Revolutionary Iraq 1968-1973
The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party is the Party of Arab National Revolution. It struggles for Arab nationalism under one national Pan-Arab leadership. Its division into regional organizations is an outcome of political division in the Arab Nation. The division of the Party will pass with the removal of the imposed division in the Arab Countries.
The Party's struggle, regardless of its place in relation to political power, is always in the direction of the aims of Arab revolution of unity, freedom and socialism.
The conditions of division in the Arab Nation are now political, economic and psychological. The Arab revolution, because of such conditions, has embarked upon a peculiar road which is to work within the existing political boundaries while working at the same time to meet the pre-requisites of national integration. The other way would have been different. It would have entailed taking control in one country and moving forward to other countries until the establishment of the single Arab state was achieved. In the view of the Ba'th Party, both roads would lead to the same end namely the establishment of the unified democratic socialist Arab State.
Theoretically and practically, the basis for Party rule in any single Arab country is for the purpose of building a base for national struggle. The development of the regional state would be put in the service of building the national state through the organizational and conceptual unity of the Party and through its united political programme.
Thus, the revolution of the Party in any single Arab state has twin aspects. One is regional and and the other is national. The two aspects are inter-related and dialectically connected. They pour into a single stream. The Party is the centrifrugal force of coordination and direction.
The failure of a single base of national struggle is not a failure in a region only: it also affects the whole of the national struggle. The Party and all Arab revolutionaries are thus called upon to safeguard the base to enable it to overcome its own difficulties especially in the first stages which would eventually give the Party more freedom to Act nationally. Any national gains and achievements also help the Party locally and give it more momentum.
It is wrong to suppose that hard and fast lines can be drawn between the regional and national tasks. Likewise, it would be wrong to draw hard and fast lines between regional and national priorities during a single phase especially in the first stages of the Revolution. For regional achievements are but a bridge for national ones. Without regional success, national work would be impossible.
Putting the regional above the national may lead to statism and placing the national over the regional may lead to rash and childish action. The Party must be alert and vigilant and must maintain a constant balance.
The bulk of the party's regional achievements in Iraq after the Revolution of July 17-30th 1968 have helped to a great extent in exerting a favorable influence over the national struggle. These included: the consolidation of the Revolution's authority and Party's leadership; complete realization of political and economic independence particularly the nationalization of Iraq Petroleum Company; the democratic transformation as expressed prominently in the peaceful solution of the Kurdish problem and the establishment of the progressive front. Such great strides have considerably strengthened the revo
establishment of the national and progressive front. Such great strides have considerably strengthened the revolutionary base in Iraq and made it a centre of gravity and diffusion in the area.
We must remember that the Revolution in Iraq still has many regional tasks to be achieved before it can play its full role in the national field. On the other hand, all that has been achieved in Iraq during the past five and a half years is only a beginning of things to come. For Iraq the task ahead is still colossal.
The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, ever since its inception, and throughout its development has considered the Palestine cause as central to the whole Arab struggle and closely related to the national struggle for freedom, unity and socialism.
The Palestine issue, since the escalation of Zionist aggressive ambitions and the establishment of the Zionist state in 1948 has been the prime Arab cause responsible for all the changes and developments in the Arab East.
After the Arab defeat of June 1967 and the Zionist occupation of more lands belonging to Syria and Egypt, the importance and significance of the Palestine issue had increased manifold. The Zionist imperialist danger to the whole existence of the Arab nation and its future has been clearly shown.
It was natural, therefore, that the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party should be almost completely preoccupied with the Palestine cause and its challenges, together with the requirements to meet the challenge.
The period between the defeat and the Revolution in July 17th 1968 was not enough to prepare a complete theoretical and practical programme of action. The Ninth National Congress of the Party in March 1968 drew correct lines of guidance.
The Party's view of the Palestine cause, the circumstances of its pre-revolution struggle, the state of dissention created by the February 1966 reaction and its isolation from direct participation in the Palestine Resistance Movement with all its political, organizational and psychological effects, made the Party produce the most comprehensive slogans and programmes for the new phase of struggle, to face the Zionist imperialist aggression.
Most of those slogans and programmes were correct theoretically such as the rejection of old defeatist solutions, denunciation of the Arab regimes responsible for the defeat and the call for a protracted popular war. We must confess, and this is very significant, that the gap was great between our slogans and our ability to translate those slogans into practical action. During that phase, our Party was besieged and was unable to play a leading role in the arena of Arab
When the Party came to power in Iraq after the Revolution of July 17th 1968, it suddenly occupied the limelight and was called upon to put all its programmes and slogans into immediate action.
The urgent pleas came from many sides: From the base of the Party and its organizations, from the masses and from the Palestine Resistance Movement some of whose sections had negative old relations with the Party. Not only were those circles pressing the Party hard for action, but many suspect elements were doing the same in order to embarass the Party.
The Party, under those difficult circumstances, did not want to be rushed without careful consideration of an accurate balance between slogans, long-range strategy and its real ability to meet the requirements.
The two most important errors committed by the Party and the Revolution in their performance of national duties towards the Pales tine cause until the events of September 1970 in Jordan were these: That the promises of the Party and its commitments toward the Palestine cause were much bigger than its ability to fulfill. The second error lay in the lack of understanding of the dialectical relationship between the regional and national tasks after the Party takes over control in any single country. The bitter experience of September 1970 was the net result of these errors.
Before those events, the Party had gone into the national arena with the Palestine cause in a way far beyond its capabilities in that phase, and before being able to settle decisively the regional tasks which would enable it to play the national role. The authority of the Revolution had to be consolidated and the Kurdish Question had to be solved before the military resources of Iraq could be released. The Party made major promises for temporary psychological gains without considering that the development of events might compel it to fulfill those promises.
Iraq at that time had over fifty thousand soldiers on the Eastern front (Jordan and Syria ). It was fully participating in all Arab official activities, military and political, in facing the enemy. Iraq had always taken the hard line in all issues without meticulous calculation of the consequences and the resources available. The Party and the Revolution in short put themselves on the crest of the wave.
When the Jordanian regime ruthlessly embarked upon the liquidation of the Palestinian Resistance, puting to the test all the slogans, the Party and the Revolution found themselves unable to deal in a way commensurat with the size and extent of the conspiracy and with the aforementioned promises.
This created a highly sensitive situation within the Party itself. Some comrades were of the opinion that everything must be thrown into the field on the assumption that this would put the Party at the head of the masses and engender fresh additional forces. These comrades neglected some military and political considerations and neglected the importance of keeping a national base of struggle, safe for retreat as well as for future initiatives. Others called for retreat and the guarding of the Revolution regardless of any losses on the national front.
The events of September 1970 cast a heavy shadow over the following phase. It was widely exploited by the forces of opposition. The reputation of the Party suffered immensely among the Arab masses and in Arab and foreign political circles. For some time, the Party was isolated and unable to make any move among the Arab masses. Its relations with some Resistance circles deteriorated.
The sincerity and vitality of the Party, however, enabled it to pick up again and overcome the difficult period by positive work on the Arab level. The Party and the Revolution have since been able to return to the fore as an effective and leading force. During the last three years, between September 1972 and October 6th 1973, many facts about the Arab situation have been revealed and many deceptions have been unmasked to prove that the Party's stances and analysis of events were basically correct on many issues.
The escalation of the revolutionary achievements in Iraq such as nationalization of oil, the establishment of the national progressive front, the success in formulating a correct framework for friendly relations with the Soviet Union and progressive forces in the world, presented Iraq as a strong base for Arab struggle and an example to be followed.
The wise and flexible way, far from verbal competition, has regained the confidence of the Arab masses and improved relations with some Arab regimes, making the Party's position more respected and to be used as a central guide by some progressive Arab circles.
The Party's initiative in 1972 in proposing a fighting union with Syria and Egypt and in treating relations with them in a constructive spirit did much to produce good results.
The Party's slogan's and programmes for using oil as a political weapon in battle, particularly after successful nationalization have made our slogans central in the Arab World.
Iraq's quick and decisive participation in the October 1973 war and its blow to American and Dutch interests, its rejection of the ceasefire and the new liquidatory solutions put the Party in this country in a distinguished and leading position against Zionism, imperialism and reactionary connivance.
Attempts to isolate our Party and Revolution at present are different from those in the past. They are now directed rather at containment of our effect on the Arab scene. Our task is to gain the full support and understanding of the Arab masses and revolutionary forces throughout the Arab World.
The Arabian Gulf area remained until recently under direct British imperialist domination. Because of the large area, sparse population and position on the maritime commercial route it remained open to foreign immigration both organized and unorganized.
After the discovery of oil in the area in huge quantities, the demographic factor, rather than the military importance -of' the area, started to figure prominently in British and American plans for the area. In order to keep their control over the area, the British and Americans adopted long range plans. In addition to possessing the loyalty of the local sheikhs and direct control over all facilities, they began organizing foreign immigration especially of Iranians. The aim was to change the Arab national character of the area in a way similar to what happened in Palestine. In their view, this would be sufficient to isolate the area from its Arab milieu and thus prevent its liberation and integration with the neighbouring Arab states and with Iraq in particular. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party was the first since the early sixties to warn of the dangers in the Gulf area. We understood that the essential character of the conflict would be national, and compared its beginnings to the beginnings of the conflict in Palestine.
During the sixties, the British and Americans exerted great effort to make new arrangements in the Gulf which had a superficial appearance of a British military withdrawal and independence for the existing small entities, while in effect it meant a tightening of the imperialist political, economic and military control of the area.
The Arab Gulf question, though characterized by the national nature of the conflict because of the Iranian Government's ambitions, is part and parcel of the Arab cause and is closely connected with the struggle for liberation, unity and progress.
The Gulf area, including Iran, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula contains the largest oil reserves in the whole world. This fact, coupled with the energy crisis, made this area one of the most important and most sensitive for the imperialists. The oil in this area ceased to be merely a good ground for investment: it became also a great strategic matter, closely connected with the imperialist interests and position in the international conflict. The future of the western world and Japan depends on oil. The renewal of arrangement in this area and the whole Arab World has become vitally important for American imperialism. Great efforts and new, immense political, economic and military resources are being used by the Americans to secure this area. It is no longer possible to isolate the events in this area from the events of the Arab Nation. It is also no longer possible to deal with the events and conflicts of this area on a regional basis in spite of the peculiarities that characterize that area.
The imperialist attempt to change the national character of the Arab Gulf is linked closely to the plan for securing energy and guarding its transportation via the Gulf, Red Sea and the Mediterranean. All the puppets and agents of the imperialists in the area, play their role in the service of these aims, in spite of their contradictions and conflicts, because of American imperialist coordination.
Lines of transport and communication are as basic as the oil itself. Therefore the roles of the agents of imperialism are not confined to keeping oil contracts and protecting loyal regimes against change and the winds of nationalization, but also to securing the lines of transportation and communication by isolating the revolutionary spots especially in Iraq and containment of south Yemen in order to topple their regimes. North Yemen is also being subjected to attempts to reinstate reactionary and imperialist control. North and South Yemen occupy a strategic position on the southern coast of the Red Sea. The imperialist plan also calls for keeping he situation in the Sudan under control, isolating the Eritrean revolution and keeping Djipoti port under Ethiopia. Such an operation of course requires dense military armaments in sea, land and air and also large budgets for propaganda, agents and military coups.
The operation is also connected with the Palestine cause or the so-called Middle East crisis. All the parties mentioned are working in accordance with a general plan which aims at striking at the Arab revolution by encirclement, domestication, penetration and finally its defeat The aim is to impose an American solution on the area.
By the time the Iraqi Revolution of July 17th 1968 took place, the American plans in the Gulf area made significant strides by gaining time and in preparing resources before the Revolution could face its responsibilities in the area. The Revolution through five and a half years of its life had to face the following conditions and considerations.
1 - The Party was preoccupied in the beginning with the task of consolidating the Revolution and was thus unable to invest effort sufficient to affect the fortunes of the area.
2 -Iraq had been absent from the area because of imperialist schemes and the policies of the previous regimes. Iraq had to start building political, cultural and economic relations virtually from scratch.
3 - It was difficult to build close links with the area because of the weakness of its popular movement and the incapacity of the local governments to respond to the dangers, The Iraqi initiatives were pictured by the imperialists as dangerous so as to isolate them from the support of the big neighbouring Arab State.
4 - The imperialist force in the Gulf area increased and accelerated at a time when Iraq was preoccupied politically, and militarily with the Palestine cause and the requirements of facing the imperialist Zionist enemy. This affected the size and quality of the Revolution's effort in the Gulf.
All this took place also in the shadow of a suspect Arab silence which may have been due in part to preoccupation with the conflict of Palestine. Certain regimes turned a deaf ear to the pleadings of Iraq concerning dangers in the Gulf. They declined any commitments, even moral and symbolic, and went as far as improving its relations with Iran before and after the Iranian occupation of the three Arab islands of Abu Musa and two Tunbs.
The alliance of such regimes with the Saudi regime, which plays an essential role in the imperialist plan, gave the reactionary Saudi regime a political cover to influence the Gulf in cooperation with Iran.
Other Arab regimes were negligent and unable to play an effective role in protecting the Gulf. Some of them accused Iraq of trying to dodge its commitments to the Palestine cause by diverting attention to the Gulf.
The responsibility of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party towards the Arab Gulf springs first and foremost from its national principles and aims. Iraq, being the largest Arab country in the area and the most advanced, carries the main burden in safeguarding the area. The national importance of the area cannot be overemphasized, and the dangers facing it are serious.
The main efforts of the Party and the Revolution have been centred around the Palestine cause and the Gulf. Relations with the Arab countries, on both the popular and official levels, have been determined to large extent by these two interrelated cases.
There are of course other factors and fields of activity which are essentially important in Arab relations such as economic, cultural and human relations which provide the substructural base for Arab unity. But most of the Arab countries are occupied with political problems. The Party and the Revolution have used all possible means to transcend political circumstances by strengthening relations with Arab countries and the masses in all parts of the Arab Homeland.
The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the Revolution carry the main responsibility in the struggle for Arab unity on all levels and in all fields of endeavour. We are called upon to make all possible progress in any of these fields.
The main considerations that determine the foreign policy of the Revolution on the international plane are:
l - The requirements of Arab liberation causes particularly those of Palestine and the Arab Gulf.
2 -The necessity of safeguarding the Revolution in Iraq which is a base of struggle for unity, freedom and socialism.
3 - Belief in the Arab revolutionary movement as being part of the world revolution and the necessity of alliance between both in struggling against imperialism, aggression and racial discrimination for the sake of freedom, peace and progress in the world, with care to safeguard the independence and distinguishing features of the Arab revolutionary movement.
4 - Belief in the necessity of establishing good relations with the Arab people in all fields, within the framework of our interests and national needs, and in accordance with our principles of fraternity and cooperation among peoples.
In the light of these considerations, efforts have been made during the past few years to establish relations with various countries.