The bourgeoisie and its lackeys flooded the front with leaflets. One hundred and fifty army newspapers coaxed the soldiers day in, day out to remain at the front. Their minds confused at first by the demagogy of the Socialist defencists, the soldiers maintained a gloomy silence.
While feverish work was proceeding “above,” mustering forces to subjugate the masses, an equally feverish process was proceeding “below,” as a result of which the masses were losing confidence in those “above” and shaking off the fetters of self-deception. The dry reports of the headquarters staffs of the armies recorded facts that showed that the army was “disintegrating” from day to day.
This is how the situation was depicted at a conference of commanders of fronts held on May 4, 1917:
General Brusilov, Commander of the South-Western front, said:
“One of the regiments declared that not only did it refuse to attack, but it desired to quit the front and return home. The committees resisted this tendency, but they were told that they would be removed. I argued with the regiment for a long time, and when I asked whether they agreed with me, they requested permission to give their reply in writing. Within a few minutes a placard hung before me: ‘Peace at All Costs, Down with the War!’ . . . In the end they promised to stay where they were, but refused to attack, arguing as follows: ‘Our enemy is a good fellow and has informed us that he will not attack if we do not attack. We must return home so as to enjoy the advantages of liberty and land—why get crippled?”(1)
General Dragomirov supplemented this with the following:
“The prevailing sentiment in the army is a longing for peace. Anybody can easily gain popularity in the army by advocating peace without annexations and the right of self-determination for nations. . . . The desire for peace is so powerful that new reinforcements refuse to accept arms, saying, ‘We don’t need them, we don’t intend to fight. . . .’” [Our italics—Ed.](2)
General Shcherbachov, Commander of the Rumanian Front, stated:
“Since my recent appointment I have already visited all the Russian armies under my command, and the impression I got of the morale of the troops and their fighting efficiency corresponds with what has just been described to you at length. . . . I shall mention only one of the finest divisions in the Russian army, which among the old troops had earned the title of the ‘Iron Division,’ and which brilliantly maintained its old glory in this war. Having been placed on an active sector, this division refused to perform sapping work in preparation for a new attack, on the grounds that they had no wish to attack.”(3)
Letters written by soldiers give a clear idea of how the spirit of revolution progressed in the army.
The abrupt change from an autocratic monarchy to political liberty, and the fact that millions of people who had formerly been ordinary, unobtrusive citizens had now been drawn into the revolutionary struggle, at first fostered a defencist spirit which fettered the minds of the soldiers.
“We welcome and support the slogan of the Supreme Commander, ‘War to Victory!’” one soldier wrote on the outbreak of the February Revolution; but thereupon added, “Some are worn out, while others are hiding behind the law of the old régime and behind capital. They live in bliss. These people, together with the gendarmes, guards and police, should be sent to the trenches, while those who have suffered so much should be sent back to Russia in their place.”(4)
The same ideas are to be found in soldiers’ letters written in March, 1917, but now they bore a more definite class tinge:
“We all feel and realise quite well what we want. God only grant us victory over the foreign enemy and then we shall tackle the internal enemy, that is, the landlords.”(5)
And the letter goes on to stress the principal aim: “to take the land from the landlords.”(6)
A third soldier complains:
“We are glad of liberty. It is terrible to die when the doors have been flung wide open in Russia. . . . Every . . . soldier wants to see the bright and happy life of to-day for which we have been waiting for 307 years. . . . But the terrible thing is that this bloodshed will never cease.”(7)
And, finally, in a letter written from the front in April, a soldier writes:
“Let these gentlemen know whether the army does want to fight for a complete victory like one man, and let these gentlemen take the most vigorous measures to put a stop to this terrible and useless slaughter, and as soon as possible, otherwise it will be too late.”(8)
And another soldier, writing on behalf of the Thirty-first Alexeyev Regiment of the Eighth Infantry Division, explains just how long the army was prepared to wait:
“If this goes on much longer, we pledge our honest word of honour that on May 15 we will quit the front, and then let them all perish, not only the soldiers in the front line but the whole of Russia.”(9)
The mass of the soldiers very soon lost their defencist illusions. The organisations created in the army under the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, and then in every large city, were extremely active. Relying on the proletarians scattered through the regiments, the Bolshevik military organisations formed Party nuclei in the army, distributed literature and organised meetings and lectures. A newspaper called Soldatskaya Pravda (Soldier’s Truth) was started in Petrograd and immediately attained a circulation of 50,000 copies. It acted as an organising influence in places where the Party apparatus had not yet penetrated. Another newspaper, Okopnaya Pravda (Trench Truth), was published at the front. These army newspapers were vivid examples of Lenin’s description of what a newspaper should be—a “collective organiser”(10)—the correspondents who wrote for the papers became organisers of Bolshevik work in the regiments, while the readers became rank-and-file Bolsheviks.
The Bolshevik newspapers very soon gained great popularity and prestige among the soldiers, who supported them materially, sacrificing not only their last copecks, but also medals, religious emblems, crosses of St. George, wedding rings, and so forth.
Neither rabid persecution nor direct prohibition could prevent the penetration of the newspapers into the army. Soldiers and workers in the war area created an organisation which performed heroic work in distributing the papers. Every copy was read until it was literally worn to shreds. Aided by railwaymen, postal workers, automobile drivers and field kitchen staffs, the papers not only reached the trenches, but were also spread along the living chain of sentinels directly facing the “enemy.”
The difficulties that confronted the Bolsheviks in their efforts to destroy the influence of the bourgeoisie over the masses were somewhat greater in the national regiments (i.e., regiments recruited from the various non-Russian nationalities inhabiting Russia—Trans.), where not only the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks had to be combated, but national prejudices as well.
It was necessary, in addition to exposing the Provisional Government, to destroy the influence exercised over the toilers of the various nationalities by their native bourgeoisies, who also were in favour of continuing the imperialist war. But here, too, the workers and peasants soon learnt by experience that what the Bolsheviks said was true.
The military organisation of the Bolshevik Party carried on extensive work in the army. By the end of April half the soldiers of the garrison of Petrograd were under Bolshevik influence. Stable Bolshevik organisations had been formed in the Pavlovsky, Izmailovsky, Preobrazhensky, Finland and other regiments.
The military organisation of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party had contacts with the regiments at the front and with a number of garrisons in the rear. How great its influence was may be judged from the All-Russian Conference of Military Organisations of the Bolshevik Party.
The Conference opened on June 16 and was attended by delegates from forty-eight organisations at the front and seventeen organisations in the rear. Delegates came from 500 regiments distributed along the four principal fronts and in thirty of the largest cities in the country.
The only regions not represented were the Caucasus and Eastern Siberia.
There were about 160 delegates representing approximately 26,000 soldiers belonging to Communist nuclei.
The Conference sat for ten days—June 16—26—and under the guidance of the Central Committee of the Party performed a tremendous amount of work.
In addition to the hearing of reports from the various localities, which gave a vivid picture of the situation at the front, there were several general questions on the agenda: organisation of the power of the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies—speaker, Lenin; the national movement and the national regiments—speaker, Stalin; the agrarian question—speaker, Lenin, etc.
At the time of the Conference a widespread national movement had developed in the army. National regiments were being formed. Soldiers belonging to one nationality were transferred from front to front. Widespread agitation for the formation of national regiments was carried on. While the bourgeoisie of the various nationalities strove for the formation of national regiments, hoping to use them as an instrument against the revolution, the more reactionary of the commanders resisted this in every way. Playing on the chauvinistic prejudices fostered by tsarism, the Great-Russian oppressors endeavoured to incite the soldiers against the formation of national units.
Several delegates at the Conference spoke against the formation of Ukrainian regiments. They argued that the creation of Ukrainian regiments in time of war presented difficulties of a purely technical character and that the demand for Ukrainisation came from the Ukrainian landlords, and not from the Ukrainian people as a whole.
A definite Bolshevik line was needed. This line was laid down by Stalin in his speech.
Having pointed out that the policy of the Provisional Government on the national question was a Great-Russian policy, Stalin set up in opposition to it the Bolshevik national programme: self-determination of nations, including the right of secession.
“The Conference is firmly convinced,” the resolution proposed by Stalin ran, “that only the resolute and unalterable recognition of the right of nations to self-determination, recognition in deed and not merely in word, can strengthen fraternal confidence between the peoples of Russia and thus make for their real union—a voluntary, not an enforced union—into a single State.”(11)
On the subject of the formation of national regiments, the Conference adopted the following unanimous resolution:
“Convinced that the formation of national regiments generally is not in the interest of the toiling masses—although, of course, the Conference does not deny the right of every nationality to form such regiments—the Conference expresses the firm assurance that the proletariat of the Ukraine, like the proletariat of Russia generally, being interested in the replacement of the standing army by a popular militia, will resist the transformation of the national regiments of the Ukraine into a standing army divorced from the people.”(12)
The resolution of the Conference created a firm basis for the work of the Party within the national regiments. While condemning every manifestation of Great-Russian chauvinism, the Conference at the same time warned against possible deviations in the direction of local nationalism and insisted that persistent work be carried on to Bolshevise the national regiments. The fight on two fronts, so distinctly outlined in Stalin’s speech, played an effective part in enlisting the national regiments on the side of the revolution, particularly in October.
The All-Russian Conference of Military Organisations of the Bolshevik Party in the Front and the Rear reviewed the four months of struggle between revolution and counter-revolution for the support of the army, and the conclusion it drew was that victory was definitely swinging to the side of revolution.
Final victory could be achieved only by intensifying the struggle, only by extending the work in the rear and at the front.
But the Conference noted one other achievement of the Bolshevik Party, namely, the successful effort to create a proletarian militia, the Red Guard.
[1] A. I. Denikin, Sketches of the Russian Revolt, Vol. I, Book 2, Paris, p. 50.
[2] Ibid., p. 52.
[3] Ibid., pp. 54-5.
[4] Soldiers’ Letters of 1917, Moscow, 1927, pp. 18-19.
[5] Ibid., pp. 29-30.
[6] Ibid., p. 34.
[7] Ibid., p. 40.
[8] Ibid., p. 43.
[9] Ibid., p. 48.
[10] Lenin, “What Is To Be Done?” Selected Works, (Eng. ed.), Vol. II.
[11] S. E. Rabinovich, The All-Russian Military Conference of the Bolsheviks in 1917, “Resolutions of the All-Russian Conference of Military Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. in the Front and the Rear, June 1917,” Moscow, 1931, p. 73.
[12] Ibid., p. 72.
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