N. Efremov, a former member of the State Duma, a land-owner and member of the Progressivist Party, was appointed Minister of Justice; A. A. Baryshnikov, a former member of the State Duma, a Progressivist, was appointed Acting Minister of Poor Relief; Takhtamyshev was appointed Acting Minister of Ways of Communication. A little prior to this the Progressivists had formed a new party—the Russian Radical Democratic Party—in order to extend their base by inviting the support of the petty-bourgeois section of the population. The new party declared in favour of a coalition and the admission of bourgeois representatives to the government.
However closely allied the Progressivists were to the Cadets—Lenin called them “a crossbreed of Octobrists and Cadets”(21)—they could not represent the bourgeoisie, whose political leaders were the Cadets. On July 13 Kerensky invited the Central Committee of the Cadet Party to nominate its candidates to the Cabinet. The Cadets declined. On July 15 three prominent Moscow Cadets—N. I. Astrov, later a member of General Denikin’s government, N. M. Kishkin, who later, in 1919, attempted to organise a rebellion in Moscow in support of Denikin, and V. D. Nabokov, Executive Secretary of the First Provisional Government—sent Kerensky a letter setting forth the terms on which the Cadets would be prepared to join the government. The Cadets insisted that the members of the government must in their activities be independent of all organisations and parties, that the government must not undertake any big reform before the Constituent Assembly met, that discipline must be restored in the army, that the soldiers’ committees must not be allowed to interfere in questions of military tactics, and that an end must be put to multiple powers. It was no longer enough for the Cadets that the petty-bourgeois leaders of the Soviets had invested the government with plenary power. They wanted the government to exercise that power independently of the Soviet. On July 18, at another of the “private conferences of members of the State Duma,” the leaders of the bourgeoisie announced what their aim was. Purishkevich hysterically clamoured:
“The power must be a power, the Soviets of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies must be put in their place and dissolved.”(22)
A. M. Maslennikov, a houseowner, lawyer and member of the Progressivist Party, seconded the arch-reactionary Purishkevich:
“It is time to say why it is we have sunk to this shame and humiliation. . . . It is the dreamers, the crazy people, who imagine themselves to be the shapers of world policy, who are to blame for this; it is the petty careerists, who want in the revolution to ride about in automobiles and live in palaces and who have sold Russia to the Germans, who are to blame for this. . . . A handful of crazy fanatics, a handful of rogues, a handful of traitors have hitched themselves on to the revolution and this handful has called itself ‘the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.’”(23)
F. I. Rodichev, one of the founders of the Cadet Party who, as Minister for Finland in the Provisional Government, pursued a chauvinistic, Great-Russian policy, insisted that the demands made by Kishkin, Astrov and Nabokov should be accepted, and said threateningly:
“We are afraid that the Bolshevism that has perhaps already shown its face in the towns will show its face in the countryside, but we must combat this, and we must call upon the government to combat it, and not to connive at it, and to organise an administration, to organise an authority in the country.”(24)
When the atmosphere had become sufficiently heated, Milyukov spoke. He made a detailed analysis of the Cadets’ demands. The bourgeois leader asked the excited audience:
“Do you consider it right that the Party of National Freedom . . . should condemn its members to the rôle of a screen, which we have refused to play until now, that the Party of National Freedom should nevertheless join the government? We think not. . . . And we considered that we would be simply deceiving the country . . . if we accepted the proposal made to us on any conditions, and not on the conditions which we put, and which—I am glad to say—are put by the Provisional Committee of the State Duma as well.”(25)
Milyukov went so far in his frankness as to demand a further postponement of the Constituent Assembly (the Government had promised to convene it on September 17).
The joint organisations of merchants and industrialists issued a declaration in support of Milyukov’s demands. Landlords and bourgeois joined forces over the demands of the Cadet Party.
On July 20, Kerensky again invited Kishkin and Astrov to join the government. He assured the Cadets that:
“The Provisional Government is invested with plenary power and is not answerable to any public organisations or parties.”(26)
Milyukov expected that the Soviet would fully endorse this statement. But the militant attitude of the bourgeoisie frightened the leaders of the Soviet and they hesitated to accept all the Cadets’ conditions. Kerensky decided to bring pressure to bear on the vacillating compromisers. On July 21 he tendered his resignation. Kerensky justified this step on the ground that he evidently did not enjoy sufficient prestige to form a government and that, on the other hand, he considered that Russia could be ruled only by a government that would unite all the public organisations. The bourgeois Ministers—Tereshchenko, Godnev, Efremov, Lvov and Nekrasov—supported Kerensky and also tendered their resignations. The Provisional Government resolved not to accept the resignations of Kerensky and the other Ministers and to leave the Cabinet unchanged until a new government was formed in one way or another. It was decided to summon that evening a meeting of the Central Committees of the Popular Socialist Party, the Cadets, the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Radical Democratic Party (the former Progressivists), the Chairman of the State Duma, the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants’ Deputies. At 9 p.m. a preliminary meeting of both Executive Committees was held, at which Tsereteli reported on the course of the crisis. Dan proposed that the session should be suspended, that they should all remain in the Taurida Palace and that those invited should attend the meeting of the Cabinet at the Winter Palace.
The joint conference of the government and the Central Committees of the compromising and bourgeois parties opened at 11.30 p.m. The discussion lasted into the morning. The bourgeoisie insisted on the adoption of the Cadets’ conditions. The compromisers demanded the recognition of the declaration of July 8. Speaking on behalf of the Mensheviks, Dan declared that “at the proper moment” they would not fear to take power,(27) but before this was done every avenue must be explored to create a coalition government. Chkheidze plied Milyukov with questions on his attitude towards the questions of peace and land. Milyukov referred him to the letter of the Moscow Cadets and added:
“First we must create a powerful Russia, and then only can we speak of achieving national aims and of observing our obligations to our Allies.”(28)
Realising the state of mind that prevailed, Milyukov rapidly changed his tactics. He played on Kerensky’s popularity and proposed that the latter be personally entrusted to form a Cabinet of persons whom he might deem fit to invite. This proposal suited the bourgeoisie because in this way the Cabinet would be independent of organisations. But it suited the compromisers also, because it enabled them to save their face in the eyes of the masses: Kerensky the “Socialist” would remain at the head of the government. The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries declared in their resolutions that they
“place full confidence in Comrade Kerensky in the formation of a Cabinet made up of representatives of all parties that are prepared to work on the basis of the programme announced by the Government of Comrade Kerensky on July 8.”(29)
On July 22 a joint meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants’ Deputies entrusted Kerensky with the task of forming a Cabinet. The reference to the declaration of July 8 was obviously intended as a smoke-screen. That same day the Provisional Committee of the State Duma also “entrusted” Kerensky with the formation of a Cabinet, but made no mention whatever of the declaration of July 8. On July 24 the Central Committee of the Cadet Party agreed to include its representatives in the government, at the same time emphasising the point that the old conditions retained their force:
“Taking note of the declaration of the Prime Minister to the effect that he intends to take as the basis for the creation of a strong government the dire necessity of prosecuting the war, maintaining the fighting capacity of the army and restoring the economic power of the State, the Central Committee of the Party of National Freedom leaves it to its colleagues, on the personal selection of Kerensky, to join the government and to occupy the posts offered them.”(30)
That very same day the new Cabinet was announced: Premier and Minister of War and Marine, A. F. Kerensky (Socialist-Revolutionary); Assistant Premier and Minister of Finance, N. V. Kekrasov (Left Cadet); Minister of the Interior, N. D. Avksentyev (Socialist-Revolutionary); Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. I. Tereshchenko; Minister of Justice, A. S. Zarudny (Popular Socialist); Minister of Education, S. F. Oldenburg (Cadet); Minister of Commerce and Industry, S. N. Prokopovich (non-party, close to the Cadets); Minister of Agriculture, V. M. Chernov (Socialist-Revolutionary); Minister of Post and Telegraph, A. M. Nikitin (Menshevik); Minister of Labour, M. I. Skobelev (Menshevik); Minister of Food, A. V. Peshekhonov (Popular Socialist); Minister of Poor Relief, I. N. Efremov (Radical Democratic Party); Minister of Ways of Communication, P. N. Yurenev (Cadet); Procurator-General, A. V. Kartashov (Cadet); Comptroller-General, F. F. Kokoshkin (Cadet).
And that is just the opinion subsequently expressed of the composition of the new government:
“While the Socialists had a small nominal superiority, the real superiority on the Cabinet unquestionably belonged to the convinced supporters of bourgeois democracy.”(31)
The July events were reflected in the provinces. On July 4, when the first news from Petrograd was received in Moscow the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies passed the following resolution:
“Until further orders all public manifestations in Moscow, whether in the shape of demonstrations or street meetings, are forbidden.”(32)
But in spite of this prohibition, that very same day huge demonstrations of workers marched from the outskirts to the centre of the city, many of the banners and placards bearing slogans demanding the transfer of power to the Soviet. Several detachments from the Moscow garrison joined the demonstrating workers.
A meeting addressed by Bolshevik speakers was held on the Skobelev Square.
Bolshevik sympathies obviously prevailed in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. On July 5 the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies passed a resolution demanding the transfer of power to the Soviets. A huge demonstration of workers and soldiers from the local garrison was held in Ivanovo-Voznesensk on July 6.
Demonstrations, and in some cases revolts of soldiers took place in Yaroslavl, Rostov, Kostroma, Shuya, Kovrov, Nizhni-Novgorod, Kiev, Riga and a number of other cities. An armed detachment, under the command of Colonel Verkhovsky, was dispatched from Moscow to Nizhni-Novgorod to disarm the local garrison.
[1] “The All-Russian Central Executive Committee During the July Days of 1917,” Krasny Arkhiv, 1926, No. 5 (18), p. 215.
[2] “Joint Session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies and the All-Russian Executive Committee of Peasants’ Deputies,” Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, No. 111, July 7, 1917.
[3] J. Stalin, The Road to October, Articles and Speeches, March-October 1917, Moscow, 1925.
[4] Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—3, Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, Register 1, File No. 42, folio 1.
[5] “The July Days in Petrograd,” Krasny Arkhiv, 1927, No. 5 (24), pp. 66-67.
[6] The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917, Moscow, 1934, p. 28.
[7] P. A. Polovtsev, Days of Eclipse, Paris, p. 143.
[8] Lenin, “The Question of the Bolshevik Leaders Appearing Before the Courts,” Collected Works, (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXI, pp. 24-25.
[9] New Style—Trans.
[10] A. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914-1917, London Hutchinson & Co., 1921, Vol. II, p. 662.
[11] “Telegram of the Minister of Marine,” Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, No. 112, July 8, 1917.
[12] “Resolution of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma,” Rech, No. 158, July 8, 1917.
[13] “Prince Lvov’s Declaration to the Provisional Government,” Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, No. 113, July 9, 1917.
[14] “From the Provisional Government,” Rech, No. 159, July 9, 1917.
[15] “Diary of Nicholas Romanov,” Krasny Arkhiv, 1927, No. 2 (21), p. 91.
[16] “Establishment of a Revolutionary Dictatorship,” Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, No. l14, July 11, 1917.
[17] “Joint Meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies and of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants’ Deputies,” Novaya Zhizn, No. 74, July 14, 1917.
[18] Hofsteter, “They Must Dissociate Themselves,” Novoye Vremya, No. 14821, July 8, 1917.
[19] “To All Members of the Party,” Rabochaya Gazeta, No. 103, July 11, 1917.
[20] Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs, London, Cassell and Co., 1923, Vol. II, pp. 156-58.
[21] Lenin, “The Results of the Elections,” Collected Works, (Russ. ed.), Vol. XVI, p. 262.
[22] The Bourgeoisie and the Landlords in 1917. Private Conferences of Members of the State Duma, Moscow, 1932, p. 202.
[23] Ibid., p. 197.
[24] Ibid., p. 207.
[25] Ibid., p. 217.
[26] “Letter of A. F. Kerensky to V. D. Nabokov, N. M. Kishkin and N. I. Astrov,” Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, No. 123, July 21, 1917.
[27] “A Historic Meeting,” Den, No. 117, July 23, 1917.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] “Negotiations for the Formation of a New Cabinet,” Den, No. 118, July 25, 1917.
[31] P. N. Milyukov, History of the Second Russian Revolution, Vol. I, Book 2, Sofia, 1922, pp. 44-5.
[32] “Appeal of the Moscow Soviet,” Izvestia of the Moscow Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, No. 103, July 5, 1917.
Previous: The July Demonstration in the Capital
Next: The Proletariat Loses Faith in the Compromisers