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NOTES OF THE MONTH

The End of Isolationism

THE REVOLUTION IN ITALY

By M. S.

Invasion of Europe and the "Long War"

By Ernest Lund

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We regret that technical difficulties beyond our control made it impossible to publish the regular August issue of the magazine. All subscribers will, of course, be compensated for the omission by having their subscription extended one month.

Attention is also called to the fact that the accumulation of important subjects requiring treatment in the magazine has compelled the editors to shift to the next issue publication of a number of articles.

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

A Monthly Organ of Revolutionary Marxism

VOLUME IX

SEPTEMBER, 1943

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NOTES OF THE MONTH

The End of Isolationism in the United States

Isolationism as a strong force in American capitalist politics, is dead. In the Democratic Party, of course, it has long ago been interred, and as for the Administration, it has been committed to an exactly contrary policy since it took office. Now isolationism is making its last, not very confident and not even very assertive stand where it used to have its greatest hold and for a long time prevailed without serious contest—in the Republican Party.

Only two years ago, the House of Representatives approved Roosevelt's proposal to extend the period of military service for Army draftees by a majority of one single vote. It was just five months before Pearl Harbor, and isolationism was still riding high in capitalist politics. The House Republicans voted against the President six to one. On virtually every other question of "involvement" in foreign, especially European, politics, most of the Republicans had to be dragged every foot of the way and, often, against their vociferous resistance.

A drastic change has since occurred, and it is a sign of the times. At the April, 1942, meeting of the Republican National Committee in St. Louis to elect a new chairman, a mild "internationalist" resolution of policy was adopted—on Willkie's threat to make a public scandal, to be sure, but adopted nevertheless. "We realize," wrote the Reluctant Dragons of Isolationism, "that after this war the responsibility of the nation will not be circumscribed within the territorial limits of the United States; that our nation has an obligation to assist in bringing about of understanding, comity and coöperation among the nations of the world..." This "realization" marked a change as revolutionary in the thinking of its authors (and as creditable to them) as would have been the admission by the late Prophet Voliva of Zion City that the world, after all, was round and not flat.

Since the St. Louis meeting, the fight in the last important citadel of isolationism has come out into the open, with the mossbacks retreating all along the line. The very fact that Willkie, who continues to nurse his presidential aspirations, to the discomfiture of several other claimants, is the principal sponsor of a change in Republican policy, has the not very paradoxical effect of retarding the adoption of a new course by the party octogenarians still fighting a furious reminiscential battle against Woodrow Wilson. But the change is inevitable. In fact, it has already taken place, to all intents and purposes.

Before the Senate lies the resolution sponsored jointly by

Democrats Hill and Hatch, and Republicans Ball and Burton, which aims to put Congress on record in favor of the United States taking the initiative in calling a conference of the not very United Nations for the purpose of forming a post-war union and implementing it with force to make its decisions binding. A more recent resolution, sponsored this time by two Republicans only, White of Maine and Vandenberg of Michigan (who has not been known in the past as a notorious "interventionist"), declares, among other things, in favor of "the participation by the United States in post-war coöperation between sovereign nations to prevent, by any necessary means, the recurrence of military aggression and to establish permanent peace with justice in a free world." Woodrow Wilson, in his time, did not put it differently. Almost a dozen similar resolutions are now in the hands of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee.

In the House of Representatives, isolationism is doing just as badly. On June 15, the House Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously approved a slightly modified version of Democratic Representative Fulbright's resolution "favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace," and as favoring participation of the United States therein. The author of the original resolution rightly called the committee's action "a positive disavowal of the isolationist policy." Significant is the fact that it was adopted not only by the fourteen Democratic members of the committee but also by the eleven Republicans. In the House floor discussion that ensued, the resolution even met with the approval of Hamilton Fish.

The fight is being taken right to the Republican National Committee. Although the recently organized Republican Post-War Policy Association has the backing of Willkie, it would be erroneous to conclude that it is a mere instrument for obtaining next year's Republican nomination or him. Strong Republican forces are behind it, especially among the "younger" elements, and it is growing in strength all over the country. Its Eastern regional conference in New York on July 19 was attended by three hundred delegates and addressed by Senator Austin of Vermont, Representative Eaton of New Jersey, the ranking Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Governor Baldwin of Connecticut, and a sprinkling of important Republican Representatives from the Eastern states. The conference not only damned isolationism and demanded "the establishment of an organization of nations to assume full responsibility in maintaining world peace," but authorized a committee to confront the Republican National Committee and its chairman, a zero named Harrison E. Spangler, with the demand that the conference policy be made the official policy of the party. How serious the association is may be judged by the statement issued by its national chairman, Deneen Watson, after meeting with Spangler and hearing that the association is trying to split the party: "Our answer to that is that unless the party is smoked out now, there will be a split in 1944. We want to start now, and not wait for the bells to toll at the Republican convention."

It is the first time such words have been uttered since the days of Teddy Roosevelt and Bull Moose, when the Republican Party developed a violent allergy to the very word "split."

In the Senate, again, there is work in progress, as if isolationism had never been heard of. Senator Vandenberg, "speaking for at least a majority of the Senate Republicans," takes a position unmistakably aimed at smoothing the road for the coming international pacts. Where formerly the Constitution could not be satisfied with less than a two-thirds Senate ratification of such pacts, Vandenberg now finds that justice will be done by a simple Senate majority. The *New York Times* appropriately recalls that "no only the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, but the World Court were slaughtered because of adherence to the idea that the United States could not join them without approval of two-thirds of the Senate." "Remembering the low between President Woodrow Wilson and the Senate, which ruined efforts at international collaboration after the First World War and kept the United States isolationist for two decades, there has been much fear at home and abroad that the same will happen this time." Vandenberg, Ball, Burton, Hatch, Hill, Austin, Baldwin, Willkie, Watson—to say nothing of Roosevelt and his circle—are at work to see that "the same" will not happen this time.

"We realize"—said the Republican National Committee resolution of 1942. But they realize too late. Isolationism is dead, but it took too long in dying. The noble sacrifice made by the air-starved minds of Republicanism will help American imperialism survive the coming storms about as much as swimming lessons would help a castaway caught in a mid-Atlantic hurricane.

American Imperialism's Great Task

American imperialism has a tremendous task before it and an appetite to equal it. When Hitler declared years ago that Germany must expand or die, he was not giving expression to a singular predatoriness of Aryan fascism but to the motive forces inexorably at work in modern imperialist society. They are at work in United States capitalism, and it too must expand or die. How else is it to begin to solve the economic problems whose acuteness is only aggravated by the war? How, if not by expanding throughout the world, is it to find a market for the products of an industrial plant enlarged to an unprecedented point? How, if not by world expansion, is it to find fields of investment for its huge accumulation of capital which would otherwise lie fallow? How, if not by establishing its direct or indirect sovereignty over the world, is it to enforce acceptance of its rule of the market, of investment fields, of the sources of raw materials, of the highways, seaways and now the skyways of the earth?

"We realize that after this war the responsibility of the nation will not be [read: imperialist interests cannot be] circumscribed within the territorial limits of the United States." Thus the Republican officialdom. If they had "realized" it fifty or a hundred years ago, and had the economic power then that the United States has today, it might have been very helpful. Now it is too late.

England became a mighty empire, the "despot of the world market," when the modern world was still young and largely undiscovered, when capitalism was still young, when hundreds

of millions in the backward countries were still in a torpor which facilitated foreign depredations, and the working class and labor movement of the advanced countries were either non-existent or inconsequential.

The United States faces the task (not the prospect, but the task) of world imperialist domination under radically different circumstances. To think that it can satisfy its expansion requirements by acquiring a little colony here and there, or a special privilege or two somewhere else, is ridiculous. It is world dominion it must get in order to survive; little less will do. But it is a different world it lives in, and there lies its tragedy and, fundamentally, its hopelessness and defeat.

There are not less than four decisive factors, all inter-related, that stand in its way. Taken together, they constitute such formidable obstacles that not even by stripping its baggage of the burdensome weight of isolationism can the United States surmount them.

In the first place, capitalism today is not what it was when England was able so easily to extend its sway over the globe. In those days, capitalism was a progressive force. No other class existed capable of performing those miracles of economic achievement which Marx and Engels were among the first to acknowledge. Capitalism was able to develop the productive forces of society on a scale never before known in history. After each of its periodic crises, it rose to new heights. Now, however, capitalist society is in decline. The ruling class is no longer the stimulator of production, but a parasite upon it. It no longer develops the productive forces, taken on the whole, but seeks desperately to contract them, to compress them within ever-narrowing limits.

This was sufficiently demonstrated in the world crisis that broke out in 1929, and demonstrated most spectacularly in the régime established during that crisis in the strongest capitalist country of all, the United States. It was further emphasized, from a different direction, so to speak, by the fact that a "real" return to large-scale production was possible only with the outbreak of the war. But it is precisely here that the deceptiveness of capitalist "expansion" may be discerned. Capitalism can resume its old pace and even appear to exceed it, only when it goes over to producing means of destruction. It can put the paralyzed Ruhr to work only in order to destroy the productive forces of Poland; Detroit gets a new lease on life only in order to paralyze and destroy the Ruhr. It is absurd to imagine that an American capitalism which could not, in peacetime, get its own economy into operation, will be able after the war to achieve that miracle plus the miracle of getting Europe's economy into operation.

In the second place, the conflicts between the big rivals of declining capitalism have assumed such feverish sharpness that it is impossible for them to agree peacefully for a fairly long period of time to a satisfactory division of the world. That, too, is a special characteristic of our epoch.

This is not to say that in the "old days" there were no rivalries and no conflicts. There were. But the world had not yet been divided among the big powers, and as its remoter corners were opened up to imperialism it was found possible to give each power a share which, although never considered "enough," was nevertheless sufficient to maintain a state of relative peace among them. China could be parcelled out among half a dozen big powers and several small ones; so could Africa. Not even the Monroe Doctrine prevented the infiltration into Latin America of the big European powers. In any case, it is enough to point out that be-

tween the Napoleonic wars of the early nineteenth century and 1914, there was not a single inter-imperialist conflict that can even be mentioned in the same breath with the First and Second World Wars.

Now it is no longer a question of dividing the world among empires-on-the-make, but of *re-dividing* it. Empires can no longer be established or expanded merely at the expense of the backward countries. Not one of the great imperialist powers of today can advance an inch without taking at least a corresponding inch from one or more of its imperialist rivals. Yesterday they could jointly attack and reduce to colonies the backward countries. Today they must attack each other and reduce to colonies those nations which are themselves imperialist, or, in any case, advanced capitalist nations.

This stage was opened up dramatically by the war of 1914-18. It continued without a break, even in the "peace" that followed the First World War, when England-France tried to reduce Germany to a semi-colonial position and when the United States sought, in the brilliant phrase of Trotsky's analysis, to put all of Europe—advanced, imperialist Europe!—"on rations." It has reached its peak in the Second World War, with Germany reducing the whole continent to a series of colonial and semi-colonial appendages, and her principal rivals, the United States and England, seeking to do what comes *fundamentally* to the same thing.

The United States operates in Europe under the same basic economic compulsions as Germany. The fact that weakened Germany required the brutal armor of fascism to accomplish what the stronger United States can still try to do under the cloak of "democracy," serves to distinguish the form but not the substance.

What is important here, however, is the fact that Germany could not establish its rule over Europe, and oust or subjugate its rivals, without precipitating the most violent war in history. That is, it met and continues to meet with resistance on such a scale as prevents it from enjoying the fruits of conquest by stabilizing the "new order." There is no reason to believe that American imperialism will succeed where German imperialism failed, and every reason to doubt it.

America's post-First World War attempt to put Europe on rations by sheer economic power met with stiff resistance from such countries as England, France and Germany, and was one of the most powerful factors contributing to the social upheavals in Europe and finally to the present war itself. American intervention in the Europe following the Second World War would have to be of a much deeper and more extensive character. The more it would take for itself, the less there would be not only for its European enemies of today but also for its present European allies.

The British Empire, for example, may represent a dying world force, but it is not yet dead. Precisely because it is dying, its resistance to encroachments upon its preserves is and will remain intense and violent. Weakened though it may be after the war, weakened though Germany and France and the other large European powers may be, they will nevertheless be compelled to, and they will, combat the advance of their American imperialist rival on the continent, fundamentally for the same reasons and with the same determination that the rivals of Germany resisted her advance over Europe. The resistance to the United States may not take the same form that it takes in the case of Germany today—namely, armed warfare—but that is a matter which, after all, relates essentially to external forms and momentary capacities.

What is and will be decisive is the fact that the United States will not be able to establish its dominion over Europe without encountering fierce resistance not only from the masses of the Old World, but also from the bourgeoisie. This resistance will not only prevent it from establishing the "order" necessary to exploit its advance but will actually accelerate and intensify the social crisis in the United States itself.

The Coming Resistance of the Masses

In the third place, all the subtle economic power that the United States can muster will not suffice to obviate the need to employ less subtle means of power to impose its rule upon the colonial peoples. England could rule India for centuries without encountering the kind of resistance which is almost commonplace in the colonies today. The epoch of feeble, isolated rebellions of Sepoys and Boxers, doomed to defeat, has given way to the epoch of colonial revolutions in which millions participate. Torpor has been succeeded by alert consciousness, acquiescence by organized defiance, physical impotence by a knowledge and possession of arms.

Even the most thick-witted and arrogant Dutch *Mynheer* now "realizes" (like the Republican National Committee!) that the slaves of the Dutch East Indies will not merely sigh with relief when their Japanese masters are driven out and then leap with joy at the return of their former Dutch masters. Even if these slaves did not understand it before, hypocritical Japanese imperialism has involuntarily hammered into their heads a hatred and a noble intolerance of the doctrine of racial superiority. Allied imperialist propaganda has involuntarily hammered into their heads no less violent a hatred and intolerance for the doctrine of foreign rule. The idea that it is just to resist it with arms in hand is now sanctified. The fact that the Japanese are opposed only to the racial superiority of others, and that the Allies are opposed only to the foreign rule of others, is not lost upon the colonial peoples. But, in their own way, the contending imperialists are teaching them invaluable lessons.

It is simply inconceivable that American imperialism will be able to march into the reconquered or newly-conquered colonies all over the world and establish its domination without further ado. If resistance in the colonies to foreign rule could be measured by units before the war, it will be measured in tens and hundreds of units after the war. Imperialism today does not have Kipling's "fuzzy-wuzzies" to contend with, but tens and hundreds of millions of colonial people who have come of age politically, who have acquired a keen national consciousness and a determination to rule their own destinies. They have been taught and are even now being taught by imperialism itself that big political and social problems are decided not by "appeasement" or negotiation or capitulation, but by struggle and power. Irony of ironies! It is the imperialists—not, God forbid! the revolutionists—who are teaching the colonial peoples the way, the only way, to get rid of imperialism.

Whether the United States tries to gain control of the colonial and semi-colonial countries directly or indirectly, by means of "subtle" economic infiltration or that means plus military measures ranging anywhere from those employed by England in India to those of Japan in China or Java, its suc-

cess (and therefore its prospects for world rule and power) is already circumscribed to the vanishing point. The masses in these countries are in no mood to accept foreign rule in any form, even though it seeks to establish itself in the guise of benevolence, "for the good of the people themselves." One of the troubles with the masses is that they often accept the promises of imperialism. One of the troubles with these promises is that the masses some day impatiently demand their fulfillment.

Right now the people of China may be inclined to accept, even if with justified suspicion, the "aid" and promises of the United States, and even the alliance with imperialism, in order to fight the Japanese invader. Once the invader is driven out, it is altogether unlikely that the people will simply allow their "ally" from across the Pacific to move into his place. To one extent or another, this holds true of all the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, even of those who are blinded by illusions about the democratic nature of "Anglo-Soviet-American" imperialism. And it is their day that has come, not the day of American imperialism.

And finally, in the fourth place, American imperialism must advance not against peasants and artisans, but against a modern, politically-advanced, industrial proletariat, especially in Europe. Agricultural Sicily, backward and isolated, is anything but a decisive test or a typical example. Of all the preposterous ideas about the war and what will follow it, the most preposterous is that the European proletariat will stand by quietly and passively when the war is over and accept whatever social and political régime the victorious Allies (we will assume for the moment a military victory of the Allies) are prepared to grant it.

Messrs. Berle, Long and others in the State Department, to go no higher in the government hierarchy, may plan among themselves the establishment of a safe and sane clerical Europe, blessed by the Vatican and dominated by Washington. They will yet learn that the miracle of changing the wafer and the wine into the body and blood of Christ is a trifle compared to what they are attempting to do. The reduction of Germany to a score of impotent provinces is talked of as though the strongest working class of Europe will simply acquiesce in this game of imperialist feudalism without a murmur. The imposition of such American puppets as Giraud upon France is dreamed and talked about as if it were as easy to do as to say. One would think that the violent social upheavals that raged for years throughout Europe after the First World War left no impression on the mind or else had passed out of the memory of man.

The United States has even less chance of *consolidating* its power over Europe following the present war, than France had following the war of 1914-8. Above all, it cannot consolidate its power by *peaceful* means, by establishing a serious semblance of "order," which is the same as saying that it cannot consolidate its power at all.

German imperialism did not establish its kind of régime over Europe merely because it wanted to, or because it is in the nature of what our "anti-Nazi" (yes, anti-Nazi!) political anthropologists call the Teutonic soul. It *had* to act the way it did for German imperialism to survive in a declining, contracting capitalist world. The United States *has* to act likewise, somewhat less brutally, perhaps, but not sufficiently less to overcome the obstacles which are there without it and which it helps to increase and to heighten.

But even the impossible must be attempted when to do

less means speedy death or at least slow strangulation. The problem of the "impossible" is resolved when it is borne in mind that for imperialism, American included, there is no choice but to make the attempt. What it involves is not only increasingly clear to the statesmen of the Republic, but is also made increasingly evident by them.

They all talk about abandoning isolationism and proceeding to "international coöperation" because the latter alone will guarantee peace. Willkie is for "America's effective and active coöperation in world councils and treaties with other nations for the preservation of peace." Vandenberg-White are for the "participation by the United States in post-war coöperation" in order "to establish permanent peace [not less] with justice in a free world." Deneen Watson's Republican Post-War Policy Association includes in its six-point program the "establishment of an organization of nations to assume full responsibility in maintaining world peace." Even the Republican National Committee resolution of 1942 comes out for "coöperation among the nations of the world in order that . . . the blighting and destructive processes of war may not again be forced upon us and upon the free and peace-loving peoples of the earth."

But all this is just talk and talk and talk, and it is meant, as Stalin would say, for the sheep.

On "International Cooperation"

Whom would this "international coöperation" be directed *against*? Against the "aggressor" nations. Who are they? Why, as every child knows, they are Germany, Italy and Japan, and under no circumstances any other country, particularly not the United States or England. But *all* the plans for "post-war international coöperation" call for what Senator Austin, at the Republican Post-War Policy Association conference, called "disarmament and disorganization of the armed forces of the Axis [and] disqualification of Germany, Italy and Japan to construct facilities for the manufacture of implements of war." If these—the only—aggressors are disarmed, disorganized and disqualified, what possible source of conflict would remain to disturb the haggard and harrassed dove of peace? What possible aggressor, outside of the Republic of San Marino, would be left to imperil once more the peace of the world?

It seems to the anti-isolationists and the converted isolationists that even after *the* "aggressors" are disarmed and otherwise prostrated "international coöperation" alone won't suffice to protect the world from unmentionable sources of conflict. It seems that stronger medicine than palaver about the "comity of nations" will be required.

The same Willkie declares in his August 12 message to the Republican leaders of his home district that "we must also see to it that our country, after the war is over, retains adequate military, aeronautical and naval strength of implement and, if necessary, protect and enforce, its foreign policy."

Protect it from what? Enforce it against whom? What happens to "America's effective and active coöperation in world councils and treaties with other nations for the preservation of peace"? Evidently, it may be ever so active—effective it will not be. Force—"adequate military, aeronautical and naval strength"—will be needed to curb the disturbers of the peace. Who? Where? How will they get a chance to dis-

turb the peace to such an extent as requires the permanent maintenance of "adequate" armed forces? Aren't the real big and bad aggressors to be disarmed down to their hobnailed boots?

Even Senator Taft, who is not fully reconstructed, discovers that "our people must commit themselves to use military force under certain conditions where aggression has been found by an international body to exist." Again: aggression by whom? The United States? Perish the thought! The disarmed and impotent "aggressors"? Of course not! England, perhaps, or one of our other allies who will be part and parcel of the "international coöperation" and the "international body"? In the first place, that is out of the question, for all our allies, thank God, belong to the category of peace-loving nations. In the second place, if they should fall into sin, and war against them should become necessary, then obviously the "international coöperation" for permanent peace is not only a failure, but this fact is realized in advance and provided for in the permanent maintenance of "adequate" armed force.

We grow a little wiser when we read Point 6 of Senator Austin's address: "Provision and maintenance of armed forces at home, united with corresponding forces in each of the United Nations, to maintain peace and order."

And we grow still wiser when we read Point 4 of Deneen Watson's program proposed for adoption by the Republican National Committee: "Preparation now for the problems of disease, civil disorder, famine and social security which might arise when the over-all fighting ceases."

Now our ideas of what the post-war armed force is needed for are sufficiently clarified. American imperialism will require a world-wide police force to maintain "order." To anyone who does not quite understand what this means, Mr. Watson's phrase should suffice: Armed forces will be needed by the United States after the war to deal with "civil disorder ... which will arise when the over-all fighting ceases."

Let us put it more simply: *The end of isolationism means a recognition that American imperialism must make a bid for world domination and that such a bid cannot even be attempted without the force necessary to suppress the class strug-*

gle, social revolutions and revolutionary struggles for national independence.

Can such a force be mustered? Will not the "isolationism," not of the old-line politicians, but of the masses of the American people, for whom the "doctrine" has always been a mixture of "keep out of Europe's affairs" and "down with war," become strong enough as soon as the war is over to make it at least extremely difficult for American imperialism to maintain a huge police force throughout the world for the preservation of counter-revolutionary "order"? In all likelihood, yes.

Even if such a force can be mustered and maintained after the war, is there enough ground to believe that its work will be successful, and thus realize the ambitions of American expansion? No, there is not. For this we have the testimony of our own eyes and intelligence, if they are only put to use. We have some supplementary testimony in the form of the remarks of one of the last of the "isolationists," Senator Wheeler, whose "isolationism," by the way, like Lindbergh's and that of most other authoritative reactionaries, never extended to Asia and the Pacific.

... As to a police force, it seems, while in theory perhaps perfectly legitimate, that the size of the police force necessary to police effectively, or the degree of sovereignty which each nation must surrender, would in practice probably be unacceptable to most of the great countries, or, if acceptable to them, would lead to burdening those charged with its operation with an ungrateful task, involving it in heavy responsibilities with the danger of international discord and the possibility of a breakdown of the system through defection by some of the most important countries. *Should that happen, the world might well have to face another period of serious political disturbance. Nor is it likely we could police the world any more effectively than Germany has policed Europe, or with any less disastrous results.* (New York Times, June 6. Our emphasis.)

In this statement is contained not only an involuntary admission of the bankruptcy of Wheeler's own "isolationism" as a means of obtaining world peace, but an equally involuntary admission that the abandonment of isolationism has come too late to do capitalism here any good.

It is worth while repeating:

It is not the day of American imperialism that is coming—it is the day of the people and their revolutionary victory.

Trotsky and the 'New Course'

On the Third Anniversary

On the anniversary of the assassination of Leon Trotsky, we reprint the concluding paragraphs of Max Shachtman's evaluation of Trotsky's earliest work against Soviet bureaucratism, *The New Course*, which is now ready for its first publication in English. Shachtman's essay, devoted to a critical historical analysis of Trotsky's work, makes up the second half of the book, the first part of which contains *The New Course* itself.

Our criticism of Trotsky's later theory of the "workers' state" introduces into it an indispensable correction. Far from "demolishing" Trotskyism, it eliminates from it a distorting element of contradiction and restores its essential inner harmony and continuity. The writer

considers himself a follower of Trotsky, as of Lenin before him, and of Marx and Engels in the earlier generation. Such has been the intellectual havoc wrought in the revolutionary movement by the manners and standards of Stalinism that "follower" has come to mean political serf, worshipper, or parrot. We have no desire to be this kind of "follower." Trotsky was not, and we learned much of what we know from him. In *The New Course* he wrote these jewelled words, which are worth repeating a hundred times:

If there is one thing likely to strike a mortal blow to the spiritual life of the party and to the doctrinal training of the youth, it is certainly the transformation of Leninism from a method demanding for its application initiative, critical thinking and ideological courage into a canon which demands nothing more than interpreters appointed for good and aye.

Leninism cannot be conceived of without theoretical breadth, without

a critical analysis of the material bases of the political process. The weapon of Marxian investigation must be constantly sharpened and applied. It is precisely in this that tradition consists, and not in the substitution of a formal reference or of an accidental quotation. Least of all can Leninism be reconciled with ideological superficiality and theoretical slovenliness.

Lenin cannot be chopped up into quotations suited for every possible case, because for Lenin the formula never stands higher than the reality; it is always the tool that makes it possible to grasp the reality and to dominate it. It would not be hard to find in Lenin dozens and hundreds of passages which, formally speaking, seem to be contradictory. But what must be seen is not the formal relationship of one passage to another, but the real relationship of each of them to the concrete reality in which the formula was introduced as a lever. The Leninist truth is always concrete! . . .

Leninism is orthodox, obdurate, irreducible, but it does not contain so much as a hint of formalism, canon, nor bureaucratism. In the struggle it takes the bull by the horns. To make out of the traditions of Leninism a supra-theoretical guarantee of the infallibility of all the words and thoughts of the interpreters of these traditions, is to scoff at genuine revolutionary tradition and transform it into official bureaucratism. It is ridiculous and pathetic to try to hypnotize a great revolutionary party by the repetition of the same formulæ, according to which the right line should be sought not in the essence of each question, not in the methods of posing and solving this question, but in information . . . of a biographical character.

There are "followers" who seem to think that the whole of Trotskyism (that is, the revolutionary Marxism of our time) is contained in the theory that Russia is still a workers' state and in the slogan of "unconditional defense of the Soviet Union." They merely prove that they have retired from a life of active and critical thought, and from the realities of life in general, and confine themselves to memorizing by heart two pages of an otherwise uncut and unread book. They would be the first to deny, by the way, that the whole of Leninism is contained in Lenin's theory of the "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" or in his strictures against Trotsky and the theory of the permanent revolution.

What Trotskyism Is

The whole of Trotsky, for the new generation of Marxists that must be trained up and organized, does not lie in his contradictory theory of the class character of Russia; it is not even a decisively important part of the whole. Trotskyism is all of Marx, Engels and Lenin that has withstood the test of time and struggle—and that is a good deal! Trotskyism is its leader's magnificent development and amplification of the theory of the permanent revolution. Trotskyism is the defense of the great and fundamental principles of the Russian Bolshevik revolution and the Communist International, which it brought into existence. Trotskyism is the principle of workers' democracy, of the struggle for democracy and socialism.

In this sense—and it is the only one worth talking about—*The New Course* is a Trotskyist classic. It was not only a weapon hitting at the very heart of decaying bureaucratism in revolutionary Russia. It was and is a guide for the struggle against the vices of bureaucratism throughout the labor and revolutionary movements.

Bureaucratism is not simply a direct product of certain economic privileges acquired by the officialdom of the labor movement. It is also an ideology, a concept of leadership and of its relationship to the masses, which is absorbed even by labor and revolutionary officialdoms who enjoy no economic privileges at all. It is an ideology that reeks of its bourgeois origin. Boiled down to its most vicious essence, it is the kind of thinking and living and leading which says to the rank and file, in the words Trotsky once used to describe the language

of Stalinism: "No thinking! Those at the top have more brains than you."

We see this ideology reflected in the every-day conduct of our own American trade union bureaucracy: "We will handle everything. Leave things to us. You stay where you are, and keep still." We see it reflected throughout the big social-democratic (to say nothing of the Stalinist) parties: "We will negotiate things. We will arrange everything. We will maneuver cleverly with the enemy, and get what you want without struggle. You sit still until further orders. That is all you are fit for." We even see it in those smaller revolutionary groups which are outside the reformist and Stalinist movements and which consider that this fact alone immunizes them from bureaucratism. We repeat, it is a bourgeois ideology through and through. It is part of the ideas that the bourgeoisie, through all its agencies for moulding the mind of the masses, seeks to have prevail: "Whatever criticism you may have to make of us, remember this: The masses are stupid. It is no accident that they are at the bottom of the social ladder. They are incapable of rising to the top. They need a ruler over them; they cannot rule themselves. For their own good, they must be kept where they are."

The New Course and the Party

The New Course does more than dismiss this odious ideology that fertilizes the mind of the labor bureaucracy. It analyzes its source and its nature. It diagnoses the evil to perfection. It indicates the operation needed to remove it, and the tools with which to perform the operation. It is the same tool needed by the proletariat for its emancipation everywhere. Its name is *the democratically organized and controlled, self-acting, dynamic, critical, revolutionary political party of the working class*.

The counter-revolution in Russia was made possible only because Stalinism blunted, then corroded, then smashed to bits this indispensable tool of the proletariat. The bureaucracy won. "If Trotsky had been right," says the official iconographer of Stalin, Henri Barbusse, "he would have won." How simple! What a flattering compliment to . . . Hitler. The bureaucracy not only won, but consolidated its power on a scale unknown in any country of the world throughout all history. Stalin himself is now the Pope-Czar of the Russian Empire.

But that is only how it seems on the surface; that is how it is only for a very short while, as history counts. "Any imbecile can rule with a state of siege," said Rochefort. Only the really powerful and confident can rule by establishing peaceful relations in the country. That, the new bureaucracy, without a past and without a future, cannot do. The combined efforts of world capitalism cannot do that nowadays, still less the efforts of the Stalinist nobility. The latter has succeeded in establishing "socialism" for itself and "in a single country." It will not live long to enjoy it. Together with all modern rulers, it is doomed to perish in the unrelenting world crisis that it cannot solve, or to perish at the hands of an avenging socialist proletariat. T

Cromwell's Roundheads marched with Bibles in their hands. The militant proletariat needs no divine revelations or scriptural injunctions, no Bibles or saviors. But it will march to victory only if its conscious vanguard has assimilated the rich and now-more-timely-than-ever lessons to be learned from the classic work of the organizer of the first great proletarian revolution.

MAX SHACHTMAN.

The European Revolution Has Begun

Problems of the Italian Revolt

In 1920, Lenin defined the "fundamental law of revolution" in a way that events since then have further confirmed: "It is not sufficient for revolution that the exploited and oppressed masses understand the impossibility of living in the old way and demand changes; for revolution it is necessary that the exploiters should not be able to live and rule in the old way."

Such a situation has developed in Italy. The masses refused to live any longer in the old way and demanded changes. The old way meant: fascism and the war, whose ruinousness and futility became increasingly apparent. That is what it meant for all classes in Italy. The masses reacted by such a lowering of "morale" that the armies of Italy became the butt of international joking. The question, "What are we fighting for?" became, "Why should we continue to fight?" The question, "Why should we continue to fight?" grew into the conclusion: "Let us fight against those who are forcing us to continue to fight." The pattern of Russia in 1917, and Austria-Hungary and Germany a year later, began to unfold in Italy. The ruling class was thereupon also compelled to react against the "old way." To prevent the masses from putting a real end to fascism and the war, it began to put an "end" to fascism in its own way and sought to get out of the war on its own terms.

The first act of the revolution was the refusal of the soldiers to fight, or at least to fight with enthusiasm and conviction. The second act was the rising mood of rebelliousness of the people at home. Totalitarian censorship prevents all the details from coming out of Italy; what does come out passes through a second sieve-screening, Allied censorship. But what is acknowledged as fact on all sides, plus those deductions that are unmistakably indicated, make at least the outline of the events clear enough.

The fascist régime found it necessary to permit (if not to organize!) a national pilgrimage of workers to Rome, so that they could be lectured by the Pope on the futility and sinfulness of revolution. The class struggle, alas, does not operate in as strict accordance with Scripture as Christ's vicar on earth would like to have it. The restlessness and discontentment of the people only mounted, even after the papal admonitions. The bourgeoisie was faced with the choice of a revolution that would overrun everything, including all the foundations of its rule, or a revolution-from-above, quiet, orderly, mildly sacrificial, formal, unupsetting. It chose the latter, of course.

Faced with a revolutionary people, the Russian bourgeoisie and even the Czarist bureaucracy, did not hesitate to sacrifice the Romanov dynasty so that they themselves would not be sacrificed. In Germany, in 1918, not even the Junkers de-

bated long in similar circumstances, and the head of the House of Hohenzollern was sent packing to Holland. In Italy, twenty-five years later, the founder and head of fascism was lopped off in order that more precious heads might remain on their shoulders. The removal of Mussolini was not enough to satisfy the masses. Even the bourgeoisie, its King and its military caste, realized this. Along with Mussolini went the more notorious representatives of the fascist régime; the lesser luminaries hastened to explain that they had never really been fascists, that they had worked for the old régime either under compulsion or as clever internal sappers.

Fascism proved to be so utterly discredited in the eyes of the people that the ruling class did not dare replace one Mussolini with another. It had to seek someone who, while entirely trustworthy, was not completely identified with the fascist government. Desperate search disclosed Badoglio, upon whose head were found two or three hairs not entirely tarred with the fascist brush. By happy coincidence, he was also a qualified representative of the only reactionary power of any consequence left in the country, the officers' corps, and a devoted servant of the King, who must, under no circumstances, be called moronic.

The mere fact that the bourgeoisie, by discarding Mussolini & Co., openly recognized the existence of an explosive situation, and its inability to deal with it "in the old way," was sufficient to open the door wide, or at least wider, to direct action by the people. The ruling class was reluctantly content to change face, in order at once to appease the masses and to make possible peace negotiations in which the Allies would not lose face. The working class wanted more, much more.

Here again not all the facts are known in detail, but we know enough. The masses, *after twenty-two years of suppression and indoctrination by totalitarian fascism*, came out into the streets were given the treatment they deserved, and some of the North, the workers went out on strike. Buildings of the fascists were stormed and the arrogant heroes-of-yesterday offered scarcely any resistance. Prominent Blackshirts found on the streets were given the treatment they deserved, and some were killed. The banners and emblems of fascism were torn down; the pictures of Il Duce were defaced and his ubiquitous name obliterated from every wall. The most vicious fascist journals were discreetly suppressed by Badoglio; others simply stopped publication, especially in view of the urgent need felt by the editors to retire to obscure holes; still others proclaimed that they had never supported the old régime out of real conviction. The fascist régime simply disappeared in a complete rout.

Fascism Is Not Invincible--The Working Class Is Irrepressible

The crucial test of the power and durability of fascism will come in Germany. But what has already happened in the birthplace of fascism gives broad hints about the future. Italy is only a small-scale rehearsal for Germany. So it was with the birth of fascism and so it will be with its death.

Fascism came into power without great difficulties. In Germany it met with no resistance from the working class, in Italy with very little. After taking power, fascism proceeded to accomplish its principal task, the extirpation of the labor movement and the reduction of the working class to a semi-

serf condition. In this too it encountered little or no resistance. It wiped out the opposition of bourgeois liberalism and even of the church. It introduced a new political system into modern society, totalitarianism, by which a despotic minority openly monopolized all political power and rights and "co-ordinated" under its control all of economic, political, cultural, scientific, religious and military life.

After more than twenty years of this in Italy, and ten in Germany, fascism seemed to have consolidated itself to the point of invincibility. His conquest marked a new historical epoch in the mind of Mussolini and the calendar was altered to make 1921 read the Year I of Fascism. Hitler spoke of the thousand years of the rule.

Who was not impressed, especially when the years of consolidation accumulated? Bourgeois admirers of fascism grew in number not only in Italy and Germany, but throughout the world. Books of praise and adulation were written by the score. Fascism was labelled "the wave of the future" not only by hopeful reactionaries and would-be imitators, but also by desperate, hopeless and disintegrated radicals. In the fascist countries, many social democrats, Stalinists, syndicalists and anarchists made their peace with the régime; some even became ardent advocates. In the democratic countries they all concluded—all but the revolutionary Marxists—that the working class under fascism is hopelessly exhausted and incapable of rising to its feet again, that a revolution is practically impossible under fascist totalitarianism, that the only hope of overturning Hitler and Mussolini is by supporting the armies of imperialist democracy.

The revolution in Italy marks the beginning of the end of all these theories of hope (in the camp of reaction) and of despair (in the camp of labor). From this standpoint alone, the Italian events are of exceptional importance, both historically and in terms of the present international class struggle. There cannot be any question about the effects: Everywhere the champions of fascism will sing more softly; everywhere the working class will gain courage and above all regain self-confidence.

How can fascism, or any other despotic, totalitarian régime, be overthrown? How can the masses get the opportunity to rise against it when it has *all* the power so firmly in its hands? The answer was really given in Czarist Russia of 1917; it is given again today in Italy.

Fascism does not signify the solution of social problems, but their repression by the most violent and concentrated force. It does not end the crisis of capitalism; it only succeeds in postponing it and, as a result, in making the ultimate explosion ten times more shattering. The very fact that it is obliged to maintain the régime of totalitarianism, that is, of all-over suppression of the masses, reveals it as a régime of crisis in permanence.

Even under these conditions, to be sure, the permanent crisis rises and falls in intensity. When it reaches a particularly sharp point, the question always arises in the dominant circles: Shall we proceed this way or that? "This way" usually means by tightening the screws on the masses; "that way" usually means by loosening the screws, that is, by seeking to appease the masses somewhat, to give them some concessions in order that they shall not take greater ones by their own efforts. There never was a régime that could forever avoid facing these choices. There never was a régime that could always make its choice with unbroken harmony in its ranks.

Uncertainty, that is, disagreement, in the highest spheres

is inevitably communicated to the lower ranks of the hierarchy. The latter is affected at the same time by the restlessness of the lowest depths—the masses. Between the two elements of the crisis—uncertainty at the top, discontent at the bottom—the chains of rule are loosened. Friction at the top opens up gaps in the previously solid and harmonious despotism, with the "hard" on one side and the "soft" on the other. As the gaps widen, the long-quiescent but never fully reconciled (because never reconcilable) masses begin to pierce into the open and to make their presence and strength felt.

The armed forces, civil or military, in which the régime always finds its firmest support, also begin to vacillate. They no longer know for sure how hard to bring the police club down upon the heads of the people, how quickly to pull the trigger on rifle and machine gun. Their uncertainty emboldens the masses; the boldness of the masses increases their uncertainty. Given a sharp crisis, this trend unfolds inexorably. When it has unfolded to a certain point, it is revolution that has broken out!

No régime of class oppression, regardless of how centralized, monopolistic, brutal, totalitarian and powerful it is, or seems to be, can escape being ground down between the gears of disintegration and revolution described above. In our epoch of social fever and convulsion, no régime can escape it for long. Czarism experienced it twice in twelve years, the second time for good. Italian fascism escaped three years after it took power (in the Matteotti crisis of 1924) but succumbed nineteen years later. Twelve years, twenty-two years, these are after all only a day in history.

The invincibility of fascism is a myth. The irrepressibility of the working class is not. Of all the miracles fascism can accomplish, one is beyond its powers: the abolition of the working class. Unable to accomplish this miracle, its doom is sealed. The condition of the existence of the working class is the struggle against the conditions of its existence. It must struggle, or go under. While other classes can go under without social life disappearing, the working class cannot. Its existence is a perpetual reminder to fascism, and all other reactionary class rule, that the day of the people will come.

Twenty-two years in history is not much. Twenty-two years in the life of a generation is a good deal. Is it not remarkable, then, that after so long a period of totalitarian rule, the working class of Italy could still summon up enough energy, will, determination and self-confidence to come forward in hundreds of thousands, defy the régime and accomplish its overturn? This is a working class that has gone through the terror of fascism; its leaders murdered, imprisoned and exiled by the tens of thousands; its organizations and institutions wiped out with fascist thoroughness. It is a working class that has not had the advantages of even bourgeois democracy for two decades. It has been subjected exclusively to the indoctrination of fascist ideology. It is a working class that has been largely renewed by the simple passage of time. And yet it appears on the scene again, strong enough to win the first battle against a long-entrenched fascist régime and . . . against all skeptics! The working class has proved again that its stamina is inexhaustible, that its power of recuperation from the most formidable defeats is great—in any case, adequate to its task. May all skeptics, doubters, tired and retired radicals take note. Keep your peace, gentlemen, and leave us to our work.

The working class is irrepressible, and fascism is neither invincible nor inevitable nor "the wave of the future."

The Italian Working Class and Parties

When the first demonstrations of workers broke out in the industrial North, Italy heard again the cry that had echoed throughout the land twenty-five years before: *Soviets!*

That is what some newspaper reports said, and it would not be surprising to learn that it was true. Under fascism and, in general, in a war economy, the army takes up all available manpower, and the working class in the factories is composed of the very young, the women, and the older workers. Among the latter, there must be many who remember the revolutionary period following the First World War. Their recollections are of a Lenin and Trotsky whose names were inscribed on the walls of every town and village of Italy in 1918 and 1919, and of the Lenin and Trotsky who were what they really were and stood for what they really stood for—not the terrible caricatures into which they have been redrawn by latter-day Stalinism. These recollections therefore embody revolutionary traditions that have not died out and have undoubtedly been transmitted to some extent to the new generation of workers. This is encouraging for the future.

But it would be gravely misleading to exaggerate this factor. By and large, the Italian working class is new, and not only in age. It is new also to the programs and struggles of the various working-class parties, about which it has only the faintest and probably the most distorted ideas, if it has any ideas about them at all. For the past two decades there has been no serious possibility, on a wide scale, of maintaining the continuity of the working class and revolutionary movements, and consequently the continuity of tradition, ideology, program and organization.

The working class never really accepted the ideology of fascism, but fascism has left its traces and scars. Even now, the working class must still pay heavily for the wreckage strewn by the Blackshirts before they were thrown out of power. To think that the Italian working class can or will simply pick up, over night, where it left off when Mussolini took power, is not even worthy of an infant's intellect.

What can really assure the Italian people against return of fascism, or of a régime that is about as bad? Only the state power of the socialist proletariat. Failing that, it little matters what replaces fascism, for it will surely be followed by a fascist or more or less fascist régime after an interlude. No capitalist régime nowadays can solve the crisis of capitalism, but only a fascist régime can succeed, at least for a time, in repressing it. If, however, the spontaneous, unorganized, uncentralized rising of the masses was sufficient to overturn fascism, it does not suffice for a socialist revolution in which the working class can take and hold state power.

The spontaneous efforts of the masses were enough to overturn the Czar and the Kaiser. To take power in their own socialist name, the working class required a trained, organized, tested revolutionary leadership, the Bolshevik Party. It was there in Russia, and the working class won. It was not there in Germany, and the counter-revolution won. It was not there in Hungary, in 1919, and the most the working class could do was to hold power for a few weeks, and even then only because of a most exceptional domestic and European situation. Such a party does not yet exist in Italy.

The great tragedy of world politics is not fascism nor even the World War. These are due in turn only to the tragedy of

the revolutionary party, to its absence at every crucial moment in the past twenty-five years and more, except in the Russian crisis of November, 1917. All of us, and now the Italian proletariat, are paying a most dreadful price for the crimes of the Second International and of Stalinism.

"Without the party, independently of the party, skipping over the party, through a substitute for the party, the proletarian revolution can never triumph," Trotsky wrote in 1924. "That is the principal lesson of the last decade." We can now say it is the principal lesson of the last two decades, and the lesson of the recent Italian events.

So long, however, as the working class exists, the basis exists for the formation or re-formation of the revolutionary vanguard party. In Italy, besides, there are undoubtedly already at hand the individuals and the groups, tiny and isolated as yet, that will compose it. In the heat of the struggle, the new instrument may be forged quickly. But only on the condition that it learns the important lessons of political experience of the last quarter of a century.

The party that must be reconstituted in Italy (and elsewhere) can under no circumstances substitute will or wish for reality. In our analysis, we do not want to do this, either. Artificial enthusiasm, self-agitation, self-deception, exaggeration—these are only the ingredients for a mess of disillusionment and despair. Critical objectivity spurns the former and thus averts the latter.

From the standpoint of political organization, the situation in Italy is not the most favorable that could be imagined. The present Italian working class, for the most part, has no experience with working class political organization and program. Fascism, in this respect, did its work pretty well.

The old Communist Party of the pre-fascist days was unquestionably a revolutionary organization of the highest type ever known in Italy. But it was incapacitated, at bottom, by what Lenin described as the "infantile malady of communism," ultra-leftism. It left a heritage of revolutionary militancy and adherence to principle; but also, alas, of rigidity, dogmatism and sectarian narrowness. How strong either or both these heritages are among the older workers of Italy is, of course, hard to tell.

The present-day "Communist" Party, Stalinism, is in every respect inferior, if the two may even be mentioned in the same breath. At the moment, it is composed only of a handful of bureaucratic time-servers of the Kremlin, people without conscience, principle, scruple or an ounce of revolutionary conviction and purpose. Until they are able to realize their ambition of establishing a bureaucratic paradise for themselves in their own native land, they are content to do the bidding of their fascist-minded bosses in Moscow, even if that means collaboration with the fascists and quasi-fascists of Italy or even the Anglo-American "liberators" of the country. They are dead and putrefying souls.

But in politics, as we have had occasion to learn, even corpses can walk again for a while. In Spain, for example, the revolutionists did not measure up to their tasks; they did not organize and act like Bolsheviks; and as a result, the corpse of Stalinism not only rose and walked again, but left confusion and desolation in its wake. Under similar circumstances, the same thing may happen in Italy. That Stalinism

will experience another "resurrection" in Italy is by no means certain. That it *may*, is undebatable. For how long, cannot be ascertained. This is definite: every inch that Stalinism gains in Italy is a day off the life of the working class and the socialist revolution.

The same is true of the miserable clique that calls itself the Socialist Party of Italy. The old Socialist Party never had very much in common with revolutionary Marxism. But what bears its name today doesn't even have much in common with the old party. It was once a power that could have taken power. It didn't. It was terrified in 1920 when it saw the workers seize the factories and mount machine guns on their walls, and the peasants seize the land. The revolution was getting too hot for the reformist bureaucracy, and it combined with the bourgeois democrats to restore "order." The idea that the utterly powerless and politically decayed remnants of the Social-Democracy will now lead a struggle for socialism belongs among those few jokes that make life a little more bearable. They do not even have the great reputation of having opposed the imperialist war which they had before fas-

cism won. Now they come back to Italy on the gun-carriages of foreign imperialism and waving its flag.

As for the bourgeois democrats abroad, including the best of them, like Salvemini and Borghese, who are honest and incorruptible adversaries of fascism according to their lights, they remain, after all, bourgeois democrats and imperialists. If they are revolutionary leaders, Garibaldi and Lenin were hermits.

But if all these groups and parties and individuals have no capacity or desire to lead a struggle for freedom in Italy, their capacity for stultifying the Italian revolution may prove to be considerable and, for a time, effective. At present, all of them put together do not constitute a very imposing force. That holds for outside of Italy. Inside Italy, they are inconsequential. But, given a favorable turn of military events, they can easily find a basis for growth and influence among the masses. It is a danger that dare not be ignored. On the contrary, it must be taken amply and deliberately into account, for it is a problem that faces the coming revolution throughout Europe.

Democracy and Socialism in the Revolution

What do the Italian masses want? The answer requires no great political perspicacity or inside information. They want an end to fascism and an end to the war. Whether the reports of the demonstrations in Italy are exaggerated or understated, the yearnings of the masses are unambiguously expressed in these two inseparably connected demands.

These demands, especially the first, cannot be realized without elections, which presuppose the right to vote, of which the masses were deprived by fascism. Without this simple democratic right, the people may exhaust themselves in a routine of declining demonstrations, instead of developing their movement to a struggle for power. With this right, the people can express themselves in an organized manner, with increasing preciseness. With it, they can compel all the old and the new political parties and personalities to subject themselves to organized popular scrutiny and to organized popular acceptance or rejection. With it, they can reassemble their organizations, work out their programs, regain political consciousness, sharpen it in debate and struggle. The proletariat, above all, can once more acquire confidence and assert itself politically as a class.

It is worth noting: Immediately upon the establishment of the Anglo-American government in Sicily, the new authorities banned all "political activity," that is, political organization and popular election. Among the first demands made by the demonstrating workers in Northern Italy, however, was the cry for "Elections!" The power of this demand was felt by Badoglio. He was compelled to announce to the people that a few months after the war is over (which war? in Italy? all over the world?), the government would "grant" elections—but not before. Both Amgot and Badoglio know what they are doing, and in doing it they reveal what they are.

In these circumstances, the demand for the right to vote is a revolutionary demand, and so is the struggle to attain it. That Badoglio and the King who is not moronic should deny the people the right to vote is quite understandable; the democratic verdict of the masses is not very alluring to them. That the right should be denied in the territory "liberated" by the

forces of occupation is an outrage, the hypocritical reasons given for the denial are an insult, and the precedent it sets for other "liberated" territories (in fact, the precedent was set before this in North Africa, and long before that in most colonies of imperialism!) is revealingly sinister.

In any case, when Badoglio promises the right to vote in the hazy future, the cry "We want it here and now!" is not only clearly indicated for the people but is revolutionary in all its implications. There can be no question about how extensive and militant a mass movement could be aroused and directed against the ruling régime, and all other reactionary and imperialist forces, on the basis of this demand.

This demand, in turn, is directly related to all the other fundamental democratic rights. Right to vote? But for whom? For what? Vote in a meaningless Bonapartist plebiscite, or in free, organized elections? The right to vote has no meaning whatsoever for the people unless they have at the same time the right to organize political parties, and put forward political programs, of their own. Political parties, in turn, are mere labels or the sheerest bureaucratic cliques unless they have the right to political existence. Political existence is inconceivable without the right of agitation and recruitment, by printed word and word of mouth. That is, the right to vote means nothing without the right to organize, just as the right to organize means nothing without the right of free speech, free assembly and free press.

If the working class, prime motor force of the revolution, is to be reconstituted as a class for itself, is to reestablish itself as an independent force on the trade union and the political fields of Italy, these democratic demands must be in the forefront of its program, of its fight for peace and against fascism, dictatorship and imperialist rule, native or foreign. If the revolutionists of Italy are to reconstitute a vanguard Bolshevik Party, begin the recruitment to its banner of the best fighters, and organize seriously the struggle for socialist power, it must appear before the masses as the most vigorous, irreconcilable and consistent champion of these democratic demands. Otherwise, what Lenin once characterized as a mal-

ady of infantilism would have to be described now—after twenty-five years of experience being added to the teachings of scientific Marxism—as a malady of senility.

The right to vote, to organize and all that these imply, would compel, as said, all parties and groups to submit themselves and their programs to popular scrutiny, challenge, debate and decision. The bourgeois demagogues and their social-democratic and Stalinist nephews, as well as the bureaucrats and irresponsible political freelances, would have little to gain by this. The people as a whole, and the revolutionists in particular, would gain everything.

It is of course not guaranteed that the right to vote would be speedily granted or even that it can be won without the proletariat taking power. Meanwhile, however, the direct struggle for socialist power is a distance off; the struggle for elementary democratic rights is on the order of the day. Correct revolutionary strategy and tactics would make it possible to slide over from the one to the other.

In connection with the struggle for the right to vote arises the question: vote for what? There is no Parliament in Italy, to say nothing of a Soviet Congress. As this is being written, the movement in Italy is apparently in a waiting stage, due mainly to the peculiarities of the military situation. But it can easily and speedily burst into action again, more explosive and widespread than it was at the outset. The demand for democratic rights will rise more acutely and imperiously the higher the movement rises, and at one stage or another must bring with it a demand for popular representative government.

Which? We know of two: bourgeois democracy, Parliament, Congress, and proletarian democracy, a Soviet government, which is a thousand times more democratic. It is impossible—more accurately, it would be wrong—to state dogmatically the exact contours of the road the struggle will take. It is quite possible, however, and even probable, that the struggle will first take the form of a demand for a national, popularly-elected, plenipotentiary Parliament, a variety of a Constituent Assembly.

The attitude of the revolutionists toward such a demand would obviously depend upon the circumstances under which it arose and the relationship of class forces. Certainly, they cannot rule out in advance support to such a demand. In fact, it is quite possible that revolutionists may encounter a situation in which they would champion such a demand. But precisely (and if) this would be necessary, even greater emphasis would have to be laid upon the need of maintaining the complete organizational and political independence of the working class and its vanguard, of driving deeper the wedge between them on the one side, and the bourgeoisie and its parties on the other.

Support, under certain conditions, of a movement to reconstitute a democratic Parliament (and, of course, participation in it if it is established) in no way contradicts the struggle for a workers' Italy, a socialist revolution, the Soviet power. There is a revolutionary situation in Italy today. The work of forming Soviets in the factories, in the cities, in the villages, begins now, because it is possible, necessary, and the surest guarantee of ultimate victory. The Russian Bolsheviks, however, showed that the struggle for the Soviet power, far from being contradicted by the demand for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly which they directed against Kerensky and his reformist props, was facilitated by this demand. The Bourgeoisie and the Mensheviks and S-Rs refused to call

the Constituent Assembly together, sabotaged it. It was finally convened by the Soviets, after they had taken power under Bolshevik leadership. Once convened, it proved to be superfluous and even a hindrance to the democratic Soviet power. The struggle for it, however, was anything but superfluous.

In the Chinese revolution, Stalinism discovered a contradiction between the struggle for political democracy, or a Constituent Assembly, and the struggle to form Soviets and to achieve Soviet power. In its right-wing phase, it declared that the Constituent Assembly excluded the fight for Soviets and Soviet power. In its ultra-leftist phase, it declared that the fight for Soviets excluded the fight for a Constituent Assembly. Trotsky shrugged his shoulders, and painstakingly set forth, once, twice and twenty times, the ABC of revolutionary Marxism on the question. Petty-bourgeois liberalism and ultra-leftism join in considering that the struggle for democracy excludes the struggle for socialist power and socialism and vice versa. Marxism unites the struggle for the two in a revolutionary manner. By revolutionary manner is meant not the "abolition" of the former for the sake of the latter, but only its subordination.

There is, of course, no law of God or man that compels the revolution in Italy to pattern itself upon the revolutions in Russia and China down to the last detail. But that the Italian masses will not avoid the struggle for democratic demands on a decisive scale seems to be, at least to the writer, a foregone conclusion. What is most important of all, however, is that the isolated and unorganized revolutionists in Italy should understand what is going on and base themselves on the realities of the class struggle. The realization of the democratic demands of the people is by no means guaranteed without a socialist victory in a Soviet Italy; indeed, without such a victory, they could at best be realized in a pretty puny, restricted and distorted form. But it is not less true that the socialist victory in Italy depends in large measure upon the revolutionists understanding that they must be the most active inspirers and champions of democratic rights for the people.

It is hardly necessary to add that any such struggle would degenerate into reformism and futility unless it were coupled with a direct economic struggle against the bourgeoisie and the big landowners. Land to the peasants, confiscation of the big estates and the latifundia, nationalization of the soil—these slogans would be no less popular and revolutionary in Italy than they were many years ago in Russia. Expropriate the war criminals, the properties of the fascists, the factories of the monopolists; workers' control of industry; democratic control of food distribution and housing—these slogans, notwithstanding the differences between the two countries and the two situations, are as valid and urgent in Italy today as in Russia of 1917. Let the bourgeois liberals, reformists and Stalinists declaim as loudly and demagogically as they can about democracy and freedom. In such demands as are set forth above, the revolutionists will distinguish themselves from all the bourgeois politicians and patchers of capitalism, to the disadvantage of the latter, and help switch the revolution to socialist rails.

The Italian revolution can triumph and leave no room for a relapse into reaction—semi-fascist, fascist, or even worse—only as a socialist revolution, that is, only by the workers taking power with the support of the peasantry and other lower classes, and proceeding to the democratic socialization of economy. To say that it can succeed only as a socialist revolution is like saying that it can succeed only as an interna-

Italy and The European Revolution

tional revolution. Concretely and first of all, this means a revolution on a European scale, a Socialist United States of Europe.

The Italian revolution has only begun. It marks the beginning of the European revolution. But only the beginning. On all sides, it is surrounded by difficulties. Badoglio is not important. He can only last a minute, so to speak. But Hitler and his armies are important; so is Anglo-American imperialism. The former occupies the industrial and revolutionary North; the other occupies Sicily and will occupy the South tomorrow. The comparatively small and long-tormented Italian proletariat has already shown heroic and promising qualities. It cannot accomplish miracles, including the miracle of driving the forces of foreign imperialism out of its land and crushing reaction at home, all by itself. These are forces that give it much to worry about.

But the revolution that has begun also gives these forces a lot to worry about! If Hitler sends divisions across the Brenner Pass it is not only to protect Germany from the Allied armies, but to protect her from the incendiary sparks of the Italian revolution. The Allies are not one whit less concerned over the prospect of revolution, in which they have more "faith" than all the soul-stricken intellectuals and tired radicals of the world put together. Amgot has already been referred to. Anglo-American imperialism thinks it can improve on King Canute. It will stop the wave of revolution by sprinkling it with a few crumbs from Herbert Lehman's breadbasket, by exorcisms straight from the Vatican itself, by deals with Canutes named Darlan and Otto and Giraud and even Badoglio (if not this one, then another), and above all by prohibitions of all political activity by the "liberated" people such as are decreed, with such religious observance of democratic principles in general and the principles of the Atlantic Charter in particular, by Amgot in Sicily.

Modern science, especially military science, is more advanced than it was in Canute's time, and Anglo-American imperialism may have more success than he did, and for a longer time. But where does it expect to get and maintain the forces required to hold back the revolutionary wave in Italy for long? Mussolini and his régime looked powerful for a long time, too, but not powerful enough. And now it is not only Italy that must be dealt with. The revolution lies right beneath the surface of all Europe, and has already broken through to the top in some places. Yesterday, Italy; tomorrow, other countries.

The English and American people are more or less reconciled, let us say, to their sons being in Europe now, during the war, on the ground that totalitarianism, fascist tyranny and horror and its war-mongering, must be brought to an end. But do not the ruling classes realize that they could never weather the storm of protest that would arise in both countries at the idea of maintaining the armed forces in Europe for the purpose of policing it against a revolutionary people?

Surely the Prime Minister has not forgotten the ill-fated experiment of the English Minister of War, also named Churchill, who tried to suppress the Russian Revolution twenty-odd years ago. Surely the President has not forgotten what happened to the simultaneous and similar experiment of his former chief, President Wilson, in revolutionary Russia. A reading of General Graves' account of the American expedition in Siberia might not be very refreshing, but it would be educational.

The war wears on, and revolutionary moods are rising among the people. When they rise, as they did in Italy, they will find increasing elbow room. The imperialists will find that they have miscalculated. Italy is a harbinger. Tomorrow there will be more and better signs.

M. S.

The UAW-CIO Through the War

On the Eve of the Buffalo Convention

The United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO), approaching its eighth annual convention, scheduled to convene in Buffalo on September 29, is able to boast that it is the largest union in the nation and even in the world, with a membership of about a million, not including some 200,000 in the armed forces (*New Republic*, August 2). Nor does it yield to any other union in the militancy and political awareness of its members and in its internal democracy.

The Spectacular Growth of the UAW

At its South Bend convention in 1936, soon after which it was to break with the AFL and join the new CIO movement, there were perhaps 30,000 members. For every member then, there are more than thirty now. Here is a success story which has already been told in print by a number of writers, but which deserves to be brought up to date and pon-

dered. For, in spite of the brilliant statistical record, the UAW, along with the other American unions, is in a period of deep crisis. Except for the United Mine Workers, no other labor organization has in recent months attracted so much attention from the press. We need only to consult the *New York Times Index* of April, for example, to find the following: Ford Chicago plant stoppage to protest transfer of two guards; Ford Rouge plant stoppage over wage dispute; Ford Highland Park stoppage over discipline against gambling on company property; strikes and picketing at Bendix plants in New Jersey; end of one-day strike at Thompson Products in Cleveland; strike at Toledo-Spicer also causes idleness at Willys-Overland; Chrysler tank arsenal workers stage eight-hour strike because of suspension of one worker for smoking; another strike at Ford Rouge plant ends. Naturally, we cannot take a list so compiled as complete, nor are the causes given usually the real causes for the strikes.

At the same time, the top UAW officials have probably issued more public statements, formulated more programs of an elaborate nature, called more regional and other types of conferences, and visited the President of the United States more often than any other union leadership in history in a comparable period of time.

President R. J. Thomas in January stated that the labor situation in Detroit was "volcanic" and said that he was "terribly afraid of repercussions among the rank and file." Committed to placing the "war effort" and the orders of "our Commander-in-Chief" above the needs of the union members, he and other union officers have found the going very rough. Yet it must be said that they have striven to the utmost and, so far, with too much success.

Because of the limits of space, we shall have to confine our story to the war period, giving only a few preliminary words to earlier history. The story up to 1938 is told very well in the book, *Labor on the March*, by Edward Levinson, at present the editor of the UAW's semi-monthly paper, *United Automobile Worker*. By reading Levinson's and other labor histories or the newspapers of the years in question, anyone can confirm for himself the following facts:

In the early years of the New Deal, auto workers were clamoring for organization but were constantly discouraged not only by the AFL bureaucracy, which feared strike actions as much as it loved craft-union divisions, but also by the NRA bureaucracy and by President Roosevelt himself, who on many occasions personally intervened to check the development of strikes and even of genuine collective bargaining. The myths are different; these are the facts, well known to the leaders of the UAW. The auto workers were the first to nickname the NRA the National-Run-Around, but others, the steel and textile workers especially, were soon able to confirm the appropriateness of the new name.

The CIO movement freed the auto workers of craft disputes and also released their militancy. Everyone of their really great victories was won by reliance on their own strength and unity and by use of the strike weapon. The amazing sitdown strike against General Motors in Flint at the end of 1936 and in January and February of 1937 lasted for forty-four days, rallied 140,000 of the 150,000 GM workers the nation over to its support, defied police and National Guard and a \$15,000,000 injunction, and finally resulted in one of the truly great labor victories of American history—a victory which made possible countless others. Chrysler fell soon after and finally, in 1941, Ford. Both were conquered by strike action.

We shall conclude this part of our story by quoting in part a message sent to Governor Murphy of Michigan by sit-downers in Fisher No. 1 plant at Flint, where they were expecting that the \$15,000,000 injunction would soon be enforced against them. It typifies the spirit and shows the source of strength of the UAW in the pre-war period.

We have carried on a stay-in strike over a month in order to make General Motors Corporation obey the law and engage in collective bargaining. . . . Unarmed as we are, the introduction of militia, sheriffs, or police with murderous weapons will mean a blood-bath of unarmed workers. . . . We have no illusions about the sacrifices which this decision will entail. We fully expect that if a violent effort to oust us is made many of us will be killed, and we take this means of making it known to our wives, our children, to the people of the state of Michigan and the country that, if this result follows from the attempt to eject us, you are the one who must be held responsible for our deaths.

The Organizing of Aircraft

By 1941 the union had virtually completed its organization of the automobile industry, but the defense program, as it was then called, was already making the unionization of aircraft plants imperative. In this almost totally open-shop industry wages were, on the average, about twenty-five per cent lower per hour than in the auto plants. Even before the Ford victory, a strike at Vultee at the end of 1940 gave promise that the union would conquer the new field as thoroughly as the old. A Labor Board victory in July, 1940, was won, but the company remained unwilling to pay more than fifty cents an hour as a minimum wage. As in the case of its other great advances, the union was forced to strike. Taking advantage of the "defense" situation, the Roosevelt Administration showed its true colors more openly than for some time. The extremely liberal New Dealer, Attorney General Robert Jackson, since promoted to the Supreme Court, denounced the strike as a communist affair. As boss of the not so liberal FBI, he was in a position to know. But, as was pointed out at the time, the workers had voted fifty to one in favor of striking, an attitude hardly surprising inasmuch as those on the minimum rate were earning a magnificent \$20 per week. Decided gains in wages and conditions were made.

By the following June (1941), although the United States was not yet formally in the war, the union leadership had definitely joined the Administration in a wartime program of breaking strikes. The present period of retreats, which has produced an ever-greater cleavage between the leaders and the workers, had begun. There was but one difference from today's situation: Hitler had not yet invaded the USSR, and the Stalinists were still avid for strikes. Already at the preceding convention in 1940, despite their aid in the oust-Homer Martin campaign of 1938-39, they had been given notice by the main body of the leadership, in the form of a resolution condemning dictatorships, *including Russia's*, that they were on probation.

The whole leadership was still verbally anti-war in 1940, even to the extent of denouncing conscription "at present." President Thomas and the others were saying that the main problem was democracy at home and predicting its eclipse, if the United States got into war—a prophecy which, however much its truth is confirmed by the course of events, they do not now choose to recall. They secured a third-term endorsement for Roosevelt with only forty votes in opposition. But even in doing this they appealed to the genuinely anti-war sentiments of the workers, pointing out that the President had definitely promised that he would not send American boys to foreign soil.

The first great test, which showed how fraudulent was their concern for democracy and how genuine their attachment to Roosevelt and the war machine, was the North American Aviation strike. Granted that there was a Stalinist leadership in the situation and that strikes were then to them a means of furthering the Stalin-Hitler entente, still the *United Auto Worker* itself of mid-July, 1941, carries a time-table which both shows how justified the workers must have felt in taking strike action and furnishes a typical example of the stalling tactics of the corporations and the Roosevelt Administration—tactics which have only become more provocative since Pearl Harbor. Here is the time-table: October 24, 1940, the union asks for an NLRB election; February 20, 1941, an election is held, with no clear majority for any union; March 13, run-off election, the CIO defeating the AFL by a very

lose vote; then until April 14 the NLRB delays certification, taking advantage of the close result; May 23, the workers vote for strike action after the company for a month refuses to make any concessions; May 28, the now defunct National Defense Mediation Board begins to work on the case but provokes workers further by taking an adjournment for a long Decoration Day week-end; June 5, "wildcat" strike is called.

At this point Richard Frankenstein was sent in by the International Executive Board and, failing to get the Pacific Coast leaders to call the strike off, in a radio speech and otherwise openly charged the Communist Party with provoking the strike, renounced any UAW or CIO responsibility, and urged the workers to return to work. Although UAW and CIO officials deplored and condemned the precedent set by the use of troops, they themselves had made it much easier, by their public statements terming it a communist and outlaw strike, for Roosevelt to resort to the military. In fact, by warning the workers that the government would act, they had practically invited Roosevelt to do so. On June 9 the soldiers took over and only then, having resisted the propaganda of both Frankenstein and the press, did the strikers return.

As the *New Republic* said at the time: "The government bullied the workers, even threatening them with induction, and ignored the sins of the company." In July, after NDMB intervention, the company signed a contract providing for a general raise, a sixty-cent starting rate and a seventy-five-cent minimum after three months, maintenance of membership, and other concessions. Frankenstein, of course, boasted that his peaceful methods brought great results. But soon after, at the next convention, delegates from North American carried a banner crediting the great Frankenstein with having organized Local 1000 of California. Any more than half-witted observer who considers the history of this and other unions both before and since the North American strike knows that the concessions were a tribute to the militancy of the workers and probably also an attempt to bolster the prestige of "good" labor leaders. What made the strike so important was this: It showed clearly, to anybody who did not already know, how the government and the top leaderships of the unions would behave in the war.

The 1941 Convention

The convention in August, 1941, completed the instructional value of the strike. Hitler meanwhile had invaded Russia. The "socialist" Reuther boys and some very conservative allies called for the head of the West Coast Executive Board member, Stalinist Michener, while the sorely-wronged Frankenstein was loud in deprecating the notion that he wanted anybody's blood. He expressed the opinion, amply verified since, that Michener would "coöperate" in the future. The Stalinists wanted to forget the strike as soon as possible, and Frankenstein did not want his own strike-breaking fully aired before the delegates. President Thomas couldn't resist taking a kick at the Stalinists while they were down, predicting that by the 1942 convention they would be howling for American entry into the war. But his next words marked him as a very minor prophet after all: "My line will then still be the same. I will still say that we should keep ourselves on record against any foreign adventures." However, realizing fully, after some coaching by Phil Murray's representatives, how useful the Michener gang would be to him in the future in keeping rank and file workers under control, he came out against any "Red-baiting," and Michener by a narrow vote escaped any penalty

more severe than ineligibility for the Executive Board for a single year.

The Reuthers shouted long and loud that a political deal was being put over, and they were right. Since they may appear again at the coming convention as enemies of Stalinism and champions of the rank and file (on such issues as incentive pay), this point is worth driving home: In their anxiety to gain power in the union and to show their own Americanism, they took the actual leadership, by their criticism of the North American strike, in advancing the present disastrous policy of retreat which the union is following. They have no claim at all to a vote of confidence.

Whatever may have been the case with the officers, the convention as a whole did not realize either that the country was close to war or that, in discussing the strike, they should have been threshing out the problems of union policy in the face of open government hostility under war conditions, instead of the individual sins of Michener or Frankenstein. Trailing behind Roosevelt, the convention voted for "national defense," for aid to Hitler's victims (lend-lease), but against involvement in foreign wars. By a two-to-one vote, union offices were supposed to be barred to those belonging to political parties which owed allegiance to any foreign government (as Thomas had said, no Red-baiting!). Even the Stalinists, now the best Americans of them all, had presented a resolution to this effect, but theirs specifically included the Socialist Party as well as communist and fascist organizations, in order that they might have the Reuthers for company in their embarrassment. As a third war measure it was voted that no financial aid could be given to any local conducting a strike unauthorized by the International and that such locals might even be expelled. On certain more obvious measures, designed largely to consolidate the leadership in power and to free them from control as the consequences of their war policy became more apparent, the delegates refused to be taken in. They would allow the officials a salary raise of only \$500; they refused to raise monthly dues to \$1.25; and, most important, they objected so strenuously to postponing the next convention to April, 1943, that the proposal was unanimously rejected.

On the war issue, CIO officials as a whole acted as liaison officers between Roosevelt and the workers. They did this by emphasizing that his policies would make an AEF unnecessary and even by putting up a show of opposition to peacetime conscription. In the *United Auto Worker* of February 15, 1941, Philip Murray was quoted as saying that the American people wanted to stay out of war, because war would mean the end of democracy at home. But the CIO convention of that year, not long before Pearl Harbor, went all-out for the President's foreign policy, Murray now saying that he wanted it to be absolutely clear to everybody just where the CIO stood. Since then the earlier slogan has been completely reversed to read: "Victory in the war means freedom, defeat the loss of all our rights" (R. J. Thomas at the UAW convention, August, 1942).

Results of the Pro-War Policy

We shall allow one of the stoutest defenders of the all-out-for-the-war policy to summarize its results. In his column in the *United Auto Worker* of December 1, 1942, Secretary-Treasurer Addes wrote:

After nearly a year of war we find that one of the most serious problems facing our union is establishing and maintaining the principles of collective bargaining....

By foregoing our right to strike we have relinquished our most powerful weapon, and the employers have been quick to take advantage of our position. . . .

He added that even the NLRB was stalling elections, demanding proof of a big membership. As for the union members, there had arisen "... a desire within the ranks to settle matters immediately by going on strike."

Finally there comes (watch it closely) the grand conclusion based on the above facts: that the NLRB must realize the importance of worker morale in the war, that it should hire more pro-labor employees, that Congress should give it more funds. The labor leader has turned labor relations counselor for the government! Grand conclusion from these facts for the workers: Let the government hire and pay him and all the rest of the Executive, too, since they share Addes' views, and let the UAW elect some labor leaders.

The principal wage demand of the 1942 convention was for a general wage increase of \$1.00 a day. When the WLB granted Chrysler workers four cents an hour instead, Leo Lamotte, Executive Board member in charge of the Chrysler Division, complained (*Auto Worker*, October 15, 1942) that they had not even granted adjustment of classifications, so that some workers were getting less than they had received when doing similar work in the days of automobile production. Moreover, no means for arbitrating grievances was set up, and the company's record in adjusting grievances was 100 per cent bad. He concludes helplessly and hopelessly as follows: "... what remedy do you think the Chrysler workers can find to obtain a fair and quick settlement of their grievances?"

The Chrysler workers themselves have given two answers to this question: (1) Recently a WLB panel reported that from November 30, 1939, to December 23, 1941, there had been sixty strikes at Chrysler plants, while since the no-strike pledge, from December 23, 1941, to January 8, 1943, a considerably shorter period, there had been sixty-six. To be sure, there have been no really long strikes recently. (2) In May of this year, completely fed up with the company's tactics and WLB stalling, the workers did stage what must be considered a major strike in a war period. It involved 28,000 workers and lasted three days. The situation was so tense within union ranks that Chrysler Director Lamotte accused the strikers of having the backing of General Motors Director Walter Reuther. *The Chrysler workers involved then demanded Lamotte's removal.* The Executive Board later condemned Lamotte for having made a public attack on Reuther but approved his strike-breaking actions during the crisis in every other way and, at Thomas' request, *unanimously* continued him in his job as Chrysler director. For this outcome and for the no-strike policy in general, Reuther fully shares responsibility. At times he has expressed the workers' grievances in stronger language than other leaders, but his devotion to Roosevelt, the war effort, and the no-strike pledge has been unshaken to date. Verbal radicalism is merely his way of extending his own influence and keeping the workers under control.

The first important consequence of the war for the automobile workers was extensive unemployment, caused by management's methods of converting to war production. In Michigan alone 200,000 were unemployed in January, 1942. There were still 185,000 unemployed in April. In this crisis UAW and other union leaders, prompted by the aggressiveness of the employers and the demands of the WPB, decided to . . .

surrender premium pay for Saturdays, Sundays and holidays! Such was the temper of the auto workers, however, that the Executive Board felt constrained to call a national conference of 1,400 delegates to ratify an elaborate *Victory Through Equality of Sacrifice Program*. Without demanding anything at all in return, the union was to surrender premium pay and reaffirm the no-strike pledge. If their nine-point program for victory was enacted, they were to take all wages for time over forty hours in non-negotiable bonds. Briefly, the program called for an end to profiteering (three per cent profit on invested capital, no exorbitant salaries or bonuses); a \$25,000 limit on incomes from whatever source derived; full rationing; complete freezing and even some roll-backs of prices; higher wages to meet higher living costs, with a \$1.00 hourly minimum; decent allowances to dependents of service men; labor representation in war agencies and on a post-war planning board.

Although the war was still in its early days, there was considerable opposition to this so-called equality of sacrifice, but the leadership put it over by using every form of pressure and demagoguery. As usual, Frankenstein was crassest and demanded of the recalcitrants: "Are we going to tell the President of the United States to go to hell?" The main line, however, was that the union was taking the offensive away from the reactionaries and that a \$50,000 advertising campaign (full-page ads in all the important papers, in the manner of the big corporations) would win "its enthusiastic acceptance by the people of the country as a sound and salutary program for winning the war." Nobody at the present date needs any aid, except perhaps a microscope, too assess the extent to which the program has been successful. Even then, one hundred and fifty delegates were keen-sighted enough to resist the pressure and voted against the surrender of premium pay. About fifty delegates, seeing the patent absurdity of taking the offensive by surrendering the strike weapon and making no move to form an independent political party, stated that "the union was taking one action after another to break down established work standards and was running pell-mell into the hands of management." Who has been proved right—these delegates or the leadership?

The Leaderless Rebellion

By the time of last year's convention, in August, conditions in the industry, except for the unemployment situation, had of course deteriorated still further. Opposition to the leaders was much more widespread than in April but not better organized. David Coolidge summarized the convention by saying that the delegates were against everything, but were leaderless. A reading of so conservative a paper as the *New York Times* fully confirms this estimate. The account in the *United Auto Worker*, on the other hand—and auto unionists would do well to note this—was pretty thoroughly censored. On the premium pay issue Frankenstein was booed for twenty minutes so that he could not be heard; delegates demanding the withdrawal of the no-strike pledge, because it had ended collective bargaining, received a tremendous ovation; a proposal to move up the election of officers two days was booed and defeated, for the delegates wanted to hear what these officers said before voting for them; by a big vote a motion was passed that officers should not make long speeches but mimeograph them instead. There was even a resolution to bar representatives and organizers of the International from the floor, one delegate calling them goons—a remark which President

Thomas said he resented, for he personally had handpicked each of these gentlemen. When the old proposal, to hold the next convention two years later, came up again, Thomas called the shouting which greeted it disgraceful and said (correctly) that it showed no respect for the international officers. The resolution for increasing again the officers' pay also brought forth a very heated debate.

At this 1942 convention the leadership did not allow itself the luxury of an internal struggle for power. United against the poorly organized delegates, they had their way except on issues of elementary democracy. When the principal debate, that on premium pay, was going clearly against them, they withdrew their original resolution and later put over a worse one that had a sound of militancy about it: they threatened that they would resume their right to premium pay unless Roosevelt barred it generally in industry within thirty days. Yet a *PM* reporter (August 5, 1942) pointed out that Reuther, pleading for acceptance of this extremely reactionary plan, received no applause whatever. The usually noisy convention met him with a deadly silence and accepted his proposal for want of something else. All the officers were reelected virtually unanimously and received pay raises \$1,000 short of their demands but large anyway; Thomas, for example, was boosted from \$5,500 to \$9,000. Another old proposal for two vice-presidencies was at last put over. These jobs, at \$7,000 each, compensated Frankenstein and Walter Reuther for sinking their personal interests to join in the united front against the rank and file. Three proposals to give the officers increased power and an unlimited vote of confidence, however, got nowhere at all. The delegates refused to delay their next convention, to make a radical cut in the representation at that convention, or to grant an increase in monthly dues from \$1.00 to \$1.50. This last question was referred to a referendum of the whole membership.

The attitude of the membership on the dues increase is an excellent index to their feelings about the Executive. For months after the convention the *United Auto Worker* carried appeals, especially from Addes, for approval of the increase. Although at the convention the increase was represented as being fifty-fifty for aircraft organization and post-war reserve, he virtually ignored the current problems of the members, since the Executive Board really had no solution for these immediate matters, and emphasized the need for a post-war fund. Thus, on November 1, 1942, Addes wrote that the employers were putting away a reserve and that the union would be wise to do the same. Of course, the union hoped that things would be different at the end of this war, but couldn't take a chance, since the end of the First World War had brought serious onslaughts against labor. The union members naturally wondered why their officials weren't more concerned about the present and why, immediately after the convention, the organizing staff had been cut in half, sixty-eight employees of the International having been fired and the workload of all remaining officials doubled, "in line with war conditions," whatever that might mean. They couldn't help remembering (1) that the officers had just had their salaries almost doubled, a pleasure which they should have refused if the union was so hard up; (2) that the organizing drive in aircraft plants had been relatively slow, as was natural in view of the limited benefits the union with its do-nothing policy could offer new members.

The union paper on February 1, 1943, reported that the rise had been rejected by a margin of about two to one. Addes

didn't surrender but proposed that the fifty cents monthly be granted not as a regular increase in dues but as a security assessment for the duration of the war only. He assured the membership that the entire amount would be set aside for a post-war fund, still under the impression evidently that this would win their votes. The Executive Board finally ended up simply by levying a flat \$1.00 assessment—they have the power to levy one such assessment per year without a referendum—for the whole year. It is very instructive to observe how Addes explains the assessment in the *United Auto Worker* of April 15, 1943. It is, he says, for the primary purpose of enlarging our organizational activities. The union has grown but not in proportion to the influx of workers into the aircraft industry. The plants to be organized are large and scattered. The Executive Board had hoped for an increase in monthly dues for this purpose, but the members had turned this down. The union's members are the highest paid workers in the world and can well contribute a little for organizing purposes to maintain their standards. Thus Addes. We don't know exactly how long the memories of the members are, but surely Addes insults them in assuming that he can change his line over night, in the good old Stalinist way, without the slightest confession of error. The members must also speculate about some other points. The International gets at least \$1.00 as initiation fee for every new member and receives forty cents of each member's monthly dues; membership in May, 1942, was reported as 610,000, while present membership is put at about a million. The union blithely spent \$50,000 on the "equality of sacrifice" advertising campaign, while the great Ford organizing campaign was launched with a fund of \$100,000.

Results of the Conferences

The convention question too has remained a hot potato for the leadership. Secretary of Labor Perkins early this year was requesting unions to hold conventions less frequently in order to ease the wartime transportation problem. President R. J. Thomas had to inform her sadly that his was a new and democratic union whose members might interpret a proposal for postponement as an attempt to perpetuate the present leadership in office. In fact, a strong movement did develop in the locals, not for any postponement but for a special convention at an earlier date. When the wordy impotence of CIO and AFL leaders generally, easily recognized as weakness by Roosevelt, brought on the hold-the-line order, which led to wage freezing but no price freezing, the UAW leadership decided that it had better head off demands for a special convention by arranging for a series of brief regional conferences.

These conferences, as well as conferences of the national GM department and the Ford Council, which were held at about the same time, discussed mainly incentive pay and the miners' struggle. This was natural, since these two issues represented two possible and very different solutions to the auto workers' own problem of improving their economic situation. The Executive Board had already rejected piecemeal and other variations of incentive pay in principle but had left the door open to a future reversal by allowing Frankenstein to remain on a WPB committee to study incentive pay systems (*NEW INTERNATIONAL*, June, 1943). Most of the conferences, and all of those representing really important sectors of the union, came out very strongly against incentives as plans for a speed-up and showed considerable distrust of the Executive Board in the process. For example, the GM conference told

the Executive to take a "firm and decisive position," while the Ford Council even urged that Executive Board members be restrained from advocating any incentive plan. The Michigan region, taking a similarly strong stand with only two delegates of two hundred in opposition, also by a unanimous vote asked for a convention in July (that is, as soon as possible) and in Detroit (that is, where many of the workers could make their influence felt on the delegates as a counterweight to the pressure of the leadership). If they were against more money via the speed-up route, the delegates were naturally for higher rates of pay. The leadership had to come out for the miners' economic demands, while condemning Lewis' "personal political campaign" against the President and the strike method. They had only a limited and temporary success with this line at the conferences, where enthusiasm for the miners' fight, if not for Lewis, was very vocal.

Hardly two more months had passed before the Michigan CIO convention, representing mainly the most vital region of the UAW, took stock of the developing situation (an ever worse cost-of-living situation, an ever tougher WLB, and the anti-strike law) and passed two important resolutions: (1) that the national CIO and all international unions ought to revoke the no-strike pledge, if collective bargaining were not soon restored, (2) that their own Michigan organization would take immediate steps toward setting up an independent political organization (*United Auto Worker*, July 15). Both these propositions they passed, it need hardly be added, over the determined opposition of their national leadership, which continues both in the union paper and in the councils of the CIO to take a diametrically opposite position.

The Michigan CIO has clearly posed the two most vital issues for the approaching convention. There are plenty of demands and programs in print but no weapons with which to realize them. The strike and independent political action are the weapons needed. As for the strike weapon, leaders of all unions, CIO and AFL, have shown that they will fight to the end against its use. To cover their cowardice they are now resorting to ridiculous bogeyman stories of the type which formerly only the Stalinists dared to invent. Every assault against labor, such as the anti-strike law, becomes a "provocation," probably concocted by Hitler and Tojo and then transmitted, by mental telepathy no doubt, to reactionary employers and congressmen. "These people want to provoke us into striking by their anti-strike law," shout Murray and Green and their hangers-on. "But we're too smart and patriotic for that. We'll grit out teeth, renew our anti-strike pledge to the Commander-in-Chief, and defy them to kick us around some more."

The Labor Leaders Who TALK Tough

On August 2, *Time*, a hard-boiled organ that is open enough in representing the interests of big business, carried the following news comment:

... Last week AFL's William Green and CIO's Phil Murray, who have held labor in line with the Little Steel formula, marched to the White House to threaten mutiny unless prices went down. This was a very interesting piece of byplay, for everyone [NB: *everyone*—W.W.] guessed that while the two labor leaders talked tough on the front steps, to impress their members, they were probably much less belligerent inside, imploring the President to hold prices level, rather than threatening him if he did not roll prices back.

Theirs was no ultimatum. But the fall season for important wage negotiations begins on August 5 with General Motors Corporation. Soon after the Little Steel formula must stand or fall.

There are two possible explanations for the words of *Time*'s editors: (1) They are confident that Murray and Green are so docile that it is possible to tell the truth about them and to laugh at them openly; (2) they are trying to "provoke" the honorable gentlemen. The reader may choose for himself the more likely explanation.

UAW's president, R. J. Thomas, yields to none as a writer of fairy tales. Listen to this one from the *United Auto Worker* of June 15:

There are some who are foolish enough to urge passage of this bill [anti-strike bill—W.W.] as a means of getting at John L. Lewis. No more stupid tactics could be used.

John L. Lewis wants this bill passed. He has been plotting for years to alienate labor from the President... If the President signs the bill now it will be playing directly into the hands of Lewis and the little crowd of Roosevelt-haters and anti-war elements who sit up nights thinking up ways to embarrass our Commander-in-Chief.

All this black-mask hokum is intended to distract attention from the Thomas policy, which is nakedly revealed in his column of June 1 in the union paper:

There has been no change since we first gave our no-strike pledge which would warrant our abandoning that pledge at this time...

The workers involved in most unauthorized strikes have real grievances... When I urge them to return to work, I do not intend to give the impression that that will close the incidents as far as the international union is concerned...

To the corporations I want to say frankly that they share in a great measure the responsibility for the few walkouts... I know for a fact that labor grievances that could be settled before the war in a few days have, since we gave our no-strike pledge, taken months to adjust...

If this situation continues we [we!—W.W.] will only be inviting more unrest. The UAW-CIO does not want that...

The union will not tolerate any effort by the corporations to take advantage of the current situation...

Let me conclude with this:

Let management enter into bargaining honestly and promptly. Let the War Labor Board accelerate its procedure... And in the meantime let every worker stick to his job. Through these steps we can obtain the basis for cooperation which we must have if our country is to emerge triumphant from this war.

Does this need much comment? Brother Thomas' only weapon, apart from some veiled (because empty) threats, is good advice. Brother Homer Martin at least began his career in the pulpit. Brother Thomas has yet to find his proper profession. The workers really know all this. The convention delegates will know it. At the last convention they had a fairly accurate idea of the situation, and since then their education has continued, as we have shown. But they will have to be determined, and they will have to be well organized. Reuther and Leonard may possibly form an opposition bloc and talk tough. Reuther may smite the incentive pay proposition from all angles, but on the fundamental issues he stands firmly united with the rest of the leadership. He has always championed the no-strike pledge. In 1941 he based his bid for power on a Red-baiting attack against the North American strike. At the last convention he said that he was glad that the UAW had sacrificed premium pay so that the union could show the world that it had "clean hands." He has gained a reputation for forthright opposition to incentive pay, yet was chairman of a special committee which recommended seven safeguards under which locals might be permitted to adopt incentive pay plans (*United Auto Worker*, April 15, 1943). It will not be enough to heckle the leadership, then accept their principal resolutions. It will not be enough to reject their resolutions, then reflect them. A new course can only be successful under leaders who really desire a change. If the

present crew cries out that experience is necessary in a crisis, the answer is obvious: they too were new in a great crisis only a few years ago.

A Record of Political Failure

Politically, too, Thomas and the other brothers have a dismal record. The Victory Through Equality of Sacrifice program was supposed by its sheer reasonableness and excellence to influence the President or Congress; or, if not, so to move the general public that they would set up a clamor for its adoption by the government. When this project had proved an obvious fizzle, Thomas suggested on November 1, 1942, that, being restricted from economic activities, the union might well concentrate on housing, price control, and important social services, including health. They might even consider building hospitals of their own to end the discrimination against workers in the hospitals of Detroit. However, on November 7, the Executive Board boosted the ante on the first victory program, and came forth with a triple V program, victory on the war fronts, on the home front, and in the post-war settlement. In general, the program called for labor representation in all parts of the war and post-war machinery of government, wages to match the rising cost of living and quicker settlement of disputes by the WLB, machinery for coöperation among the CIO, AFL and Railroad Brotherhoods on political and economic matters, a much broader social security program as an immediate war measure, more generous provision for men and women in the armed forces and their dependents, and clarification of the Atlantic Charter. The program, an imposing document, is less important to examine for itself than for the means proposed for carrying it out. The preamble calls for "reorientation of the functions of the labor movement to deal adequately with the new problems created by the war. . . ." The CIO and its internationals ought to lobby aggressively and constantly in Washington. They ought to "demand greater representation on policy-making boards in order that these boards meet our justifiable demands." Leaving the War Labor Board because of its failings would be a great error.

The slogan of this program might be summarized, "Let the union leaders tell it to Congress and the President." A few specific suggestions of the program were eventually adopted to a slight degree or in badly distorted form, but Congress became progressively worse and so did the President, although congressional misdeeds distracted attention from Roosevelt's lesser efforts in the same reactionary direction. By the middle of 1943 the movement among the workers for an Independent Labor Party was gaining such momentum that efforts had to be made to turn it into safe channels. Brother Frankenstein now came up with the brilliant idea of more or less cornering the market on penny postcards and of starting a great Tell-it-to-Congress campaign, with the ordinary workers doing the telling this time. Brother Addes claims credit for a Tell-It-to-the-President campaign along the same lines (*United Auto Worker*, June 15).

The Michigan CIO convention, as we have said, adopted a resolution in favor of an Independent Labor Party; and the CIO and UAW leaders, after opposing the proposal completely, gained a rear guard victory by having the resolution define the new party as an instrument for supporting Roosevelt and his program more effectively. Then the CIO Executive Board, after complaining and threatening for months about the relationship of prices and wages—Murray at one

time went so far as to issue an ultimatum with a deadline, July 15, for rollbacks, after which he was going to start a campaign for revision of the Little Steel formula—decided on some political action of its own. They specifically and emphatically rejected the idea of a new party and projected a vast and expensive campaign for rewarding friends and punishing enemies in both the old parties. Even *The Nation* (July 31) was appalled at the political stupidity of their promise to support Roosevelt, no matter what. Murray has appointed two committees, one headed by Hillman and including Thomas as secretary, to organize bigger and better non-partisan leagues to operate in the next elections, the other headed by Addes to put pressure on Congress at once with an eye to reforming well-meaning congressmen who have somehow gone astray.

But the non-partisan plan, he says, is the program of the national CIO, and that's good enough for him. Meanwhile, in the August 1 issue of the union paper, Thomas whoops it up for Vice-President Wallace's recent Detroit speech, in which Wallace whooped it up for Roosevelt, himself, and some new kind of capitalism, not a capitalism of scarcity but of abundance, which he thinks could easily be realized if only the capitalists would change their nature entirely. The UAW Executive had just issued another new program, one concerning the post-war world, which called for a very large degree of socialization. How the program is to be achieved is, of course, not explained. As a matter of fact, Thomas doesn't really care. He is for Roosevelt and Wallace, and they are for capitalism.

The subservience of Addes and Thomas to the President almost passes belief. Addes, worried what the President would do about the anti-strike bill, as he had a right to be on the basis of his knowledge of Roosevelt's record, expressed his entire confidence (*Auto Worker*, June 15) that the President would veto the bill "if he followed his own conscience." Almost every labor "statesman" whitewashes or covers up for Roosevelt after our weak-conscienced President has allowed himself to be led astray by the wicked reactionaries, but it takes a super-bootlicker to make apologies in advance. But Thomas, as we have seen, is not to be outdone. Lewis, he says, provoked the Smith-Connally bill just to embarrass the Commander-in-Chief. Whv, pray, should so good a labor man as the Commander-in-Chief be embarrassed by a proposition so patently anti-labor?

A Convention Program

The UAW Executive Board is worried about the coming convention. Not satisfied with the Murray-Green mission to Roosevelt, Thomas, Addes, Reuther, Frankenstein and Leonard paid a visit of their own to complain about the economic squeeze on their members. Like Murray and Green, they too said on emerging that the union, although much against its will, would have to ask for more pay if prices are not rolled back (*Associated Press*, July 30). They would like Roosevelt to do something, anything, to enable them to keep a hold on their members. Despite any slight concessions or big promises they may obtain from the President, who must be worrying a little, too, the record of history clearly demands the following program: *The no-strike pledge and the reactionary leadership must go; militancy must return; a Labor Party must come.*

WALTER WEISS.

The Theory of the 'Long War' and

The Coming Invasion of Europe

Our perspectives on the war have had as their central axis the concept of the "long war." This concept was adopted following America's entry in December, 1941. It was based on the view that the production and military potentials of the Allies and the Axis, considered from the standpoint of logistics, sufficiently balanced each other to make a military knockout highly improbable until after a war of attrition of unforeseeable length. (Estimates ran from ten to fifteen years.) However, we added, this military appraisal must be complemented with a revolutionary appraisal of the warring nations. The latter led us to the conclusion that it is likewise highly improbable that the masses would permit such a protracted reign of blood-letting, starvation, and destruction without intervening to bring it to a revolutionary end.

The recent turn in the fortunes of war in favor of the Allies has caused a widespread feeling that the above perspective is no longer tenable. This view, usually implicit but often explicit, has been voiced particularly in the present discussion of the national question, by both the supporters and critics of the resolution of the Workers Party.

Optimism About the War's Duration

Following the American landings in North Africa last winter, many of our supporters were ready to throw overboard the "long war" theory, being convinced of a rapid Allied victory. This optimism dissolved during the early stages of the Algerian and Tunisian campaigns, especially with the initial American defeats. However, it seems once more to have shot way up with the successful conclusion of the North African campaign and the accelerated bombing of Europe. Some have almost given way to the optimism of the bourgeois commentators, viz., that German power is rapidly disintegrating and needs but the appearance of a second front on the Continent to give it a death blow.

An examination of the military prospects in Europe is very essential to the revolutionary forces. For us it is not idle speculation based upon purely military hypotheses, as with the average "military expert" in the press. The basic approach for us stems from an understanding of the economic and political forces at play. If we err in our estimates of the forces at play we will adopt a perspective that the events themselves will continually overturn and, consequently, leave us disoriented and without compass or rudder.

This applies above all to the present discussion of the national question. It is easy to see that a war of attrition ended by revolutionary upheavals will leave Europe in a considerably different state of affairs than an Allied "blitz" with Allied armies of occupation. Though not on the same level of importance, it is yet exceedingly important to examine where the Allied occupation will most probably occur in any event, what the rôle of the Red Army will be, and where English and American forces will seek to "police" the revolution.

It is a matter beyond debate that the initiative has passed into the hands of the Allies. From the expected invasion of England we have now come to the expected invasion of Eu-

rope. The course of the war has advanced the latter as the next logical step.

But what is the significance of an invasion of the Continent? Can it be equated, as so many think, with a knockout blow for Germany? Where will the invasion come? What will its effect be upon post-war revolutionary developments? Events that have occurred since we first adopted a perspective on the war permit us now to elaborate and bring some details into sharper focus.

From a purely military point of view the destruction of the enemy's armies and the occupation of at least strategic parts of his homeland must be the aim for a total victory. The shortest route to the German homeland is across the Low Countries, less than two hundred miles at its widest point and nearer to one hundred miles at its narrowest point. But is anyone so foolish as to believe an Allied army could land on these coasts and push across to Germany without staggering losses? Here, above all, the prospect would be one of stalemate, reorganization, large-scale replacement, delays, reverses and, at best, a slow, piecemeal reduction of an intricate system of German defenses directly based upon the German home industries and connected by means of the most excellent transport facilities found anywhere. A British army on the Somme in 1943 will not necessarily be nearer to Berlin than a British army on the Somme in 1915.

Significance of the Invasion Routes

But this short-line invasion route seems least likely to be adopted, if for no other reason than that the military considerations, which admit it as a possibility, will be outweighed by the political considerations, which exclude such a possibility.

It is the failure to appreciate this relationship between political and military considerations that leaves most bourgeois commentators at sea when dealing with the second front. They fail to understand that the capitalist statesman, when discussing strategy, places the question of "Who will occupy what at the finish?" before the question, "How can we finish it most quickly?"

Allied statesmen have spent many a sleepless night over the question of "Who will occupy what?" Beginning with the Allied chief in the White House and running the gamut through to the most insignificant little government-in-exile, they have all devoted much thought and time to the jockeying and maneuvering to determine who will be where when it is all over.

Above all have the gentlemen of Downing Street drawn upon their age-old experiences in statecraft to juggle the many delicate and intricate factors that make up "the European question." Churchill once referred to post-war Europe as "that uninviting jungle," about which he would rather not think. However, that was nearly two years ago. We can rest assured that the British statesmen have done considerable thinking since then on how best to "restore order" in this "jungle," with the least possible harm to capitalism in general and British capitalism in particular.

Such Anglo-American plans for a "reorganization" of Eu-

rope must deal with two obstacles—the proletarian revolution and the Kremlin. For those who start at seeing these opposites linked by the conjunction “and,” a little realistic analysis will show how they are related to each other.

As revolutionary Marxists, we have long ago characterized the Kremlin as a deadly enemy of the proletarian revolution and a reliable emergency prop of the bourgeois order in countries where it begins to crumble. All we need do is to remember the GPU in Loyalist Spain. But let no one conclude from this that Churchill will calmly turn over to Stalin the task of “organizing Central Europe.” To begin with, we must not forget the elementary fact that even if Churchill were dealing with a Czarist Russia he would want most jealously to delimit Russian influence over European affairs. But the Russian bear today is a far stranger and more unpredictable animal than anything the British Foreign Office was ever called upon to fathom. And in its long history it has dealt with many strange and unpredictable peoples. Even we Marxists engage in polemics over what to call this monstrosity that has been fastened on the Russian people. What are we to expect from the products of Eton with their contempt for theory and penchant for a conservatively practical “muddling through”?

The British will be less impressed by the fact that the Russian bear is led, ring through the nose, by the executioner of the Third International than by the fact that in the lair of the bear exists an economy different from and hostile to capitalism.

We ourselves ask: “Is bureaucratic collectivism an export commodity? Will the Kremlin seek to impress its economic image upon the face of the Balkans and Central Europe?”

We can be sure that there is many a different answer given to these questions in different bourgeois circles. However, they will all agree in answering one question: “Can we safely entrust the policing of the Balkans and Central Europe to the Kremlin?” Here their unanimous answer will be “No!”

The Allied policy for post-war Europe will therefore be based upon a strategy to exclude Russia.

Russia and Her Allies

How will Russia react to such a policy? Whatever else we may debate about bureaucratic collectivism as a base for imperialist expansion, we know from considerations of Russia's national security (as diplomats politely call it), that the Kremlin will seek at least the boundaries of the Hitler-Stalin pact period and, either as spheres of influence or direct acquisitions, Bulgaria, Rumania, Ruthenia, parts of Hungary, parts of Yugoslavia, most of Poland (including Warsaw) and more of the Finnish coast line. This would leave the Kremlin the strongest power on the Continent until such time as Britain could restore Germany or France as a counter-balance.

Would not the Anglo-American statesmen go to untold lengths to prevent such Russian expansion? Only a cursory knowledge of imperialist power politics in Europe for the last several decades is sufficient to understand this.

Russian agents and pro-Russian sentiment will cause the Allies enough headaches in revolutionary Europe without the added factor of the Red Army in Warsaw, Belgrade, Sofia and perhaps Budapest. The European bourgeoisie would shudder with fear as did once the Catholic prelates when the Turks marched out of Asia to appear under the walls of Vienna. How can The City and Wall Street proceed with plans for European reorganization, with capitalism being overturned by masses of workers and peasants in Eastern and Southeast-

ern Europe who may view the Red Army as deliverers from class exploitation?

The arrival of the Red Army in these countries must not be confused with the arrival of the Nazis. The profound disturbances of property accompanying the Nazi occupations were in their fundamentals really bookkeeping operations. The native capitalists (Czechs, French, etc.) were forced to accept worthless German notes in return for majority control of their banks and industries by German capitalists. With the end of German occupation, it will not be too difficult to untangle these bookkeeping transactions and restore the property to its “legal” owner. But the prospect in the countries occupied by the Red Army is quite different. As in the Baltic states and in Poland, the entry of the Red Army will be viewed as the occasion for the workers and peasants to rise and settle old scores with their oppressors. The Kremlin can afford to sponsor an initial period of a “revolution from below,” demagogically blessed from on top. Then the commissars will arrive to “help” the occupied peoples organize “their” governments and industries and “vote” themselves into the Soviet Union.

Let the Anglo-Americans protest. The peoples of these “liberated” countries may very well rally or be rallied around the Kremlin standards. Would the Allies go to war with Russia to wrest the Balkans and Eastern Europe from her control against the sentiment of the peoples of these countries? And if they were reoccupied by the Allies through military force, could they reestablish and maintain capitalist ownership without the continued presence of Allied bayonets? And all this with the home front in Britain and America highly unstable, to say the least, and a worse situation in Western Europe. At best an unsavory prospect for the Anglo-American guardians of bourgeois order.

It must be firmly established that Stalin has no fears of the overturn of capitalism, as long as the Kremlin has a firm hand over the forces doing the overturning. It is only where the masses participate in the onslaught against capitalism independently, as in Spain, with the prospects for the creation of a real workers' state, and not a Stalinist caricature of one, that Stalin sees the handwriting on the wall. Churchill may find the Russian agents who lead the Communist Parties of Western Europe unexpectedly cooperative in bolstering bourgeois order. It would be a gross error, however, to expect the same from the Red Army under all conditions.

It will be British strategy, therefore, to make sure that at the end of the war the Red Army will be as far as possible from the Balkans and Central Poland and that an Anglo-American army will be in a position to drive a wedge between the Red Army and Central Europe.

The “Second Front”

The way of guaranteeing the exact opposite would be for the Anglo-American forces to become enmeshed in Northern France and the Low Countries, giving the Red Army, in the event of a German collapse, a free hand in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. It is not for nothing that the Russian agents have been bellowing for a second front. And no matter how many new fronts are opened, they will keep on calling for a “second” front. For what they really mean is a front in Western Europe.

A second front in Western Europe would be as foolish for the Anglo-Americans as for a burglar to choose to break down the front door of a house, with his untrustworthy accomplice slipping in the back door while the householder is attracted

by the noise in front. It would end with the burglar sustaining the blows and the accomplice getting the booty.

An invasion of Italy seems also unlikely, and in any case indecisive. It would prove a long-drawn-out and costly affair, with little gained toward a strategic breach in the enemy's armor. Its success would achieve the dubious asset of knocking Italy out of the war. But this would be accomplished for all practical purposes by continued aerial harassment of her industries and transport and would save the expense of feeding and policing the nation. The German lines in the Brenner Pass, swollen with the remnants of the Italian forces, would prove impossible to crack. All this, looked at militarily. Politically, an Italian invasion would be no more beneficial to Allied strategy than one in Western Europe.

The strategic value of Sicily in the middle of the Mediterranean and as an air base for operations against Italy and Southern France will be sufficient to cause the Allies to expend a major campaign in occupying it. But the real invasion will be elsewhere.

All political necessities, buttressed, however, by military considerations, point to the invasion coming via the Balkans—either by way of Crete, Salonika, and up the Vardar valley or, with the aid of Turkey, from the Turkish bridgehead in Europe into Bulgaria supported by landings on the Bulgarian and Rumanian Black Sea coasts.

From the military side it is worth noting that the British have always found it advantageous to utilize their sea power to conduct a peripheral war, i.e., to engage the enemy in the far-flung corners of the war map, where shipping gives the British the advantage (witness the wars with France fought in North America, India, Spain, Egypt, etc.). The Anglo-American quartermaster staffs would find less of a supply problem in sea-borne transport of divisions and equipment to Greece from America, Britain, and North Africa than would the German quartermaster brains in rail communication from Germany. This is especially true since many of the railroads radiating south and east from Vienna would be required to do double duty, adding the Balkan front to their load for the Russian front.

Another military aspect is the question of the reserves. In the event of an invasion of Western France the British would still keep close to two million men in the British Isles as a reserve in the event something catastrophic happened on the Continent and another Dunkirk proved impossible. These troops would serve no strategic purpose as a counterweight to the Germans. However, the German home reserves would be within a few hours of the front. These same two million troops, however, stationed in Britain during an Allied invasion of the Balkans would tie up a German force of nearly the same number in France and the Low Countries, for the Germans could not strip their Western defenses in the face of such a force across the Channel.

It is not an insignificant factor to note that Churchill fought the British and French general staffs during the last war in favor of sea-borne operations (Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Salonika) as against hopes for a break-through in France. As matters turned out, the Salonika army proved decisive in the last stages of the war in knocking Austro-Hungary and Bulgaria out of the war and sealing Germany's doom at a time when the German armies in France still stood on the Hindenburg line.

The Invasion Through the Balkans

From the political side of the question, a Balkan invasion

would have as its aim sending an Allied army into Europe through the rear door ahead of (at least abreast of) the Red Army. Allied control of the western shore of the Black Sea (Rumania, Bulgaria) and Yugoslavia would place them in a position to open a great offensive across the Hungarian plains toward Budapest and Vienna.

Meanwhile the Allies would keep a deft hand on the lend-lease faucet of Russia, turning it off and on to suit their own, not the Russian, military needs. If the Balkan campaign went well for the Allies, supplies could be withheld from the Russians to prevent them from utilizing the diversion in the Balkans to open offensives likely to make more rapid progress against the Germans in Russia than the Allies were making in the Balkans. If too many German troops were drawn from the Russian front into the Balkans, more supplies from the Allies to Russia would mean more pressure and the drawing off of German strength back to the Russian front. Lloyd George and Clemenceau sought to play the same game with Russia in the last war but usually the Russians got nothing at all because of the terrific needs of the Allied front in France.

If Allied offensives toward Budapest and Vienna then forced Germany to eventual surrender, Allied armies would race north from the Balkans toward Warsaw and Danzig, establishing an Anglo-American barricade across the path of the Red Army. Such a barricade, anchored on a British fleet in the Black Sea at one end and another British fleet in the Baltic at the other, would constitute a new form of the *cordon sanitaire* against the Russian menace, the difference being, however, that the *cordon sanitaire* of Clemenceau-Lloyd George was designed to keep the ideas of Bolshevism from "infecting" the masses of Europe who sought to follow in the footsteps of their Russian brethren. The *cordon sanitaire* of Roosevelt-Churchill would seek to keep the hob-nailed (probably lend-lease) boots of the Red Army from the streets of Warsaw, Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia and Bucharest. The *cordon sanitaire* of 1919 sought to exclude from Europe the messengers of the Communist International with their revolutionary manifestos and world-shaking ideas. The *cordon sanitaire* of 194(?) would seek to keep from Europe the armed expropriators of the new Czar of the Kremlin, the totalitarian missionaries of bureaucratic-collectivist slavery.

Whereas the earlier *cordon* was openly hostile to Bolshevik Russia, the new *cordon* will be formed with the oily hypocrisy typical of capitalist diplomacy. Like so many other moves in the relations of the Allies to Russia, the Balkan strategy will be a stinging slap in the face to Stalin. The ostensible reason for the route north from the Balkans will be announced to the world by the Allies as an effort "to cut off the German armies in Russia," "to unite with our brave Russian allies" and, above all, "to go to the aid of Russia."

Churchill recently promised some serious fighting in the Mediterranean "before the leaves fall." However, the leaves will fall many times before Allied Armies reach the Hungarian plains and cross them to the gates of Vienna. It is already July and the Italians are still in Sicily and the Germans in Crete. Even if the occupation of Crete is accomplished this year, it is doubtful if a Continental bridgehead can be consolidated before next spring. The struggle up the valley of the Vardar will prove a much more protracted undertaking to the Allies than the headlong dash down the Vardar was for the Germans in 1941. The entry of an Allied fleet into the Black Sea depends not only upon Turkish agreement to open the Dardanelles, but also upon complete air mastery to

protect the ships in this relatively small body of water flanked to east and north by German airfields. The vast edge of offensive mechanized weapons over defensive weapons which gave the Germans their "blitz" victories in Poland, France and the Balkans no longer prevails. Tank-destroyers and numerous special anti-tank weapons have once again brought defensive and offensive weapons on a more equal plane. Likewise, the infantry-scattering dive bomber has now become virtually a clay pigeon for a cool-headed crew on a modern anti-aircraft gun. Given sufficient time, the economic and manpower preponderance of the Allies will tell. But again we ask, how many times will the leaves fall before the enemy's army is destroyed and his homeland occupied? All one can answer now is that the leaves will fall again and again upon millions of ever-increasing graves on the isles of the Aegean, on the ancient battlegrounds of the Vardar, on the wide wheatfields of Hungary—and still the slaughter will go on. For essentially the view we first enunciated—the theory of the "long war"—remains unshaken. Left to themselves, the capitalist rulers of the earth who called for the Frankenstein monster of war will prove unable to banish him.

But it is inconceivable that the toiling masses—in France, Belgium, Italy, Norway, Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, the Balkans, Russia, Britain and even in America—will continue to send their best blood to redden the Vardar and the Danube, will continue to see the cities laid low, the fields laid waste, pestilence and hunger stalk the streets and countryside, nerves wrecked and muscles wracked in unbearable toil to produce the means of destruction, without at one point saying, "*It is enough!*"

Again we repeat—it will be a long war, unless . . .

ERNEST LUND.

July 7, 1943.

Postscript. The above was written a few days before the invasion of Sicily, which brought in its train a series of momentous events. The editor has, therefore, kindly permitted me to add this note of comment to indicate how these events have influenced the perspective outlined in the article.

Sooner than most of us expected, the toiling masses have raised their own voice in the midst of the bedlam of war to say in no uncertain terms: "It is enough!" By their peace demonstrations, the Italian workers have toppled Mussolini from his perch. And with it the war has entered a new phase. We are now turning the corner of 1917. The Italian revolution is yet far short of the February days in Russia. But even if the heroic workers of Milan and Turin are held at bay by a military dictatorship, supported either by German or Allied bayonets, the workers' revolution has appeared on the scene to stay.

Whereas at the time the article was written it was necessary to indicate the rôle of the masses with the hypothetical "unless," it is now possible to say that the revolutionary volcano of Europe will erupt long before the time-tables of the Allied general staff calls for any decisive knockout blows.

The liberal commentators, who never see further than their noses, are already speaking of the possibility of German peace demonstrations. Yes, they will come, and with a ferocity that will make these liberals wince. But with it will come more than they bargained for. When the Hamburg dock worker and the Krupp steel worker again find their voice, its echo will be heard in the downing of tools on the Clydeside, the march of Welsh miners, the rumble of revolution in India and among the millions of British, French, Dutch, Japanese and American colonial slaves. Yes, and in the United States the workers will tear to shreds the straightjacket of wartime control and unloose their pent-up resentments in a great surge of economic and political offensives.

Meanwhile the antagonism between Russia and her allies comes ever more into the open. The Anglo-American strategists will make many a move against Russia without regard for its effect in lengthening the war. Only the growing specter of a revolutionary Europe will convert their cat-and-mouse game into a frantic scramble to hasten the end and jointly prop up the old order before it is too late.

E. L.

August 2, 1943.

An Open Letter to Max Shachtman

A German Trotskyist Speaks Up

Dear Shachtman:

In the course of the past year, I have been made aware on different occasions of reports and "insinuations" somewhat to this effect:

1. "Some people are of the opinion that the German comrades are tired and demoralized. As they see it, you too (that is, I, the writer of these lines) have retired, and have not shown a sign of life for a long time. This is most deplorable. . . ."

2. "Some people show the tendency constantly to minimize and ridicule the Germans and their views. They call you tired and pessimistic characters who are to be dealt with cautiously. . . ."

Every time, I answered the bearers of these reports (and I note here only the "mildest" ones):

"What's that to me? Everyone according to his needs and abilities! I regard all that as gossip and am resolved as always

to stick exclusively to the *political* views and acts of those friends or foes whom I have to deal with. The moral label ('demoralization' or any other) may be applied only after the political situation has been scrupulously examined. Great persons grow by themselves, little ones are made by God. Or: little persons dabble in psychology because they are not big enough for political questions. Weak in psychology, into the bargain, they are given to formalism. Steeped in formalism, they land inevitably in gossip-mongering. Thus the circle is closed. Go ahead and see how you make out."

That, dear Shachtman, is how matters stood up to the time your article (*NEW INTERNATIONAL*, March, 1943) appeared. With this article you raised the theme of the "demoralization of the Germans" out of the sphere of private gossip into that of public discussion, and I consider that now is the time, for the good of all concerned, to say a few appropriate words. You may well believe at the very outset that I have no inten-

tion of waxing morally indignant over the charge of "demoralization." I am much rather prepared to maintain as far as possible the sprightly tone of your polemic, for the aim of this letter is simply to stand the affair on the political feet on which it belongs. As soon as this is accomplished, everyone can write his own moral verses. I will of course not fail to chip in a few of my own.

Unfortunately, there is a whole series of questions that I cannot enter into at all, and others that I can only skim over lightly. In the very first place, I admire the rashness with which you pass off your views on "National and Colonial Problems" as Marxism - Leninism - Trotskyism. By my beard (which I have just shaved) that is—to use a "sprightly" expression—the most colossal nonsense I have read in years! No, my dear fellow, here I come right to the point and so far as the colonial problem goes I take decisively the side of the "Cannonites." If I cannot do this in the case of the "national question," and thereupon, without regard for persons, simply establish what the facts are and what is politically obvious, that changes nothing at all in the friendship that I otherwise have for the aforesaid "Cannonites." Somewhere or other, we all make a mistake once—political discussion exists for the purpose of clearing up such mistakes. *Summa summarum* (as we say): Morrow and Morrison, against whom you let loose so furiously, have a correct position *en général*, whereas you are as wrong throughout as it is possible to be.

Distorted and false through and through is also everything you say about the history of the "Three Theses," that is, about the fact, indisputable in itself, that almost a year was required to decide upon its publication. If I were in *your* position I would not, in the first place, have raised such an outcry against the "Cannonites" on the matter of "publication." For there was a time when Shachtman belonged to them and had a decisive influence there on publications. Precisely at that time came the *non*-publication, achieved by Shachtman upon all sorts of pretexts, of certain German writings, as, for example, the "Theses on the Construction of the Fourth International." Hand on my heart, dear friend! You didn't do a bad job on us then for our "independence of spirit"—nowadays things are published, even if late but nevertheless at least they are published in the end. I cannot help seeing in this a great advance over your administration.

And then: if you had been just a little less precipitate and had oriented yourself a little better, you would have stumbled over the joke that the "Three Theses" reached publication so late only because the "organization" of its discussion—ha, ha!—was wanted. We live in an epoch of brusque turns; there's nothing can be done about it. And your story is given a brusque turn when you learn that the most zealous advocate of that "organization" which was certainly the most comical thing, in our opinion (what's true should remain true for everybody), was none other than Marc Loris.

I'm not joking! . . . The rôle that Marc Loris played in the whole affair is presented in a thoroughly false way in your article. In your version, he is raised to the position of a courageous martyr on the basis of the alleged guilt of the wicked "Cannonites," when in reality (from *your* standpoint—I myself don't care about it, I am only "turning" history) he was their Guardian of the Grail. And while you distribute light and shadow so unjustly, all the political facts get hopelessly muddled up on the other side. You overlook completely, for example, that (a) Marc Loris was and remains our adversary in the national question; (b) that Morrow declared himself

explicitly in agreement with Marc Loris on all points of principle (and quite rightly so, as investigation would show); (c) that you yourself, for all the differences in words, agree with Morrow and Morrison in political results (and that alone decides!).

Yes, dear Shachtman! for all the sprightliness of your polemic, you are an innocent angel! I am tempted to apply the lines you wrote about Morrison to your own article, *mutatis mutandis*, and to say: "Six (not only three!) solid pages of denuded and processed forest are covered with a wordy and terribly embarrassed effort to refute the Cannonites. If you want a primer on how to say Yes, No and Maybe in systematic rotation, read the Shachtman article."

Yes, dear Shachtman, read the Shachtman article! After having once more mauled the abused forest for six pages in it, he comes to the "epoch-making" conclusion "that the struggle for genuine [*sic*] national freedom, be it in China or Belgium, Serbia or India, can be re-launched only [*sic*] under the leadership of the proletariat, that is, under the leadership of the only class capable of *breaking with both imperialist war camps*."

That seems not bad, eh? But read it calmly and convince yourself by going over the articles of Morrow, Morrison and Loris that you are not the only medicine man who lights up the right road for the struggle for national freedom with this weighty lamppost. *Only* under the leadership of the proletariat? God protect you and your "genuine" doctrine, which is accidentally also the doctrine of Morrow, Morrison and Loris! The difference in the *words* may be ever so great between you (so far as the national question in Europe is concerned), in *substance* you say the same thing. More plainly: every one of you recognizes the necessity of being the "champion" of the national movement with fine words and formulae, but all of you, faced with the precise question of what you think of doing with the *existing* movement (which is already "re-launched"), give the proud answer: Here are my conditions. You could make the thing much less ceremonial, however, and say simply: Nothing! It is this abstract, passive, negative position that binds you together.—You acted most unjustly, dear Shachtman, to abuse Morrow and Morrison for what is so dear to you yourself. This first of all.

Secondly, the "Three Theses" (just as do the masses) turn their naked behinds from the very outset to the admirable attempt to polish the moon a perfect white with "genuine" proletariat pepper, and say:

Here is the national movement, and it is a *progressive movement* according to both the *objective conditions and the aspirations of the masses*. We have to accept it, *just as it is*, for the proletarian leadership is not "ordained," it is *conquered*. Only the most intimate participation can enable us to destroy the bourgeois influence in stubborn struggle against all other tendencies, to lead the movement to victory and to shift it over to the socialist revolution.

When you read this, dear Shachtman, you will, I trust, be inclined with all your strength to call "such" a conception "petty bourgeois" and your own "Marxian." Here, where I am only a steadfast brusque turner of false histories, I gladly allow you the pleasure, and believe: You acted most unjustly a second time in asserting that the "Three Theses" are "in any case" not hostile to your own "viewpoint." In heaven's name: the political line of demarcation runs (in the national question!) between you, Morrow, Morrison and Loris on one side, and the "Three Theses" on the other. It is completely

incomprehensible to me (objectively) how we could be "on the right track" from your viewpoint, when the "Three The- ses" and you are moving in diametrically opposite directions.

However, as already stated: all this can neither be motivated nor expounded today. It serves more as a preparation for the "German problem," which has reached the public wrapped in flagrant falsehoods and will now, also in public, be translated into articulated political language. I can imagine your surprise when you learn that this "German problem" must first be extracted from the following passage in your article:

"So far as we know, the German comrades have not replied [to Morrow's article]. It is deplorable, but not entirely surprising. After having been none too politely kicked around, abused and threatened for their independence of spirit, put under the gag, and then insulted by a reply from Morrow (not so much by the reply itself, mind you, but by the fact that Morrow was assigned to write it), there is little wonder that some of them end up disheartened and even demoralized. Answer at this date? And Morrow? . . ."

This whole magnificent display, dear Shachtman, has been cooked up by you alone! It moves so smoothly . . . and revenge is sweet . . . and I don't mind acknowledging right off that I have nothing against the "method" of dragging an opponent through all available literary gutters. The writing individual is no mass movement, however, and therefore I now put a condition to him. This condition reads: the facts underlying the execution must be *demonstrated*—otherwise there is a literary judicial murder.

But either I am crazy or you are completely cuckoo! . . . I can remember clearly having decided, *immediately* after receiving Morrow's article, to answer him. And sure enough (we shall simply never finish with these turns!): a detailed reply is on the way! *Ergo*: "Answer at this date? and Morrow?" Sure, dear Shachtman, why not? So long as the subject allows for it, even the devil and his grandmother in person (who is supposed to be a pretty young woman, by the way) may be answered. Then why not Comrade Morrow, who, after all, has not done me any "evil," and at most has the "tough luck" of not sharing my views in the national question? You obviously proceeded with the idea of doing me a favor by assuming that I am (a) "insulted by a reply from Morrow," and (b) *especially* insulted "by the fact that Morrow was assigned to write it." It happens that just the opposite worried me, and I was (a) happy over Morrow's *answer* (for it gave me the opportunity to develop the dispute in greater detail), and (b) especially happy over *Morrow's* answer (for he is a much less diplomatic opponent than, for example, Marc Loris).

You see, not a single conclusive word remains out of your fine polemic, but we are not yet quite finished. Your aim to have Morrow polished off with my assistance, yields the result that it is not Morrow who is insulted, but I.

Bah! think nothing of it! I think nothing of it either—I act that way only theoretically for a moment in order to straighten you out and to drag the "German problem" out from under the polemical débris. In this sense: You believed seriously that I ended up "disheartened and even demoralized" as a result of those puerilities (just take it all in all!) that you lay at the door of the "Cannonites" as misdeeds committed against us. Do you really believe "there is little wonder"? Oh, dear Shachtman, that's the greatest affront you could ever have given me!

Purely theoretically, of course!—in practice, I continue quite unoffended: I admit the *possibility* of one fine day becoming tired, demoralized, and incapable of doing anything more. Such a situation *might*, especially under the influence of physical suffering, easily occur, and under such circumstances there would be "little wonder." But that I would then run around and make the "methods" of the terrible "Cannonites" responsible for the wear and tear on my virtues—*this* wonder, dear Shachtman, you will never live to see! I would, on the contrary, attach the greatest importance to being *first-class* demoralized material and a spiritually clean corpse.

I think that therewith the last remnant of your artistic polemic has gone to the dogs and—here we are at the "German problem." Have no fear! it is only the short tail that wags this letter. Like every tail, this one has—I do not know if this has already occurred to you—something uncommonly expressive about itself: it harmonizes, so to speak, the animal with the rest of his body.

What I mean is: you are not the only one, as shown at the beginning, who indulges in speculations of a moral nature on the Germans. Justice for you, as for everyone else, demands acknowledgment that the external picture does mislead one to such speculations: the sum-total of our activity leaves *much* to be desired and we are not in a position to accomplish the most urgent tasks. But inasmuch as a "Marxist" must not be content with external appearances, so, here too, the question must first of all be traced to its material domain. Looked at *materially*, the German problem is as simple as a brick. It is solved in principle the minute it is named. It is given a name by a simple sentence, which has the validity of an axiom in Leninism. Here it is, the sentence that dissolves all speculation into thin air:

No revolutionary organization without people who are materially in a position to work for it professionally.

Anyone who needs a moral on this basis, which is alone decisive, may lament the dismal waste of energy with which the Germans were forced to make their way for the past ten years (*nota bene*: without professional party workers!). I personally do not write here in order to react, with deeply justified bitterness, to a political shortsightedness that plays such a weighty rôle in the painful history of the German organization and in which you, again, are not without your share of responsibility. We carry on the struggle as long as it is possible—we take accomplished facts in our stride. In view of the fact that so many people believe that the heart of Bolshevism lies (as Bukharin once said!) in the insipidity of the provincial spirit . . . yes, in view of this wholly insipid provincialism, I stick in the promised word and conclude:

The horse philosophizes over the whip one way and the driver another. Politics, however, is the art of selection, and the profound human aspiration to replace the horse with the motor and the whip with the electrical battery.

Yours cordially,

A. T.

London, June 17, 1943.

P.S.—I have written this letter in my own name, if only in order not to spoil the joke of the matter. But I showed it to all the friends who could be reached and would "approve" it, for the "demoralization" concerns all of them just as much as does the "German problem." Every one of them would have answered you in the same way, and it is thus to be understood as a collective reply.

My Reply to the Open Letter

Dear Friend:

I am obliged to you for your efforts to set me straight on so many things, the "German problem" included. The results, however, are not equal to the efforts. Because this is regrettably the case, I am compelled to add some supplementary, as well as critical, remarks to your somewhat misaddressed open letter.

1. The "reports and insinuations" about the "demoralization" of some German comrades, to which you devote so much of your letter, do not originate with me. They come originally from the Cannonites. Evidently, you have not yet learned that such "moral labels" are part of the stock vocabulary they employ against those political opponents whom they cannot otherwise answer. If you are interested in the rest of that vocabulary, you can find it in the recently-published first volume of Cannon's *Collected Works* which is devoted to killing off the long-dead "petty-bourgeois opposition." I have no doubt that if you *had* known who first applied the label, you would have directed your open letter, or one like it, to the right address. . . .

It is true that in the March, 1943, *NEW INTERNATIONAL*, in speaking of the treatment accorded the views of the German comrades on the national question in Europe (embodied in their "Three Theses"), I wrote that "there is little wonder that some of them end up disheartened and even demoralized." Is it really necessary to explain to you that these words were used and meant both in a different sense and a different spirit from those animating the Cannonites? You say somewhere in your letter that I insulted you. I will not do it "again" by giving such an explanation. Instead, I will confine myself to two statements:

I spoke of disheartenment and even demoralization of some German comrades, not on the basis of the Cannonite "insinuations," but in simple reiteration of the way comrades of the German section itself described the situation following the accumulated experiences of their organization with the Cannonite leadership. And they are comrades whose reliability and good faith I have ample reason to accept without question, regardless of their agreement or disagreement with my political ideas.

Secondly, in spite of your letter, I must decline to retract my remarks—not so much the words, which are not so important, as the substance. I reserve for the latter part of my reply the reasons for my insistence.

2. You find it necessary to do more than is necessary. You defend your Cannonite friends in the case of the publication of the "Three Theses" of the Germans. "Even if late . . . at least they are published in the end," and that is a "great advance over your [Shachtman's] administration," when, it seems, nothing was published, either in the beginning or in the end.

You refer to the German theses on the construction of the Fourth International which were submitted for publication in *The NEW INTERNATIONAL*, some five years ago, when I was one of its editors. I do not recall very clearly the document, the circumstances, or the reasons I then had for not agreeing to its publication.

You compare this incident with the way the Cannonites handled the "Three Theses." Let us grant that my vote

against publishing your 1938 theses was a first-class mistake and an injustice. At worst, this revealed a personal aberration in the matter. What possible organizational or political motive could I have in "suppressing" the document? What policy did I have on the question of "constructing the Fourth International"—and in what act or proposal was it revealed—that the publication of the German document would have affected adversely? What part of my position in the International, or "control" of it, was I seeking to protect bureaucratically by the "suppression"? Were the theses perhaps directed against me? That would indeed be news. The fact is, as you must know, that (rightly or wrongly) none of us here attributed such vital importance to the document, to say nothing of the importance of "suppressing" it. This is partly demonstrated by the fact that the question never even came before the Political Committee of the party, where Cannon, always intensely interested in all questions relating to Marxian theory, could have the opportunity of expressing himself on it.

And the "Three Theses"? You say, with ever so much delicacy, that "almost a year was required to decide upon its publication." I envy your ability to compress so much in so little! Never having quite mastered the knack of writing tersely, I would expand your delicate formula to read:

The Cannonites at first refused to publish the document at all. They inveighed violently against the German comrades, basing themselves on Cannon's theory that public discussions are permissible (if at all!) only *after* the subject of discussion has been decided inside the party. I would go further, and say that, in a sense, the "Three Theses" did not suffer so much from suppression by the Cannonites as from over-publication. First, they published it for the exclusive use of their committee members, who were then properly lined up against it. A second time they published it for the exclusive use of party members, who were then properly lined up against it, by methods we have long known and which you are now learning. Then, finally, after the party convention had pronounced itself against the views of the Germans, and all was fairly safe, it was decided to communicate these views to the vulgar populace, accompanied by a, for him, appropriate comment by Morrow.

These are the two cases you compare, with praise for the better showing made by the Cannonites. I will not say you have lost your sense of proportion; I will simply assume that, in your own words, you do not want "to spoil the joke" by going into verbose detail about *why* "almost a year was required to decide upon its publication." (While on the subject, may I ask how many years will be required to "decide upon the publication" of the article by the German comrade on Hilferding, which was "held up" for its reference to Hilferding's theory of money?)

Let me now proceed to the "political" questions, since I know how popular is the novel belief (perhaps it is not so novel) that "organizational" questions, questions of "methods," are not political matters, and in any case always belong to some nether region in party discussion.

3. You find that our position on the colonial question in the World War has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism-Trotskyism, and that any claim to the contrary is "the most colossal nonsense I have read in years." On this question

you "take decisively the side of the 'Cannonites.'" Presumably that means, among other things, that you are still for the defense of Anglo-American imperialism's "ally," China, on substantially the same grounds set forth by Morrow and Morrison, who "have a correct political position *en général*."

The only argument you have added to theirs, in refutation of the stand taken by our party, is that our position is the most colossal nonsense. That is, my dear friend—I am the first to acknowledge—a weighty argument deserving all the consideration it merits, but it is not fully convincing. It would be difficult for anyone to debate the colonial question on the basis of such an argument. For me, it is impossible. Better yet, it is superfluous, for I have dealt in many issues of *THE NEW INTERNATIONAL* with arguments which I found somewhat more tangible and to the point. When you are prepared to take up in detail the articles I have written, I shall no doubt be willing to resume the debate on this question.

Nor is it very fruitful to discuss here the "correct political position" which, you say, the Cannonites have "*en général*." The difficulty is that it is so "general." Better that we continue with the concrete questions. In fact, that will be much more enlightening precisely as to their policy "*en général*." That is why I proceed to the national question in Europe, into which you have introduced such a breath-taking "turn."

4. You write: "The political line of demarcation runs (in the national question!) between you [i.e., Shachtman], Morrow, Morrison and Loris, on one side, and the 'Three Theses' on the other."

This is either a case of paper being patient, and indifferent to what is written on it, or a case of gross misunderstanding—at least on my part, let us say. I shall therefore try to clarify what is involved in the discussion of the national question in Europe, as I understand it and in highly summarized form. This should serve to establish where the line of political demarcation is really drawn and who stands on either side of the line.

(a) Soon after the entry of the United States into the war, I, among others, set forth the point of view that this would be a war of long duration, lasting five years, perhaps ten years, or even more, with no decisive military victory by either imperialist camp in sight; and that the war would come to an end only when "interrupted" by proletarian (or genuinely popular) revolutions. Until such revolutions would break out, the war would drag out and bring with it an ever-accelerating degeneration of capitalist society, economically and politically.

This point of view was embodied in theses finally adopted by the leading committee of our party. What the Cannonites have to say on this subject, I really cannot tell, for as you know, they incline to say as little as possible on the war. The views of the German section, so far as we know, are set forth only in the very summary "Three Theses." My *impression* is that on this point there is sufficient similarity between our views. Right or wrong?

(b) We hold that one of the outstanding manifestations of the decay of imperialism in this war is that *it throws society back*, and forces toward the top of the political agenda questions which are "historically outlived." This is especially true of imperialism in its fascist form, that is, the form toward which all capitalist society tends at one pace or another. Among the historically out-lived questions referred to, the most important in Europe today is the national question.

This question is new for us in two senses: First: in that it

does not (cannot) appear in the same form it assumed in the period of the constitution of the modern big nations as part of the struggle against feudalism, and second, in that the question of national liberation arises now in countries which were yesterday not only independent national states, but also imperialist national-oppressor states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Holland, Belgium, France) and which have now been reduced to the status of colonial or semi-colonial countries by German imperialism.

We hold further that this is not some peculiar aberration of German imperialism alone, but a characteristic of modern imperialism in general; that this is not purely or essentially a temporary phenomenon, or a "mere" war phenomenon that will disappear when "military necessities" no longer "require" it. In the extension of imperialist dominion over former independent and even imperialist nations, and their reduction to the position of colonies, we see a further development of the trend in present-day capitalist society toward the establishment of what your Theses and our Resolution both refer to as the modern slave state.

We have set forth these views in various theses, polemical articles, and especially in our detailed resolution on the National and Colonial Question. If you do not like my phrase that, on this point, too, the "Germans are on the right track," let me use another: There is a sufficient similarity of views between us. Again, that is my impression. Right or wrong?

The Cannonites, on the other hand, have little if anything in common with these conceptions, to the extent that they give coherent expression to any conception at all on this point. Right or wrong?

(c) We affirm that the national question has been placed on the agenda again in Europe—in a new form and in new social and historical conditions.

Wright denies this, and proves his point with irrefutable conclusiveness by a quotation from Lenin in 1915 that the struggle for national independence in such countries as France is a thing of the past; his program of action would consist in parading through the revolutionary underground movement in France carrying a placard with this quotation written on it, plus the added admonition that they are wasting their time on a task which their bourgeois ancestors solved for them a hundred and fifty years ago. Morrow has essentially the same understanding, i.e., lack of understanding, of the problem and policy for dealing with it. Morrison is a congenial person who believes every people is entitled to national independence (Lenin said so), but right now in Europe the way to champion it is to maintain the strictest silence unless some undisciplined person asks you the question point-blank. Morrison has discovered that if he comes out in plain English for national independence in France, Holland, Poland and Servia, as he does in China, he will have to support de Gaulle, Queen Wilhelmina, the Polish bourgeoisie and Prince Peter as much as he now supports Chiang Kai-shek.

That, you say ("in order not to spoil the joke"?), is substantially our position! Excuse me.

The Cannonites contend that there is a difference *in principle* between the national question in Europe and the national (colonial) question in Asia. Loris, I note, challenges this preposterous contention; so, decidedly, do we; if my *impression* is not wrong, so do you. The Cannonites deny that the "outlived" national question has arisen again in the large countries of Europe; you and Loris, so far as I can judge, and our party, hold the contrary view. The Cannonites are thus

compelled to oppose the prominent advancement of democratic slogans in Europe today, especially the most important one of national liberation, the right of self-determination. We hold that the road to freedom for Europe, the road to the Socialist United States of Europe, lies through emphatically advancing to the forefront the main democratic slogans as a means of reawakening the masses, reassembling the proletarian and revolutionary movements, setting them into motion against their imperialist oppressors, and *thereby* facilitating the switching of the struggle onto the rails that lead to proletarian revolution and power.

What considerations animate Loris in his highly diplomatic polemic against the export-radicalism of the Cannonites, I do not know exactly and am not violently interested; but in the views he does put forward on this point he seems to face in the same direction as ourselves. So—this is my *impression*, you understand—do you. Right or wrong?

(d) Finally, you write:

Here is the national movement, and it is a *progressive movement* according to both the *objective conditions and the aspirations of the masses*. We have to accept it, *just as it is*, for the proletarian leadership is not "ordained," it is *conquered*. Only the most intimate participation can enable us to destroy the bourgeois influence in stubborn struggle against all other tendencies, to lead the movement to victory and to shift it over to the socialist revolution.

If this is written in opposition to our viewpoint, God alone in his infinite wisdom knows why. Allow me to quote from another document:

In the first place, it [the revolutionary vanguard] must find its place right in the heart of this underground popular movement, especially now, when the movement is still in a fluid state politically, before it has become programmatically and organizationally rigid in a bourgeois or petty-bourgeois sense, that is, before any of the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois political currents in the general movement has succeeded in completely centralizing it and imposing its political program and leadership upon it....

Unless the revolutionary Marxists are in the movement from the beginning, it will be impossible for them to accelerate the process of differentiation and influence in the direction of revolutionary proletarian hegemony and policy....

The presence of the revolutionary vanguard elements in the movement, and above all, a correct policy, are urgently required to counteract reactionary imperialist and social-imperialist currents. Otherwise, the definitive victory of these currents will convert the movement into a reactionary tool of imperialism and nullify its progressive significance....

The Marxists seek, first of all, to establish the hegemony of the proletariat and of proletarian policy in the general movement. They must therefore agitate for the incorporation of progressively bolder economic demands for the workers into the program of the national movement and its daily activity....

The "hegemony of the proletariat" in the national movement does not mean the abandonment of the struggle for national liberation in favor of the "purely socialist" struggle, in view of the fact that in the actual movement, "hegemony of the proletariat" would only mean the hegemony of the more advanced elements of the proletariat, who would still have to appeal for the support of the main body of the working class as well as the peasantry. The latter will respond quickly only if the "activist" movement puts at the head of its demands the war cry of national freedom....

The task of the revolutionary Marxists, therefore, is to explain to the masses, on the basis of their own experiences (which sometimes must be repeated and repeated before their lessons are finally assimilated!) that the democratic rights and democratic institutions which the masses desire cannot be assured by the bourgeoisie in power, but only if the workers continue their struggle to the end of taking power in their own hands, of ruling through the *most* democratic and representative bodies, the councils of workers and peasants....

Etc., etc.

Where do these quotations come from? From Wright? From Morrow? From Morrison? From one of the many con-

tributions Cannon has made to the discussion on this question, with that rich Marxian erudition and politico-theoretical insight for which he is justly renowned? Or even from Loris? No, my friend. They are taken from the resolution of our party on the National and Colonial Question, published in the January and February, 1943, issues of *THE NEW INTERNATIONAL*. This is most unfortunate for your conception of where the "political line of demarcation" should be drawn in this dispute. But the interests of political clarity are the gainer, and that is, is it not, what we are both interested in.

Political clarity demands also, I am compelled to acknowledge, that the formula which you quote from my article (that the struggle for genuine national freedom can be re-launched only by the proletariat) be either revised or elaborated, so that it ceases to lend itself to misunderstanding or misinterpretation. If you read, in detail, our party resolution, you will see clearly the sense of this formula. Even Hitler can "launch" a national movement and struggle, as he did in Iran, or as the Japanese did in Burma. Eisenhower can even "launch" a popular revolution in Italy with the advance of his armed forces. My aim, first and foremost, is to distinguish between the imperialist "national" movements, and the genuinely democratic, plebian, mass movements for national freedom, which are composed overwhelmingly of proletarians and peasants. My aim is to distinguish between the genuine national movement in France, for example, which was "launched" by the proletarians, and is predominantly proletarian (if you wish, plebian), and the national "movement" of the French imperialist army of de Gaulle and Giraud. The former must be supported wholeheartedly; the latter opposed and exposed. Yet, permit me to say, even to the former, to the revolutionary underground movement, I would set one "condition" for support: that the movement does not become part and parcel of the Allied imperialist camp, integrated in it and subordinated to it, a situation that *may* (not will, but may) develop *if* and when the Allied plus the de Gaullist armies land in France and *if* they succeed in establishing their domination over it.

Reflection now impels me to conclude that it is not so much your point of view on the national question that I have misunderstood. I misunderstood the real point of the "joke": *Your letter was misdirected—it was meant for the address of the Cannonites!* I do not find this so objectionable. Only, I think we should have been given only a copy and that the original should have been sent to them.

5. Which brings me directly to the last point—"demoralization" and the like.

It is quite unnecessary to point out to me the difficulties the German section and its leadership have labored under for years, the lack of full-time party workers, the meagerness of financial resources, etc. That affects many things; it has little to do with *my* point.

It is equally unnecessary to insist that the German comrades, or you in particular, are not demoralized in the struggle against the class enemy and for the socialist revolution, or that if it should ever come to pass that you quit the struggle, you would not act like those miserable chunks of moral flesh who reproach others to excuse themselves.

My remarks referred simply and solely to the fact that at least some of the German comrades had lost, or failed to display, their "morale" in the fight against Cannonism, and the policy and régime it represents. That is all; but it is enough.

You say you are preparing a reply to Morrow? I will read

it with interest. You say that answering Morrow is as good as answering anyone else, if the interests of the cause require it? Agreed, even if it is not always pleasant or even profitable. But let me give you a few examples of what I mean by demoralization in the concrete case.

You allowed the Fourth International to be undermined and reduced to a fiction without a serious struggle.

I will not dwell upon the German participation in the farcical "international conference" which was brought together for the sole purpose of sanctioning our bureaucratic expulsion from the SWP by means of a procedure which not even Foster and Pepper used against us in the CP, or Stalin against Trotsky and Vuyovich in the CI. After they expelled us from the CP, Foster and Pepper allowed Cannon, Abern and me to appear before a Plenum of the Central Committee to appeal against our expulsion, and no conditions were attached to our appearance. Stalin allowed Trotsky and Vuyovich to appear before the Comintern Plenum with their appeal, also without conditions. After our expulsion from the SWP, Cannon would not allow us even to appear with our appeal before the "international conference" unless we declared formally, in advance, that we would accept whatever decision was taken. Doesn't this alone entitle him to a place right next to Lenin as an expert in Bolshevik organizational principles and party democracy? A pity that the documented "incident" is not included in his recently-published book.

But I want to speak really of what has taken place after the installation of the new, "safe" Executive Committee and Secretariat, both qualified as "International." Will you be good enough to inform me of a single action that these bodies could take, or have taken, against Cannon's veto? Will you be good enough to inform me of what action it took, or word it uttered, in connection with the scandalous refusal of the SWP to issue a political declaration on the war, when the United States became a participant? I know what *your* opinion was. I know what was the opinion of the German comrades generally. But where was the International "leadership," or, more simply, where was the International? Does it exist only for ceremonial purposes? Is it merely a costume that Cannon dons on special occasions to show that he, thank God, is an internationalist? Is it valuable to him only to the extent that it "supports" him against us, and thereby proves the "isolation of the petty-bourgeois opposition in the ranks of the Fourth International"?

There is a vitally important discussion going on in the International on the national question in Europe. The French section has taken a stand, more or less. Your section, too. The English comrades are discussing it. The SWP has taken a "position" (the saints preserve us!). Where is the International? Where is its leadership? What does it have to say on the question? What guidance does it offer in the discussion, and in the decision that must be taken some day on a world-wide basis?

Here is the answer to the riddle: The leading international comrades are opposed to the SWP position on the question. Therefore? Therefore, the "Executive" or the "Secretariat" of the Fourth International keeps its mouth shut. It confines itself to the world-shaking act of excommunicating Quebracho from the Argentine movement. There's leadership for you! A real subject for Volume Two of Cannon's *Collected Works* on the organizational principles of Bolshevism! Do you begin to see what I meant specifically by "demoralization"? The Germans are part of this "leadership of the Inter-

national," aren't they? But I have yet to see an "open letter" from them on *this* question.

Again: One of the most, if not the most, important political acts of the Trotskyist movement since the war began was the conduct and policy of the leaders of the SWP in the Minneapolis trial. We have deliberately refrained from dealing with the question for reasons which I suppose you understand. Be that as it may. One of the leaders of the Fourth International, Comrade Grandizo Muniz of Mexico, did deal with the question. He wrote a sharp criticism of the policy followed by Cannon and Goldman in their trial testimony. He was not dealing with some trifle, some petty incident, but with the most important wartime political action of the leading section of the International. Cannon understood this. He wrote a reply, and both documents were "in the end" printed in pamphlet form. Without for a moment implying that I agree with Muniz on all points, I will nevertheless say that Cannon's reply proved all over again that "the style is the man," and that the contents are worthy of him.

Now, I ask: Where was the International in this most important political dispute? Did it intervene in any way? Did it express an opinion one way or another? Did it endorse the policy of Cannon, or the criticism of Muniz, or what the devil did it do? Does it exist only for the purpose of mumbling "Amen" to everything The Leader says, or, failing that, to remain silent? And the Germans—did they have anything to say, or didn't they consider the matter of importance?

It is not an "outdated" matter. It is still current. Here is what Goldman writes in *The Militant*, as recently as July 10, 1943:

... The Supreme Court said [in the case of the Stalinist, Schneiderman] practically what the defense in the Minneapolis case contends in its brief, namely, that the *Communist Manifesto* must be interpreted in the light of the conditions under which it was written; that in 1848, when the *Communist Manifesto* was issued, there was no democracy whatsoever in Europe; hence, there could be no way of effecting a revolution other than through violence.

Yes, my friend, there it is, word for word and in bold-face type. What a garland of roses for the grave of Eduard Bernstein! The very essence of the thoughts of Marx, eh? And of Lenin. And of Trotsky. And positively saturated with the dialectical spirit.

What does the "International" say to this? What can it say when one of its embittered leaders (not demoralized, not disheartened, just embittered!) found it possible to speak of the Secretariat as "Cannon's wastebasket"? It says nothing. Why? Because it doesn't exist. The Germans, however, do exist, whether or not they have professional workers. What do they say? They write "open letters." To whom? To Goldman? To Cannon? To the SWP? No—to Shachtman! You see, I do get the "joke," after all!

Again: At the September, 1940, Plenum of the SWP, the Cannonites adopted the slogan of "workers' control of conscription." The best that could be said for it was that it was equivocal. It became for a while the chief point of distinction between the "revolutionary" Cannonites and us "pacifists." We hammered away at it. As you know, they dropped it completely and it hasn't even been mentioned in *The Militant* for I don't know how long. Where, dear friend, were you in this fight?

And where were you, or the German section, or the "International," in the fight against the social-patriotic formula put forward at the same Plenum by Cannon, as his "new" contri-

bution to Marxist policy in the imperialist war? He said, you will surely recall, that in reply to the social-democratic question about what to do if Hitler attacks us, "we answered in a general way, the workers will *first* overthrow the bourgeoisie at home and *then* they will take care of invaders. That *was* a good program, but workers did not make the revolution in time. *Now* the two tasks must be telescoped and carried out *simultaneously*." (My emphasis—M. S.) In our criticisms of this "new" policy, we tore it to shreds, if you will permit me to say so. Cannon never even dared defend or repeat this "original" contribution of his. It was dropped into oblivion, where it belongs and where, I hope, it will remain. What did the "International" say? Good, a waste-basket cannot be expected to say anything in a political dispute. But the Germans, who are not a waste-basket, might have tried an open letter. They did not. Evidently, the rationing of paper in England is exceptionally severe.

Or finally: How is the silence of the German comrades on the recent past of the SWP to be understood, the SWP which cannot be a formal part of the "Fourth International" because of American laws, but which is certainly a political part of it? Are you unaware of the Cannonite policy of "preserving the cadres during the war," which is interpreted in practice as complete passivity in the unions and the class struggle, self-effacement, what Lenin used to call *khvostism* (tail-endism), which is taught to the SWP membership as the quintessence of Leninist wisdom, in contrast to our "adventurism"? (Yes, yes, we "petty bourgeois democrats" have turned with iron dialecticality into "adventurists" and even "putschists"!)

Have you nothing to say, either, on what is being substituted for class struggle activity in the SWP—the vulgar and ludicrous iconization of Cannon? Surely, you do not regard this as a "personal" question, or a trivial "organizational" matter. By now we should all have learned better.

People with well-hinged knees write repeatedly in Cannon's magazine, without smiling, of "Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and Cannon." Nobody protests indignantly, not even Cannon. Indignation at Byzantinism is reserved only for Russia. A special Commission is solemnly set up by the SWP Political Bureau to assemble the writings (don't laugh!) of Cannon for publication as collected works. (I do not envy the commission its task; it is still scratching its head: "Where do we even start to look for the stuff?!") All his factional trivia and bluster of the last party fight is painfully gathered together and blown up into a book on the fundamental principles of Bolshevik organization, which its editor coolly classifies as superior to anything ever written by Lenin or anyone else on the subject. Unrestrained adulation is the weekly rule of *The Militant* in its series of reviews of the book which every member of the intimate clique writes (or is obligated to write). The membership is taught that there were only three really Bolshevik organizations in history—Lenin's Party, the Russian Opposition, and Cannon's party. The Fourth International? Its sections? *Dreck*, as we say in German. Is it not a fact that Wright said just that in his introduction to Cannon's book? We learn from the friends we still have in the SWP that under stiff protest of international comrades, this passage was finally deleted and the introduction reprinted. A good beginning! But though the words are gone (in one case, at least), the "education" remains.

How is it possible to make an icon out of a man who so perfectly fits what Marx once shouted at Weitling? Well, Trotsky once reminded us, in writing about the ridiculous at-

tempts to do the same thing with Sen Katayama, that there is a Japanese proverb, "Even the head of a sardine can be worshipped, the main thing is to have faith." But we have always regarded this sort of thing not only as undignified in the working class movement, but as a means, and a symptom, of the corruption of the movement—not as a mere personal matter, which makes you sick to see, but which you try to shrug or smile away, as Goldman does.

I note that in this "trifling matter," too, you have not found it necessary to express yourself. No open letter, and, so far as I know, no closed one.

But enough for now. From what I have written, you will understand, even if you do not agree, why I must decline to accept what you call the "political line of demarcation" in the national question, and reluctantly refuse to withdraw my remarks, which I hope you now understand a little more clearly, about the demoralization of "some" of the "comrades."

MAX SHACHTMAN.

August 18, 1943.

P.S.—I now hear that the Cannonites have received a copy of your open letter to me for publication in their press. My friend, it is for their archives! Have you any idea that it will be printed by them, even "in the end"? I have no such idea, although I should be delighted to be disillusioned (once!) by Cannon. I do know that if one of my comrades sent an open letter of criticism to the press of an opponent, then, whether or not the opponent published it, I would most certainly favor publishing it in my party press. What then is the difficulty for Cannon? Simply the fact that he could not publish your letter without making some political comment of his own on it! And what could he say, my friend, what could he say? *Und das*, again as we say in German, *ist des Pudels Kern!*

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