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The Results of the Session of the Enlarged Executive Committee.

by Karl Radek.

The sessions of the Enlarged Executive Committee which we have introduced of late have proven to be an institution which is in many ways more important than the World Congress. The Congresses can only decide upon general questions. They can only control in general the practical execution of these decisions. The Sessions of the Enlarged Executive Committee which take place at shorter intervals and in which a sufficiently large number of party representatives just arrived from their respective countries, take part, are able to create an uninterrupted living bond between the Executive Committee and the Communist Parties. They enable the Executive Committee continually to observe the development of all the affiliated parties and in this way to correct mistakes made by various parties much more quickly. The joint labors of the party representatives and the joint discussion of the political and organizational difficulties create a living understanding of all the problems of the Communist International without which the International cannot exist. The First International attempted to centralize the leadership of the international labor movement in the same way and to create an international executive board. This failed simply because there were practically no Socialist proletarian parties anywhere. The leadership of the First International was an attempt to create an international labor movement from above rather than to unite and centralize an existent labor movement. The First International therefore could only sow the seed of a future international labor movement. The Second International was from the very beginning a federated institution. The parliamentary reformist epoch divided the movement into a number of labor parties, each of which lived an entirely isolated life in its daily work. The uniting tasks were lacking as well as the unifying spirit. The Communist International can approach this problem of central leadership, not because—as our enemies say—Moscow commands, but because the epoch brings forward common problems which can only be solved by the Communist Parties in common.

The last Session of the Enlarged Executive Committee was the best proof of this. It had to deal with the result of the first attempt to establish a general proletarian united front through agreement with the leaders of the Second and 2½ Internationals. But not only this problem, which was from the very beginning an international one, could and had to be solved on an international scale; no less international were the differences in the Norwegian and French Communist Party on the one hand and the Italian and Czecho-Slovakian Party on the other. However different conditions in the four countries may be, and however different therefore the problems and the difficulties are with which these parties have to struggle, the question upon which the Executive had to decide could be handled as a whole only by the Executive. What sort of questions were they? As for France and Norway, the question at issue was how a Communist Party in a land which has not yet experienced any revolutionary disturbances is to frame its policy in order to produce

the maximum of Communist consciousness and Communist fighting ability in its ranks. It is very difficult to form a Communist Party by means of the propaganda of Communist ideas. The foundation of Communism appear then as deductions, as corollaries of theory.

The clarity with which various members of the Party understand Communist theory is different and very often it does not appear specially important whether they express the conceptions of Communism more or less clearly. Clarity of thought in the Party often appears of minor importance when compared to so-called practical necessity, when compared to the hesitation to repulse this or that group of leaders. The process of the growth of a Communist Party in a land with a comparatively unrevolutionary situation brings with it a number of organizational questions. Since the masses are not in a condition of revolutionary flux, the problem of the manoeuvres which are to bring to us those groups of workers now standing aside is of the highest importance. By examining the tone of the French Party press, the nature of its editorial policy and the contents of its agitation the Executive Committee attempted to make it clear to the French Comrades that the more petty bourgeois the environment in which a Communist Party has to operate, the clearer must its intellectual visage be. The same problem exists in Norway where the central organ of the Party today is still called *Socialdemokrat*, which in itself shows to what degree the Party pays inadmissible attention to ideological traditions. The same problem comes to light in an organizational form in the question of the trade union tactics of our French comrades who up to the present have not drawn any clear, intellectual line of division between them and the Anarcho-Syndicalists with whom we are in practice allied against the reformist trade union leaders. The question of the attitude of the French Party to the united front and of the Norwegian Party to the Liberal Government are two sides of the same feeling of weakness. The young Communist Party of France fears the united front just because it is too little penetrated by clear Communist spirit and has too little assurance that it would obtain more strength from a practical bloc for the immediate struggle with the French Socialists.

Instead of this intransigence due to weakness, in Norway we find an objectionable pliability due to intellectual and political weakness. The Communist Party supports the Liberal Government (which is also supported by the Socialist Party) and calls that the united front, without understanding that we want to unite with the non-Communist workers for the battle against the bourgeoisie and not for the support of the bourgeoisie which can only weaken the working masses in the last analysis even when it temporarily offers some advantage or other.

The problems of the Italian Party are of an altogether different nature. Here we have a young Communist Party which forged its Communist spirit in its battle with Serrati and through this struggle permitted itself to be forced into a situation where

it too little understands that the establishing of connections with the working masses is just as important an element of Communist policy as the clear elaboration of the Communist idea. The theses of the Italian Party Congress on tactics prove that it has not yet overcome its "Left Communist" errors which were rejected by the Third Congress. Its attitude in the question of the united front, where it applies the united front in the trade union field but is not able to estimate it at its true value in the political field, demonstrates the political dangers which follow from theoretical mistakes. In the Italian Party the old bitter struggle against Serrati was the source of the theoretical and practical mistakes.

In the leadership of the Czecho-Slovakian Party there have recently developed certain differences between the Muna-Smeral-Kreibich group on the one hand and the Jilek-Hauser group on the other which arose from the fact that in practice the spirit which last year led to bitter struggles between Smeral and the Left has not yet been overcome.

The simple fact that Muna and Kreibich today on the whole agree with Comrade Smeral prove that Comrade Smeral when he last year delayed with the formation of an open Communist Party did so not because he was a bad Communist but on account of temporary tactical considerations. Smeral is no doubt the most sober, far-sighted leader of Czecho-Slovakian Communism but his sobriety and carefulness, which led him last year to hesitate very much with the formation of a Communist Party in order that he could get the large masses of Social Democratic workers to follow him, is accompanied by a lack of élan which is seen in a laxity of organization of Communist nuclei in the trade unions and in the steadfast exploitation of all legal possibilities for revolutionary purposes. This produced a certain lack of confidence in the Party leadership among certain Left comrades. They were unable to oppose another policy to Smeral's policy which was on the whole correct. And thus the lack of confidence gave birth to a spirit which contained the germ

of anti-parliamentarian Communism, the tendency towards splitting the trade unions and towards a certain illegal romanticism. The Executive had to crystallize the healthy proletarian revolutionary element out of the Jilek-Hauser group in order to employ it to stiffen and energize Smeral's correct policy.

As at the Third Congress, in the discussions on the problems of various of our Parties the question at stake was the unequivocal execution of the Communist (and at the same time) mass policy of the Communist International; it was a question of concretely connecting the chief slogan of the World Congress, "To the Masses!", with clear Communist policy. The line of the Third Congress is now being expressed in the fight for the proletarian united front. The Enlarged Executive Committee not only had to examine the actions of its delegates to the Berlin Conference and in the Commission of Nine—and it investigated and approved them—but also had to create the most important prerequisite for the further fight for the united front. This prerequisite is the uniform policy of the Communist International itself. The Executive Committee could not ignore for a moment the fact that the Communist International had not acted uniformly during the recent campaign; on the contrary, it established this lack of unity and it took steps to ensure that in the future when an action is decided upon it will not be thwarted by any misgivings of individual parties. The presence of prominent French comrades during the debates, the exhaustive discussion and the concluding statements of Comrade Frossard convinced all the members of the Executive Committee that the French Party will do its share to prevent our opponents from utilizing its mistakes to their advantage.

The Enlarged Executive Committee decided to convoke the Fourth Congress of the Communist International for the fifth anniversary of the Russian Revolution in Moscow. This Congress will in the main consider the programs of the Communist Parties, a question which is of the greatest importance and which we desire to treat in the near future.

The Session of the Enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist International in Moscow.

First Day, June 7th, 1922, Forenoon.

The Session was opened in the Kremlin by Comrade Zinovieff at noon.

There were present 41 representatives of 17 countries with deliberative voice, 9 representatives of 8 countries with consultative voice, 4 representatives with deliberative voice from the Red Trade Union International and the Young Communist International and furthermore one representative with consultative voice.

The list of the delegates with deliberative voice is follow:

Germany: Zetkin, Brandler, Eberlein, Heinrich.
France: Frossard, Souvarine, Sellier, Leiciague, Cartier, Rappoport.
Italy: Bordiga, Graziadei, Gramsci, Ambrogio.
Czecho-Slovakia: Smeral, Kreibich, Jilek, Muna.
England: Bell.
Austria: Gruen.
Holland: Jansen.
Norway: Fris.
Bulgaria: Jordanov.
Ukraine: Kon.
R.T.U.I.: Nin, Melmitchianski, Misiano, Brandler.
Y.C.I.: Schatzkin, Schoenhaar, Ziegler, Doriot.
Finland: Sirola, Kuusinen.
Latvia: Stutchka,
North America: Cook.
Poland: Pruchniak.
Russia: Trotzky, Zinoviev, Radek, Bukharin, Stalin, Kamenev, Pokrovsky, Lunatcharsky, Tomsky, Rudsutak.
Spain: Sierra.
Japan: Taguchi.

Furthermore Comrade Bartz (Germany) is present with a consultative voice.

The list of the delegates with consultative voice is as follows:

Georgia: Zschakaya.
Lithuania: Kapsukas, Angaretis.
Persia: Sultan Zade.
Estonia: Pögelmann.

South Africa: Jones.

Iceland: Wallenius.

Egypt: Avigdor.

Uruguay: Pintos.

There is a total of 27 delegations with 59 delegates present of whom 49 delegates have a deliberative and 10 a consultative voice. 25 countries and the Youth and Trade Union Internationals are represented at the Session.

According to a motion of Comrade Brandler Comrades Zinoviev, Frossard and Zetkin were unanimously elected to the Presidium of the session.

The following agenda was adopted:—

1. Information on the Social Revolutionary trial.
2. The Berlin Conference and the united front.
3. The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and its immediate tasks.
4. The Communist Party of France.
5. The Communist Party of Norway.
6. The Communist Party of Italy.
7. The Communist Party of Germany.
8. Our relations to the Syndicalists.
9. Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.
10. The convocation of the Fourth World Congress of the Communist International.

The Communist International and the Trial of the Right Social Revolutionaries.

Comrade Zinoviev:—

The Presidium of the Communist International decided to participate officially in the forthcoming trial against the Social Revolutionaries. This decision was based on the following considerations: Soviet Russia is the most important country of the proletarian world revolution. Everything that goes on in Russia affects the vital interests of the world proletariat. The interest which even the two antagonistic Internationals showed in Berlin in

the trial of the S.R.'s is an ample proof of the historic significance of this trial. It will show the whole world how the petty bourgeois counter-revolution must be fought. The Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International proposes that the Executive Committee take part in the trial in the following manner:—

1. The Communist International delegates the official prosecutors. The Second and the 2½ Internationals which advocate the interests of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie have sent the defending attorneys. Thus it is quite logical that the Communist International on its part provide prosecutors. In this manner the roles will be distributed correctly. For the Communist International Comrades Zetkin (Germany), Muna (Czecho-Slovakia) and Bokányi (Hungary) are the prosecutors.

2. The Communist International undertakes the defense of that group of the accused which consists mainly of young workers, former terrorists, who have realised their mistakes and more and more approach Communism. The Second and the 2½ Internationals accuse this group of treason. This is one more reason for us to defend them. As attorneys we propose: For Semenov, Comrade Sadoul (France), for Konopleva, Comrade Gramsci (Italy) and for Usov Comrade Felix Kon (Poland).

3. In order to expose in the course of the trial the role which the bourgeois states and the Mensheviks played during the intervention (this trial will deal with the history of the Russian Revolution in all its periods) the Communist International will appoint its representatives from various countries as so-called political specialists. For this purpose we propose: For Czecho-Slovakia, Smeral, for France, Frossard and Sadoul, for England, Bell and for Bulgaria Jordanov.

The plenary session unanimously adopted this motion of the presidium.

The Polish Social Traitors and Comrade Dombal.

Speech of Comrade Pruchniak (Poland).

Comrade Pruchniak obtains the floor for a special statement. He reminded the Session of the imprisonment of Comrade Dombal in autumn of last year. Dombal, member of the Sejm, a popular leader of the peasants in Central and Western Galicia, was imprisoned according to false testimony of the former Captain Novak, which was enforced from the latter by means of torture. According to these statements he was the leader of the Polish Communist military organisation, was in connection with the Soviet Mission and prepared in agreement with Comrade Karakhan a fictitious attempt against Karakhan in order to disturb Russo-Polish relations.

On the basis of these statements Dombal was imprisoned and on the order of the Pilsudki Government accused of high treason. The P.P.S. is responsible for this imprisonment. This same P.P.S. defends the Russian Social Revolutionaries.

Comrade Pruchniak proposed on behalf of the Communist Party of Poland that Vandervelde be demanded to obtain the admission of the attorneys of the Communist International to the trial of Dombal, as Vandervelde demanded the admission of representatives of the Second International to the S.R. trial.

Comrade Zinoviev declared that the situation is quite plain, as the P.P.S. has been a twin of the Social Revolutionary Party since 1905 and always marched with it shoulder to shoulder. The P.P.S. is in the same international situation as the S.R.P. It belongs neither to the Second nor to the 2½ International. As "democracy" rules in Poland, members of parliament are being imprisoned and liberty is strangled. We have the right to demand the admission of our advocates to the trial of Dombal and can best do it through Vandervelde. Comrade Zinoviev proposes that Comrades Frossard and Pruchniak be appointed to arrange this affair.

The motion is adopted.

Report of Comrade Radek on the Break-Up of the Commission of Nine.

Events since the 2nd of April, i. e., since the beginning of the Conference of the Three Internationals in Berlin, provide rich political material on the united front "from above". We must now critically sift this material.

After the dissolution of the Commission of Nine the press of the Second International and in a still more shameless manner that of the 2½ International tried to prove that we had merely used the united front as a sort of manoeuvre for the Genoa Conference.

In the opinion of these gentlemen we attempted to mobilize the working class on the occasion of the Genoa Conference and afterwards in view of the alleged splendid results of the Conference, had no more use for the united front and presented our ultimatum. However, the historic development of our struggle for the united front proves just the contrary.

Already in January 1921 we approached the problem of the united front as an experiment, empirically as it were, by means of the "Open Letter" in Germany. In Autumn 1921 the Communist International debated this problem and already at that time the united front became a practical task of the Communist International. At a time when nobody even dreamed of the Genoa Conference, we already carried on animated discussions on the united front. It is a simple perversion of the facts when somebody affirms that the Genoa Conference played a role in the development of the idea of the united front. This problem resulted as a natural consequence of the struggle of the masses. As to the Genoa Conference, we were conscious of the fact that this Conference was no ordinary Conference, that it would deal with extremely important problems, the solution of which was awaited by the working masses of Europe with certain hopes. This Conference was to show the new proportion of forces between the capitalist powers which arm for new raids. We on our part were imperatively obliged to see to it that all the working class would not only be a silent looker-on at these activities of the bourgeoisie. The Berlin Conference was the result of our tactics of the united front. We did not intend to discuss at this Conference the great theoretical problems of the labor movement. We put up only such questions as were comprehensible from the standpoint of the policy of the Second and the 2½ Internationals. The old united International was split in consequence of the reformist policy of the leaders and as long as this reformist policy is not replaced by revolutionary class struggle there can be no question of organizational and intellectual unity with the Second and the 2½ Internationals. What we immediately need is not that unity, but a political bloc under concrete conditions for the realization of definite demands. We pointed to a series of concrete demands which they also must defend, as for instance the problem of wage reductions, of the offensive of capital against the eight-hour day; we mentioned the situation of Soviet Russia, which is weakened as a consequence of long struggles against all capitalist states. Even the Amsterdam International had to recognize that the overthrow of Soviet Russia would signify the victory of world reaction.

Our demand for the united front was answered with a series of conditions. "If you," they said, "appeal to us as to petty bourgeois Socialists and demand the united front, we declare we are ready to conclude an agreement if you grant the corresponding concessions to your own petty bourgeois Socialists, i. e. to the S.R.'s, to the Mensheviks, to the Separatists of the Ukraine, Georgia, etc. Demands of this kind are a complete misinterpretation of the idea of the united front. The Georgian and Ukrainian problems have nothing to do with it. The financial blockade of world capital forces us to make concessions; the Second International however, demands that we grant full liberty to those parties which in their programs demand the complete political and economic reestablishment of capitalism. Petlura-Ukraine and Menshevik Georgia were all the time practically instruments in the hands of the Entente only with the support of which were they able to live and to maintain themselves. We would do too much honor to these Socialists if we would believe them able to put up a well-contrived political plan; in reality it was only a quite obvious manoeuvre: to make the united front impossible. On the opening day of the Berlin International Conference, the Berlin *Vorwärts* wrote "The united front with the Communists is impossible". The *Vorwärts* proposed unity between the Second and the 2½ Internationals, between which there existed practically no differences.

Comrade Radek then outlined how reluctant he was to sit at one table with the Social Democrats who are responsible for so many proletarian victims and for the fact that the prisons are still overcrowded with our comrades. He then treated the significance of our concessions with regard to the S.R.'s, and of our promise that the S.R.'s would not have to pay for their crimes with their lives. The speaker agreed with Comrade Lenin that this was a high price. Comrade Lenin was right when he said that our concession would be considered an encouragement, for new attempts and that Europe would call these murderers angels. We, on our part, however, were conscious of the magnitude of the price. Especially now, after the break-up of the Commission of Nine we realize the utility and the importance of this sacrifice. Thanks to this concession we succeeded, in following the line of the united front and enforcing the convocation of a conference to deal with the problem of the calling of the World Labor Congress. Comrade Radek analyzed the later events and dealt

with the Genoa Conference and the attitude of the various parties towards it. The bourgeois Cologne *Kölnische Zeitung* characterized the Genoa Conference as a struggle between two worlds: The world of the satisfied and possessing and that of the hungry and poor. Even the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, the organ of the German Independent Social Democrats had to admit that the Genoa Conference was the first conference in which the bourgeoisie and Communism fought against each other. The representatives of the Second and the 2½ Internationals after the Genoa Conference have been carrying on the most shameless and cynical campaign against Soviet Russia, which according to their statements has concluded an alliance in Genoa with the world bourgeoisie. Longuet writes articles every day against Soviet Russia of which one is baser than the other. On the occasion of the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany, Longuet reached the acme of his cynicism and protested against this treaty on behalf of European peace. The "most honorable" Independent leader, Crispian, interprets the treaty, according to which within the term of eight months no attack must be undertaken, as the "4th of August, 1914" of the Third International. In their denunciations, the representatives of the Second and the 2½ Internationals state that we have bound ourselves in Genoa to carry on no propaganda and that we therefore had to oppose the Labor Congress. However, it is obvious to everybody that the attitude of the Second International — which opposed the united front from the beginning — has been the reason for the failure of the Labor Congress. Comrade Radek mentioned the letter of Abramovitch already pointed to by him in Germany, in which the latter writes that the English Labor Party fears a bloc with the Communists on the eve of the elections and that the SPD. in view of the coming struggle against the increase of taxes opposes the bloc with the Communists. The attitude of the Second International towards the united front has not changed since the beginning of the negotiations. The attitude of the 2½ International, which formerly supported the idea of the united front, has changed, however. This alteration of its course took place at the Separate Conferences in Brussels participated in by the English Labor Party and the Socialist Party of Belgium and which decided to convoke a Labor Congress in the Hague without the Communists. The Socialist Party of France has altered its attitude. The Longuet Wing is advancing more and more towards the Right. Under the influence of Blum and Renaudel it prepares a bloc with the bourgeois parties as a counterpoise against the Communists. At the eve of the elections it will not expose itself by a united front with the Communists. The attitude of the Longuetists in France determines the attitude of the German Independents. This became evident when Wels and Friedrich Adler voted at the Conference against the admission of the workers' delegations. We will also in the future fight for the united front of the masses, for the united front and for the struggle, an idea, which the reformists are not able to understand.

Then Comrade Radek dealt with the experiences of the first phase of the struggle for the united front. He summed up the results thus: It is necessary that the Communist International itself forms a closed united front. The Communist Parties of France and Italy which signed our decision on the united front have submitted to this decision only in words and not in deeds. Comrade Radek points to the incorrect tactics of the French and Italian comrades, who hold the opinion that this decision does not correspond to the force ratio in their countries. He stresses the necessity of a complete and strict execution of the adopted decisions by all parties. The view of those who consider the failure of the attempted united front from above a proof of the dispensableness of the united front in general is completely incorrect. In reality this attempt was only a step on the way to the formation of the true united front of the masses. We have proved that the Social Democratic gentlemen have refused to form the united front. The more sacrifices we make to the cause of the united front, the more plentiful will be the fruit which these sacrifices will bear.

Finally Comrade Radek emphasized the correctness of the tactics of the Communists in Saxony, who in spite of the split of the Commission of Nine and of the failure of the World Congress continue to work for the united front by supporting the Labor government.

The Saxon Labor Government has invited our Genoa Delegation to call on it on their return from Genoa through Germany. It even agreed to the appearance of our delegates at labor meetings in Dresden, Chemnitz and Leipzig. How can we explain this? In Saxony the Communists hold the fate the government in their hands. The Menshevik Government of Saxony desired therefore to show itself before the working masses of their country in our society. This invitation, however, was made at a time when it was already sure that the Commission

of Nine would be split. This proves that even in Germany the conditions for the united front are not everywhere the same. Therefore we should not work mechanically.

Every success in the struggle for the united front is a weakening of our adversary. The Communist International can be content with the results of the Berlin Conference, which proved to the masses that we stand for the united front.

At present, however, the problem does not gravitate around the world Labor congress, but around the concrete actions of the proletariat in the various countries with regard to its vital problems.

Comrade Zinoviev's speech on the United Front.

Comrades, I think that we can now not only draw the conclusions from what has already taken place, but we must also think of the future. But to decide the right path for the future, we must first examine the period just concluded, that is to say, review the first act of the fight for the united front. We must ask the question: Have we gained by it, and if so, in reality, what?

I think I can say, without exaggeration, that during this first act, the Communist International has gained most important results, and the greatest gain among them is that we Communists can no longer be held before the masses as so-called "splitters". That is a fact. Of course, our adversaries will continue to declare that we are "splitters", but to the average worker, after a half year's fight for the united front, we are no longer the "splitters". And that is already a great step forward. We were indeed splitters at the beginning of the work of the Communist International. We could not have done otherwise. We were obliged to split the old Socialist Parties, to save the best revolutionary elements of the working class and to form a rallying point for the new Communist Party in every country. For a time, we had to come out as splitters, but no one of us regrets it. Those comrades, in France for example, who now regret the split, show that they are only half-Communists. The split was an historical necessity, it was a great step forward. But now, after the passing of two to three years, when we have firmly established our Parties everywhere, we must go to the masses and work in such a manner that the simplest worker will understand us. The split for us was no end, but a means to win over the masses, and in my opinion is already half achieved. The masses begin to show a new attitude. They are now forced to see that the split was no selfish aim on our part, and that we are those who call and work for the unity of the revolutionary masses on one platform.

This we have gained; it is a victory the fruits of which one does not see immediately, for instance, in the shape of votes. Also during the the Conference we have gained a moral victory: such, for instance, was Radek's speech. We can indulge in these rejoicings without any boasting.

That does not mean however that everything is going smoothly with us. Not in the least. We must see the lessons quite clearly. The tactic of the united front was and is correct; we must reconize that. But when we now consider the results of the first act, the tempo of our struggle for the united front was a little too swift. That did not depend upon us alone, indeed, but on the march of history, however it is necessary we today admit it. The Genoa Conference was no Russian but an international affair, only a narrow minded fool can not understand that. And we were obliged to exert ourselves to the utmost, to exercise pressure on the bourgeoisie gathered in Genoa.

The Commission of Nine is in fragments. Was it all in vain? Many comrades will see in it a disappointment, but that will only be the case with those comrades who do not understand the tactic of the united front dialectically. Also those comrades who wish to see in the united front an organic liaison and who continually wish to save the Communist International, must admit that. What is the united front? It is the fight for the winning of the masses over to Communism. Some comrades, especially those of whom we say in Russia that they see two miles under the earth (there are such comrades in the French Party) say that the united front is opportunism. That, as we see however, is not the case.

The form will change; what we have had until now is but an episode. We have had a Commission of Nine, perhaps we shall be obliged to make attempts in yet another form, but the tactic of the united front, as a fight to win over the masses not yet adhering to Communism will continue and will take on special forms in each country.

One should also not undervalue the meaning of the Russian declaration before the Commission of Nine. This, in my opinion, is not fully realized in our agitation. The Russian Party, after mature consideration of the matter and conference with its brother parties made the following important statement:

We are ready to form a united front, even if the Second and the 2½ Internationals withdraw their promises to support the Russian Soviet Government. Please don't save Soviet Russia, she will save herself. The truly revolutionary proletarians will none the less help the first proletarian State.

Thus, after all these Russian watchwords are rejected, there remains, in the opinion of the Russian Party, room enough for a common fight. Through this declaration we say: the Russian questions are evidently important ones, in a certain manner ideal ones, but we are in such a phase of the struggle of the world proletariat that we should unite in the struggle for the eight-hour day, aid for the unemployed, and in the fight against the offensive of Capital. We should now make use of this declaration in the agitation throughout the world.

In Berlin, the Second and the 2½ Internationals have recognized the fight for the eight-hour day. Was that not our moral victory? Can they really consistently unite the reformist standpoint with the eight-hour day? In no case. A reformist fight for the eight-hour day is, in the given conditions, impossible. It is impossible to defend in a reformist manner even the very modest program accepted by the Berlin Conference under the given historical conditions. It is impossible to reconcile it with a consistent reformism; absolutely impossible. And an honorable reformist must say to himself that these economic demands have a political effect.

But this slogan was really a poor-spirited manoeuvre, a dishonorable move on the part of the reformists. The recognition of these demands was really forced upon them by the masses and, under given conditions, can become revolutionary demands.

Now, Comrades, what does the future hold? Will we again fight for the united front and what will become of international Menshevism? There is the possibility that international Menshevism may probably wheel to the left. I am firmly convinced that the Second and the 2½ Internationals will be forced a dozen times by the march of history and the pressure of the masses to talk Bolshevik or half-Bolshevik, just as was the case at a certain time with the Russian Mensheviks. Plekhanov once said they are half-Leninist. The united front is the outcome of the existing relation of forces of the bourgeoisie and the working class. The Commission of Nine is indeed disrupted, but Capitalism remains strong. The bourgeoisie has thoroughly organized itself and the working class must also prepare itself. The fundamental phenomena are there, whether the Commission of Nine exists or not. And on the ground of these phenomena the fight for the united front must and will proceed; and on the ground of these phenomena we will experience the swing of the Second and the 2½ Internationals to the left. The whole objective situation is such that both these Internationals are compelled by the pressure of circumstances to make these movements, but that will not prevent them at certain moments from openly acting reactionarily as the only real saviors of the bourgeoisie. That we must clearly realize. Comrade Smeral said to me that between the immediate demands, on which the action of the Party during the present period depends, and our goal there exists the necessity of a link and I fully agree with him. The immediate demands are the initial step to the masses and to the united front. They who do not understand that will never be good enough to lead a great mass-party. But our view of the struggle remains the same. On the one hand we have the small immediate demands, on the other the dictatorship. Is there nothing between the two? Between the gray prose of the partial demands and the poetry of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Is there no connection? This question crops up everywhere and we believe we are able to say to our comrades there must be such a connection. The masses now begin to fight for little things. They are not yet Communist, not yet revolutionary enough to fight for the dictatorship or to make a revolution. But they want a wider perspective; they want to see a goal that at the present time is more or less attainable and I believe that we have already slogans that can fill this role. The slogan of the Workers' Government is such a one that serves quite well as a connection between these two phases. The gray everyday demands and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Our comrades, including our French comrades must at last understand that. Take the situation in such countries as Italy and Czechoslovakia—we will later speak in greater detail about them—and we clearly

see that such a situation exists there. We must fight for the eight-hour day against the offensive of Capital; we must fight for the small everyday demands. The might of the workers there is proportionally so great, that we may and must venture to put forward such claims as that of a Workers' Government.

The united front is not what is taking place in Saxony. That is one form of the united front although it is not identical with it. It is an exceptional situation. But our French friends will not understand that. They see in Saxony and Thuringia a sort of ministerialism. The Third Congress has sanctioned it. It is the slogan of the Workers' Government, standing as a link between our program of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the small everyday demands, for which we must now mobilize the masses.

Certainly this tactic is not necessary everywhere. But we have in Saxony such an exceptional case. However we should not attempt to cloud the tactic of the united front because of the concrete shape it assumes. I think that at this stage we must take as our most important lesson what has already been said, "Not only the intense fights for the small everyday demands not merely propaganda for the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship, but also in between greater demands, as for instance the slogan of the Workers' Government, and the slogan of the control of production in those countries where the working class is proportionately strong enough."

I must also deal with the defects, which this phase revealed to us. Friedrich Adler said a month ago, when we demanded the convocation of the Commission of Nine: It is no sabotage but a defect in the readiness for action of the Second International. I think, comrades, we ourselves must look for such faults in our own organization, and this is especially advisable at the present time. We have not understood how to arouse the masses; we have not understood how really to mobilize all our Parties, we have not understood, in the factories, and workshops, how to make our fight a mass fight; and even more we have had to witness the tragic play of the Communist International appearing as not a perfectly united body. To my knowledge, this is the first time this has occurred in the history of the Communist International. We have indeed had cases, where different persons have attempted to ruin and discredit the Communist International; but this was the first time that—after a decision had been made by the International—entire Parties did not do what their Communist duty demanded of them. That is an important lesson. The Communist International is a disciplined, centralized organization. That was formerly our pride, our pride, our boast, our honor, that we were not as the Second and the 2½ Internationals. We had not at this time any direct revolutionary struggle. It was no question of an uprising; smaller matters were at stake, and nevertheless a great lack of unity was shown. If we once make a decision and show such a lack of discipline, then the Communist International is lost. We must admit that. This is no light matter, no jest, nor a more or less witty expression. The French and Italian comrades must realize that if the Communist International makes a decision, neither one nor another section are able to sabotage it. They must see that through this the Communist International will become a mere propaganda society and not a fighting organization.

That we must realize once and for all, and it is a most important lesson. The tactics of the united front — we already said in our first Thesis — not only enable us to win over new masses, to find out our strength as against the Second and the 2½ Internationals, but also to look into the depths of our own party. Therefore I believe it to be most important to speak out plainly what took place upon this occasion. We have looked thoroughly into our sections and we are an international fighting organization. We must state frankly that in this circumstance we have had a rather sad experience, Comrades, you remember our February Session, when the great majority, — only three parties voted against it, although they approved it in general — approved the tactics of the united front, and what has resulted from it. After the February decision, we were no longer in discussion but in action, indeed not in armed action, but nevertheless in a very important political and international action, which the workers were following attentively, and which our enemies were all watching closely. — What has this shown? That individual parties have fallen away, have not participated in this action, but have thwarted it and with every step delivered arguments to our enemies. In the Berlin *Vorwärts*, in the German Social Democracy, in the English Labor Party, everywhere it was, "Yes, but your French party, doesn't it do the same?" What answer can we give? And among ourselves, it is the truth, that the French party has thwarted our action, even if from another standpoint. Imagine, if such a tradition should

grow in the Comintern, that it makes decisions and in reality does something quite different. What then is the difference between the Comintern and the Second and the 2½ Internationals. It will not always be a question of the united front, it will also one day be a question of more important decisions, upon which heads will be at stake. We must therefore show our parties, which in the main are still young parties, that when we make international decisions, these have a meaning. We cannot allow another tradition to develop. We cannot overlook this lesson: The stage of development of our parties when at work in action is of very great importance.

In Norway the Party is also in such a position that it embraces the majority of the workers, not indeed a majority of the working class but a majority of the organized workers and this feeling has given birth to the ideology which says, "We have a majority. Why then a united front?" And the Party has developed a tendency which is more or less against the united front. The Norwegian Party as a party has not thwarted our action. We cannot make the same accusation as against the French Party; it has not publicly thwarted it. The case of Lian is an exceptional case, and I only mention it for the information of the comrades. Yes, there exists in the Norwegian party such a tendency, and it is the greatest error that they can make. They say, "We have a majority". But which majority have you? Have you the majority of the whole working class. No. You have the majority of the vanguard, but you have not the majority of the working class itself and the united front is a means of gaining it. It is not a question of only the advance guard but the great working mass itself. And if you have them, you only have them giving you their ballots but not fighting for Communism. And even more on the part of the French comrades is this attitude an error. They also say we have a majority. Now, which majority have you. It is not even proved that you have the majority of the political vanguard; it would then have been impossible to witness the sorry phenomenon of the most vulgar anarchists, the twin-brothers of Scheidemann, getting a majority in the revolutionary unions. Now, how is this? You have the majority of the working class and yet the leadership of the revolutionary unions is in the hands of these gentlemen? Comrade Frossard promised that after St. Etienne things would be different.

I hope and wish that we obtain this majority but this is at present only a wish and not a reality. Never count your chickens before they are hatched. And so we will wait until Comrade Frossard's Syndicalist chickens are really with us. Comrades, there is yet another point against our French comrades. It appears that in France the reformist party of Renaudel obtained more votes than we did in the North at the last departmental elections. And then they come and say, "we have a majority". It is an optical illusion on the part of our French comrades. The united front aims to obtain a real majority of the working masses.

I pass on to Italy. We will have to speak about this in detail later. What has the situation there proved? In Italy there is a so-called *Alleanza del Lavoro*. When this was being founded, the Italian Party said it would not participate in the founding conferences, because that would mean the united front on the political field. Now the *Alleanza* is established. In the first place it is an ambiguous affair. The reformists want to make it a thing of no meaning. The working masses want a rallying point in this form. The first thing that we need is also to have a voice in the *Alleanza*. But our Italian Party has such a strategy, that, although they have 500,000 members in the Unions, they have no voice in the *Alleanza*, because they did not join it at the right time. Now they must fight for the representation of Communist trade union organs in the *Alleanza*. . . . The reformists evidently will not permit this and they must now fight for what in the beginning they could have had without any struggle. They had been invited as a political party. They explained, "As a political party we do not wish to." That is theoretically ridiculous and impossible of defense. How can a Marxist maintain that this powerful economic struggle which is now spreading does not concern a political party. What kind of a political party is this? In the first place, it is theoretically helpless for a Marxist, and taken politically it is also helpless. Now we are, in consequence of incorrect strategy, in the position of having not a single representative in the *Alleanza*. And why is this. Because the tactic of the united front was not clear to our comrades. They did not decide on it in time, and our Italian friends have thereby shown a lack of discipline.

What was our experience? We were always being written, "We feel ourselves to be soldiers of the revolution". And then they write twenty articles against the united front, they say it is Millerandism, they arouse the masses against the Comintern, and

then talk to us of "soldiers of the revolution". That is no discipline but the contrary. Have the French comrades such a bad opinion of us as to think we are satisfied to dangle the word discipline before their noses and to say "What a disciplined party!" When, twenty years ago, we were together with the Mensheviks in the party—twenty years ago it was the united party and we were in the minority—we acted so, and said we submit to discipline, but we always undermined the whole position and we were right. (Voice: "But you didn't talk about it!" Kreibich: "But the Mensheviks did!") That is a reminiscence. After fifteen to twenty years one can relate it. But to do it against the Comintern is a different thing.

Now, what next? Is the united front at an end. No! It has only just begun. We must probably pursue this tactic for a number of years yet, until we have won over the majority of the workers. The forms will be various and unfortunately I can give Comrade Radek no guarantee that after a time he will not have to meet with Vandervelde again. (Radek: "That's why I treated him so politely.")

He behaved very politely and so did Bukharin, although at the reception the latter displayed a little too much temperament. (Bukharin: "That was my deceased brother.")

Thus everything is possible in this poor old world in which we live. It is yet possible that we—until we have all the workers on our side—must return to such forms as we already had, it is also possible that the struggle will go quite differently. We have begun the fight for the united front from above and from below. Now it is quite clear that we can arrive at no great results from above. This campaign is only adapted to win the masses to fight from below for the real struggle, through this preliminary fight from above. We will not weep because The Commission of Nine was broken up. We will do without such a Commission when the fight for the United Front begins again in all factories, workshops and towns. And the more the Second and the 2½ Internationals grumble at us, the more contentedly will we fight for the eight-hour day, for the small everyday demands, and later raise the slogan of the Workers' Government and the dictatorship of the proletariat. What we had before was a small prologue. The real fight for the united front will take place in the workshops and factories, where the masses are. The second lesson is the need for greater solidarity, not of words but of deeds, in the fight for the united front. Certainly such parties as the French and the Italian are absolutely necessary components of the Comintern. We must do everything to bind these parties as fast and as firmly as possible to the Communist International, but if that is only possible at the price we paid during elapsed period, that would be a tragedy. This price the Communist International cannot pay.

Our slogan must now be: *Through the united front of the Communist International to the united front of the working class and through this to victory over the social patriots and with it victory over the bourgeoisie.*

Report of Comrade Kreibich on the International Youth Conference.

(Session of June 8th.)

In March 1922 a conference took place at which the fact was established that the youth, which had up to the Third World Congress been the advance guard of the Communist Party, no longer plays this role. It is necessary that the youth be enrolled in the united front of the entire proletariat, all the more since the offensive of capital hits the youth especially hard.

The economic demands of the youth must be included in the list of demands which are to be set up as a basis for the united front. The Young Communist International established close connections with the Communist International and the various Parties. It also supported the tactics of the united front. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, the Communist Youth collaborated with the Socialist Youth in the question of vacations. The Young Communist International has also commenced activities in the trade unions. Its activity is here and there hindered by the fact that one must carry on at the same time a fight for entrance into the trade unions and into the Red Trade Union International.

The alliance of the Second and 2½ Internationals against us recently formed in Berlin existed as far as the youth is concerned long ago with the objective of isolating the Communist Youth. The crisis of the youth organizations have also been echoed in Russia where the new economic policy has impaired

the situation of the youth. We are looking for practical means to fight against militarism; in this connection the organic collaboration of the German and the French Communist Youth in the occupied regions is of very great importance. In Italy our youth is almost daily carrying on the fight against the Fascisti and has been compelled to organize along military lines for this struggle. At the Congress of the Communist Youth of France a resolution was adopted advocating the united front. This resolution is in part opposed to the stand of the French Party itself. At the Congress of the American Youth the prejudice against a legal Party has been finally overcome. The complete success of our youth is, however, only possible with the support of the Communist Parties of all countries.

Election of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

(Session of June 13th.)

In today's session of the Enlarged Executive Committee the new Presidium was elected. In addition to the President, Comrade Zinovieff, who was elected by the Third World Congress, the following comrades were elected:—

Russia: Bukharin, Radek.

Germany: Brandler.

France: Souvarine, Leiciague.

Italy: Gramsci.

Czecho-Slovakia: Smeral, Jilek.

Bulgaria: Jordanoff.

As alternates: Cook (North America) and Kuusinen (Finland).

The two French representatives have as before together one vote. The same holds true for the two Czecho-Slovakian representatives. The provisional double representation of the Czecho-Slovakian Party was necessary since at the time of the election it was not known which of the two comrades would be delegated to the Executive Committee by the Czecho-Slovakian Communist Party.

Convocation of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International.

The night session of the Enlarged Executive Committee on June 11th, 1922, decided to convoke the Fourth World Congress for November 7th, 1922, the fifth anniversary of the Russian Revolution.

The agenda will be as follows:

- 1—Report of the Executive Committee.
- 2—The tactics of the Communist International.
- 3—The program of the Communist International and of the Communist Parties of Germany, France, Italy, Czecho-Slovakia, America, Japan, one Scandinavian and one Balkan Party.
- 4—The agrarian question.
- 5—The Red Trade Union International.
- 6—Educational work.
- 7—The youth question.
- 8—Oriental problems.

The following International Committee was elected to elaborate the program of the Communist International and to collaborate in the program of the Parties mentioned under Point 3 of the agenda:

Russia: Lenin, Trotzky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Radek.

Germany: Clara Zetkin, Thalheimer, Ludwig, Meyer.

France: Frossard, Cachin, Souvarine, Paul Louis, Rappoport, Renaud Jean.

Italy: Bordiga, Graziadei.

Czecho-Slovakia: Smeral, Skalak, Kreibich, Burian.

Finland: Kuusinen.

Hungary: Kun, Rudas, Varga.

Bulgaria: Kabaktchieff.

Norway: Friis.

Latvia: Stutchka.

Austria: Strasser.

Poland: Warski.

Japan: Katayama.

Great Britain: MacManus.

North America: Cook.

The Executive calls upon the affiliated Parties to appoint commissions for the elaboration of their program immediately and to report their composition to the Executive Committee in order that the work can be commenced immediately.

Notice.

All reports on the Session of the Extended Executive Committee are taken from the *Moscow Pravda*. An exact report on this session will shortly appear.

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