

FACTS AND FIGURES — No. 27

THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY  
IN LEBANON  
AND THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

A Study in Changing Attitudes

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## FOREWORD

This is the first study, as far as we know, to be carried on a foreign community in any Arab country, concerning the Palestine problem.

The Research Center of the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) was interested in studying the American community in Lebanon for a number of reasons. One reason is that the Americans appear among the most ignorant and careless of people with regard to Arab rights in Palestine. Another reason is the fact that Lebanon has the unique position among the Arab countries of offering information to a foreign community in the community's own language. However, the major reason behind this basically empirical survey is to offer to those in charge of Arab information offices, Palestinians and non-Palestinians, who are trying to reform the approach of the Arab mass media toward the Palestine problem from the mistakes and shortcomings of the past, some facts about the American mentality which they are supposed to address and to get a feed-back from.

Of course we do not claim that studying the Americans in a country like Lebanon leads to an understanding of the whole American public. This is so, because we know that an

American community thousands of miles away from its home, and which is affected by conditions that differ from the conditions which affect the people at home at the present time, cannot be representative of the American people. But we do claim, on the other hand, that to study a community like the one we have is the best way to get a clear and exact idea about the reaction to the information they receive of those who are reached by our mass media. This study is not an information material, but a basis for information-planning. It does not study the Americans but it studies the extent of their knowledge of us and of our information to them. If our information service is ineffective among the Americans in Lebanon, could it be effective in the U.S.? If it is difficult for members of an American community, in the midst of the Arab world, to comprehend or believe the ideas transmitted by our information service, could it change the situation in the U.S.? If the influence left by the traditional American enmity to the Arab revolution (including the Palestinian revolution) deprives some members of the American community in Lebanon of the ability to see the facts, could those facts overcome such influence in the U.S.?

We do not mean, by all those previous question marks, to be pessimistic or to give ready-made judgements about the effectiveness of Arab information about Palestine in the U.S. No judgement can be given before we evaluate the effect of Arab information, in recent years, on approximately five hundred Americans who live in Lebanon. By putting some

question marks, we are only expressing thoughts which cross the minds of many Arabs, and which worry Arab information personnel when they think of the future of "working" for Palestine in the U.S. The experience of the effects of information on an American community could be useful for such personnel.

The following are the major conclusions that were reached on the basis of the study's findings:—

*First*, the Americans in Lebanon agree with what we keep repeating about the fact that Zionist propaganda and information misleads American public opinion, through the American mass media. This confirmation by Americans supports our condemnation of the American communications system. Two-thirds of the Americans in Lebanon admit, very frankly, to the prejudice of the American mass media against the Arabs. None of them, however, stated that the American mass media was prejudiced in favor of the Arabs. Only 3 per cent believed that the American mass media was unprejudiced and objective. Hence, two-thirds of the Americans in Lebanon confirm that the picture, drawn by mass media in their country, about the Palestine problem is distorted, misleading and doubtful.

*Second*, without saying why, half of the Americans in Lebanon stated that they were ignorant of the facts of the Palestine problem before leaving their country. (We assume that the main reason behind the ignorance of the Americans

in Lebanon of facts about the Palestine problem is due to Zionist infiltration in most fields in America, especially in the field of information. Yet that ignorance is due, at the same time, to the weakness, disability, and hence failure of Arab information in America.) As a matter of fact, we would expect the percentage of those who lack any knowledge about the facts of the Palestine problem to be much higher if the study were to be carried out in the U.S. Our expectation is based upon the fact that a good number of the Americans in Lebanon showed special interest in Arab affairs before they came to the Middle East; and that could be one reason that made them come here. (Again, the Americans in Lebanon do not represent the Americans in the U.S.) That is evidenced from the fact that 25 per cent of the Americans in Lebanon shared our view of the Palestine problem before they came to Lebanon. Yet even this group was not completely convinced of our view; two-thirds of this group still believe that the Zionists have some right in Palestine! This leaves 8 per cent of the Americans in Lebanon who, prior to leaving their country, were totally convinced that we have an absolute right to Palestine.

*Third*, there is no doubt that the residence of Americans in Lebanon helps tremendously in acquainting them with our view of the Palestine problem, and assists in convincing them of our rights in Palestine, especially since the Americans in particular, and foreigners in general, come over from countries which lack any Arab information effort for Palestine, or where such efforts are, at best, quite weak and crippled.

Hence it is not strange to find out that two-thirds of the Americans in Lebanon changed their views on the Palestine problem after they came to Lebanon. Most of the Americans in Lebanon said that the change in their views was great. All of them said that the change was in favor of the Palestinian Arabs. (They changed from misunderstanding and/or not supporting Palestinian Arabs, to varying degrees of understanding and support.)

We should, however, look for the reasons behind the change in the views of the Americans in Lebanon. Our study shows that the change was not due to Arab mass media, or to the efforts of those in charge of the mass media. Only one American attributed the change in his view, after residing in Lebanon, to Arab mass media. The rest of those who changed their views attributed the change to their acquaintances; Palestinian Arabs, and non-Palestinian Arabs. This important fact should make us take great care of personal relationships with foreigners, because personal contact seems closer to success than the ordinary mass media apparatus like the broadcasting system and the press. This position of ours is supported by the fact that Arab mass media had no effect at all upon one-third, and had a negative effect upon another one-third of the Americans in Lebanon. Compared to this, four-fifths of the Americans who changed in our favor stated that personal contact was the main reason behind their new stand on the Palestine problem.

*Fourth*, all that was said previously does not mean that

we are in good shape and that the Americans in Lebanon are truly convinced of our view. Less than 25 per cent of them believe, after being acquainted with our point of view, that we are completely right in the conflict. The rest of them do not completely agree with our view of the conflict. They agree with some of what we see as our right and, at the same time, they believe some Zionist claims. Hence they give the Zionists support and sympathy which is more or less equal to that which they grant us.

*Fifth*, there is a wide-spread belief that the Christian church in the U.S. (especially the Protestant Church) plays a big role in "poisoning" the minds of the Americans as far as the Palestine problem is concerned. The church is believed to conceal the facts about the Palestine problem and to prepare the American public to believe Zionist claims. This is the reason which made those in charge of our study attempt to measure the truth behind that belief. The findings show that the church does not seem to be a very instrumental element in making the Americans "pro-Israel." Only one-third of the Americans in Lebanon stated that the church affected their view of the Palestine problem. But, even this one-third did not say that the church made them more sympathetic to the Jews. One-third of it (one-ninth of our sample) said that the church made them less sympathetic to the Jews (but did not necessarily make them sympathetic to us). Still not all those who were made more sympathetic to the Jews became sympathetic to "Israel." The church does not affect the purely

political view of the Americans in Lebanon on the Palestine problem.

The study supported the wide-spread notion that the Protestant church surpasses the Catholic church in attracting the Americans towards the Jews and hence towards "Israel." The Protestant church made half of the affected Protestants pro-Jewish, while the Catholic church made one-third of the affected Catholics pro-Jewish.

*Sixth*, one of the most outstanding characteristics of the Palestinian Revolution today (especially as far as it is reflected in the information sphere) is its emphasis on the fact that it is not an anti-semitic movement as Zionists claim, by declaring that it is fighting a racial and imperialistic existence in Palestine which is Israel, and that it is not at war with the Jews, and by calling at the same time for the establishment of a democratic state in Palestine. That is, the Palestinian Revolution does not aim at exterminating the Jews as Zionists claim. These two characteristics of the Palestinian Revolution, which are in accordance with the other aims of the revolution and in accordance with the Palestinian personality and Arab heritage, can play an effective role in penetrating the wall of Zionist propaganda and in presenting the Arab rights in their real form. This will lead to the replacement of the distorted image which was, and still, is being drawn by Zionists and their collaborators all over the world. This is why we were interested in finding out the extent of the knowledge and beliefs

held by the Americans in Lebanon about these two Palestinian demands. The outcome might not be very encouraging. However it is not very discouraging either. It is not encouraging because we hoped that the Americans who live among us would understand and believe us more than they do now. Anyway, the understanding and belief are not missing altogether. Almost half the Americans in Lebanon were convinced of the Palestinian Revolution's assertion that it is not anti-semitic. The other half were either not convinced or not sure.

All the previous discussion speaks of confidence. It leaves the task of convincing other people to our information. However as far as hearing of the assertion is concerned, the situation is quite different: a majority of the Americans in Lebanon (94 per cent) had heard of our assertion that we are not anti-Semitic and that we want a democratic state in Palestine. This fact reflects the special attention paid by the Americans in Lebanon to this specific subject.

Since Zionists and their American collaborators spread rumors that the Palestinian Resistance Movement is a purely communist movement (they give the fact that it has some left-wing elements, and that it has won the support of many leftist countries and movements, as evidence to their claims which aim to antagonize American public opinion towards the movement), we were interested in knowing whether the Americans in Lebanon were fooled by such rumors. We found that

only 10 per cent of them believed such rumors. The rest either did not believe them or were not sure.

*Seventh*, the Palestinian Revolution sees but only one solution to the Palestine problem: armed struggle to liberate every inch of Palestine. However, it is useful for people in our information services to know what others think of in terms of solutions to the problem.

We found that half the Americans in Lebanon called for de-Zionization of "Israel," and transforming it into a Palestinian state which would accommodate all Palestinian Arabs under a democratic structure for all citizens in that state, with guarantees by the U.N. A lesser percentage (28 per cent) called for the realization of the U.N. resolution of 22/11/1967—known as the "peaceful solution." Only 10 per cent called for recognizing "Israel" and resettling the Palestinian refugees outside Palestine.

The P.L.O. Research Center tried, while studying the views of the Americans in Lebanon on the Palestine problem, to get an idea about the impression of the Americans on the Center itself. We asked independent questions about the subject. It might be good to give, very briefly, the conclusions about that independent subject.

We found, by asking "Did you know of the existence of the P.L.O. Research Center before receiving this ques-

tionnaire?"', that 60 per cent of the Americans in Lebanon did know of the existence of the Center and that 50 per cent of them have read publications by the Center. We were encouraged by such a result, but also disturbed because half of the Americans in Lebanon did not read any publications by the Center, which is quite a loss. The loss is heavy since it has occurred in a country where the Center is located. Since the Center was established four years ago, it has published 25 books in English, eight in French, six in German and two in Danish and Spanish, with a total of more than quarter of a million copies, most of which have been distributed and are now out of print.

The previous discussion shows that the wall constructed by Zionists, to prevent any penetration of the Palestinian Revolution's thought, can be penetrated. It also shows that our sphere is still a limited one. We must invest more efforts in trying to reach the maximum number of foreigners, including those who live among us and who probably are the closest to us, not only geographically, but mentally and psychologically.

We must *not* be satisfied by blaming the Zionists and imperialism for blocking our information efforts. Definitely, the shortcoming is ours in many cases. That is why we asked "Do you attribute your lack of knowledge about the Center and its publications to: a) Failure of the Center in reaching you; b) Lack of interest in the problem on your behalf; c) Other reasons?"

The findings show that 85 per cent of those who did not know of the existence of the Center and who did not read any publications by the Center attribute that to the failure of the Center in reaching them. The rest said that their lack of interest in the problem was the reason for their lack of knowledge about the Center and its publications.

The Research Center sees other reasons for its failure in reaching half of the Americans in Lebanon (hurdles placed by Zionists and imperialists; the residue of a foreign mentality which is antagonistic to any Revolutionary Arab publications; the self-chosen isolation of many foreigners from the Arab society in which they are living; the tendency of foreigners to read only their own publications). However, the Center will not hide itself behind any of the forementioned reasons. On the contrary, the accusation should make the Center more active, and it might push those in the field of Arab information to be more active as well.

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## I

### INTRODUCTION

It is assumed and generally accepted that the Americans are exposed only to one point of view about Palestine, namely the Zionist point of view. This is because the Zionists have control over the mass media in the U.S.A.

In view of the above assumption we are particularly concerned about the Americans who get to see the other side of the Palestine problem. A population of such Americans is the American community in Lebanon. By residing in Lebanon, that community has the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the Arab point of view.

Thus the American community in Lebanon has been exposed to two mass media systems which present two different views of the Palestine problem.

Exposure to the Arab point of view is expected to leave some effect on the persons exposed to it, whether that effect is negative or positive.

The main aim of this study is to measure the change of attitudes, if any, of the Americans who live in Lebanon and have been exposed to two communication systems.

The study focuses on two main periods: pre-exposure to Arab mass media; and post-exposure to Arab mass media. It tests three things:

- a) Whether any change occurred in the attitudes of Americans who live in Lebanon.
- b) The magnitude and direction of the change, i.e. favorable or unfavorable to the issue at stake.
- c) What brought about the change, i.e. the causes of change in attitudes.

Point "c" is the central point of the study. We assume that any change in attitudes is due to exposure to the Arab point of view.

The two major means of exposure are: a) mass media; b) personal contact or personal relationships.

We want to find out how effective each of the two means is, and which is the more effective of the two.

Another aim of the study is to test some notions which are generally accepted by some or all of the parties concerned with the Palestine problem. These notions are:

- a) The relationship between the Church and the Zionist cause.

- b) The notion that most Arab states and Palestinian resistance movements are on their way to becoming communist.
- c) The notion that Palestinians are anti-Israeli but not anti-Jewish.
- d) The notion that Palestinians want a democratic Palestinian state.

In addition we are interested in knowing what sort of solutions the Americans, who live here, would offer to the Palestine problem.

The suggested solutions are, to a great extent, a reflection of attitudes towards the problem.

After stating the background and the aim of the study, it must be mentioned that there is a limitation on the way the study was conducted. The limitation concerns the approach used to study that change in attitudes. We asked the respondents about their attitudes towards the Palestine problem, prior to residing in an Arab country, at the time when a change in attitudes could have taken place and in what way the new position of the respondents might affect their outlook towards their previous position. There is no way of overcoming this limitation. However the fact that we want to measure the most general previous attitude which they held about the issue, minimizes the limitation slightly. Ideally

there are two approaches to the study of attitudinal change: *first*, by studying the same group back home and then following up the study after the group spends one year or more in an Arab country; *second*, by taking a sample in the U.S. which is of a similar background to the sample of Americans taken in Lebanon. Due to circumstances beyond our means neither of the two ideal methods could be followed.

This being so, and due to the nature of the sample (as will be seen later) we believe that the present research is a primary survey for a much more developed and precise detailed study.

*Research Plan*

The main sources from which we got the names and addresses of Americans in Lebanon are two: a) A.U.B. Telephone Directory; b) The 1969 edition of the "American Business Concerns, Educational and Philanthropic Institutions in Lebanon."

We do not claim that these two sources provide a 100 per cent coverage of the Americans in Lebanon; however they definitely include a large majority of the Americans who reside in Lebanon.

The number of Americans listed in the two sources is 538. A questionnaire was designed and tested; then it was mailed to all 538 subjects. It was found that 78 subjects had

left Lebanon for good, and 60 subjects were outside Lebanon for the summer. This brought the number of eligible respondents to 400. Of those eligible, 100 subjects or 25 per cent of the community filled in and returned the questionnaire.

*Characteristics of the Population*

Of the 100 respondents under study 89 are males and 11 are females. All respondents are adult. Their ages range between 29 and 66. (See Table 1 for age distribution.)

TABLE 1

| <i>Age</i> | <i>%</i> |
|------------|----------|
| 20—29      | 7        |
| 30—39      | 29       |
| 40—49      | 34       |
| 50—59      | 21       |
| 60 & over  | 8        |
| No answer  | 1        |
| <hr/>      |          |
| Total      | 100      |

In general, the respondents are highly educated. 66 per cent of our sample have received an M.A. or Ph.D. 32 per cent have received university education, and only 2 per cent have received only secondary education. None has stopped at the elementary level. (See Table 2 for educational distribution.)

TABLE 2

| <i>Education</i> | <i>%</i>  |
|------------------|-----------|
| Elementary       | 0         |
| Secondary        | 2         |
| University       | 32        |
| M.A., Ph.D.      | 66        |
| Total            | <hr/> 100 |

Most respondents belong to the upper occupational levels. Forty-six per cent of them are professionals, (mainly professors) and 35.0 per cent are businessmen, managers and executives. Teachers number 4 per cent, clergymen 6 per cent and journalists, writers, etc. 8 per cent of our sample. One respondent has a clerical position. (Table 3 shows occupational distribution.)

TABLE 3

| <i>Occupation</i>     | <i>%</i>  |
|-----------------------|-----------|
| Clerical              | 1         |
| Teaching              | 4         |
| Professional          | 46        |
| Businessmen, managers | 35        |
| Priests               | 6         |
| Journalists, writers  | 8         |
| Total                 | <hr/> 100 |

*Religion*

Catholics are 16 per cent of the total, and Protestants are 76 per cent. 8 per cent have no religion.

We notice from the characteristics of the group that it is a special group in the sense that it is composed of certain strata of people, i.e. it does not include a cross-section of the population pyramid in age, occupation or education.

As far as the subject of the research is concerned, this may have some advantages since such individuals are more effective in American social and public life than ordinary individuals. Anyway, this population does not represent the average American.

## II

### THE AMERICAN MASS MEDIA AND THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

The question asked about this subject was "How did the mass media of your country present the Palestine problem?" This question cannot attain a detailed study of the American mass media. However it can provide a general picture left by the media on the American public.

68 per cent of our sample said that the American mass media was pro-Israeli or pro-Zionist in its presentation of the Palestine problem. None of them, on the other hand, said that the American mass media (AMM) was pro-Arab or took the Arab side. Only 3 per cent said that the AMM presented the problem objectively. 12 per cent of our sample said that the AMM ignored the problem or presented it very poorly. 1 per cent said that the AMM presented the problem as an internal historical conflict. 16 per cent gave no answer to the question. (See Table 4a below.)

TABLE 4a

| <i>AMM presentation of the Palestine problem</i> | %     |
|--------------------------------------------------|-------|
| 1) Pro-Israeli                                   | 68    |
| 2) Pro-Arab                                      | 0     |
| 3) Ignored or poorly presented                   | 12    |
| 4) Objectively                                   | 3     |
| 5) Other                                         | 1     |
| 6) No answer                                     | 16    |
|                                                  | <hr/> |
| Total                                            | 100   |

Most respondents described the AMM briefly as "pro-Israel," but some of them gave more details about how the AMM presented the Palestine problem with strong bias in favor of Zionism. Such detailed descriptions are:

- "No presentation of the Palestine problem. It was an Arab-Israeli problem."
- "With prejudice against the Arabs."
- "Israeli point of view strongly presented."
- "Largely ignored it. Anti-Arab when occasion arose."
- "Most large papers leaned towards the Israeli side. The smaller ones were more objective."

- "There is no Palestine or Arab point of view; it was all knowingly or unknowingly pro-Israel."
- "Media with wide coverage (e.g. Time, Life, etc.) made it seem that the Arabs lacked any valid arguments and that they tried to cover this by threats and bluster."
- "As a youth and student in the U.S.A. the Zionist position was an assumed part of news and media. Mostly we were unconscious of the issues of justice."
- "The AMM handled the problem as if the Arabs were reacting as children unable to accept a parental decision."
- "Facts there. Interpretation pro-Zionist."
- "Indirectly it led one to believe that Israel was persecuted. This was never said directly but one got that impression."
- "A small country fighting for existence against barbaric elements."
- "Pity for the 'underdog' represented as poor, defenseless Jews."
- "As a problem of Jewish refugees."
- "As a tragedy. The Jews needed a home. However it did not explain why Palestine should be that home."

One respondent sees that there has been a slight change in the AMM position over the past 20 years. Prior to 1948, he says, the AMM gave only the Zionist side. After 1948 and 1956 there were a very few publications which attempted to deal with the rights of the Palestinians. Since 1967 there has been an increasing number of publications which have been critical of Israel. But the heavy weight is still on the side of the Zionists, who have a massive and well-organized propaganda program.

### *Conclusion*

The above figures and statements show that the respondents perceive the AMM as strongly pro-Israel and at the same time almost completely anti-Arab. It also shows that as far as the Palestine problem is concerned the AMM seems to be quite biased and greatly influenced by the Zionist position.

We can conclude from the detailed descriptions stated above that the AMM uses certain techniques to support the Zionist case. Five such techniques which could be used at different occasions are:

- (1) The AMM presents the facts but gives them a Zionist interpretation. This is a very effective technique since in most events the interpretation and rationalization of the event means much more than the event itself.

- (2) Appealing to morality. The mass media appeals to certain moralistic values of the American public. For instance, the Americans are for the "underdog," so the AMM presents Israel as the poor, defenseless, persecuted country whose population is threatened with being driven into the sea.
- (3) The AMM stresses that Israel is part of the "civilized" world, while its enemies are part of the "uncivilized" world. The AMM also tries to depict the achievements of Israel as a manifestation of the glory of Western civilization.
- (4) The AMM deliberately ignores the existence of the Palestine problem and presents the problem as an Arab-Israeli conflict. This technique helps in erasing many facts and rights like the displacement of the Palestinian people, the problem of refugees, etc.
- (5) The AMM turns to a direct method by supporting and representing the Israeli point of view and attacking the Arabs as "irrational," "people who lack valid arguments," "dreamers," and "threatening."

It is worth mentioning that only 15 per cent of our sample believed that the picture drawn by the AMM was true. On the other hand, 31 per cent believed the picture was incomplete; 23 per cent believed it was misleading, and 11

per cent of our sample believed it was both misleading and incomplete. 5 per cent thought it was doubtful. 15 per cent gave no answer. (See Table 4b below.)

The fact that 70 per cent of our sample did not trust their mass media could not be generalized with regard to the American public, because of the special qualities of our sample.

TABLE 4b

| <i>Position on picture<br/>drawn by AMM</i> | <i>%</i> |
|---------------------------------------------|----------|
| True                                        | 15       |
| Doubtful                                    | 5        |
| Misleading                                  | 23       |
| Incomplete                                  | 31       |
| Misleading incomplete                       | 11       |
| No answer                                   | 15       |
| Total                                       | 100      |

### III

## CHANGE IN ATTITUDES

#### 1) *Attitudes towards the Palestine problem prior to residing in an Arab country*

It is necessary in order to measure any change in attitudes and the reasons behind the change to find out what were the attitudes of respondents before they were exposed to the new effect. In our case, before they came to our part of the world.

The respondents were asked the following question: Before residing in an Arab country, what was your attitude towards the Palestine problem?

The answers to the above question were analyzed then classified.

*Findings:* 25 per cent of our sample said that they were pro-Arab or sympathetic to Palestinian Arabs before residing in an Arab country. On the other hand 17 per cent of our sample said that they were pro-Israeli or sympathized with Israel before residing in an Arab country.

The above finding is unexpected. Very few people would think that in any sample of Americans one would find more



sympathizers to the Arab cause than to the state of Israel. Two possible explanations are pertinent here. *First*, one can hypothesize that among Americans who come to work in Arab countries and who hold an attitude towards the Palestine problem, a higher proportion of those who are sympathetic to the Arabs than those who are not came here. *Second*, it could be that among the American intelligentsia who hold an attitude towards the Palestine problem a majority is sympathetic to Palestinian Arabs.

Other findings are: 24 per cent of our sample said they lacked any knowledge about the problem, and 19 per cent said they were indifferent to the problem. Some respondents attributed their indifference to lack of knowledge about the problem. 9 per cent gave other replies, and 6 per cent gave no answer. (See Table 5 below.)

TABLE 5

| <i>Attitude prior to residing<br/>in an Arab country</i> | <i>%</i>  |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Pro-Arab                                                 | 25        |
| Pro-Israeli                                              | 17        |
| Lacked knowledge                                         | 24        |
| Indifferent                                              | 19        |
| None of the above attitudes                              | 9         |
| No answer                                                | 6         |
| Total                                                    | <hr/> 100 |

2) *Change in attitudes. Its magnitude and direction*

The aim of this section is to determine whether there is any change in the attitudes of the respondents after they have resided in Lebanon, how big or small that change is, and the direction of the change.

The question asked to determine whether any change took place was: Did residing in Lebanon?

- a) Reaffirm the view you had before coming to Lebanon.
- b) Alter your view of the problem.
- c) Have no effect on it.
- d) No answer.

"Residing in Lebanon" is equal to "getting to know us." We want to find out whether the respondents new experience or new situation, i.e. residing in Lebanon, led to a change in their view of the Palestine problem.

*Findings:* 63 per cent of our sample stated that residing in Lebanon altered their view of the Palestine problem. 20 per cent of our sample said that residing in Lebanon reaffirmed the view they had before residing in Lebanon, and 4 per cent gave no answer. Only 13 per cent of our sample said that residing in Lebanon had no effect on their view of the problem. (See Table 6a.)

The respondents who said that residing in Lebanon altered their view of the Palestine problem were asked:

Has there been:—

- a) little change in your view;
- b) average change in your view;
- c) great change in your view.

40 respondents or 63.5 per cent said there was great change in their view of the problem, while 19 respondents or 30.1 per cent said there was average change in their view, and 4 respondents or 6.3 per cent said there was little change in their view. (See Table 6b.)

TABLE 6a

| <i>Residing in Lebanon<br/>and change of view</i> | <i>%</i>   |
|---------------------------------------------------|------------|
| a) Reaffirm one's view                            | 20         |
| b) Alter one's view                               | 63         |
| c) Had no effect on it                            | 13         |
| d) No answer                                      | 4          |
| <b>Total</b>                                      | <b>100</b> |

TABLE 6b

| <i>Size of change</i> | <i>Number</i> | <i>%</i>    |
|-----------------------|---------------|-------------|
| Little change         | 4             | 6.3         |
| Average change        | 19            | 30.1        |
| Great change          | 40            | 63.5        |
| No answer             | 0             | 0.0         |
| <b>Total</b>          | <b>63</b>     | <b>99.9</b> |

*Conclusion*

We conclude from the above data that there is a positive relationship between residing in Lebanon and a change of view of Americans towards the Palestine problem. In other words, residing in Lebanon contributes to change of view of Americans towards the Palestine problem.

In general, the magnitude of change in the view of Americans who reside in Lebanon is big. Only 4.0 per cent reported little change in their view compared to 63.5 per cent who reported great change in their view.

The next important question to ask is, who changed their view of the problem?

On the basis of their attitudes towards the Palestine problem before coming to Lebanon, the respondents were divided into five groups: 1) pro-Arab; 2) pro-Israeli; 3) indifferent; 4) lacked knowledge; 5) other.

It was found that the group which changed more than any other group was the "pro-Israel" group. All 17 respondents who were pro-Israeli before coming to Lebanon changed their view of the problem. 12 of them (or 70 per cent) said there was great change in their view.

The largest number of those who changed their view, next to the pro-Israel group, were those who lacked knowledge about the problem. They were followed by those who were indifferent.

Among those who lacked knowledge 21 respondents or 87.8 per cent changed their view of the problem, 66.6 per cent of whom said there was great change in their view.

Among those who were indifferent 14 respondents or 82.3 per cent changed their view of the problem, of whom 45.0 per cent said there was great change in their view and 29.4 per cent said there was average change in their view. (See Table 6c below.)

TABLE 5d

| GROUP            | CHANGE |     |         |     |       |     |       |     |           |     | Total |
|------------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-----------|-----|-------|
|                  | Little |     | Average |     | Great |     | N. A. |     | No change |     |       |
|                  | %      | No. | %       | No. | %     | No. | %     | No. | %         | No. |       |
| Pro-Arab         | 4.0    | 1   | 16.0    | 4   | 4.0   | 1   | 4.0   | 1   | 4.0       | 18  | 25    |
| Pro-Israel       | 11.7   | 2   | 17.6    | 3   | 70.0  | 12  | 0.0   | 0   | 0.0       | 0   | 17    |
| Indifferent      | 5.2    | 1   | 29.4    | 5   | 45.0  | 8   | 10.2  | 2   | 15.2      | 3   | 19    |
| Lacked knowledge | 0.0    | 0   | 20.2    | 5   | 66.6  | 16  | 4.3   | 1   | 8.6       | 2   | 24    |
| Other            | 11.1   | 1   | 0.0     | 0   | 44.4  | 4   | 11.1  | 1   | 33.3      | 3   | 9     |

The direction of the change in the view of respondents:

One important notion should be observed before going into an analysis of the direction of change in the views of our respondents. It is a change of view rather than of attitude. For example, one can be sympathetic to the Arabs but at the same time he may think they are partly wrong.

Although view and attitude may coincide and although they are closely related, they are not the same.

We found it more important for our purpose to know the view which respondents hold after being acquainted with Israeli and Arab points of view.

The respondents were asked: After being acquainted with Israeli and Arab points of view, do you believe:

- a) Israelis are right.
- b) Both have some right and both are partially blamed for the problem.
- c) Arabs are right.
- d) No answer.

*Findings:* It was found that after being acquainted with both Arab and Israeli points of view regarding the Palestine problem, 22 respondents or 22.0 per cent of our sample be-

lieved that the Arabs are right (that they have every right, moral and otherwise, to Palestine); while none of our respondents believed that the Israelis are right. However, the majority, 76 respondents or 76.0 per cent believed that both Arabs and Israelis have some right and both are partially blamed for the problem. Although the category "both Arabs and Israelis have some right and both are partially blamed for the problem" implies that Arabs and Israelis are equally blamed for the problem, several respondents qualified it by adding the statement "Arabs are mainly in the right," or by saying "Arabs are essentially right but they are partially blamed for the 1967 war." We can conclude from the qualifications made by many respondents who came in the above category that a majority of our respondents believe that the heavy blame falls on Israel. 2 per cent of our sample gave no answer. (See Table 7a below.)

TABLE 7a

| <i>View</i>                                           | <i>%</i>  |
|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| 1) Both have some right and both are partially blamed | 76        |
| 2) Israelis are right                                 | 0         |
| 3) Arabs are right                                    | 22        |
| 4) No answer                                          | 2         |
| Total                                                 | <hr/> 100 |

When we analyze the change in view of groups within the sample we find the following:

- a) *The pro-Arab group:* Among this group (25 respondents) 17 respondents or 68.0 per cent believed both Arabs and Israelis had some right and both were partially blamed for the problem; while 7 respondents or 28.0 per cent believed the Arabs are right. 1 respondent gave no answer.
- b) *The pro-Israeli group:* Among this group (17 respondents) 13 respondents or 76.4 per cent believed both Arabs and Israelis had some right and both were partially blamed for the problem, while 4 respondents or 23.5 per cent believed the Arabs were right. The change of view among this group is striking: 23.5 per cent were won to the Arab side and 76.4 per cent ceased in their one-sided attitude.
- c) *The indifferent group:* 17 (89.4 per cent) out of 19 respondents who were indifferent to the problem before coming to Lebanon believed both Arabs and Israelis had some right and both were partially blamed for the problem, while 2 respondents believed the Arabs were right.
- d) *Those who lacked knowledge:* Among this group 19 out of 24 respondents or 79.1 per cent believed both Arabs and Israelis had some right and both

are partially blamed for the problem, while 5 respondents or 20.8 per cent believed the Arabs are right.

- c) *Other views:* Among this group 5 respondents believed both Arabs and Israelis had some right and both were partially blamed for the problem, while 4 respondents believed the Arabs were right.
- f) *The no-answer group:* The 6 respondents who gave no answer about their attitude to the Palestine problem prior to residing in Lebanon, believed both Arabs and Israelis had some right and both were partially blamed for the problem. (For direction of change by groups see Table 7b.)

### Conclusions

A) We conclude from the above findings that a large majority of respondents, 76.0 per cent, do not see the issue in black and white (one side is wrong while the other right), but as a complex issue where both parties have some right and both are partially blamed for the problem.

B) Also while 22.0 per cent believe the Arabs are right, none of the Americans in Lebanon believe the Israelis are right.

C) Even among those who are pro-Arab or sympathetic to the Arabs, a majority believed the Arabs are also to blame for the problem.

D) In general, residing in Lebanon or being acquainted with the Arab point of view seems to be in favor of the Arabs. It worked very well in the case of those who had been pro-Israeli, and in the cases of those who had lacked knowledge and had been indifferent.

From this we can generalize that giving our viewpoint to Americans will help us and at the same time it will harm the Israeli influence in America.

TABLE 7b

|                  | Israelis are<br>right | Both are right<br>and blamed |      | Arabs are<br>right |      | N. A. |   | Total |      |
|------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|------|--------------------|------|-------|---|-------|------|
|                  |                       | No.                          | %    | No.                | %    | No.   | % | No.   | %    |
| Pro-Arab         | 0                     | 17                           | 68.0 | 7                  | 28.0 | 1     | 4 | 24    | 100  |
| Pro-Israeli      | 0                     | 13                           | 76.4 | 4                  | 23.5 | 0     | 0 | 17    | 100  |
| Indifferent      | 0                     | 17                           | 89.4 | 2                  | 10.6 | 0     | 0 | 19    | 100  |
| Lacked knowledge | 0                     | 19                           | 79.1 | 5                  | 20.8 | 0     | 0 | 24    | 100  |
| Other            | 0                     | 5                            | 55.5 | 4                  | 44.4 | 0     | 0 | 9     | 99.9 |
| No answer        | 0                     | 6                            | 100  |                    |      | 0     | 0 | 6     | 100  |

### 3) *Main causes of change in attitudes*

When we speak of causes of change in a social situation we should keep in mind that there is no way of determining *all* the factors behind the change. This is so because people

in daily life cannot be controlled like an experiment in a laboratory. On the contrary, people are exposed to an unlimited number of effects and experiences some of which they are aware of and some of which they are not aware of.

However, the above discussion does not mean that we cannot find out the main factors behind any change, since change is due to an interaction of factors rather than to a single factor.

In discussing changes in attitudes towards a political problem, like the Palestine problem we focus on two major means that can lead to change, namely mass media and personal relationships with individuals concerned with the problem.

63 respondents stated that residing in Lebanon altered their view of the Palestine problem. This group would be the focus of the study as far as change of attitudes is concerned.

The respondents were asked the following question:

Basically, do you attribute the change in your view regarding the Palestine problem:

- a) Mainly to Lebanese or Arab mass media.
- b) Mainly to Lebanese or Arab acquaintances.

- c) Mainly to other Americans.
- d) To both "a" & "b"
- e) To both "a" & "c"
- f) To both "b" & "c"
- g) Other causes specify
- h) No answer.

Only one respondent of 1.5 per cent of those who changed their attitude attributed the change mainly to Lebanese or Arab mass media. On the other hand, 27 respondents or 42.8 per cent attributed the change in their attitude mainly to Lebanese or Arab acquaintances.

1 respondent or 1.5 per cent attributed the change to other Americans. 11 respondents or 17.4 per cent attributed the change mainly to both Lebanese or Arab mass media and acquaintances. None attributed the change to both Lebanese or Arab mass media and other Americans.

11 respondents or 17.4 per cent attributed the change mainly to both Lebanese or Arab acquaintances and other Americans. 11 other respondents or 17.4 per cent attributed the change to their own readings and evaluation of the problem. 1 respondent gave no answer. (See Table 8a below.)

TABLE 8a

| <i>Cause of change</i>                                | <i>Number</i> | <i>%</i> |
|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------|
| a) Lebanese or Arab mass media                        | 1             | 1.5      |
| b) Lebanese or Arab acquaintances                     | 27            | 42.8     |
| c) Other Americans                                    | 1             | 1.5      |
| d) Lebanese & Arab mass media and acquaintances       | 11            | 17.4     |
| e) Mass media and other Americans                     | 0             | 0.0      |
| f) Lebanese or Arab acquaintances and other Americans | 11            | 17.4     |
| g) Own readings & evaluation                          | 11            | 17.4     |
| h) No answer                                          | 1             | 1.5      |
|                                                       | 63            | 99.5     |
| Total                                                 |               |          |

*Conclusion*

We can conclude from the above findings that personal contact is more effective than mass media as far as the Palestine problem is concerned. This is so because personal contacts, that is Arab individuals, have succeeded in changing the attitudes of a majority of Americans compared to Lebanese or Arab mass media. The conclusion still holds even when we move to a combination of factors. If we take those who attributed their change to Lebanese or Arab acquaintances and to Arab acquaintances and other Americans, we find that they compose 60.2 per cent of those who changed; while

those changed due to both mass media and acquaintances compose 18.9 per cent of those who changed. The difference is significant and it is not due to chance.

It is necessary to study other factors contributing to a change in attitude regarding the Palestine problem, and aspects of the relationship between mass media, personal contact and change in attitude.

One important aspect of the relationship between mass media, personal contact, and change in attitudes is the degree of exposure by our respondents to mass media and personal contact.

Respondents were asked pertinent questions to determine the degree of their exposure to media. They were asked how often they read local or Arab newspapers and magazines, how often they listened to local or Arab radio stations. They were also asked if they read any books or pamphlets on the Palestine problem, or if they had attended any lectures or seen any documentary films on the problem. Similarly, they were asked how often they visited Arab friends and how often their friends discussed or explained the Palestine problem to them.

A score was given to each part, and on that basis an index that measures the degree of exposure. A scale was constructed which included three groups: a) the high exposure

group; b) the moderate exposure group; c) the low exposure group.

By running the degree of exposure to mass media against cause of change in attitude, it was found that there was no relationship between degree of exposure to mass media and cause of change.

Needless to mention you find a greater majority among the highly exposed group, who attributed their change in attitude to Lebanese or Arab friends, than among the moderately exposed group or the low exposed group.

Another factor contributing to a change in attitude is the effect of the mass media and personal contact on our subjects.

When asked about the effect of Lebanese or Arab mass media on them, our respondents showed the following distribution: only 3.0 per cent of our respondents said that the mass media had a strongly positive (good) effect on them. 34.0 per cent said it had a positive effect on them, and another 25.0 per cent said it had no effect on them. Also 27.0 per cent said Lebanese or Arab mass media had a negative (bad) effect on them. 1.0 per cent said the effect was strongly negative and 6.0 per cent said the effect was both negative and positive.

The effect of Lebanese or Arab mass media is equally distributed in three directions. It positively affects around one third of our respondents, negatively affects one third, and



has no effect on one third of the adult American population in Lebanon. (See Table 8b below.)

TABLE 8b

| <i>Effect of Lebanese or Arab mass media</i> | <i>%</i> |
|----------------------------------------------|----------|
| Strongly positive                            | 3        |
| Positive                                     | 34       |
| Has no effect                                | 25       |
| Negative                                     | 27       |
| Strongly negative                            | 1        |
| Both positive and negative                   | 6        |
| No answer                                    | 3        |
|                                              | <hr/>    |
| Total                                        | 100      |

Lebanese and other Arabs as individuals seem to have a much better effect on the Americans who reside in Lebanon than the mass media.

21 per cent said that their Lebanese or Arab acquaintances had a strongly positive effect on them, and 57.0 per cent were positively affected by Lebanese or Arab acquaintances. This means that 78.0 per cent of the Americans were positively and strongly positively affected by Arab individuals. Only 3.0 per cent were negatively affected by Arab individuals, and none saw the effect as strongly negative. 15.0

per cent said their Lebanese or Arab acquaintances had no effect on them as far as the Palestine problem is concerned. (See Table 8c below.)

TABLE 8c

| <i>Effect of Lebanese or Arab acquaintances</i> | <i>%</i> |
|-------------------------------------------------|----------|
| Strongly positive                               | 21       |
| Positive                                        | 57       |
| Has no effect                                   | 15       |
| Negative                                        | 3        |
| Strongly negative                               | 0        |
| No answer                                       | 4        |
|                                                 | <hr/>    |
| Total                                           | 100      |

A third contributing factor to change of attitudes is length of stay in Lebanon.

Of the 55 respondents who stayed in Lebanon over three years, 16 respondents or 29.9 per cent believed Arabs are right. Compared to this, among the 18 respondents who stayed 2-3 years in Lebanon only 2 respondents or 11.1 per cent believed Arabs are right. Among those who stayed 1-2 years in Lebanon 3 out of 21 respondents (or 14.2 per cent) believed Arabs are right.

*Conclusion*

There is a positive relationship between length of stay in Lebanon and attitude towards the Palestine problem. The longer Americans stay in Lebanon or among us, the greater the possibility of their belief that Arabs are right. (See Table 8d.)

TABLE 8d

| Length of stay<br>in Lebanon | Attitude towards the Palestine problem     |      |                 |      | Total      |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|------|-----------------|------|------------|
|                              | Both Arabs and<br>Israelis are<br>to blame |      | Arabs are right |      |            |
|                              | No.                                        | %    | No.             | %    |            |
| Less than 1 year             | 5                                          | 83.4 | 1               | 16.6 | 6          |
| 1—2 years                    | 18                                         | 85.8 | 3               | 14.2 | 21         |
| 2—3 years                    | 16                                         | 88.9 | 2               | 11.1 | 18         |
| Over 3 years                 | 39                                         | 70.1 | 16              | 29.9 | 55         |
|                              |                                            |      |                 |      | <u>100</u> |

IV  
NOTIONS

In this section the findings about certain notions concerning the Palestine problem will be reported with conclusions.

1) *The Church and the Palestine Problem*

The respondents were asked three questions about the effect of the church on their attitude towards the people of Jewish faith and hence towards the state of Israel and the Palestine problem. The questions were:

- 1) While growing up, did your church affect your attitude towards the people of Jewish faith?
  - a) A great deal.
  - b) A little bit.
  - c) Not at all.
  - d) No answer or does not apply.

- 2) Did the effect of the church on you:
- a) make you more sympathetic to the people of Jewish faith?
  - b) create in you an emotional attachment to the people of Jewish faith?
  - c) make you less sympathetic or not sympathetic to the people of Jewish faith?
  - d) No answer.
- 3) If answer to question 2 is "a" or "b", would you say that that sympathy or emotional attachment was carried by you to the state of Israel?

——Yes                      ——No                      ——Not sure

55 per cent of our sample said that their church had no effect at all on their attitude towards the people of Jewish faith, while growing up. 22 per cent said their church affected their attitude towards the people of Jewish faith a little bit, and 14 per cent said their church affected their attitude towards the people of Jewish faith a great deal. 9 per cent gave no answer. (See Table 9a below.)

TABLE 9a

| <i>Effect of church</i> | <i>%</i> |
|-------------------------|----------|
| A great deal            | 14       |
| A little bit            | 22       |
| No effect at all        | 55       |
| No answer               | 9        |
|                         | —        |
| Total                   | 100      |

Of those affected by their church, 18.0 per cent of our sample said their church made them more sympathetic to people of Jewish faith, while 3.0 per cent said their church created an emotional attachment in themselves to people of Jewish faith. 11.0 per cent said their church made them less sympathetic or not sympathetic to people of Jewish faith. 4 per cent gave no answer. (See Table 9b below.)

TABLE 9b

| <i>Kind of effect</i>           | <i>%</i> |
|---------------------------------|----------|
| More sympathetic to Jews        | 18       |
| An emotional attachment to Jews | 3        |
| Less sympathetic to Jews        | 11       |
| No answer                       | 4        |

Only 9 per cent said that the sympathy or emotional attachment created by their church was carried to Israel. 12 per cent said the sympathy was not carried to Israel. 4 per cent gave no answer. (See Table 9c below.)

TABLE 9c

| <i>Relationship to Israel</i>  | <i>%</i> |
|--------------------------------|----------|
| Sympathy carried to Israel     | 9        |
| Sympathy not carried to Israel | 12       |
| No answer                      | 4        |

Our sample is composed of 16.0 per cent Catholics, 76.0 per cent Protestants, and 8.0 per cent have no religion. Of the Catholics only 31.2 per cent were affected by their church as compared to 47.8 per cent of the Protestants. (See Table 9d.)

TABLE 9d

| Religion    | Greatly affected | A little bit | Not at all | N. A. | Total |
|-------------|------------------|--------------|------------|-------|-------|
| Protestants | 0                | 5            | 11         | 0     | 16    |
| Catholic    | 14               | 17           | 44         | 1     | 76    |
| Religion    | 0                | 0            | 0          | 8     | 8     |
|             |                  |              |            |       | 100   |

### *Conclusion*

The Protestant Church seems to affect a greater number of its people than the Catholic Church does. 47.8 per cent of the Protestants were affected by their church while growing up as far as the Jews are concerned; while only 31.2 per cent of the Catholics were affected by their church regarding that subject.

The effect of the church in America regarding the Jews is diverse: a) 21.0 per cent were affected in favor of the Jews, that is they were made sympathetic to the Jews. However only 40.2 per cent of those who were sympathetic to the Jews carried their sympathy to Israel. There is a relationship between the Jews and Israel as far as sympathy by others is concerned; but the relationship holds only in 40.0 per cent of the cases; b) 11 per cent of our respondents were negatively affected by their church, that is they were made less sympathetic to the Jews.

The American church seems to affect some of its people positively and others negatively. Why this is so, is another question.

All the previous analysis shows that there is a weak relationship between the church and Israel. The church hardly attempts to gain sympathy for Israel among its own people.

### 2) *The Americans and Palestinian claims:*

a) *anti-Israeli but not anti-Jewish;*

*b) acceptance of a democratic Palestinian state.*

a) The respondents were asked the following two questions about the first notion. The questions are: 1) Have you heard of the Palestinian claim that Palestinians are anti-Israeli but not anti-Jewish? 2) Are you convinced of the claim?

*Findings:* 94 per cent of our sample had heard of the Palestinian claim that Palestinians are anti-Israeli but not anti-Jewish while 6.0 per cent had not heard of such claim.

Of those who had heard of the claim 45.0 per cent were convinced of the claim, while 15.0 per cent were not convinced of the claim. 34.0 per cent were not sure whether the Palestinians were serious in their claim or not. (See Table 10a below.)

TABLE 10a

| <i>Anti-Israeli but<br/>not anti-Jewish</i> | <i>%</i>  |
|---------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Convinced of it                             | 45        |
| Not convinced of it                         | 15        |
| Not sure                                    | 34        |
| No answer                                   | 6         |
| Total                                       | <hr/> 100 |

b) Here again, 94 per cent had heard of the claim that Palestinians want and are able to live with Palestinian Jews under a democratic Palestinian state; while 6.0 per cent had not heard of that claim.

This claim did not convince as many Americans as the first claim. 20.0 per cent were not convinced of the second claim, compared to 15.0 per cent who were not convinced of the first claim. 33.0 per cent were convinced of the second claim, compared to 45.0 per cent who were convinced of the first claim. 42.0 per cent were not sure whether the Palestinians meant their claim that they want a democratic Palestinian state or not. (See Table 10b below.)

TABLE 10b

| <i>Democratic Palestinian state</i> | <i>%</i>  |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|
| Convinced                           | 33        |
| Not convinced                       | 20        |
| Not sure                            | 42        |
| No answer                           | 5         |
| Total                               | <hr/> 100 |

3) *The Americans and the assertion that most Arab states and Palestinian Resistance Movements are heading towards communism*

10 per cent said they were convinced of the above assertion, while 68.0 per cent said they were not convinced of it. 22 per cent said they were not sure. (See Table 11a below.)

TABLE 11a

| <i>Arab states are communist to be</i> | <i>%</i> |
|----------------------------------------|----------|
| Convinced of it                        | 10       |
| Not convinced of it                    | 68       |
| Not sure                               | 22       |
|                                        | <hr/>    |
| Total                                  | 100      |

Respondents were asked if that assertion weighed as a factor against the Arabs and in favor of Israel. 8 respondents said it did not, 7 said it did and 2 were not sure.

Then respondents were asked whether the public opinion in their country was convinced that most Arab states and Palestine Resistance Movements were communist to be, and whether that might weigh as a factor against the Arab states and in favor of Israel.

Thirty-nine per cent of our sample believed that the

public opinion in their country was convinced that most Arab states and Palestinian Resistance Movements were communist or communist to be; while 28.0 per cent believed that the public opinion of their country was not convinced of that assertion; 33.0 per cent said they did not know whether the public opinion in their country was convinced of the assertion or not. (See Table 11b below.)

TABLE 11b

| <i>American public opinion and "Arabs are communist"</i> | <i>%</i> |
|----------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| Convinced                                                | 39       |
| Not convinced                                            | 28       |
| Do not know                                              | 33       |
|                                                          | <hr/>    |
| Total                                                    | 100      |

As for whether the above assertion weighed as a factor against the Arab states and in favor of Israel, 41.0 per cent believed it did. 1 respondent said the public opinion of his country was not affected whether Arab states were communist or not, and 1 other respondent said he did not know. 57 respondents gave no answer. (See Table 11c below.)

TABLE 11c

| <i>Weights as factor against Arab states</i> | <i>Number &amp; %</i> |
|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Yes                                          | 41                    |
| No                                           | 1                     |
| Don't know                                   | 1                     |
| No answer                                    | 57                    |
|                                              | —                     |
| Total                                        | 100                   |

*Conclusion*

A majority of Americans residing in Lebanon (68.0 per cent) do not believe that Arab states and Palestine Resistance Movements are going to become communist. Also, although we do not have sufficient data on this, it seems that as far as the Americans in Lebanon are concerned even if Arab states became communist this would not weigh against them and in favor of Israel.

As far as American public opinion is concerned, it was found that Arab states being communist or heading towards communism would weigh as a factor against the Arabs and in favor of Israel.

We were interested to learn whether the Americans who

resided among us for a while would still be interested in the Palestine problem when they go back home.

The respondents were asked the following two questions:

- 1) Do you think that after you go back home your interest in the Palestine problem will:
  - a) be the same as it is now?
  - b) diminish?
  - c) cease?
  - d) do not know.
  
- 2) After you go back home would you care to read any publications about the Palestine problem?
  - a) Yes.
  - b) May be.
  - c) No.
  - d) Don't know.

*Findings:* 81 per cent said that after they go back home their interest in the Palestine problem would be the same as it was now. 11 per cent said it would diminish. None

of them said that his interest in the Palestine problem would cease. 8 per cent gave no answer. (See Table 12a.)

Also 90.0 per cent said they would care to read any publications about the Palestine problem after they go back home. 6 per cent said they might care to read such publications. No one said he would not care to read such publications, and 4.0 per cent said they did not know whether they would care to read any publications about the Palestine problem or not. (See Table 12b.)

*Conclusion*

In general, all adult Americans who reside in Lebanon will keep their interest in the Palestine problem after they go back home, and they will care about reading any publications about the Palestine problem when they are home for good.

TABLE 12a

| <i>Interest in the P.P. after they go back home</i> | <i>%</i>   |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Be the same as it is now                            | 81         |
| Diminish                                            | 11         |
| Cease                                               | 0          |
| Do not know                                         | 8          |
| <b>Total</b>                                        | <b>100</b> |

TABLE 12b

| <i>Care to read publications about the P.P. after they go back home</i> | <i>%</i>   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Yes                                                                     | 90         |
| May be                                                                  | 6          |
| No                                                                      | 0          |
| Don't know                                                              | 4          |
| <b>Total</b>                                                            | <b>100</b> |



## SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

The basic aim behind asking our respondents about solutions to the Palestine problem was not to obtain solutions, but to get to know the thought patterns of the Americans who live in Lebanon regarding the Palestine problem.

According to the researcher there are two kinds of solutions to political problems in general and to the Palestine problem in particular. The two kinds of solutions are: a) just; b) practical.

Based upon that notion, the following two questions were asked:

- 1) What is your conception of a just solution to the Palestine problem?
- 2) What is your conception of a practical solution to the Palestine problem?

### *Analysis of Findings*

Several thought patterns were expressed by our respondents. However four major patterns were observed.

A) The First major pattern called for the de-Zionization of Israel and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state. This solution was suggested as a just solution to the Palestine problem. The practical solution suggested by the same group was the steps that should be taken to implement the democratic state; things like the return of refugees, holding elections, guarantees by the U.N., etc. This solution was suggested by 33.0 per cent of our sample.

B) The second major pattern suggested as a practical and just solution to the Palestine problem was the United Nations resolution of 1967. This solution was suggested by 28.0 per cent of our sample.

The following are representative quotes by those who offered this solution:

- 1) "A single state in Palestine where all citizens are equal, with no racial or religious nationality, including the repatriation of Palestinian families with full access to their former possessions or compensation."
- 2) "De-Zionization of Israel. Israel a multi-religious, multi-racial Middle Eastern state with well defined borders. Return or compensation of refugees."
- 3) "Return of the Palestinians to their country with equal rights in a Palestinian republic."

C) The third major pattern was expressed by 14.0 per cent of our sample. This pattern could better be summarized by the words of one respondent: "The only just solution is a return to the pre-Israel Palestine." This pattern was suggested as a just solution but no one suggested it as a practical solution. The practical solution suggested by this group was a joint Palestinian-Israeli state with compensation to the refugees.

The recreation of Arab Palestine was seen as the only just solution to the Palestine problem. A quote that reflects this pattern was: "Return of the Palestinians to Palestine and an exodus of the Zionists."

D) The fourth pattern was expressed by 10.0 per cent of our sample. This pattern equally stressed the survival of the state of Israel and a humane solution to the refugee problem. The theme of this pattern is one of resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Arab countries and overseas with full compensation, in return for settling boundary disputes and recognizing Israel.

Two representative quotes are:

- 1) "Resettlement of refugees in Arab countries and overseas; settle boundary disputes. End guerilla warfare. Acceptance of compensation."

- 2) "Limited return of refugees with generous compensation to all refugees."

In addition to the four major patterns, two minor patterns were expressed as both just and practical solutions to the Palestine problem. The first minor pattern is one that demands the establishment of two states: the pre-1967 Israel and a Palestinian state in the occupied territories.

The second minor pattern calls for accepting Israel as a state. As one respondent put it: "Israel is here to stay. Learn to live with them."

9 per cent of our sample did not suggest any solutions to the Palestine problem.

It is worth mentioning that few respondents thought that a just solution was no longer possible or that it was too late to think of a just solution. A few other respondents thought that no practical solution that could be accepted by both Arabs and Israel was even possible.