

Where is Gorbachev's 'perestroika' headed?



Steelworkers demonstrate in Montenegro, Yugoslavia. The specter of such an upsurge in the Soviet Union keeps Gorbachev awake at night.

Horvat-Picture Group

Growing worker unrest forces party shake-up

By CARL FINAMORE

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev returned from a September visit to Siberia in a hot sweat. People there were "at my throat," he said on Soviet television. Apparently, Gorbachev heard an earful of complaints—and for good reason.

People are fed up. There has been a steady and serious decline in the Gross National Product (GNP)—particularly in agricultural production—in the last two decades. And these figures have continued to drop since Gorbachev took over as general secretary of the Communist Party (CPSU).

Exiled dissident Alexander Amerisov presents an accurate picture, confirmed by numerous other reports, when he writes: "Gorbachev's policies ... have backfired, producing misery for the Soviet people rather than benefiting them. Wages are down. Prices are up. Shortages are even greater than under Brezhnev."

The skepticism of the Soviet people toward the economic reforms is, therefore, quite understandable. It also explains why the bureaucracy has been consciously moving slow in implementing *perestroika*—that is, economic restructuring involving the introduction of capitalist-type market mechanisms. The bureaucrats want

to avoid a flare-up with the working class.

While increasingly bold expressions of public dissent have been appearing for some time, it was the heat Gorbachev took in Siberia that finally convinced him to make some rapid-fire political moves aimed at removing the resistance to his reform program among "hard-line" sectors of the bureaucracy.

He immediately convened an emergency session of the Supreme Soviet and got himself elected president. Several other changes were made to strengthen his leadership in the CPSU.

Gorbachev's goal is to satisfy the minimal social needs of the population

before impatient workers and peasants begin to utilize democratic openings of *glasnost* to raise their own program. The bureaucracy is desperately trying to avoid a massive political confrontation with the working class like the one that began in Poland years earlier when similar economic austerity "reforms" were introduced.

China has also just reported that strikes took place in 19 cities this past summer in reaction to *perestroika*-type price increases.

In short, Gorbachev is in a race to keep *perestroika* ahead of *glasnost*. But, paradoxically, it is precisely the introduction of *perestroika* "market reforms" which makes a confrontation with the working class and poor farmers inevitable.

Latest government shake-up

Among the most important recent leadership changes made in the CPSU was the elevation of Vadim A. Medvedev to a full seat on the CPSU politburo. He was

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SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT



Is Gorbachev returning to Soviet democracy?

By CARL FINAMORE

When the Soviet Union launched the world's first satellite in 1958, Sputnik entered overnight into the vocabulary of every language. Two new words—*glasnost* and *perestroika*—have also rocketed to our attention, but with much more down-to-earth objectives.

Soviet economic, political, and social structures are being overhauled and, in some cases, wholly replaced. Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev describes his sweeping reform efforts as a "revolution without shooting."

Seeking mass approval for his policies, Gorbachev has dissociated himself from the extreme political repression and forced-march economic measures of Josef Stalin's 30-year rule. Gorbachev says he is for "freedom of speech, the press, conscience, assembly, street processions, and demonstrations."

And while there have been significant democratic openings at all levels of society—openings which the Soviet masses are seeking to break wide open—Gorbachev is delivering considerably less than he promises.

Less than one year ago the Communist Party (CPSU) newspaper, *Pravda*, warned against the growth of unofficial political clubs and condemned advocacy of opposition political parties or independent trade unions.

"Their activities sometimes take on a clearly illegal character," the newspaper said in a front-page editorial, referring to newly organized unofficial political clubs. "Without the permission of authorities, they organize demonstrations, even disturbances. They illegally print and disseminate literature hostile to socialism."

In May 1988, the most prominent of the independent magazines, ironically named *Glasnost*, had its equipment confiscated, its files and manuscripts destroyed, and its editor jailed. There are numerous other examples of Gorbachev complaining that too much freedom to criticize his policies will "introduce confusion into society."

In addition, Vladimir Khlebanov, who in 1977 founded the country's first independent union, the Free Interprofessional Association of Workers (SMOT), has been in psychiatric detention since 1978. All efforts to secure his release, as well as that of the other SMOT co-founders, have been labelled acts "of imperialist destabilization" by the ruling Communist Party.

Back to Lenin?

Despite this poor record, Gorbachev would like the Soviet workers to believe that his proposals for changes in the nation's political structures amount to a return to Lenin. In his address to the May 1988 Central Committee, where he outlined these changes, Gorbachev stated that

"the party acted in this very way in Lenin's lifetime and under Lenin's leadership."

But does *glasnost* really mean the introduction of genuine soviet democracy as conceived by the revolutionary founders of the Soviet state? Hardly.

The heirs of Stalin's political machine are introducing reform measures which, unlike early Bolshevik policies, are exclusively designed to retool their cumbersome and grossly inefficient bureaucracy.

In particular, in order to increase labor productivity, it has become absolutely necessary to relax the iron grip of the centralized bureaucracy over virtually all aspects of the economy. The bureaucracy is being reshuffled, but it's the same old deck of cards. Gavriil Popov, a chief Gorbachev adviser, admits as much when he notes that "the tempo of change will be determined by how fast the apparatus learns new ways to lead."

Among the winners in this new deal of the cards will be factory managers and local economic administrators. The rights of the workers and the factory committees are peripheral to the real purpose of Gorbachev's reforms—which is the strengthening of the role of the managers.

The "State Enterprise Law," enacted Jan. 1, 1988, will invest managers with control over the use of profits for reinvestment or as workers' bonuses. Even the clearly stated right to elect managers is subject to

"confirmation by the superior body."

Zhores Medvedev, a leading Soviet dissident, says that Gorbachev is not proposing "self-management ... in any real sense. He talks about self-management in the context of the need to restrict ministerial interference [with decisions of the managers]."

A revival of factory committees with control of production is one of the factors Lenin and Trotsky stressed would result in increased productivity, elimination of waste, and preparation for workers running the government.

But Gorbachev's reforms are not aimed at increasing workers' control of their enterprises. Their goal is to legitimize the power of managers.

Democracy for austerity's sake?

Polish Solidarnosc developed in reaction to the same policies which Gorbachev wishes to introduce into the Soviet Union. [See accompanying article on Gorbachev's economic reforms.]

Gorbachev has admittedly watched Poland's experience very closely. He has observed the failure of the discredited Polish Communist Party (PUWP) to institute price hikes and other economic "reforms."

Realizing that the Soviet CPSU also lacks the moral authority to successfully impose *perestroika's* austerity program, Gorbachev has turned elsewhere. He wants



The Russian Revolution was based on an alliance of the working class and the peasants, who were the vast majority of the Czarist army.

the soviets (councils) to give the stamp of approval for his anti-working class economic package.

To achieve his purpose, he must invest the soviets with a carefully crafted democratic image. Gorbachev claims that he desires to limit "functions performed by the party and state bodies and [to] restor[e] in full power the soviets at all levels."

His most ambitious plans are to be implemented in April 1989, when the Supreme Soviet will be replaced by a freshly elected Congress of People's Deputies.

But how can this Congress really represent the interests of the workers and peasants when the Soviet government still denies basic political rights to the population?

Gorbachev's soviets

Originally, the soviets were democratically elected councils that developed throughout Russia in the months leading up to the 1917 insurrection. They were made up of delegates from mass organizations representing millions of workers, peasants, and soldiers.

Since that time, the influence, power, and rights of the soviets and other mass organizations have been completely usurped by the Stalinist Communist Party. None of the *glasnost* democratic reforms will fundamentally reinvigorate these soviets or mass organizations.

For example, to ensure bureaucratic political dominance of the soviets, no other socialist parties are tolerated. The hundreds of new independent political clubs are also closely monitored and harassed.

Boris Yeltsin's downfall as Moscow CPSU chief occurred after he allowed a wide range of independent socialist clubs to hold a national convention where numerous anti-bureaucratic resolutions were passed, including one resolution favoring a multi-party system.

It is impossible to speak of soviet democracy when dissenters—particularly those seeking to return the Soviet Union back to the path of Lenin and Trotsky—are not allowed full political rights, including the right to form parties.

The glaring absence of soviet democracy can be seen in the recent election of Gorbachev as president of the Supreme Soviet. He was elected in a one-hour session by a vote of 1500 to 0.

Real soviet democracy

The Bolsheviks under Lenin and Trotsky repeatedly emphasized the critical role of mass organizations through which the majority could actively participate in government. Lenin's theses on democracy were adopted by the First Congress of the Communist International in 1919.

This report stated that "genuine democracy ... is possible only ... by enlisting the mass organizations of the working people in constant and unflinching participation in the administration of the state."

For the first time in history, the workers, peasants and soldiers—the overwhelming majority of the population—controlled the government. In fact, the Bolshevik program went further. It called for the workers and peasants to *be* the government.

"It gives those who were formerly oppressed," Lenin said, "the chance to straighten their backs and, to an ever-increasing degree, to take the whole government of the country, the whole administration of the economy, the whole management of production, into their own hands."

The Bolshevik leaders' broad appreciation for "mass participation" in government has nothing in common with the narrow parameters of *glasnost*.

Several parties in bitter opposition to the Bolsheviks functioned in the soviets. They ran elections, circulated their press, and organized meetings and demonstrations.

After the revolution, their rights were fully guaranteed by the Bolsheviks. In fact, the Bolsheviks actively solicited the participation of Soviet opposition parties in the government. But only a small left-wing section of the Socialist Revolutionary Party agreed for a brief period to join the government.

The other parties took up arms against
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Policies of Stalin's rise echoed in new reforms

By JOANNE VINCOLISI

Since coming to power in 1985, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has regularly leaned on the early record of the Bolsheviks for his support, hoping that it will provide the necessary historical and theoretical precedents for his current policies.

While shoveling more dirt on Stalin's political grave, Gorbachev has resurrected a popular Bolshevik leader, Nicolai Bukharin, to accomplish this task. Bukharin was the chief architect of Stalin's economic policies from 1923 to 1928.

Bukharin and Stalin claimed to base their policies on the New Economic Policy

relationships would have eliminated the capitalist "world market" profit criterion for trade. A new trade basis between countries would develop commensurate with the expansion of productive capacity, eventually leading to a generalized system of planned economy in distribution as well as production.

Revolution makes detour

But these post-World War I revolutions failed. The young Soviet republic was isolated and on the verge of economic collapse after four years of imperialist armed intervention.

In 1921, immediately after the civil war,

NEP as quite simple: "Industry should supply the rural districts with necessary goods at such prices as would enable the state to forego forcible collection of the products of peasant labor."

But a major dispute soon broke out in 1923, with Trotsky on one side and Bukharin and Stalin on the other. It involved defining the exact character of production incentives. This may appear to have been a rather academic discussion. It wasn't. The results radically altered the future course of the Soviet Union, with many of the same issues resurfacing today.

Trotsky urged a steady increase in

different approach—one which is remarkably similar to today's *perestroika* reforms. They introduced capitalist profit incentives to increase production. This only aggravated the imbalance between city and country, while intensifying the oppression of poor peasants by rich landowners, or kulaks.

Perestroika's role model

Bukharin told the peasants to "get rich." Both he and Stalin encouraged the kulaks to let supply and demand market mechanisms exclusively determine the price of their products. Unfortunately, a large number took this advice seriously. A broad layer of rich peasants and middlemen, the "NEP-men," developed.

Millions of peasants refused to sell their grain to the government unless prices were continually raised.

This price-gouging siphoned away scarce government capital needed to build up industries in the cities. Indeed, kulaks were getting rich, but the cities were starving. By the spring of 1926, over 60 percent of the grain destined for sale was in the hands of only 6 percent of peasant proprietors.

The most ambitious rich peasants even tried to find ways to sell grain for a higher price on the world market, thus violating the monopoly on foreign trade exercised by the Soviet government. If they had been successful in circumventing the government's trade monopoly, there would have been even less grain available for the hungry Soviet people.

Everything came crashing down in 1928. The kulaks convinced the middle peasants to hoard grain and foodstuffs in a calculated joint effort to blackmail the government into raising prices.

"The working class," Trotsky wrote, "stood face to face with the shadow of an advancing famine."

Forced collectivization

Reeling in panic at the threat posed by the kulaks, the state bureaucracy, under Stalin's leadership, broke with Bukharin. Its reaction was brutal. Agricultural products were taken from the peasants with bayonets. The kulak threat was eliminated by attempting to dissolve 25 million individual peasant holdings into 2000 collective farm units within a three-year period.

This forced march toward collectivization caused long-term damage to Soviet agriculture. Millions of peasants were politically alienated from the Soviet regime. And economic results were no better.

Trotsky writes that "the collective farms were set up with ... equipment suitable ... for small-scale farming. In these conditions an exaggeratedly swift collectivization took the character of an economic adventure."

The forced collectivizations of 1929-31, were a tragic and unnecessary result of the grievously mistaken policies promoted for five years by Stalin and Bukharin. Unfortunately, these same policies serve today as the model for *perestroika*. ■



(NEP), which the Bolsheviks adopted in 1921. This is not completely accurate. Though some elements were similar, the strategy pursued from 1923 to 1928 was completely opposed to that of the Bolshevik Party under Lenin and Trotsky.

Stalin's and Bukharin's reactionary approach flowed from their defeatist orientation of building "socialism in one country." Lenin and Trotsky maintained the traditional Bolshevik theory of linking the fate of the first workers' state with the advance of the world revolution.

The early Bolsheviks stressed the need for socialist revolutions in every country, especially Germany. It was considered self-evident that the young Soviet republic could only survive with financial credit, raw materials, and tens of thousands of skilled workers supplied by other victorious revolutions.

Non-exploitative international economic

factory production was one-fifth of the pre-war level. The collapse of productive forces surpassed anything history had ever seen.

A devastating chain reaction took effect. The peasants refused to supply food to the cities because factories were not producing commercial products in exchange. The peasants buried their harvested crops, saving them for a better day.

Under civil-war pressures, the government was forced to militarily requisition agricultural products. But that "military communism" policy had to stop when the war ended.

The NEP thus began in 1921. It utilized pre-revolution production incentives such as supply and demand and traditional money payments. Trade between the city and countryside was reestablished on this basis. In this sense, Lenin and Trotsky supported the NEP as a necessary "retreat."

Trotsky describes the objectives of the

industrial growth to supply the peasants with farm equipment and consumer items to serve as necessary production incentives. He correctly predicted that this relationship was the firmest basis for closing the "scissors," a reference to the ever-widening social gap between the city and country.

Industrial expansion, Trotsky argued, would be financed by charging peasants a higher price for commercial goods and paying them less for their agricultural stocks. This unequal exchange—or "borrowing"—from the peasants was absolutely necessary in order to rebuild the devastated economy.

Of course, the price differentials could not be excessive. Trotsky points out that, "Too heavy 'forced loans' of products, however, would destroy the stimulus...[for peasant] labor."

Stalin and Bukharin had a completely

... Soviet democracy

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the revolution. As a result, they were outlawed.

Civil war narrows democracy

The civil war, fueled by the invasion of 14 imperialist armies, not only imposed severe physical hardships on the Soviet population, it also gravely altered the political course charted by the Bolsheviks.

Trotsky commented that democracy "narrowed in proportion as difficulties increased. In the beginning, the party had wished and hoped to preserve freedom of political struggle within the framework of the Soviets. The civil war introduced stern amendments into this calculation."

In his book "The Revolution Betrayed," Trotsky stressed that the leaders of the revolution considered any measures in conflict with soviet democracy "not as a principle, but as an episodic act of self-defense."

As civil-war induced famine spread across

the Soviet Union in 1921, Lenin and Trotsky were forced to support severe restrictions on the highly valued inner-democracy of the CPSU. There was a ban on organized internal political groupings apart from the democratically elected leadership of the CPSU.

Trotsky reports that these steps were "again regarded as an exceptional measure to be abandoned at the first serious improvement in the situation ... lest it lead to a strangling of the inner life of the party."

But, unfortunately, temporary measures taken in self-defense perfectly suited the needs of the emerging Stalinist privileged layer to silence all dissent. To this day, even with the much-heralded *glasnost*, factions and tendencies are strictly prohibited in the CPSU.

Toward socialist democracy

Lenin's last political act before he died was an offer to form a bloc with Trotsky

against the developing bureaucratic deformations in the CPSU and the soviets.

Trotsky waged this battle until he was murdered in 1940 by an assassin carrying out Stalin's orders.

Two years prior to his death, in September 1938, Trotsky and his supporters launched the Fourth International, a new world party committed to socialist revolution. One of Trotsky's closest associates in this effort was Leon Sedov, his youngest son. Sedov was responsible for coordinating the work of Trotsky's supporters inside the Soviet Union.

In October 1936, prior to his mysterious death in a French hospital, Sedov summed up the tasks of Soviet workers in their struggle against the ruling bureaucracy. In an article on the meaning of the Moscow Trials, he wrote:

"The Soviet proletariat can only march toward socialism by the revival and full blossoming of soviet democracy, by the legalization of all soviet parties—above all the party of revolutionary Bolshevism. But the revival of soviet democracy will only be possible through the overthrow of the parasitic bureaucracy. And the overthrow of

the bureaucracy can only be accomplished by the revolutionary force of the toiling masses." ■

Suggested reading

1. The Third International After Lenin

by Leon Trotsky

Written in 1928, it was smuggled out of the Soviet Union after being suppressed by Stalin. It outlines the specific economic and political proposals of the Left Opposition in its fight against bureaucratism. \$8.95 paper, Pathfinder Press.

2. The Revolution Betrayed

by Leon Trotsky

Examines the social roots and political development of the Stalinist bureaucratic degeneration of the original goals of the Russian Revolution. \$6.95 paper, Pathfinder Press.

3. Marxist Economic Theory, Vol. 2

by Ernest Mandel

4. The Meaning of Gorbachev's Reforms

by Alan Benjamin

(Socialist Action pamphlet \$.75)

5. Poland: The Fight for Workers' Democracy

by Zbigniew Kowalewski

(Socialist Action pamphlet \$1.50)

Fidel Castro, *Perestroika*, and workers' democracy



Fidel Castro has made it clear that what Gorbachev thinks is good for the Soviet Union is not necessarily good for Cuba.

By ROLAND SHEPPARD
and ALAN BENJAMIN

In his annual July 26 speech this year, Cuban President Fidel Castro centered his attention on the *perestroika* (economic restructuring) reforms pursued in the Soviet Union and other workers' states.

Castro, in a carefully worded speech commemorating the 35th anniversary of the assault on the Moncada barracks, did not openly oppose *perestroika*, but he rejected this policy for Cuba. He stated that "Cuba will never adopt methods of capitalism."

In sharp contrast to the top ideologues of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Castro stated, "Socialism and capitalism are diametrically different by definition and essence."

Castro's speech was a strong reaffirmation of the Cuban Communist Party's "rectification" campaign, which was launched at the Third Party Congress in 1986. This campaign developed in response to the *perestroika*-type economic measures introduced in Cuba in the late 1970s.

These were measures that authorized private producers—mainly farmers—to sell whatever surplus they had left (after selling their quotas to the state at fixed prices) on the "free" markets. There the producers could obtain whatever price the market would bear.

The reforms, however, led to the proliferation of middlemen (often rich peasants) who made small fortunes selling farm produce in the towns. They did this by hoarding goods in order to speculate and price gouge.

Seeing the dangers to the revolution posed by the development of this privileged and parasitic social layer, the Cuban CP slammed on the brakes and resorted back to the campaign of moral and ideological incentives characteristic of the early years of the Cuban Revolution.

In response to those who argue that Cuba should abandon its "rectification" process and step in line behind Gorbachev's market reforms, Castro said:

"Many capitalists believe that the socialist system will have no choice but to adopt methods, styles, and even motivations and a certain kind of idiosyncrasy of a capitalist nature. They're indulging themselves in wishful thinking. ... It has never occurred to us to think that we have to copy what the Soviets do."

Elsewhere he stated, "If someone is suffering from corns, why look for a remedy for a toothache?"

At one point, Castro alluded to one of the dangerous consequences of *perestroika*: unemployment. He rejected capitalist incentives for production (the threat of layoffs to increase productivity) and the introduction of unemployment in a "socialist" society.

"We don't want anyone jobless on the street," Castro said, "and the day we work well, with efficiency, and there is a surplus labor force, the solution lies in reducing the number of working hours."

The concept of guaranteed full employment and a shorter workweek in a highly industrialized socialist system is a far cry from Gorbachev's acceptance of the need for unemployment in the Soviet Union. (Gorbachev actually said that whoever finds the solution to unemployment should get a "Nobel Prize.")

Castro concluded one portion of his remarks on *perestroika* with a wish of his own. He said he hoped that Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership would "rectify" their current market-reform "mistakes," just as Cuba had done in 1986.

Castro lambasted the capitalists and their apologists who, "on the basis of the self-criticism now going on in the Soviet Union," are bent on discrediting the great achievements and gains of the socialist revolutions. "They're trying ... to detract from the historical merits of socialism and demoralize it," Castro said.

In response to the multiplying number of critics of socialism—all of whom are having a field day with what they call Gorbachev's confessions of the failures of Marxism and socialism—Castro spoke with great pride

about the record of the Cuban Revolution.

He began by pointing out that the Cuban July 26th Movement carried out a socialist revolution in opposition to those who insisted that Cuba must first have a prolonged capitalist stage to gain independence from the United States.

"Cuba ... was the first country to free itself from U.S. imperialism in this hemisphere ... and the first one to carry out a socialist revolution," Castro stated.

"This revolution was precisely characterized by a reluctance to copy from others," Castro continued. "Had we been willing to follow stereotypes, theory had it that no [socialist] revolution could be made here; ... that's what the books used to say, what the manuals used to say."

This was a direct reference to the Soviet leadership and to the Cuban Stalinists, then organized in the Cuban Socialist Party. Both were responsible for writing the manuals and books that promoted the "two-stage theory of revolution."

Cuba's agrarian reform

Castro also described how the Cuban Revolution had carried out its successful land reform. The Cuban approach rejected forced collectivization and used education and patience to organize the poorer farmers to produce in a collective manner, while nationalizing the large private farms into state farms.

Referring to the small peasants or sharecroppers who were given the land, Castro stated:

"We haven't forced any of them to join cooperatives. The process of uniting those plots has taken us 30 years. We've gone ahead little by little on the basis of the strict principle of it being voluntary. ... And yet more than two-thirds of their lands now belong to cooperatives, and all of them are making headway, they are prospering."

This approach by the Cuban leadership was identical to the one advocated in the Soviet Union by Leon Trotsky in the middle and late 1920s, prior to Stalin's forced collectivizations. [See Carl Finamore's article on the Soviet economy in this section.]

Ninety miles from the U.S.

Castro went on to explain to the July 26 rally that the Cuban people have no one else but themselves to rely on to solve their economic problems and to defend their revolution from the threats and pressures of U.S. imperialism.

"Were imperialism to attack us," Castro said, "who is there to defend the island? No one will come from abroad



The Cuban revolution has relied on mass mobilizations of the population to discourage U.S. aggression.

to defend our island; we defend the island ourselves. It isn't that someone might not want to defend us, the thing is that no one can, because this socialist revolution is not just a few kilometers from the Soviet Union; this socialist revolution is 10,000 kilometers from the Soviet Union."

Here Castro reveals his understanding of the new terms of "peaceful coexistence" worked out between Reagan and Gorbachev over the past few years. He is aware that the summit agreements involve settling "regional conflicts" across the globe and knows that he can be cut off from Soviet support at any time, leaving him vulnerable to the imperialist colossus to the north.

This is why Castro appealed so strongly for the Cuban masses to mobilize to defend the revolution.

Castro's veiled response to Gorbachev demonstrated the great strengths and achievements of the Cuban Revolution—and of socialism in general. But it also brought to light some of Castro's and the Cuban leadership's shortcomings.

These weaknesses center around two themes: the lack of institutions of workers' democracy in Cuba and the lack of a consistent proletarian internationalist perspective to defend and extend the Cuban Revolution.

Lack of socialist democracy

In his speech, Castro indirectly rejected the limited *glasnost*/democratic openings Gorbachev has introduced in the Soviet Union—openings which Gorbachev justified on the grounds that "criticism is a bitter medicine, but the ills of society make it a necessity."

Castro categorically rejected the idea that Cuba had any ills which would make *glasnost*-type measures necessary. "We have created our own political way to suit the country," he said. "We have to rectify absolutely none of this. Ours is a superdemocratic system."

Elsewhere Castro stated, "It is not that we want to be more virtuous than anyone else, or more pure than anyone else. It's that we are 90 miles away from the most powerful empire on earth, and 10,000 miles from the socialist camp. ... That is why imperialism tries to weaken the revolution ideologically ... so that it can swallow us like a ripe apple."

In his speech, Castro said he would never allow what he called "pocket-size parties" to organize in Cuba. He repeatedly spoke of the need to maintain "ideological purity" and to prevent all those who would "sow dissension" from doing so. "We don't need capitalist political formulas," he said, "they're just trash."

Castro here confuses bourgeois democracy with proletarian democracy. The existence of a multiparty system is not necessarily a "capitalist formula." For example, Lenin and the early Bolsheviks tried to preserve the multiparty character of the soviet system. In fact, Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary oppositionist parties functioned legally all through the civil war until they engaged in armed insurrection against the government.

Castro correctly points to the need for a Leninist combat party to lead a revolution against capitalism and to consolidate a workers' state. But he departs from Lenin and the early Bolsheviks when he upholds the prohibition of tendencies and factions inside the Cuban CP as well as the prohibition of any opposition political parties. [See article by Carl Finamore on soviet

democracy in this section.]

The prohibition of tendencies and parties makes it difficult—in fact, nearly impossible—to organize opposition against a mistaken policy.

While it is correct and necessary for the Cuban Revolution to use any means necessary to prevent the exiled Cuban capitalists and their supporters inside the country from organizing against the revolution, it is not true, as Castro implies in his speech, that all forms of dissent in Cuba are pro-capitalist and counterrevolutionary.

Underground political currents

There exist in Cuba a number of political currents—made up mainly of intellectuals and artists—that firmly support the revolution but object to the one-party monopoly on political power by the ruling Cuban Communist Party. These currents, all of them underground, have also pointed to the failure of the revolution, now in its 30th year, to provide institutionalized channels for criticism, debate, and genuine participation by the masses in the major decisions affecting their lives.

These objections are justified. Cuban "people's democracy" is unquestionably more democratic than anything that ever existed in Cuba in the past. But the Cuban CP, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, and the numerous other mass organizations are plagued with severe bureaucratic deformations.

The structures of all these institutions are vertical and top heavy. No organized opposition groupings are allowed. And no real decisions are made by the lower bodies or mass organizations; these are all made by the Central Committee of the party.

Close observers of the Cuban Revolution often point out that Castro regularly recognizes—and corrects—serious mistakes or abuses committed by leading party bodies. Although this is undoubtedly true, no revolution can rely on one person, however brilliant or committed to the revolution he or she may be, to correct the myriads of problems and mistakes inherent in any

genuine social transformation.

The existence of organized channels for genuine participation and debate—i.e., of genuine socialist democracy—is not a danger or liability to the Cuban Revolution. It is a vital necessity.

Limits to Cuba's internationalism

The Cuban Revolution has been under intense pressures and attacks from its inception. Today, with Gorbachev's shift toward accommodation with U.S. imperialism, the revolution is more vulnerable than ever.

In his speech, Castro acknowledged that the next two to three years will be extremely difficult ones for the Cuban masses. He predicted economic hardships resulting from, among other things, the deteriorating terms of trade with Cuba's capitalist trade partners.

For nearly three decades, the Cuban leadership has been confronted with the difficult situation of increasing the well-being of its population within the confines of a beleaguered island. The economic support from the Soviet Union has been essential to its survival, but not sufficient to provide the capital and consumer goods which the Cuban people require to move the revolution forward.

The revolution has been successful in resisting the imperialist blockade and siege. But it cannot ultimately survive or deepen the gains it has made unless it breaks out of its isolation in the Western hemisphere. For this to happen, the Cuban example has to be extended throughout the rest of Latin America as the road for national independence.

Although Castro and the Cuban CP have demonstrated a willingness to materially oppose U.S. imperialism in Nicaragua and Africa, they have been unwilling to apply the lessons of the Cuban Revolution, which Castro acknowledged in his speech, to the rest of the colonial world.

Referring to Nicaragua, for example, Castro has repeatedly stated that the Sandinistas have not proposed to carry out a socialist revolution, and that he fully agrees with this view. Castro has strongly endorsed the Sandinista government's commitment to a capitalist mixed economy. In his July 26 speech he reiterated this view.

But the entire history of the 20th century—particularly in Latin America—has proven that there is no middle capitalist road between U.S. imperialism and the example of the Cuban socialist revolution that can lead to genuine national independence.

Uneven response

Castro's condemnation of Gorbachev's *perestroika* reforms reveals the healthy revolutionary character of the Cuban leadership and the Cuban Revolution. Castro's reaffirmation of Cuba's political structures and international policies, however, point to the important weaknesses of the Cuban revolutionaries.

Castro and the Cuban CP are not Stalinist. And while there are noticeable bureaucratic deformations, there is not a hardened bureaucratic caste at the helm of the revolution that must hold back the masses in order to preserve its material privileges.

The Cuban leaders can best be described as "revolutionaries of action"—i.e., revolutionaries who are genuinely committed to advancing the interests of the workers and peasants, but whose program for carrying out this objective contains severe limitations.

But whatever its weaknesses, Castro's speech represents a breath of fresh air at a time when the leaders of the Soviet Union, China, and the Eastern European workers' states are hailing the "virtues of the market economy" and the advantages of "peaceful coexistence." Castro's speech will provide valuable ammunition for all those who want to respond to Gorbachev and uphold the road toward socialism. ■



U.S. troops in Grenada. The Cuban revolution is constantly faced with the threat of U.S. invasion.

Alex Webb/Magnum

Chilean Marxist traces Lenin's 'Trotskyism'



By ROBERTO PUMARADA

La Revolucion Social: Lenin y America Latina by Marta Harnecker. Siglo XXI, Mexico City, 1986, and Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, Managua, 1986.

The development of the imperialist phase of capitalism, resulting in World War I, led Lenin to conclude that the coming revolution had to combine in a single process both the democratic (anti-feudal) and the socialist revolutions.

Thus in 1917, Lenin broke with the conception of a "two-stage revolution" inherited from the founders of Russian Marxism. This schema held that the bourgeois-democratic tasks would have to be concluded *before* embarking on a socialist revolution.

Lenin explained that the Russian capitalists could not carry out a democratic revolution. Instead, he pointed out that only a workers' state supported by the peasantry could fulfill those tasks—as well as go forward toward socialism. Lenin's

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views on the matter thus came to coincide with those espoused by Leon Trotsky in his theory of "Permanent Revolution."

After Lenin's death, however, Josef Stalin revived the old "two-stage" theory. Opposing points of view were vilified as "Trotskyism."

The Stalinist dogma effectively required maintaining political blocs with "progressive" sections of the ruling class. The policy resulted in such disasters as the military coups in Indonesia (1967) and Chile (1973).

It is in this context that the publication of Martha Harnecker's "La Revolucion Social: Lenin y America Latina" takes on significance.

The evolution of Lenin's views

Harnecker, a Chilean theorist who lives in Cuba, (and whose writings have taken

on a semi-official character) undertook a study of the development of Lenin's strategic conceptions in order to apply them to Latin America.

She elaborates Lenin's views on the class character of the revolution, describing their evolution between 1905 and 1917. Harnecker's conclusions on this point confirm the traditional Trotskyist interpretation of the subject.

Relying heavily on her reading of "Two Tactics" and "The Agrarian Program of Social Democracy," Harnecker summarizes Lenin's pre-war conception, rooted in the economic determinism of the Second International, as accepting that "the revolution of 1905 is a *bourgeois revolution* in its *economic-social content*. If it triumphed, it would not destroy capitalism but rather develop it further." (emphasis in original)

In this analysis, the attempts by Stalinists to portray Lenin's single 1905 reference to the "uninterrupted" character of the Russian revolution as a healthy rebuttal to Trotsky's "ultraleftism" are shown to be historically false.

Harnecker explains what Lenin really meant by this formulation. She writes: "Once the bourgeois-democratic revolution has triumphed, clearing the ground for the development of capitalism, the proletariat will consciously begin immediately a struggle for *another revolution*, the socialist revolution."

"The uninterrupted character of the revolution consists in not contenting itself with the triumph of a democratic regime which gives free reign to capitalism, but rather in *continuing to struggle* for socialism in the conditions created by the democratic revolution."

The need for socialism

On the eve of the October 1917 Revolution, Lenin transcended these views. Reviewing Lenin's "Letters From Afar," "Letters On Tactics," and the "April Theses," Harnecker notes the break and attributes it fundamentally to the analysis of imperialism developed by Lenin during World War I.

She points out that the Russian Revolu-

tion took place in one of the most backward countries of Europe and, at the same time, one that had suffered the accelerated impulse of war.

"The crisis produced by the war," she writes, "demanded the adoption of radical measures which, although still not affecting private capitalist property, submitted capitalist control to workers' control, which already imply the first steps towards socialism."

This required the establishment of a "dictatorship of the proletariat," which Harnecker describes:

"[T]he dictatorship of the proletariat does not mean the exclusive government of one class nor the elimination of an alliance with other classes... [it] signifies the political leadership of the proletariat. The proletariat as the leading and dominant class, must know how to direct its policies in such a way that it first resolves the most urgent problems."

In this sense then, "The soviet government was a workers' and peasants' government because it represented the two principal classes of the revolution, whose struggle or agreement determined the luck [of the] revolution."

Lenin's "Trotskyism"

Lenin later explained his new conception in more depth in "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky" and in the articles "The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and "The Fourth Anniversary of the Russian Revolution."

In the last article, Lenin stated, "Bourgeois-democratic reforms are a byproduct of the proletarian revolution, that is, socialist.... The first transforms itself into the second. The second resolves in passing the problems of the first, the second consolidates the work of the first. The struggle, and the struggle alone, determines how far the second will go."

As Harnecker points out, "It seems important to insist that the transformation of the first into the second, which the Bolshevik leader here sets out, has nothing to do with his 1905 conception of the uninterrupted passage of the bourgeois-

democratic revolution into the socialist.

"In that epoch, [according to Lenin's thinking at the time] the only tasks which the revolution set forth were the bourgeois-democratic tasks which drove the country, not towards socialism, but rather, towards the development of capitalism."

Harnecker concludes, "It is impossible for socialism to definitively triumph in a single country, especially if it is a backward country such as Russia, without the triumph of the socialist revolution in some of the advanced countries."

What Harnecker misses

Harnecker's book is not without defects. In one sentence, she dismisses Lenin's belief that a socialist government had to be based on soviets (workers' councils). She fails to come to grips with the degeneration of the Russian Revolution led by Stalin and its impact on the non-Russian Communist parties.

Thus, the policies of the pro-Moscow Cuban Popular Socialist Party before 1959 and the Chilean Communist Party in the Allende era are occasionally and uncritically mentioned. This is a serious error in a work which purports to explain the importance of Leninism in Latin America.

Harnecker's ambivalence flows not only from a misperception of these parties as revolutionary but also from a rigid division of the revolutionary party's program into "minimum" and "maximum" demands. She states:

"It is important to differentiate the political discourse directed to the vanguard from the discourse directed to the great masses. These, especially if they are backward, must be informed only of the immediate tasks which the revolution plans to put in practice: It is not necessary to talk of other tasks, nor insist on the socialist character of the revolution, much less of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

This passage has a grain of truth. "Talking socialism" and abstract posturing are apt to alienate workers who do not see the connection between their everyday struggles and socialist solutions.

But the failure to raise "transitional" demands—which link the daily or economic struggles for "minimum" demands to the "maximum" demand of socialism—poses the danger of allowing reformist leaders to keep the fight within "minimum" boundaries.

Transitional demands

The relationship of forces in any struggle often leads to compromises. In such cases, transitional demands are needed to educate the workers and carry the struggle forward during the next upsurge. Without such education, the movement can dissipate without future prospects, particularly where reformists are involved.

This is where Harnecker's separation of minimum and maximum goals becomes dangerous. She warns against an organization becoming bogged down in opportunist minimalism, or carried away by sectarian ultimatism. But she fails to pose any solution short of trusting the revolutionary vanguard to know what to do next.

When it is understood that Harnecker still includes the official Communist parties in the "revolutionary vanguard," even though they support Stalin's two-stage theory, one has a right to pause.

Harnecker intends to follow the present book with one which will elaborate her views on this and other questions in more detail.

Her present work, though marred by the problems noted, is nevertheless a serious study of Lenin's conception of a revolutionary situation and of the evolution of his thought on the key question of the class character of the revolution in the imperialist era. It also confirms some of the views traditionally defended by the Trotskyist movement:

"For Latin America to escape from underdevelopment, there is no other road than the revolutionary transformation of society through anti-imperialist and democratic solutions, which, in our countries, are at the same time necessarily anti-capitalist solutions." ■

... Growing worker unrest

(continued from suppl. 1)

also named chairman of the party commission on ideology. Medvedev gives a good picture of where *perestroika* is going.

The economic reforms he describes are extremely far-reaching. They challenge fundamental aspects of a planned economy and seriously jeopardize a broad range of social gains made in the 1917 Russian Revolution.

"The market is an indispensable means of gearing production to fast-changing demand, and a major instrument of public control over quality and cost," Medvedev says. "Cooperative businesses and individual enterprises are effective not only in small-scale production, ... they may also be useful in organizing ... large-scale industry. Our previous concepts of public property ... have proved untenable."

Nikolay Shmelyov, a leading Soviet government economist, was even more descriptive. Writing last year in the leading Soviet political and literary journal, *Novy Mir*, he said:

"We need to permit companies and organizations to sell freely, to buy freely, to buy and borrow from their reserves ... to invest their enormous but idle resources. ... In place of fruitless efforts at central planning ... we should introduce contracts between supplier and consumer."

Shmelyov continued: "Only profit can measure the quantity and quality of economic activity and permit us to relate production costs. ... One way of reducing the current shortage of capital funds [is] for the appropriate enterprises to sell bonds to enterprises ... and private parties as well."

None of these capitalist-like "market reforms" come cheap. They all have a price, and it's the working class and poor farmers who will pay.

The cost of reforms

There are numerous examples indicating that the reforms mean more austerity for the majority.

For example, Gorbachev has strongly hinted that he no longer plans to wait two years before raising prices on consumer goods like meat and milk. He only backed away from price increases last year because of strong popular resistance.

On another occasion, Gorbachev's chief economic adviser, Abel Aganbegyan, complained about the 1986 government food subsidies and said that it had become "a major problem how to get out of this mess." This messy problem for the bureaucrats—in reality one of the major social achievements of the socialist revolution—costs approximately \$91 billion a year.

Another policy shift that has caused great concern among Soviet workers is the gradual introduction of unemployment.

According to Soviet economist Vladimir Kostakov, Gorbachev's economic "modernization" program could result in the loss of between 13 million and 19 million jobs within the next 10 years.

In June 1987, the government adopted a law stipulating that all laid-off workers will obtain the wage of an average Soviet worker (approximately 200 rubles) for three months. Those who cannot find a job in the same branch of industry will be "recycled," that is, retrained for another job.

But Kostakov warned that the service sector and other industrial branches might not be able to absorb the large numbers of unemployed manual workers. "We are already experiencing difficulties with re-employment of the released workforce," Kostakov stated.

Indeed, Gorbachev no longer acknowledges the Soviet state's historic responsibility in assuring everyone a job. Advocates of *perestroika*, in fact, continually refer to unemployment as a "natural" part of life.

Profit or planned economy?

But the negative impact of *perestroika* is not limited to the standard of living of the

working class. There are other very damaging consequences for the economy as a whole if the profit motive becomes the major stimulus for production.

Gorbachev was confronted with these problems during his recent visit to Siberia. He criticized many enterprises which were making a huge profit by emphasizing production of luxury items. Following the logic of the profit motive, some factory managers apparently have been shifting production away from inexpensive mass consumer items.

"There are some who have simply embarked upon the anti-social road and cut down the output of cheap goods in popular demand," Gorbachev complained. "Imagine what will happen," he said, "if everyone takes this road."

That's exactly the problem.

But Gorbachev should be pointing the finger at himself. His plan for broad application of the profit motive will necessarily mean more wasteful diversions of labor and capital.


A far better recourse—one which Gorbachev is *not* proposing—would be to fully democratize the planned economy, replacing the bureaucratic administration

solution. "The substance of the current agrarian policy," he says, "is to change the relations of production on the farms." This includes promoting "contractual and lease agreements for up to 50 years."

In a dramatic speech on Oct. 13, Gorbachev called for farmers throughout the Soviet Union to be freed from the current state-run system of collective agriculture. Specifically, Gorbachev proposed that the limited experiments in leasing state lands to individual farmers should be promoted across the country. "Our idea," he said, "is that all agriculture, the entire agrarian sector, should follow this path."

Gorbachev has already encountered some problems in the countryside, just as he has in the city. Even with the colorful imagery of making "the farmer sovereign master" over the land, many farmers suspect Gorbachev's motives. *The New York Times* reports "a public jealous and resentful of the growing private entrepreneurial class."

Addressing himself to those agricultural workers who are reluctant to give up the social and economic security of the collective farms, Gorbachev remarked: "No fool is going to go to work on a lease



Novosti-Sipa

Gorbachev's goal is to satisfy the minimal social needs of the population before impatient workers and peasants begin to utilize the democratic openings of 'glasnost' to raise their own program... In short, Gorbachev is in a race to keep 'perestroika' ahead of 'glasnost.'

altogether with genuine forms of soviet democracy. This would more rationally and equitably determine production for social needs. [See accompanying article on soviet democracy.]

Reorganizing agriculture

Bureaucratic mismanagement of the economy is probably most acute in the countryside. Peasants neither have a sufficient quantity of equipment in good running order nor a sufficient quantity of desirable consumer products. This eliminates two key incentives for high productivity.

Why should peasants produce more if there are not enough quality goods flowing to the countryside?

Gorbachev thinks he has discovered the

contract as long as he can have a salary without earning it."

This statement by Gorbachev, in addition to being condescending, places the blame for low productivity in the wrong place. The major problem stifling production in the Soviet Union is not the workers—but the parasitic bureaucracy that rules the country. This is a privileged social layer that has amassed great material benefits through its monopoly on political power.

Risks of agrarian policy

Production of foodstuffs should be planned according to the democratically decided needs of the population. The primary use of the profit motive in agriculture runs the same risks as those already incurred in industry.

Planting may very well shift away from inexpensive foods toward highly priced specialty crops. And if private peasants are allowed to grow crops specifically for more profitable foreign markets, a serious food shortage could develop inside the Soviet Union. A food shortage is not idle speculation. It is, in fact, exactly what occurred in Soviet agriculture in the 1920s under similar conditions.

Long waiting lines and scarcity of mass consumer items will also grow dramatically if top Gorbachev adviser Abel Aganbegyan is correct in his prediction that "the monopoly of the ministry of foreign trade will be ended" with the new reform program. Last year there were already over 1300 enterprises with independent relations with the foreign market.

Economics and politics

Since Stalin's triumph over the original Bolshevik revolutionary program of Lenin and Trotsky—a triumph born from the assassination of virtually the entire leadership of the early Bolshevik Party—Soviet bureaucrats have subordinated the needs of oppressed people all over the world to their privileged, reactionary interests. They term this approach "Building Socialism in One Country." It is the polar opposite of the internationalist appeal of "Workers of the World, Unite!"

Perestroika economic overtures to capitalist banks and foreign markets will substantially increase pressures to accommodate to imperialism. *Time* magazine welcomed the reforms because, "Gorbachev may represent the West's last chance, at least in this century, of better integrating the Soviet Union into the world economy. There it could come under pressure to behave like a Western country, competing for capital and markets, lowering the barriers to foreign investment, and even making its currency convertible." (July 27, 1987)

Vadim Medvedev didn't waste any time in letting the imperialists know he was ready to deal. On the day he was elected to the politburo as chief ideologist, he put a new twist on the time-worn Stalinist "peaceful coexistence" policy of screwing the working class.

Medvedev actually termed the class struggle "outdated." Instead, he said, "socialism and capitalism will inevitably interact within the framework of the same human civilization." Not to be outdone by Medvedev, former Foreign Secretary Eduard Shevardnadze declared that "the struggle between the two systems is no longer the decisive factor."

The result of these hallucinations is that the Stalinist bureaucracy is cutting aid to Nicaragua, Angola, Cuba, Vietnam, and other liberation fighters—using them as poker chips to deal with imperialism.

Although this is the same essential foreign policy Moscow has followed for over 60 years, it is an even greater counterrevolutionary threat when combined with increased reliance by the Soviet Union on the capitalist world market.

Political revolution

It would be a widely different world had the socialist revolutions spread from Russia, as the Bolsheviks expected. But that did not happen. Instead, a political counterrevolution occurred, with Stalin at its head.

Today, the heirs of Stalin still rule over the workers, parasitically feeding on the gains of the 1917 revolution. The bureaucratic degeneration of the first victorious socialist revolution was the result of the tragic isolation of the Soviet Union due to the delay in the world revolution—and not, in any sense, a logical result of Marxism.

The current Soviet misleaders—"reformists" and "hard-liners" alike—must be removed through a political revolution which preserves the anti-capitalist social character of the country. To accomplish the task of establishing genuine socialist democracy, it will be necessary to build a new communist party based on the revolutionary program defended by Lenin and Trotsky. ■



Allison Evans

Zbigniew Kowalewski and Dave Walsh (chairperson, seated) at Socialist Action forum in Boston

Kowalewski greets El Salvador rally

By ZBIGNIEW KOWALEWSKI

The following greetings were presented to an El Salvador solidarity meeting of 300 people in Boston on Oct. 14.

I am pleased to give greetings to this meeting. For many years, I have followed with admiration the struggles of the Central American people against imperialism and capitalism, and for national and social liberation. One year before the victory of the Sandinistas' popular revolution, in my book published in Poland, I explained the history of the struggle waged in Nicaragua by the generations of General Sandino and Carlos Fonseca.

In 1980-81, as an activist in the Polish workers' movement, Solidarnosc, I experienced the formidable force and creativity of the mass mobilizations of the workers, followed by the students and the farmers, all of whom were fighting in defense of their rights and interests against the ruling totalitarian bureaucracy.

They demonstrated their capacity to take their destiny in their own hands and to design a project of the true socialism—socialism based on the full workers' and mass democracy, on the power of the workers' councils, and on the people's self-management of the economy, the society, and the state.

I am sure that the Salvadoran workers and masses are able to organize themselves in a similar manner and to generate a similar project of a new society and power without oppression and exploitation.

The tremendous development of mass organizations recently shows that the time of the Salvadoran workers and farmers may not be far away.

The struggles and goals of the Salvadoran people and the Polish working class are deeply similar. But an extremely serious problem is that there exist at the same time very deep mutual misunderstandings. The origin of this is the fact that they have very different immediate enemies and that in both countries many people maintain the negative idea that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

The day when these misunderstandings will be overcome, the day when the Polish workers from Solidarnosc will support the heroic struggle of the Salvadoran workers and farmers, and the day when the Salvadoran popular movement will understand the legitimacy of the struggle of Polish Solidarnosc, will be the day when an enormous step will be made on the road toward the true international socialist democracy.

Kowalewski kicks off tour in eight cities nationwide

Zbigniew Kowalewski brought the message of Solidarnosc and Polish workers' self-management to eight cities during the first leg of his month-long U.S. tour. [See calendar for events in remaining cities.]

• **In Boston**, Kowalewski's four days (Oct. 13-16) were packed with meetings and interviews. He spoke at three Socialist Action-sponsored campus meetings (Suffolk Univ., U. of Mass., and Tufts) to audiences ranging from 20 to 40 students. He also spoke at a citywide Socialist Action forum that drew close to 60 people.

While Kowalewski was in Boston, Rubén Zamora, a leader of El Salvador's Democratic Revolutionary Front, addressed a public meeting sponsored by the Democratic Socialists of America and the Central American Solidarity Association. Kowalewski was invited to give greetings to the gathering of 300. [See greetings on this page.]

Kowalewski's remarks were received with great enthusiasm. While on stage, Zamora walked over to him, shook his hand, and referred to him as "compañero."

During his stay, Kowalewski was interviewed by the *Lynn Daily Item*, a Boston-area daily paper with a large Polish-American readership, and Tufts University Radio.

• **In New York**, on Oct. 15, Kowalewski spoke at a rally of 100 people commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Fourth International sponsored by the Fourth Internationalist Tendency and the Fourth Internationalist Caucus of Solidarity. This was the culminating event of a weekend of activities. Other rally speakers included Rosario Ibarra, Charlie Van Gelderen, Susan Caldwell, John McAnulty, Mahmud Hawari, Lloyd D'Aguilar, Jake Cooper, Alan Wald, Paul LeBlanc, Gerry Foley, Esteban Volkov (Leon Trotsky's grandson), and Claudio Mangani.

• **In Detroit**, on Oct. 19, Kowalewski spoke at Wayne State University to a group of 40 people that included several Poles and other Eastern Europeans. The student paper, *The South End*, ran an extensive interview with Kowalewski as well as a front-page article on the meeting.

• **In Cincinnati**, on Oct. 20, Kowalewski spoke to a meeting of 20 students at the University of Cincinnati and to several informal gatherings of student and union activists. He was also interviewed by the campus newspaper, *The News Record*.

• **In Youngstown, Ohio**, on Oct. 23, he addressed a meeting of 60 people, mainly trade unionists, sponsored by the Youngstown Workers' Solidarity Club and

Solidarity USA, a militant group of steel-worker retirees.

When Kowalewski concluded his remarks by saying, "I think my ideas are very close to your ideas, so I'm very happy to be with you," the audience responded with enthusiastic applause. The informal discussion, in which steelworkers raised their problems with the company, the government, and the union bureaucracy, indicated that they also felt there were common lessons to be learned from their experiences and those of the Polish workers.

Kowalewski also spoke at a Socialist Action forum in Cleveland and was interviewed by several Northeast Ohio radio and television stations. The *Sunday Warren Times* carried an interview.

• **In Chicago**, on Oct. 25, Kowalewski spoke to a class of 20 students at Roosevelt University and to a forum of 15 students at Northeastern University. A citywide Socialist Action forum at the U.E. headquarters drew 40 people.

• **In Minneapolis-St. Paul**, on Oct. 26-28, Kowalewski spoke at three Socialist Action campus meetings (Univ. of Minnesota, Carlton College, and Macalester College) with a combined attendance of 110 students. The major daily newspaper in St. Paul ran an extensive interview.

• **In Kansas City**, on Oct. 29, Kowalewski spoke to a citywide forum of 35 people organized by friends of Socialist Action. This was the first of three public meetings scheduled in the area. [Next month's *Socialist Action* will report on the two other events in Kansas City as well as on the events in the remaining four cities of Kowalewski's U.S. tour.]

This roundup was compiled from reports filed by our correspondents in each city. For reasons of space, the reports have been abridged.

Kowalewski November tour dates:

Los Angeles: Fri., Nov. 4, 7:30 p.m., L.A. City College, Holmes Hall, Rm. 6, 855 N. Vermont	Lecture and film showing of "Ten days that shook the world." 3435 Army, Rm. 308. Donation: \$5 (\$8 includes dinner)	Baltimore: Thurs., Nov. 10, 7 p.m., Towson State Univ., Linthicum Hall, Co-sponsored by Prog. Student Union
San Francisco: Sat., Nov. 5, 3 p.m., "Struggle for socialist democracy in Poland and the Soviet Union."	Wed., Nov. 9, 12 noon, 422 Stephens, Berkeley Campus. Co-sponsored by AFT Local 1474, AGSE, District 65 UAW.	New York: Fri., Nov. 11, 7:30 p.m., Hunter College, West Bldg. Room 415

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