

The

NEW

**WHAT'S AHEAD FOR
PARTITIONED PALESTINE?**

by Al Findley

INTERNATIONAL



WHY WALLACE IS RUNNING

Notes of the Month



THE NEO-STALINIST TYPE

A Preliminary Discussion



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by Henry Judd



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INTERNATIONALIST**

by James T. Farrell



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BOOKS IN REVIEW

CORRESPONDENCE

JANUARY 1948

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We presume it's quite unnecessary for us to draw your attention to the revolution that has taken place on the cover of the NI. . . . The old masthead has been going strong for six years (it came in with the January 1942 issue) and we thought we'd pension it off. . . . Besides the reversing of the masthead (black on white) and the smaller type used for articles, we might add that the new look means a more uniform arrangement of the cover from month to month. . . . There's no use concealing the fact that we think it's great, but we'd be glad to hear from you about it.

The preparation of the article by Max Shachtman on "One Hundred Years of Marxism," in commemoration of the centenary of the *Communist Manifesto*, has been interrupted by Camrade Shachtman's tour of the Workers Party branches on the west coast. . . . It's still pending. . . - A coming issue will also contain a round-up review of articles on the anniversary in the periodical press, reading from left to right

There are two more essays which we want to excerpt from Trotsky's book *Problems of Life* (see the first, "Not by Politics Alone . . .", in this issue). . . . One discusses the effect of the Russian Revolution on the institution of the family, and the other is on the church and the movies as channels of education and propaganda. . . They're ready but unscheduled.

The current series of articles by James T. Farrell on the great Irish revolutionist, James Connolly, will remind our readers of Farrell's interesting article on James Larkin last year. . . . Both will appear as part of a book to be entitled *Irish Essays*, which will also discuss James Joyce among others.

Among our contributors in this issue . . . *Luis Velasco* is a South American Marxist who has been a frequent contributor to the NI. We should mention, perhaps, that his thought-provoking article in this number was written primarily as a discussion of social-structural changes in Latin America, not as a discussion of Peron the individual. . . . *Henry Judd* is a member of the NI editorial staff and at present acting editor of *Labor Action*; author of *India in Revolt*. As readers of both publications know, he is the leading American Marxist analyst of the problems of India. . . . *James M. Fenwick* runs the column "Off Limits" in *Labor Action* on matters of interest to GIs. He is also the Newark organizer of the Workers Party. . . . *Al Findley* is a regular writer for *Labor Action* on the Jewish question..

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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

A Monthly Organ of Revolutionary Marxism

VOL. XIV

JANUARY, 1948

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NOTES OF THE MONTH

Truman's Christmas Gift and Altgeld's Anniversary—Partition and the Division of the Globe—Leon Blum's "Third Force"—Compulsory Free Trade at Havana—The Politics of Anti-Inflation—Why Wallace Is Running

Altgeld and Amnesty. There were two events in December which were outwardly unconnected but deserve to be mentioned together. One was the centenary of the birth of John Peter Altgeld on December 30, 1847. At a memorial meeting in Chicago his name was lauded by men who, a half century earlier, would have been among the mob hanging him in effigy (we mean Republican Governor Dwight Green, for example).

For Altgeld was the Illinois governor who in 1893 brought the hell-fire of the bourgeois world down on his head by pardoning three men—three anarchists. These were the victims of the famous Haymarket Affair of 1886; or rather, those three of the frame-up victims who were not hanged like Parsons and August Spies in the lynching spree that followed the explosion of the bomb during the demonstration for the eight-hour day. A year later Altgeld refused to use the National Guard to break the "Debs Rebellion," the great Pullman strike; President Cleveland had to send in federal troops to do the dirty job. The bourgeoisie has taken forty-six years to forgive him, now that he is quiet and dead.

We are well aware that Altgeld was not the knight in shining armor he has sometimes been depicted, that he knew also how to be a conniving politician and an opportunist. He was, after all, only a liberal bogged down in the sticky business of being a "practical" operator in capitalist politics. But in the light of the second December event we want to mention, his name is a rather honorable one.

President Truman also faced a problem of pardoning men in jail, or men who had been under arrest during the war, for no crime committed: the conscientious objectors of World War II. Just before Christmas, he made known his glad cheer: an amnesty (full pardon) for only 1,523 out of 15,805 cases reviewed. Clemency was extended to religious COs, *but the political and non-religious COs were explicitly excluded from the benefaction and their appeal rejected.*

On what ground was the distinction made? The President's committee said: these men have dared to put their own political or social views above the wisdom of the state—impermissible, a bad example. But did not the religious variety also put their own views and interpretations above not only the state but also their own church, which in most cases did *not* tell them to refuse arms?

As is well known, we do not agree with the futile policy of

individual conscientious objection as a means of opposing war, but we are obliged to denounce Truman's Christmas gift as a piece of detestable hypocrisy and spiteful vengeance (more than two years after the war is safely won for Wall Street, too!). Thanks for nothing, Mr. President!

Three Partitions. It happens that there are two articles in this issue both of which deal with the necessity of national re-unification—in Palestine and in India. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL has dealt before with the same question in partitioned Germany. Here are three major areas of the world where the aftermath of the imperialist war has created artificial state boundaries where none existed before, dividing and splitting. It is symptomatic of the degeneration of the capitalist world we live in.

Before the First World War the classic example of a partitioned country was unhappy Poland, parceled out to Russia, Germany and Austria. Liberal, not to speak of radical, opinion pointed to it as a living accusation against imperialism. But even after that imperialist war and the equally imperialist treaty of Versailles, *one* Poland emerged. Today we have four Germanies, two Palestines, and two and a half Indias. Where before Lenin spoke of the division of the world by the imperialists, they are now dividing the divisions. One product clearly not manufactured by the United Nations is—united nations.

Capitalism is in retreat from its early-day task of furthering national unification and erasing petty national boundaries. The unification of Italy and of the German states was the achievement of nineteenth-century capitalism; the fratricidal warfare of Arab against Jew and Hindu against Moslem is the achievement of capitalism today. But this does not simply represent a reversion to an outlived state of affairs; history does not really repeat itself, since the context changes. *The atomization of peoples now under way is only the other face of the coagulation of world power into two great clots, American and Russian.*

We remember the absolute monarch who wished that the people, that great beast, had but one neck so that he could cut off its head in one stroke. The hydra heads of modern imperialism are reducing themselves more and more to only a pair. They thereby loom above us as all the more fearsome

monsters; but it is the revolution of the peoples that raises the little men of society to even greater towering heights. When the latter unite from below under the leadership of a rising working class, there will be only two strokes of the sword.

•

Third Force. When Leon Blum—the reformist chief of the French Socialist Party, who for some reason or other continues to believe that he believes in socialism—appeared before the Chamber of Deputies as candidate for premier, he made a speech calling for the formation of a “third force,” which would oppose both de Gaulle and the Stalinists.

During the recent war *we* said that we stood for the “third camp,” which, we explained, meant that we gave no support either to the camp of Allied or to the camp of Axis imperialism, but represented the revolutionary interests of the working class against both rival groups of exploiters.

What concerns us is not the superficial resemblance in phrase but the enlightening difference in the content of the phrases, and the opportunity it presents to underline the meaning of the third-camp position.

For Leon Blum, the other two forces are reaction on the one hand (de Gaulle) and the revolutionary working class on the other (this is the light in which he sees the Stalinists, like all reformists). We do not have to reiterate here our view that the French Communist Party is capable only of parasitically feeding on the militancy of the workers whenever this jibes with Russian imperialist needs; that it uses the revolutionary working class only as a base of operations and a cat's paw, ready to betray it as fast as Blum himself, though in a different interest; that the recent push of the Stalinists in Western Europe is from their side an expression of the inter-imperialist conflict between the rival Russian and American would-be empire builders, *grafted on to* the legitimate class struggle of the proletariat. Though he admits that the CP is only an agency of the Kremlin, Blum, as a fossilized reformist, cannot resist the opportunity to tar the rebellious militancy of the workers with the brush of Stalinist totalitarianism.

On the basis of this attempt to maintain the untenable status quo as against both capitalist reaction and proletarian revolt, Blum sets his “third force” *between* the two as a moderator of the forces that are inescapably tearing French society apart. Or rather, this is what he hoped to do—it was not even he but rather the Popular Republican Schuman who was elected.

The third camp of the anti-war socialists was the third camp of the *working class* against both rival groups of capitalists. The “third force” of Blum is the petty bourgeoisie vainly trying to hold the balance between working-class revolution and capitalist reaction. It is a dream of a new Popular Front without the Stalinists and against them. This “third force” tries hopelessly to wedge in as a compromise between force No. 1 and force No. 2. The socialist third camp stands outside of and fights both, on its own class feet.

It remains to add that in spite of his defeat for the premiership Blum has declared more than once in *Le Populaire* that the Schuman government has indeed become his “government of the third force,” even though it was elected with Gaullist votes. Here is the old spectacle of social-democrats continuing to hold on to the coattails of the “defenders” of bourgeois democracy even as under their eyes the latter accommodate themselves to Bonapartist reaction. The position of the third camp was never more necessary than in France today.

COMPULSORY FREE TRADE

The most cynical sideshow in the UN is going on at Havana. At the International Trade Conference there, the United States delegation is busy winning the peace—its own peace.

The issue is exceedingly simple: thirty-six of the fifty-eight sovereign nations represented are in favor of defending themselves against U. S. economic penetration by tariff protection and import restrictions—naturally, tariffs and restrictions on U. S. goods in the first place. Therefore, evidently from the loftiest motives of world peace and harmony, the good neighbors from up north take an opposite view of what should be done.

They are for the creation of an International Trade Organization with real authority to reduce national restrictions on trade. The line-up: the U. S., England and most Western European nations versus nearly all the economically backward countries of Latin America and the Near East, led apparently by Argentina.

The argument of the latter bloc is also simple. It was given a century and a half ago by Alexander Hamilton in his famous Report on Manufactures: they have to protect their “infant industries,” industrialize their economies, cease to be agricultural dependencies of Wall Street. This argument is reinforced by an even stronger one: namely, this bloc has an easy majority of the conference.

Filibustering for the minority is Clair Wilcox, acting chairman of the U. S. delegation. He has two themes. One is strictly for the use of the conference stenographers—at any rate, it goes mainly into the minutes:

If this is to be the outcome of our negotiations here, I say that all our hopes for expanding trade, raising the standard of living, promoting economic development and achieving world peace are doomed to failure.

The stumbling-block is the fact that the majority countries are in favor of expanding their *own* trade, raising their *own* standard of living, promoting their *own* economic development—and nobody is very much interested in world peace. And so Wilcox swings that indispensable piece of equipment of the good neighbor, the economic big stick. If the ITO is not given its teeth, then—

Other countries may be told when they approach us with their goods that they can sell to us, but only up to a certain limit. They may be told that they cannot sell to us unless they agree to take specific quantities of specific goods in return. They may be told that they cannot sell to us unless they modify policies we do not like. They may discover, when they attempt to sell in other markets, that we have been there first to freeze them out.

Mr. Wilcox happily admitted that the U. S. was prepared for such a struggle and confident of its ability to withstand trade limitations better than less developed countries. He then cleared up certain natural misconceptions by adding: “*I do not utter these words as a threat. . . .*”

Wilcox Vindicates Engels

The spectacle of protectionist United States appearing as the champion of world free trade is a model of bland hypocrisy, but it is as economically understandable as the position taken by the small-country bloc.

Regarding the latter Karl Marx explained:

The system of protection was an artificial means of manufacturing manufacturers, of expropriating independent laborers, of capitalizing the national means of production and subsistence, and

of forcibly abbreviating the transition from the medieval to the modern mode of production. [*Capital*.]

In his introduction to Marx's pamphlet *Free Trade*, Engels relates how he explained to a Scotch manufacturer why the Americans prefer to pay tribute to native industrialists when they could buy the same or a better article from England more cheaply, why they do so in the expectation that in twenty-five years they would be able to hold their own in the open world market. He adds:

Protection, being a means of artificially manufacturing manufacturers, may, therefore, appear useful not only to an incompletely developed capitalist class still struggling with feudalism; it may also give a lift to the rising capitalist class of a country which, like America, has never known feudalism, but which has arrived at that stage of development where the passage from agriculture to manufactures becomes a necessity. America, placed in that situation, decided in favor of protection. Since that decision was carried out, the five and twenty years of which I spoke to my fellow traveler have about passed, and, if I was not wrong, *protection ought to have done its task for America and ought to be now becoming a nuisance.* [Our emphasis—Ed.]

As often, Engels was a bit previous in his time-coefficients, but it is not just lately that protection has become a nuisance for American capitalism. U. S. unchallenged dominance in the post-war world, however, has now made protectionism an absolute brake on that further expansion which alone can relieve the pressure of "ever more rapidly increasing and concentrating capital. . . . Thus the passage from a home to an export trade becomes a question of life and death for the industries concerned; but they are met by the established rights, the vested interests of others who as yet find protection either safer or more profitable than free trade." (Engels.)

Here are both sides of the question at Havana. Both blocs are fighting for life; but life for American capitalism means unbridled economic rule throughout the world.

It is true that in a real sense, the small-country demand for defensive restrictions on imports places a reactionary limitation on the full flowering of world exchange; in the same sense that Haile Selassie was defending an outlived feudal society against Mussolini. World socialism will make restrictive and protectionist practices unnecessary through *planned* free trade, just as it will make it possible to jerk Ethiopia through telescoped centuries of economic development. But the main impact of Ethiopia's fight for freedom was the blow it struck at the main enemy in the world, imperialism; and the main impact of the small-nation fight at Havana would lie, if successful, in its weakening of the underpinnings of Yankee imperialism and its stimulus to the development of an industrial proletariat in the now backward countries.

Socialist Versus Liberal Policy

These are the objective consequences. "Do not imagine, gentlemen," said Marx in his above-mentioned speech on free trade, "that in criticizing freedom of commerce we have the least intention of defending protection. One may be opposed to constitutionalism without being in favor of absolutism." Engels added:

The question of free trade or protection moves entirely within the bounds of the present system of capitalist production, and has, therefore, no direct interest for us socialists, who want to do away with that system. Indirectly, however, it interests us, inasmuch as we must desire the present system of production to develop and expand as freely and as quickly as possible; because along with it will develop also those economic phenomena which are its necessary consequences, and which must destroy the whole system, misery of the great mass of the people, in consequence of overproduction.

In 1848 Marx opined that "the protective system in these days is conservative, while the free trade system works destructively . . . and carries antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie to the uttermost point. In a word, the free trade system hastens the social revolution. In this revolutionary sense alone, gentlemen, I am in favor of free trade."

In the present relationship of the forces represented at Havana, the objective consequences are no longer the same as in 1848 Europe, but the *criteria* remain. In any case, as Engels pointed out, it is not the job of (say) the Latin American proletariat to give purely gratuitous advice to their capitalists on how to run their business.

What shall we say, however, of so-called liberals who (politely, of course) denounce the small countries at Havana for not submitting to the U. S. plan for economic overlordship, echoing Clair Wilcox's hypocrisies about expanding world trade? We refer to the *Nation* of January 10. In Wilcox's big stick (about which, incidentally, it says not a word) it sees only the herald of the mythical "world federation," of which the International Trade Organization (with canine teeth) is to be the first installment.

There could be no clearer light cast either on the nature of contemporary liberalism or on the objective meaning of the utopian "capitalist world federation" illusion.

POLITICS OF ANTI-INFLATION

As this is written, the wholesale price index of the government's Bureau of Labor Statistics has just reached another post-war peak. From 1939 to 1945 this official index—which studiously avoids taking into consideration realities like the black market, quality deterioration, elimination of special discounts and clearouts at reduced prices, etc.—rose by some 37 per cent. From January 1946 to last March, it upped again by 40 per cent. This was one of the sharpest rates of price increase ever recorded in this country.

Since the beginning of August at least, prices have been again rising. As Secretary of Labor Schwollenbach mildly said in his annual report to Congress: Whatever wage increases labor won during the war "generally were erased by the spiraling cost of living." Meanwhile last year's corporate profits are estimated at \$17 billion as compared with \$12.5 billion in 1946; which, in turn . . .

Another thing which corporate executives do in turn, besides raking in profits, is to explain that higher wages mean inflation: when people have more money to spend, they bid up prices, etc. But this reasoning is not applied to the largest inflationary factor of this sort—the government's military budget. Today military expenditures are greater than the total pre-war national budget! These are orders that go to create demand, directly and indirectly, such as bids up the price of every commodity.

President Truman rose to the occasion—the threat of *inflation and the skyrocketing of the cost of living*—with characteristic adroitness and clarity. Having, only a few weeks before, gone out of his way to denounce price controls as the instrument of a "police state"—that was 1947—he appeared before Congress with the onset of 1948 to demand the reimposition of *partial* price control on selected commodities as an anti-inflation measure.

The apparent inconsistency immediately disappears when we remember that (1) 1948 is a presidential election year and all previous statements are by the rules of the game considered obsolete; and (2) Truman's demand for *partial* price con-

control does not contradict his belief that this means partial police control, since the OPA found out in its earliest days that this kind of price control is unworkable and ineffective—in short, a fake.

Besides, he would have been the most surprised Missourian in Washington if the proposal had been accepted by the Republican majority. According to the newspapers, some of the GOP leaders even toyed with the idea of voting in his bastardized price-control proposal just to see Truman outsmart himself; but that maneuver proved to be too subtle for the Republican intellect.

"Better Than Nothing"

The latter, equally cognizant of the fact that 1948 is the promised year of their re-entrance into the White House, hastened to introduce and pass an "anti-inflation" bill also. As if to prove that Truman is really the lesser evil, they did not even bother to include *fake* price-control provisions. This conclusively demonstrated—did it not?—their more reactionary character.

Instead the new law vigorously pleaded with big business to do *voluntarily* that which it fought tooth-and-nail against being legally required to do: reduce prices and allocate scarce materials fairly. Even this masterly plan they had to steal from lesser-evil Truman, who had already exhausted its possibilities by two appeals to the nation's business men to reduce prices.

This voluntaristic anti-inflation drive of Truman's took place not long before the BLS index resumed its upward climb. This was merely an unfortunate coincidence. We are not so prejudiced as to believe that Truman's appeals to cut prices were the *cause* of the upward climb.

Sternly insisting that he was still for price control (non-police-state variety), Truman signed the Republican bill without more ado. The reason given was that this bill was "better than nothing," though nothing was better than price control; and though nobody could find anything anti-inflationary in the bill, it is obvious that to pass a bill is better than to pass no bill. This logic is derived from the famous syllogism which goes as follows:

Nothing is better than wisdom.
Dry bread is better than nothing.
Therefore, dry bread is better than wisdom.

This bill which was "better than nothing" immediately justified the faint praise which the President had bestowed upon it. Providing as it did for voluntary allocation agreements by industrialists (uncontrolled by the government and unenforceable by either government or business), it also had to provide that these industrialists be exempted from the operation of the anti-trust laws.

Here one of the shorter arms of coincidence reached into the picture. Meeting in Washington almost as fast as they could get there after the *anti-anti-inflation* bill was passed, the steel corporations got together to discuss their voluntary allocation program, serene in their new immunity from anti-trust persecution. Indeed, the president of United States Steel, Benjamin Fairless, told the press he wanted a written guarantee from the government that his corporation would really be exempt from anti-trust harassment if it enters the voluntary program.

The coincidence lay in the fact that not many days later the *Federal Trade Commission* was scheduled to open hearings on its charges that 101 steel manufacturing companies had conspired unlawfully to fix prices and stifle all competition in the industry.

Nor is steel the only one in the pillory. A total of 114 anti-trust cases are now pending against a roster of 1300 companies—big names in auto, meat packing, household appliances, oil, housing, etc. The list reads like a Who's Who of American industry. The charge: monopoly practices linked up with skyrocketing price levels.

However, Truman's foresight must be commended at this point. In his "State of the Union" message to Congress, before he signed the bill exempting the bad big boys from anti-trust worries, he had already proposed increasing the funds appropriated for the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Department. It is obviously nothing more than even-handed justice to give trust-busters more money on the one hand, and the monopolists more immunity on the other. This is the system of checks and balances in the great American tradition.

CIO Prepares for Wage Fight

Wendell Berge, who until last spring was the head of the Anti-Trust Division, anticipated these developments in a recent magazine article (*Virginia Quarterly Review*, Autumn, 1947):

One inevitable by-product of this post-war monopoly drive has been the number of efforts made to remove whole fields of production or economic service from the jurisdiction of the anti-trust laws. . . . Cartelists count upon the cessation of vigilance directed toward them. . . . This effort on the cartel front, however, has been duplicated and even in some respects exceeded by attempts to remove the domestic operation of many fields from the jurisdiction of the anti-trust laws upon one excuse or another.

The excuse turned out to be the fight against . . . inflation.

This positively invaluable kind of struggle against inflation is spreading to all fronts. General Motors President Wilson told the NAM recently that the 40-hour week is "inflationary" and a stop should be put to it instanter. GM will have the opportunity, too, since its contract with the UAW comes up for reopening of negotiations on February 28. And after a recent meeting of the Wage Policy Committee of the auto workers, President Reuther made a statement in which he said:

The failure of both government and industry to stop inflation leaves labor no choice but to demand and win further wage increases in order to restore and maintain the purchasing power workers have lost through skyrocketing prices.

The steel union likewise is preparing for a new wage round. At the moment we will not dwell on the question: Will Reuther again fight for wage increases *without price increases*? We will ask another.

In the statement quoted above, Reuther also said:

Failure of the government to curb the inflation Americans are suffering under today can be attributed directly to unscrupulous political maneuvering by both the Democratic and Republican Parties. Both parties are playing fast and loose with the welfare of the people in a political chess game whose object is to see which party can win more votes on the inflation issue without doing anything about it.

Very true. Is it therefore Reuther's conclusion that labor must break with these twin betrayers of the welfare of the people and build a party of its own? Not that we've heard—not out loud, anyway. Instead, we shall not be amazed to find Reuther also rooting for Truman in November. The rationalization for this, we suspect, lies in something like the syllogism we cited above:

Nothing is better than a labor party.
Truman is better than nothing.
Therefore, Truman is better than a labor party.—Q. E. D.

A logician would point out that the obvious fallacy here is the use of the word "nothing" in two different senses. Politically speaking, that is also what actually happens when the logic is put into practice: the workers get two distinctly different kinds of "nothing"—the Democratic kind and the Republican kind.

This is exactly what took place in the recent *anti-anti-inflation* melee.

WHY WALLACE IS RUNNING

It has been said that a politician needs three hats: one to throw into the ring, one to talk through, and one to pull rabbits out of. Henry Wallace has the first two; as a result he needs the third more than ever.

The reaction to Wallace's announcement of his presidential candidacy already indicates the self-defeating character of the movement he is evoking. It is a third-party movement, but without labor's backing. It is a self-styled "peace movement," but one based on the program of appeasing Russian imperialism. It is a "liberal crusade," but one repudiated by almost all liberals except the Stalinists' private collection of anointed "progressives."

The most wonderful thing about Wallace's strategy is that in one fell swoop he succeeded in alienating more different groups, from more different points of view, than most politicians can usually do through not less than a half dozen separate blunders. Still, the extent to which the "flight from Wallace" by the people with "names" will have its counterpart among the nameless rank and file is still to be seen; it is by no means to be assumed.

•

Up to now, Wallace has been riding a wave—in truth, the wave of the future: the feelings of discontent with and suspicion of the increasingly reactionary policies of both old parties on the part of the workers and little people of the country; the desire to break away from the two-in-one bi-partisan sham in Washington; and the instinctive sympathy of the underdogs with one who seemed to stand up and attack both sets of rulers in the name of democracy, peace and security.

This is still his strength. The tragedy lies precisely in the fact that hundreds of thousands of militants, who are ready to follow a strong lead for independent labor political action, do not know anyone else to whom they can look.

Their Criticism and Ours

To these workers Wallace offers not a labor party, not even a labor-based third party, but rather a mugwump movement hothouse-forced by the Stalinists. Wallace's stumpers and door-bell ringers will try to sell this to the trade-union customers as "just as good as a labor party."

Will the whole idea of independent political action thus be tied up with the brand of anti-labor reaction and pro-Russianism which is the Stalinists' reason for existence? Insofar as this takes place, it can only serve to discredit and taint the idea of a real labor party and real workers' politics in the minds of their dupes.

The labor leaders and liberals who are at present engaged in shoveling abuse on Wallace's head are working to this end as busily as are the Stalinists.

The breakaways from the Progressive Citizens of America (Kingdon, Crum, Walsh, etc.); from the American Labor Party (the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' people in New

York); even previous Stalinist darlings like Senator Pepper; even more, the bureaucracies of the CIO and AFL unions who are now reviling Wallace with especial vulgarity—all these are outraged by Wallace's candidacy.

And what is his crime in *their* eyes? It is the fact that he refuses to support Truman as the "lesser evil" to the Republicans. It is the fact that he is "splitting the ranks of the progressives," as the refrain goes. It is the fact that Wallace says: "We want a new party, an anti-Wall-Street party, an anti-war party, a party of the common man. The Democrats and Republicans are hopelessly sold to the big interests and cannot be reformed. We must start *now* to build a party that will speak for the workingmen. We cannot wait for 'ideal' conditions which never come!"

This echoes the healthiest sentiments among the restive masses, and if this were the primary content of the Wallace movement it would indeed be a landmark in American social history. Let there be no mistake about that! But the truth is that these fine words have as much meaning in Wallace's mouth (or in his politics) as the fine word "socialism" has in the mouth of his impresario, the Communist Party.

For Wallace, the "dominant issue" is what he calls "peace," by which *he* means a policy of stuffing Stalin's belly with "concessions" in power politics so that American imperialism may suck at the rest of the world undisturbed. He proclaims openly that Truman has only to take a few steps in this direction to cause him to drop all the fine talk about new parties and political independence and the need to "stand up and be counted" against Wall Street. His remarks on Taft, discussed below, make it crystal-clear that his demagogic appeal to working-class interests is a tactical convenience and not a programmatic principle.

While he has for some time had the dual character of muddle-headed liberal and Stalinist cat's-paw, like many others, in this election he explicitly presents himself to the people primarily in the second capacity.

Wallace's Crime

We do not go for the notion that the antagonism of workers to Wallace as a Stalinist stooge springs only from exposure to the vicious anti-red drive of American reaction. Reaction is here taking advantage of a *fact* and playing it for all it is worth; but it remains a fact. Reaction may take advantage of workers' healthy hatred for Russian totalitarianism and its agents, as it took advantage of their healthy hatred for fascism before and during the recent war; but it is the job of socialists to disentangle anti-Stalinism from red-baiting as it was our job to disentangle anti-Nazism from warmongering. In the present case it is our job to disentangle labor opposition to Wallace as a *pro-Stalinist appeaser* from opposition to him as a "splitter of the progressive front."

The labor leaders and liberals consciously amalgamate the two anti-Wallace motivations. "Look at what Wallace is doing," they scream; "he rejects the 'lesser evil' of Truman in order to pull Russia's chestnuts out of the fire!" One is left to assume that rejecting Truman is equivalent to being a "Russia lover."

Shortsightedly squinting down from their comfortable perches on top to the milling mass who are looking for a way out of the bi-partisan blind alley, they are working overtime to convince labor that the *idea* of independent political action is a Stalinist-invented trap. After only yesterday themselves denouncing Truman as a strike-breaker, they are now comforted by the thought that he is not as big a strike-breaker as

Taft. Voting for the "lesser strike-breaker" is still the intellectual height of official CIO-AFL thought in the United States. It is known here as practicality.

We hope that the rank and file of labor will be as solidly anti-Wallace as their leaders, but we do not believe that large masses of them will be so from the same smug considerations, even if (as we fear) most of them will reluctantly cast their ballots the same way. Wallace's crime is that, far from offering them a chance to vote between a candidate of their own and a capitalist candidate, his performance may only obscure the pressing necessity of the sole immediate solution of labor's dilemma—the formation of a genuine labor party by the trade unions themselves.

We leave for coming issues of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL any further discussion of Wallace's program and political ideas, insofar as he has such. Right now we wish to take up a question which has been widely raised by the entrance of the man into the presidential race. This question is: Why did Wallace do it?

No one can take Wallace's own formal explanation entirely seriously as the decisive motivation—viz., one must stand up and be counted for what one believes, let the chips fall where they may, etc. This was the obvious sort of thing to say once the decision was taken. But Wallace has not been noted for always standing up and sounding off on what he believed, except on the subject of the fatherhood of God and the blessedness of the Spirit. It was not very long ago that he was himself arguing that he could not bolt the party because of the danger of "splitting the progressive front."

What changed his mind?—assuming it was neither a sudden attack of galloping principledness nor a visitation like that of the archangel to Joan of Arc (although in Wallace's case the second possibility is not to be dismissed lightly.)

The argument about not "splitting the progressive front," whether made by Wallace in his previous incarnation or by his ex-friends now, is based on the view of Truman as the "lesser evil" to a Taft. From our discussion thus far, one might have a right to assume that Wallace has broken with the sterilizing concept of the "lesser evil" as such, in favor of principled politics. This would indeed be a noteworthy step of ideological emancipation for any man so bourgeois-minded as Wallace, and even a praiseworthy mark in his favor, however wrongfully applied. But the assumption would be unwarranted.

Troglodyte or Truman?

The fact is that Wallace is navigating by the light of the "lesser evil" theory as closely as before; he has merely changed his mind about whose breast the label should be pinned on. For Wallace today, the genuine lesser evil is—Taft.

...if the only choice were between a Truman advocating compulsory military training and military aid to reactionary régimes and a Taft strong against compulsory military training and shipment of arms abroad, I would vote for Taft. I have made this statement because I wanted to emphasize the supreme importance of peace in the strongest possible way. [Wallace, in the *New Republic*, December 29. Italics in original.]

Strong enough—it leaves nothing to be desired when the country's "No. 1 liberal" flatly asserts his preference for the country's No. 1 symbol of reaction, as against Truman. The startlingness of the antithesis also explains sufficiently, perhaps, why this application of the "lesser evil" theory does not lead him to the conclusion that Taft should actually be sup-

ported—a possible conclusion which he vigorously repudiates but which required, at least, that he run himself. Outside of himself, he indicates, Taft is the best bet for "peace" (in the Wallacian sense)—and "peace," you will remember, is the supreme issue.

Why is Taft, the arch-reactionary, yet the least warmonger of the field of candidates?

[1]...he is not as violently anti-Russian as are most of the other potential Republican candidates...

[2]...he is the Republican least likely, among all those seeking the presidential nomination, to pursue a foreign policy backed with armed force, and thus to sharpen the chances for war...

[3] There are two types of Republican candidates today. One conforms to the Henry Luce, American Century type, and the other is Taft. The American Century type of candidate believes first, last and all the time, in the "menace of communism"... This group, and their candidates, I look on as the most dangerous in America.

[4] Taft...believes that that encroachment [of government on business] can be delayed if our government has no active role to play overseas.

[5]...today we have Taft standing for a "Little America" and the whole Luce stable of presidential hopefuls for a "Big America." President Truman belongs to the "Big America" group just as certainly as Dewey or Vandenberg... They are suited by temperament and ambition to build a strong and expensive mechanism to run the world.

[6] Compared with the "American Century" adventurers, Taft is a troglodyte of prehistoric vintage. [Ibid.]

This perfectly clear exposition of Taft's relatively peaceful qualifications can be boiled down to one sentence: The "Big America" candidates are smart enough to know what American imperialism's interests require; Taft, on the other hand, is stupid. (Troglodyte is defined as a cave-dwelling savage, any person of primitive or degraded ways of living, or an ape.) What better recommendation?

Why Stalinists Run Wallace

We forbear from probing Wallace's mental processes any further. A more interesting question obtrudes: *Where did Wallace get this interesting inversion of the lesser-evil doctrine?*

Certainly not from the Kingdons and Crums of the PCA. We suggest further that (well founded as this view of Taft may be in its essentials) the process of reasoning from these premises to the conclusion that Taft is the lesser evil to Truman, as well as the complete de-emphasis of the domestic issues in favor of a glassy-eyed concentration on the question of foreign policy—all this is politically completely alien to liberal patterns of thought. It is not too great a speculative leap to lay it at the door of *those who are indeed today Wallace's sole political chaperones—the Stalinists.*

The original question is transformed. Not "Why is Wallace running?" but "Why is the CP running Wallace?" And this question can be examined without any psychological probings whatever.

(1) *The CP is running Wallace because it prefers the election of a more isolationist Republican to Truman.* Wallace, of course, cannot be elected, but he can defeat Truman. More than that: the very announcement of Wallace's candidacy has already strengthened the chances of Taft's winning the Republican nomination; the Republicans may feel that they can afford a less popular candidate. If Truman is defeated, no matter what Republican is elected, the *Daily Worker* will claim that the people have given an implied mandate against the Truman Doctrine and against Truman-Marshall arch-imperialism. Stalin has a real interest in choosing between a Truman and a troglodyte.

(2) *The CP is running Wallace because the only alternative was to run an openly CP candidate.* Obviously the Stalinists could not even dream of supporting Truman while in Europe they busily paint him in black colors as a deep-dyed arch-fiend. No matter how great the pressure at home, their well developed system of opportunistic adaptation to the labor bureaucracy could not carry to this point, where it would conflict with the major need of their Russian masters.

Then why didn't the CP run its own party candidate? The obvious answer is that as long as Wallace was willing to bite, this was unnecessary. But in addition, an open CP candidate would have put Stalinist-controlled unions on a very uncomfortable spot: whom could they endorse? It must be remembered in this connection that the Stalinists have not run a presidential candidate of their own in twelve years—really, in sixteen years, since in 1936 the CP “ran” Browder for the record but put its bankroll on Roosevelt (as they are now doing with respect to Wallace and Taft).

(3) *The CP is running Wallace as the biggest possible sounding board for an all-out propaganda attack on the Marshall Plan—the No. 1 task assigned by Moscow.*

(4) *The CP is running Wallace as the best form of pressure upon Truman, for what it is worth.* They can at least hope that, if the Wallace campaign takes, Truman will find it expedient to move over in his direction in order to keep from losing too many Wallacian-liberal votes. They can also

hope that the Wallace campaign will stimulate the formation and spread of permanent Stalinist-third-party fronts (like the recently formed California Independent Progressive Party). In the absence of a real labor party or even of a native-sponsored third party, such groups could funnel social discontent into the hopper of Stalinist pressure politics.

One thing is made entirely obvious by the Wallace affair: a new independent party, which seeks to speak for the masses against the classes, can only be an abortion *unless it is solidly based on the organized labor movement.*

Even if the Kingdons and Crums had gone along with Wallace on this adventure, the realities of his situation would have been only slightly altered as long as the trade unions turned thumbs down. The purely “liberal” vote and social influence, as distinct from labor’s vote and social weight, is not quite a negligible quantity but it is a distinctly minor consideration.

The converse is, however, not true. Labor’s independent political strength is the unlit fuse of American society—its explosion would shake the political framework to its foundations and send cracks ramifying into the social and economic substructures. In comparison the Wallace movement is a wet firecracker pinging inside an empty can.

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Toward a Re-United India

Program for the Fight Against Partition

The division imposed upon the sub-continent of India, into the Dominion of Pakistan and the Dominion of India, has occurred under the most disastrous and tragic circumstances imaginable. If recent experience in the colonial world has again indicated the incapacity of the national bourgeoisie to successfully lead the nation to national independence (Indo-China, Indonesia, etc.), the experience in India has not only underscored this fact again, but also the additional fact that this same bourgeoisie can only lead the nation from one disaster toward the menace of an even greater disaster.

Creations of only a few months, the Dominions of Pakistan and of India are already squared off against each other as though the perspective of an ultimate, full-scale war between them is to be understood, taken for granted and prepared for!

Such a war is not possible today, nor probably for many years to come. Both territories are too chaotic, disorganized and lacking in stability to engage in such madness at the moment. Yet this is clearly the trend, as openly predicted by their respective leaders, including the eminent philosopher of non-violence, Mahatma Gandhi! But neither one has the army, the administrative or technical cadres, or the machine necessary for war. Yet it is clear that both governments, young and immature as they are, are pointed in that direction, will begin (indeed already have begun) to prepare for this eventuality, and—assuming they remain in power, consolidate and establish themselves—will one day plunge the whole land into its greatest catastrophe, war between Pakistan and India, over continental control.

If we speak of the necessity of an orientation toward reunification of India, it is without any illusions. The terrible damage already inflicted on the cause of a united India makes it impossible to accomplish such a task except over a long period of time and with the utmost difficulty. The division of India today is a fact that must be taken as a new departure point. We must seek to understand why the division took place as it did, the causes of the disastrous manner in which it was carried out, and then pose the question of whether it can be healed, and how.

It is apparent that neither dominion is capable of healing the rupture but, given their troubled and dynamic internal social systems, will clash again and again. If today's struggles over those princely states which have not yet made their choice between the dominions (Janagadh, Kashmir and Hyderabad) will be settled in one or another way by force of circumstances, we should only view such settlements as temporary in character and in no way harmonizing the antagonism between the two power groups. The same attitude must be maintained toward the important agreements and settlements of serious financial matters reached in December 1947 by the two states. The rulers of Pakistan, in a far inferior economic and industrial position, will not rest with their defeat in the Kashmir adventure; nor have the Hindu capitalist rulers of India become reconciled to their losses in the Pakistan territories.

What were the factors leading to the division of the conti-

ment, a division long opposed by the Indian nationalist movement?

We cannot here trace the entire history. Fundamentally, it resulted from the historic incapacity of the Indian bourgeoisie, organized in its Congress Party, to lead the oppressed nation as a whole in the fight for national independence. Partition was thus the end result of a long period of struggle and negotiation between three forces—British imperialism, the Congress Party and the reactionary Moslem League of the feudalists. Throughout the torturous negotiations of partition's final phase, lasting two years, imperialism remained the dominant element in the situation, despite the fact that its own internal weaknesses forced it to twist and yield and bend.

Why Partition Took Place

The final solution reached, while not the most satisfactory, was nevertheless highly acceptable to imperialism since it signified the *continuation*, even though in a highly modified form, of Britain's power over the bulk of India's economic life.

The direct rule of British imperialism is ending. The job of governing the country has been handed over to the Indian bourgeoisie, with whom the British imperialists have entered into a partnership. . . . Despite a certain improvement in the relative position of Indian capital, the volume of British capital investment in India has undergone no significant change, while the grip of imperialist capital over the exchange banks, insurance companies and in shipping and key positions in industry continues. . . . The *direct rule* of British imperialism, we declare therefore, is being replaced by *indirect rule*.

This declaration of the Indian Trotskyist party on the eve of the August 15, 1947, day of "independence" is essentially correct.

But more was involved than the creation of this junior partnership of the Hindu capitalist class with imperialism. Unable to force an acceptance of its original "Cripps proposal," under whose terms a unified India would have emerged with the junior partnership embracing the Moslem League as well as the Congress, imperialism sought a solution that would not only leave India in as weak a condition as possible, but with a chronic, long-lasting communal division that would sap the potential unified strength of the country and assist the British strategy of remaining on and intervening at important moments in the life of the two dominions. Thanks to the Congress and to the Moslem League, equally, this strategy has succeeded.

Finally, it would be blindness itself not to recognize the mass forces and pressures at work that made it possible for the Moslem League to take the adamant stand that it did. The truth is that over a period of years the Moslem masses became increasingly (and justifiably) concerned over their possible future under a Congress regime. Since no reassuring force rose among the Hindu masses to calm their fears, the Moslem League leaders were not only able to create a mass movement out of the communal problem but were also able to present themselves as the *sole* active mass force present at the conference table. The partition of India did not take place merely as a cold, worked-out deal between the three forces we have

mentioned. The atmosphere was ready for the violent and tragic explosion that occurred.

In a previous article in *THE NEW INTERNATIONAL* (December 1947), we have attempted to outline the character of the Hindu-Moslem conflict and relate it to the now increasingly familiar world tendency of the regrowth of narrow nationalist and communalist movements within the confines of the more backward territories. Moslem communalism, called into existence first by British imperialism, became a force which could not be brushed aside and which channelized the strength and desires of tens of millions of India's most backward and down-trodden community. At the conference table of partition it had to be accounted for.

Chain Reaction Unleashed

The actual partition took place suddenly, abruptly and brutally. Only the top leadership of Congress, imperialism and the Moslem League knew what was coming. In this sense, even though it may be argued that India's division was "agreed" to and segments of the nation were consulted, we maintain that it was a reactionary and imposed division, so far as the masses were concerned.

Nehru for the Congress, Jinnah for the Moslem League, and Lord Mountbatten for imperialism were thus the authors of the great disaster which followed, particularly in the province of Punjab. The frustrated impulses of the two peoples, held back by their leadership from a joint struggle against imperialism, ran into communal lines and burst out in a frenzy of communal warfare. Two nations, Hindu and Moslem, were born amid the barbaric death of hundreds of thousands, the forced migration of millions and the destruction of enormous amounts of property.

By November 1947, it was estimated that eight million persons had been switched or displaced in the Punjab and elsewhere. Many others will migrate, at a slower pace, and the tendency will be for both dominions to become strictly one community or the other. This was the greatest mass migration of world history, whipped up by a fantastic outburst of communal hysteria. Over four million Hindus and Sikhs fled Pakistan, and about the same number fled the Indian Dominion. No one has accurately estimated the number of deaths, but it was at least 250,000 people. The Sikh community of approximately five million, residing in the Punjab, had the highest percentage of displacement and losses. One and a half million fled Pakistan, and 600,000 were left without any land or property after the debacle.

If fratricidal communal strife appears outwardly as the explosion of primitive emotions and fanatic passions, a closer examination will indicate this to be untrue. A backward, semi-feudal milieu, with a great mass of illiterate and down-trodden peasants such as India provides, is not even necessary for such outbursts, as the example of Nazi Germany and the Jewish community indicates. What is essential is the perversion of genuine and legitimate social grievances into paths desired by reactionary segments of the population, on *both* sides. The clearest example of this is the story of the Punjab, where the major portion of the catastrophe took place..

The province of the Punjab was a distinct section of India, with a large population of Hindus, Moslems and Sikhs, all speaking a common language (Punjabi), and comparatively well unified culturally and historically. The Sikhs, long employed by the British as the nucleus of their armed forces in India, had developed into a privileged military caste, often and justly compared with the Cossacks of the Czar. This com-

munity occupied roughly the center of the Punjab. Furthermore, "... the border regions of both Eastern and Western Punjab were occupied by the land-hungry peasantry. The persistent propaganda of the Moslem League promised the land to the Moslem peasantry who were told that once Pakistan was established, all land would belong to the Moslems." (M. Naidu, *The Militant*, October 27, 1947.) Likewise, in the Moslem sections of the Punjab, the landlords and money lenders were mainly Hindus. Class and communal struggles overlapped and were confused.

The document dividing the Punjab was a British-drawn document. It was deliberately conceived to antagonize the Moslems, who constituted 57 per cent of the Punjab, and the four and a half million Sikh community. On either side of the announced border between India and Pakistan four million minority peoples found themselves. On one side was a large Moslem community, in conflict with their Hindu landlords, industrialists and capitalists, bankers and business men, money lenders and merchants. On the other side were masses of Hindu peasants, living under Moslem landlordism. In-between was the rich and powerful community of the bearded Sikhs. And the British were permitted to handle this tense problem and make the final decision!

Suddenly, without warning, the Punjab was split wide open, with the demarcation line between India and Pakistan running down through the rich communal lands of the Sikhs. Reactionary, communalist elements on both sides had been agitating the land-hungry peasants that partition would be the signal for the expropriation of opposing communities and seizure of their lands and property. Once such action had begun it swiftly became the bloody chain reaction familiar to us. Poverty, land-hunger, feudalism, religious fanaticism, narrow communalism, incapable of being held in check by a non-existent revolutionary leadership, ran rampant. The real criminals in the situation are the same three forces that had signed this partition conceived in secrecy—British imperialism, Hindu capitalism and Moslem feudalism. That landlords, capitalists and feudalists were murdered in the struggle, and their properties destroyed, again illustrates the meaning of Marx's remark about the continuation of our social order leading to the "common ruin" of all classes.

Pakistan Versus India

Thus the division of the sub-continent took place. There now exists Pakistan and India, two tremendous nations busily attempting to consolidate their power and erect firm state foundations. How, from an economic standpoint, do they compare with each other? We give a brief summary of both nations' outstanding characteristics, without detail.

The Dominion of India is, by far, the more advanced economically and industrially. With a population over four times that of Pakistan, India possesses most of the coal and iron mines, textile and jute mills and steel mills, as well as the major harbors of the sub-continent (Bombay, Madras, Calcutta). India has the bulk of industrial production and skilled labor, particularly since most of the skilled Hindu workers who were living in Pakistan areas have now fled, along with the flight of Hindu captial from that unhappy dominion. India's main difficulty, economically speaking, is a shortage in food production.

Pakistan is primarily an agricultural area—backward at that—with very little actual industry. Larger than Greater Germany, it has a population of seventy million; of whom about sixty million are Moslems. It is the most backward re-

gion, industrially, of the sub-continent. Pakistan has no known iron or coal, and Karachi is its only important harbor. The country's major asset is its large agricultural production, including 85 per cent of all the world's jute supply (which must be processed in India!). There is an agricultural surplus of wheat and rice, cotton, wool and tea. There is little capital for development, and the people are largely illiterate—four per cent can read as compared with twelve per cent in India. Its skilled proletariat is small and rudimentary, with most of the population consisting of land-hungry peasants.

The Indian Dominion thus is the center of capitalism, while Pakistan is the home of the strongest semi-feudalism and landlordism. This is the heart of the economic struggle between the dominions, with Hindu capital seeking to rule and exploit the sub-continent as a whole, and Moslem landlordism resisting and demanding its share in such an expansionist program.


Given its obvious weaknesses and disadvantages as against the Indian Dominion, the future of Pakistan as a long-lasting, viable state is doubtful indeed. The desire to find a more stable base is unquestionably one of the reasons why the Pakistan rulers have begun various expansionist adventures, such as the invasion of Kashmir. Writing in *New Spark* (August 30, 1947), Indra Sen has described some of the *internal* political problems of Pakistan, all calculated to further upset the struggling young state.

He points out that Pakistan itself is composed of various minorities, divided along *national* lines—the Pathans, the Punjabis, the Baluchis, the Sindhis and the Bengalis are all separate peoples within the body of the Moslem state. There is a movement among the Pathans (in the northern frontier area) for separation from Pakistan; Baluchistan has affiliated with Pakistan only as an autonomous province with its own administration; there is a trend among the Moslems in Bengal to join forces with the Hindus in their own region and thus (since Bengal is the single most powerful unit of Pakistan) threaten to dominate the whole dominion. The Pakistan Constituent Assembly, in which the Bengalis have a clear majority, is now the center of the struggle among these disintegrating and centrifugal forces within Pakistan itself. These tendencies, however, do not signify an early falling apart of the Pakistan Dominion, which will, on the contrary, be held together precisely as the reactionary pressure of the Indian Dominion grows and tugs at it. This is a familiar story in history.

The Key Problem

Now, viewed in its broadest aspects, the partition of the Indian sub-continent—as well as the disintegrative characteristics within each separate dominion briefly described above—is but another example of a world-wide phenomenon peculiar to capitalism in its stage of total degeneration and regression. This outstanding characteristic of our age, denied and ignored by the official Fourth International movement, has presented theoretical and tactical problems which virtually only two political movements, the IKD [German Trotskyists] and the Workers Party, have grappled with, each in its own way and with its own answer. The wartime national movement in Europe, the question of the Stalinist-occupied countries of the East of Europe, Palestine—these are some of the more familiar new headaches plaguing revolutionary socialists. India and Pakistan, *mutatis mutandis*, fit into the same category of revived, unexpected but nevertheless solvable national problems.

Unfortunately, the Indian Trotskyist movement (Bolshe-



vik-Leninist Party of India), like its sister sections of the Fourth International, has distinguished itself (and continues to do so) only by the multitude of its errors in handling this matter. In our opinion, it has been consistently and thoroughly wrong from the beginning, and is still wrong. Does the BLPI believe it can grow and gain commanding influence without solving this key problem? Apparently yes, because it has never dealt with it in such detail and with such seriousness as to oblige us to conclude it even recognizes its importance. A brief resolution two years ago (now antiquated) and several articles in its press are all we have discovered.

In its December 1946 issue, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL published an article presenting its point of view on the Pakistan, or the Hindu-Moslem problem, as well as an invitation to the Indian Trotskyists to explain their position. This was never accepted, and the proposal that the BLPI champion the *right* of the Moslem community to self-determination, if it so wished, was never discussed, rejected, accepted or amended by the BLPI.

Our previous criticisms of the BLPI still stand, in full. Now we must add new ones, and renew our invitation to these comrades to explain their viewpoint, or at least tell us what is wrong with ours. Faced with the accomplished partition, what does the BLPI now say? It condemns the partition (so do we); it calls for unity of Hindu and Moslem masses (so do we); it explains the deceptive nature of Moslem communalism, etc. Its proposal for the healing of the communal division is summed up by its publication, *New Spark*, in the following slogan: "For a single revolutionary Constituent Assembly for India and Pakistan." Just as this slogan sums up the BLPI's political program of today, so does it sum up everything that is wrong with that program. We shall attempt to explain why.

The strength and mass base of the reactionary, communalist Moslem League was long under-estimated by the BLPI. The BLPI was not alone in this error; many others who attempted to analyze the complex politics of India were also wrong, among them this writer. As a result, the BLPI only recognized the strength of this movement at a late stage and

never developed a program which, in a positive fashion, could meet it.

The very logic of the class struggle within India, it was felt, would dissolve communalism through the revolutionary effects of national liberation, the emergence of the Indian proletariat as the leader of the nation, etc. But precisely because this "logical" development did not and has not occurred, the acuteness of the Moslem problem grew. From a purely British-created movement of reactionary feudalists and petty bourgeois the League became a mass movement, with a certain independent existence of its own. Doctrinal disputes over whether or not the Moslems constituted a "legitimate" nation became increasingly abstract—i.e., meaningless. The point was, rather, that politically speaking they acted and believed more and more as though they were determined to become a nation!

The slogan of "Hindu-Moslem working class unity," while it remained applicable to concrete phases and actions of the class struggle, no longer sufficed as a central slogan to meet a developing *political* crisis. The proposal that revolutionary socialists champion and support the right of the Moslem people to self-determination, to a separate existence, if they so wished (a wish which became increasingly obvious) was rejected by the BLPI, which clung to its old position. Failing to understand that the struggle of nationalities and national minorities for self-realization within India itself is an organic part of the general, all-nation struggle for national independence from imperialism (to which it can, if properly directed, add its strength as small rivulets feed a river), the BLPI advanced the utterly mechanical notion that only *after* the complete independence of India can the national problem within the country itself be resolved. That is, the BLPI proposed to put off indefinitely the working-out of a solution to what was rapidly becoming the key political issue! It still proposes this. In practice, the BLPI made a farce out of the concept of the permanent revolution, under which the working class wins and earns the leadership of the nation because it and it alone is able to solve the multitude of unsolved problems, chief among which are national and minority problems. In practice, the BLPI proposes the "pure" proletarian revolution which, after its victory, will settle all questions.

The BLPI's present slogan of a "single revolutionary Constituent Assembly for India and Pakistan" is merely a new version of its former abstractionist slogan of Hindu-Moslem unity and, like the latter, evades the issue. To advance it today, as the *chief* slogan, must signify indeed that the BLPI does not even accept the partition as an accomplished fact! To think that a single Constituent Assembly (that is, broad Moslem-Hindu unity) is realizable in the near future is to display a fantastic blindness in the face of what is happening. Or, if the BLPI agrees that such a united assembly is remote, then what business does it have making this its central slogan, rather than (at best) a propagandistic or educational one? This slogan is meaningless not merely because it is unrealizable, but because it makes no contact with a single living political development of today.

A revolutionary party such as the BLPI, with few or no units in Pakistan or among the Moslem masses, must do better than this. Have not the comrades of the BLPI considered the fact that the Hindu bourgeoisie would also favor a "united Constituent Assembly" for all of India? How shall you distinguish yourself from the Hindu chauvinists and nationalists of the ruling class who wish to "unify" the Moslem masses under their rule? By calling your Constituent Assembly "revolutionary"?

Here again the BLPI plays fast and loose with words. "Revolutionary" in what sense? Shall its task be to institute workers' power and begin the construction of socialism in India? Then you are confusing your "revolutionary Constituent Assembly" with a Congress of Soviets and the proletarian dictatorship, which is really what you mean. The Constituent Assembly, as the highest political expression of the national-democratic revolution, cannot be "revolutionary" in this sense. Lenin and Trotsky, in their old writings against the left-Mensheviks and the Russian S-Rs, often denounced this mixing up and confusing of issues.

A Program for Re-Unification

But, besides this matter of theoretical confusion, we wish to stress our principal objection to the slogan—namely, its stubborn blindness before the reality that the two peoples are drawing apart, not closer together as the very issuing of the slogan would falsely imply. The problem is: how to halt this disintegration; how to reverse the process and set the two peoples on the road leading toward one another. No well-meant abstraction will do it.

In bringing our general attitude toward this problem up to date, we offer the following set of propositions, partly a repetition of what has been previously said:

(1) The BLPI shall support and champion the right of self-determination of all national and communal minorities and peoples within the Indian sub-continent. First and foremost, the BLPI shall declare the right of the Moslem people to its own state, to complete separation, if they so wish.

(2) The BLPI shall fully support the right of existence, continuation and survival of Pakistan as a separate state. It shall categorically oppose any step or action on the part of the government of India and of the Hindu bourgeoisie to crush Pakistan and bring about "unity" by force and violence or economic pressure. It goes without saying, this implies no political support to the Pakistan regime or to its reactionary feudal-landlord rulers. It does mean that the BLPI supports the right of the people within Pakistan to determine their own future.

(3) The BLPI will oppose all efforts on the part of the Indian Dominion to squeeze Pakistan economically, by institution of taxes and duties on Pakistan raw materials; by confiscating Moslem properties in India; by withholding funds from Pakistan, etc. The first steps on the long and hard road toward a democratic re-unification of the sub-continent can only begin in simple, but important, economic and social matters. The BLPI proposes customs unity, free travel between both countries, international trade unions of all workers in the dominions and such other concrete measures as will underscore unification. The BLPI supporters in Pakistan should naturally have a corresponding policy.

(4) The BLPI must recognize that, in an educational sense, the only acceptable solution it can put forward for the eventual organization of a re-unified India is that of a federated India, constructed along not only multi-national but also multi-communal lines. This can mean not only a federated state of the Punjab, for example, but also a federated Moslem state of the Punjab, and a federated Hindu state of the Punjab. We do not advocate or wish this, but we certainly cannot exclude such a possible development.

This, then, is our view of the road toward re-unification, in its broad outlines.

HENRY JUDD.

Peron: Argentine Sub-Imperialist

Structural Changes in Latin America

Latin America is undergoing a profound economic and social transformation.

A vigorous industrial development in Argentina and Brazil was made possible by the First World War. But it was the Second World War which gave the impetus to a true industrial revolution in these two countries. Between 1935 and 1945 certain branches of Argentine industry expanded between 50 and 100 per cent. The size of the industrial proletariat increased from 470,000 in 1935 to 1,000,000 in 1945. (*Fourth International*, "Newsletter from Argentina," December, 1945.) So great is the concentration of the proletariat in the Buenos Aires area that 900,000 workers are to be found within a radius of 100 kilometers.

The two world wars permitted the semi-colonial countries to move toward independence, developing a comparatively strong industry of their own. Argentina freed itself from dependence on British imperialism, creating its own reserves of capital. While the tempestuous development of Brazilian industry was based on North American credit, Argentina took advantage of European investments, the flight of capital from Europe, primarily German investments, to emancipate itself from both English and American capital. Until the First World War, Argentina was a semi-feudal country, an exporter of agricultural products to England. The governments and "Gaicho" policy took shape in the heat of the struggle between the commercial bourgeoisie and the conservative latifundists (big landowners) who were supported by British imperialism.

In 1930, General Uriburu overthrew Irigoyen's Radical Party, representative of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, and installed a conservative government of latifundists headed by Augustin P. Justo. In 1938 the Ortiz-Castillo combination deposed Justo, promising "clean" elections against the agrarian oligarchy. But the development of Argentina's industry was already beyond the capacity of the old Radical Party, which represented the commercial bourgeoisie and the heretofore embryonic industrial bourgeoisie. When Ortiz (who was close to the Radicals) died, his successor, Castillo, tended toward German influences. But this was hardly sufficient. In June, 1943, the revolt of the Rawson-Ramirez clique installed a military regime opposed to the United States and supported by Hitler.

Peron's Plan

The "grey eminence" of this revolt was Juan Domingo Peron, who rose to power by way of elections after the years of military dictatorship, defeating the "Democratic Union" composed of Radicals, Stalinists and Socialists. Peron's regime now has a social base that extends not only into the bourgeoisie and the middle class, but into the backward layers of the Argentine proletariat as well. Peron was able to defeat both the Stalinists and the Socialists in the trade unions, creating his own unions of a totalitarian type. His social policy of increasing wages won him enormous sympathies.

Not so long ago Peron announced a five-year plan and also signed a commercial treaty with Chile which looks toward a customs union. Argentina's five-year plan, as well as its rela-

tions with Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia, expresses the dynamic industrial expansion of the Argentine bourgeoisie and its drive to conquer new markets for its growing industries. But perhaps Peron's political and social influence can best be measured by the ideological pressure it exerts even within the Trotskyist organizations.

In the January-February, 1947, issue of *Octubre*, which carries on its cover Trotsky's classic phrase concerning defense of the USSR, we find various articles on the structural changes which are occurring in Argentina. Victory Guerrero, in an editorial article, "Continental Policy of the Argentine Bourgeoisie," sustains the main thesis that *Peron is realizing a bourgeois democratic revolution in Argentina*, and that the customs union with Chile constitutes a step toward the unity of Latin America.

The plan is inseparable from the Union. Both constitute an obvious attempt to overcome the feudal isolation of Chile and Argentina, authentic pre-capitalist remnant imposed by imperialism. Nevertheless, the plan is at the same time a reflection of the weakness of the Argentine bourgeoisie. The country cannot achieve its self-determination except by renouncing its separate existence and integrating itself in a Latin-American state in accordance with the example of the United States in the eighteenth century.

In order to give this magisterial thesis a foundation, the author defines Argentina's character as being that of a semi-colonial and feudal country. And he is not alone. In another article headed "Lenin and the National Question," Niceto Andres follows him along the same path. Without in the least noticing it, both authors fall into contradictions in analyzing the national economy. "The agrarian problem in Argentina—naturally we exclude the other countries of Latin America from this characterization—has been substantially resolved from the capitalist point of view." (My emphasis—L. V.) "Along with the development of the national industry, the first imperialist war exercised other effects of the same type in the countryside. With the ending of the war, agricultural products brought high prices on the world market because European production was disorganized. This wave of prosperity allowed new peasant strata to acquire property rights to the land they cultivated; similarly, it made it easier for other tenant farmers to establish capitalist forms of relations: the substitution of rent in money for rent in kind, etc. According to an estimate by Horne, 70 per cent of the peasantry is capitalist in type, well-to-do tenants and independent farmers. As in the case of the industrial evolution, the Argentine countryside took advantage of the imperialist crisis and accentuated its march toward superior levels. At the same time, the so-called 'oligarchy' (latifundists) had already lost in large part its old patriarchal form." (V. Guerrero, "Continental Policy," *Octubre*, No. 3, 47.)

Did Peron Make a Revolution?

This is the manner in which Guerrero characterizes the economic structure of a "semi-colonial country." But Niceto goes even further.

Let us now look at Argentina. *Its agriculture possesses a capitalist character. Its industry gives employment to a numerous and concentrated proletariat. It is a creditor nation. Nevertheless, the*

bourgeois-democratic tasks are still to be completed. . . . Argentina's semi-colonial character is determined in the last instance by the semi-colonial character of Latin America taken in its totality. . . . Argentina cannot conquer an independent position for the simple reason that the independence of Latin America and each one of the "countries" that make it up can only be won through the unification of a great national state. *The unity of Latin America, for us that signifies the bourgeois-democratic revolution.* (Niceto: "Lenin and the National Question," *Octubre*, No. 3, 47.)

Our author continues his dispute with the Argentine group associated with *El Militante*, which supports the opposite thesis that Argentina is no longer a semi-colonial country but capitalist *par excellence*, and that consequently the bourgeois-democratic revolution has been accomplished in this country. He affirms that such a revolution has never been realized in Argentina. It was carried out neither by Irigoyen nor anyone else, but by Peron. "Until 1916, Argentina was 'almost' colonial. Irigoyen's rise to power did not essentially modify this situation. Uriburu and Justo represented the oligarchical-imperialist reaction, Ortiz and Castillo the extension of this policy with semi-Bonapartist characteristics, under conditions of war. . . . When therefore was the bourgeois revolution carried out? Grit your teeth and contemplate the Medusa's head. That revolution took place . . . on the 4th of June, 1943." (Niceto. My emphasis—L. V.)

Thus we arrive at the fundamental thesis that Peron realized the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and accordingly the author asks his adversaries: Why do you call it a "dictatorship" of the "totalitarian" stripe?

Since the democratic revolution in its agrarian as well as in its industrial aspect has already been exhausted in Argentina, according to the authors themselves, it follows that the principal task of the "Peron Revolution" is to realize *the unity of Latin America*, because "the semi-colonial character of Argentina is determined in the last analysis by the semi-colonial character of Latin America taken in its totality."

Our authors turn back to the period of pre-independence when the adventurer-generals of Latin America dreamed of continental unity. They cite the Venezuelan general Miranda, San Martin, and Simon Bolivar, the "Liberator," who wished to unite Latin America into a federation of states in imitation of Washington and who called the congress of Panama for this purpose. However, the embryonic bourgeoisie of the period was too weak to realize this task, while Anglo-American imperialism did everything possible to prevent it and to stimulate the formation of "independent" states, thus effecting the "Balkanization" of the South American continent. With the development of Argentine industry the Argentine frontiers have become much too narrow, and the inexorable need for a market has given birth to the "continental conscience" of the Argentine bourgeoisie. And Latin America is a market of 130,000,000 people. *Argentina's five-year plan and the customs union with Chile are the coefficients of the same policy.* (Guerrero, "Continental Policy.")

"Socialism in Due Time"

The limits of this "emancipating" process, continues our author, depend on the international situation, the attitude of the American working class and of its vanguard. Solemnly assuming the toga of a Marxist Cato, our author thunders: "It is the duty of the vanguard in the United States to give political support to every step taken by the nationalist-bourgeois government of Argentina against imperialism . . . the Betancourt government (Venezuela), the APRA (Peru), Bolivian nationalism, the Dutra government (Brazil) and Peron's

own government, all demonstrate that the Latin American bourgeoisie is incapable of conducting a vigorous and openly declared [?] struggle against imperialism." (Guerrero, *Ibid.* My emphasis and question mark—V.)

It should be evident now that the Argentine Trotskyists wish to be more Catholic than the Pope and more *Peronista* than Peron, leading forward the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Argentina, Brazil and the other Latin American countries with the blessing of Pope Stalin and that "democratic revolutionary," Peron. For them the socialist revolution belongs to a distant epoch: "The five-year plan and the customs union with Chile will sweep the feudal trash from the path of the working class and force imperialism to retreat from its posts of control over the continental and Argentine economy (really?) thus restricting its markets, aggravating its crisis and providing a much wider historic arena for the great future struggle between the Latin American bourgeoisie and the proletariat of the continent." (Guerrero, *Ibid.*)

In other words we are far, very far, from a socialist revolution. First Peron, with Stalin's blessings and the brave help of the *Octubre* Trotskyists, is to realize "the unity of Latin America" and "force imperialism to retreat" in order "to provide a much wider historic arena for the Latin American proletariat." And this is called Marxism! Comrade "Gauchos," this is not Marxism but a native "hash à la Peron."

II

In order to investigate and clarify our problem, and to separate the correct ideas from the "hash," we must refer to the writings of Jose Carlos Mariategui, Peruvian Marxist, esteemed not only in his own country and on the Latin American continent but among all Spanish speaking peoples. We have at hand only his "Seven Essays on the Interpretation of the Peruvian Reality," which does not contain much on our question. Nevertheless, what there is will aid us in clarifying the problem in question.

Mariategui teaches us that the Spanish *conquistadores* found in existence an Incan economic system which was . . .

well disciplined, pantheistic and simple—enjoying material well-being. Subsistence abounded and the population increased. The Empire was radically unaware of the Malthusian problem. . . . The collective work and the common effort were directed fruitfully toward social ends. (Mariategui, *Seven Essays*, page 7.)

Without being able to replace it, the Spanish *conquistadores* destroyed this formidable machine of production. The Inca economy, the native society, decomposed and was completely crushed by the conquest. The links of unity broken, the nation dissolved into dispersed communities. . . .

The domain ruled by the Viceroy outlined the beginning of the difficult and complex process involved in the formation of a new economy. . . . On the ruins of the collectivist Inca system, the *conquistadores* imposed the feudal European system, dividing the common lands among themselves and plundering the Inca palaces and silver mines. . . . The Spaniards began to cultivate the soil and exploit the gold and silver mines. . . . [But] the weakness of the Spanish Empire resided precisely in its character and structure, this being more of a military and ecclesiastical enterprise than political and economic. Large groups of pioneers did not land in the Spanish colonies as they did on the shores of New England. To Latin America there came almost no one but viceroys, courtesans, adventurers, clerics, doctors and soldiers. A true force for colonization did not, therefore, take shape in Peru. The population of Lima included a small court, a bureaucracy, some convents, inquisitors, merchants, servants and slaves; besides, the Spanish pioneer lacked the aptitude necessary to create nuclei of labor. . . . The colonizers preoccupied themselves almost exclusively with the exploitation of Peruvian gold and silver.

Thus it was that the conquest imported a feudal Spanish system in process of decay, imposing it on the ruins of Inca collectivism. The republican economy, like that of the conquest, was also

born of a political and military deed... With independence, the ideas of the French Revolution and the North American constitution begin to find a climate favorable to their diffusion in South America because a bourgeoisie existed, though embryonic in character. Given its economic needs and interests, this bourgeoisie was fated to catch the revolutionary fever from the European bourgeoisie. Certainly, Hispano-American independence would never have been realized had there not existed a heroic generation responsive to the emotions of its epoch, with a capacity and will to inspire in these peoples a true revolution... The leaders and caudillos, the ideologues of this revolution, were neither inferior nor superior to the premises, basically economic, of this event...

Spanish policy was in total contradiction to, and acted as an obstacle to, the economic development of the colonies. She [Spain] did not allow them to engage in traffic with any other nation, reserving for herself the role of the metropolis and monopolizing in exclusive fashion the right to all commerce and enterprise in these territories...

The natural impulse of the productive strength of the colonies was to fight to break this bond. The nascent economy of the embryonic American national formations imperiously demanded separation from the rigid authority, and emancipation from the medieval mentality of the King of Spain, if it was to achieve its development... Taken on the plane of world history, South American independence reveals itself as being determined by the necessities of the development of western, or more precisely, of capitalist civilization. [My emphasis—V.]... Although the rhythm of capitalist phenomena had a less apparent and ostensible function in the elaboration of independence than the echo of the philosophy and literature of the encyclopedists, it was without a doubt much more decisive and profound. (Mariategui, *ibid.*)

For Mariategui, then, South American independence has its basis in capitalist development. For the *Octubre* Trotskyists, the formation of national states in Latin America belongs to the pre-capitalist epoch. Here is the first fundamental disagreement.

Change in Argentina and Brazil

Since Spain could not satisfy the needs flowing from the economic and social development of the colonies, the latter sought relations with the capitalist countries, above all with England. "Then in process of formation, the British empire was destined to represent genuinely and overwhelmingly the interests of capitalist civilization. In England, seat of liberalism and Protestantism, the machine and industry prepared the future of capitalism. It was for this reason that England was called upon to play a primary role in the independence of South America." (*Ibid.*)

The South American colonies were saturated with monks, doctors, viceroys, inquisitors, soldiers, governors and adventurers; needing modern colonizers, needing industrial products, "they turned toward England whose bankers and industrializers, colonizers of a new type, wanted to win new markets, thus fulfilling the role of builders of an empire just rising as the creation of a manufacturing and free-trade economy." (*Ibid.*)

The economic interests of the Spanish colonies and the interests of the western capitalists were in complete harmony... Hardly had these nations won their independence than they sought those elements and relations that the growth of their economy required in traffic with the capital and industry of the West. To the capitalist West they began to send the products of their soil and subsoil; and from the capitalist West they began to receive textiles, machinery and a thousand and one industrial products. A continuous and growing contact was established between South America and western civilization at his time. *Naturally, the countries most favored by this traffic were those situated on the Atlantic.* (*Ibid.*)

Mariategui, as we see, considers the liberation of Latin America from the Spanish yoke a profound revolutionary transformation which conforms to the economic necessities of

the colonies, as well as to the development both of the colonies and European capitalism; an economic and political revolution; even though limited, a step forward from Spanish medieval feudalism to free-trade capitalism. *In this general sense the wars of independence had already begun the bourgeois-democratic revolution in all of Latin America.* However, the rhythm of this transformation from a feudal to a capitalist society was different in various countries, in the first place the regions of the Atlantic and the Pacific. *The circulation of commodities and emigration were much more intense on the Atlantic coast, in Argentina and Brazil. For this reason, these countries acquired primary importance in the capitalist epoch, displacing Peru and Bolivia, previously the centers of the Spanish domain and the Empire.*

The comrades of *Octubre* must be blind not to have seen this fundamental change. *Due to capitalist influence, the economies of Argentina and Brazil were transformed, and they acquired first importance as the most capitalistic and industrial countries in Latin America.* "Argentina and Brazil attracted European capital and emigrants to their territories in large quantities. The strong and homogeneous sediment deposited by this tide from the west accelerated the transformation of the economy and culture of these countries, and gradually they acquired the function and structure of European culture and economy. *Liberal and bourgeois democracy could sink sure roots here, while the extensive and stubborn persistence of feudal residues impeded its progress in the rest of South America.*" (Mariategui, *ibid.*, page 12, my emphasis—V.)

Nature of Peron's Dictatorship

The most prominent South American Marxist teacher establishes "the structure of European economy" in Argentina and Brazil, that is, the existence of a "capitalist and liberal bourgeois economy" in these countries long before the Argentine *Octubristas*. Political and economic developments since Mariategui wrote have confirmed his analysis. During the First World War Argentina and Brazil, and in part Chile as well, developed their industries to such a point that they were able to a large extent to free themselves from European imperialism. *From our point of view, therefore, the democratic revolution in these countries corresponds to this and the post-war period.*

Varga's dictatorship in Brazil corresponds to a crisis of Brazilian capitalism, a repercussion of the world crisis. The semi-Bonapartist Ortiz-Castillo regime also reflects the same phenomenon in Argentina. Peron's dictatorship is a continuation and deepening of this process, accelerated and shaped by the crisis of world capitalism and the second imperialist world war. These Bonapartist-totalitarian regimes appear in the classic situation where the bourgeoisie is no longer capable of governing the country with classic liberal methods and the proletariat is still not mature enough to take the power. The totalitarian dictatorships of Argentina and Brazil do not constitute a termination of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, but the reflection of the premature crisis of liberal capitalism in these countries.

The industrial development of these countries is not the work of the dictatorships and is not at all based on them. *Its fundamental cause and tempestuous development are rooted in the mortal crisis of imperialism impelled to its own destruction in the Second World War, giving economic freedom to these countries, and allowing them to develop their own industries so that they might satisfy the needs of the continent.*

Under the conditions determined by imperialism, this industrial development gives the appearance of youth and dynamism to these regimes of crisis. It compels these regimes to abandon the classic methods of liberalism and pass to a "controlled economy" containing strong elements of state capitalism. Consequently, the momentary concessions granted to the workers are not inspired by Peron's democratic revolution, but by the Bonapartist policies of his regime.

III

And now for some final conclusions:

(1) If the democratic revolution in Argentina and Brazil was concluded and done with in the first post-war period, *then only the Latin American proletariat is a revolutionary force, and only the socialist and proletarian revolution is on the order of the day.* The Bonapartist, dictatorial, or Nazi-like regimes in Argentina and Brazil, the APRA regime in Peru, the defeated Villaroel regime in Bolivia, the Betancourt regime in Venezuela, and that of Morinigo in Paraguay, are not "backward" regimes of the last wave of the democratic revolution in South America. They are in reality reactionary regimes, the tardy product of the wave of German Nazism and European fascism in general. They are regimes of capitalist crisis in the specific conditions of South America.

In accordance with Mariategui, we must establish the difference between the two large capitalist countries of the Atlantic coast, Argentina and Brazil, and the rest of the continent, principally Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay and Venezuela. In these latter countries there are strong residues of feudalism. Nevertheless, Mariategui poses and defines the socialist revolution as the immediate perspective for Peru, arguing that only this revolution is capable of realizing such bourgeois tasks as the agrarian question and national liberation from the imperialist yoke, given the weakness of the native bourgeoisie and the strength of the imperialists, given the close tie between the native bourgeoisie and imperialism.

Starting from this premise, the "anti-imperialist" struggle of the native petty-bourgeoisie, the Peruvian APRA, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia, Betancourt in Venezuela, Stalinism in Chile and Brazil, is demagogy reduced to impotent phrase-mongering, and collaboration with imperialism on coming to power. To support this struggle is to distract the proletariat from its historic mission of realizing the unfinished democratic tasks through the Socialist revolution.

Argentina's "Sub-Imperialism"

Only the proletariat can consistently combat imperialism in South America. Whether it be considered from the economic or from the social and political aspect, the socialist revolution is on the order of the day in all of South America, with this difference: In Argentina and Brazil the Socialist tasks will be realized immediately, *while in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, etc., the democratic tasks will be completed in passing in order to step immediately into the proletarian phase.*

(2) The Argentine economy is capitalist *par excellence*.¹

1. This fact is established by the "Octubrists" themselves, who find Argentine industry and agriculture obviously capitalist. Where then is the content of the bourgeois democratic revolution and Argentina's semi-colonial character? To rid themselves of this headache and save themselves from an obvious contradiction, the "Octubrists" declare: "The semi-colonial character of Argentina is defined in the last analysis by the semi-colonial character of Latin America." This is an error, however, because from any point of view the continent does not constitute an economic entity on the same plane of development. At the side of capitalist countries such as Argentina and Brazil, we have semi-colonial countries like Peru, Bolivia, etc.

Peron's expansionism is not a struggle of the Argentinians against imperialism, but an expansion of the Argentine bourgeoisie which strives to dominate the continent and establish a local "sub-imperialism." The Argentine-Chile treaty gives enormous advantages to Argentina, reducing Chile to a dependency. Peron pays \$13 Argentine for 100 kilograms of wheat, selling it to Chile for \$35 Argentine and bringing about a Chilean selling price of 400 to 500 Chilean pesos. The Chilean producer receives from the state only 195 to 205 Chilean pesos for the same product. This same relationship obtains for all products.

The conditions of world imperialism being what they are, there will not be very much room for Argentina's "sub-imperialism." In the long run Argentina will have to submit to Yankee imperialism. The struggle between Peron and Braden was not for domination of the continent, but for the crumbs which the Argentine bourgeoisie requires as a sub-agency of American imperialism. However, Argentina is no longer a semi-colonial country despite this relationship. Czarist Russia borrowed money from France and was not a semi-colonial country.

The economic dependence of Argentina is of a modern imperialist, not of a semi-colonial type. Great Britain, without being a semi-colony, being an empire in decay, depends more on the United States than does Argentina. *For this reason the struggle between Argentina and the North American bourgeoisie does not have a revolutionary character for the proletariat, but a local, limited and inter-imperialist character within the South American framework.*

Against ALL Imperialism

(3) The program of the United States of Latin America cannot be considered as bourgeois-democratic under present conditions, though theoretically the native bourgeoisie could have realized it. Nevertheless it failed to do so. The situation of Latin America at the dawn of capitalism cannot be compared to the situation of medieval Europe, which constituted a "Christian republic" united under the Pope and the Roman Empire of the German people, with an official language, Latin. The development of capitalism divided Europe into national states. The same development took place in Latin America but with this difference: After the crushing of the indigenous races, national cultures and different languages did not appear, the Spanish language remaining dominant. This facilitates the realization of the Socialist United States of Latin America. *However, the content of this program is socialist and not bourgeois. Its realization will be accomplished under the conditions of imperialism, not of that pre-capitalism which the democratic revolution was destined to clear away.*

The Argentine Octubrists confuse the phenomenon and relationships of modern imperialism with feudalism; the socialist with the bourgeois revolution; totalitarian Bonapartism with bourgeois democracy; and industrial development caused by the imperialist world crisis with the democratic industrial revolution. They make of Marxism a scientific and international doctrine which seeks and finds the same phenomena in every part of the world, a native "hash." They proclaim the Peron reaction a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and his inter-imperialist struggle for crumbs an anti-imperialist struggle which merits the support of the proletariat.

Proclaiming the democratic revolution, which has already been completed, to be the task of the proletariat, they post-

pone the realization of socialism to another historical epoch, thus placing themselves within the Stalinist orbit which desires to profit from Peron's struggle against the United States. Thus do they lose sight of the revolutionary perspective and reduce the proletariat to the subordinate role of supporting Peron's "sub-imperialism" and Stalinist imperialism, abandoning the classic doctrines of South American Marxism in favor of imported Stalinism. In the end they may discover themselves in the embrace of Peronism, betraying the proletariat.

Latin America is passing through a period of profound economic and social change caused by the crisis of capitalist imperialism. Naturally we have no desire to underestimate the importance of imperialist oppression in Latin America. However, the South American phenomena have a general character modified by local conditions.

Imperialism can be fought only under the proletarian banner of the socialist revolution. The proletariat should not lend its support to the reactionary, nationalist and utopian petty bourgeoisie, but should engage this bourgeoisie in political combat with its own program. In the case of the reac-

tionary and fascist Argentine bourgeoisie which "struggles" against North American expansion, the proletariat should form its own front opposed to both Peronism and Yankee imperialism. *In view of the world division between the two imperialist blocs, the proletariat cannot reduce itself to being lackeys and cannon fodder for one or the other bloc, but should carry forward its own policy of the world-wide proletarian and socialist third front opposed to capitalist and Stalinist imperialism.*

Only by tirelessly combatting not only imperialism but also Peronism, Aprism, Villaroelism, Stalinism and such reactionary *caudillos* as Betancourt and Morinigo under the banner of the socialist revolution, can the struggle be carried to a finish and the democratic tasks accomplished in the backward countries of South America. The unity of Latin America will be realized not by Peron in his struggle against Yankee imperialism, but in the struggle of the proletariat against imperialism and its native bourgeois allies, as the immediate historic perspective.

Luis VELASCO.

(Translated by Abe Stein)

What's Ahead for Palestine?

Arab-Jewish War or Voluntary Union

The tragedy of Palestine lies not only in the fratricidal warfare that has sprung up, with its death toll of over 475 people in the first month following the UN vote in favor of partition. It lies also in the fact that the two working classes involved, Jewish and Arab, failed to break through the national antagonisms and achieve a solution of their own.

This outcome has not done away with the elements out of which could have been fashioned a solution which guaranteed a united free Palestine and the national rights of both peoples. These elements were and are: the antagonistic interests of Jewish workers and Jewish bourgeoisie, the antagonistic interests of Arab peasants and Arab feudal landlords; and the existence of a real common ground for a joint class struggle of the Jewish and Arab toilers against the exploiting classes of both sectors of Palestine.

Before partition, this meant that only such unity of the nationalities from below could have achieved independence without the imperialist splitting up of Palestine. After partition, it means that only the same national-class unity can achieve a re-unification of the suffering country without outside imperialist domination. Partition, even insofar as it is to be regarded as an accomplished fact, does not change the lines of the only lasting solution.

Unfortunately, the semi-feudal Arab leaders and the bourgeois Jewish leaders helped the British to divide the two peoples and prevented a joint anti-imperialist struggle. As usual in such cases, since no solution came from the workers or the oppressed peoples concerned, the imperialists imposed their own solution—a solution that is guaranteed to keep the country in turmoil and bloodshed for at least a year and in economic bondage for at least ten years.

The present set-up is indeed a great incentive to violence. The UN creates such an incentive by the fact that its plan is only a recommendation, and by the fact that it provides for

a dangerous transition period under the British to be followed by an interim period under the UN.

In this way the imperialists first lay out a wall (state boundaries) between the two peoples and then, after thus intensifying the existing national antagonisms, refuse to release their hold on both. As long as the wall is not actually cemented in place, as long as the transition period of continued imperialist control lasts, the Arab leaders can hope to upset the entire plan for their own reactionary ends and by their own reactionary means—by utilizing force, bloodshed and diplomatic blackmail.

Cease Fire!

At the same time that we oppose the fratricidal warfare already created by partition, we must demand that both the British and the UN pull out of Palestine *immediately*. Their continued meddling in the seething pot will not moderate the situation they have created, nor will it be intended to do so. Neither will the forcible suppression of the Arabs by "outside" UN troops, as demanded by many Jewish leaders, serve to convince any Arab peasants (not to speak of their leaders) that the Jews are in Palestine to do *them* any good.

In addition to this, it is necessary for the Jewish and Arab workers to raise the demand of "Cease fire!" and to mobilize all sections of both Jews and Arabs, the majority of whom—while they do not as yet see eye to eye on the political future of the country—are passionately against a war between the Jews and Arabs. Every attempt must be made to isolate the groups, such as the Mufti's organized "People's Army," led by Kawukze among the Arabs, and the Irgun and Stern groups among the Jews, which fan the flames of fratricidal war.

I

The establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine does not eliminate the necessity for Arab-Jewish rapprochement and unity. The small country of Palestine is divided into eight

parts. In addition there is the free city of Jerusalem, with an almost equal population of Jews and Arabs, and the industrial city of Jaffa, which is to be an Arab enclave within the Jewish state. If for no other reason, the braided borders of the partition make the independence of the two states not a divorce from each other but a condition that calls for work in the common interests of the two peoples.

Economic conditions also dictate a policy of building Jewish-Arab unity. Neither the Jewish nor the Arab section of Palestine can exist without the other, if the *present* living standards of both Arabs and Jews are to be maintained, or if the country is to be able to absorb large-scale immigration. The Arab area, which is primarily agricultural, will have a huge deficit if it does not share in the tariff revenue of the industrial section of Palestine, which will be part of the Jewish state. The Jewish state needs grain from Arab agriculture to feed its population and also needs the Arab agricultural areas as part of its "internal" market. Both the Jews and the Arabs need large-scale irrigation projects like the Jordan Valley Authority to raise the productive level of the country and to increase its ability to absorb immigration.

Economic union can be made to serve as a real bridge between the two countries. Characteristically, the UN plan provides for foreign economic rule for at least ten years. Continued foreign economic rule via the UN will result not in Arab-Jewish cooperation but only in the subordination of the economy to foreign imperialist interests, with a resultant stifling of the economic development of the country.

Thus, economically too, the immediate interests of Palestine demand complete economic freedom from foreign control *now* to really make the economic union a bridge to the cooperation of both peoples.

Once having established free independent states that are so intertwined geographically and so interdependent economically, the next step for the Palestinian nations can only be to work for a voluntary union of the two states. In this day and age of "great power politics" it seems unnecessary to have to point out that there can be no real independence for small states, let alone splinter states like a partitioned Palestine. Voluntary union is the only way of maintaining Palestinian freedom from outside imperialist coercion and intervention.

II

The Arab state has before it the tremendous problem of *agrarian reform* and *democratization* of political and social life. The present feudal leadership of the Arabs, i.e., the Arab Higher Committee, was never democratically elected by the masses and represents primarily the powerful feudal families. The Mufti and the Husseini family have established a near monopoly on political power by use of the religious authority of the Mufti, by feudal family connections, and by political terrorism against political opponents. In many cases they have moved in and taken control of trade unions.

The main victims of the Mufti terror have been Arab advocates of Arab-Jewish cooperation and especially labor leaders advocating such a position. The outstanding case is that of Sami Tahai, who resigned from the Stalinist-controlled "Workers Assembly" to form the Workers Socialist Party and who was liquidated for his efforts.

The problem of democratization of Arab political life will not only necessitate fighting the feudal Mufti elements but also the Stalinists. The Stalinists claim control of a majority of the Arab trade unions and are attempting to assume totalitarian control of all labor unions. The Stalinists have suffered

little from the Mufti, because they have been supporting him and his Arab Higher Committee, while seeking representation on the Arab Higher Committee and total control over labor unions.

The Russian position in favor of partition has as yet not changed the political stand of the Arab Stalinists. They continue to oppose partition, although it has cost them a great deal of support.

Agrarian reform is vital for the future welfare of the Arab State. The overwhelming majority of the country will be fellahen (peasant). A large proportion of the land is in the hands of the effendis (landlords) and even the "landed" peasant has hardly enough land to produce more than a bare subsistence with primitive agricultural methods. While the usurer, who constituted the greatest single millstone around the neck of the peasant, has temporarily receded into the background as a result of war prosperity, he will reappear soon if land is not distributed and the state does not offer *free or low cost credit* for the modernization of Arab agriculture.

Above all, the Arabs must avoid the path of "irridentism." That could lead to nothing but communal war, economic dislocation, and the triumph of the most reactionary forces in Arab social life. The peace of all Palestine depends on Arab labor accepting the Jews as a nationality in Palestine and, even on the basis of two separate states, taking steps toward re-unification.

While the Arab state will have very few Jews, the Jewish state will in fact be a state inhabited by two nations. The problems of bi-nationalism have not been eliminated. The proposed Jewish state will have approximately 550,000 Jews and approximately 400,000 Arabs. Even granting that large-scale Jewish immigration will change the ratio, the Arabs will remain a large cohesive and different national entity within the Jewish state.

The problem here is to prevent the crystalization of two rigid "national blocs" opposing each other. How is this to be accomplished? Obviously it cannot be accomplished by giving the Jews special privileges as Jews. *Complete social, economic and political equality of both peoples is an absolute necessity.* This must include the right of an Arab to be elected to *any* office, including the presidency or its equivalent, and to have the same legal right to immigration.

The establishment of fixed ratios of representation—even equality—will only make for *national* polarization, since it will require separate national electoral colleges or curia, and voting will necessarily take place on a nationalist level. Personal and individual civil rights are not enough. The "national" question must be taken out of *daily* politics by guaranteeing in advance, and scrupulously observing, the national rights of the Arabs in the Jewish state. The emphasis in Palestine must be on the inclusive character of the new independent country and not on its exclusive features..

For United Trade Unions!

The only way to prevent national blocs is to *cut across national lines by class action.* This means the creation of united Arab and Jewish working-class organizations from trade unions to political parties.

The old Zionist and Labor Zionist policy of *Kibbush Avodah* (the policy of employing only Jewish labor in order to make jobs available for Jewish immigrants) and the policy of exclusive trade unions, both of which were wrong in the past, can be actual dynamite in the future. It is the job of the revolutionary socialists and of the left-wing Zionist groups

like the Achduth Avodah and Hashomer Hatzair to lead the way. It is not sufficient to be for Arab-Jewish unity in the state apparatus. The organization of federated *parallel* unions of Arabs and Jews (*Irgun Mesutaf*) is no substitute for a single united trade union. The need in Palestine today is for a single class-struggle trade-union organization and, above all, for mixed political parties of Jewish and Arab workers.

IV

Economically, Jewish Palestine is capitalist. In industry and trade the "socialist" sector of the economy (cooperatives, etc.) represents about three to five per cent, according to Revusky's book, *Jews in Palestine*. In agriculture, where the Kibutzim, Kvutzat (collectives) and cooperatives are strongest, they represent about ten per cent of the cultivated land and about the same proportion of the Jews engaged in agriculture.

The Jewish bourgeoisie is at present engaged in an attempt to destroy the basis for this "socialist" economy. They propose the abolition of the national ownership of land via the Jewish National Fund and the stopping of all subsidies to collectives and cooperatives. They argue that the public enterprises were necessary when it was difficult and unprofitable to do any job, but that now "free enterprise" will do a better job. "The Moor has done his work, the Moor may go."

Politically, the Mapai (the reformist labor party) is in office in the "government within a government" which exists in Palestine. But Jewish Palestine faces a real struggle between the labor movement and the Jewish capitalist class which has tolerated it up to now.

The bourgeois mayor of Tel-Aviv and the mayors of all other major towns in Palestine have demanded a re-organization of the governmental set-up which would give them control. They have established a "committee of the Right" to rally all the forces of the bourgeoisie. Together with the Union of Industrialists they are giving aid to the strike-breaking, anti-Marxist, black union set up by the Revisionists—the Federation of National Labor. They have the support of the semi-fascist Revisionists, who polled 24,500 votes in the last election, about ten per cent of the total.

In the future the Revisionist party as such will take a back seat. It will work through the Irgun, which has announced that it will transform itself into a legal party. The Revisionists will attempt to enforce their hated domestic policies under the cloak of the Irgun's prestige as an anti-British resistance force. Together with the clericalists of the Misrachi (5,000), Agudah (5,000) and possibly the Paole Hamisrachi (24,000), plus a possible 10,000 for the Paole Agudath Israel, the right-wing forces can perhaps muster fifty per cent of the vote. What is more important, by grace of the reformist labor leaders they now control the municipalities and the police, to which will be added the military power of the Irgun and the economic power of the Union of Industrialists.

Danger of Civil War

The danger of armed civil war fomented by the fascists is increased, not decreased, by the recent agreement between the Haganah and the Irgun. This agreement provides among other things that, once the Jewish state is established, the Irgun will be absorbed into the official militia of the state.

While they will be "absorbed" to the extent of being subject to the same top command, they will be allowed to keep their identity and their own closely knit organization. This will enable them to throw their military strength into the political struggle. The armed bands of the Right are prepar-

ing for struggle while the labor leaders take no steps to crystallize independent workers' detachments, relying only on the "national" militia, the Haganah. The reformist leaders of the Mapai have offered to capitulate and form a broad coalition government including the Revisionists. Like all social democrats they are willing to cede important beach-heads to the reactionaries and hope that the liberal bourgeoisie will do the job of containing them. A false illusion! The job can only be done by the workers and by bold and vigorous leadership.

There is a regrouping of forces taking place in the Jewish labor movement. During the last year a left wing of the Mapai broke off and, together with the left Poale Zion, formed the Achduth Avodah Party. The Hashomer Hatzair, too, appeared for the first time as an independent political party in the last elections. Each group received 24,000 votes as compared to the 40,000 votes for the Mapai.

On January 10, 1948, these two groups will have a unity conference. No concrete unified program will result, but a vague general manifesto will be issued. The main aim of this unity is to form a bloc to bargain for governmental posts, to shift the center of gravity of the coalition to the left, and to stop the Mapai from capitulating too much to the right. The actual program will be worked out later, mostly in practice. The Hashomer Hatzair will drop its slogan of a bi-national state and the Achduth Avodah will drop its slogan for a Jewish socialist state in all of Palestine. Both are pro-Russian but the Hashomer Hatzair, in practical politics, supports the Anglophile Dr. Weitzman, while the Achduth advocates an active anti-British policy. In relation to the Arab question, the conference will come out for an Arab-Jewish rapprochement. In Jewish Palestine the united organization will probably not favor a single united trade union of Jewish and Arab workers, but rather federated (*Irgun Meshutoff*) separate Jewish and Arab unions. The manifesto will not demand immediate independence of Palestine but will call for strengthening of the UN supervision of Palestine.

Whatever anyone may say about partition and the establishment of a Jewish state (that for the first time it gives recognition to Jewish national aspirations, etc.) one thing is certain: the existence of the Jewish state in a partitioned Palestine will not solve the Jewish problem. Small states can never solve any major social problem.

The overwhelming bulk of the Jewish people will remain outside of Palestine. The same force—capitalism—that gave rise to modern exterminationist anti-Semitism still exists. For all Jews, workers and middle class alike, must realize that the *continued existence of capitalism means the extermination of the Jews*. Their only hope for *survival* is in the destruction of the breeder of fascist barbarism. For Jews, socialism is not merely a question of "ideals," socialism is not only a question of something "for the common good," but a stark *national and personal necessity*. The statement "socialism or barbarism" has a special and ghastly meaning to the Jews. To them it means: "*socialism or extermination.*"

The establishment of a Jewish state opens a new era for socialist-Zionist Jews. The Zionist goal has been realized, but the Jewish problem remains. A Jewish state will exist in Palestine, but the danger of extermination still faces ten million Jews, who will not or cannot be absorbed by Palestine. For socialist-Zionist Jews to be *consistent*, there can be only one answer to the new situation—a shift to greater *unity with the revolutionary party* throughout the world.

AL FINDLEY.

Portrait of James Connolly—II

Connolly as Nationalist and Internationalist

A factor which helps to explain why many American Marxists have often been rigid and schematic is that they have not sufficiently grasped the problems of capitalism from the standpoint of a backward country with an undeveloped economy, in contrast to those of an advanced country with a modern economy. Because of this, I think that Connolly should have an especial interest and significance for Americans. He was a Marxist who came from the depressed working class of a backward country, a nation which had not won national sovereignty.

Once we realize this fact, seeming contradictions in his work and his beliefs can be explained. Connolly, besides being a Marxist and a revolutionary leader who came from the working class, was also a nationalist and a believing Roman Catholic. He was born amidst conditions of life which feed discontent: the alternative to discontent in conditions such as those of his childhood is an attitude of submissiveness. Rebellion and discontent offered Connolly the road to development of his own personality, his individuality.

He was but one of a mass oppressed by capitalism; at the same time, this mass bore most heavily the burden which was imposed as a result of English control of Ireland. As Connolly studied and matured, he came to see that a complicated series of burdens lay on the back of the common people of Ireland: there was more than one oppressor. He was able to grasp the complicated nature of the problems which were involved in the Irish problem.

Reading his work, or the accounts of his life, one is struck by the fact that there was little subjective blockage in Connolly's nature. He was direct and simple. He was capable of drawing clear and warranted correlations. He was able to measure actions, large and small, in terms of his ultimate aim—the aim of a democratic and socialist world. His own personal experiences and observations were drawn into his thought; and on the basis of these he was able to grasp facts from his studies with amazing lucidity and to arrive at firm theoretical conclusions.

Urged Collective Agriculture

There was considerable variety of experiences in his own life. He saw at first hand the conditions of life of workers in Ireland, in Scotland, in America. He was clearly aware of differences between Ireland and America. Even before he came to the United States he had studied economics by himself and had written about the differences in methods of agricultural production in Ireland and in the United States. Thus he wrote:

The agriculture of Ireland can no longer compete with the scientifically equipped farmers of America; therefore, the only hope that now remains is to abandon competition altogether as a rule of life, to organize agriculture as a public service under the control of boards of management elected by the agricultural population (no longer composed of farmers and laborers, but of free citizens with equal responsibility and equal honor), and responsible to them and the nation at large, and with all the mechanical and scientific aids to agriculture the entire resources of the nation can place at their disposal. Let the produce of Irish soil go first to feed the Irish people, and after a sufficient store has been retained to insure of that being accomplished, let the surplus be exchanged with

other countries in return for those manufactured goods Ireland needs but does not produce herself.

Thus we will abolish at one stroke the dread of foreign competition and render perfectly needless any attempt to create an industrial hell in Ireland under the specious pretext of "developing our resources."

Apply to manufacture the same social principle. Let the cooperative organization of the workers replace the war of the classes under capitalism and transform the capitalist himself from an irresponsible hunter after profit into a public servant, fulfilling a public function and under public control.

And speaking along the same line, he discussed the proposal of creating peasant proprietors instead of a landlord class. He wrote:

... have our advocates of peasant proprietary really considered the economic tendencies of the time, and the development of the mechanical arts in the agricultural world? The world is progressive, and peasant proprietary, which a hundred years ago might have been a boon, would now be powerless to save from ruin the agriculture of Ireland.

The small farmers could no longer compete with the mammoth farms of America and Australia. He continued by pointing out how the American farmer, with his thousands of acres and his machinery could outsell the Irish farmer in the English market.

Connolly Versus Stalinism

Economic backwardness is a relative phenomenon. It must be gauged from the standpoint of the world market. At the present time the phenomenon of backwardness is more complicated than it ever was in the past. Advanced countries such as England are being placed in a position that is at least remotely analogous to that of the Irish farmers in Connolly's time. British workers must work harder and get less than the American workers. This is a consequence of competition on the world market. It is to Connolly's merit that he grasped this fact and stated it simply and clearly in his very first years as a socialist.

Without the access to the inside knowledge of many statesmen, without the academic training of many economists, Connolly saw the relationship of the Irish problem to the problems of the world market. In simple language he was able to state the nature of the impact which the world market made on Ireland, on its farmers and also on its workers. His political nationalism was not turned into an excuse for "economic" nationalism. He wanted Irishmen to be free men, free and proud and dignified: he did not believe in the development of national resources in a backward country at the expense of the moral and social development of the people of that country.

In this sense he may be contrasted with Joseph Stalin. Connolly saw the need of collectivization. But to him, collectivization must (a) be undertaken in order to feed the Irish people, and (b) be undertaken democratically. Stalin's forced collectivization was diametrically different from that proposed by the young Connolly. As Manya Gordon demonstrates factually in her book, *The Russian Worker Before and After Lenin* (New York, 1941), the Russian people as a whole got less food after collectivization than they did before it. Collec-

tivization provided Stalin with a labor supply needed for industrialization. The development of national resources was implicit in the implementation of the theory of "socialism in one country"; but all this, as we know, was done at the expense of the Russian people.

Connolly here had a very clear insight, one which should be carefully considered by those who have argued that he was too nationalistic to be a socialist. His nationalism was, in reality, consistent with his internationalism. And both were consistently developed not only in political but also in economic terms.

A good way of testing Connolly's clarity would be to contrast his ideas—such as those quoted above—with the ideas of the Irish Stalinist, Brian O'Neill, in *The War for the Land in Ireland*. Both here and in his book *Easter Week*, O'Neill pays tribute to Connolly.

Writing in the 1930s, O'Neill dealt with the world agrarian crisis, and he had no trouble demonstrating that the Irish farmer was the victim of the world market and produced at a grave disadvantage in competition because of the development of farming in advanced countries. Attempting to point the way out, O'Neill quoted the passage I have given above. And the way out proposed by O'Neill is described as that taken by the Soviet Union, with planned economy and collectivized agriculture. As part of his proof O'Neill offered culled statistics from the various Soviet sources, but he did not compare and evaluate them. He may well have been sincere, but from the standpoint of the present it is clear that he depended on the usual bureaucratic generalities and abstractions. The Irish problem was treated as though it were the Russian problem: win a "third-period" revolution on paper and then Ireland could be modeled after the Soviet Union. Without any real relevance to his argument, O'Neill insisted that the increase in the number of tractors and harvesters in the United States from 1910 to 1930 should have permitted American agriculture to double its sowing. This did not happen; American agricultural production increased by only 13.5 per cent during this period. Needless to say, I am not an economist or a statistician. But I can see the utter shabbiness of arguments of this kind.

Attempt to Stalinize Connolly

I mention this fact because, when I originally read O'Neill's book in 1936, it fooled me. And the way that Stalinism fools persons untrained in economics and statistics can thus be suggested. Isolated statistics are used falsely. By a meaningless comparison of abstracted statistics, a false conception of production in the Soviet Union relative to the United States is indicated. We now know that the Irish workers and farmers, bad as was their lot, fared better than did the Russian workers and farmers during the period of forced collectivization. After the famine in Russia in the early 1930s, the Russian government was forced to make concessions: it permitted a certain portion of the agricultural product produced on collective farms to be sold directly on the market. Here is the way O'Neill described this:

The produce of farms is disposed of in two ways. It can be handed over entirely at a fixed price to the cooperative organizations, to be distributed by them to the consumers, or twenty per cent can be sold direct (a method introduced in 1932 to induce the collectives to market more of their produce). The advantages of this latter modification are that larger supplies are available at lower prices due to the more direct path from the producer to the consumer, while the collectives are often able to receive more for their produce. Vegetables grown in the garden may also be sold

direct to the consumer, but no middleman is permitted to step into the transaction.

This last sentence is further suggestive. O'Neill introduced this reference to the middleman as an obvious appeal to prejudice and as a rationalization. In general, he gave no clear picture of Soviet agriculture; at the same time he stressed the chaos of capitalist agriculture. He threatened to outdistance American agricultural production with a minimum of percentages. And here is a sample of his general style and method of Stalinizing the tradition of Connolly:

... by 1926 it could be said that agriculture had been saved [in the Soviet Union]. . . . But hand in hand with this development, there was not only an increased prosperity for small and middle farmers; the wealthiest peasants and the kulaks—the hated gombeen men¹ of the village, who worked their farms by hired laborers and who were often, in addition, shopkeepers, money-lenders or publicans—had their position strengthened, with a corresponding hardening of their capitalist psychology. And while agriculture had been restored, it had not developed on the new social basis, in the sense that while in the towns the means of production were long since socialized, agriculture, in which the ownership of the land and the implements was not centralized, was relatively much more backward.

The reader can learn about the real situation which was masked by this double talk by reading Manya Gordon's study cited above.

A contrast between Connolly and O'Neill will show the difference between a real socialist and a Stalinized intellectual. In Connolly's heated passages, there is indignation, indignation over the condition of the Irish masses. Contrast this with the way that O'Neill uses phrases like gombeen men, money-lenders and publicans in order to create Irish enthusiasm for Stalinism, which drove the gombeen men out of Russia just as truly as St. Patrick drove the snakes out of Ireland.

Connolly absorbed the democratic national tradition of Ireland. When he released the first issue of his paper, *The Workers Republic*, in Dublin on August 13, 1898, he stated:

We are Socialists because we see in socialism not only the modern application of the social principle which underlay the Brehon laws of our ancestors, but because we recognize in it the only principle by which the working class can in their turn emerge in the divinity of FREEMEN, with the right to live as men and not as mere profit-making machines for the service of others. *We are Republicans because we are Socialists*, and therefore enemies to all privileges; and because we would have the Irish people complete masters of their own destinies, nationally and internationally, fully competent to work for their own salvation.

Connolly as Internationalist

Spiritually or intellectually, he was a product of the great French Revolution, of the Irish tradition of rebellion, of the Marxist international movement, and also of the Catholic Church. And, as we have noted, he himself lived the hard life of the workers. He arrived at his ideas by patient and methodical study. And the aim of his thought and activity was to work for genuine freedom. Once when a lady was disturbed by a speech he had delivered, he answered her remarks by declaring: "Revolution is my business." His total life experience led him forward to revolutionary action. He saw this action as taking place in Ireland. But he linked it with the idea of an international struggle for socialism and democracy.

When away from Ireland he participated in the socialist

1. Money-lenders.

movement in Scotland and in America. When the First World War broke out, he called for action not only in Ireland but elsewhere. He saluted Karl Liebknecht. And when there was a false rumor that Liebknecht had died, he wrote:

... we cannot draw upon the future for a draft to pay our present duties. There is no moratorium to postpone the payment of the debt the Socialists owe to the cause; it can only be paid now. Paid it may well be in martyrdom. ... If our German comrade, Liebknecht, has paid the price, perhaps the others may yet nerve themselves for that sacrifice. ... All hail, then, to our continental comrade, who, in a world of imperial and financial brigands and cowardly trimmers and compromisers, showed mankind that men still know how to die for the holiest of all causes—the sanctity of the human soul, the practical brotherhood of the human race.

Connolly worked on *Labour in Irish History* for many years. During this period he was also engaged in many other activities, editing, lecturing, organizing, leading strikes, participating in anti-British demonstrations, traveling from Ireland to America and back to Ireland, and at the same time earning a modest living for himself and his family. This work, along with *The Re-Conquest of Ireland*, offers an economic and social history of Ireland. Connolly claimed that capitalism was a foreign importation brought to Ireland by the English. With capitalism, feudalism was also introduced into Ireland. The life of the Gaelic clans, where property was owned by the clans, was in consequence broken up. In clan life a rudimentary form of democracy had been practiced. Then he traced the course of the development of capitalism in Ireland, a subject nation. He related this development to the successive struggles for national independence. These struggles he evaluated and interpreted from a socialist standpoint. Early in *Labour in Irish History*, he quoted, as a premise, the following passage from Marx:

That in every historical epoch the prevailing method of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, forms the basis upon which alone can be explained the political and intellectual history of that epoch.

He traces the alterations in the prevailing method of production in Ireland through feudalism to capitalism, and he describes the class character of every movement which struggled for Irish freedom. The tradition of social struggle in the Irish national movement is here outlined step by step, generalized, evaluated and in this way ordered in terms of a coherent analysis and doctrine. The lesson which he persistently draws from the analysis of Irish struggle is that the social question is inseparable from the political question.

Class Line in Nationalist Movement

He reveals that one of the factors involved in the failure of Irish rebellion is the fact that there was always more than one class. This lesson is presented in his first chapter, and it is then illustrated by a series of lucid analyses which are concerned with every important movement for liberation in Irish history. He wrote:

During the last hundred years every generation in Ireland has witnessed an attempted rebellion against English rule. Every such conspiracy or rebellion had drawn the majority of its adherents from the lower orders in town and country, yet under the inspiration of a few middle class doctrinaires the social question has been rigorously excluded from the field of action to be covered by the rebellion if successful; in hopes that by each exclusion it would be possible to conciliate the upper class and enlist them in the struggle for freedom.

The result has been in nearly every case the same. The workers, though furnishing the greatest proportion of recruits to the ranks of the revolutionists, and consequently of victims to the prison and the scaffold, could not be imbued *en masse* with the revolutionary

fire necessary to seriously imperil a dominion rooted for 700 years in the heart of their country. They were all anxious enough for freedom, but realizing the enormous odds against them, and being explicitly told by their leaders that they *must not expect any change in their conditions of social subjection, even if successful*, they as a body shrank from the contest, and left only the purest minded and most chivalrous of their class to face the odds and glut the vengeance of the tyrant—a warning to those in all countries who neglect the vital truth that successful revolutions are not the product of our brains, but of ripe material conditions.

Connolly's conclusion to his study affirms the view that labor must take the lead in the liberation of Ireland. It must be the most forward, the most daring champion of both national liberation and social justice in Ireland; it must assemble all discontented Irishmen around it. This is the road to the re-conquest of Ireland. Thus:

As we have again and again pointed out, the Irish question is a social question, the whole age-long fight of the Irish people against their oppressors resolves itself in the last analysis into a fight for the mastery of the means of life, the sources of production, in Ireland. Who would own and control the land? The people or the invaders?

Here in Connolly's view was "the bottom question of Irish politics." But:

...it is undeniable that for two hundred years at least all Irish political movements ignored this fact, and were conducted by men who did not look below the political surface. These men to arouse the passions of the people invoked the memory of social wrongs, such as evictions and famines, but for these wrongs proposed only political remedies, such as changes in taxation or transferences of the seat of government (class rule) from one country to another. ... The revolutionists of the past were wiser, the Irish Socialists are wiser today. In their movement the North and South will again clasp hands, again it will be demonstrated, as in '98, that the pressure of a common exploitation can make enthusiastic rebels out of a Protestant working class, earnest champions of civil and religious liberty out of Catholics, and out of both a united social democracy.

Connolly's basic lines of thought were continued from *Labour in Irish History* to *The Re-Conquest of Ireland*. The first sentence of the foreword to this volume expresses its guiding thought:

The underlying idea of this work is that the labor movement of Ireland must set itself the re-conquest of Ireland as its final aim, that their re-conquest involves taking possession of the entire country, all its powers and wealth—production and all its natural resources, and organizing these on a co-operative basis for the good of all.

A True Prophet

Following a historical account of the conquest of Ireland, Connolly describes the conditions of life of the Irish masses in the early twentieth century, in Dublin and Belfast; he discusses problems and questions of democracy and of political morale and morality, quotes statistics and otherwise reveals in a voice of eloquent and passionate indignation the moral and physical consequences of exploitation; he deals with the problems of education, describes the position and fate of women, and analyzes the value and the possibility of the cooperative movement. His book reveals vision and idealism, and at the same time no detail concerning the misery and wretchedness of the masses is too small for his attention. At one point in the book, he states:

For the only true prophets are they who carve out the future which they announce.

Connolly here announced a future for Ireland. This ideal future—a socialist commonwealth—was the standard by which

he measured the Irish present, and it was the basis of his political faith. In action, he sought to lead Ireland toward the realization of that ideal; in his writing, he sought to implant this faith and this ideal in the minds of Irishmen. He wrote:

A people are not to be judged by the performance of their great men, nor to be estimated spiritually by the intellectual conquests of their geniuses. A truer standard by which the spiritual and mental measurement of a people can be taken in modern times is by that picture drawn of itself by itself when it, at the ballot-box, surrenders the care of its collective destiny into the hands of its elected representatives.

The question whether such elected persons have or have not

the power to realize the desires of their constituents scarcely enters into the matter. It is not by its power to realize high ideals a people will and must be judged, but by the standard of the ideals themselves.

This quotation furnishes a suggestive insight into the thought of Connolly. His thinking was both practical and visionary; it gave energy and direction to a fighting faith and a concept of a free future. In our next article we will discuss further aspects of the thought of James Connolly.

JAMES T. FARRELL.

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The Neo-Stalinist Type

Notes on a New Political Ideology

[Subjoined to the following article are two book reviews which were written independently of each other and of this article. The three are brought together here as a preliminary discussion of an interesting aspect of the nature of Stalinism today.—Ed.]

A new political species has come into existence in our own day.

The existence of different species of plants and animals was recognized long before scientific analysis decided upon the differentiating characteristics which classified them. Since then, however, science has decided that the onion belongs to the very same family as the lily, but that the Douglas fir tree is not truly a fir tree at all; and the common name *ellflower* is used not for one genus but even different ones.

As Dwight Macdonald likes to say: things are no longer as simple as they were in the good old days, when a bellflower was simply a bellflower—and a socialist was simply a socialist.

Today there are not only seven quite distinct "bellflowers" but perhaps a larger variety of "socialists," and understandably both raw workers and raw intellectuals are confused. Yet science thinks it has clarified something when bellflower is distinguished from bellflower, socialist (genus *Bolshevik*) is distinguished from socialist (genus *Menshevik*) and the socialist family is distinguished from the Stalinist family.

The *newness* of the new political species, which we here call the neo-Stalinist, forced itself upon attention before its differentiating marks could be isolated. Perhaps it is still too early to pigeon-hole it accurately. But at least a few notes are in order at this point.

We are here discussing the Stalinists, not in Russia where they hold power, but in the capitalist countries. And here—to be sure, step by step with the degeneration of Stalinist Russia—a change has been noticeable for more than a decade.

Evolution of Neo-Stalinism

It took visible shape with the notorious Popular-Front line of 1935 and the influx of Stalinized liberals into the Communist Party organizations and peripheries. We begin to notice that, in arguing with a Stalinist member or sympathizer, more and more often it was no longer possible to "score a point" by proving that Stalinist policy was in contradiction with good Marxism or even Leninism:

"So a Popular-Front government is nothing but the old-fashioned reformist coalition government? Well, what was wrong with the coalition governments—except that there were no communists in them?" Or: "Lenin said we cannot support imperialist governments in their wars? Well, that was before a socialist state existed in the world."

Naturally, these were not the usual official answers, and we ascribed them (not without justice) to the ignorance and lack of tradition of CP neophytes still wet behind the ears with liberalism. But the development of this sea-change in the Stalinist ranks did not end with the abandonment of Popular-Frontism in 1939; it spread from the peripheries to the cadres of the CP; and it took ever cruder forms.

We cite a later-born symptomatic response: *"No, there's no democracy in Russia. Why should there be? You can't trust uneducated workers to know what's good for them."*

Since this is not the sort of thing to

be found written in official Stalinist organs, one must find out for oneself the astonishing and increasing frequency with which this is encountered from Stalinist sympathizers. A very important fact: not from Stalinist worker-sympathizers, almost only from intellectual and petty-bourgeois sympathizers.

But even this is not the full-flowered form. If it were, one should not yet, perhaps, speak of a new political species. We are concerned with a further phenomenon: *the existence of Stalinist sympathizers who do not even consider themselves socialists of any kind—who are not for socialism!*

Now this should not be confused with our belief that Stalinism is not really socialism, or that Stalinism and socialism have nothing in common. The point is that, while this has been our belief for a long time, the typical Stalinist is a Stalinist because his belief is opposite. *Not so the neo-Stalinist.*

This non-socialism—even anti-socialism—of the neo-Stalinist may take more than one form. Henry Wallace and Dr. Frederick Schumann in America, the Dean of Canterbury in England, all deny that they are for introducing socialism into their own country or into any other country. But, as Wallace puts it, the "Russian system" is the form of "economic democracy" which seems to make Russians happy: it's all right for them and "we can learn a lot" from it.

Does this mean then that (for example) a Schumann, while not for socialism in America, is a "kind of socialist" because he is for socialism in Russia? Perish the thought. Schumann is not the type of naive Stalinist sympathizer who thinks that all Russian workers spend half the year in health resorts and sanitariums.

What attracts him about Russia is not illusions about its effectuation of socialist ideals, which are as alien to him as they are to Stalin, but it is a feeling of new possibilities inherent in a completely statified economy which is not burdened by concern for the masses nor slowed up by pandering to them—"new possibilities," naturally, for the élite, not for the rabble.

"Totalitarian Socialism" Discovered

This is indeed what sent even Eric Johnston and the ultra-reactionary Eddie Rickenbacker back from Russia burbling with enthusiasm over "what we can learn from Russia." To drop into our own language for a moment: *what attracts them about Russia is not its "socialist" façade but its bureaucratic-collectivist realities.*

Ex-Ambassador Joseph Davies made it explicit in *Mission to Moscow*: the Russian Revolution of Lenin and Trotsky is dead; Russia is moving in "our" direction (and he did not mean moving toward the de-nationalization of industry); and the new Russia above all has nothing in common with Trotsky's old-fashioned ideas about socialist revolution.

To be sure, Johnston and Rickenbacker did not become pro-Russian in orientation; but Davies lived to raise his voice in defense of Russian spies caught red-handed rifling atomic secrets in Canada—a strange note from a patriotic American immortalized by Warner Brothers!

There is a second form, not essentially different—that of the type who blandly speaks of Russia as "totalitarian socialism" and *supports it as such*. After all, just another kind of socialism, you see, and everybody knows there are *so many* kinds of socialism! Of course one hopes that the *American* people will prove intelligent enough to merit some kind of democratic socialism, but meanwhile one accepts half a loaf. The people never know what's good for them, as we have already heard.

And exactly what is "totalitarian socialism"? We have become familiar with it: it is a society where the state owns the means of production and a totalitarian bureaucracy "owns" the state and oppresses the people under a police régime. It is the same thing which the Socialist Workers Party (Cannonites) wryly calls a "degenerated workers' state." *It is what we call bureaucratic collectivism—to use shop talk again.*

Is this type also "another kind of so-

cialist"? Then Stalin is too, it goes without saying. But it is no part of the purpose of these notes to demonstrate that "totalitarian socialism" exists in the same limbo as red blackbirds, liquid ice and honest ward-healers.

The point is once again that we are dealing with a political ideology which, in rejecting capitalism, looks not toward a socialist reorganization of society but toward bureaucratic collectivism—which accepts the complete statification of the means of production and the abolition of capitalist property relations, but consciously rejects the decisive role of the working class and proletarian democracy.

This is the new political species—the neo-Stalinist type.

What are the social roots of this neo-Stalinism?

We begin by rejecting the notion that it is a personal or individual aberration, to be explained merely by this one's senility, that one's cracked pot, or the other one's careerism. This may have to be argued, but not here and now.

We suggest that the two book reviews immediately following cast an interesting light on this question: the one by J. M. Fenwick does this explicitly, and the analysis of Bernard Shaw by Howe converges toward the same point. But Shaw was not a Stalinist? Precisely for that reason.

For now that we have done emphasizing that neo-Stalinism is a *new* political phenomenon, it is necessary to make clear that it is a *new* plant from *old* roots. I think it is biologically correct to say that a plant which has migrated from one climate and soil to an entirely different environment can develop into an entirely different species in time—but whether correct or no, this analogy expresses what has happened in the political sphere. What are the old roots?

"Reactionary Socialism" and The Communist Manifesto

For a starting point in analyzing this new phenomenon we go back first, beyond Shaw's time, to the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels. Indeed—to Section III (often referred to as the "obsolete" section) of the work whose hundredth anniversary is observed this year. This is the section which analyzes the various "kinds of socialism" existing in 1848. By the time the Second International was founded, all of these movements were already dead.

The first "kind of socialism" we find analyzed there is... "reactionary socialism." The red blackbird again! Why reactionary? *Because these movements, which spoke in the name of socialism, had their roots in classes alien to the proletariat.*

One of the subdivisions under "Reactionary Socialism" is petty-bourgeois socialism. Already in the *Manifesto* Marx and Engels explained: "The industrial and political supremacy of the bourgeoisie threatens it (the petty bourgeoisie) with certain destruction; on the one hand, from the concentration of capital; on the other, from the rise of a revolutionary proletariat."

In this social situation, the radical petty bourgeois rejected capitalism, attacked it, and "dissected with great acuteness the contradiction in the conditions of the modern proletariat." Here are Bernard Shaw's ancestors. But they equally rejected the working class, which was the social force which pressed them from the other side. For them too (as the *Manifesto* says later of the utopian socialists), "Only from the point of view of being the most suffering class does the proletariat exist for them"—or, if not as the most suffering class, at least as fellow-sufferers.

Where then did they point, if neither to the capitalist class nor the proletariat? In 1848 Marx noted that this breed of socialist looked back with nostalgia to "the old property relations and the old society"—which at that time meant the society of the Middle Ages.

In our day Wallace still combines his pro-Russianism with sighs for the good old horse-and-buggy days of small enterprise, before monopoly. But a scientist like Harlow Shapley is too technology-minded and a Schumann is too sophisticated for this sort of nonsense. *For them rejection of both capitalism and the proletariat leads straight to the embrace of Stalinism, as representative of a social system in which they think they can hope for a new social role for the middle-class intelligentsia.* This is (mostly was) likewise the social appeal of a movement like Technocracy.

But in 1848, these petty-bourgeois socialists who yearned to escape from being crushed to death or futility between the upper and nether millstones of capital and labor—into whose embrace did they fall? We have seen that Marx noted their eyes were turned back to the old feudal social relations. And looking in that direction we find another "kind of

socialism," which the *Manifesto* indeed analyzes first of all—*feudal socialism*.

In order to arouse sympathy the aristocracy were obliged to lose sight, apparently, of their own interests and to formulate their indictment against the bourgeoisie in the interest of the exploited working class alone. Thus the aristocracy took their revenge by singing lampoons on their new master, and whispering in his ears sinister prophecies of coming catastrophe.

In this way arose feudal socialism: half lamentation, half lampoon; half echo of the past, half menace of the future; at times, by its bitter, witty and incisive criticism, striking the bourgeoisie to the very heart's core, but always ludicrous in its effect, through total incapacity to comprehend the march of modern history.

The aristocracy, in order to rally the people to save them, waved the proletarian alms-bag in front of a banner.¹ But the people, so often as it joined them, saw on their hindquarters the old feudal coat of arms, and deserted with loud and irreverent laughter.

Here, at the *beginnings* of capitalism, we find a rival ruling class camouflaging its interests under a synthetic working-class movement in order to carry on its own class struggle, using the proletariat as a base of operations and petty-bourgeois ideologists as lieutenants.

Reformism to Stalinism

Today, at the other end of capitalism's life, in the days of its degeneration, we see another rival ruling class using the same methods. In the capitalist countries Stalin's agents also "formulate their indictment against the bourgeoisie in the interest of the exploited working class alone." *Half echo of the past, half menace of the future!*

The *Manifesto* dissects a social type which at that time gravitated toward aristocratic reaction and today can gravitate toward Stalinist reaction. *It is the same type which, in the middle age of capitalism, took the form of the extreme right-wing reformist socialist* and produced the Shaws, Webbs, Noskes, Karl Renners and Martynovs.

I have deliberately listed here only a few stalwarts of the Second International who lived on into the period of fascism and Stalinism. At the risk of being accused of stacking the cards, I wish

1. This sentence, as well as the first paragraph of this passage, should be read aloud to anyone—including any "kind of Trotskyist"—who continues to claim that the Communist Party is a working-class party in spite of all for the reason that it directs its appeal to the working class or that it uses the working class as a base of operations—i.e., "waves the proletarian alms-bag in front of a banner." According to this notion of some of our contemporaries (Cannon, Johnson), the reactionary-feudal movement of which Marx speaks was also a "kind of working-class party" in its day.

to point out that all of the above-mentioned capitulated to one of these two symmetrical forms of totalitarianism, given half a reasonable opportunity and incentive (Shaw, as Howe points out, to both).

Not accidentally—as we Marxists love to say (to the disgust of people who prefer a little elbow room for historical improvisation). For the basic political character of these reformists was fixed in a deep-rooted distrust of mass upsurge from below, fear of the million-headed mass in motion, and lack of belief in the social capacity of the working class.

They placed their faith in bourgeois democracy. That is much more difficult to do nowadays and getting harder all the time.

If a bookkeeper like Sidney Webb could froth at Lenin but beam primly over Stalin; if an intellectual snob like Shaw could grow rapturous over the charlatan Duce; if Noske could prefer capitulation to Hitler even to the mild pangs of emigration; if Renner could get blue in the face when the Vienna masses in the streets shouted "Dictatorship of the proletariat! Soviet power!" in 1918, but act as Stalin's quisling in Austria at a later date—then it is only because the alternatives were to throw in their lot with the revolutionary working class or else forget about serious politics. And these were men whose brain neurons developed around the ideas of socialism and Marxism. How much easier the process is for men like Wallace and Schumann and—God be willing—the Dean of Canterbury!

The people we have been discussing

CARLSON: "HOMO STALINENSIS"

The past decade in most capitalist countries has witnessed the emergence of a new socio-political type identified variously by such names as crypto-communist, proto-Stalinist, Stalinoid liberal, etc.

What characterizes these persons is, alternatively, either the pursuit of capitalist aims using the Stalinist deformation of socialist methods, or the pursuit of Stalinist aims by the employment of capitalist methods. Not infrequently both methods are employed simultaneously, especially when the conjunctural interests of Russia and a given capitalist country are the same—for instance, as was the case during the Second World War when both Russia and her capitalist allies sought the defeat of Germany.

are, then, a political (not simply a psychological) tendency. But they do not constitute a social stratum.

It would be absurd to speak of them as, say, an embryonic bureaucratic-collectivist class.² The Voltaires and Diderots were ideological heralds of capitalism but were not the embryonic bourgeoisie.

Indeed, one cannot speak of an embryonic bureaucratic-collectivist class at all by mere analogy with the birth-processes of capitalism. As a private-property-owning class, the capitalists could assume a definite social identity long before they even bid for state power. But by its very nature, a bureaucratic-collectivist class can exist *as a definite class* only under its own social system. For individually the members of this class own no means of production, and collectively they own the means of production only through control of a state which does so. Insofar as the elements which may later germinate into this class incubate under capitalism, they exist in a social system where they do not as yet have any special and uniform relation to the process of production.

The ideologists of neo-Stalinism are merely the tendrils shot ahead by the phenomena—fascism and Stalinism—which "outline the social and political form of a neo-barbarism" (Trotsky). We have taken a look at the coat of arms on their hindquarters, as Marx recommended, but it is too early to desert with loud laughter. What is still needed is the doubled fist.

HAL DRAPER

Such individuals are most easily observable in Europe, where social tensions are greater. They are particularly definable in England, where the absence of a mass Stalinist party prevents their being absorbed in a larger political milieu. Konni Zilliacus, the "left" Labor Party member; Joseph Needham, the biochemist; or the so-called "Red" Dean of Canterbury are representative types from abroad. Henry Wallace is a good domestic example.

While there is a certain amount of interpenetration with the "fellow-travelers" of the depression period both in

2. J. M. Fenwick, in his review of Carlson's biography (below), speaks of the neo-Stalinist type as "bureaucratic-collectivist man." I do not think this should be interpreted in the sense I am criticizing here.

personnel and in social characteristics, yet in what may be called the bureaucratic-collectivist man we have a new formation. In the pre-war fellow-traveler was still visible the last flush of socialist idealism. It is not insignificant that even the term has become rarer in the active political vocabulary. The bureaucratic-collectivist type, opportunist when patching up a career, brutal when in power, is a product of the economic, political and moral decline of our times.

The activity of such types in European areas controlled by Russia, and their more circumscribed activity in the United States, lend an interest to studying the evolution of these ambivalent individuals. The development of their mentality is not necessarily a unilinear one. The recently published biography¹ of Evans Carlson, the famous commander of the Marine Second Raider Battalion during World War II, is exceptionally interesting in that it shows the development of this mentality in one of the most inhibiting of all spheres—the military.

Gung Ho and Morale Building

Carlson's fame rests upon two small model operations carried out in 1942: an attack on Makin Island and a long march through Guadalcanal. Though these victories were puffed up by the United States press, since they were among the first victories by American troops after a long series of defeats at the hands of the Japanese, it was recognized that in these victories there was an unusual element which helped make Carlson's achievement possible. This was the *esprit de corps* which he was able to establish. It was symbolized in the famous philosophy of *Gung Ho!*—an expression taken from the Chinese and meaning, roughly, cooperation.

Gung Ho was based partly on practices developed in classic form in the Red Army of Lenin and Trotsky's time. Says Michael Blankfort, Carlson's Stalinist biographer, describing the plans for the unit: "... there would be no caste differences in the Raiders. Officers would be leaders by ability and knowledge and character—and not because they held the President's commission. They would give no unnecessary orders; they would not order a man to do what they themselves were not prepared to do with him; they would have no special mess or barracks or club. And there

1. *The Big Yankee*, by Michael Blankfort. Little, Brown, Boston, 1947.

would be no unnecessary saluting." Before being executed, military operations were explained in their entirety to the men. The political background of the war and Allied war aims were similarly developed.

The ideological investiture was, however, purely capitalist. The polarities were of the standard aggressor-victim and fascism-democracy type. On the personal level there was a total absence of a policy of fraternization with Japanese soldiers. "Can you cut a Jap's throat without flinching?" Carlson would ask. "Can you choke him to death without puking?" But he would explain, relates his biographer, "that this wasn't a race war or a war of color against color." Carlson's command was, of course, Jim Crow.

Standard military morale builders, such as prayer, patriotism, and unit pride, were applied with maximum intensity by Carlson. Physical conditioning was exceptionally severe. This program was applied to an élite group: one thousand men personally selected by Carlson and his officers among three thousand volunteers from an arm of the service which was itself composed of volunteers, the Marine Corps.

It should therefore be small cause for wonder that Carlson achieved exceptional military results with minimal forces. Other facts are also interesting. The psychoneurosis rate in his battalion was probably the lowest of any combat unit in the United States infantry. Only one man cracked up in the Guadalcanal operation. Carlson's methods of what he called "ethical indoctrination" were so successful that they formed the subject matter of a Yale study.

Carlson's Road to Stalinism

Though elements of Carlson's success are obviously due to factors other than his "ethical indoctrination," the role played by his conceptions and their *radical implications* were well, if instinctively, recognized by the officer caste in the Marine Corps. After Guadalcanal he was never again placed in direct charge of men. He was discriminated against in other ways also.

Short of engaging in psychoanalytic speculations, it can be said that Carlson's whole life was molded by the military services, which he joined at sixteen and a half and served almost uninterruptedly until his death in 1947. The chief conditioning factor in his life prior to the

army was probably the fact that he was the son of a poor Congregationalist minister. The atmosphere of the Protestant ethic, so well described by the sociologist Max Weber, was unquestionably influential in the development of the democratic aspects of his system.

Early in his Marine Corps career he read Upton Sinclair, Theodore Dreiser and Sinclair Lewis. By as late as 1927, however, when he was witness to the bloody collapse of the revolutionary upsurge in China, he preserved an imperialist attitude toward Far Eastern events. But at this time he fell under the influence of Admiral Mark L. Bristol, a liberal in terms of naval thinking, who did not believe that an emotional attitude toward the Orient was a substitute for a serious study of it. He also initiated an educational program among Marine enlisted men. When he was transferred to Nicaragua Carlson began to apply enlightened methods in dealing with native troops under his command (he spoke to them exclusively in Spanish, for instance), but of course these were democratic methods directed *against* the nationalist movement. Here also he picked up an interest in guerrilla warfare.

The years 1937-38 in China—years of the decline and Stalinization of the peasant movement—were decisive for Carlson. During this period he traveled with the Stalinist Eighth Route Army as a Marine observer. The results obtained by the limited democracy granted the troops by the Chinese Stalinists (which was, in any case, greater than that in the United States armed forces) could not but impress Carlson. Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley, with whom he became acquainted in China, also proved of importance in conditioning his thinking. He emerged a proponent of the Stalinist peasant military movement and an opponent of Japan, which the United States was at that time appeasing and encouraging.

Following the war he joined the American Veterans Committee. In 1947 he announced his candidacy for state senator in California, with the PCA backing him and the Stalinists doing the pushing from behind. In the last days of his life Carlson's thinking took a further turn: he expressed a belief in the necessity of "socialism"—i.e., the Russian system.

The evolution of the bureaucratic-collectivist man was on its way.

JAMES M. FENWICK.

BERNARD SHAW'S ANTI-CAPITALISM

Eric Bentley's recent book on Bernard Shaw² frankly declares its intention to be polemical—to wit, a defense of Shaw as political thinker. Though half of his book analyzes the plays—and very well, too—the burden of Bentley's argument is political. The result, to put it bluntly, is pretty sad.

Since Bentley's argument is largely directed against the usual Marxist objections to Shaw's politics, his own knowledge of Marxism is called into question. But as soon as Bentley enters the field of political theory he is like a provincial let loose in a museum: all he can do is to remember a few phrases of his hometown's philistines. Thus we read that Marxism "appeals to pure sentiment, to that praise of the poor as poor which is the essence of demagoguery." And again, that Marxism believes in "the adequacy of 'material and economic factors' to make revolutions on their own"—whatever revolutions made on "their own" by "factors" may mean!

This kind of writing calls into question Bentley's entire book; no one can claim serious attention when he gives such a completely ridiculous report of what Marx believed. This is the kind of impressionistic, off-the-cuff politics which a young literary academician can pick up by reading literary magazines in which ex-leftist intellectuals announce their break from Marxism. It is terribly stale and second-hand.

Shaw was never a systematic thinker. First shocked into social awareness by the depression of the early 1880s, he developed an eclectic concoction of notions picked up from a variety of sources. From Marx—whom, incidentally, he admitted having read only very skimpily—Shaw borrowed the general social critique of capitalist society, while rejecting the Marxian historical approach, the theory of class struggle and Marxian economics. From the marginal-utility economists Shaw borrowed his economic theories. But the most decisive intellectual influences in his life were a number of very perceptive but *essentially reactionary* critics of industrial capitalism: Carlyle, Ruskin and, when he read him later on, Nietzsche. These writers savagely attacked all the faults of capitalism, but since they rejected socialism and the working class (largely because of their antipathy to the masses and to any kind

of mass movement) they had no alternative but to fall back upon mere nostalgia or reliance on a great and benevolent leader.

Shaw had one great intellectual virtue: he has been taken in by almost everything else but never by capitalism. He succumbed to Nietzscheism, Lamarckism, vegetarianism, imperialism, fascism, Stalinism, anti-vivisectionism, Fabianism and what have you; but he knew how rotten were the internal social workings of capitalist society and never stopped saying so. As a result his magnificently composed pamphlets, polemics and prefaces are full of some of the most eloquent and effective anti-capitalist agitation of our times. But that was all. His best writing was always in terms of *particularities*, always very concrete and limited. As soon as he entered the field of theory, as soon as he essayed generalizations, he usually made an ass of himself.

Even in the late nineteenth century Shaw's political physiognomy was accurately described. Despite the fact that Shaw was infinitely more brilliant than he, the British Marxist, H. M. Hyndman, in an essay called "The Final Futility of Final Utility" destroyed Shaw's economic theories. The British socialist writer, Max Beer, described Shaw most accurately:

Having no objective guide, no leading principle to go by, Shaw necessarily arrives at hero-worship—at the hankering after the Superman to guide mankind. I have noticed the same mental development in several continental critics. . . . They began with Social Democracy, passed through the Ibsen period, worshipped *The Enemy of the People*, finally becoming adherents of Nietzsche in theory and of Bismark or some other social-imperialist in practice.

Supermen and Yahoos

For Shaw socialism was not a mass movement in which the working class played a leading role; he distrusted the masses of people, the Yahoos as he called them. What he had in common with the other Fabians, the more routine reformists, was precisely this distrust of the mass. They, however, did not go along with his notion of superman; as complacent and cautious reformists they had enough sense to realize that the leader theory was for them a very dangerous business. That is why they, who never could write such bitter and brilliant attacks on capitalism as did Shaw, also seldom succumbed to the modern totalitarians so disgracefully as did Shaw.

Only in recent years have we been able to see what Shaw's Socialism for Supermen and Gentlemen really meant. When Mussolini came to power, Shaw was one of the first European intellectuals to applaud the insel dictator. For this Shaw got the most merciless polemical drubbing of his life. The Italian democrat—one of the last genuine survivors of the breed—Gaetano Salvemini went after Shaw fist and claw and never let go. Salvemini exposed for all time Shaw's frigid flirtations with totalitarianism.

Later when Hitler came to power Shaw behaved in the same way. And finally he became an apologist for Stalin, in whose tyranny he saw a vindication of the principle of the "efficient leader." Shaw may have yearned for the Nietzschean "socialization of the selective breeding of Man" (*The Revolutionist's Handbook*)—which Bentley has called, with other-worldly restraint, "idealistic racism"—but in practice he could not resist the wretched corporeal supermen of fascism and Stalinism.

This is the hardest nut for Bentley to crack and the way he does it is really an indication of what passes for *avant-garde* thought these days. Bentley approvingly declares Shaw believed that

liberalism and fascism are rival masks of capitalism, and fascism is in some ways the better of the two. It sometimes benefitted the proletariat, it gave bureaucratic status to functionaries who were formerly casual employees. . . . To that extent it prepared the way for genuine socialism. (My emphasis—I. H.)

Shaw's praise of fascism, Bentley triumphantly concludes, was merely a device to prod British liberals out of their complacent belief in laissez-faire capitalism. But is it not clear that by this sort of argument almost anything can be excused or explained away?

What Shaw wanted above all was a society run according to the rational prescriptions of Victorian intellectuals—gentlemen, every one of them. His hero—the naturally muted British version of the Superman—was the "efficient civil servant" who would do things right. If there is any single political idea that would be anathema to Shaw it is the one contained in Lenin's remark that every cook must learn to be a cabinet minister. Shaw was for ministers ruling and cooks cooking.

Unlike the great Marxists, Shaw was fundamentally alien to the democratic and equalitarian spirit that has inspired all genuine socialist movements; his conception of socialism was thoroughly

2. *Bernard Shaw*, by Eric Bentley. New Directions, 1947, 242 pp., \$2.00.

Not By Politics Alone...

[The following essay is excerpted from the first chapter of the book by Trotsky, *Problems of Life*, which in some ways is one of the most unusual which that great and versatile revolutionary leader and thinker wrote. The English version of this work, first published in London in September 1924, is now quite inaccessible for most readers.

[The full title of this first chapter is "Not by Politics Alone Does Man Thrive."

[We here use the original translation by Z. Vengerova but have taken the liberty of changing some Britishisms (where American readers might misinterpret the thought) and also a few unidiomatic phrases.—Ed.]

What is our problem now?

What have we to learn in the first place? What should we strive for? We must learn to work efficiently: accurately, punctually, economically. We need culture in work, culture in life, in the conditions of life. After a long preliminary period of struggle we have succeeded in overthrowing the rule of the exploiters by armed revolt. No such means exists, however, to create culture all at once. The working class must undergo a long process of self-education, and so must the peasantry, either along with the workers or following them. Lenin speaks about these changed aims of our interests and efforts in his article on co-operation.

... We must admit [he says] that our conception of socialism has radically changed on one point. All was previously centered for us—by necessity—in the political struggle, the revolution, conquest of

bureaucratic. He was ready to borrow from every non-capitalist theory so long as it was not committed to a belief in the independent historical role of the masses. That is why Shaw could admire Stalin but could never appreciate the democratic idealism which was the underpinning of Marx's and Lenin's life-work. To the end Shaw was the petty bourgeois, resentful of his rulers but hating the "Yahoos."

That this sort of doctrine should today find a certain response is not surprising. Mr. Bentley has done it the doubtful service of reducing it to its most frank, unadorned and ugly essentials.

IRVING HOWE.

power, etc. Now our interests have shifted far away from that—to the peaceful organization of culture. We should like to concentrate all our forces on the problems of culture and would do it—but for the international relations which force us to fight for our position among the other nations. Yet, apart from foreign politics, and in regard to internal economic relations, the center of our work is the struggle for culture.

I consider it of some interest to quote here a passage on "The Epoch of the Struggle for Culture" out of my book, *Thoughts About the Party*:

In its practical realization the revolution seems to have drifted to all sorts of minor problems: we must repair bridges, teach people to read and to write, try to put down the cost of boots in Soviet factories, fight against filth, catch thieves, install electric power in country districts, etc. Some vulgar-minded intellectuals with dislocated brains—which makes them imagine they are poets or philosophers—speak already about the revolution with an air of condescending superiority: "Ha, ha!" they say, "the revolution is learning how to trade. And—ha ha ha!—to sew on buttons." But let the twaddlers babble away.

The purely practical daily work, provided it is constructive from the point of view of Soviet economics and Soviet culture—Soviet retail trade included—is not at all a policy of "small deeds," and does not necessarily bear the impress of pettiness. Small deeds without great issues abound in the life of men, but no great issues are possible without small achievements. To be more precise, at a time of great issues, small deeds, being a part of large problems, cease to be small.

The problem in Russia at the present moment is the constructiveness of the working class. For the first time in history the working class is doing constructive work for its own benefit and on its own plan. This historic plan, though still extremely imperfect and muddled, will connect all the parts and particles of the work, all its ins and outs, by the unity of a vast creative conception.

All our separate and minor problems—Soviet retail trade included—are parts of the general plan which will enable the ruling working class to overcome its economic weakness and lack of culture.

Socialist constructive work is systematic construction on a vast scale. And amid all the ups and downs, amid all the errors and retreats, amid all the intricacies of the NEP (New Economic Policy), the party carries on its plan, educates the young generation in the spirit of it, teaches everyone to connect their private aims with the common problem of all who may call on them one day to sew on a Soviet button, and the next—meet death fearlessly under the banner of communism.

We must, and shall, demand serious and

thorough specialized training for our young people, in order to save them from the great defect of the present generation—from superficial dabbling in generalities—but all specialized knowledge and skill must serve a common purpose that will be grasped by everyone.

Nothing, therefore, but the problems of our international position keep us, as Lenin tells us, from the struggle for culture. Now these problems, as we shall see presently, are not altogether of a different order. Our international position largely depends on the strength of our self-defense—that is to say, on the efficiency of the Red Army—and, in this vital aspect of our existence as a state, our problem consists almost entirely of work for culture: we must raise the level of the army, and teach every single soldier to read and to write. The men must be taught to read books, to use manuals and maps, must acquire habits of tidiness, punctuality and thrift.

No Short-Cuts

It cannot by some miraculous means be all done at once. After the civil war and during the transitional period of our work, attempts were made to save the situation by a specially invented "proletarian doctrine of militarism," but it was quite lacking in any real understanding of our actual problems. The same thing happened in regard to the ambitious plan for creating an artificial "proletarian culture." All such "quests of the philosopher's stone" combine despair at our deficiency in culture with a faith in miracles. We have, however, no reason to despair and, as to miracles and childish quackeries like "proletarian culture" or "proletarian militarism," it is high time to give such things up. We must see to the development of culture within the frame of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and this alone can secure the socialist import of the revolutionary conquests. Whoever fails to see this will play a reactionary part in the development of party thought and party work.

When Lenin says that at the present moment our work is less concerned with politics than with culture, we must be quite clear about the terms he uses, so as not to misinterpret his meaning. In a certain sense politics always ranks first. Even the advice of Lenin to shift our in-

terests from politics to culture is a piece of political advice. When the working class party of a country comes to decide that at some given moment the economic problems and not the political should take first place, the decision itself is political.

It is quite obvious that the word "politics" is used here in two different meanings: firstly, in a wide materialistic and dialectic sense, as the totality of all guiding principles, methods, systems which determine collective activities in all domains of public life; and on the other hand, in a restricted sense, specifying a definite part of public activity, directly concerned with the struggle for power and opposed to economic work, to the struggle for culture, etc. Speaking of politics as being concentrated economics, Lenin meant politics in the wide philosophic sense. But when he urged: "Let us have less politics and more economics," he referred to politics in the restricted and special sense. Both ways of using the word are sanctioned by tradition and are justified.

The Communist Party is political in the wide historic or, we may also say, philosophic sense. The other parties are political only in the restricted sense of the word. The shifting of the interests of our party to the struggle for *culture* does not therefore weaken the *political* importance of the party. The party will concentrate its activity on the work for culture and take the leading part in this work—this will constitute its historically leading, i.e., political, part. Many and many more years of socialist work, successful from within and secure from without, are still needed before the party could do away with its shell of party structure and dissolve in a socialist community. This is still so very distant that it is of no use to look so far ahead. . . .

In the immediate future the party must preserve in full its fundamental characteristics: unity of purpose, centralization, discipline and, as a result of it, fitness for fight. But it needs under the present conditions a very sound economic base to preserve and to develop these priceless assets of Communist Party spirit. Economic problems, therefore, rank first in our politics, and only in conformity with them does the party concentrate and distribute its forces and educate the young generation. In other words, politics on a large scale require that all the work of propaganda, distribution of forces, teaching and education should be based at present on the problems of economics and culture, and not

on politics in the restricted and special sense of the word.

The proletariat is a powerful social unity which manifests its force fully during the periods of intense revolutionary struggle for the aims of the whole class. But within this unity we observe a great variety of types. Between the obtuse illiterate village shepherd and the highly qualified engine driver there lie a great many different states of culture and habits of life. Every class, moreover, every trade, every group consists of people of different age, different temperaments and with a different past.

But for this variety, the work of the Communist Party might have been an easy one. The example of western Europe shows, however, how difficult this work is in reality. One might say that the richer the history of a country, and, at the same time, of its working class, the greater within it the accumulation of memories, traditions, habits, the larger the number of old groupings—the harder it is to achieve a revolutionary unit of the working class. The Russian proletariat is poor in class history and class traditions. This has undoubtedly facilitated its revolutionary education leading up to October. It causes, on the other hand, the difficulty of constructive work after October. The Russian workman—except the very top of the class—usually lacks the most elementary habits and notions of culture (in regard to tidiness, instruction, punctuality, etc.). The western European worker possesses these habits. He has acquired them, by a long and slow process, under the bourgeois regime.

This explains why in western Europe the working class—its superior elements, at any rate—is so strongly attached to the bourgeois regime with its democracy, freedom of the capitalist press, and all the other blessings. The belated bourgeois regime in Russia had no time to do any good to the working class, and the Russian proletariat broke from the bourgeoisie all the more easily, and overthrew the bourgeois regime without regret. But for the very same reason the Russian proletariat is only just beginning to acquire and to accumulate the simplest habits of culture, doing it already in the conditions of a socialist workers' state.

History gives nothing free of cost. Having made a reduction on one point—in politics—it makes us pay the more on another—in culture. The more easily (comparatively, of course) did the Russian proletariat pass through the revolu-

tionary crisis, the harder becomes now its socialist constructive work. But on the other side, such is the frame of our new social structure, marked by the four characteristics mentioned above,* that all genuine, efficient efforts in the domain of economics and culture bear practically the impress of socialism. Under the bourgeois regime the workman, with no desire or intention on his part, was continually enriching the bourgeoisie, and did it all the more, the better his work was. In the Soviet state a conscientious and good worker, whether he cares to do it or not (in case he is not in the party and keeps away from politics), achieves socialist results and increases the wealth of the working class. This is the doing of the October revolution, and the NEP (New Economic Policy) has not changed anything in this respect.

Workmen who do not belong to the party, who are deeply devoted to production, to the technical side of their work, are many in Russia—but they are not altogether "unpolitical," not indifferent to politics. In all the grave and difficult moments of the revolution they were with us. The overwhelming majority of them were not frightened by October, did not desert, were not traitors. During the civil war many of them fought on the different fronts, others worked for the army, supplying the munitions. They may be described as "non-political," but in the sense that in peace time they care more for their professional work or their families than for politics. They all want to be good workers, to get more and more efficient each in his particular job, to rise to a higher position—partly for the benefit of their families, but also for the gratification of their perfectly legitimate professional ambition. Implicitly every one of them, as I said before, does socialist work without even being aware of it.

But being the Communist Party, we want these workers consciously to connect their individual productive work with the problems of socialist construction as a whole. The interests of socialism will be better secured by such united activities, and the individual builders of socialism will get a higher moral satisfaction out of their work.

LEON TROTSKY.

* The "four characteristics," discussed in the section preceding our excerpt, are: the character of the Soviet state as a dictatorship of the proletariat; the Red Army as the support of workers' rule; the nationalization of the chief means of production; and the monopoly of foreign trade.—Ed.

Books in Review . . .

Fanaticism and Heresy

THE HERETICS, by Humphrey Slater. Harcourt, Brace. 1947. \$2.75.

The Heretics is really two independent novels about two different historical periods, 1197 to 1212 in France, and 1936 to 1939 in Spain. The first novel deals with the fate of the heretical Albigensians and their children; the second is an account of the Spanish Civil War. As an artistic achievement, the latter is the inferior of the two but has a much greater political interest. The first section is the work of a brilliant novelist, the second of an equally brilliant journalist. It is an account rather than a narrative, a report rather than a novel. Slater has, unfortunately, not imaginatively worked through his Spanish material.

The link between these disparate sections is that they both deal with fanaticism and its consequences. Slater states of a Stalinist that his "devout ruthlessness about his policy, which he regarded as something mystically superior to real individuals, and to which they should be utterly subordinate was . . . little different from the fanaticism of the old ecclesiastical Inquisition." The era of Innocent III and the era of Stalin are both characterized by "campaigns, purges, confessions, executions, denunciations, betrayals."

Fanaticism is, I take it, adherence to a belief *no matter what*. It submits to no tests. If a Stalinist, ignorant of the latest Soviet edict, derides as false the report that twelve-year-old Russian children are made subject to the death penalty, he will not, when the report is proved true, modify his belief in the justice of the Soviet order. He will state that the edict only proves the advanced character of the regime, because its educational system converts twelve-year-old children into political adults.

I quite agree with Slater on the close similarity between Innocent III and Stalin. But I cannot accept the problem of fanaticism as only a moral one. It is a social and cultural problem as well. Why is fanaticism more virulent in some epochs than in others? The answer must be sought in the social, political and economic tensions of the respective epochs. Stalinism is a horrible perversion, but what are the inadequacies of a capitalist system that make inhabitants of the system into Stalinists? What are the conditions in Russia that permit this rude fanaticism? These are the questions that Slater must face and has not.

And yet, this is a valuable book. Its anti-Stalinism is not second-hand but is based on Slater's Spanish experience. Slater understands the role of the Stalinists in the Spanish Civil War. Isolated episodes in the book are brilliant.

He is particularly effective in presenting the Russian policy through the deliberations of the Operational Policy Commission. The Russians propose as their thesis on the duties of the regimental officer that he "obey, know and report," and mechanically repeat each other's arguments. When one

of the Spanish members of the commission proposes to invest the regimental officer with the power of decision and initiative, he is voted down.

Perhaps the most brilliant writing in the book is his account of a battle scene in which the Loyalists are being slaughtered on a slope. A political meeting is called by the Stalinists to discuss the situation. "The Brigade Commissar made a speech in which he did his best to carry out his instructions to link up the immediate issue of the troops' morale with the political question of the fight against Trotskyism." When one of the Stalinists states that he must still try to explain to his men why they are being slaughtered in an untenable military position, he is denounced for undermining morale and giving objective support to fascism. The meeting ends with a unanimous vote of confidence in the leadership and a unanimous condemnation of the "Trotskyist-fascist" agents of the enemy.

Slater is a writer of experience, understanding and power. He has the novelist's gift, and as soon as he digests his experience, he will write finer novels than *The Heretics*. But *The Heretics* is more than a promise; it is an achievement.

RICHARD STOKER.

Is Social Science Possible?

CAN SCIENCE SAVE US? by George A. Lundberg. Longmans, Green, 1947; \$1.75.

This is one of many books which have appeared in recent months discussing science from the bourgeois point of view. It is generally more progressive than most of them, in pleading for the extension of the scientific method to wider fields. Lundberg separates himself from the "scientific" irrationalists, like Eddington, Compton and Millikan, who deny that man's social ills are susceptible to scientific analysis. But while Lundberg points out that the early development of the sciences was opposed by those with vested interests in ignorance and superstition, he does not understand that the same situation is faced by the social sciences today.

Despite his limitation, he makes a contribution in emphasizing that there is no fundamental difference, such as precludes the application of intelligence and scientific method to both, between the external physical world and the social world. He takes up the objection that "the investigator is inside instead of outside his material," with its implication that unbiased observation and interpretation are impossible in social science. This difficulty, however, is more or less present in all science and can be controlled only by the use of the proper techniques peculiar to the given science.

Another alleged obstacle is the "motives" involved in social phenomena and supposedly beyond the ken of science. But already and despite its youth, the science of psychology has been forcing "motives" to lose many of their mysterious aspects and to

give ground before the advance of scientific analysis. (Lundberg, incidentally, fails entirely to weigh the *motives* of the capitalist employers of the professional "social scientists.")

He stumbles even more in ruling the question of "values" out of scientific activity. Actually, valuation is a basic constituent of the scientific approach; it is a consideration of what is significant and what is assumed. All his activity is directed toward acquiring, selecting and evaluating new facts which will increase his basic knowledge.

This is expressed by I. Lewy in "Valuation in Fact-Finding" (*Journal of Philosophy*, October 9, 1947). Lewy points out that physical science is founded on the *selection* and *organization* of the facts of reality which are of *value* to us. Science is the organized accumulation of the significant facts in man's struggle to control the physical world. Mere facts about society are meaningless unless they imply an evaluation of the past and the calculation of the possibilities of the future.

To quote Lewy: "It is obvious that fact-finding boards or purely descriptive science may become a weapon in the hands of those who defend the status quo or vested interests or prejudices of all sorts." But the class conflict in society does not permit a common evaluative foundation for social science, and only the interests of the working class point to the abolition of that class conflict. That is why it is possible to adopt a truly scientific attitude toward social phenomena only by projecting oneself into the point of view of the working-class struggle for a classless society.

Thus Marxism is as much of a broad science of society as we can expect today. It will become a more exact, a more "true," science as we progress toward socialism and a society without class divisions.

WALTER GREY.

Marxist Missionary

JOSEPH WEYDEMEYER, by Karl Obermann. International Publishers, New York, 1947.

With the murder of Trotsky the last representative of the great revolutionists of the past was cut down. The passage of time serves only to bring their greatness into sharper focus. Possessors of the best in western thought as synthesized with Marxism, infused with an energy and conviction rare in Europe since the French Revolution, these personalities represented the new revolutionary vanguard. They were the first political scientists, in the literal sense of the term. They were the first to prepare the socialist transformation of society through an understanding of its laws of motion.

Capitalism in its headlong decline induces distortion in all concepts—even those held by the revolutionary vanguard. At a time when the Marxist cadre is small and subject to tremendous social and ideological pressures, it is instructive to review the lives of those individuals, great and close to great, who can be placed under the heading: The Revolutionary Man.

In 1842 Joseph Weydemeyer was a twenty-four-year-old artillery lieutenant attached to the garrison at Minden, Westphalia, when he fell under the influence of the

Rheinische Zeitung. He soon became a Marxist, crowding his life with the most varied activity until his death in St. Louis in 1866.

His activity in the 1848 events in Europe led to his leaving for the United States in 1851. He plunged immediately into the life of the German émigré groups. Almost immediately he founded *Die Revolution* (Marx's *The Eighteenth Brumaire* was first published in it), the first of a long series of papers with which Weydemeyer was connected.

He continually sought to effect a rapprochement between the more advanced German labor movement in the United States and the English-speaking workers.

Intervening constantly in national matters of interest to the working class, he wrote extensively on the tariff and slavery questions, participated in the opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska bill organized workers' militia for defense against the Know-Nothings, aided in the election of Lincoln, and during the Civil War served as the colonel of a Missouri infantry regiment.

Of particular interest in this biography (it is one of the few products of current Stalinist scholarship possessing value) is the portrayal of the efforts of Weydemeyer—as early as 1851!—to introduce Marxism into the American scene. This thorny problem is still with us.

JAMES M. FENWICK

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a continuation of the social revolution which was led by Lenin and Trotsky.

The only salvation from totalitarian barbarism, which in its most elemental form is a product of decomposing capitalism or the defeated revolution, is the socialist revolution, the only revolution possible in our times. This revolution will not abolish democracy but realize it completely for the first time in history, abolishing the system of capitalist monopoly and the totalitarian monopoly of the Stalinist bureaucracy.

If Liston Oak wishes to save our civilization or formal bourgeois democracy, he will have to unite with us whether he does or does not hate Lenin and Trotsky, or else pass into the ranks of the bourgeois-Stalinist counter-revolution. The attempt to evade a theoretical position with insults or fits of ill temper will not save him from having to choose between these alternatives.

A. RUDZIENSKI.

Correspondence . . .

Rudzienski Replies to Oak

[Our contributor Rudzienski here replies to the letter by Liston Oak which appeared in the September issue. The original article by Rudzienski was printed in the August issue.—Ed.]

TO THE EDITOR:

Liston Oak feels offended by the term "innocent" which I used in connection with his comparison between the present situation in Poland and Russia under Kerensky. May I say that the adjective "innocent" was used casually in the text without the intention of offending anyone. The article originally bore the title "The Errors of Liston Oak," which the editor of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL later changed to read "A Social Democratic 'Innocent' Abroad." I did not use the term "innocent" in any derogatory sense, since I prefer "innocent" people to rogues and sharpsters.

My article was dedicated to explaining Liston Oak's errors and not to censuring him. With Oak's statement that "my casual comparison between the Poland of 1945-47 and the Russia of Kerensky and Lenin was not a brilliant one," the question was almost completely cleared up because this was the fundamental difference between us.

However, angered by the unfortunate adjective "innocent" (which the editor over-emphasized, contrary to my intentions), Liston Oak draws the noose tight and, like a bourgeois and not a socialist, says, "Rudzienski's distortion of my meaning is a typical piece of Bolshevik polemical hypocrisy."

Why the need to fire this Big Bertha, since Oak himself confesses his comparison was not exactly a happy one? I wished only to explain to the readers that the present Warsaw government bears no similarity to Kerensky's regime, because the latter was created during a revolution and was a democratic government; the Stalinist government was imported on the bayonets of an invasion, is anti-democratic, anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary. Had Liston Oak accepted just this, the discussion would have been cleared up.

I agree with the clarification that "there

was in Poland neither a bourgeois nor proletarian revolution," but "that a democratic socialist revolution had been suppressed, drowned in blood by the Red Army and the NKVD and the Polish Communist Quislings." I desire only to add that by the "democratic socialist revolution" I understand the socialist revolution, the only revolution possible now. There is no doubt that the socialist revolution will be the most democratic of all revolutions; the definition of the revolution as "socialist" distinguishes it from the bourgeois revolution and emphasizes its different class content in accordance with Marxist theory.

But like a vulgar bourgeois and not a socialist, the ill-tempered Liston Oak confuses all that was previously clarified, with one small phrase which follows the previous quotation: "as it was in Russia by the Bolsheviks, under Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin."

For my part it is not a question of adjectives or of finding stains on the radiant sun of Liston Oak's socialist theory, but of explaining the different content of the bourgeois and proletarian revolution. It is hardly a question of a contradiction between the adjectives "socialist" and "democratic." The revolution of our times is destined to realize a combination of different tasks in the course of the same historic process.

Liston Oak admits his error in comparing the Warsaw government with the Kerensky government; even more, he states that there was no social revolution in Poland. And then, contrary to all the logic of scientific discussion, he lowers the level of discussion by insinuating that I am guilty of "Bolshevik hypocrisy." Going even further he puts Lenin and Trotsky on the same level with Stalin and the... Communist Quislings of Warsaw.

Since the level of the discussion has thus been lowered, we must explain elementary truths. All the revolutions in history have been followed by periods of reaction. Isolated from the international proletariat, the Russian Revolution was destroyed by Stalin, who is not the continuator of Lenin and Trotsky's work but its most abject and infamous grave-digger. Socialism is a maximum and superior stage of social democracy. The totalitarian autocracy of Stalin is a phenomenon of the counter-revolution and not