

# WORLD OUTLOOK

## PERSPECTIVE MONDIALE

*Un service de presse ouvrier*

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 21 rue d'Aboukir, Paris 2, France

NEW YORK OFFICE: World Outlook, P. O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York, N. Y. 10010

Vol. 4, No. 7

March 18, 1966

<u>In this issue</u>	<u>Page</u>
General Suharto Takes Over in Indonesia . . . . .	1
Japanese CP Urges United Front Between Moscow-Peking . . . . .	4
The Cubela-Guin Trial -- by Joseph Hansen . . . . .	5
Chilean Miners Widen Their Strike Struggle . . . . .	8
Pentagon Steps Up War Propaganda Against China . . . . .	9
Bolivian Crowd Greets Barrientos with Rocks . . . . .	11
La Paz Political Police Fire at Trotskyists . . . . .	13
Military Junta Smashes Bolivian Workers' Radio Station . . . . .	14
Meeting of the MNR Bombed . . . . .	14
Leaders of Bolivian Mine Workers Held Prisoner . . . . .	15
Why Don't They Eat Words? . . . . .	15
The New Draft Program of the American CP	
-- by George Novack . . . . .	16
No Love for the Bomb in Palomares . . . . .	20
In Defense of the American Trotskyists	
-- by Pierre Frank . . . . .	23
An Embryonic Left Wing in the Italian CP	
-- by Sirio Di Giuliomaria . . . . .	27
Official Lies No Longer Convince Most Americans . . . . .	32
Documents:	
Unification of the Bolivian POR . . . . .	33

### GENERAL SUHARTO TAKES OVER IN INDONESIA

In what amounted to a military coup d'état March 12, General Suharto deposed Sukarno from power in Indonesia while retaining the former president as a figurehead. According to the Djakarta radio, Sukarno agreed to "transfer" his powers, thus in fact ending his "lifetime" presidency. A victory parade was at once staged by the Indonesian army in token of its conquest of power. And while the parade was going on, General Suharto issued a decree in the name of Sukarno banning the Indonesian Communist party.

Reba Hansen, Business Manager,

P. O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station,

New York, N.Y. 10010

# WORLD OUTLOOK

## PERSPECTIVE MONDIALE

*Un service de presse ouvrier*

PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 21 rue d'Aboukir, Paris 2, France

NEW YORK OFFICE: World Outlook, P. O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York, N. Y. 10010

Vol. 4, No. 7

March 18, 1966

In this issue

Page

General Suharto Takes Over in Indonesia . . . . .	1
Japanese CP Urges United Front Between Moscow-Peking . . . . .	4
The Cubela-Guin Trial -- by Joseph Hansen . . . . .	5
Chilean Miners Widen Their Strike Struggle . . . . .	8
Pentagon Steps Up War Propaganda Against China . . . . .	9
Bolivian Crowd Greet's Barrientos with Rocks . . . . .	11
La Paz Political Police Fire at Trotskyists . . . . .	13
Military Junta Smashes Bolivian Workers' Radio Station . . . . .	14
Meeting of the MNR Bombed . . . . .	14
Leaders of Bolivian Mine Workers Held Prisoner . . . . .	15
Why Don't They Eat Words? . . . . .	15
The New Draft Program of the American CP	
-- by George Novack . . . . .	16
No Love for the Bomb in Palomares . . . . .	20
In Defense of the American Trotskyists	
-- by Pierre Frank . . . . .	23
An Embryonic Left Wing in the Italian CP	
-- by Sirio Di Giuliomaria . . . . .	27
Official Lies No Longer Convince Most Americans . . . . .	32
Documents:	
Unification of the Bolivian POR . . . . .	33

GENERAL SUHARTO TAKES OVER IN INDONESIA

In what amounted to a military coup d'état March 12, General Suharto deposed Sukarno from power in Indonesia while retaining the former president as a figurehead. According to the Djakarta radio, Sukarno agreed to "transfer" his powers, thus in fact ending his "lifetime" presidency. A victory parade was at once staged by the Indonesian army in token of its conquest of power. And while the parade was going on, General Suharto issued a decree in the name of Sukarno banning the Indonesian Communist party.

Reba Hansen, Business Manager,

P. O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station,

New York, N.Y. 10010

The reactionary nature of the military coup d'état could scarcely be made plainer. Nonetheless the decree cited alleged "underground activities" by the Communist party, including "slander, aggravation, threats, rumors and armed activity..."

All the evidence now points to a renewed and intensified blood purge in the unhappy archipelago where estimates of the number of victims slaughtered either directly by the army or under its instigation run as high as 200,000 to 350,000.

Thus Sukarno's desperate attempt to redress the balance on which he formerly maintained power appears to have come to an end. On February 21, Sukarno, who already seemed to hold only a semblance of power, suddenly dismissed Nasution, the general who seized the reins of power on October 1 and initiated the massive witch-hunt for "Communists." Reports from Djakarta indicated that Sukarno had succeeded in splitting the generals.

With at least some power back in his hands, Sukarno sought to strengthen his left flank. He reshuffled his cabinet, bringing in figures opposed by the generals as "soft on Communism." Among them were Foreign Minister Subandrio and Minister of Basic Education Sumardjo.

This maneuver had no chance, however, of finding forces on the left strong enough to counter the army. The Communist party was shattered as an organization during the months of blood-letting. The top leadership was smashed, Aidit himself having been executed according to a number of rumors that gained in credibility as time passed. Party cadres were physically liquidated by the tens of thousands. The mass murder terrorized millions of workers and peasants, for they were totally unprepared to defend themselves. Sukarno found nothing to lean on toward his left.

The generals meanwhile held a series of secret meetings, in which they composed at least their major differences. One of their decisions, evidently was to depose Sukarno.

Moreover, they blocked Sukarno's efforts to bring the purge to an end. There appears to have been some subsidence of the mass killings, but executions still went on. [See World Outlook March 11.] In addition, demonstrations against Sukarno, organized by reactionary student organizations around such slogans as getting rid of Subandrio and Sumardjo, were not opposed by the army. In fact they appeared to be covertly encouraged and even instigated by the officer caste.

In face of this renewed assault, Sukarno gave in, and now appears to have reached the final stage of his political career -- a keeper of the rubberstamp for putting his name to decrees issued by the army. How long the generals will deem this to be a profitable game remains to be seen.

As for the imperialist reaction, this is sufficiently indicated by the March 13 New York Times: "In Washington the Administra-

tion found it difficult to hide its delight with the events in Indonesia. Officials believed that both President Sukarno and the once-powerful Communist party had taken sharp setbacks."

Writing from Washington, Times correspondent Max Frankel stressed the "delight" of the Johnson administration and indicated that the situation in Indonesia was the result of intervention in the internal affairs of that country:

"After a long period of patient diplomacy designed to help the army triumph over the Communists, and months of prudent silence while Mr. Sukarno appeared to be slipping, officials were elated to find their expectations being realized."

There appeared to be hope in Washington that General Nasution would yet emerge as the new "strongman" in Indonesia.

"The United States retained excellent contacts with the military leaders," Frankel revealed, "even after Mr. Sukarno had renounced American aid and had begun to move against American information libraries, the Peace Corps and news correspondents."

Frankel added: "The Central Intelligence Agency was known to have participated in some plots against him [Sukarno]. An American flier was captured by the Indonesians while flying for a rebel group."

Of all the lessons to be drawn from the success of the counter-revolution in Indonesia, one of the most obvious is Sukarno's role. In 1961 he was reported to have told Kennedy, "I am the best bulwark in Indonesia against Communism."

This was completely true. Sukarno's greatest single success as a bourgeois politician was to attract and to hold the support of the Indonesian Communist party. Instead of mobilizing the workers and peasants to take power in Indonesia and open up the road to socialism, the Indonesian Communist party under D.N. Aidit placed political confidence in Sukarno and depended on him both to safeguard its own standing and to lead the struggle against imperialism and indigenous reaction.

The result was a debacle for the Communist party on the scale of the one experienced in Germany with the rise of Hitler.

The Kremlin, of course, shares responsibility for the immense defeat in Indonesia, for Aidit was only practicing the line of "peaceful coexistence" developed by the Soviet bureaucracy.

Peking, too, helped pave the way for the counterrevolutionary victory in Indonesia. Despite the radical language and the many references to Lenin, Mao and his circle covered up Aidit's opportunist policies if they did not actively encourage them out of their own eagerness to please Sukarno as a diplomatic ally.

The end result was to weaken the world position of both the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, not to mention the



Democratic Republic of Vietnam and all the other workers states. This was one of the big reasons for the "delight" in Washington over the turn of events.

The main victims of the defeat in Vietnam are, of course, the workers and poor peasants who placed their confidence in the capacity of the Communist party to lead them in a struggle for power. They had to pay with one of the most monstrous slaughters of modern times for the illusions sowed by Stalin's heirs in Indonesia.

How long will it take them to rebuild from the ground up, this time constructing a leadership genuinely shaped in accordance with the principles of Leninism? A precise answer cannot be given to this question. But that the Indonesian workers and poor peasants will do it, is absolutely certain.

#### JAPANESE CP URGES UNITED FRONT BETWEEN MOSCOW-PEKING

The leaders of the pro-Peking Japanese Communist party have been urging the Mao leadership to join with the Soviet government in some kind of united action in support of the Vietnamese freedom fighters in resisting American imperialism.

The suggestion was publicly advanced in Akahata, official journal of the Japanese Communist party.

Agreeing with the Chinese that "modern revisionism" must be overcome in order to restore the unity of the Communist movement, Akahata nevertheless argues that "in the present situation it is not possible to put off or to delay international united action until the complete overthrow of modern revisionism is carried out."

A Japanese Communist delegation arrived in China February 10 and presumably has been discussing Akahata's proposal, which goes counter to the policy followed up to now by Mao.

Previously the main proponent of a policy of united action on a governmental level between China and the USSR, despite the deep differences between the Communist parties of the two countries, has been the Trotskyist movement.

The Trotskyist argument is that the common cause of the workers states as well as the world revolution has been damaged by Peking's rejection of any united front with "revisionists" until they reform and publicly criticize themselves.

Fidel Castro also urged united action in several speeches when Johnson first began escalating the war in Vietnam.

Seymour Topping of the New York Times reported from Hong Kong March 12 that the Japanese delegation had held unusually long discussions with the Chinese and that the Albanian ambassador had returned to Tirana possibly to report on the talks.

## THE CUBELA-GUIN TRIAL

By Joseph Hansen

The trial of seven men, accused in Havana of plotting to assassinate Fidel Castro, came to a swift conclusion. On the opening day, March 7, the main defendant, Rolando Cubela Secades, confessed that he was guilty. The following day a letter from Fidel Castro was read, asking the court not to impose the death penalty. The prosecutor at once dropped his demand for death; and in his summation the same day called instead for thirty years' imprisonment. On March 10 Cubela and Ramón Guín Díaz were sentenced to twenty-five years each; José González Gallarretta and Alberto Blanco Romariz to twenty years each; Juan Alsina Navarro to ten years; while Guillermo Cunill Alvarez and Angel Herrero Veliz were set free.

Details about the trial were sparse in the press outside of Cuba, and there were self-evident inaccuracies as in the names of the defendants, thus it is necessary to await further facts from Havana before definitive conclusions can be drawn. What was reported, however, can only arouse grave reservations about the nature of the trial which was held before a five-man military tribunal.

Thus Agence France Press reported from Havana March 1 that Rolando Cubela and Ramón Guín, two former leaders in the guerrilla struggle that overthrew Batista, had been arrested the day before on charges of "counterrevolutionary activities in complicity with the American CIA." The charges were stated at length in a Cuban government communiqué issued March 5. The most sensational part was the accusation that Cubela, a former leader of the Revolutionary Directorate and the top official leader of the Cuban student movement after the victory, had plotted with the CIA to murder Castro, using a high-powered rifle equipped with telescopic sights.

Exactly one week after being arrested, Cubela was in the prisoner's dock. If he had the benefit of legal counsel, it was not mentioned in the cable dispatches. During the four hours of the first day's session, the feature was Cubela's confession. According to the Associated Press, "He tearfully pleaded for conviction and a death sentence." "To the wall!" he cried. "To be executed, that is what I want. It is justified."

Here is the report compiled from various sources by the Paris daily Le Monde [March 9]:

"Before five hundred persons present in the courtroom, Rolando Cubela delivered an impassioned self-criticism. The former comandante declared that he deserved to be executed.

"During his deposition, Rolando Cubela said that in Madrid he had met the counterrevolutionary leader Manuel Artime, former civilian chief of the expedition at the Bay of Pigs, whom he accused of having personal ambitions and of acting under the instigation of the American government.

"Ramón Guín, who likewise admitted his guilt, said that he had never transmitted information of an economic nature to the CIA. The other defendants accused the CIA and its agents in Madrid, as well as an attaché of the United States embassy in the Spanish capital.

"I am an unstable character, filled with contradictions and weaknesses; I became dissolute, beginning with the day I abandoned the revolution. Because of my own corruption, I became an ally of the corrupted enemies of our people and our revolution."

"Pounding his chest, the former head of the guerrilla fighters of the Escambray, the leader of the revolutionary students, who in the very center of Havana killed Batista's chief of military security, Rolando Cubela, former comandante of the revolutionary armed forces, confessed everything and ended his profession of faith with Castro's celebrated cry, 'Country or death!'"

"Referring to his interview with Mr. Fidel Castro, who, in January, had called him in in order to try -- according to the charges -- to get him back on the right road, Cubela declared 'that he had never felt the least hate for Fidel, completely the contrary.'

"He cried out: 'I don't understand why I thought of committing such a foul and shameful act as wanting to assassinate the prime minister, hiding behind a window, using a rifle with telescopic sights.'

"This astonishing self-criticism," concludes the report in Le Monde, "rather surprised the foreign observers, who wondered if Rolando Cubela had not been promised that his life would be spared."

Was any concrete evidence placed before the court to show that Cubela's confession was truthful? If so, it was not included in the reports appearing in the foreign press. The March 8 issue of Le Monde mentioned only that in the official communiqué issued by the Cuban government it was stated that in a search of Cubela's quarters a rifle equipped with telescopic sights had been found.

Le Monde says nothing about any facts concerning when and where Cubela obtained the rifle equipped with telescopic sights. Nor is anything said concerning the extraordinary delay in carrying out a plot allegedly decided on in Madrid a year ago, in February 1965.

Many questions leap to mind which the court, one would think, would be concerned about clearing up. For instance, there is the strange parallel between the way in which Kennedy was assassinated and the way in which the CIA, together with Artime, plotted with Cubela, according to the prosecution, to assassinate Castro.

There is the cryptic reference to Castro's calling in Cubela sometime in January (a month before Cubela was arrested?) for a talk in hope of getting him straightened out. What was the subject matter of this talk? What had attracted Castro's attention to Cubela? If it was an overt course of action, how did this fit in with a conspiracy that was presumably under way to assassinate Castro? And if Cubela did not feel the "least hate" for Fidel, why did he not respond at

the time to the talk with the Cuban leader? Shouldn't Castro have been asked by the court to testify as a witness on the basis of this interview?

Not less important is the pattern of the trial itself, which is not without a certain resemblance to the notorious trials conducted at one time under Stalin. Did the court take this into consideration and seek to establish the evidence in such concrete detail as to eliminate the possibility of anyone drawing such an invidious parallel? Perhaps the court record will relieve any anxiety on this score, but the summary nature of the trial does not arouse much expectation that this will prove to be the case.

Castro's intervention to save the lives of the prisoners appears to have been not unexpected. Were there advance intimations that he intended to make a move of this kind? If not, how is the reaction of the "foreign observers" to Cubela's confession, reported by Le Monde, to be accounted for? What, specifically, caused them to have such an unfavorable reaction to Cubela's confession? -- a reaction, it should be noted, that does not redound to the credit of the Cuban government.

The letter from Castro, read in the court March 8, raises questions itself. Here is the account provided by the March 10 Le Monde, again compiled from Havana dispatches:

"In a letter addressed to the revolutionary tribunal, Mr. Fidel Castro asked that the death penalty should not be given the defendants. The prosecutor had demanded the death penalty Tuesday [actually Monday evening] against four of the defendants and thirty years in prison for the other three. In his letter the chairman of the Cuban council declared that the plot was 'one of the foulest and most repugnant acts' that had occurred during the seven years of the revolutionary government and that the death penalty, particularly for Cubela and Gallareta, would be a 'severe and natural punishment.' He said, however, that 'the revolution is strong,' adding: 'I ask you not to demand the death penalty for any of the accused.' The prosecutor, as a result, asked the court for sentences of thirty years in prison for the four men as well as for their co-defendants.

"After Mr. Fidel Castro's letter was read by the court, everybody stood up, the spectators, the judges, the prosecutor, the accused, and applauded with all their might. Many in the carefully screened audience, entirely Communist, felt relieved. Rolando Cubela would not be executed, the others neither. The memory of the young president of the revolutionary students had won.

"We will not advance by shooting three or four counterrevolutionary Cubans," said Mr. Fidel Castro in his letter. "Instead, let's work to make impossible the deviations, the straying away, the weaknesses, a heritage of a corrupted society. We will not forget the mistakes committed, and in view of the facts grave punishment is warranted. Nevertheless, it is necessary to prove our capacity to analyze happenings in order to uproot the evils from which we still suffer: parasitism, corruption and egoism. The revolution, victorious



and strong, can afford to be generous."

The speed with which Castro's letter was written and delivered to the court -- to be read on the second day of the trial -- is surprising. On the basis of what evidence in the first four-hour session of the court on March 7 did Castro come to the conclusion that the main defendants were guilty?

Perhaps even more surprising is the fact that two of the seven prisoners were released. The dispatches do not indicate the reason for this. Was the evidence against them insufficient? Were they falsely accused? How did they happen to get dragged into the same case as Cubela and Guín?

These and similar grave questions about the trial demand answers. It is to be hoped that these will be provided by the court record and that this will be published immediately and in full.

#### CHILEAN MINERS WIDEN THEIR STRIKE STRUGGLE

The class struggle in Chile has taken a decidedly militant turn since 7,000 miners at the Braden Copper Co., a subsidiary of the Kennecott Copper Corp., went out on strike January 3 at El Teniente, the world's largest underground copper mine.

In order to keep up with the skyrocketing cost of living, the miners had asked for a wage increase of seventy per cent. The company offered only thirty per cent.

The strike had political overtones inasmuch as the Frei government won office on a demagogic platform that aroused considerable hope among the populace. The miners' action was a sign of impatience over Frei's slowness in delivering on his campaign pledges.

Since then, sympathy strikes have flared at various other mines. On February 16, some 11,500 miners at four Anaconda Co. mines staged a two-day solidarity strike. After strikes at three other Anaconda mines, the government declared the strikes illegal and arrested twelve union leaders.

Finally, on March 11, police opened fire on copper miners in front of police headquarters in El Salvador. Five persons were killed and twenty-five injured. The struggle began when a crowd of 1,000 sought to persuade the night shift at the Anaconda mine not to report to work. Eighty-five police and soldiers went to union headquarters to "end" the demonstration. Met with "knives and rocks," they retreated but were followed by the crowd.

Defense Minister Juan de Dios Carmona informed leaders of the Copper Workers Federation that "further violence" would not be tolerated. President Frei was reported to be holding emergency meetings with government officials.

PENTAGON STEPS UP WAR PROPAGANDA AGAINST CHINA

The series of hearings on the war held before various committees in Washington during the past month has made much plainer the fundamental objective of Johnson's policy in Asia.

It is certainly not to export freedom, democracy and self-determination to Vietnam, as its propagandists advertise.

On the contrary, it seeks to break the national liberation struggle in the south and so frighten and weaken Hanoi that its leaders will stop assisting the National Liberation Front and pressure it to capitulate.

These dovetail into its larger aim to hem in Communist China. For this purpose official spokesmen have been depicting Peking as an aggressive, expansionist, imperialistic tiger, getting ready, like Hitler's Germany, to spring upon its nearest neighbors and spread its dominion as fast and as far as it can throughout Asia.

Cueing the chorus in this scare campaign is Defense Secretary McNamara who told the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy March 7 that China would be capable within two or three years of launching a nuclear attack on countries within 700 miles of its borders. China, he added ominously, would be able to make a nuclear attack on the United States in ten years.

He ignored the facts that the U.S. is the only power that has ever dropped nuclear bombs on crowded cities and that the Chinese leaders have often stated they would never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

McNamara also said he was "disturbed" over the power this growing arsenal had given China to support the "aggressive statements of her leaders." He failed to explain, however, just how either the bombing of north Vietnam or the crushing of the revolution in the south would immobilize or eliminate the alleged menace of China's nuclear expansion.

His reticence does not at all mean that this crucial matter is not up for consideration. Indeed, the issue of how to deal with China is provoking furious debate not only in public sessions but behind the scenes of official Washington.

In the seventeen years since the victory of the revolution in 1949 the United States has undeviatingly pursued the same policy of containment toward the People's Republic of China that it did toward the USSR from the stabilization of the Soviet Republic in 1920 to its recognition in 1933. Washington not only refuses to recognize Peking but is now bent on tightening its encirclement around her by every possible means.

Washington's present policy is to stop short of provocative steps which would bring China into defensive armed conflict, as in

Korea. However, such developments as the revolution in south Vietnam, the Sino-Soviet split, the growth of China's nuclear capability, and the reinforcement of American military installations in Southeast Asia have now brought forward two further questions for discussion and decision. Is containment and isolation adequate to serve the aims of U.S. imperialism's global strategy? And, are not the circumstances propitious for all-out war with China now to obliterate its nuclear potential and remove its challenge for generations?

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee scheduled hearings on China following its sessions on Vietnam precisely because many of its members are so alarmed, even frightened, about the intentions of the White House and Pentagon in regard to China. They know better than anyone outside the innermost governing and military circles that influential people are pressing for a preventive nuclear war with China and that this proposal has not been completely and conclusively rejected by Johnson.

The slant of the testimony given by McNamara and Rusk indicates that this option remains open. More than that, it may serve to prepare the way for such an eventuality if or when the administration should decide to embark on that deadly path.

Rusk was Assistant Secretary of State during the Korean war and his obdurate anti-Chinese stand is well known. "Secretary of Defense McNamara has seemed obsessed recently with worry over Red China," the syndicated columnist Drew Pearson reported from Washington March 10, "It appears to overshadow all his decisions in the Pentagon and his discussions with Congress."

The Senate has authorized the added appropriations the president requested for the extended war in Southeast Asia with only a few dissenting votes. But this vote did not show the extent of the opposition to his course nor the deep distrust of his ulterior aims among the dissident congressmen.

Pearson told of a private meeting held by critical Democratic senators to discuss what tactics to follow on Senator Morse's resolution to rescind the 1964 Bay of Tonkin Resolution which Johnson has been interpreting as a blank check for escalating the war.

The senators present grew very emotional over the dangers of war. McCarthy of Minnesota declared that "we've got a wild man in the White House, and we're going to have to treat him as such." (McCarthy was considered as a possible candidate for vice-president before Johnson chose his fellow senator from Minnesota, Hubert Humphrey.)

Senator Gore of Tennessee described the president as a "desperate man who is likely to get us into war with China, and we have got to prevent it. We all like the President, but we've got to stop him."

What are ordinary citizens to think -- and do -- when senators who have been warm supporters of Johnson sound like keepers in an

insane asylum confronted with the need to put a strait jacket on the head of the institution who has suddenly gone berserk!

These fears are not confined to one side of Congress. The oldest Republican in the Senate, Aiken of Vermont, has likewise expressed his private view that the president was headed for nuclear war with China.

This terrible possibility lurking behind the current military moves is all the more serious because it appears to be gaining ground among Johnson's closest advisers.

It lends the utmost urgency to the key slogans of the antiwar movement in the United States: Bring the troops home and stop the war now!

### BOLIVIAN CROWD GREETES BARRIENTOS WITH ROCKS

La Paz

After resigning as co-president of the Military Junta, General René Barrientos Ortuño took a trip abroad. As was inevitable, he visited the United States and Panama where he received precise instructions on how to conduct himself, as well as a "brain washing."

He stayed away for two months. During his absence he was proclaimed a candidate for the presidency in the coming July 3 elections by the so-called Frente de la Revolución Boliviana [FRB] made up of the MPC, PRA, PIR and the PSD.\* He returned to Bolivia Friday, March 4.

The Military Junta utilized the occasion to stage a demonstration in force. They sent a delegation of thirty persons to Lima to greet the general, a nonstop Lloyd Aereo Boliviano plane landing the party at the La Paz airport at 3 p.m. The entire cabinet, headed by President Alfredo Ovando Candia, welcomed him home. A squadron of military planes did stunts and the army and police set up controls on the roads and at the airport.

Wearing a bullet-proof vest, General Ovando Candia met Barrientos and took him in the bullet-proof presidential automobile to the center of town.

The night before, the entire city had been covered with placards and the walls had been painted with slogans favoring Barrientos. Cards with Barrientos' picture had been given to the shops to put in their windows and other cards had been strung on the electric lines. The city had a festive air, a natural extension of the political circus.

---

\*Movimiento Popular Cristiano, Partido Revolucionario Auténtico, Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, Partido Social Demócrata.

Finally, they had sent dozens of trucks to bring in peasants, and they tried to attract miners into joining in by offering them expenses of 170,000 bolivianos [12,000 bolivianos = \$1] for two days. (For a day of exhausting labor in the mines, a worker is paid 9,000 bolivianos.) A few peasants and some riffraff from several mines came in.

Nothing happened until the cortege reached the city. But from the Villa Victoria bridge onward, hostility was displayed against Barrientos and those accompanying him -- the leadership of the FRB, including Anaya (PIR), Guevara (PRA), Bozo (MPC), Siles Salinas (PSD candidate for the vice-presidency). Crowds of spectators lined the streets. As the cortege proceeded it was met with insults, pebbles, and in some places even tear-gas grenades. Barrientos was greeted with cries of "assassin," "murderer," "fascist," "starver" [hambre-ador], "agent of Yankee imperialism," etc., etc.

At the Pérez Velasco Plaza, three tear-gas grenades were thrown. Barrientos, who had got out of the bullet-proof car to proceed in an open automobile, turned back to the bullet-proof vehicle in a hurry. The chauffeur stepped on the gas, knocking over arches set up for the celebration. Bombs were thrown in the Prado, a place where followers of Barrientos customarily gather.

The building next to the headquarters of the COB [Central Obrera Boliviana] and the Mine Workers Federation [Federación de Mineros], the doors of which have been padlocked with heavy chains by the Military Junta, was taken by the FRB as a headquarters and meeting place. From the splendidly decorated balconies of this building, the leadership of the FRB and Barrientos nervously watched the incidents in the street, where more grenades were thrown and insults were shouted at Barrientos. They were able to speak after the police intervened with arms, wounding Velarde a university student leader.

A number of orators preceded Barrientos. When he began, the clamor again broke out. Barrientos stammered and prudently withdrew from the forefront of the balcony. The speeches were brief and the meeting was cut short.

A counter demonstration began as a protest over the wounding of Velarde. This ended with a crowd throwing rocks at the headquarters of the Partido Social Demócrata which are opposite the university.

Despite the multiplication of commissions aimed at attracting peasant interest, the peasants did not mobilize. Small groups of bureaucrats marched with peasant banners. Agents of the DIC [Dirección de Investigación Criminal] at Catavi, Siglo XX, Huanuni and some bureaucrats adhering to the PRA stood in as miners. All public employees were ordered to show up at the reception for Barrientos under threat of being fired if they did not. Army personnel out of uniform were also ordered to show up. The groups belonging to the FRB were prodigal with money.

But with all this, only about 3,000 persons turned out. The



hostile crowds were several times larger. The welcome organized for Barrientos, it can be concluded, was a failure. It revealed his lack of popularity, the resistance among the people to him. The FRB, made up of insignificant groups, is incapable of mobilizing the masses.

By way of contrast, the activity of the POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario] attracted attention. Barrientos' return gave the POR an opportunity to engage in action and demonstrate its capacities shortly after uniting.

During the night before the reception, squads engaged in painting slogans on walls. At the march and the meeting, numerous groups of members of the POR distributed small leaflets with sentences like: "Barrientos, Ovando, Murderers. Long live the United POR"; "Against Military Fascism. Long Live the United POR"; and so on.

Throughout practically the entire parade for Barrientos, POR publicity was to be seen everywhere, some of it being thrown through car windows into the faces of the officers guarding Barrientos.

Groups of workers formed around the demonstrating members of the POR, and they improvised lightning demonstrations that went right up to the leaders of the FRB, shouting: "Down with the Military Junta, Murderers, Assassins." They would then disperse in the crowd.

University students belonging to the POR displayed a globe with a triangular sign that read: "Military Murderers -- Long Live the POR."

Members of the POR were in the forefront of the incidents that interrupted the Barrientista orators in the Prado. The bourgeois press has maintained silence about the POR's action, or has attributed it instead to the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario] and the extremists in general.

The MNR and the PCB [Partido Comunista Boliviana] also distributed leaflets, but only on a small scale. The leaflets of the united POR dominated the scene.

Barrientos in the end did not dare accept the presidential candidacy offered by the FRB, saying that he would study the Bolivian situation and decide later.

#### LA PAZ POLITICAL POLICE FIRE AT TROTSKYISTS

La Paz

At 3 a.m. March 4, as two squads of members of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario [Revolutionary Workers party] were pasting up leaflets in the factory area of the city near the railway station, some twenty carloads of agents of the DIC [Dirección de Investigación Criminal], Bolivia's political police, pulled up and began firing their rifles.

Gabriel Guzmán, a railway worker and member of the Central Committee of the POR, was the target of several shots before being arrested.

The other Trotskyists, numbering about twenty-five, escaped the police contingent and went to other areas to continue their work. They saved all their leaflets from falling into the hands of the cops.

Other squads that went out the same night ran into scuffles but without major damage.

### MILITARY JUNTA SMASHES BOLIVIAN WORKERS' RADIO STATION

La Paz

On February 28, agents of the DIC [Dirección de Investigación Criminal], Bolivia's political police, smashed up the broadcasting equipment of Radio Continental, the station belonging to the Building Trades Federation [Federación de Trabajadores Fabriles] of La Paz, located in the Vino Tinto area.

According to the March issue of the underground newspaper, El Fabril, the vandalistic action was discussed and decided on at the February 22 meeting of the cabinet set up by the Military Junta. Minister of Labor Col. Samuel Gallardo Lozado was opposed, and the proposal gave rise to a sharp dispute.

During the events of last May, Radio Continental was silenced by mortar fire. Patiently and with considerable self-sacrifice, the building-trades workers repaired the station and were getting ready to resume broadcasting.

By again smashing up the equipment, the military government aimed at preventing a workers' station from competing on the air and breaking the monopoly on publicity held by the junta.

The building-trades workers reacted violently against the government and are demanding replacement of the destroyed equipment, stating that they are mobilizing and declaring a "state of emergency" until their demand is granted. The other sectors of the labor movement have expressed solidarity, condemning the fascist methods of the military.

### MEETING OF THE MNR BOMBED

La Paz

Under protection of Bolivia's political police, a fascist group belonging to the Movimiento Popular Cristiano, the party set up by the Military Junta, threw bombs at a house where ninety-two members of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario were meeting. The home belongs to one of the leaders of the MNR, Dr. Guillermo Jauregui Guachalla. No one was arrested, but the house was badly damaged. The incident

typifies the methods employed by the military dictatorship against political opponents.

### LEADERS OF BOLIVIAN MINE WORKERS HELD PRISONER

La Paz

Sinforoso Cabrera of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario and Pastor Alcócer of the Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria Nacional, both of them leaders of the Mine Workers Federation, were arrested some time ago for presiding at a workers meeting at the Kami mine. Two university leaders, Armando Velasco and Eduardo Belmonte, who were visiting the mines in connection with a campus-mine agreement, were also arrested.

Alcócer and Cabrera, who was held in the Alto Madidi concentration camp until recently, were brought to La Paz. The COB [Central Obrera Boliviana] and the Mine Workers Federation secured a writ of habeas corpus which they served on the head of the DIC [Dirección de Investigación Criminal] to secure the release of the two defendants.

To get around this legal move, the prosecution charged the two with criminal attempts against the security of the state. Thus they were sent to the San Pedro prison where another mine workers' leader, the Trotskyist Isaac Camacho, is being held under the same charge.

A national campaign has been launched to win the release of these revolutionary leaders. Already it has met with wide response among the masses.

### WHY DON'T THEY EAT WORDS?

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is chagrined over the reports in other countries that India faces famine. She told the Associated Press [in a dispatch printed March 13]: "There was a time when famine meant people falling down and dying like flies. If this is the meaning, then we don't have famine. If it means that there will be a period of considerable hardship, there is one now, and it is likely to worsen in a couple of months."

A notorious queen of France once quipped, when told that the people had no bread, "Why don't they eat cake?" The final rejoinder to her humor came in a guillotine.

The Indian ruler is even more cynical. "Famine? They've got the wrong definition."

But the hunger demonstrations now going on in India indicate a mounting impatience with the indifference of the rulers. There's a good reason -- the example of China which showed that one way to get a full rice bowl is to carry out a thoroughgoing revolution.

THE NEW DRAFT PROGRAM OF THE AMERICAN CP

By George Novack

The Communist party U.S.A. made public a new draft program the last week in February as part of a national turn it is taking toward more open activity. This move is a meaningful sign of the times on the American political scene.

For the past fifteen years the CP has had to function in a semilegal manner because of official prosecutions and unofficial victimizations. These objective difficulties, which have confronted the entire radical movement throughout the cold-war period, were compounded by the tactical errors of its leadership followed by the effects of the erosion of Stalinist monolithism.

At the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 the political committee of the Communist party estimated that fascism and the third world war were imminent in the United States and proceeded to revamp the party accordingly. Part of the leadership, including its present spokesman Gus Hall, who were indicted by the government under the Smith Act, skipped bail and went underground in conjunction with the constitution of a nationwide illegal apparatus involving scores of functionaries.

The membership was recklessly purged of "unreliable" individuals which reduced its effective forces one quarter to one half in several states. Conspiratorial fear and suspicion spread like a contagion through the disturbed, confused and decimated ranks.

The main political resolution adopted at its sixteenth national convention in February 1957 acknowledged that "the errors made by the Party in estimating various phases of the struggle against the war danger also influenced its judgments of the fascist menace, particularly in relation to attempts to outlaw the Party. This took the form of overestimating the scope, level and tempo of the process of fascistization under way generally. Our evaluation also tended to equate the attempted outlawing of the Party with fascism.

"This led to wrong organizational decisions in 1950, including conscious efforts to reduce the size of the Party membership...This led to the introduction of a system of leadership which virtually gave up the fight for legality, tended to accept a status of illegality and abandoned many possibilities for the public functioning of the Party...As a result...the Party needlessly lost thousands of members."

The efforts made by the CP at that juncture to stanch the hemorrhage were nullified by the convulsions arising from the Khrushchev revelations and the Hungarian revolt which split the leadership and shook the party from stem to stern. The mounting disillusionment, demoralization and disintegration were reinforced by the prolonged prosperity, the intense political reaction and the subsidence of social struggles during the 1950's. Many more thousands quit the

discredited party.

At the height of its influence in the early 1940's the American CP could boast of 100,000 members. Although Hall claims 12,000 for the party today, it is well under 5,000 with not too many activists among them.

The rebelliousness issuing from the insurgent youth on the campuses, the Negro struggle and the antiwar movement has infused new hopes in the tired, harassed and aging CP as it has reanimated the whole American Left. The CP has now unfurled its sails to take advantage of these fresh breezes.

Its new turn is facilitated by the general relaxation of repression over the past few years and more specifically by the November 15 ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court that individuals could invoke constitutional guarantees against self-incrimination and refuse to register their membership. At the meeting in New York where Gus Hall announced the new program he stated that this decision made it legal to be a member and Communists need no longer fear arrest and heavy fines for belonging to the party.

Hall said that the party planned to enter more candidates for office under its own banner and that its foremost theoretician, Herbert Aptheker, may run for Congress in Brooklyn this year.

Since November, CP members in various parts of the country have been identifying themselves for the first time in years and party units have been canvassing for recruits. For example, at Berkeley, California, Aptheker's daughter Bettina, prominent in the student free-speech and antiwar activities there, has proclaimed her membership and others have been following suit.

The resistance to red-baiting and the policy of nonexclusion for political views characteristic of the more militant protest movements has also encouraged the CP to operate more boldly in its own name. Thus the National Coordinating Committee on Vietnam, headquartered in Madison, Wisconsin, includes Arnold Johnson as official CP representative.

It may seem anomalous to an observer abroad that the CP should decide, or be permitted, to take such a step in the midst of a shooting war which finds U.S. imperialism arrayed against the Communist world. Why tolerate any freer play for the CP in its own domain while administration statesmen declare that the expansion of Communism must everywhere be contained at all costs?

It happens that Johnson's regime is not well situated to unleash a witch-hunt at home along with its escalation of military operations in Southeast Asia. The war is, as one senator remarked, as "unpopular as a rattlesnake." Critics of administration policy are to be found all the way from the national capital to the small towns. Not a few are in the top circles of his own party, as the recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings disclosed. Where will the administration start -- or stop -- if it should resolve to



cast a dragnet for dissenters?

This broad and diversified disagreement on foreign policy is a partial shield for the more radical opponents of the war. Washington knows it would be ill-advised to undertake a ferocious, large-scale, indiscriminate witch-hunt while its propagandists are striving so hard to justify its military aggression on the ground that the U.S. is bringing freedom and democracy to Vietnam. Not only its already skeptical allies but a sizeable segment of the American public would not swallow this contradiction.

This explains why Johnson felt constrained to give a personal pledge that there would be no revival of witch-hunting now, despite the flood of criticism against his policies in Vietnam. He stated this February 23 in New York in a speech accepting an unearned award as a "defender of freedom" while 5,000 antiwar demonstrators picketed the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel chanting: "Bring the boys home now" and "Hey, hey, L.B.J., how many kids did you kill today?"

Johnson's promises do not signify an end to legal harassments or victimizations either for the Communists or other nonconformist groups. Hall himself is presently under indictment for failure as an officer to register the party as a Soviet agency under the 1950 Internal Security Act. And the party is appealing its own November 19 conviction for nonregistration in a series of suits stretching over the past thirteen years.

On March 4 the U.S. Attorney General petitioned the Subversive Activities Control Board to order the DuBois Clubs to register as a "Marxist youth organization created and controlled" by the Communist party. These two-year-old clubs are the center of the CP following among the radical youth, although many members are simply rebels against the Establishment.

Two days after the government charges, the national headquarters of the DuBois Clubs in San Francisco was wrecked by a bomb explosion attributed to the right-wing conspirators. Hoodlums also attacked DuBois Club members in New York.

This first move by the administration against an organization opposing the war is meeting resistance from the antiwar forces. Yale Professor Staughton Lynd, who went to Hanoi last December on a three-man "peace mission," applied for membership in the DuBois Clubs "in sign of solidarity with the first peace group that the Government attacked." The Young Socialist Alliance, meeting in convention in Chicago at the time of the registration move, offered its full support in defense of the DuBois Clubs.

The previous 22 attempts by the government to produce registrations of other organizations have all bogged down in prolonged court proceedings. Although its provisions are extremely harsh, the registration move is primarily design to harass and discourage recruitment.

The March 9 New York Times pointed out that the move is likely

to have the opposite effect. "In the present mood of rebellion on many campuses the surest way to stimulate recruitment is to give the clubs ammunition for charges of repression or thought control. Many undergraduates will share the view of the American Civil Liberties Union that the action is intended to intimidate the organization in its protest against the Vietnamese conflict. The result will only be more members and more protests."

The one humorous aspect of the affair has been the widespread confusion between the DuBois (pronounced "DooBOYS") Clubs and the Boys Club headed by former Republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon. That notorious witch-hunter had to decry the identification of his reputable youth organization with the one cited by the Justice Department.

Despite these acts of repression, neither official policy nor American public opinion are presently directed toward a restoration of the relentless and multiplying persecutions at the crest of McCarthyism in the 1950's. In the current military terminology, the witch-hunting is a limited rather than an "open-ended" enterprise.

This is indicated by the State Department's granting of a passport to Gus Hall for a "world tour of inspection" in which he hopes to visit the Soviet Union, Cuba, north Vietnam and China, among other places. It did this after revoking Aptheker's passport for going on the unauthorized trip with Lynd to north Vietnam.

These two actions neatly reflect the ambivalent attitude of official Washington toward the CP. It is inclined to be somewhat more lenient toward a pro-Moscow party like the American CP than with a Maoist group like the tiny Progressive Labor Movement because of its feelers for an eventual détente with the Kremlin.

The new program of the CP, in its own way and for its own ends, also looks forward to and prepares the way for such an eventuality. It presents an "American road to Socialism" symmetrical with the English and Italian Communist versions of their own national path.

Despite a sprinkling of radical rhetoric, the document is thoroughly Khrushchevist in spirit and reformist in substance and outlook. It points to the doctrine of peaceful coexistence as the polestar for international and domestic politics. It proceeds from the proposition that the fight for world peace can be won and the threat of nuclear war averted without the prior conquest of power by the workers in the imperialist centers and while the monopoly capitalists retain their economic, political and military grip on the United States.

To implement the strategy of peaceful coexistence at home, the CP proposes to back up the moderate faction in the monopolist ruling class against the aggressive right-wing militarists. This is supposed to tip the scales decisively in favor of a peaceful attitude toward the "socialist camp" and the colonial liberation movements. Such a line of accommodation with the "accommodationists," known as

"coalition politics" in radical circles, led the CP to support such "lesser evil" Democrats as Kennedy in 1960 and Johnson in 1964.

Since Johnson "took over Goldwater's program" (which really was his own inasmuch as it has been revealed that the president and Pentagon had decided to bomb north Vietnam and escalate the war before the November 1964 elections), the most favored representative of the "peace-loving elements" in the eyes of the CP seems to be Senator Robert Kennedy.

Peking should pounce upon the draft program as a prize specimen of "revisionism." It envisages a peaceful, gradual, constitutional road to socialism and calls for the eventual establishment of a "new people's party" of an indiscriminate class nature, with an antimonopolist but not necessarily socialist program. Meanwhile, almost all the political activity of the CP takes place within the liberal precincts of the Democratic party with the conspicuously unsuccessful aim of rendering the policies of the governing party more "progressive" and "peaceful."

The American CP is not only one of the weakest in the West but one of the most subservient to Moscow. The Worker made a much milder protest against the trials of the Soviet writers Daniel and Sinyavsky than the French CP; it apologized in effect for the Kremlin prosecution. Gus Hall told a critical questioner at the New York meeting that he thought the erring writers should have been dealt with ideologically rather than criminally and then went on to say that every country has its own way of doing things and the severe sentences was "the Russian way."

Indeed, for the CP leaders there may be many "roads to socialism." But support for Stalinist thought-control trials in the Soviet Union and for capitalist politicians in the United States surely leads away from it.

#### NO LOVE FOR THE BOMB IN PALOMARES

Having finally confessed March 2 that the package, lost over Spain in a B-52 collision with a tanker plane last January 17, contained four H-bombs, the State Department appears to hope that the unscheduled incident -- so damaging to the carefully cultivated public image of an all-wise, all-protective Uncle Sam -- can now be quietly filed away under the heading of "slip ups, past and forgotten." It has been proved that plutonium, one of the deadliest poisons known, can be accidentally scattered over fields and towns without the least harm -- if it's done by the Pentagon. Moreover, the U.S. government has scraped up 1,500 tons\* of "earth and vegetation" to be shipped to the Savannah River nuclear plant near Aiken, South Carolina, which is presumably equipped to get rid of the radioactive-contaminated stuff. Finally, the U.S. ambassador to Spain frolicked

---

\*The March 3 Le Monde reports the amount is 6,000 tons.

publicly with the Spanish Minister of Information for a few minutes in the chilly water at the Palomares beach to show how safe everything is.

Unfortunately, despite the soothing State Department propaganda, all is not yet well in and around the small Spanish town. And not only because one of the H-bombs has not yet been located. For an informative report on this, we are indebted to the special correspondent of the Paris daily Le Monde [March 6-7].

He quotes an eyewitness on how it all began:

"For years, at ten o'clock in the morning, we could see how the planes were supplied. On January 17 four planes were flying over the village. Two of them fell in flames; the others managed to escape. We found the bodies of seven of the crew and we saw four survivors parachute down. We also saw some yellow parachutes falling like torches. Only later did we learn that atomic bombs were attached to them. From that time on we haven't had any peace here."

The correspondent describes the area as a barren one. Only a badly rutted dirt road leads to the little farming town with its patches of land where tomatoes, beans and cucumbers are normally grown.

"Why, before the Americans came," one of the inhabitants told Le Monde's correspondent, "the place was so quiet you could hardly hear a fly buzzing. Now we are almost all emigrants and we worked hard in France or South America so we could buy a little piece of land from the people in Cuevas de Almenzora [the town five miles away]. And now what is going to happen to us?"

Eight hundred Americans are camping in the outskirts of the village. A fleet of twenty naval craft with 2,000 crewmen are standing offshore in the Mediterranean. "On the road leading through the village to the contaminated area, heavy-weight trucks go and come, blazing red tank trucks, blue transport trucks, jeeps and tractors. They are working on the contaminated area, keeping it sprinkled, they told us, to hold the dust down, and putting the soil into big sealed cases to be shipped to the United States to the nuclear plant at Aiken. The American soldiers, in ranks of twenty to sixty, shoulder to shoulder, are scraping an area of more than ten square kilometers [about 2,470 acres]. They move ahead a step at a time, pushing over all the stones and picking up the smallest piece, the tiniest bit of metal. Behind them come men carrying Geiger counters. The soldiers working on the contaminated land wear white coveralls, high rubber boots, a gauze mask to protect their mouth and nose; helicopters skim the ground, shaking the walls of the small white houses. The bars used to open only in the evenings. Now they open before sunrise. Work begins at six in the morning."

As for the villagers, they have not been drawn into this frenetic activity. "People here aren't working," a peasant told the correspondent. "The whole day we move around like ghosts. Work? Why? At first, we couldn't. Now they've given us back our land, but how

are we going to grow anything if we don't even know if anybody will buy our crops? We've been cursed. Who is going to convince the buyers that we're not contaminated? If at least the papers would come out clearly. No, it was thanks to foreign radio stations that we learned some of the details."

Another peasant said: "Besides, they haven't given us any indemnity yet. We're only poor peasants. The Americans aren't in any hurry. But the bank's not waiting and it's presenting us with notes that we have to pay. If at least we could leave here! But who would buy our land? Nobody."

Le Monde summarized other remarks: "We were out for more than twenty-four hours, picking up bodies, and walking around the wreckage of the planes on contaminated ground. The doctors came later. When they detected dangerous radioactivity, they even burned the shoes and clothes of a lot of us. And we were wearing these same clothes for three days, playing with our children. Nobody told us about an atomic bomb or radioactivity. Who can tell us that our children won't show up with something wrong? If at least they had given us clear information."

In the fishing town of Aguilas, 12½ miles away, the story is similar. It was some of the Aguilas fishermen, who make a living netting shrimps and red mullet, that rescued the airmen who parachuted into the Mediterranean. "At first," said one of them, "nobody would buy fish from us. They said it was radioactive. We gave it away. My children and I ate it; we had no choice...Now it's still worse. People have begun to buy again. Shrimps have gone up again to 160 pesetas a kilo. But what has happened now is that nobody is fishing any more."

They haven't gone fishing since one of the bosses, Francisco Orts, fishing outside the restricted zone, found he could not pull in his nets; they were too heavy. He was able to tow them to one of the American ships standing by.

"The Americans immediately took the boat over," said one of Orts' comrades, "and for four days they stayed at anchor out to sea without a single Spaniard being able to come near. A helicopter flew away with the device they found in the net. The Americans said it was a block of cement, but nobody believes them.\*

"They gave 30,000 pesetas to the Catalans to pay for the damaged nets...And they restricted five more miles along the coast, exactly where you find shrimp. It meant ruin!

"Since then we have had to fish in a very narrow area, so no

---

\*From this report, it would seem that two of the H-bombs fell on land, setting off the ordinary explosives used as a percussion for the plutonium trigger. This blew open the bomb casings. The other two H-bombs, it can be speculated, fell into the Mediterranean, one of them later becoming entangled in a fisherman's nets and thus being retrieved. The fourth H-bomb has not yet been located.



one is catching a thing. And they say that the Americans are going to stay here a year. Up to now no one has given us any idemnity. Does that seem right to you? What are the authorities doing about it?"

For the past five years, an attempt has been made to build up the region for tourism. But this, too, has been affected. A real-estate agent told the Le Monde correspondent that foreigners are now beginning to draw back and to demand health guarantees.

"As long as things remain unsure," he said, "I don't think anyone will venture to come for a vacation on this beach. After this business only a fool would get the idea of coming here to rest. Tourists will go through maybe; but not to stop...I don't think so. So far as I'm concerned, I wouldn't bring my wife or boy to a place like this."

The general feeling of the area was expressed by the owner of a small boat in Palomares: "Bad luck has hit this village. Cursed be the bomb and the one who invented it."

#### IN DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN TROTSKYISTS

By Pierre Frank

[The following article has been translated from the February issue of La Quatrième Internationale, official organ of the Parti Communiste Internationaliste, French section of the Fourth International. The original title is "Une Campagne Perfide Contre les Trotskyistes Américains."]

\* \* \*

In the previous issue of our newspaper, we reported the World Congress of the Fourth International which was held in December 1965. Shortly after the present issue appears, a special issue of the magazine Quatrième Internationale will be off the press containing the political documents adopted by the World Congress. Everybody will be able to judge them, discuss them, even answer them, if he feels so inclined.

Whatever the case may be, we are certain that no other organization in the world will be able, any more than in the past, to offer the movements of the working class and the oppressed masses of the entire world such comprehensive theory and politics, constituting an answer to the imperious demand for an overall strategy in face of the world-wide counterrevolutionary strategy directed by American imperialism. Such an international revolutionary policy can be worked out only by an organization of militants linked through daily activities with all the big mass struggles, those of the workers of the cities and fields of Latin America, the African revolutionists, the Asian masses, the Spanish proletariat, the vanguard of the workers states, etc.; that is, by an International.

The need for an international strategy against imperialism leads to the holding of conferences like the recent one in Havana; but these conferences are burdened by confusion from all kinds of leaderships and the weight of the leaderships of states who give precedence to their national problems and to the interests of the bureaucracy over the general interests of socialism. The Fourth International is at present the only workers organization that is not linked to any bureaucracy whatsoever and that does not depend on the partial or passing interests of any privileged layer.

One of the outstanding features of the World Congress in December 1965 was the consolidation of the reunification carried out at the preceding Congress in 1963, and this in spite of all kinds of efforts to break it up or reduce it to a minimum. Certain groups here in France, that claim to be Trotskyist, have kept this up since the reunification, without answering the question raised by us in our pamphlet on constructing a revolutionary party: How can you attempt to work out Trotskyist policies outside of an international organization, outside the Fourth International?\*

The struggle against the Fourth International has taken a new, indirect form in recent months. For years it appeared to some people to be sufficient to denounce "Pabloism"; but this theme now appears still more run down at the heels due to the fact that the Fourth International broke with Pablo because of his publicly advocating positions rejected by the preceding World Congress. At present the Socialist Workers party, the American Trotskyist organization, has been taken as the target of these organizations hostile to the Fourth International. The SWP does not formally belong to the Fourth International because of laws in the United States forbidding workers organizations to belong to an International, but it warmly greeted the 1963 reunification and it has continued to express its political agreement with the International and its policies. The attacks against the SWP are all the sorer because the people now resorting to them formerly hailed the name of this organization.

In a painful brochure written by Stephane Just, the few pages devoted to the SWP were among the most frenzied. The effect of this brochure as a whole was exactly the contrary of that counted on; it was thus necessary to undertake another attack in a more adequate way. This has just been done by Pierre Broué in vicious fashion. In l'Ecole Emancipée, the bulletin of a tendency in a teachers union, he wrote an article on the appearance of a "new left" in the United States. This was the occasion which he utilized -- in an organ of this nature and in an article with pretensions at objectivity -- to devote himself to a perfidious and lying attack against the SWP. He writes:

"The Trotskyists of the SWP were not capable -- in contrast to the English Trotskyists of the SLL [Socialist Labour League] -- of utilizing and exploiting the disintegration of the [Communist]

---

\*Construire le Parti Révolutionnaire, by Pierre Frank. 21, rue d'Aboukir, Paris. May 1965. 29 pp. 2 francs [\$.40]. In French only.

movement following 1956. Led by old, often demoralized cadres, they seem to have settled on a main line of finding foreign substitutes for revolutionary action in the working class: ultra-Castroists, they followed up with black nationalism, making of Malcolm X a new Castro and at the same time conducting a campaign to send federal troops into the South! Sclerotic and bureaucratized, the SWP expelled, in violation of its own statutes, the leaders and founders of its youth organization, Robertson and Tim Wohlforth, each of whom has a small circle..."

The overwhelming majority of the readers of l'Ecole Emancipée are obviously unable to follow English-language publications; similarly they are unable to follow the internal life of the SWP, its internal bulletins, so that they could not ascertain whether Broué's two sources of information were expelled justly or unjustly. As in this case, we will not argue over the comparison with the English SLL which he uses. We could say a lot about it, but if Broué believes he can still find in the SLL the Communists who broke with the British CP in 1956, he should provide himself with a lantern.

We learn from him that Robertson and Wohlforth, who agree with each other only on fighting the SWP (the question of their own dispute is still a matter of argument between them), each have a small group. Yes, each one a group not numbering more than a few dozen members. But he forgets to say -- he cannot be ignorant of it, since the American bourgeois press mentions it and his friend Healy of the SLL is publicly disturbed about it -- that the SWP, this organization allegedly led by old, often demoralized cadres, has succeeded in winning to its own ranks and to the ranks of the Young Socialist Alliance, some hundreds of youth and that the Alliance is the strongest socialist youth organization in the American universities where it is conducting a courageous struggle against the war in Vietnam and for the freedom of the black people. Let us add, for Broué's information, that the age level of the SWP leadership has gone down considerably and that the "old, demoralized cadres" are the happiest about this.

But Broué goes beyond all limits when he attacks the SWP politically. Take the way he simplifies the positions of the SWP. According to him, the defense of the Cuban Revolution and the defense of the Negroes are "foreign substitutes for revolutionary action in the working class." It is unfortunate that in the United States the working class is -- as was generally the case in France in relation to Algeria at the time of the war there -- practically indifferent to the question of Cuba, if not, alas, following behind the State Department -- and not much concerned about the Negro struggle.

But Broué's attack has a political origin. It is necessary to recall that the organization to which Broué belongs has shown that it never understood the Algerian question, nor the Cuban question, nor the colonial question in general. One remembers that for the La Verité group, Messali Hadj was for a long time the quasi Bolshevik leader of the Algerian Revolution; and when it finally became completely clear that this champion was serving as a tool of de Gaulle, this group forgot that the Algerian people were continuing their

struggle against French imperialism without Messali Hadj. Broué and his friends probably saw support for the Algerians as a "foreign substitute for revolutionary action in the working class." It is likewise true that Broué's friends, for example the SLL, see Castro as another Batista.

As for the question of black nationalism, Broué's attack against the SWP testifies to ignorance in the problem of oppressed minorities; his implied policy would mean de facto subordination of the aspirations of the Negroes to tomorrow's revolutionary movement of the white proletariat; that is, stopping them sine die. Broué, for certain, is unaware that Trotsky, as early as the thirties, had a presentiment of the importance of the black movement and that he foresaw it as highly probable that it would orient towards a nationalism which could possibly go as far as demanding secession. And Trotsky, far from condemning such an orientation of the Negro movement, thought that this nationalism would be very progressive. What Broué writes about sending federal troops to the South is a mutilation of the question, because the SWP is utilizing precisely the fact that the United States government is sending troops to Vietnam, to Santo Domingo, and not to the South, to explain to the Negroes that they have no other recourse but to undertake their own self-defense. In his article, Broué cites the pioneer black in self-defense, Robert Williams, today a refugee in Cuba, forgetting to mention that he cooperated with the SWP in his actions.

Why, finally, did Broué forget in his picture of renewed political life in the United States, a phenomenon of great importance; namely, the circulation of tens of thousands of copies of Trotsky's works published in the form of pocketbooks? Why did he omit mentioning the appearance of a notable Trotsky anthology, The Age of Permanent Revolution, edited by our comrade of the SWP, G. Novack, and with a preface by I. Deutscher?

We could have understood a detailed political criticism of the SWP in the organ of the group to which Broué belongs. But to make a sneak attack in writing for an organ and a public that does not know what it is all about, while not so long ago a public debate on the tactical problems of the workers struggles was evaded, is not very creditable and does not stand up any better than Just's brochure.

The Socialist Workers party continues to carry high the banner of Trotskyism in the United States in the citadel of world capitalism. The Internationalist Communist party assures it of its complete solidarity in face of the attacks that are likewise aimed at the entire International and its sections. Attacks in the style of Just and Broué are only poor attempts to postpone the moment when their group will have to deal with genuine problems, those of belonging or not belonging to the Fourth International, those of the conditions and means of constructing mass revolutionary Marxist parties. Because the denunciation of "Pabloism" yesterday, of the SWP today, of traitors" or "worn-out" people, who are preventing the Robertsons, Justs, Broués and Healy's from assembling the masses, is an "argument" that becomes less and less impressive.

AN EMBRYONIC LEFT WING IN THE ITALIAN CP

By Sirio Di Giuliomaria

II.

Rome

Among the first reactions outside the Italian Communist party [PCI] after the October plenum of the Central Committee [see World Outlook March 11], one worth noting was the statement made by Santi, a former member of the secretariat of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] and one of the leaders of the left wing of the Italian Socialist party [PSI] with which the PCI leadership have sought to build a "united party." In the corridors of parliament, of which he is a member, Santi said that this was a dark period for minorities -- while the minorities in the PSI were being smothered by proposals for new statutes, Ingrao's position in the PCI (which he does not agree with) had met with a very bad reception. Santi pointed out that the person who had levelled the heaviest attack on Ingrao was Amendola, the one who initiated the discussion on the proposal for a "united party." In such an atmosphere, declared Santi, it is difficult to talk of a "united party," which "should be a people's, socialist, democratic and internationalist party, in deeds and not in words." Thus the PCI bureaucrats found themselves at a crossroads -- either allow internal democracy to develop, thus permitting the left wing to grow; or come down with an iron hand, thus giving up all chance of attracting the sectors of the PSI which they had been courting.

The pattern at the provincial congresses and later at the eleventh national congress showed that the majority of the party leadership tended toward the latter road. However, the general political mood was quite different from the one at the previous congress and the leadership could not ignore this.

The debate took place in two forms: written articles in the two main organs, L'Unita and Rinascita; discussions at the local and provincial congresses and at the national congress.

The written debate was, of course, more easily restricted than the oral. Articles were not censored, but many that took left-ist positions were not printed. The official excuse was "lack of space." In spite of this a goodly number of Ingrao's supporters, of various political shadings (the Ingraoists have little political homogeneity) succeeded in getting articles published.

The issues emerged most clearly at meetings of the rank and file. Here all the differences tended to break out into the open. This was due in particular to the following:

- Most of the rank and file, particularly Ingrao's followers, not being worried about the full timers losing posts, were mainly interested in discussing politically.
- The rank and file are not too keen about going in for



maneuvers like the ones employed at the top. Once the topics were placed on the agenda for discussion, they tended to draw the logical conclusions.

• The bureaucratic apparatus was not strong enough to put case-hardened leaders in charge of all the local congresses. In many cases meetings were conducted with either weak leaders or even leaders belonging to Ingrao's tendency serving as reporters.

On the whole an estimated one-third of the party members attended local meetings. This is a high figure for the PCI.

In the provincial congresses, the debate was less vigorous, the differences not so sharp. Nevertheless a fresh wind was blowing. A few congresses were won by the Ingraoists (Venice, Bari, Perugia, Pisa, Foggia, Taranto, Brinsisi, Terni, Vicenza, Pistoia); while in others, including the big cities, a consistent minority stood up for the left wing. In Rome, for instance, the left wing under the leadership of Pintor, Notoli, Jacoviello, Cini, Illuminati and others fought on political issues; and, in the elections for the top bodies, obtained good results. In Naples, headlines in the nonparty press were captured by the Ingraoists aside from the attention given to some openly pro-Chinese speeches. In Milan, where the bureaucracy exerted heavy pressure with threats, maneuvers and exclusion from the slate to be recommended for membership on leading bodies and as delegates to the national congress, about fifty delegates (including Rossanda and Coppola) held out against the bureaucratic offensive. The national leadership had previously removed Rossanda from her post as head of the national committee in charge of the party's cultural policy because of an article she wrote in Rinascita in which she attacked Togliatti's policy in the sphere of culture.

This was the climate in which the eleventh national congress opened in Rome. Longo's political report was not substantially different from his report at the October session of the Central Committee. The only new fact to be noted was a bloc between the right wing and the bureaucratic center (represented by Longo) along with a new push toward the right, especially in the so-called "dialogue with the Catholics," which was now no longer a dialogue with Catholic forces in the labor movement but a dialogue with the Pope and the Church. A similar shift was visible in attitude toward the PSI (Nenni's Socialist party) which was now approached as a whole. The idea of an alliance and "united party" constituted of the left wing of the PSI, the PSIUP and the PCI was therefore abandoned. Longo openly attacked Ingrao, particularly on the two issues that had been raised by Ingrao: the need to work out a program before contacting other forces and the need for more internal democracy and more publicity for the debates going on within the leadership.

Various bureaucratic devices were utilized to limit debate. These included offering the rostrum to foreign representatives and other fraternal delegates (about forty) which took up a good deal of time, and strict limitation of the number of speeches permitted by the chair. The result was that the Ingraoists, who had won about fifteen to twenty per cent of the delegates were not given even propor-

tional time. Some of their speakers who were granted the floor were not even the best among them or the most representative of the Ingraoist positions. Others were granted the floor under the most disadvantageous conditions; i.e., at the beginning of the morning sessions when many delegates were just arriving.

In the commissions of the congress (the Political Commission and the Electoral Commission) in charge of bringing in nominations for the leading bodies, the left wing was scarcely represented. In the important Electoral Commission, the Ingraoists were represented by one person (Reichlin) in a body of fifty-two, that included the top leaders (Longo, Alicata, Berlinguee, Scheda, Pajetta, etc.).

In spite of these unfavorable conditions, Ingrao held out against the heavy direct and indirect pressure. He made a speech openly critical on various issues although he was less explicit than he was at the October session of the Central Committee.

- Center-left government. The party has abandoned the perspective of a "more advanced center-left." This should be made clear to the masses. Meanwhile a new program should be worked out. The struggle for achievement of the program ought to create the conditions for a general alternative to the present situation. In stressing this point, Ingrao probably intended to alert the party rank and file against any repetition of supporting a new edition of the center-left government on a "more advanced base." This was in the air at the congress, since the government had just fallen.

- The unity of the leftist parties is important, but achievement of this objective must proceed through elaborating an alternative program that can stimulate the mobilization of the masses and become the program of the left as a whole. This was directed against Amendola, who supported the idea that first unity should be sought and then a program should be worked out jointly by all the forces that agreed to unite.

- The suggested program should be developed along two main lines. The first concerns foreign policy. With respect to this, it should be underlined that Italy's economy and politics are part of a world system and should be opposed with this in mind. The unity of the international Communist movement is essential.

- The second concerns economic policy. The problems of today are not only conjunctural but structural. Basing himself on the idea included in the theses presented to the congress that a new economic policy is required to liquidate both the ancient and more recent heritages, Ingrao said: "We propose to the left as a whole, as the sole alternative to monopolist developments and without hiding that this involves deep institutional reforms, a new type of economic management, a strong permanent mobilization of the country, hence a modification of power and class equilibrium. This does not mean that we ignore the problems of gradualness; a program, too, has its political and economic tempos. However, it is one thing to implement a program gradually; it is another to introduce contradictory and partial elements in a policy and a machinery going in a different direc-

tion. Arguing against Amendola, Ingrao declared that state intervention in the field of publicly owned corporations is not sufficient; it should be extended to the "decisive sectors in the hands of the monopolies."

- A weak point was Ingrao's seeming acceptance of the idea that a contradiction exists between "Catholic consciousness" and capitalist reality. However, even on this point Ingrao indicated differences with the right wing, emphasizing that the basis of the "dialogue with the Catholics" should be problems of the family, the emancipation of women, of women, urban society.

- Ingrao's last point concerned internal democracy. "Comrade Longo," he said, "expressed very clearly his preoccupation over the question of the 'publicity' given the debate. I would not be sincere if I said that I had been convinced." After insisting on his wholehearted acceptance of discipline and unity and opposition to the formation of factions, Ingrao emphasized the concept that there is no unity without democracy and no democracy without unity. He concluded his speech with an appeal to work for the party.

A real ovation greeted Ingrao, continuing until he reached his seat. While most of the party secretariat sat on their hands and did not even congratulate Ingrao for giving what was probably the best speech at the congress even from a formal point of view, the now recognized leader of the left did something not seen among the party leaders for a long time -- he thanked the delegates by raising his clenched fist in the old Communist salute.

Ingrao's speech drew fire from quite a number of subsequent speakers, notably Pajetta and Alicata, who distinguished themselves with their sharp criticisms. The few Ingraoists able to get the floor did little to answer the arguments thrown at their leader. Among the "old party leaders," Secchia offered some support.

As for the Communist Youth, the speech made by National Secretary Occhetto testified to the shameful capitulation of the national leadership. It should be pointed out, however, that this did not reflect the political situation in the local and provincial congresses, where a number of young cadres took firm and courageous stands. The reason for the discrepancy lies in a peculiar characteristic of the present leadership of the Communist Youth.

The Communist Youth constitutes a kind of "transition organization," in which young cadres are formed before taking their places in the party organizations. Traditionally, leadership in the Youth has constituted a springboard for leading posts in the party. As leaders in the Youth, young cadres come in touch with the top bureaucrats, are flattered and corrupted by them, and learn how to become specialists in the current underhand maneuvers which play such a big role in the party's daily internal life. Thus it happened that Occhetto, on the eve of leaving the youth organization, sought to demonstrate that he is no longer dangerous and that he can safely be included in the top level of the party. It also happened that the post of National Secretary of the Youth becoming vacant, other

members of the youth leadership were stirred to demonstrate their capacities to handle the post. Two candidates are now fighting for the job: Claudio Petruccioli, who is seeking the support of the left-oriented rank and file while at the same time taking moderate positions in order not to ruffle the party leadership; and Pio Marconi, who has turned sharply from very radical to very opportunist positions, becoming the chief candidate of Pajetta and Alicata.

Under the circumstances a split vote on the theses was not to be expected. They therefore received unanimous approval. The differences that had been openly voiced were reflected better when the slate for the new Central Committee was submitted. A hand vote was taken on this. Votes were cast against Pajetta on the one side and Pintor on the other.

The right wing and the center heavily predominate in the composition of the new leading bodies. First of all a new body was set up -- the Political Bureau, standing between the "Direzione" and the National Secretariat. The size of the Central Committee was increased while its functions were considerably reduced through its being divided up into "working committees" and being placed under three leading bodies: the "Direzione," the Political Bureau and the National Secretariat.

The main leaders of the left wing were eliminated from the Central Committee. Thus, despite the increase in size, names like Coppola, Zandigiaco, Paolicchi, Milani and Garratana cannot be found in the new list of members.

In the "Direzione," Ingrao and Reichlin were included, while the number of members was increased to thirty-one. In the Political Bureau only Ingrao was included as a left-wing representative. The National Secretariat is completely dominated by the bureaucratic center, both Ingrao on the left and Amendola on the right being eliminated.

In spite of its limitations and defects, which are even more glaring from the viewpoint of principles, the eleventh congress of the PCI was a milestone in the development of a new left in Italy. For the first time since the early days, a real left-wing tendency, visible to everyone, has appeared at all levels in the PCI. Although this tendency received only weak representation at the national congress, it includes roughly around twenty-five to thirty per cent of the rank and file; and, even more important, the political level of the left wing, from Ingrao right down to the bottom, is much higher than that of the rest of the party.

The impact made by this tendency at the congress can be considered satisfactory if the conditions under which it had to operate are borne in mind. Most of its members, in fact, consider that they did well at the congress. In any case the main thing is that they emerged, gained a certain understanding of the tasks lying ahead and formed an embryonic organization. New steps ahead, however, can be made only through a better, clearer and firmer political orientation. On the tactical level, a number of illusions that the left wingers

entertained about the party's "democracy" were punctured. Many of them even came to understand that excessive efforts to reach a political accommodation with the party bureaucrats is useless and that it weakens the position of the left by making its political positions less intelligible to the rank and file.

The bureaucratic center emerged stronger in a formal way, especially through the consolidation of Longo's personal power, which was accomplished, among other means, by resorting to the old methods of the "cult of the personality" (awarding a gold medal to Longo at a special ceremony in the congress, devoting a great deal of space to statements by the General Secretary of the party, etc.). However, this is but a stopgap in the present situation -- the days of a monolithic PCI are gone forever.

[End]

### OFFICIAL LIES NO LONGER CONVINCING MOST AMERICANS

The nerves of the American people are getting on edge over the escalation of the war in Vietnam, in the opinion of Pete Hamill, columnist of the liberal New York Post. "There has probably never been an American war that has caused such profound uneasiness," he writes in his March 8 column. "If you move around a little, you hear the same things said in Miami or Las Vegas as you do in New York. What are we doing there? Why aren't we winning? How can we get out? Very few people think that it will end in nuclear disaster, but many think it could last for years. An even larger number believes that its own government is lying."

"Even some of the pollsters agree," Hamill continues. "Late last year the Opinion Research Corp. did a poll for the Columbia Broadcasting System, and one question concerned the truthfulness of official U.S. information about Viet Nam. Only 15 per cent believed the government was 'always' truthful; 13 per cent thought it was 'almost never' truthful; and 67 per cent believed it was 'sometimes' truthful. It is not one of the polls Lyndon Johnson yanks eagerly from his pocket."

Why don't most American people believe the government? Eisenhower's lies about the U-2 spy plane were not decisive; nor were Kennedy's lies about the Bay of Pigs invasion. But with these precedents, the long succession of lies issued by the Johnson administration in various fields finally led to a qualitative change.

Hamill lists a number of official lies but overlooks a truly colossal one -- Johnson's campaign for office in 1964. (The Post was for Johnson.) Millions voted for the "peace" candidate. Then, shortly after being sworn in, the peace-loving Johnson put the warmongering Goldwater's platform into effect. A lot of voters came to the conclusion that a man who talks like Johnson but acts like Goldwater is quite likely to be lying when they see his mouth start flapping.

## UNIFICATION OF THE BOLIVIAN POR

[For some years the Bolivian Trotskyist movement has been split into two wings, each designating itself as the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Revolutionary Workers party). In 1963, following the Reunification Congress of the Fourth International, efforts were initiated to unite the Bolivian Trotskyists. This led to an announcement last June that the two sides had begun formal discussions. Already, however, the two groups were acting in common in many areas of the country. The difficult conditions under the military dictatorship have hampered the normal process of discussion; but on the other hand the severe repression exercised against the entire labor movement has tended to bring the revolutionary vanguard together. On February 17 representatives of the two sides signed a unification agreement, the text of which was released to the press. The following is a translation made by World Outlook.]

\* \* \*

The conversations and negotiations on unifying the POR, which were announced June 15, 1965, have ended successfully with the following agreement:

(1) Ratification of the June 15, 1965, communiqué.

(2) Constitution of a united leadership with representatives from the Trotskyist groups. The united POR will function under this single, centralized leadership, composed of a Central Committee and Political Bureau. Comrades Guillermo Lora and Hugo González Moscoso will be in charge of the National Secretariat.

(3) The organs representing the POR on a national scale will be Masas [Masses] as the political newspaper, and Lucha Obrera [Workers Struggle] as the magazine of educational and theoretical orientation.

(4) The unification of the POR corresponds to the needs of the Bolivian revolution on the road to overcoming the present crisis in leadership, and to the deepest aspirations of the masses in their struggle to forge a solid vanguard capable of leading them to power, defeating imperialism and its national servants.

(5) The Partido Obrero Revolucionario will act in accordance with the following line:

(a) Fight with all means against the Military Junta which has inaugurated a fascist regime aiming at physically destroying the trade-union, political and labor organizations, while at the same time annulling democratic rights, lowering wages, increasing unemployment, etc., etc. The POR will struggle shoulder to shoulder with the Bolivian people in defense of their social conquests and their interests.

(b) The present fascism is nothing but the accentuation of

the totalitarian tendencies of the right which were part of the Movimientista\* regimes which ended up prostrate in face of imperialism.

(c) The strategic objective of our struggle is nothing other than establishing a government of the Bolivians themselves; that is, a workers and peasants government, which presupposes an alliance of the exploited of the cities and the mines and fields.

(d) The evolution of national policy and the presence of a Military Junta in power has imposed and will continue to impose an armed struggle by the masses against the military hierarchy, the unmitigated instrument of imperialism.

(6) In view of this, the POR as a united party, calls on all the Marxist Leninists, the Trotskyists, and all the workers in the country, to support the Trotskyist unification and to energetically support the growth and strengthening of the POR.

La Paz, February 17, 1966

Filimón Escóbar

Hugo González Moscoso

On instructions from  
Guillermo Lora  
PARTIDO OBRERO REVOLUCIONARIO

PARTIDO OBRERO REVOLUCIONARIO

---

\*Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario [Revolutionary Nationalist Movement] of which Paz Estenssoro was the leading representative.