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From The New International, Vol. XXIV No. 1, Winter 1958, pp. 61–63.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’ Callaghan for the Encyclopaedia of Trotskyism On-Line (ETOL).
A History of Sino-Russian Relations
by Tien-fong Cheng
Public Affairs Press. 355 pps.
Many pro-nationalist books have been written in the United States. Some have been aimed at the liberals in an effort to reduce their antipathy toward greater aid to Chiang; some have aimed at consolidating the Knowlandites. A History of Sino-Russian Relations by Tien fong Cheng, how- [line of text missing] the internationalist moderates, the Eisenhower politicals – who are now at least thinking of revamping the U.S. attitude toward Stalinist China. For them, a “factual,” unsentimental, unadorned casebook is the indicated procedure; where the liberal desires social proofs and the Knowlandite wants Red-baiting, the moderate relies on more institutional descriptions.
Cheng serves up a lengthy background in his painstaking narration of Czarist investiture of the Chinese northern territories. This serves as evidence for his essential point: that the Communist seizure of power represents the culmination of a continual, unbroken pattern of Russian attempts to dominate China. For him, that is the real meaning of the Maoist revolution, since, in effect, he denies any indigenous character to Chinese Communism and considers the Chinese C.P. to have been simply a tool of Russian subversion.
Dr. Cheng’s accounts of Czarist Russia’s imperialist ventures into China is detailed and valuable for reference. He traces Russian expansion into Siberia culminating in clashes with tribes owing allegiance to the Manchus and describes the various treaties down through the years which gave Russia huge territories (Amur, Ussuri etc.), great military and economic penetration into Mongolia, Sinkiang, Manchuria, etc. Cheng then deals with the other imperialist powers and their roles in the rape of China, highlighting the conflicts of interest between Japan and Russia over Manchuria and the railways. Of course in this narration, the U.S. is the kindly foreign friend. Following his detailed backdrop of pure-1917 imperialist penetration, Cheng arrives at the Bolshevik revolution viz-à-viz China. One might think that the October Revolution itself was a topic of some importance to a consideration of A History of Sino-Russian Relations, however he gives it little attention.
>CHENG VIEWS THE CHINESE COMMUNIST Party as simply the mechanism of Russian subversion in China; and his lengthy discussion of the Kuomintang, the formation and role of the Communist Party and the Chinese Revolution of 1925–27 is utilized to prove his point. The revolution for Cheng was simply a patriotic one. The question of land reform, social revolution, the rights of workers are not dealt with. He portrays the Kuomintang as a vibrant, anti-warlord, anti-imperialist group devoted to Sun Yat-Sen’s famous Three People’s Principles (interestingly Cheng never mentions what they were).
Cheng accurately describes why the Kuomintang accepted the Chinese C.P. into its ranks and turned toward Russia; (1) because of the Versailles Treaty, (2) because of Russian guns and aid, (3) because of the need for organizational help, (4) because of the impact of the Russian Revolution on all Asia. He further states that the Communists immediately began to subvert the Kuomintang and attempt to seize control of this institution which had raised them from nothing and given them a place in a mass movement. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kuomintang had been a small group of intellectuals and bourgeois who more or less based their aspirations on the strength of warlords aligned to it. The Communists and the Russian “advisor” Borodin showed Dr. Sun the usefulness of the mass movement; the possibilities that could be obtained with the support of the workers and peasants. Borodin held the Communists in check to prevent precipitous or divisive action within the Kuomintang. In fact, the C.P.’ers participated in the raising up of the mass movement and then the curbing of it so as not to offend the bourgeoisie. Consequently, the revolution, the mass movement, and the Communists were drowned in blood by Chiang Kai-Shek. This, Cheng views as a positive accomplishment.
After the revolution was smashed, Stalin finally ordered the Chinese C.P. to insurrection, but at that point it proved disastrous. The remnants of the C.P. and its following became guerillas and wandered through China setting up Soviet Republics which were soon smashed. Finally, after the famous Long March they lodged themselves in northern China to reappear forcefully, years later, during the Sino-Japanese war.
One thing is apparent in the story of the Chinese C.P. It represented indigenous growth in Chinese society itself as well as a Russian instrument. For better or worse it was the only group with a real appeal to the workers and peasants during the 1925–27 revolution and in the following difficult period. Even as a Stalinized party it survived and even expanded. No group without roots in the society, without representing at least some of the aspirations and needs of the people could have done so. A simple Russian extrusion certainly would have folded. In general, the C.P. though isolated from it, followed the Moscow line in the period leading up to and including the War. Within that context, though Mao Tse-tung put forward serious ideological differences with the Russian ideology: instead of basing themselves on workers the Chinese CP found roots in the peasantry and, secondly, Mao formulated basic differences on the nature of the future state.
The seizure of Manchuria by the Japanese brought into being a series of different attitudes on the part of Russia, including at one point, the recognition of and a treaty with the Manchukuo puppet state. As part of the popular front line the Chinese C.P. entered into an alliance with Chiang against the Japanese invaders. Chiang had been primarily concentrating on fighting the Communists and the possibility of social reforms, and consequently taking only hesitant actions against the Japanese. The famous “Sian Incident” as well as pressure from large sections of the Chinese people forced him to make a new turn. But he retreated constantly before the Japanese and tied up huge armies blockading his “allies in the north.”
Cheng tries to place blame for the ineffectiveness of the Chiang-C.P. alliance upon the shoulders of the Stalinists. However, beginning with the Nationalist attack on the Stalinist 4th Army, the Kuomintang was clearly the more disruptive. A major portion of the difficulty was due to the dynamism of Mao’s legions and the corrupt, demoralized and extortionist character of the Central Government and its troops. The Stalinists were able to maintain popular support in the areas they controlled by dispensing reforms, manipulating the various strata of the peasant populace, establishing peasant armies and organizations with an illusory semblance of democracy. Consequently their areas of influence widened and they were able to generate large scale guerilla activity behind the Japanese lines. In contradistinction to this, the Nationalist government was unable to organize the areas under its control. They imposed unfair taxation, extorted the local populations, repressed the “uncontrolled” popular movements.
It is interesting to note that Cheng rarely refers to the question of corruption and when he does it is a passing statement about war and the moral climate it engenders.
Despite America’s attempts to mediate between the Mao forces and the Central Government in order to create a coalition regime, the hostilities broke out afresh. At the start of the conflict the Kuomintang won some victories, but quickly the picture reversed itself and the more poorly equipped Maoist armies completely vanquished the Nationalist forces. Cheng feebly ascribes this to logistical questions plus demoralization of Chiang’s troops due to being away from home for so long. The clear facts in the situations were that the C.P. legions were a dynamic new force capable of appealing to the Chinese masses because of its anti-capitalism, its land reforms, its pretension of democracy, and its concern with village problems. This program masked the emergence of a new totalitarian class force which never intended to give free reins to the people.
The Kuomintang armies fell apart due to the absence of any popular support, because of their inability to accede to any popular needs, their looting and their corruption. Nationalist troops, in fact whole armies, deserted or capitulated, leaving huge amounts of American arms for the Stalinists. Russian military aid to the Chinese Stalinists was negligible and the reason for the victory of the revolution was in large part indigenous to China – the inability of capitalism to organize Chinese society – and the absence of a socialist alternative.
Cheng ends his book with a “description” of Formosa as it now is and a statement that the Kuomintang will once again rule China. It is a hope as empty as it is pious. The Maoist regime will be overthrown by the body of Chinese people, but they will never tolerate a return of the corrupt Kuomintang.
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Last updated on 15 January 2020