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C O N T E N T S

The Lessons of the German Events (Resolution adopted at joint sitting of the E. C. C. I. and representatives of the Central Committee of the C. P. of Germany).

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Introduction to Instruction for Communist Fractions in Non-party Institutions and Organizations.

Instructions for Communist Fractions in Non-party Institutions and Organizations.

The Lessons of the German Events.

The present document, which is of extreme importance for the whole of the Comintern, was drawn up at a recent conference of the ECCI with representatives of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party.

A serious regrouping of political forces within the Central Committee of the German Communist Party has taken place, as the result of the political crisis just passed through.

These groups have crystallised out as follows. A right group (Brandler), which however, received an insignificant minority on the Central Committee (2 votes against 27); then a compact group, which at present represents the main body of the Party (17 votes on the Central Committee); and finally, the old left (Berlin and Hamburg).

In the opinion of the ECCI it is necessary at present to achieve a complete fusion of the central group with the left group against the opportunist errors of the right. The beginning of this fusion is marked in the present document, on which — with the assistance of the ECCI — both these tendencies representing together 99 per cent of the German Communist Party were united.

All the representatives of the Sections of the Comintern now in Moscow (including the Polish communists) voted for the resolution.

At the last moment even the followers of Comrade Brandler subscribed in principle to the resolution, making a special declaration.

The ECCI is convinced that the fusion of the central main body with the left against the opportunist errors of the right will assist the German Communist Party in carrying out correctly the great tasks now confronting it. The ECCI will take the most severe measures against any manifestation of factionism, from whatever side it comes.

G. Z.

The events which took place in Germany, Poland and Bulgaria in the period from May to November 1923 marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of the international movement.

In Germany, along with the development of the crisis in the Ruhr, the proletarian class war passed from the phase of gradual accumulation of revolutionary forces into a new phase concerning the fight for power.

In view of the great significance of the German revolutionary movement, the historical change which took place in August and September and the events of the autumn are of great importance to the Communist International. The lessons and the conclusions to be derived from these experiences must be taken advantage of to the greatest detail by the whole of the Communist International.

Since a tactical estimate of these events must be made almost entirely on the fundamental principles of the Communist International, the Executive desires once more to give a fully concrete exposition of the tactical method of the Communist International, which in the present epoch is both theoretically and practically of extreme importance — the tactic of the United Front.

1. The Tactics of the United Front.

At the Third World Congress of the Communist International, the tasks of the German Communist Party arising from the March defeat were discussed in the greatest detail and summed up in the slogan: To the Masses! In December of the same year, the method by which the masses were to be won over was embodied concretely in the resolution of the Executive on the tactics of the united front.

In Germany the Communist Party immediately proceeded to carry out the tactics of the united front with the greatest earnestness. The whole objective situation in Germany favoured these tactics. As a result of its labours the Party achieved great success; it won the increasing sympathy of the masses, and caused disruption in the ranks of the Social-Democrats.

A number of our Sections began to employ the tactics of the united front only slowly, after overcoming much resistance and along with many errors. In France a considerable section of the Party in 1922 failed to understand the tactics of the united front, and seriously feared that they would be interpreted as an

ideological concession to the Social-Democrats. In England a section of the comrades wrongly interpreted the tactics of the united front in the sense that communists were not to criticize the opportunist Labour Party in Parliament. In Finland, similar false conclusions were come to. In Roumania, a section of the comrades honestly believed that the tactics of the united front meant a parliamentary collaboration with the Social-Democrats. In Italy the Communist Party for a long time committed the exact reversed error, and refrained from giving the tactics of the united front a wide application for fear that the purity of the theory and program of the communist movement might thereby be compromised. A number of other parties made a too mechanical interpretation of these tactics, and thought it was enough to address a stereotyped open letter to the Social-Democrats once a month and then forget all about it. They were not able to employ the tactics of the united front for the purpose of carrying on a real political fight.

The mistaken application of the tactics of the united front made in a number of countries, especially at the beginning, does however, not mean that the tactics themselves are wrong. This conclusion would be just as mistaken as the rejection of the revolutionary exploitation of parliamentarism on the grounds that certain parliamentary fractions are only able to learn to make use of it after many errors. The tactics of the united front were, and are, in themselves, right, in spite of incidental errors connected with them.

The tactics of the united front have their strong sides and they have their dangers. Although in October 1923 we did not possess a safe and certain majority in the German proletariat, nevertheless, the very fact that the young Communist Party at that period could seriously ask itself whether it had not already a reliable majority to proceed to seize power, proves that the tactics of the united front are capable of bringing about the most essential pre-requisite for the seizure of power, namely, the winning over of a majority of the proletariat for the proletarian revolution. If the Communist Parties have to take into consideration the psychology and the mood of the backward masses still remaining under the influence of the Social Democrats, this does not prove the erroneous of the tactics but merely points to a source of danger in the application of the tactics.

In the first theses of the Executive in December 1921, the dangers connected with the tactics of the united front were emphatically indicated: "Not all the communist parties are sufficiently strengthened and consolidated, not all have finally discarded the centrist and semi-centrist ideologies. Cases of going to the other extreme are possible, of tendencies which, in effect will lead to the dissolution of the communist parties and groups into a formless united bloc. If the tactics planned are to be carried out with success for the cause of Communism, then the communist parties themselves which carry out the tactics must be strongly and firmly united and their leadership must be marked by clarity of thought."

The Fourth World Congress also pointed out the dangers concealed both in the whole tactics of the united front and in the special slogan of the Workers' Government. The Congress declared: "In order to avoid these dangers, and in order to be able to take up immediately the fight against the illusion that a stage of 'democratic coalition' is inevitable, the communist parties must not forget that every bourgeois government is at the same time a capitalist government, but that not every workers' government is in reality a proletarian socialist government!"

These warnings of the Communist International must be borne in mind, particularly since the recent events in Germany; for the German Communist Party, which after the Russian Section, is the most mature party in the International, has committed grave errors in the application of the tactics of the united front.

It is essential that communists in all countries should now ponder carefully what the tactics of the united front are and are not. They are tactics of revolution, not of evolution. Just as the Workers' (and Peasants') Government cannot be for us a marked democratic transitional stage, so the tactics of the united front are not a democratic coalition nor an alliance with the Social Democrats. They are purely a method of revolutionary agitation and mobilisation. We reject all other interpretations as opportunist.

We must bear this clearly in mind, for only then can the tactics of the united front have any meaning for the Communist International and contribute to the aim of winning over the bulk of the proletariat for the revolutionary fight for power.

Naturally the tactics of the united front as a method of agitation among the wide masses of the workers are suited for a definite epoch, namely, the epoch when the communists in nearly every country which is of decisive importance to the working class movement are still in the minority. In proportion as concrete conditions change, so also will the application of the tactics of the united front have to be modified. Even to-day application of the tactics must differ in different countries. As the fight becomes sterner and assumes the character of a decisive struggle, we shall more than once have to change the manner of application of the tactics of the united front in the various countries. The time will come when entire and now still powerful Social-Democratic parties will collapse, or, if they persist in their treachery, will burst like soap bubbles; and when whole strata of the Social-Democratic workers will come over to us. The tactics of the united front further and expedite this process.

2. The Revolutionary Crisis in Germany.

Shortly after the occupation of the Ruhr by the French army, the Executive of the Communist International drew the attention of all the Sections to the approaching revolutionary crisis. The International Conferences in Essen and Frankfurt were also devoted to this question.

The beginning of the revolutionary wave in Germany was signalled by the great strikes in the Ruhr and the struggles in May and June, the strike in Upper Silesia, the metal workers strike in Berlin, the fights in the Erzgebirge and the Vogtland and the political mass strike of August 1923, which brought about the fall of the Cuno Government.

The rapid increase in the acuteness of the situation was expressed in the rise in prices, the depreciation of the currency, inflation, burdensome taxation, the decline of parliament, the increased capitalist offensive following on a feeble offensive of the proletariat, food scarcity, decreases in wages, the abolition of the social conquests of the working class, as well as in the growth of separatist and particularist movements, the increasing impoverishment of the old and the new middle classes, and in the decline of the influence of the democratic middle parties. The whole burden of the war in the Ruhr was laid upon the proletariat and the middle classes, who were being steadily proletarianised. The aggravation of the class antagonisms proceeded step by step with the rapid decline of German capitalist economy, which was severed from its centres of power.

In many provinces, the starving masses armed themselves and marched into the country in order to seize the foodstuffs they lacked. Large sections of the middle classes fell into despair, and vacillated between the two poles which indicated a way out of their plight, the communist and the fascist groups. In the large towns plundering, hunger demonstrations and rioting became frequent occurrences.

In the months leading up to the winter of 1923, the relation of class power in Germany moved steadily in favour of the proletarian revolution. Before the movement in the Ruhr began, the eighteen to twenty millions of the German proletariat were far removed from any nationalist frame of mind. A profound ferment was taking place among the six to seven million petty bourgeois of the towns and the four to five million small peasants and tenant farmers.

The democratic coalition policy was patently bankrupt. The Social Democrats, who had shared the power of government with the democratic bourgeois parties, had to decide whether they should enter into a firm bloc with the representatives of heavy industry and of reactionary militarism; and this they finally did.

The task of the German Communist Party was, and is, to take advantage of the period of international complications arising out of the crisis of the Ruhr, the internal and extremely difficult crisis of German capitalism, and the proceeding liquidation of the Ruhr crisis in order to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to set up the dictatorship of the proletariat.

To this end, the Party should have mobilised the industrial proletariat for the fight, both against German heavy industry and French imperialism, but at the same time, it should at least have neutralised the middle classes of the town and country, and, if possible, brought them under its leadership.

The first task could be fulfilled only if the Party succeeded in freeing the majority of the proletariat from the influence of the Social Democrats of whatever shade, and in organising them so that they should be prepared for the attack upon the capitalist positions.

This task has not been adequately carried out, the reasons for which will be examined below.

The second task, in essence, involved destroying the fascist influence and transforming the nationalist frame of mind into the will to fight in alliance with the proletariat, against the German big capitalists and against French imperialism. This task was tackled by the German Communist Party with success, as is best evidenced by the Anti-Fascist Day of July 29, 1923. Large sections of the petty bourgeois population were already in sympathy with the German Communist Party, which had succeeded, in a rather high degree in pointing out to these strata, the hypocrisy of the "social propaganda" of the fascists and their objective role as aiders and abettors of the big bourgeoisie, who were betraying the nation, as well as the community of interests of the proletariat and petty bourgeoisie.

The disintegration in the ranks of the bourgeoisie grew from week to week. At the same time confidence in the German Communist Party increased. It was necessary to organize this confidence and to prepare all available forces for the final blow.

In September, the German Communist Party and the Executive of the Comintern, in consultation with the representatives of the five largest parties, came to the conclusion that the revolutionary situation in Germany had so far matured that the question of the decisive struggle was a matter of only a few weeks.

From that time forth the Party mobilised all the forces at its disposal and armed itself with every means for the decisive fight. The Party worked feverishly to make everyone of its members an active fighter, armed for the struggle. In order to bring the whole proletariat into the revolutionary fighting front, the Party initiated and supported local councils of action everywhere. Intensive agitation was carried on among the railwaymen, electrical workers, and state and municipal workers.

The Executive of the Communist International concentrated the whole of the International, and particularly the sections of the countries adjacent to Germany, and of Soviet Russia on the impending German revolution, and settled the duties of the individual Sections.

3. The October Retreat and its Causes.

In October, the German Communist Party, despite its weaknesses, was prepared for the revolutionary fight for power. If, in spite of the revolutionary situation, and in spite of the exertions of the Communist International and the German Communist Party, neither a revolutionary decisive struggle, nor political mass struggles resulted, this was due to a number of errors and defects, and in part, to opportunist deviations.

Defects in estimating the revolutionary march of events.

The Party realised too late that the revolutionary situation in Germany had matured. The Executive of the Communist International also failed to draw attention energetically enough to the oncoming crisis, with the result that the necessary fighting measures were not taken in hand in time. Already, with the end of the preceding period (Cuno Government, occupation of the Ruhr), the question of power should have been raised and the technical preparations should have been undertaken. The Party failed to realize in time the significance of the mass struggles in the Ruhr and in Upper Silesia, as a sign of increased consciousness of power and growing political activity, and only after the strike against Cuno was the necessary readjustment of attitude made.

Tactical errors.

The task of intensifying and broadening the numerous isolated actions which took place between July and September and to develop them right up to actions with political slogans, was not fulfilled.

After the Cuno strike, the mistake was made of wanting to put off elemental movements until the decisive struggle took place.

One of the most serious errors was that the instinctive rebellion of the masses was not transformed into a conscious revolutionary will to fight by giving it political aims.

The Party failed in making an energetic and vigorous agitation for the tasks of the political workers' councils, and in connecting most closely the transitional demands and the partial struggles with the final aim of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The neglect of the factory councils' movement also made it impossible to place upon them temporarily the functions of workers' councils, so that when the decisive moment came, an authoritative centre around which the vacillating wor-

kers who were drawn away from the influence of the Social Democratic Party could rally, was lacking.

Since other united front bodies also (councils of action, control commissions, fighting committees) were not systematically used in order politically to prepare the fight, the fight was almost entirely interpreted as a party affair and not as a united fight of the whole proletariat.

Political-Organizational Weaknesses and Defects.

The Party showed very little ability to consolidate organizationally its growing influence in the mass organizations of the proletariat. It displayed still less ability to concentrate its forces for a protracted period on one fighting aim.

The amount of technical preparation, of readjustment of the organization for the fight for power, of the arming and internal consolidation of the centuries, was at a minimum. The much too brief and feverish technical preparations, practically produced no results; it is true, they technically prepared the Party members for action, but they did not embrace the wide proletarian masses.

Errors in estimating the relation of forces.

The feverishness of the technical preparations during the decisive week, the view that the struggle was only a Party struggle, and the concentration on the "final blow" without preliminary and accumulative partial struggles and mass movements, made it impossible to examine the true relation of forces and to fix proper dates. Therefore the statement as to whether the majority of the working class at the decisive points would follow the lead of the German Communist Party, was rendered an absolutely unreal and unsafe calculation. In fact, the only thing that could be asserted was that the Party was on the way to winning over the majority without yet possessing the leadership of them.

The under-estimation of the forces of the counterrevolution, consisted of the fact that the Party underestimated the power of the Social Democrats as a hampering force within the proletariat.

The Party also misunderstood the nature and the role of the left social democratic leaders, and allowed the illusion to be cherished in its own ranks that by exerting the necessary mass pressure, we could compel these leaders to join with us in calling for the fight.

The mistaken political-strategie orientation on Saxony.

The rigid one-sided policy of passing to the decisive struggle only from the defence of the Central German positions was a mistaken one. It resulted in the neglect of other industrial and fighting provinces, and in severe disorientation after the Saxon position was surrendered without a fight. It was a fatal error of the Party to stake all its cards on Saxony, and thereby fail to provide itself with a line of retreat and defence in case of failure, and a reserve line of attack.

As a result of all these errors and defects of the Party, and of the weakness of the working class, there was a shrinking from the decisive fight for power at the last moment. While in Bulgaria, where the Party had formerly not participated in armed struggles, the defeat can still form the basis for future victories, in Germany, after the defeats of 1919 and of March 1921, the Communists are in such a position that they must in the fight under stand how to lead the masses to victory.

In any case, it was a great mistake of the Party not to have immediately changed its front and proceeded at once to partial struggles, and that in spite of the fact that some partial preparations had been made, it retreated without a fight immediately upon the entry of the Reichswehr, the pronouncement of a state of siege throughout the Reich and the suppression of the Party.

4. The Saxon Experiment and the Hamburg Struggles.

The aggravation of the class antagonisms in Germany, the sharpening of the economic crisis, the concentration of the Party upon the decisive struggle, induced the Executive Committee of the Communist International and of the German Communist Party to undertake the experiment of allowing the communists to enter the Saxon Government.

The idea of the participation in the Saxon Government was, in the opinion of the Executive, a special military and political task, which was defined in an instruction as follows:

"Since, as we estimate the situation, the decisive moment will take place not later than four, five or six weeks hence, we consider it necessary that every position that can be directly useful should be immediately occupied. In view of the prevailing situation, the question of entering the Saxon

Government must be treated as a practical one. On the condition that Zeigner and his people will be prepared sincerely to defend Saxony against Bavaria and the fascists, we must enter the government, immediately arm from fifty to sixty thousand men in an effective manner, and ignore General Müller. The same in Thuringia."

Under these originally assumed premises, the participation in the Government conformed to the resolutions of the Fourth Congress. The promotion of revolutionary struggles, the welding of the working masses should have been the pre-conditions for the entry into the Saxon Government: this entry should have been based upon mass movements. Although the direct military task had to be put off in view of the slowing-down of the revolutionary process, nevertheless, the communists could and ought to have carried on a real revolutionary activity. In this however, they showed themselves gravely below expectations.

It was their duty first of all to advance ruthlessly the question of arming the workers; from the first moment of their participation in the Workers' Government, the communists should have known no other basic principle but the arming of the proletariat.

It was further their duty to unfold before the masses their proletarian program for saving the country, and to carry on an energetic propaganda for the political workers' councils, and thereby to counteract the sabotage of the left socialist ministers. It was their duty to work in parliament and in the factory councils for the immediate adoption of revolutionary measures, such as the confiscation of the enterprises of manufactures who were sabotaging production, and the requisition of the houses of rich families for homeless workers and their children.

It was also the duty of the communists from the first moment of their participation in the government to brand in the eyes of the masses the double-dealing policy of Zeigner, his secret negotiations with the military dictators, as well as the whole counter-revolutionary role of the left social democratic leaders.

Owing to this negligence, and to the fact that the Party was not capable of mobilising the masses, the Saxon experiment failed to mark a forward move in the fight: Instead of revolutionary strategy, we had a non-revolutionary parliamentary co-operation with the "left" social democrats. The special assertion of the Communist ministers that they were responsible only to the Landtag and to the constitution, was scarcely suited to destroy democratic illusions.

The Chemnitz Conference could have been a success for the Party only if adequate revolutionary work had been undertaken by all the Party bodies. The Party allowed itself to be caught unprepared by the thrust of the enemy, the Reichsexecutive*) which everyone foresaw. The greater therefore was the error that, although the general strike was to be proposed, no attempt was made to concentrate the conference from the moment of its opening exclusively on the question of defence against the Reich-executive. These were errors, which undoubtedly facilitated the treacherous game of the left social democratic leaders.

A direct contrast to Saxony was the uprising in Hamburg. Here it was proved that a bold surprise attack of determined fighters could smash the enemy militarily. But it also showed that such an armed struggle, even though, as was the case in Hamburg, it is regarded by the population not without sympathy and is supported by a mass movement, is nevertheless doomed to failure if it remains isolated and is not supported on the spot by a workers' council movement, the absence of which was severely felt in Hamburg.

The fight itself in the Reich was hampered by contradictory orders issued by the centre, and the strike movements which were actually taking place, suffered from lack of news of the fight in the Reich generally, and by the news which was received of the outcome of the Chemnitz Conference.

Nevertheless, it was possible to call off the fight in Hamburg with exemplary discipline. The lessons to be derived from it are valuable for the Party and for the International. Particularly note-worthy was the villainous conduct of the Hamburg social democratic leaders who supported the military action against the rebels. Their conduct is but the reverse side of the medal, the face of which is the conduct of Zeigner and his "lefts" in Saxony.

The Saxon experiment has severely discredited the "left" social democrats; it has demonstrated that they are in reality the lackeys of the counter-revolution. The Hamburg uprising has considerably strengthened the consciousness of power of the

*) The expeditionary force of the Reich sent against one of its individual states.

German proletariat, and was at the same time a severe blow for the social democrats.

The Communist Party must realize clearly the errors which were committed during the Saxon experiment and in connection with the fight in Hamburg. Without this it will be impossible for the Party to conduct correct tactics in the future.

5. The Role of the Social Democrats and the Change in the Tactics of the United Front in Germany.

The leading strata of the German Social Democrats are at the present moment nothing else than a fraction of German facism under a socialist mask. They have handed the power of the state over to the representatives of the capitalist dictatorship in order to save Capitalism from the proletarian revolution. Sollmann, the Minister for Internal Affairs, declared a state of siege; Radbruch, the Minister for Justice, has converted "democratic" justice into extraordinary justice against the revolutionary proletariat. Ebert, the President of the Reich, also formally handed over government power to Seeckt. The social democratic fraction in the Reichstag screened these actions and voted for the Special Powers Act which set aside the constitution and handed over power to the White generals.

The whole international social democracy is gradually becoming the official armour bearer of the capitalist dictatorship. Men like Turati and Modigliani in Italy, Sakasov in Bulgaria, Pilsudski in Poland, and the social democratic leaders of the stamp of Severing in Germany, are direct participators in the government power of the capitalist dictatorship.

For five years the German social democrats of all shades had been gradually passing over to the camp of the counter-revolution. The process is now nearing its completion. The legitimate heir of the "revolutionary" Government of Scheidemann and Haase is the fascist General Seeckt.

It is true there are differences even in the camp of the capitalist dictatorship, and these may be of great enough importance to be exploited for our class fight. There are shades of difference between Ebert, Seeckt and Ludendorff. But, apart, from those differences in the camp of the enemy, the German communists must not forget that the main thing is to bring the working class to understand what is the essence of the whole affair, namely, that in the fight between capital and labour the leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Germany are irrevocably united with the White generals.

It is not only just now that the German social democrats have passed over to the side of capitalism. At bottom, they have always been the class enemies of the proletariat. But it is only now, after they have passed from capitalist democracy to capitalist dictatorship that this has become grossly evident to the masses.

It is this fact which induces us to introduce some modification into the tactics of the united front as applied to Germany.

No negotiations with the mercenaries of the White dictatorship! This is what every communist in Germany must plainly realize and proclaim loudly and emphatically to the whole German proletariat.

But even more dangerous than the right wing of the Social Democratic Party leaders are the left wing leaders, this last illusion of the deceived workers, these last fig leaves covering the counter-revolutionary policy of Severing, Noske, and Ebert.

The Communist Party of Germany rejects all negotiations not only with the Central Committee of the German Social Democratic Party, but also with the "left" leaders as long as these heroes do not summon up enough manhood to break openly with the counter-revolutionary gang sitting in the Central Committee of the German Social Democratic Party.

The tactic of the united front to be employed in Germany is now: "Unity from below."

In the first theses of the Executive of the Communist International of December 1921, we find:

"As a counter-poise to the diplomatic game of the Menshevik leaders, the Russian Bolsheviks put forward the slogan: Unity from Below! i. e., the unity of the working masses themselves in the practical fight for the revolutionary demands of the workers against Capitalism. Practice has proved that this was the only correct reply. As a result of this tactic, which was modified according to the circumstances of time and place, a huge section of the best Menshevik workers was gradually won over for Communism!"

The Communist Party of Germany must learn how to realize the slogan of the united front from below.

A ferment such as had never before existed is going on among the workers who still belong to the German Social Democratic Party. They see the bankruptcy of their leaders and are seeking new paths. There is therefore no reason why we should reject local negotiations and agreements with the German S. D. P. workers wherever we are faced with honest proletarians who are prepared to prove their devotion to the revolution.

The organs of the united front, the factory councils, control commissions and committees of action, must be so closely interwoven that they finally become the centrally directed apparatus of the proletarian fight for power.

6. Immediate Tasks of the Party.

The main estimate of the situation in Germany which was made in September by the Executive of the Communist International, remains essentially unchanged. The character of the fighting phase which has begun and the main tasks of the Communist Party remain the same. The German Communist Party must not strike from the agenda the question of uprising and the seizure of power. This question must stand before us as urgent and portentous as ever. However great the partial victories of the German counter-revolution may be they cannot solve any of the crisis problems of capitalist Germany.

Therefore, in view of its experiences gathered during the last few months, the German Communist Party is faced with a number of immediate tasks.

The Party must organise the fights of the proletariat against the abolition of the eight-hour day and of the workers' rights. The Party must unite the unemployed movement organisationally and politically with the movement of the employed workers and thus avoid the danger of the working class being split into starving unemployed and employed workers who still have a crust of bread. The Party will be best able to fulfil this task if it prepares the impending economic struggles in advance, in such a manner that they will be not only directed against reduction of wages, but will also have a political aim as expressed in the slogan: "Work for the unemployed!"

The Party propaganda must be directed towards making the broadest masses conscious that only the dictatorship of the proletariat can save them. This task must be bound up with the aim of politically annihilating the Social Democratic Party. This demands the organisation of the united front bodies and that every partial struggle should be given a definite aim.

The Party must seek to win over in addition to the industrial proletariat, the rural proletariat, the clerks and officials, the small peasants, and the proletarianised middle classes, and make them the allies of the working class under the hegemony of the revolutionary workers. This can be done by clear and definite agitation, by propaganda on behalf of the economic program of the German Communist Party, by fighting against still existing remnants of pacifist orientation in the West, by pointing out the national role of the German revolution and the significance of an alliance between the German Soviet Republic and Soviet Russia, and by determined and indefatigable work in the organization of the control commissions and similar organs of the revolutionary movement.

The work of organization within and without the Party must go hand in hand with agitation and propaganda. The German Communist Party must be not only a good propaganda party, but also a good fighting party. The work of arming the workers and of technically preparing for the decisive struggle must be carried on with tenacity. The proletarian "centuries" must be organized in fact and not merely on paper, and must be supported by the sympathy of the broad masses of the workers, which can only be won by the active leadership on the part of the C. P. G. in all struggles and actions of the proletariat. Only when the working masses can count upon the protection of the "centuries" in their demonstrations and strikes and in all their conflicts, will the centuries receive the hearty support of the masses in their arming and training and in securing information as to the forces of the enemy.

The pre-requisite for all this is that the Party should make a thorough utilization of all its experiences. Every remnant of democratic illusions and of the notion within the Party that the German Social Democratic Party, or groups of this party which are ideologically and organisationally under its influence, can as such lead revolutionary struggles, must be rooted out. It must be hammered into the heads of the members that the German Communist Party before the victory of the proletarian revolution, is the party of the uprising, the only party for destroying the capitalist system, and that in all the partial struggles its work can only be revolutionary if it aims at smashing the state apparatus of the bourgeoisie, keeps constantly in view the aim of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Communist Party is the only revolutionary party, it is strong enough to prepare for and achieve the victory of the masses of the proletariat against all other parties -- this must be the firm conviction of every Party member.

In order to bring about this orientation within the Party, the C. P. G. must openly discuss throughout its membership the experiences it has passed through. The Party must learn how to carry on discussions without weakening its power of action. In order to consolidate its whole power of action it must, in spite of all difficulties and its position of illegality, not neglect to clear up all its differences and put an end to discussions at a Party Congress.

The Communist International absolutely demands that the unity of the Party should be maintained. The Executive of the Communist International calls upon the whole membership of the German Communist Party to do everything in its power to that the whole Party on the Party Congress should unitedly put an end to the fractional conflicts and achieve complete power of action.

The Executive of the Communist International calls the attention of every member of the German Communist Party and of all the other Sections of the Communist International, to the gigantic tasks of the present revolutionary crisis. The Executive is firmly convinced that the experiences of the last few months have not been in vain, and if they are carefully studied and utilized, will bring the victory of the proletariat nearer.

Moscow 21 January 1924.

The Executive Committee of the Communist International.

Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the Organization of Factory nuclei.

The following resolution on the Organization of Factory Nuclei was unanimously adopted at the Session of the Presidium of the E. C. C. I. on January 21st, 1924, with the proviso, that amendments necessitated by conditions within the various Sections may be introduced.

The Party organization must be adapted to the conditions and aims of its work. Under the reformist policy of the social-democratic parties, which endeavoured to exert an influence upon the bourgeois government by means of the ballot box, it was natural that attention should be chiefly directed to the organization of voters. The organization, therefore, was based upon electoral divisions and residential areas. The Communist Party

inherited this form of organization from the social-democratic parties, but it is entirely opposed, not only to the final aims of the Communist Party, but also to its immediate tasks. The final aim of our Party is to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie, seize power for the working class, and bring Communism into being. Its immediate tasks are to win the majority of the working class by active participation in the everyday struggles of the working masses, and to secure the leadership of these struggles. This can only be achieved by means of the closest contact between our Party organisations and the working masses in the factories.

It was from this point of view that the Third Congress of the Communist International decided that the basis of the Communist Party must be the factory nuclei. In the majority of the

Sections of the Communist International this has not yet been carried into effect; and in many, the question of organizing factory nuclei has not even been concretely formulated. The experience of the German revolution, (at the end of 1923) once more clearly demonstrated that without factory nuclei and the closest contact with the working masses, it is impossible to draw the latter into the struggle and to lead them, that it is impossible to gauge their moods accurately and thus take advantage of the most favourable moment for our action, and that it is useless to expect victory over the bourgeoisie.

The Fundamental Forms of Local Organization.

1. **The Factory Nuclei form the Basis of the Party Organization.** All Communists working in a factory must be members of the nucleus in that factory.

Note: Where there are only one or two Party members in a factory and therefore they cannot form a nucleus, they are to be attached to the nucleus of the nearest factory, which must conduct the work in all adjacent factories where there are no nuclei.

2. Communists who do not work in factories, workshops, shops, etc., (housewives, domestic servants, house porters, etc.) form Residential Party Nuclei.

Note: Members of factory nuclei who live in other sections are obliged to register with the committee of the section (part of the town) where they reside. The section committee assigns them to residential nuclei. Members of Party nuclei of other sections who are assigned by Section Committees to residential nuclei, vote in these nuclei on questions which they have voted on in the factory nuclei, (questions of Party principle, election of Party delegates, etc.)

3. Unemployed members remain attached to the nucleus of the factory where they were formerly employed. In the event of protracted unemployment, with the consent of the section committee, they may leave their nucleus and be transferred to the sub-section where they live, and be attached to another nucleus.

4. In small industrial centres, towns and villages, where the workers reside in close proximity to their factories, or farms, uniform nuclei are formed as far as possible around the factory or farm.

5. Factory nuclei and residential nuclei elect an executive committee consisting of three or, at most, five persons. The elections take place at the general meetings of the nuclei. The executive committee of the nucleus distributes the work amongst its members. Depending upon the size of the nucleus, the executive committee appoints comrades for the distribution of literature, the conduct of propaganda, a comrade for trade union work, one to conduct the work of the fractions in the factory committees, one for cooperation with the young communist nucleus, one to conduct the work among women, etc.

6. Party members who are members of a factory nucleus pay their dues to that nucleus; Party members who are members of a residential nucleus pay their dues to the latter.

7. In large towns where there are numerous factory and residential nuclei, they are united into sub-sections. The sub-sections are joined into sections. All the sections of a large town constitute the local organization. The section committee fixes its own sub-sections. In doing so, the section committee should attempt as far as possible to form the sub-sections around large factories.

In medium sized towns, sub-sections should be formed, uniting the factory and the residential nuclei. The sub-sections constitute the local organization. In small towns and villages the nuclei are united into local groups. The local organizations in middle-sized towns and the local groups of small towns and of villages are united into subdistricts.

Note: Sub-sections and local groups, in accordance with local needs and requirements, hold regular meetings of all the members of the factory and residential nuclei of their sub-section.

8. At the head of each sub-section or local group, is an executive committee consisting of three to five persons, elected at the general meeting of the members of the nuclei of the sub-section or local group, or else, depending upon local conditions (e. g. when the Party is illegal) at delegate conferences. The Secretary of the committee of the sub-section and of the local groups must be confirmed by the section committee (in the country districts, by the the district committee). At the head of the section (city) and sub-district (country) is the section or sub-district committee, elected at section or sub-district Party conferences.

9. At the sub-section and group delegate meetings, and at district and sub-district conferences, the nuclei should be represented in proportion to the size of their membership, but in such a manner that the majority should consist of delegates from the factory nuclei. The number of delegates from each nucleus should be decided by the sub-section or sub-district committee.

In organizations where, owing to the fact that they are illegal, it is impossible to have a large representation at the sections or sub-district conferences, the delegates may be elected not directly by the nuclei, but at subsection or group delegate meetings.

10. Local Committees (in large towns) are elected at local conferences consisting of delegates from all the sections elected at section conferences in proportion to the size of the membership of the district.

11. In order to increase the influence of the factory nuclei, more than half the members, both of the sub-section committees and of the section committees should be members of factory nuclei. The local committees should consist partly of factory workers.

12. Where the Party is illegal, the higher Party organs in special circumstances (e. g. the arrest of a section committee, etc.) have the right to appoint new members of the section committee, with the understanding that a delegate meeting or conference will be summoned at the first opportunity in order to confirm the appointed committee or elect a new one. Members of a committee who have escaped arrest have the right of co-opting new members to the committee, with the agreement and confirmation of the higher party organs, until a conference is summoned. If the party is illegal, the number of members of the section committee should be as small as possible.

The Tasks of the Factory Nuclei.

The political organizational work of the Party should be centred in the factory nuclei. The factory nuclei, by leading the struggles of the working masses for their everyday needs, should direct them into the fight for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. A factory nucleus should, therefore, consider and determine its point of view upon every political or economic question agitating the working masses, and upon every conflict arising in the revolutionary method of settling questions and, as the most conscious and active part of the working class, must assume the leadership of the struggle.

In addition to general Party work, the tasks of the factory nuclei are as follows:

1. To carry on communist agitation and propaganda among the non-party working masses; systematic instruction of individual workers in order to draw them into the ranks of the Communist Party; distribution of political literature in the factories; discussion of questions affecting the factory; and even the publication of a special factory newspaper; the carrying on of social and agitational work among the factory workers.

2. Determined and continuous efforts must be made to win elected posts in the shops, trade unions, co-operatives, factory committees, control commissions, etc.

3. The nuclei should participate in all the economic conflicts and demands of the workers. The task of the nuclei is to broaden and deepen the movement, to point out to the workers the political consequences of the struggle, and to persuade them to adopt the wider struggle (both economic and political) and to set up a united front of the workers against the bourgeoisie and against fascism.

4. The nuclei must carry on an obstinate fight in the factories and workshops against the members and followers of other parties, also of the socialist parties and other "labour parties", using for this purpose facts relating to the activities of these parties which can be understood even by the most backward section of the working class.

5. They must bring about contact between the employed and unemployed workers in order to avoid a conflict between them.

6. Where conditions are ripe, they must carry on a fight for workers' control of the industries, banks, land and transport, and for the supply of the workers with the primary needs of life.

7. They must exert an influence upon the youth and working women employed in the factories, and draw them into the struggle. They must assist in the formation of young communist nuclei in the factories, and support them wherever they already exist.

8. Every member of a nucleus must actively participate in every kind of party work in the factory to which he is assigned by the executive committee of the nucleus.

Apart from the special tasks in their factories, the factory nuclei have also to perform territorial tasks at their places of residence, since workers employed in factories also have various needs and fulfil various social functions in the places where they reside (housing, food, health, education, elections, etc.).

The chief territorial tasks are as follows:

1. To conduct the political and organizational work of the Party at the place of residence, the carrying on of campaigns of various kinds (electoral, against bad housing, high rents, etc.), to see that the families of workers, clerks, etc. are assured of the primary necessities of life.

2. The distribution of Party literature, the recruiting of new readers and new Party members, agitation, propaganda, individual instruction of non-party workers, educational work in the sub-sections (clubs, etc.), inviting sympathisers to participate in workers' demonstrations, and generally carrying on the working class fight.

3. House to house propaganda in the sub-sections, the collection of information as to the party affiliations of persons residing in the sub-sections, as to political work, and the activity of fascists; keeping records of stores of firearms, etc.

4. Work among women and children.

These Territorial Tasks apply also to the Residential Nuclei. Their work must be carried on under the direct control of the sub-section committee, and be co-ordinated with the work of the factory nuclei.

Establishing the Factory Nuclei.

In view of the novelty of this question for many sections of the Communist International, and the varying conditions in different countries, the Executive Committee of the Communist International proposes that the subject should be widely discussed in the Party press and at Party meetings, and then only should the reorganization of the Party on the basis of factory nuclei be attempted. Nuclei should first be organized in the larger factories.

The nuclei should in no circumstances be confused with the communist fractions in the trade unions, co-operatives, etc., whose

function cannot be replaced by the nuclei. The functions of the fractions are narrower than those of the nuclei. The nucleus, or rather, the executive committee of the nucleus, must direct the work of the factory committee fractions in the factory.

The Executive Committee of the Communist International earnestly requests all Sections of the Communist International to furnish it with detailed information on the progress of the discussion on the questions here touched upon, and of the results achieved in the organisation in the factories.

Instructions for the Organization of Factory Nuclei in Germany.

Concerning the Communist Party of Germany, the following special instructions were adopted by the Presidium of the E. C. C. I.:

1. In accordance with the resolution on the organization of factory nuclei (see above) adopted by the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the Party must carry out its reorganization in such a way as to make the factory nuclei the basis of the Party organization.

2. Members of factory nuclei must be in a majority in the section and sub-section committees. Big cities must be divided into sections. The local Party committee must include workers from the bench.

3. Factory and residential nuclei are to be amalgamated into sub-sections, which are to be under the control of section committees. Wherever possible, the section committees must form the sub-sections around big factories.

4. Local committees (or section committees) must immediately elaborate a program with a time-limit, with the object of carrying out this reorganization in every locality, and must submit it to the Central Committee of the Party for approval. In the course of two months, the reorganization must have been carried out throughout the country under the direction of the Central Committee of the Party. The Central Committee must keep the Executive Committee of the Communist International regularly informed on the progress of the reorganization work.

Consequently, the last paragraph of the resolution on the reorganization of factory nuclei, does not apply to the German Communist Party.

Introduction to Instruction for Communist Fractions in Non-Party Institutions and Organizations.

The question of communist fractions (in America, caucuses) in non-party organizations is closely connected with the necessity of Communist Parties gaining an influence over large non-party masses. In order to achieve this, every Communist Party must have organs to conduct a communist policy within non-party organizations. Among these organs are also communist fractions (caucuses). Their correct organization determines the correct application of the directives of the Party, and guarantees the unity of communist will and tactics and ensures coordinate actions. In other words, without these qualities the Communist Party cannot properly carry on its work.

At the same time, the fact of the existence of communist fractions raises the question of their interrelation with Party organs. One cannot expect satisfactory results from the work of the communist fractions if these inter-relations do not promote the interests of the Party as a whole. The communist fractions are not independent autonomous organizations endowed with powers to deal with all questions of Party life. They are subordinate to Party organs which supervise and guide the work of the Party in the given region and in the locality where the work of the communist fraction lies. Thus, for instance, in a factory, the fraction in the factory committee is subordinate to the Party nucleus. The fraction in a town cooperative, a municipality or a trade union is subordinate to the local Party organization as represented by its committee. The fraction in any national congress or in a National Parliament is subordinate to the Central Committee of the Party.

The aforesaid order of subordination is easily understood, both in regard to the lowest and the highest communist fraction.

In a factory where the factory committee discusses and decides questions connected with the factory, the nucleus as a whole is responsible to the factory workers for the actions of the fraction in the factory committee. Therefore the Party nucleus cannot allow the fraction within the factory Committee to decide and act independently on behalf of the whole nucleus. The nucleus carries out its directives in the factory committee through this communist fraction. In the event of the fraction deviating from these directives or refusing to carry them out, the nucleus can recall such communists from the factory committee or compel them to submit to the directives by means of a special regulation. Such a procedure is justified by the fact that the communist nucleus, being the basis and the primary fundamental unit of the Party, carries out only the directives of the Party as a whole. Moreover, the communist nucleus has to discuss and decide questions which concern the entire local organization or even the entire Party, while the fraction only deals with questions concerning the factory Committee.

This applies equally to fractions within local trade unions, cooperatives or municipal councils. The responsibility for the work, the actions or the decisions of any of these fractions to the workers and peasants, employees or government officials, does not rest with separate members of the fraction nor with the fraction as a whole. The responsibility to these sections of workers rests with the whole Party organization of the given town. But

apart from the questions of responsibility, one must take into account that it is easier for the local Party Committee to get a clear conception of the general political situation. It can more easily determine what demands to bring forward at a given moment and what is of greater importance at this or that period. Therefore in the given case, the interests of the entire Party render it incumbent on the fractions to carry out implicitly all directives of the corresponding Party organs and always to work under the latter's guidance. At the same time, in their capacity as members of the Party, the fraction members in their nuclei and at general meetings of their sub-section, section, or local groups, have the right to discuss all Party questions. In these organizations they may also criticize Party organs for inadequate guidance and wrong directives given to the fraction by the Party organ.

The responsibility for decisions or actions at congresses and in Parliament, viz. for fractional actions on a national scale, rests with the Communist Party as a whole. Hence, the Central Committee of the Party must use great care and circumspection in the selection of communist candidates for Parliament, or for the fraction of the national trade union executive committee or for the executive committee of the factory committees. Careful

selection in such cases will safeguard the Party from being compromised by the actions of communists within these fractions, and will ensure an adequate application of the Party policy.

Circumspection in this respect will also minimise the danger of insubordination on the part of the members of such fractions to the decisions of Party organs. For it must be taken into account that the more important the role of the communist fraction (in Parliament and in the national executive committees, trade unions, cooperatives, and factory committees), the stronger will be its tendency to emancipate itself from the influence of the Party.

Endeavours to create a homogeneous organization, capable of establishing contact with the masses and of leading the latter in a victorious struggle against capitalism, will not be realised, if Communist Parties neglect to organize communist fractions in all non-party organizations and to establish adequate inter-relations between the Party organizations and the communist fractions. But even the organization of communist fractions presupposes that in the entire organizational work, the centre of gravity is transferred to the establishment of nuclei in the shops and to making these nuclei the basis of Party organization and the foundation of the entire Party.

Instructions for Communist Fractions in Non-Party Institutions and Organizations.

1. Wherever there are not less than three communists in workers' and peasants' organizations and in various institutions — trade unions, cooperatives, educational, athletic and other societies, factory and unemployed committees, as well as at congresses, conferences and in municipal councils, parliaments, etc., — it is essential to establish a communist fraction with the object of increasing Party influence and introducing the policy of the Party into non-party masses.

2. All communist fractions, regardless of their size and importance, must be subordinate to corresponding party organs — the nucleus (the executive committee of the nucleus), group, local, district, (in America, nucleus, branch, section, local, district) or central committee, according to the position occupied by the given communist fraction (local or national). Such Party organs must issue the necessary instructions to the communist fractions (thus, for instance, the executive committee of a factory nucleus must control and direct the work of the communist fraction in the factory committee, in accordance with the directives received from the higher Party organs. District committees must control and direct the work of the communist fractions in all the non-party organs and organizations in its district, etc.). In all questions on which decisions were made by corresponding Party organizations, the fractions must strictly abide by these decisions.

3. When discussing in the Party committees questions concerning a fraction, the committee must carefully prepare these questions and organize preliminary conferences with the representatives of the fraction wherever existing police conditions allow.

4. Communist fractions, with the consent of the corresponding party committee, elect their executive committee, which is responsible to the corresponding Party organ for the work of the fractions.

5. During the interval between Congresses (conferences), the communist fractions within the executive committees of local trade unions and co-operatives are the guiding and unifying organs for all Communists in these organizations. The communist fraction in the executive boards of trades councils (in America, central labor councils, State federations of labour) and of district co-operatives, are the guiding and unifying organs for all Communists in these organizations.

These fractions are all subordinate to the control of the local or district Party committee, but must also report to the

fractions in local conferences or district conventions of trade unions and co-operatives. Candidates to the executive boards of the above-mentioned organizations are nominated by the fractions of the corresponding conferences and conventions in agreement with the local or district Party committee. The above regulations apply also to the national trade union and co-operative congresses or conventions.

6. The corresponding Party committee has the right to install or recall any member from the fraction, notifying the fraction of the reason for such action.

7. Communist fractions must come to an agreement with the corresponding Party organs with respect to candidatures to the executive boards of all the organizations and organs mentioned above. The same procedure is to be adopted with respect to recalls or transfers from one fraction to another.

8. Fractions have complete autonomy in questions of their inner life and current work. Party committees must not interfere with their everyday work. They must, on the contrary, allow fractions as much freedom of action and initiative as possible. In the event of serious differences of opinion between the Party committee and the fraction on any question within the competence of the latter, the corresponding Party committee must once more investigate this question together with the representative of the fraction, and arrive at a final decision by which the fraction must abide.

9. All questions having a political significance and subject to discussion by the fraction, must be discussed in the presence of representatives of the committee. The committees must delegate their representatives immediately on receipt of a notification from the fraction.

10. Every question subject to the decision of non-party institutions and organizations in which the fraction works, must be previously discussed at a general meeting or in the executive committee of the fraction.

11. Party organizations (nuclei, group (branch) local and other bodies, Party conferences and conventions or committees elected by them) should receive reports on the work of fractions, decide on the tactics and political lines of their further work etc.

12. At general meetings of non-party organizations, all fraction members must act and vote as a unit on all questions. Disciplinary measures must be taken against any Party members infringing this regulation.