Justice, 31 July 1909.

The Czar’s Finger Prints in Persia.
How Far is Sir Edward Grey Implicated


Source: Anon “The Czar’s Finger Prints In Persia – How Far is Sir Edward Grey Implicated,” Justice, 31 July 1909, p.6. It is possible that this information came to Justice via Peter Petroff;
Transcribed: by Ted Crawford.


After the bombarding of the Mejliss (Parliament) of Persia at Teheran by the Shah’s Cossacks on June 23, 1908, it was suggested in various quarters that Colonel Liakhoff had been acting under instructions from the Russian Government. On July 3 of last year M. Izvolsky, the Russian Minister, gave the British Ambassador “the most positive assurances that Colonel Liakhoff, in carrying out the Shah’s recent measures and assuming military control of Teheran (if he had done so), acted without the orders, knowledge, or approval of the Imperial Government.” The following despatches (translated) from Colonel Liakhoff to his superiors show that the Russian diplomatist lied, as usual. We should like to know how far Sir Edward Grey has been deceived in this matter, or if he – a typically treacherous Whig – was after all a party to the assassination of a Parliament.

* * *

“Report No. 59, Secret.

“To THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE MILITARY DISTRICT OF THE CAUCASUS.

“To THE QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL.

“Your Excellency,

“On the 26th of May (June 8) H.M. the Shah summoned me and the First Dragoman of the Legation to Bagh-i-Shab. In an intimate conversation the Shah expressed his agreement to our former proposals, of which I had the honour at the time to inform your Excellency, to abolish the Constitution, disperse the Mejliss, and, by means of a whole series of manoeuvres, so as to escape the insistence of the European Powers, to return to the former absolute form of government. To which be added that in asking for a plan at further action be would request that there might be as little bloodshed as possible. To this I ventured to remark that in a contest bloodshed was unavoidable and indispensable.

“When we had returned to the town that evening, I and the First Dragoman drew up at the Legation a plan for further action against the nest of robbers that is here grandiloquently called a Parliament. In this, as a basis for farther action, the aim adopted was, up to the actual moment, to lull to sleep both the Mejliss and its adherents on the one hand, and the European Legations on the other; then unexpectedly to bring about a collision, and, making use of our organised military force, to destroy the nest of these bribe-takers and kill all its defenders who should think of offering any resistance. Those who survive its destruction should be prosecuted by means of administrative order, and subjected to the very severest punishments.

“Knowing the local custom of all the authorities, not excepting the Shah himself, in season and out of season, to shove their noses into every arrangement, and thereby spoil things, we thought it expedient to insist that after the acceptance of the plan we had drawn up, I, as the chief person concerned, should be given full freedom of action, with the right not to submit to anybody’s orders whatsoever from outside, no matter from whom they might emanate, until the task should be completely accomplished. Although from the former orders, and instructions of your Excellency the fashion of my action and the limits of my full powers are quite clear, yet I venture humbly to beg you to make clear to me the limits of active participation in the matter in hand, apart from the secret share which I shall take in bringing the matter about.

“When the plan of campaign which we have drawn up has been approved by the Minister and Shah, I shall have the honour of forwarding a copy to your Excellency without delay.

“Awaiting your commands,

“COLONEL V. LIAKHOFF.

“May 27 (June 9), 1908, Teheran.”

* * *

“Report No. 60, Secret.

“To THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE MILITARY DISTRICT OF THE CAUCASUS.

“To THE QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL.

“Your Excellency,

“The plan drawn up by myself and the First Dragoman of the Legation was approved by the Minister, after preliminary telegraphic communication with St. Petersburg, almost without any objection being raised, with very unimportant modifications. As to the Shah, he long hesitated, like a Persian, fearing the blood which mist necessarily be shed, and began to propose some sort of half measures, compromises, etc. in view of this we were forced to bring into play the final decisive means. We announced that the plan had been approved by the Russian Government as the best for the purpose in the present condition of affairs, and that if the Shah is not willing to agree to it Russia will refuse him all support and disclaim all responsibility for whatever further may happen. The means were strongly effective, and of course, he agreed without delay, and granted complete liberty of action for carrying it into effect.

“The fundamental points of the plan are as follows

“(1) With the funds of the Legation and of the Shah to bribe important members of the Mejliss and the ministers, so that at the last sittings they could carry out whatever policy is dictated to them.

“(2) Up to the final movement, when all preparations have been completed, to keep up comparative friendliness with the Mejliss, pretending that there is a desire to come to terms with it on a basis of mutual concessions, and with that purpose to enter upon negotiations.

“(3) To attempt by bribery or other means to tempt out the armed men from the Mejliss, the Mosque, and the adjacent buildings of the Anjumans.

“4) To endeavour to buy over majority of the leaders of the great city Anjumans, so that on a given day they should not let out but keep in their members.

“(5) On the day before, or in good time, to send out into the Mejliss, and the Sipabsalar Mosque, disguised Cossacks to give an excuse for the bombardment by firing in the air, and afterwards to kill all the defenders to be found there.

“(6) To take the most energetic measures in order that not a single malcontent should succeed in taking sanctuary in a European Legations, especially the British Legation.

“(7) When all the preliminary preparations are completed, on a fixed day to surround the Mejliss and adjacent buildings with Cossacks of the brigade and artillery, and to bombard it and kill all who resist.

“(8) After the bombardment to give up the houses of eminent Constitutionalists and Deputies to be sacked by the soldiers and rabble.

“(9) To arrest without delay eminent Constitutional leaders, deputies, and partisans, and hang or exile them according to their social position and importance.

“(10) To publish, for the tranquillising of men’s minds and for the Powers manifesto to say that the Mejliss will be convoked a second time.

“The Shah expressed his consent and preferred a wish that the Persian forces should take part, but I resisted categorically and obstinately, in view of the fact that this is just the most suitable moment for the Brigade to render real service and take the place that befits it in the life of the Persian State, and so render more easy the attainment of yet further aims.

“As to my direct share and active participation on the day of the bombardment, the Minister was against it, fearing the objections of the Powers. But I, keeping in view your Excellency’s orders, and the circumstance that however much the Persian Officers may be devoted to Russia, still they remain Persians, and at the decisive moment may by some sentimentality or other spoil the whole thing, insisted on my own personal direction.

“I may confidently assure your Excellency that in the Brigade which is entrusted to me, both among the officers and the non-commissioned ranks, there is excellent discipline and devotion to the cause, and unless any conditions from outside interfere, I can answer for success.

“Awaiting your commands,

“COLONEL V. LIAKHOFF.

“May 31 (June 13), 1908, Teheran.”

* * *

“Report No. 62, Secret,

“To THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE MILITARY DISTRICT OF THE CAUCASUS.

“To THE QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL.

“Your Excellency,

“With regard to Your Excellency’s inquiry as to the action of the Cossacks near the English Legation in not allowing any one to enter it I have the honour to give the following explanation:

“From my former reports Your Excellency knows of the intention to surround all the Legations, with the object of preventing the public from entering them and taking sanctuary, and of my punctual execution of this plan, As to the special measure taken by me against the English Legation, the reason was as follows; On the5th (June 18) in the evening I was called up on the telephone to the Legation by the Minister, who informed me that, according to information received, the English Legation was in vague outlines guessing what was being prepared, and was intending to offer sanctuary to the malcontents, so as thereby to weaken the effects of our action. Accordingly he advised that more special measures should be taken against the British Legation than against the rest.

“As to the Minister having advised me (as reported) Instead of surrounding the English Legation to surround the houses and shops of Russian subjects in the streets nearby, and so to prevent access to the Legation, there was at the time no talk of this between us.

“Although I admit that this would have been wiser than what we did, since the final result would have been the same, and it would have deprived the English of a direct ground for protest, we did not adopt this course, not, I imagine, because I would not listen to advice, but simply because in the fever of work this combination came into nobody’s head.

“Herewith I have the honour to forward to you a list of the officers who specially distinguished themselves and were thought worthy by me of being rewarded with Russian decorations.

“Awaiting your farther orders,

“COLONEL V. LIAKHOFF.

“June 12 (25) 1908, Teheran.”