

# THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

Vol VI. No. 16.

Workers' Library Publishers,  
35 East 125th St., New York.

10 cents

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## May Day in Berlin

THE streets of Berlin have been drenched with the blood of the workers. The police bands of the social-democratic chief of police, Zoergiebel, have fired upon and violently handled the Berlin workers during their May-Day demonstration. That was the last artistic touch to the May-Day provocations, which Zoergiebel in conjunction with Grzesinsky and Severing had been preparing for a long time. The workers rallied to the demonstration in order to defend the proletarian right to the streets, and fell into the social-democratic trap.

The indignant workers erected barricades in the workers' quarters of Neukolln and Wedding as a reply to Zoergiebel's fire, and hurriedly armed themselves with whatever came to hand. During the night of May 1st and 2nd an armed struggle went on around the barricades. Zoergiebel mobilised thousands of police with rifles, grenades, machine guns, searchlights and armoured cars. The

first barricades were captured by the police. But during the two successive nights the workers erected fresh barricades. During the days of May 3rd and 4th the military activities were of a one-sided nature. Zoergiebel's dehumanised bands rained shot into the streets of Neukolln and Wedding, killing women and children, and carried out general searches and arrests. The workers did not fire a shot in reply. On the fifth of May it was all over.

SUCH are the main facts and the course of events in Berlin. There is nothing involved and incomprehensible in those facts. It is all simple and clear. During the last couple of years the German workers have risen with increasing frequency, and are passing from defence to a counter-attack. Every day their sympathy is growing for the U.S.S.R. The German C.P. is extending and intensifying its influence. For several reasons this

is becoming inconvenient to the uncrowned kings of industry. The faithful police-hound of the bourgeoisie, Zoergiebel, has been given the order to shatter and eradicate the German C.P., to organise a blood-bath for the German workers, to give them such a lesson that they will not be so bold in future.

Noting the growth of offensive tendencies among the proletariat, coupled with the swift growth of the C.P.'s political influence with the working masses, the social-democrats develop a carefully prepared provocation with the object of evoking a premature rising of the revolutionary proletarian advance-guard, so tearing them away from the broad working masses and shattering and exterminating them individually.

There is nothing difficult to understand in that. It is all simple and comprehensible. And yet an involved knot of contradictions is interwoven with this "old and ever new story." The Berlin barricades were the armed rising of part of the Berlin proletariat against the bloody repressions of the Zoergiebel whelps. Of course, by comparison with the enormous revolutionary wars which are imminent, the Berlin barricades are no more than a small armed clash. But just as the sun is reflected in a drop of water, so the Berlin barricades are a reflection of the growth of the revolutionary prerequisites, of all the main contradictions of the German and the international reality at the present stage.

The first contradiction consists in the development of the German proletariat itself. Owing to a number of historic reasons the German proletariat is at present playing a leading role in regard to the workers of other capitalist countries, is showing them the road along which they have to travel in the near future. At the present moment the German proletariat is at a turning point. It is now sufficiently strong to pass to isolated attacks but it is not sufficiently strong to develop a wide offensive. In practice this is reflected in the fact that the social-democrats still enjoy influence with the workers; but the German C.P. is increasingly successful in drawing behind it great masses of the workers, including social-democratic workers.

This contradiction constitutes one of the most difficult elements in the situation. On the one hand it is impossible for the prole-

tariat to refrain from joining the battle, they have to develop a counter-attack, and yet on the other their forces are still insufficient for an extended struggle. This period in the development of the revolutionary forces of the proletariat renders inevitable considerable vacillations, and makes the outcome of the attack extremely uncertain and obscure. And all the difficulties, the ebbs and flows, the vacillations, were to be observed during the May days in Berlin. On May Day there was an "illegal" demonstration of two hundred thousand. During the night leading to May 2nd the struggle passed into one of its highest forms: an armed battle on the barricade. But by the evening of the 2nd it was clear that the majority of the Berlin workers were still unprepared for the transition even to such a form of struggle as a general strike in protest against the murder of the workers.

In this regard no less typical is the fact that in the recent elections to the factory committees the Berlin tramway workers gave two-thirds of their votes to the C.P., but on May-Day they not only did not participate in the demonstration: they did not even strike.

The second contradictory element consists in the role of the Zoergiebel machine-guns. On the one hand they are the instruments of the external attack on the U.S.S.R. and the internal war against the proletariat, and on the other hand they play the role of instruments of peace between the German imperialists and the Anglo-French imperialists. On May-Day the Zoergiebel machine-guns also played the role of an instrument of blackmail. They fired at the workers not only to lay down a road for a new capitalist offensive on the workers, and to prepare for the Fascist bourgeois democratic dictatorship and the war on the U.S.S.R., but also in order to obtain a reduction in the amount of reparations and an increase in the German army. Even before Zoergiebel's bestial moves were ended the activity of the magnates of heavy industry in this direction was clearly revealed.

There is revolution, and armed insurrection in Germany—so reduce the reparations payments, allow us to enlarge our army! The German bourgeoisie needed the blood of the Berlin workers, poured out by Zoergiebel, as proof positive to the reparations commission.

But this does not exhaust the role played

by the machine-guns in the Berlin barricades. Social-democrat Zoergiebel's machine-guns were intended to become the chief source of strength of the present great coalition and to guarantee its further extension. The German social-democrats are seeking—with the aid of the blood of the Berlin workers—to wash away their former democratic opposition sins and to show their masters that they are quite capable of governing a capitalist State. They are paying for their ministerial seats in the coalition government, with the Berlin workers' blood.

That is the complex dialectic lying behind the German machine-guns.

**B**UT what of the reparations problem which stands behind the machine-guns? Does it not in its turn represent a complex interweaving of contradictory elements? In the first place, the antagonisms between vanquished Germany and the victorious countries: the U.S.A., France, Britain and so on. Secondly, the antagonisms between the U.S.A. and Britain, and thirdly, the antagonisms between all the participants in the reparations commission on the one hand and the U.S.S.R. on the other.

Nor, in estimating the significance of the Berlin barricades, may one pass over the antagonisms within the German bourgeoisie. All the organs of the great capitalists (the Berlin exchange newspaper, the metal-works newspaper, the Rhenish-Westphalian newspaper etc.) represent the events as a Bolshevik rising of the rabble, composed of "innumerable and well armed insurgents, who acted under a single leadership from one central point." The organs of the middle and petty capitalists (Frankfurter Zeitung etc.) on the other hand represent the matter more "liberally." The Frankfurter Zeitung writes: "The police behaved themselves as if it were a question of a self-contained enemy area, of a compact enemy, of a real "insurrection" with which the population is in sympathy. All that is quite inaccurate." The organs of the capitalist magnates are carrying on an open and frenzied slander of Moscow, and the liberal organs of the capitalists are doing the same on a smaller scale, and rather shamefacedly.

One must not over-estimate these disagreements among the bourgeoisie. It is the cus-

tomary dispute between two camps of the bourgeoisie as to the measures that are most effective at a given moment, in order to stifle the revolution: whether an open or hidden form of dictatorship, a democratic deluding of the workers to be complemented with machine-guns, or a Fascist handling of the workers complemented by democratic delusions.

The simple barricade "antagonism"—the workers on one side and the police on the other—thus represents a complex knot of contradictory elements. And the more complex and confused that knot, the more does it become necessary to untie it.

**T**HE German bourgeoisie is feverishly seeking a way out of the contradictions into which it has got itself. Imperialism minus colonies, extension of trade with the U.S.S.R. and preparation of war against her, orientation to west and to east, a fascist democracy or a democratised fascism—these are the contradictions which the German bourgeoisie is struggling against.

No less difficult is the situation of German social-democracy. It is a party still operating in dependence on considerable sections of leftward moving workers, and a party carrying out the policy of the rightward moving bourgeoisie. A party which formally is defending the interests of the workers, and yet is carrying through capitalist rationalisation at the expense of the workers, and openly agitating for new armaments. A party which still operates on the leftward moving workers in order to wage a struggle against the revolutionary section of the workers; against the Communist Party.

In all classes the consciousness is growing more strong of the impossibility of continuing any longer their present kind of life. The situation is growing more tense daily.

German social-democracy feels the difficulties of the present situation particularly keenly. For the second time in Germany's history it is taking upon itself the mission of saving German capitalism from the socialist revolution. The Social-Democratic Party is the active and leading party of the bourgeoisie State against the working class at the present time in Germany. No individual and no party of the

bourgeoisie can now control the growing indignation of the working class with capitalist rationalisation and the preparation for fresh wars. Only social-democracy still has some reserves to enable it to decide to undertake this work. Those reserves are the workers who still follow social-democracy. But these reserves are every day becoming less and less reliable. The sands are running out for social-democracy. Unless they act now it will be too late farther on. Social-democracy jointly with the bourgeoisie sees its sole salvation in social fascist dictatorship. To liquidate all the revolutionary, democratic achievements, to shatter and annihilate the C.P., to demoralise the leftward moving workers with rifle fire, to establish the social-fascist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, to sell itself for an advantageous price to the Anglo-French imperialists, to become the head and forefront of the preparations for armed intervention in the U.S.S.R. through the Second International, to obtain a colonial mandate as payment for military services—such is German social-democracy's "general plan," which to them provides escape from all the contradictory elements in German imperialism. But it is necessary to act very swiftly and very resolutely, sticking at nothing. Away with the game of democracy! It is necessary to act Zoergiebel fashion. Social-democracy will break its neck against this problem, and the "left-wing" will be the first to go under.

**T**HE Berlin repressions are the first stage towards the fulfilment of the "general plan." German social-democracy, which plays the role of leader to the other socialist parties has, during these May days, openly taken the road of fascism, has openly become a social-fascist party. And it will travel yet further along that road.

Drunk with the blood of the workers, Zoergiebel has disclosed the secret of all social-democracy in the pages of the bourgeois press. During all these days, during the days when he was shooting down the Berlin workers, "I," he declared, "had close contact with the trade unions and social-democracy."

The immediate plan of the social-fascists is to stifle the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and to disperse all the revolutionary or-

ganisations of the workers, in doing so operating on the more backward sections of the proletariat. Zoergiebel is satisfied with the support he received from the heads of the reformist trade unions and social-democracy.

For their part the social-democrats are also completely satisfied with their Zoergiebel. They cannot sufficiently laud him. "In the main the police did only what was necessary," announced the social-democratic "Vorwaerts." For the social-democrats the "only thing necessary" was the shooting down of the workers.

The chief masters of social-democracy, the leaders of the entire capitalist class, the uncrowned kings of heavy industry, are not entirely satisfied with Zoergiebel. The social-democrats have not yet fully succeeded in demonstrating that they are capable of administering a bourgeois State, they snort. They acted irresolutely. They did not forestall the May demonstration. They dragged out the job of suppressing the rising, the destruction of the barricades, the conquest of the workers' quarters, far too long. Of course the police under Zoergiebel's leadership did their duty, but Zoergiebel's armed forces sent against the barricades were too small. There was not enough blood. The results were inadequate. Only by smashing the C.P., the Red Front Fighters, and other revolutionary mass organisations of the proletariat, could the social-democrats earn the complete confidence of their masters.

The social-democrats have not yet resolved on that step. It is true they have declared the Red Front Fighters dissolved, have closed down the Communist newspapers for a time. But they are not yet decided on dissolving the Communist Party.

Over the corpses of the Berlin workers, fallen in the barricade battles, the social-democrats are carrying on a filthy haggling concerning the further development of the fascist offensive against the German proletariat and its revolutionary conquests. In the present political game the C.P. is put to the test. A new conspiracy is hurriedly being organised against it. A frenzied campaign of calumny is being carried on against it. Communism is the chief enemy, cry all the bourgeois and social-democratic newspapers; it is the Com-

munists who stir up the workers, calling on them to overthrow the capitalist system, it is they who are responsible for our shooting down the workers. We must finish with the Communists.

All the internal and external contradictory elements of German imperialism, which broke through to the surface in the form of the Berlin barricade battles, are now concentrated around the German C.P. After the shattering of the barricades in the workers' quarters it is necessary to take this workers' "barricade" by storm.

Germany is part of the world stabilisation, which has, with great difficulty, been established since the war. But it is a special part. It is the Achilles heel of world imperialism, it is its weakest link. The instability of capitalist stabilisation here finds its clearest expression. In this regard, Germany plays the part of barometer to the revolutionary storms imminent in all countries. The barometer foretells the storm—and that is the international significance of the May Days in Berlin.

The May Days have shown the working masses all the impermanence, the instability, the precariousness of the entire capitalist system in an accessible and intelligible form. The reformists' legends as to the restoration of capitalism, and its crisis-free development, are refuted. The rising in Vienna in 1927, the Ruhr and Lodz affairs in 1928, the Berlin barricades in May, 1929, such are the results of this restored capitalism. Capitalism has recovered from its post-war ruin. But as the result of its temporary consolidation it has not merely not saved itself from a general crisis, but is getting more and more to a dead end. The framework of the capitalist system is becoming more and more dependent upon the increased productive forces. A ruthless struggle for markets is developing between the imperialist States, a feverish preparation for further wars is being made. The socialist system is speedily being built in the U.S.S.R., the revolutionary movement is growing in the colonies. The workers are becoming ever more convinced of the instability and precariousness of present-day capitalism, of the possibility of overthrowing it—no matter how firm it seems—by the mighty and united pres-

sure of the toiling masses, under the leadership of the advance-guard of the revolutionary proletariat—the Comintern.

THE Berlin barricades herald a new and more important stage in the leftward movement of the working masses. At their barricades the Berlin workers have demonstrated an enormous revolutionary energy, the greatest initiative, audacity and flexibility. The Berlin workers have confronted the entire German proletariat, and also the entire international proletariat, with the task of rising to a new, a higher stage; of passing to higher and more decisive forms of the class struggle.

The Berlin barricades, together with the Hamburg barricades of 1928, have once more, since the Moscow, 1905, rising, confirmed the possibility of a barricade struggle in the streets of the modern towns, even with the incomparably greater destructive force of machine-gun and armoured car fire, as compared with the rifles of 1905.

Vienna, Ruhr, Berlin, these are the advance guard battles of the international proletariat, rising to a new revolutionary struggle. Vienna, the Ruhr, Berlin are prerequisites to a new rise of the international revolution, to a new struggle for the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and for the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship. The intensification of the class struggle in all the capitalist countries has now reached such a degree that every wide offensive of the proletariat confronts the masses with the problem of the necessity to prepare for the struggle for power. At the present time every large-scale conflict of classes places the problem of power on history's agenda. And this connotes the proximity of a new rise in the international revolution, when the conquest of power by the proletariat will become an immediate, practical task.

The problem of the conquest of power as an immediate practical task was not raised at the Berlin barricades. In vain do the social-democrats, together with the left-wing and right-wing renegades from Communism, seek to represent the Berlin battles as a putsch, as a flash in the pan, as an attempt of a handful of Communists isolated from the working masses to seize power. If it were so, if the

C.P. were to be sundered from the working masses, Zoergiebel, Severing, Muller, Loebe, would not hesitate for a moment before the dispersal and break-up of the C.P. The German C.P. is moving together with the working masses, and when the conditions mature, when the masses rise to the new revolutionary battles, it will lead them on to the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie, to the conquest of power by the proletariat.

**T**HE main task, brought to the forefront by the Berlin events, for the German C.P. to tackle is the further extension and consolidation of its connections and influence with the masses. There can be no other answer to provocation than the mobilisation of the masses; than their incitement to struggle. In Germany at the present moment an extensive social provocation of the whole proletariat is being carried on. The continued attack on wages, on the labour day, the continued carrying out of capitalist rationalisation, the destruction of all the revolutionary conquests, the growth and the attack of fascism, are all "provoking" the working class to struggle. Consequently the C.P. may boldly appeal to the working masses in reply to the police provocation.

The chief thing to be done now, taking into consideration the results of the election to the factory committees, is to transfer the central attack of the Party work to the enterprises. The enterprises are at the moment the chief mobilisation points of the proletariat, and in them are found its main organisations. The committees of struggle, the factory committees, the trade unions, are all that is necessary to the proletariat in order to organise their ranks for the mass battles under the leadership of the C.P. Consequently, the organisation of Party nuclei in the enterprises and their consolidation wherever they already exist acquire a decisive importance at the present moment. This is the chief link in all the Party work. This is the chief prerequisite to the conquest of the majority of the working class, which the C.P. of Germany is now confronted with.

Closely connected with this task is that of freshening and strengthening the ranks of the factory functionaries. Both the factory committee elections and the May Days showed that the situation here is far from satisfactory, and that the Party is confronted with obstacles

which partially paralyse its attempts to operate its decisions. Although the right-wingers have been driven out of the Party, although the conciliators have no influence whatever, yet the traces of social-democratic views are still not entirely eradicated. Social-democratic traditions and a passive attitude to the task of intensifying the struggle against social-democracy, still possess considerable vitality. They must be ended at whatever cost, and in the shortest time possible. A hundredfold intensification of the struggle against social-democracy, against the right and left-wing renegades, against elements within the Party which do not comprehend the meaning of this struggle, and interfere with it—there is the task. Without this the Party may prove to be in the rear of the masses at the decisive moment.

During the past year the German C.P. has taken an enormous stride forward in its development. During that year it more than once took on itself the direct leadership of the economic battles and political demonstrations of the proletariat. The elections to the factory committees revealed an extraordinarily swift growth of its influence with the working class. But the enormous difficulties which arise out of the "transitional" situation of the proletariat—when it is forced to pass to struggle without being adequately prepared for it and without having the possibility of widely developing its forces—are reflected in our Party also.

Not for one moment do we doubt that the German C.P. will rise supreme to all the difficulties with which it is confronted.

Zoergiebel will not succeed in breaking the German C.P. The German C.P. will succeed in breaking the backs of the Zoergiebels and their bourgeois masters.

Social-democracy is unmasked as never before. A wave of protest against Zoergiebel's bestialities is rising within its ranks. The social-democratic worker reserves are wavering. Parts are already beginning to abandon the social-democratic ranks. The task of winning the workers away from social-democracy is arising before the C.P. in a new form and in new conditions. The C.P. can and must take social-democracy in the rear and capture its worker reserves from it. After the Berlin events the Party is much nearer than before to the conquest of the majority of the workers.

# Canada and the Anglo - American Conflict

John Porter

**T**HE process of the disintegration of the British Empire is nowhere more clear and striking than in the case of Canada, and nowhere does the ever-sharpening contradictions between British and American imperialism find a more concrete expression or lead more openly to war. Even the most brief analysis of the Anglo-American rivalry in Canada, a rivalry that is complicated by the existence of a growing Canadian bourgeoisie, shows that the war which is imminent will bring about in Canada a situation that will confront the Communist Party with tremendous tasks, culminating in the struggle for power.

Until recent years, more particularly until the outbreak of the world war, Canada was, in almost every respect, a typical British Dominion supplying raw materials and food-stuffs to Great Britain, constitutionally subservient to the British Crown, possessing little industry of its own, and importing most of its manufactures, firstly from Great Britain, and secondly, from the U.S.A. Foreign capital investments were overwhelmingly British. At the same time, the penetration of the U.S.A. was noticeable even prior to 1914. Although British capital investments reached the huge sum of \$2,500,000,000 in 1914, American investments totalled \$700,000,000, while the immigration of the impoverished American farmers, attracted by free land in Canada, reached the number of 100,000 in the five years prior to 1914. The Great War changed these relationships. Factories, mostly of American ownership, sprang up like mushrooms throughout the East. The influx of British capital stopped. Canadian manufactures began to be exported to England to meet the huge war-time demands; the Canadian army provided a huge market for Canadian products that could not be supplied by England. Huge American loans were floated in order to liquidate the acute after-war crisis that affected Canada. By 1920 the total

American investments in Canada reached the sum of \$1,300,000,000, while British investments barely held their own from pre-war days. Thus, the effects of the Great War upon Canadian capitalism qualitatively changed both her inter-Empire and international relationships, particularly with the United States. They can be summed up as follows:—

a. Canada became a far more independent factor in Empire politics; together with the other Dominions she entered upon the policy of demanding greater freedom within the "Commonwealth of Nations," thus hastening the disintegration of the British Empire.

b. Canada, due to her transformation from a predominantly agrarian country into a growing industrial one, became a competitor to Great Britain on the world market, through seeking a market for her industrial and agrarian products.

c. The balance of foreign economic power and control shifted from Great Britain to the United States.

The industrial development of Canada was duplicated in the agrarian field. The total Canadian grain crops have doubled since the year 1914, and exports, chiefly of wheat, have risen until Canada is the largest single exporter of wheat in the world. She has supplanted India as the grain-grower of the Empire; India's grain crop is smaller than before the world war, and the great bulk of the Indian crop is consumed at home. While this tremendous agricultural development provided the Canadian bourgeoisie with a basis for the development of industry through the expansion of the home market, an opportunity that has been fully taken advantage of, thus providing another cause for weakening the "bonds of Empire" between Great Britain and Canada, it had the opposite effect of rendering Canada still more necessary to Great

Britain as a granary, particularly because of the decline of India as a wheat-exporter. The importance of this fact in time of war cannot be over-estimated; without the regular importation of Canadian wheat the British Isles could not exist. But it is in the field of industrial development that the chief contradictions manifest themselves. The expansion of industry, chiefly manufacturing, mining, pulp-and-paper and textile, within Canada, has, since the war, continued. While the total gross production of Canadian industry was roughly \$2,500,000,000 in 1922, it reached the sum of \$4,000,000,000 in 1928, and is still increasing. "With 100 as the common base of the indices of October, 1927, the surveys of the Bureau of Statistics give the following figures for October, 1928: Employment 111, pig-iron 245, steel 195, bank debits 122, car-loadings 107, building permits 114, imports 120, exports 137, coke 138, coal 116" (*Economist*, December 22nd, 1928). The phenomenal growth of the iron and steel industry rob both Great Britain and the United States of one of the chief markets for these products (although in the case of the U.S.A. Canada still remains its chief purchaser of steel rails). The foreign trade of the country illustrates perhaps more clearly than anything else can possibly do, in view of the scarcity of data upon the capital investments etc., the conflict between American and British interests in regard to Canada. Canada's trade with Britain at the end of last year was as follows:—

Canadian imports from Britain ...	\$255,977,098
Canadian exports to Britain ...	\$547,647,969
Surplus (favorable to Canada) ...	\$291,670,871

Canada's trade with the U.S.A. for the same period was:—

Canadian imports from the U.S.A. ...	\$866,482,077
Canadian exports to the U.S.A. ...	\$492,582,966
Surplus (favorable to the U.S.A.) ...	\$373,899,111

Canadian trade with the rest of the world was as follows:—

Canadian exports ... ..	\$295,056,292
Canadian imports ... ..	\$140,845,574
Surplus (favorable to Canada) ...	\$154,210,718

The foreign trade of Canada, while growing very rapidly (1928 showing the greatest volume of foreign trade in Canadian history), is tending more and more in the direction of

the U.S.A., while trade with Great Britain tends to decrease (although trade with British colonies increases). But, more important than this are the following two tendencies:—

a. Britain's trade with Canada has a distinct tendency to become increasingly more unfavorable to Great Britain, showing an increase of food and manufactured imports from Canada, and a decrease of industrial exports to Canada. This is explained by the industrial development of Canada, the growth of those industries producing means of production, culminating in the phenomenon that Canada has become an exporter of manufactured products in excess of her imports of them.

b. Canadian trade with the U.S.A. increasingly becomes more favorable to the U.S.A. and unfavorable to Canada. Canada is the best customer of the U.S.A., selling and buying more goods in the American market than any other country.

At the same time, the Canadian bourgeoisie, involved in the imperialist scramble for markets, is seeking an outlet to the East, with the result that her trade with British India, Australia, China, Japan and other eastern countries is increasing. Vancouver is developing into a great seaport, and tends to rival the eastern ports, particularly as a grain port. This gravitation of Canadian trade to the Pacific brings Canada into the orbit of American Pacific politics, while at the same time the importance of the Canadian Pacific coast and the ports of Vancouver, Prince Rupert and Victoria, with their coaling stations, increases for Great Britain. The appointment of an independent Canadian Embassy in Japan last year is indicative of this orientation to the East.

However, this expansion and American orientation in foreign trade does not proceed without strenuous attempts upon the part of the Canadian bourgeoisie to build up home industry by a series of tariffs, thus departing from the Free Trade policy of the halcyon days of British trade supremacy in Canada. While anxious to reap all the benefits afforded by the British Empire Preference Scheme promulgated at regular Imperial Conferences, the Canadian bourgeoisie is by no means willing to let these benefits impede its competitive successes upon the world market. This was shown



clearly by the recent act of Canada, following the examples of Australia and New Zealand, of raising the British Preference Tariff by demanding that goods imported from Great Britain must in future contain 50 per cent. of British workmanship or material, instead of the 25 per cent. previously agreed upon under the scheme. This means that unless an article exported to Canada from Britain is at least 50 per cent. British it will have to come into Canada at a higher rate of duty than preferred goods. This, in spite of the so-called "defence of imperial unity" proclaimed by the Canadian bourgeoisie, was a serious blow to British manufacturers, especially to those who have to import their raw materials from non-British countries, such as cotton from the U.S.A. and copper from Spain. However, it can fairly certainly be stated that the benefits enjoyed by Canada in the Empire Preference Scheme are of tremendous importance, while at the same time it is clear that independent actions such as that cited above will be taken in the interests of the development of home industry.

In its tariff relations with the U.S.A. Canada is in continual trouble. The bourgeoisie of the heavy industries, steel, iron, coal, and railways, have always fought American competition vigorously and continue to do so. The high tariffs erected by the U.S.A. against Canadian agricultural products are now being increased by Hoover in his effort to ameliorate the agrarian crisis, and provide a constant bone of contention between the Canadian and U.S. governments.

The foreign trade policy of the Canadian bourgeoisie, caught as it is between the millstones of American and British imperialisms, seems to be to use all possible measures for the development of home industry, particularly heavy industry. This policy seems to be meeting with some success, and the explanation is to be found in the willingness of the British imperialists to grant concessions that were unheard of prior to the war, in order to retain the expanding Canadian bourgeoisie as an ally and as a market, albeit a declining one, for its industrial products. The position of Canada as a granary of the Empire also plays a decisive role in the relations between Canada and Downing Street.

The common interests of Canadian and

American capitalism, and the definitely imperialist politics now being developed by Canada are factors making for the collapse of the economic and political unity of the British Empire. The huge and ever-growing profits of the Canadian bourgeoisie are finding profitable fields of investment in Latin America. The export of Canadian capital to Brazil, Mexico, and Cuba increases, and in addition to being subscribed as part of the American capital invested in these countries, also follows independent channels. The Royal Bank of Canada does a great volume of business in Cuba; there are heavy investments in the sugar industry, also in the Brazilian traction combine. During the recent counter-revolution in Mexico the Canadian press watched events very closely, and approved of the acts of the American government in giving assistance to the reactionary rebels, stating that "Canada has many interests in Mexico, and Canadians will watch with concern the course of events" (*Toronto Globe*, March 10th). In the imperialist struggle in Latin America, between America and Great Britain, Canadian finance capital finds itself chiefly an ally of the U.S. In addition to this, a great part of the billion dollars of foreign investments held by the Canadian bourgeoisie are in the form of bonds and shares held in native American concerns. In the field of financial investment, Canada draws near to the foreign policy of the United States.

A conception is held in many circles of the Comintern that Canada is virtually a "colony" of the United States. For instance, comrade Lovestone during the December Plenum of the American Party, attributed the theory of "decolonisation" to those Canadian comrades who pointed out the new nature of Canadian capitalism since the world war. Acting upon the assumption that Canada is a colony, he accuses the Canadian Party of harboring the false position of "decolonisation." The truth of the matter is that Canada, since its bourgeois revolution of 1837, has ceased to be a colony, has developed since that time in the sphere of complete capitalist relations, and, as the Colonial Thesis of the Sixth World Congress states, is "a continuation of their (the 'mother countries') capitalist system." Further, the Thesis states, "there can be no talk of the colonial regime" in these type of countries.

Far from being the theory of "decolonisation," the fact that Canada is developing its own imperialist interests, is seeking a place on the world market, only goes to prove that in doing this she is sharpening the Anglo-American rivalry, and at the same time heading for war as a result of the hopeless tangle of the imperialist contradictions in which she is becoming ever more enmeshed. To ignore this is to ignore the whole course of the forces making for the proletarian revolution in Canada. Far from being a "colony" of either American or British imperialism, the latest available figures regarding foreign investments in Canada show the opposite, while not for a moment eliminating the fact of Anglo-American rivalry within the country. The figures follow: *Financial Post*, December 21st, 1928.)

Total Foreign Investments	British	American
1927:		
\$5,500,441,000	\$2,192,467,000	\$3,089,181,000
Jan. 1, 1928:		
\$5,666,369,000	\$2,204,064,000	\$3,215,512,000
Jan. 1, 1929:		
\$5,706,669,000	\$2,234,364,000	\$3,313,612,000

Of the total foreign investments, 57 per cent. is American and 39 per cent. British. The total national wealth, including over one billion dollars of Canadian foreign investments, is \$30,250,000,000, which means that the U.S. possesses 10 per cent. and Great Britain 7.4 per cent. Of the capital invested in railways, industries and finance (banks etc.) the following is the proportion:—

	American	British	Canadian
1920 ...	17 per cent.	16 per cent.	64 per cent.
1929 ...	19 per cent.	13 per cent.	66 per cent.

This indicates a strengthening of Canadian and American capital, and a weakening of British capital. This by no means precludes the control of Canadian industries by American and British finance in concrete instances, but at the same time the figures show that the control of Canadian industry and finance is not so "colonial" as is sometimes thought.

Where is the contradiction between the U.S. and Great Britain to be found chiefly? Not so much in the struggle of either of them to retain Canada as a "colony" but in the hopeless disunity and chaos within the Canadian bourgeoisie itself. These are extremely diffi-

cult to indicate, but the following groupings to some extent do this:—

a. The so-called "new industries" such as lumber, paper, hydro-electric, mining, etc., attract American capital, and the Canadian capital in these industries is drawn increasingly closer to the interests of American capital, and their American markets which form their chief fields of sale.

b. The Bank of Montreal group, closely connected with the Federation of British Industries, Baring Bros., Barclay's Bank, the British Metal Corporation and the Canadian Pacific Railroad.

c. The Royal Bank group connected with Mexican investments, and large American electrical and financial corporations, the chief Canadian-American group.

d. The Canadian Bank of Commerce group in close connection with Lord Melchett (an ally of the Rothchilds) and large Canadian mining interests. It is this group which has recently bought out the American nickel interests and formed the British-Canadian nickel combine under the leadership of Melchett (Mond). (Canada produces 90 per cent. of the world's supply of this war metal.)

e. The Canadian manufacturers and iron and steel producers who are seeking to develop home industry and capture the home market.

f. The grain interests, millers, cattle-merchants and the like who find their greatest market within the British Empire and who are rapidly being thrust out of the American market through the medium of prohibitive tariffs.

This gives some picture of the conflicting interests within the country. No section of the Canadian bourgeoisie is free from the effects of Anglo-American rivalry; some sections are to some extent independent, but they are insignificant. It is this disunity and conflict that determine the course of Canadian politics; any dismissal of this fact by referring to Canada as a "colony" of either British or American imperialism is fatal, and denotes a complete misunderstanding of the nature of a colony, as well as a total ignorance of the disintegrating effects of the development of the Dominions into competitors of the home country upon the world market.

The increase of American capital and influence in Canada, the decline of the British Empire and consequently of British capital investments, and the industrialisation of Canada, has caused a decided change in the relations of the Canadian bourgeoisie with the British Government. As the Thesis of the Sixth Congress on the Colonial Question states in this regard:—

“On the other hand, the competition between various imperialist systems for influence in these semi-independent countries can also lead to their breaking off from the metropolis and even to a union with the competitors of the latter. These reasons frequently compel imperialism to reconcile itself to a certain political and economic independence of its agencies in such colonies (Dominions) which arise on the basis of its united and native strength in relation to the corresponding imperialism.” This has been borne out in fact by the Dominions; the British Empire has been forced to concede an almost complete independence to the Dominions in order to retain the much-advertised “Commonwealth of Nations.” This was stated quite clearly by General Smuts in the South African Union Parliament in September, 1919, in words that have oft been repeated since: “The British Empire as it existed before the war has in fact ceased to exist as a result of the war. The last vestige of anything in the nature of subordinate status in the relationship will have to disappear.” The following events indicate the course of this change of relationships in Canada; the demand for independent representation at Versailles, Lausanne, Locarno, Washington, and the final gaining of a seat on the Council of the League of Nations; appointment of independent embassies in France, the U.S., Japan; signing of independent treaties with many countries and independent signature of the Locarno Treaty and the Kellogg Pact; opposition to British foreign policy and the refusal to prepare mobilisation at the call of the British Government (Chanak, Irak, Egypt etc.) The King Government, representing the Liberal Party, carried on this fight, which was never resisted in principle by Britain. But the struggle for complete independence, which was only voiced by petty-bourgeois liberal elements, was never visualised in reality by the Canadian bourgeoisie; their constitutional demands have

almost entirely disappeared and they are content with their new status as a “partner” with Great Britain. This finds both economic and military justification from the viewpoint of the Canadian bourgeoisie, in the first sense because of the Empire preference enjoyed, and the existence of vital markets both in Britain and the Empire, as well as in countries within the sphere of British trade influence; and in the second sense because of the complete naval and military helplessness of Canada. It can safely be said that the struggle of the bourgeoisie for complete independence is not the perspective for the future; that on the other hand Canada is able to gain from Britain all those constitutional privileges that is necessary for its development.

In this respect it is necessary to note the grave error made by the Canadian Party in attributing to this demand for constitutional freedom, the nature of a national colonial bourgeoisie fighting for freedom from imperialist domination, and the likening of Canada to Egypt. This has been recognised as opportunist and false by the Party, since the Sixth World Congress.

This peaceful gaining of constitutional freedom by the Canadian bourgeoisie explains the almost total absence of any sentiments for annexation to the U.S. The Canadian bourgeoisie could gain nothing by this annexation as a whole, although it would possibly benefit certain sections. Only recently in the dispute over the disposal of Labrador did Newfoundland (Britain’s oldest colony) threaten union with the U.S., but this was obviated by the granting of Labrador to Newfoundland. The question of annexation to the U.S., however, will probably arise in a far from peaceful form in the coming Anglo-American war.

The role of the Liberal Party under the King Government is clear. Representing the most powerful Canadian interests, it seeks to utilise the Anglo-American conflict for the benefit of the Canadian bourgeoisie as a whole; in this sense it is playing a flagrantly opportunist role and one that will lead to disaster. Necessary to both British and American imperialism, it plays the game of granting concessions and at the same time resisting both groups, the while seeking to build a powerful national economy and to assume a somewhat independent imperialist attitude in the struggle

for markets for Canadian manufactured and agricultural products.

The coming war will bring all these festering contradictions to a head, and in this lies the chief task of the Communist Party, of correctly estimating the forces at work, and rallying the Canadian masses against the war danger. Three roads are open to Canada in the event of the outbreak of Anglo-American armed struggle :—

- (a) Neutrality. Canada playing the role of salesman to the conflicting Powers, with the inevitability of later being drawn into the conflict on one side or the other.
- (b) Declaration of war with Great Britain against America.
- (c) Declaration of war with the U.S. against Great Britain.

It is difficult to prophesy which road the Canadian bourgeoisie will take, but it is absolutely inevitable that no matter which of these actions is taken by the Canadian bourgeoisie, that chaos and civil war will result. In the camp of the disunited bourgeoisie, sections of which adhere to American, British or have independent interests, severe chaos and disruption would immediately ensue, causing a governmental crisis that would rock the country. The population itself is a basis for internecine warfare; sections of it are loyalist, that is, rank British imperialists; other sections are of American extraction and birth, with ties across the border; the greatest powder magazine, however, consists in the French-Canadian masses, who number almost one-third of the total population, speak French, are nationalist in character, and who resisted the last war by force of arms. This heterogeneous population will be hopelessly divided no matter what action is taken in the next war. However, one thing more is certain, that the relationships of Great Britain with the Dominions, and particularly Canada, will undergo tremendous changes. The Dominions reserve, and will demand, the right for independent declaration of war. In the words of a prominent British military specialist spoken in March of this year, "If Great Britain stopped to consult the Dominions she would lose the war, and if she did not consult them

she would lose the Dominions." The Canadian bourgeoisie, in taking this independent step, as it will be forced to do, will distintegrate the Empire, and in that sense only will constitute a progressive force. But its progressive character will stop at that; it is and will remain the enemy of the Canadian workers and poor farmers.

That the Canadian bourgeoisie is acutely aware of its fatal position is clear from the numerous writings and statements upon the subject that appear from time to time. In the debates in the House of Commons upon the Kellogg Pact, when Bennett, the Conservative leader, declared, with reference to the war preparations of the U.S.A., that : "When our great neighbours talk of war against Great Britain they are talking also of war against Canada," the Liberal Premier, King, retorted that such a jingoistic speech was calculated to "throw doubt upon the good faith of the neighbouring republic." Commenting on this, the *Toronto Star*, Liberal organ, stated :

"It does not call for much intelligence to enable one to know how, in the event of war, this country would be smashed and torn by the contending forces, and no matter what happened at sea or anywhere else, this country would emerge smashed and broken and no longer British. Of that there can be no doubt. No valour could save us from being ground under overwhelming forces as Belgium was, with no powerful neighbours to intervene as in her case. . . . All the fine dreams that Canadians as a people now indulge in of going on as a great and free British nation would be over and done with in the red glare of war. The one supreme foreign interest of Canada is to build and preserve the greatest goodwill between Britain and the United States."

In a recent book by two international lawyers, entitled *Canada and World Politics*, the following statement appears : "In the event of war it is improbable that the effective control of Ottawa (the capital) over the people of Canada could last more than three or four weeks." Commander Kenworthy in his recent book on *Peace and War* declares : "Yet this would mean a terrible war on Canadian soil. Automatically the Americans [in the event of Canada uniting with Britain.—J. P.] would invade Canada, and Britain, fighting both in

the Pacific and Atlantic, would forego other naval campaigns, including colonial raids and trade attacks, so as to permit the throwing of as many British troops and aeroplanes from all parts of the Empire on to Canadian soil in as short a time as possible. If Canada were invaded a long-drawn-out and bloody land and aerial warfare would follow to add to the horrors of the naval campaigns."

It is clear, then, that Canada, no matter what jurisdictional action is taken by its bourgeoisie, is destined to be a battlefield in the not far distant future. The King Government has openly entered the British bloc against the U.S.S.R., is embarking upon a battleship-building campaign, as well as strengthening its aerial, chemical and military arms of warfare. In preparation for this coming crisis and to ensure the co-operation and loyalty of Canada, Britain is increasing its imperialist propaganda within the country, and even making an attempt to once more export British capital. It is certain that any attempt to under-estimate the power and influence of British imperialism in Canada would lead to a total misunderstanding of the relationship of forces.

This, then, is a short summary of the perspectives that lay before the Communist Party, not only of Canada but of Great Britain and the United States, perspectives which are organically bound up with the whole tactics and strategy of these parties. As one of the principal theatres of the gigantic world conflict, Canada is destined to play a decisive role in the international politics of the future. The following conclusions can be summarised as of the most profound importance, for the Canadian Party particularly, but also for all sections of the Communist International :

1. The chief enemy of the Canadian workers and poor farmers is the Canadian bourgeoisie, which is developing as an imperialist clique, possesses no characteristics of colonial oppression, but is a partner in the imperialist schemes of British and American finance capital.

2. Nevertheless, the Canadian bourgeoisie

is hopelessly disunited, sections of it finding common interest with the American imperialists, others with the British imperialists. This bourgeoisie, in common with all others, is an inveterate enemy of the U.S.S.R., and is party to the war plans of Great Britain against the First Workers' Republic, as instanced by the feverish war preparations that are now going on.

3. In the event of the outbreak of the Anglo-American war a revolutionary situation will inevitably occur within the country, which will complete the disintegration process of the British Empire, and at the same time confront the workers of Canada, under the leadership of the Communist Party, with a favourable situation for decisive struggle for power.

4. The task of the Communist Party is to ruthlessly expose the lackeys of the bourgeoisie within the ranks of the Canadian proletariat and farmers who are giving abject assistance to the imperialist schemes of the Canadian bourgeoisie, and to continually place the war danger before the eyes of the masses. The Party must prepare for struggle by raising concrete slogans, against both American and British imperialism, and against being dragged by the Canadian bourgeoisie into either one of the two imperialist camps. However, the danger lies ahead of confusing this with any movement for neutrality that may arise among sections of the bourgeoisie, and the most careful means will have to be taken not to repeat the past error of placing the Party in the camp of any bourgeois opposition movement.

The revolution that faces the Communist Party is a proletarian revolution, and the culmination of the ever-deepening contradictions within Canada into open warfare places upon the Party the historic task of creating a Workers' and Farmers' Republic. This is the only "independence" to which the Party can subscribe.

Upon the correct estimation of this conflict in Canada alone can the future tactics and policy of the Canadian Party meet with ultimate success.

# How Not to Fight Militarism

L. Alfred

ACCORDING to the Swedish Communist press, the Communist deputy Edoff Andersson put forward the following motion in the Swedish Parliament during the military debate :

"That Parliament requests the Government to prepare during the coming year proposals for the abolition of the present military system within three years."

No doubt comrade Andersson had the best intentions, and desired to expose the unwillingness of the Swedish bourgeoisie, its Parliament, its Government, and its social-democratic lackeys, to carry out disarmament ; but the objective effect of such an appeal to the bourgeoisie and its institutions on such a matter is exactly the contrary, for it promotes the illusion that disarmament by means of parliament, and without the proletarian revolution, is not impossible, particularly in the special conditions obtaining in Sweden. The exposure of bourgeois and social-democratic pacifism is urgently necessary and immediately possible. Comrade Andersson's proposal, however, makes this exposure dependent upon the pacifist manœuvres of the Government and the social-democrats, for it will only be apparent after a few years whether or not the Government will keep its eventual promises of disarmament.

Unfortunately, the motion is pacifist not only in its objective effect, but is also based to some extent on pacifist illusions. This is obvious from the following passage in the motion :

"The demand to abolish the military system is the demand which formerly had been put forward by the organised working class, and which should be put forward now, not primarily because of the expenditure on armaments, but because this demand is one to abolish the weapon of the capitalist class against the working class."

"The abolition of capitalist militarism would be a step towards a new order of society,

for it would deprive capitalist society of one of its strongest supports ; and if the working class has the power to abolish that military system, society will be transformed according to the will of the working class."

Comrade Andersson's motion, and particularly the arguments on which it is founded, belong to those "incorrect and frivolous methods of fighting war" on which Lenin wrote in 1922 :

"I remember that on the question of fighting war a number of declarations were made by our Communist deputies, both within Parliament and outside its walls, which contain terribly incorrect and frivolous ideas on fighting war. I think that these statements, even if made after the war, must be resolutely opposed, and the names of the speakers openly stated. The condemnation of such a speaker may be softened if that serves a purpose, but none of these cases must be passed over in silence, for a frivolous attitude to this question is an evil which surpasses all others, and which it is impossible to condone." (Lenin : *On the Work of Our Delegates to the Hague.*)

Comrade Andersson's motion and the remarks quoted above were made in the year 1929, more than ten years after the war, when the experiences of the world war have been thoroughly and clearly evaluated by Lenin and other representatives of international Communism, and when the Communist International has many times (the last time at the Sixth World Congress) thoroughly dealt with the questions of tactics and principles of fighting war, including the question of disarmament, and has in its decisions clearly and precisely formulated the Communist attitude to these questions.

It would be an error to conclude from this that the decisions of the World Congress are unknown in the Swedish Communist Party. The Manifesto of the Swedish C.P. issued on 2nd April, 1929, correctly formulates the basis of Communist tactics in fighting war. The Manifesto runs :

"Imperialist war and armaments are not fought by bending the knee to the oppressors, by appeals and resolutions addressed to the organisers of war. Real peace and disarmament can be attained only by the complete destruction of capitalism."

Four days after the publication of this Manifesto, on 6th April, 1929, the Communist deputy, comrade Andersson, brought in a motion in Parliament which is nothing but an "appeal and resolution addressed to the organisers of war," and which is likely to prevent the workers from clearly seeing that disarmament can be obtained only by the destruction of capitalism.

Comrade Andersson's motion and the idea expressed in the Swedish Party Manifesto, are incompatible. For comrade Andersson appeals to the bourgeoisie and its institutions, his remarks suggest that capitalist militarism must first be abolished, and that then society will be "transformed according to the will of the working class," *i.e.*, the revolution will be accomplished. The Manifesto, on the other hand, says unmistakably that appeals should not be made to the organisers of war, to the institutions of the bourgeois State, that the destruction of militarism is possible only *after* the victorious proletarian revolution, and is even unthinkable before.

Not disarmament, but the arming of the proletariat and the disarming of the bourgeoisie, is the revolutionary way of fighting war and militarism. There is no other way for the proletariat, not even in Sweden. This must be openly stated. But the arming of the proletariat and the disarming of the bourgeoisie are matters which can never be demanded in a capitalist State, because they are not dependent upon the capitalist State, upon the parliament of the bourgeoisie and its government, because only the proletariat, by its will and its revolutionary action, can accomplish these tasks.

Let us again emphasise the fact that the Communist International does not put forward the demand for the abolition of the military system and for disarmament. This is not because the C.I. needs war as the prelude to revolution, as Kautsky declares. Peace is one of the objects of Communism, and the C.I. consistently and stubbornly fights for this

object. But for the Communist International to demand disarmament would not mean consistent fighting for that object; that would merely help to spread the utopian idea that world peace is possible before the world revolution. The objects of Communism, including world peace, can be realised without an imperialist war, but not without civil war. The question of fighting war must be considered in connection with the basic problems of the proletarian revolution, otherwise one falls, willy nilly, into the errors of pacifism.

The Communist International fights militarism, not abstractly, but in its concrete manifestations: conscription, the civil militia, mercenary armies, the militarisation of the young, etc. This is the only possible way of rallying the working masses to a serious revolutionary struggle against militarism, an object which cannot be achieved by demanding disarmament.

In 1916 Lenin wrote on this question: "The opportunists would rejoice . . . if we were to lose ourselves in the cloudy distances of some vague sort of disarmament, to save ourselves by flight from painful reality. Disarmament is such a flight from hateful reality, but by no means a struggle against it." (*Lenin on the Slogan of Disarmament.*)

The slogan of disarmament has now been adopted by pacifist swindlers. Its objective purpose is to draw a veil over imperialist war preparations, to speed pacifist illusions, to distract attention from the only method which will lead to success—the proletarian revolution. Under the slogans of fighting "any war" and "any militarism," the fight against the revolution, against proletarian insurrection, against the oppressed peoples' struggles for emancipation, against so-called "red militarism" is now being waged.

#### THE SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS

If this is so how are we to understand the Soviet Government's disarmament proposals? Are not they, too, hypocritical, and designed to hide the war preparations of that government? Are they not calculated to arouse pacifist illusions among the workers, the more so as it is well known that the Soviet Government consists of Communists and enjoys great

popularity among the workers of capitalist countries? Should these proposals therefore be supported by Communists in the capitalist countries.

All these questions were exhaustively answered in the Theses of the Sixth World Congress. We take this opportunity of repeating and explaining the ideas of the theses.

The Soviet Government's disarmament proposals are distinguished from the phrases and projects of the imperialists and their social-democratic parties in that their purpose is not to spread but to destroy pacifist illusions. Although it was perfectly clear to the Soviet Government that the imperialists who talked of disarmament would not in actual fact disarm, their proposals were by no means hypocritical, for they are not in contradiction to the policy of the Workers' State, which is not an imperialist policy, but a policy of peace, corresponding to the interests of the working masses. The disarmament proposals of the proletarian State, sabotaged and distorted by the capitalist governments with all manner of excuses and tricks, are definitely designed to convince the workers of the world of the sincere desire for peace of the proletarian State, and to tear the hypocritical peace mask from the faces of the imperialists.

Had the Soviet Government done nothing about the imperialists' peace swindle, had it obstinately refused to take part in the negotiations concerning disarmament and peace, it would have played into the hands of the imperialists, who are on the look-out for any credible argument which will serve the purpose of assuring the people that the only obstacle in the way of world peace is the Soviet Union. The best possible answer to the cunning peace manoeuvres of the imperialist warmongers was the simple proposal of the Soviet Union, which exposed the poisonous intrigues of the imperialists and proved indisputably to the working masses of the whole world that the Soviet Union stands, not for phrases on disarmament, but for disarmament in fact.

It should be emphasised that this method of exposing the imperialist disarmament swindle can be used only by a proletarian State. Where the proletariat has not seized power it cannot use this method, for in such cases it would not lead to an exposure of the bourgeoisie, but

rather to a concealment of the revolutionary struggle against war. Communists should make no secret of the fact that they are preparing for the forcible overthrow of bourgeois society. But if a man says to his enemy: "Disarm yourself to-day, so that I may kill you to-morrow," he will not be taken seriously. One is compelled either to keep silent on the revolution, or to leave the demand for disarmament alone.

Dealing with the question of war, and the attitude of the proletariat in capitalist countries towards the Soviet Government's disarmament proposals, the Sixth Congress declared:

"This difference in the methods of fighting pacifism between the proletariat of the Soviet Union and that of the capitalist countries involves no contradiction. It does not follow that Communists in capitalist countries should not use the Soviet Union's disarmament declaration for purposes of agitation among the masses. On the contrary, the disarmament policy of the Soviet Power must be used in agitation more energetically and to a greater extent than before. The way to do this is not to put forward the same proposals in the different countries, but (1) to recruit support for the Soviet Union as the protagonist of peace and socialism—for its defence against imperialism; (2) to use and to demonstrate the results of the Soviet Power's disarmament policy, the unmasking of the imperialists, in order to root out all pacifist illusions among the masses, and to point out the only way to disarmament and peace—the arming of the proletariat, the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship." (Section 64.)

The incorrect attitude quoted in the above paragraph indicated the urgent need for a more thorough study of the questions of principle and tactics involved in fighting war. Such study is essential for a correct attitude towards the concrete, practical questions of war and military policy, and for the dissemination among the masses of correct ideas on fighting war.

All this applies particularly to preparation for the International Day against imperialist war, when the revolutionary proletariat will demonstrate its will to peace and its strength in the fight against imperialist war.



# For the Forthcoming Plenum of the E. C. C. I.

## C. Lapinsky's Report on the International Situation (Conclusion)

### The "Third Period" in International Politics

#### I. THE PREDOMINANCE OF BASIC ANTAGONISMS

**T**URNING to consider the world political situation, we can lay it down that in this sphere also, the chief feature is the predominance of basic antagonisms over the antagonisms of a more local and transient character. Such a feature always indicates the existence of a critical period, a period of crisis, and is the harbinger of coming storms.

A development of this type always results in the antagonisms which are more local and transient in their scale and character, gradually coming within the orbit of the antagonisms which are on a world scale and decisive in their character, being engulfed by these, following their laws of development, and, in the last resort leading to the same ends.

In order to illustrate this conception, I remind you of the development of the first imperialist period, which led to the world war. During several decades following the Franco-Prussian war, there developed innumerable, diverse antagonisms between the interests of the various powers. But the emergence and development of these antagonisms did not prevent it from being a period of the peaceful development of capitalism, similar to that of the earlier development of capitalism which lasted from the close of the Napoleonic wars until the revolutionary disturbances at the end of the first half of the century, and practically to the Crimean war. And only a higher capitalist development—capitalism's entry into the stage of imperialism—brought with it, as an inevitable consequence of the development of monopolies, an extreme intensification of relationships, which developed into a struggle for world hegemony between the two mightiest capitalist powers of that time—Germany and Britain.

Somehow or other, the local antagonisms between the various States had to become part of the general system. The deciding and universal elements of development took charge: every State was forced to choose between the chief protagonists in the coming world conflict. But as we know, this did not happen in a moment. Right down to the actual beginning of the war, and even during its first stages, many States were still vacillating.

For decades, French policy was essentially vacillating between an orientation towards Britain and an orientation towards Germany. Even politicians who are regarded as classic exponents of the idea of revenge, such as Gambetta, not to mention politicians of the type of Jules Ferri, in their search for compensations for lost Alsace and Lorraine (but in fact in the endeavour somehow or other to ensure France's rank as a great power), allowed themselves to be drawn into an active colonial policy, and thus gradually slipped into hostility to Britain. To a certain extent Bismarck connived at this development, the culminating moment of which was the stormy Fashoda incident, when France was led to the very threshold of an armed conflict with Britain. At the same time, on the other side of the Rhine, the basis of Bismarck's policy was, as we know, the endeavour to avoid, at all costs, the emergence of a too homogeneous system of alliances. The policy of "reinsurance" by maintaining close relations with Tsarist Russia, even while being allied with Austria-Hungary, was ended only with the fall of Bismarck, being for that matter afterwards revived in more mongrel forms. In the same way, Britain also, on the threshold of the twentieth century (and almost down to the outbreak of the war), when the outline of the imminent world conflict were already indicated by the emergence of the triple

entente against Germany, continued for many years to endeavour to come to an agreement with her German rival on the most disputed and decisive issue of naval armaments. And Tsarist Russia, in its turn, still continued to seek German friendship, although bound by an alliance with France. I need but mention the famous episode of Biorke, when Nicholas II. concluded a treaty with Wilhelm which was, in effect, a direct betrayal of his French ally. Such men as Bismarck, and afterwards Witte in Russia, were continually thinking of throwing one bridge or another across the abyss dividing the system of European alliances. This dual system of alliances developed by no means in a moment, and it by no means acquired an inevitable, irreconcilable character all at once.

The period of vacillation, which was a special form of transition period, came to an end after the final miscarriage of the many attempts to reach an agreement between the two chief antagonists; Britain and Germany, who incarnated the decisive antagonism of the epoch of pre-war imperialism. From that moment all had to make their choice. There arose a single barricade across the world. Every capitalist State was forced to place itself on one or other side of that barricade. There was no longer room for neutrals—such were the dictates of history.

A similar course of development is observable at the present time. Out of the chaos of the post-war state of capitalism, out of the absurdity of all kinds of local conflicts and disputes, we now have a crystallisation of the decisive factors which indicate the most important world antagonisms. With the same inevitability as that of the last pre-war period, albeit with the same or analogical vacillations and hesitations, all local factors are gradually yielding place, are becoming subordinated to those leading elements which are conditioned by all the logic of the latest capitalist development, and which arise, as it were, out of the very heart of capitalism. That is undoubtedly the symptom of the approach of more critical, more stormy times. That is the symptom of the "third period."

Of course, this development is not being manifested in a single moment, although in our age of the decline of capitalism and the social revolution everything develops at a much greater rate. The antagonisms of a local and

temporary nature are not at once absorbed into the system of all-embracing, central antagonisms.

And, of prime importance this, the development is this time the more complex inasmuch as we have in the new circumstances not one "barricade," as during the first imperialist period, but three, around which the countries are grouping themselves. Now we have to deal not with one central antagonism but with three antagonisms, each of which is a central, world antagonism. The Sixth Congress considered of prime importance three main categories of facts. The Congress distinguished an intensification of antagonisms: (1) between the leading imperialist Powers, Britain and America; (2) between the imperialist exploiters and the awakening colonial peoples; (3) between the capitalist world and the Union of Soviet Republics.

Not any one of these antagonisms can be reckoned as of purely local importance, such as is the considerable antagonism between Germany and France: an antagonism which filled the history of the first post-war period, and to some extent the first period of stabilisation also. But, despite all its importance, even this antagonism is being thrust into the background by the more essential world antagonisms, in one way or another being interwoven with them, is being drawn into their system.

Needless to say, these three decisive conflicts cannot be strictly delimited. The struggle for markets, for instance, which is playing the chief role in the process of crystallising the Anglo-American conflict, is not without influence on the formulation of relationships between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R. also, although the antagonism between these two historical factors is in its basis first and foremost a class antagonism. But we can declare without reservation that the first of the three specified conflicts, *i.e.*, the struggle between the British Empire and the United States for world hegemony, is the most general inter-imperialist conflict of the capitalist world of to-day.

The second conflict grows out of the mighty movement of the colonial peoples, which constitute the majority of the population of the world, and are now finally passing from the position of being the subject of exploitation to

the role of an active, independent factor in the world historical process. Here the revolutionary development breaks into the economic development of capitalism, creating an entirely new situation and new laws of development.

Finally, the third fundamental antagonism, that between the whole world bourgeoisie and the great country of the socialist revolution, is the decisive social conflict of the whole epoch. For the first time in history the antagonisms between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat have grown to the dimensions of an international antagonism. We see that by comparison with the first period of imperialism, which led to the world war, the world situation has become incomparably more complex and many-sided.

## 2. RESTRAINING FACTORS

In the realm of economic and political phenomena we have not only to do with the development and intensification of antagonisms. There are also present a number of phenomena and tendencies which retard, complicate and protract the development of the process leading to direct armed conflict. We have already indicated the increasing interlocking of extremely heterogeneous capitalist interests, which are being confined less and less to purely national frontiers. We have quoted the book by the Director of the Washington Economic Institute, in which this ideologist of international finance capital affirms that "the world has reached a point in the development of its organised economic activities where national boundaries are of relatively little significance, notwithstanding the numerous economic barriers that have been erected by political States." This "development of organised economic activity," which finds expression in innumerable interlockings and fusions, is undoubtedly complicating the whole development and in certain cases preventing the gun from "going off of itself." We may cite the example of the Dawes Plan, which in 1924 undoubtedly discharged the European atmosphere for a time, as can be seen by comparing the situation which followed its introduction with the condition of half peace, half war, which reigned in Western Europe until 1924, and which had its clearest demonstration in the French invasion of the Ruhr.

Development in the direction of armed conflict is also complicated by the universal instability of internal political development in, at any rate, all the European and Asiatic capitalist countries.

In a number of European countries, and in Britain first and foremost, the petty-bourgeois liberal and petty-bourgeois reformist elements, in the struggle for parliamentary power, have to take the attitude of the masses into account and arm themselves with democratic pacifist phrases. In the last resort these phrases serve only as a more dangerous method of deluding the masses, which are led into error concerning the decisive tendencies of imperialist development, concerning the true policy of the determining capitalist groups and the degree to which the reformist and middle parties are subjected to them. This chicanery becomes doubly cynical and doubly dangerous when it is a question of an aggressive policy towards the Soviet Union and the colonial countries. Incessant campaigns of lying and slander against the country which is constructing socialism, not only completely neutralise the possible indirect effect of the reformists' pacifist demagogy, but create the moral atmosphere necessary to the policy of hostile encirclement and the preparation of war on the U.S.S.R. As history has shown, reformism has become the party of armed struggle against the socialist revolution. This one fact alone will, with the arrival of definite circumstances, fling reformism into the camp of armed struggle against the country of socialist revolution. We have already been witnesses of this in the case of Poland in 1919-20.

So far as the colonial peoples are concerned, during the whole of the post-war period we have observed in both the decisive colonial countries, France and England, the absolutely indubitable fact that the reformist parties have given their active support to the aggressively imperialist policy of the bourgeois governments. We can all still remember, for instance, how the British Labour Party, with MacDonald at its head, betrayed all the positions on the question of sending British troops to China. The leaders of the Labour Party have not uttered one word, either at their last conference in Birmingham or in their election campaign, concerning Egypt, where the

British imperialists are suppressing the struggle for national independence by armed force and have dispersed an insufficiently servile parliament. As we know also, the Simon Commission counts official representatives of the Labour Party among its members. In a word, we have a complete united front with the imperialist bourgeoisie, and government politicians do not stint their words of praise for the Labour Party leaders and their patriotic support of the official policy.

In accordance with all this, colonial wars and semi-wars have become something in the nature of a chronic phenomenon, something which does not disturb the general picture of peace. Pacifist phraseology is simply not applied to the colonial peoples. The Monroe Doctrine and the British reservations to the Kellogg Pact connote that an enormous section of the colonial world (including Egypt, although it is not mentioned by name) is officially removed from the official pacifist schemes. The prohibition of war is not extended to this part of the world. After the Pan-American Conference in Santiago in 1923, in his speech, which included the latest official interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, Hughes, the U.S. Foreign Secretary, stated that "The United States reserves to itself the right of definition, interpretation and application" of the Monroe Doctrine. So, too, in his main note on the Kellogg Pact, Chamberlain made the proviso that this pact was not to restrict Great Britain's freedom of action "in certain regions, the prosperity and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety." And on this issue the *London Times* wrote: "There are, however, certain parts of the world where backward races exist to whom fighting is still the most natural method of settling a dispute, and for whom force is still the one convincing argument." (*Times*, 20th July, 1928.)

Thus, within the confines of the indisputable "spheres of influence" of the decisive imperialist States, war activities are quite legal. Here military activities simply do not form part of the conception of war, in the strict sense of the word. But as we have seen by China's example, even in the more important disputed spheres of influence, the decisions of international conferences (the Washington

Conference in the case under consideration) proved unable to prevent war activities (which of course are not recognised as war).

So that, at any rate so far as colonial wars are concerned, the internal political instability of the capitalist countries and the coming to power of the reformists and the middle parties connected with them cause no essential change, do not act as restraining and retarding elements. That instability brings with it a certain temporary restraint only in the inter-relationships between imperialist Powers. The vacillation and half-heartedness of the petty-bourgeois parties here make themselves felt in the search for compromises, in the attempts to smooth over the contradictions, in the pacifist futilities, which occasionally and for a brief period retard and confuse the inevitable development. Thus the arrival of a Labour or Lab.-Lib. Government in Britain may bring with it isolated manifestations of a more conciliatory attitude towards America, may create a certain illusion of a breathing-space, which in the last resort will only sharpen American appetites.

Without doubt the fear of the working class, the fear of revolution, remains a more real restraining element. In August last year, at a session of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, even the ancient reformist, Eduard David, expressed his conviction that any "future war between the Great Powers will swiftly and inevitably be transformed into a savage civil war in all States." The fear of seeing this transformation of imperialist war into civil war undoubtedly constitutes one of the few real factors making for bourgeois-reformist pacifism. For that matter the reality of this factor is altogether conditional. For the decisive imperialist Powers are more and more coming to conceive of any future war exactly as a kind of civil war, directed against a revolutionary country or countries (which on this basis could be represented as a violator of the peace, and so as coming under the application of the corresponding articles of the League of Nations Covenant).\*

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\* In an article on the Kellogg Pact the "*Times*" considers it one of the pact's defects that it does not foresee one of the chief contingencies against which the interested countries would need to retain a free hand, i.e., an uncontrolled right of

war, in a counter-revolutionary sense, is more and more becoming blended with the conception of international war. The bourgeoisie is now openly announcing the slogan of the transformation of international war into civil war. We have already experienced the blending of these two conceptions during the Polish-Soviet War of 1920, and during the armed intervention in China.

None the less, the existence of this connection, even in the event of a premeditated transformation of the coming war into a war against revolution, involves an additional risk to the bourgeoisie and leads it to be cautious in its choice of the moment.

Finally, the complexity of the whole present situation by comparison with that prevailing before the world war also provides a certain restraint; the modern world, as we have above noted, is now divided not by one single central antagonism (such as the Anglo-German antagonism of former days); together with the central inter-imperialistic antagonism of our day (the Anglo-American antagonism) we have a development of decisive and central antagonisms of another kind—the antagonism between the world of individual ownership and the country constructing socialism, and the antagonism between the colonial peoples passing into the realm of revolution and the imperialist countries. Each of these decisive antagonisms has its own peculiar logic of development, and the lines of that development, crossing and intersecting, result generally in a much more complex phase of development than that of the 1914 conflict. The development of purely imperialist antagonisms may in one circumstance restrain and complicate the process of bringing the class war against the land of revolution to its head, but given a different circumstance it may on the contrary accelerate the conflict with the revolutionary country. In definite conditions that conflict with the land of revolution might even play

war. That contingency is civil war. The "Times" puts it thus:—

"Do not changes in the forms of government and rapid adaptations of social organisation contain germs of new conflicts, which will not easily be settled by any general formulæ, however widely professed? Is there not implicit in present conditions a danger of civil war at least as great as that of international war?" ("Times," 27th August, 1928.)

the role of a diverting manœuvre, i.e., it might arise as the result of an attempt to create a united front of the imperialist powers by force of "accomplished facts." Here, everything depends on the particular situation arising, and that cannot be foreseen in all its details.

Such, approximately, are the most important elements which may exert a restraining influence on the tempo of development of the decisive antagonisms of our day. We have noted the highly conditional importance of these restraining elements. We could not pass them over in silence, since without them all the dialectic, and all the zig-zag features of the development (just as in the realm of economics) would remain incomprehensible. But in any case we are free from illusions; the hope that the "organised economic activities" will finally overcome the role of "national boundaries, notwithstanding the numerous economic barriers that have been erected by political States" is merely the Utopia of the ideologists of American finance capital, who are counting on obtaining "control" over the world, through the powers, resources, and "peaceful" penetration, by the automatic action of the United States' financial might. As we know, the United States Naval Department does not share that Utopia. Reformist pacifism merely combines the Utopia "of super-imperialism with the supplementary Utopia of its own production: the Utopia of a gradual consummation of socialism and disarmament by peaceful methods and with the benevolent participation of the capitalists. In fact, the "economic barriers erected by the States," and which have ostensibly to disappear in face of the higher organisation of finance capital, are becoming still more numerous and cumbersome. We have already noted the increase in the protectionist wave. The fiasco of the free traders' "bankers' manifesto" is a generally admitted fact. This constriction of the economic world of capitalism of which we have spoken above, and the impossibility of regaining the previous tempo of development (despite the enormous successes in the technical field), remains a deciding factor.

What is the international way out of this blind alley? In a certain public speech Professor Turner announces: "Truly, it is a straitened world. A world compelled by invincible forces to self-constraint, to union, to agree-

ment, is adapted only to suicide." Another no less well known American scientist, I. Baumann, writes in the *World*: "Inevitably there must come either war or a system of pooling and rationing in view of the diminution of all the most vital resources." And after citing both these scientists, the historian of American foreign policy, the participant in the Paris peace and Washington conferences, Professor Blackley, adds in his own name: "The world is growing smaller, its resources are becoming more restricted, whilst the competitive struggle over those resources and over markets for disposal of manufactures is becoming more intensive, industry and finance are so organised that an unfavourable situation or political instability in any sphere is reflected on the prosperity of other countries. The United States is closely interlocked with other countries by strengthening financial associations: in these conditions it is clear that the policy of the United States of America also the policy of the world as a whole, must have in view a closer international co-operation both economically and politically." (*The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States*, 1925, p. 321 and 325-6.)

Thus the way out of the constriction, imposed upon and openly recognised by capitalism, is the "pooling" system, the combining of resources, agreements, self-restrictions adaptations under the threat of "suicide," such as a war evidently would be. In all this only one thing is true: there is an undoubted tendency towards the growth of a kind of interdependence, and towards an intensification of the network of organised international connections. Following on the continental and world trusts, the "co-operation of the (emission) banks," the fixation of world prices for certain commodities, the centralisation of international exchange speculation, the organisation of international committees for transfer, "super-banks," etc., we have an unbroken stream of conferences of foreign ministers, the organisation of political exchanges attached to the League of Nations, a vigorous creation of "regional" and world agreements and pacifist schemes and machinery on a continental and on a world scale. The economic "interlockings" are leading also to a certain amount of political super-structure. But from all this to draw the conclusion that with the

demonstrated curtailment of the world the capitalist Powers are growing less militant than when they found the world more spacious, is one that only "scientific" theologians can make.

In our analysis of the main features of the international-political situation we shall necessarily come to conclusions analogical to those following from an analysis of the economic situation. The competition between the decisive central antagonisms and the international political "interlockings," makes the present state of "equilibrium" increasingly unstable, ponderous and immense, and increasingly streaked with all kinds of surprises, complications and conflicts. And here, as in the economic sphere, the "organisation" of the world is becoming increasingly confused, irrational, absurd and contradictory internally to the point of savagery. Here also the "pacifist" creation and maintenance of peace, which is the official aim of every politician, is growing into a Tower of Babel, into a competition of world pacifist schemes (behind which is concealed the preparation of the war for world hegemony) into the fusion of the conception of the "international" war with that of counter-revolutionary war, with that of "civil" war against the revolutionary countries, into a final and dissolute confusion of the very conceptions of war and peace, just as the ten-year "disarmament" agreement is serving merely as a cloak for a frantic armaments race.

Both war and peace have been transformed into the same feature: into extreme economic rivalry. As one American author, the vice-president of the U.S. Tariff Commission, formulates it: "War is no longer merely an armed conflict, it is also an economic struggle. From this point of view it is an aggravated form of trade competition." (Culbertson *International Economic Policies*, N.Y., 1925, p. 331.) Such is the latest reincarnation of Clausevitch's well-known old formula that war is merely a continuation of politics with other methods. But the converse has become the truth: peace is only a weaker form of war. The dividing line between peace and war is here being eliminated to a certain extent. The most frantic rivalry for a world grown more restricted has become the law of the period of capitalism's decline, but a law complicated by

the entry of the colonial peoples on the scene as an active historic factor and by the triumph of socialism in certain parts of the world.

These phenomena can be seen at the basis of all the three decisive antagonisms of our time. Each of them is in some way interlocked with the others. Not one of them appears in a "pure" form. The action of one is strengthened by the action of another. Thus the elimination of the enormous areas occupied by the Soviet Union, from previous world capitalist circulation must of itself indirectly intensify the rivalry between the capitalist Powers; for it is clear that the more restricted the basis of exploitation becomes, the more severe must the rivalry also become. The struggle against the colonial and semi-colonial peoples, who look to the U.S.S.R. as the only country which has declared war against all forms of exploitation, inevitably intensifies, as does the struggle of the Imperialist Powers against the U.S.S.R. This connection was revealed to everyone when the wave of the Chinese revolution in 1926-27 reached its highest level, but in its potential form this connection never disappears. And only the turpitude and hypocrisy of the everyday bourgeois propaganda can reduce everything to a mere matter of Soviet "propaganda," and can fail to observe the natural historical connection between the two phenomena, which is independent of any kind of propaganda whatever, and for which geographical distances do not exist. And finally, the antagonism between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R. is, out of all these three decisive antagonisms, the one of the highest significance (as Lenin himself emphasised), for here, all the antagonisms interlock and fuse: the struggle for an extension of the world market; the struggle for the unrestricted exploitation of the colonies; and the higher, extreme, antagonism of the period—the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Consequently, it is here that the antagonisms achieve their highest intensity. Thus we see that all the central antagonisms we have mentioned subordinate all the other, more local, antagonisms to themselves, and at the same time are interlocked one with another, and their boundaries cannot be absolutely fixed. In 1920 Lenin sketched the connection between all world events and the struggle of

the imperialist Powers against the Soviet movement in the following words:

"The second governing idea of our theses (he is speaking of the theses on the colonial and national issues) is that in the present world situation, after the imperialist war, the mutual relationships of the peoples, the whole world system of States, is determined by the struggle of a small group of imperialist nations against the Soviet movement and the Soviet States, at the head of which is Soviet Russia. If we leave this out of account we cannot rightly consider any national or colonial issue, even though it were a question of the most distant corner of the world." (Speech at Second Congress of the Comintern., 26th July, 1920. *Collected Works*, new edition (Russian), Vol. XXV., p. 352.)

Since Lenin uttered those words there have been many changes in the world situation, and yet even to-day they retain all their force. In its historical line the "struggle of the imperialist nations against the Soviet movement" remains the basic, the most important background of the whole world picture, even though at various moments the tone of the background may not emerge so clearly. As for the inter-connection between all the central antagonisms of the epoch, that emerges still more clearly, still more definitely, than when Lenin uttered the above words. Any intensification of the emancipation movement in any of the decisive colonial countries leads, one may say, automatically to an intensification of the relations with the Soviet Union. An activity, purely economic, market in its nature could combine with the activity of other factors only from the moment when, with the progress of the restoration of the capitalist mechanism (*i.e.*, of capitalist "stabilisation") the problem of disposal of commodities was laid bare as a central economic problem. The elimination of the colossal expanse of the Soviet State from the orbit of capitalist exchange was bound to intensify the struggle among the capitalist States for the remaining markets. And on the other hand, this intensification of the problem of markets was bound to lead to a redoubling of the tendency towards the armed overthrow of the proletarian dictatorship. Here all the factors come to one end: historical experience, and that experience becomes

the more interesting because it is bound to be doubly clear at the moment that the revolution captures any of the decisive capitalist countries.

### 3. THE DECISIVE ANTAGONISMS

Each of these central antagonisms must be the object of special study. Here we deal with them only briefly, in order to outline the general course of development, the general disposition in the structure of events, so to speak.

We begin with the Anglo-American antagonism. The world war, which led to the break-up of Germany and turned the law of unequal development to the advantage of America, made this antagonism quite inevitable, setting it in the place of the previous Anglo-German antagonism. During the first ten years after the war the rivalry between the two capitalist Powers went on in the economic sphere and outside "politics," so to speak. This was conditioned by a number of factors: the universal exhaustion after the war, the continuation of a state of "semi-war" in Europe, the indispensability of Anglo-American "co-operation" in order to restore the disintegrated capitalist circulation (and first and foremost, currency and credit circulation), and finally, a certain withdrawal on Britain's part in the first political trial of strength at the Washington Conference, consummated by Britain's "voluntary" renunciation of the alliance with Japan. The antagonism still preserved its diffused character, although the common base was apparent.

For the present period the characteristic feature is, that this antagonism has passed into a higher political phase; it has entered the scene of open political struggle, raising the question of the methods and resources for the struggle. That struggle is concentrated around three issues:

The first issue is that of naval armaments. Both the Powers (as did Britain and Germany in their time) have entered the phase of difficult, prolonged and so far fruitless attempts to come to agreement. And in the course of this Britain is hastening to arrange an ally at her rear in the form of France, whilst the U.S.A. has entered upon an enormous construction of armaments with the object of forcing Britain to yield.

The second issue is that of the so-called freedom of the seas, *i.e.*, the question of trading rights in war time. The U.S.A. is no longer agreeable to Britain having sole control of the sea roads during wartime, since this forces America to the necessity of taking active part in the conflict, and that inevitably on the side of Britain.

The third issue in the political struggle is that of "pacifist" rivalry. Each country is striving to take under its control the task of "international peace." Britain's method is to exploit the scheme of the League of Nations, which is essentially a part of the Anglo-French "Entente." With this scheme is bound up all the military and colonial might of the strongest land of militarism—France, and all the complex and mighty system of the British Empire. The existing division of almost the whole colonial world between the two decisive colonial powers: Britain and France, is in one form or another covered and sanctioned by the League. The League is the incarnation of the post-war Versailles legitimism, it is the organ for maintaining the "status quo." On the contrary, American "pacifism," the pacifism of the mightiest country in the world, yet one which is still only just winning itself a corresponding "place in the sun," concentrated in the policy of the "open door," represents a more flexible, more fluid system, one better preserving its possibilities for the future. In accordance with this, the League is more than a scheme, it is, as we know, a whole complex mechanism. But the American pacifist schemes, such as the pan-American alliance, in general, retain the more rudimentary form of doubtful agreements such as the Kellogg Pact, in which no mechanism like that of the League of Nations is involved. To outward view the rivalry of these pacifist schemes is something on the lines of a noble competition for the more certain guarantee of peace. In fact, it is a struggle over the issue of who is to "control" peace and war between the nations, who is to decide the question of the "legality" of war in each separate instance, who is to compel the participation of others in that war. Hence the endeavours of Britain and France by one way or another to draw the United States into the orbit of the League. Hence also the United States' vacillations between the hope of being able to hold her own in the League itself, and



the calculation that she will better safeguard her independence and her hegemony by the more gradual method of "isolation," together with fluid peace agreements such as the Kellogg Pact. In this sphere of higher and more complex intrigues, the struggle of the two decisive imperialist States for world hegemony, finds perfect expression.

The intensification of the Anglo-American antagonism has already manifested as one of the factors in the re-orientation of British policy in relation to the strongest Continental power: France. Here we have an eloquent example of how with the entry of the central world antagonisms on the scene, they embrace the other less essential antagonisms, even those of a Continental scale, and draw them into their system. Is not that a sign of the times?

In this sense, there is the restoration of the "Entente" which had its clear expression in the famous "naval compromise," that restoration is undoubtedly a remarkable fact. Will the fact of a "left" government coming to power in Britain lead to a complete destruction of this new "Entente"? That is still an open issue, although the whole system of the present-day "equilibrium" is undoubtedly much more precarious than that of the pre-war days. The leaders of the Labour Party have demonstrated their entire adherence to the "continuity" of foreign policy. As we know, MacDonald was the joint author of the "Geneva Protocol," which embraced many of the fondest aspirations of France; at the London conference of 1924 the same MacDonald by no means displayed any especial liberality towards the German side. Nor, finally, may we forget that in the determination of the policy of the Conservative Government no small role was played by the colossal changes in the latest methods of waging war. There has been an extraordinary growth in the importance of submarine, air and chemical warfare, and all this led to an increased importance in France's strategic positions in regard to her British neighbour, by depriving Britain of the traditional advantages accruing from her island situation. In the event of a conflict France, with her enormous war resources, could be only the ally or else a most dangerous enemy of Britain. The British Admiralty's sudden outburst of affection for France is merely the con-

verse side of the fear which France inspires. A further accentuation of the Anglo-American rivalry would lead inevitably to a struggle between Britain and America for the decisive influence in French policy. So far France is cleverly exploiting this state of affairs in order to consolidate her already strong positions.

All this sets its impress on the middle-European "problem" also. The aforementioned facts have transformed the German "problem" preponderantly into a problem of Franco-German relationships. To a considerable extent Britain has renounced her post-war role of "protector" of conquered Germany, of mediator and arbiter between Germany and France. The Paris conference of "experts" can hardly essentially bring with it anything more than some transitional decision. The Allies' demands do not allow of any radical reduction of the German tribute. The reparations problem is essentially a problem of "transfer" and a problem of inter-allied debts. But the problem of "transfer" (i.e., of converting large sums, reckoned in foreign currencies) comes up always against the same old problem of markets. Only a maximum development of export can assure Germany the necessary payment resources. And the problem of inter-allied debts, which in the last resort have to be wiped out by Germany, is in dependence on the lack of desire on the part of the United States to subject her former allies' obligations to any further reduction. Hoover, the nominee first and foremost of the industrial concerns, has even the reputation of being a particularly irreconcilable opponent of revisions of agreements on war debts.

Of course, with the increasing diminution of America's internal debt, the question of payments on these allied debts is becoming less and less an issue of financial importance, and increasingly a political weapon which she will not let out of her grasping hands cheaply. But for this very reason it is difficult to foresee all that the future may bring with it in this regard. In order to emphasise the extent of the possibilities concealed within that future, I cite a few lines from the work of a certain American banking "expert."

"If an agreement were realised between France and the United States, if it became possible to co-ordinate policy in the Pacific Ocean, giving especial attention to the exploit-

ation of Indo-China as a naval basis in the event of a possible armed conflict, it would then be possible to regulate the payments on more favourable conditions. To ensure this, the United States might receive certain unimportant French colonies in the Carribean Sea, paying more than the market price for them. The appointment of Claudel, an expert on Eastern questions, as French ambassador to Washington in 1926 would render such conversations possible." (W. R. Batsell, *The Debt Settlements and the Future*, Paris, 1927, p. 124.)

All this sounds rather like a poor joke, or, perhaps, the fruit of an idle imagination. But how eloquently crude it is! What ideas do not get engendered in connection with the debts problem! The purchase of "unimportant" colonies, a naval base in Indo-China—not so very far from Singapore!

Consequently, America's unconditional and complete renunciation of the idea of revising the inter-allied debts (and consequently Germany's reparations burden) would get her nowhere. We should not forget either, that America's banking capital, which is bound up with the problem of international credit, is itself interested in cleansing the channels of world currency-credit circulation from purely "political," i.e., State indebtedness. Thus in the U.S.A. there are also internal contradictory elements.

But in any case all this is the "music of the future." So far, the reparations problem serves as a focussing point for the intercrossing and refraction of all the innumerable contradictory elements in the modern capitalist world, and the intercrossing of these elements is hardly likely to permit of anything more than a transitional, temporary decision at the present international conference. It is difficult to conceive of any new "plan" playing the same role of turning point, by its political and economic consequences, as did the introduction of the Dawes Plan in 1924. At that time, this assembling of the first reparations mechanism indicated the beginning of the "stabilisation" of European relationships; it closed the era of extraordinary chaos and anarchy in international economic and political relationships. At the present time such a sharp break is not possible. Of course, any considerable reduction of the reparations tribute, its "com-

mercialisation," the creation of any more perfect reparations mechanism, would be bound to create new binding threads between modern Germany and the Entente powers. That is indisputable. But the re-organisation of the Dawes system will not settle either the problem of Germany's Eastern frontiers, or the question of national union (i.e., union with Austria) or the question of the developing contradictions between the country's economic strength and her international political situation, a contradiction which finds its highest expression in her degradation to the level of a second-rate war power.

At the same time, the intensification of the Anglo-American antagonisms and the growing financial link with the United States must inevitably complicate the so-called "western orientation." For "the west" is itself becoming a dialectical conception. In these conditions it is difficult to regard the policy of bourgeois reformist Germany as a completely homogeneous and stable system. With a growing *rapprochement* with the capitalist Powers this policy will become more and more a triangular one, i.e., a policy of manœuvring between the countries of the Entente, the U.S.A., and the Soviet Union. Of course, any prolonged complication of the reparations problem, any crisis in the Dawes system, would involve a certain weakening of the connections leading to the West. On the other hand, the arrival from any quarter of a *fait accompli* in the sense of war operations and a temporary alliance between America and the "Entente" Powers along the class front line, would establish a completely new situation, of which it is difficult in advance to see all the definite forms and all the possible consequences.

In every way the situation here is one of instability, contradictoriness and a many-phased quality of development.

Whilst dealing with this same aspect of a changing world situation in connection with the intensification of antagonisms between the two imperialist giants, Britain and the United States, we ought to stop to consider the new situation in the Mediterranean (here the characteristic feature is Britain's mediation between France and Italy), and even more in the Pacific (where the characteristic feature is Britain's endeavour to effect a *rapprochement* with Japan). But owing to the lack of time I

must pass over these problems, merely noting their place in the general scheme of events.

I must also leave it to others to consider the second decisive antagonism of our day, the militant antagonism between the countries exploiting the colonies and the colonial peoples. This antagonism is destined to play an increasing role month by month in all the dynamic of modern development. How swiftly the attention of the British imperialists turned from their Chinese to their Indian anxieties, when they had hardly succeeded in sweeping back the first wave of the Chinese revolution! Truly we cannot complain of the weak tempo of historical development. And how characteristic is the impotence and the distraction of the British Labour Party, the possible governmental party of to-morrow, in face of the events in India, the unswerving development of which is compared by the Indian correspondent of the *Times* to the irresistible advance of a Juggernaut!

#### 4. THE THREE PERIODS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE CAPITALIST WORLD AND THE SOVIET STATE

Finally, permit me to deal in greater detail with the third decisive antagonism of our time, which sets all the capitalist world in opposition to the country constructing socialism. We have already noted that this is an antagonism of the highest historical importance: in it is embodied the greatest world antagonism of the entire epoch, the antagonism between capitalism and socialism, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and consequently it partly engulfs, partly deflects, the other antagonisms into itself.

What are the basic historical factors in the unceasing, constant hostility of the capitalist world to the republic of the Soviets? These factors can be schematically reduced to three:

The basic and decisive is the social, class struggle, the struggle of the bourgeois-capitalist counter-revolution against the proletarian revolution. And the struggle for the further enslavement of the colonies has to be related to this.

The second factor can be called the economic or imperialist in the broadest sense of the word: the striving to extend the markets for capitalist industry by *force majeure*.

The third factor might be called the international political, the imperialist factor in the more narrow sense. This factor, having a less universal, territorial character, arises preponderantly from those separate countries (predominantly Poland and Britain), who are hungering for this or that part of the territory of the Union, and which take a hostile attitude to the consolidation of any strong State whatever on the European and Asiatic east, to a certain extent even independently of its social and class character. This third factor is an additional stimulus with a more restricted radius of operations.

All these factors taken jointly, but especially the first two, and the first, above all, make the hostility of the capitalist world to the land of the socialist revolution the chief law of development of the entire epoch, make the danger of war on the U.S.S.R. essentially and historically permanent and inevitable. Only superficial reformist or liberal wittings, who cannot see farther than the end of their nose, and have regard only for the events of to-day, can fail to see this or deny its existence. The only question at issue can be that of fluctuations in the degree, in the actuality, of that danger, or in the alternation of moments of "breathing space" with moments of direct menace.

What are the chief factors making for a "breathing space," for a temporary protraction and complication of the development of the conflict? Again, they can be reduced to three main factors:

The first, which we call the social class factor, is the active opposition of the working class, the fear of revolution with which they inspire the bourgeoisie.

The second, which we call the economic factor, is the impulse towards the exploitation of the existing market possibilities, already available and developing under the Soviet regime. This is market opportunism, so to speak. The extreme need of markets is also reflected dialectically in its own way. It first drives towards aggressive action through the call for "all together" to open the market by force with the "prospects" lurking within it, of breaking down the regime of monopoly of foreign trade and the whole Soviet structure out of which that monopoly grows; then, on the other hand, the same extreme necessity of

markets impels them to a "*rapprochement*" with the land of Soviets, to a real exploitation of the existing possibilities. The crisis conditions of capitalist trade and industry and the competition of capitalist countries especially help to strengthen this second tendency. Both the tendencies can be active at the same time, each finding support from certain bourgeois strata and countries.

The third factor, which we call the international-political, is the profound antagonisms among the various imperialist powers: at certain, occasionally prolonged periods of time, these antagonisms render difficult the formation of a united front for armed struggle against the Soviet Union.

Taken in the aggregate, the combination of these three factors (of which only the first category has a decisive importance) gives as a result a state of instability as the most characteristic feature of the whole system of inter-relationships between the world of capitalism and the land of socialism: that instability of course harmonises with the general picture of universal instability which is so characteristic of all the present-day relationships, whether economic, social, international or internal.

But the foregoing is merely a general analysis on the abstract plane. In different circumstances the separate factors of both categories (i.e., of conflict and of breathing space) acquire different force, conferring a corresponding coloration and tempo on the international situation. Historically we can here also draw a broad generalisation and distinguish something in the nature of three periods!

The first period, which coincided with the emergence and consolidation of the Soviet regime in military battles, was characterised by a higher intensity of the first, decisive factor, of the first category, i.e., of the social-class struggle, passing into the international realm: the struggle between capitalist counter-revolution and the revolution acquired the character of an open foreign military intervention. On the other hand, during this period, which partly coincided with a still existant world war, the factor which emerged most strongly was the third factor of the second category, i.e., the antagonism among the imperialist powers, which had not yet ceased their war operations or who afterwards consummated those operations with an enforced peace. But

during the Polish-Soviet war the first, social factor, of the second category was manifested most strongly: i.e., the active opposition of the working masses to a counter-revolutionary war against the land of proletarian dictatorship. The contradictoriness, the "dialectic" of development thus reached its highest development during this period.

The succeeding, second period was characterised by a temporary drop in the activity of the counter-revolutionary class factor. Having subdued the first wave of revolution at home and in consequence feeling rather less strongly the immediate force of the social menace coming from the East, the capitalist powers wandered in the labyrinth of contradictions and absurdities created by the system of peace treaties. America "isolated" herself. In a certain sense Japan, rejected by Britain at Washington, was also "isolated." The operation of the antagonisms among the western-European powers, with its effect of restraining the class conflict with the Soviet Republic, continued to be manifested quite clearly in the "peace" conditions. Only with the overcoming of the Ruhr paroxysm did the "era of democratic pacifism" arrive. With the fresh participation of America, the antagonisms between the European States were smoothed over. The danger of the U.S.S.R. would have grown in corresponding degree, but the powers were absorbed in the restoration of the mechanism of capitalist economy, for during the preceding years they had come to realise the menace of its disintegration. At the same time the universal reaction of broad worker and even petty bourgeois masses against the continuation of the destructive war in other forms led everywhere to the dominance of pacifist phraseology, which was reconciled but poorly, with the open preparations for war on the U.S.S.R. After the possibilities of the internal market had proved to be swiftly exhausted, there was the beginning of the first searches for new market possibilities, which included the Soviet lands among them. With this search was associated ideologically the foggy hope of a gradual degeneration of the Soviet regime by the inclusion of the Soviet Republic in the world economic orbit. ("Lloyd Georgeism" in its different forms and variations.)

At the same time financial capital began to

restore its hegemony. Centripetal tendencies still predominated in British policy, being dictated by the vital necessity of restoring European capitalism. Anglo-American "co-operation" became the higher law of the corresponding "pacifism." In fact all this period of European development took its tone more and more from American capital, which abandoned its "isolation" for the sake of the "salvation" of Europe. The "era of democratic pacifism" opened the door to the "stabilisation" period.

Not one of the factors of either the first or the second category emerged with decisive force. The period was in general openly transitional.

The "third period" gradually crystallising on the basis of "stabilisation" and emerging clearly in approximately 1927, brought with it a sharp change in the situation. All the three conflicting factors: "counter-revolutionary class," "economic" and "imperialist" emerged with new force, and at the same time, fusing and interlocking. The comparative growth in economic strength and the return of openly reactionary governments to direct power (or the consolidation of Fascist governments) strengthened the offensive tendencies among the decisive sections of the bourgeoisie. The revolutionary movement in the colonial countries, and in China first and foremost, accentuated these tendencies, leading to a formulated outbreak of hatred. The counter-revolutionary class factor emerged sharply. At the same time the problem of the markets acquired extreme severity. Objectively and in the consciousness of the capitalist class the entire process of "stabilisation" (rationalisation, reparations and so on) hung on the problem of distribution. At the same time there was an increase of disillusionment in regard to the possibility of a gradual "re-education," of a gradual overcoming of the Soviet regime by its "peaceful" attraction into the world capitalist economic orbit. These illusions of "Lloyd-Georgeism," which the Trotskyist talk about as "Thermidor" and the decisive economic dependence of the Soviet Republic on the capitalistic world temporarily provided with fresh nourishment, were finally dispelled. This gave a fresh stimulus to the assumption that the problem of markets for capitalism in the East (the last remaining great potential markets) could be resolved by methods of violence

and force, and not by methods of "peaceful" gradualism. The operation of the "economic" factor interwove with the operation of the class counter-revolutionary hostility. To the imaginations of the most militant elements in the capitalist camp, the same way out was presented from both the social and the economic cul-de-sac. There was a simultaneous and parallel intensification in the question of the third factor—the imperialist factor in the narrow sense of the word. In the British conservative camp adventurist-imperialist elements gradually got the upper hand—the police, the military, the officials of the Indian department and the colonial department, the Asiatic "patriots," colonial capital—in a word, a heterogeneous coalition of defenders of "vested interests," and everything that is old, a coalition which would not be averse to cutting all the Gordian knots with one stroke. In Poland, adventurist-Fascist elements, a turbulent military Mafia came into power, with a strong impulse towards their British protectors, and representing traditionally the purely territorial appetites for part of the Soviet Union.

The process of the internal evolution of Polish fascism, accelerated and complicated in its tempo by the colossal economic, social and international difficulties which it came up against, has led of recent days to an undivided dictatorship within the fascist camp itself of the most unresting and unrestrainable militarist clique.

At the same time, European reformism, once more frightened by the enormous outbreak of the class struggle in Britain in 1926, everywhere accomplished yet another further phase of open evolution to the right, becoming still more closely interlocked with all the mechanism of the bourgeois capitalist State, and thus weakening all the restraining tendencies in that State. In the preceding period social-democracy was preponderantly the expositor of Anglo-American finance capital which was striving to overcome the worse forms of anarchy in international relations with a view to the restoration of the mechanism of capitalist economy. By pouring new juices into the capitalistic organism, and thus again strengthening the centrifugal tendencies behind every national State barrier and stimulating the class energy of the bourgeoisie, the

"stabilisation" process evoked a corresponding evolution on the part of the social-democrats. In all countries social-democracy is becoming the most flexible, the most "modern" politically realist guide of militarism, albeit hidden under pacifistic phraseology. (The German social-democrats build cruisers, Paul Boncour is the author of the French 1927 proposals on the question of "restriction" of naval armaments and the co-author of the naval "compromise" of 1928, and so on). The "left-wing" social-democracy, recognising its baselessness and frightened by the fresh explosions of the class struggle (the British, 1926, General Strike, the Vienna rising) are now openly capitulating to the "right-wing" reformists, either renouncing their "left-wing" phraseology or else giving themselves over to the most platonic and meaningless "left-wing" verbal chicanery, which is the worst method of deluding and corrupting the masses, who grow accustomed to phrases which bind their authors to nothing whatever, to the old impotent grousing, and to reconciliation with the hegemony of militarism and the preparation of war on the land of revolution.

Meantime, on the other side of the barricades the Soviet Republic was entering on its reconstruction period, on an era of accelerated and unswerving expansion of its industrial production, thus awakening new hopes among the leading sections of the working class in the West and a new confidence in the ultimate victory of socialism, but by that very fact accentuating the alarm of the whole reformist bourgeois world. At the same time new and considerable economic difficulties and contradictions, growing out of our own, out of socialist stabilisation, even infuse new life into the old dillettante conceptions of the approaching "end."

In distinction from the second period, in the international realm (and first and foremost, in regard to the U.S.S.R.) this third period is impressed with a pure British, Conservative-imperialist policy, in which the centrifugal, imperialist and class counter-revolutionary tendencies predominate.

All this in the aggregate has greatly increased, and is inevitably further increasing, the danger of war. Any policy of hostile encirclement and economic boycott logically leads

to war. The breaking of relations with the U.S.S.R. and the Arcos raid at one time compelled even "Vorwaerts" to beat the alarm and to talk about the danger of war complications. (In exactly the same way the revelation of the Anglo-French "naval compromise" resulted in a detailed elucidation of the minds of the German social-democrats.) Thus the accentuation of this antagonism also constitutes a distinctive feature of the "third period."

Does that mean that in this regard development is moving towards conflicts along a straight line, without coming up against any obstacles? That of course cannot be affirmed. Here also development is many-sided and complex, as it is in the sphere of the other central antagonisms of our day. And at this stage the operation of the various factors of the second category, *i.e.*, of the restraining elements, comes into evidence. First and foremost the social factor. The process of capitalist "stabilisation" has strengthened the offensive tendencies not only in one stratum of society, the capitalist elements, but undoubtedly it has in new forms quickened and strengthened the activity and revolutionary spirit of the working masses. This revived activity, this growth of class consciousness and class energy is revealed in various degrees and in various forms, but the actual fact of that growth is not open to doubt. It strikes one clearly in Germany and in France. Everywhere the reformists are defending their positions from the new pressure of the leftward-moving masses, with great difficulty, by new exertion of effort. But even in Britain, where after the defeat of the General Strike and the miners' lock-out, the years 1927 and 1928 were a period of the greatest ebb of strike wave for a decade, the victors in the 1926 struggle, the Conservatives, feel far from comfortable. At the elections they will suffer either overwhelming defeat or at the very least a considerable reduction in seats and a decline in prestige, and possibly the necessity of an alliance with the Liberals; in other words, a return to the old coalition. The only question is the extent of the defeat awaiting them. The Conservatives will be saved from this defeat neither by their "victory" of 1926, nor by the restriction of trade union rights, nor the abolition of the miners' seven-hour day, nor the suppression

of India and Egypt, nor the despatch of troops to revolutionary China, nor the break with the Soviet Union. It is true the enormous majority of the working class will still give their votes to the cowardly, arch-opportunist Labour Party, which is entirely tied to the tail of the bourgeoisie. But that party is already feeling the growing pressure of the working class acting on its class instinct, its class hopes and demands. It is characteristic that the closer they are to the elections, the more definitely do the leaders of the Labour Party have to declare in favour of restoration of relations with the U.S.S.R. These leaders will afterwards delude the masses a hundred-fold, but the above-mentioned fact of itself shows the direction in which the masses are tending. At the recent Birmingham Congress, both in the Labour Party Programme and in MacDonald's speeches there was no mention whatever of restoration of relations with the U.S.S.R. At the present moment, on the eve of the elections, both Henderson and MacDonald are loudly defending the renewal of "recognition."

The second, *i.e.*, the "economic" factor, is also exercising restraint. The problem of the markets is again manifesting its "dialectic." The severity of the whole economic situation, the threat of a credit crisis, the depression which has replaced a favourable situation in various countries, the increase in unemployment, are all having the effect of transferring the drive towards markets to more "peaceful" efforts, at least among certain sections of the manufacturers, to exploit and develop the existing possibilities opened up by the reconstruction period of Soviet economy.

Finally, the growth of centrifugal, imperialist tendencies in all the capitalist States as the inevitable consequence of "stabilisation" is leading to a new intensification of the international-political antagonisms within the capitalist camp. The clearest fact in this sphere is the Anglo-American rivalry. We have previously pointed out that it is already complicating all western European development. In the system of double-crossing which determines the policy of present-day Germany the line of the "western orientation" is of itself becoming more complex; Germany finds that her support in the U.S.A. provides a certain

counter-balance to her one-sided tie to, and dependence on, the Entente Powers. All these are merely details, but in the definite circumstance we are considering they are not entirely without a transient political significance. We have already dealt with the prospects of the Paris Reparations Conference and the limitations of its possible results. The difficulties of agreement between Germany and Poland are not only in the political sphere on the frontiers issue, but even in the incomparably less ticklish question of the trade agreement, the difficulties have proved to be much more considerable than could have appeared to anyone who, forgetting the existing and intensifying antagonisms, imagined that some "super-plan" of international stabilisation would be simply and swiftly enforced on both countries. In this regard there has been a characteristic "evolution" of the German social-democrats, who whilst in opposition were convinced advocates of Polish-German *rapprochement*, and who, on finding themselves in power and drawn still closer to the dominant agrarian and capitalist classes, had to "disillusion" themselves of the idea that this *rapprochement* could be accomplished easily. In any case, the antagonism arising from the struggle for expansion of Polish and German capitalism proved to be strong enough to have as a result a state of treatyless trade relationships which has now lasted four years. On the corridor issue Conservative Britain, forced to seek an alliance with France, has of recent years given least support of all to Germany's pretensions despite her unceasing attempts to draw all the forces of Germany into the struggle with the Soviet Union. (The advent to power of the Lloyd Georges and Snowdens might bring with it certain changes in this regard.)

Such in a very general outline is the picture of the inter-crossing tendencies. The tendencies making for development towards armed conflict, the war danger, remain the decisive and the most important ones; they are founded in the very nature of the antagonism, and as we have seen, in all the logic of development of the third period, the characteristic of which is the intensification of the decisive antagonisms of the epoch and the subjection of all other antagonisms to them. But that development is not proceeding, nor can it proceed along a

straight line. Here also, as in all the other spheres, the result is the extremely unstable situation, which is so characteristic of the whole epoch.

Crisis and instability, the absence of any firm, "normal" equilibrium, a profound confusion and contradictoriness of development, a fluidity in all the historical reality, an incessant flicker, which likens it to a bad movie, and on this super-mobile and badly lit background a growth of operation of all the central antagonisms of one day—such is the picture of the situation, and it is one profoundly volcanic in its character.

##### 5. "WHICH WILL COME FIRST?"

In this situation we hear the question from various comrades: Which will occur first, the imperialists' attack on the Soviet Republic or an "internecine" struggle among the imperialists themselves? If the question be asked in that form there can be only one answer. Probably the attack of the imperialist enemies on the Socialist Republic will come the earlier. For the antagonism of the bourgeois capitalist world towards the land of proletarian dictatorship is undoubtedly an antagonism of the higher historical order. For on the historical plane the bourgeoisie's hatred for the socialist proletariat is undoubtedly, indisputably stronger than all the other antagonisms. Consequently it is difficult to imagine a cruder and more dangerous error than to declare that the danger of war on the Soviet State is "less real" than that of war among the imperialist States.

But is the reality completely exhausted when we have said this? Have we not already seen that towards the end of the last world war the ruthless struggle among the capitalist powers was combined with war on the Soviet State? (engendering a "supplementary" war on the part of the newly risen Poland against the proletarian State). The present developments lead to an extreme interlocking of all the antagonisms. And even the growing hatred for the Soviet Union arises, as we have already seen, out of various sources:

not only out of the class counter-revolutionary antagonisms (which generally play the decisive role) but out of the economic market considerations, and even out of the coarse territorial appetites. Consequently the war with the Soviet Union, despite all the welding effect of the social class antagonism on the capitalist States, is arousing other appetites at the same time. One war easily creates a favourable situation for another. We have seen how the Great War created a favourable situation for a whole series of "little" wars (Polish-Soviet, Greco-Turkish, the seizure of Vilno etc.). The circumstance of any international war might easily be exploited by the Polish adventurists always ready for an attack on the U.S.S.R. A war on the U.S.S.R. may become a starting point for a war between separate capitalist robbers, but the fact of a development of war between the imperialist robbers would not unquestionably guarantee the U.S.S.R. from attack by one or another robber who would desire to exploit the "opportunity" and all the situation of war licentiousness. Any modern war contains the threat of world war, which in some way or other would draw everybody and everything into the vortex. The whole secret of the idea of "pacifist" ideology, the ideology of the League of Nations, and also essentially of the Kellogg Pact, is that henceforth "neutrals" cannot and ought not to be. Neutrality is stigmatised in advance as an international crime. The whole world, armed to the teeth, has to become one solid fighting camp in the struggle against the presumed "violators of the peace." At the same time the "international" war is increasingly conceived of as essentially a civil war against revolutionary countries, i.e., as a counter-revolutionary civil war.

Consequently it is difficult to prophesy so dogmatically which will come first. One war may give the signal for the other, the one is interwoven with the other. And a conflict between separate capitalist robbers cannot and must not have the effect of diverting our attention. The danger of war against the country of revolution is historically the most real, the most evident, the closest of all the possible dangers.