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From Labor Action, Vol. 13 No. 42, 17 October 1949, p. 4.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for ETOL.
The assembly convened by the Chinese Communist Party has proclaimed a new state from the capital at Peiping. Mao Tze-tung, head of the party, is also chief of state; Chou En-lai, one of the party’s top triumvirate, premier and foreign minister. Communist Party domination is indisputable and complete in all sections of the new government.
Following swiftly on the announcement, Russia recognized the CP regime, renouncing its treaty with the almost defunct Nationalists. Most likely the other “peoples’ democracies” will follow suit in short order. Foreign Minister Chou has requested all governments, including the U.S. and Britain, to grant such recognition.
In speculations over these events most observers had agreed that the new state would be officially announced either at the fall of Canton, last toe-hold of the Nationalists on the continent, or on October 10, the so-called “double tenth” anniversary day of the 1911 Revolution which inaugurated the modern political era in China. Instead Mao made his unexpected statement to the Political Consultative Assembly on September 20, its opening day, a most unusual procedure. From a national viewpoint this was premature.
It is apparent now that the pronouncement was made to coincide with the opening days of the United Nations General Assembly with the object of strengthening the hand of Russian diplomacy. It is very probable that the Russians will try to make the Chinese issue a major pivot point in their strategy at this session of the UN.
With it they will not only be able to make extensive propaganda as defenders of an Asiatic people but will fry to challenge Anglo-American control of the council by demanding replacement of the discredited Nationalists by the new government. Since China has a permanent seat on the Security Council—at the insistence of Washington— this is a matter of great importance. Instead of answering the charges of Yugoslavia, Vishinsky can now make much of the deprivation of the rights of a nation of half a billion people.
The timing of the new state Was tied to the larger international strategy of Russian foreign policy; from its birth it is a member of one of the world power blocs without autonomous orientation in world affairs. Conversely, all nations must now reckon with this extension of Russian international power deep into the heart of Asia. For the first time a Stalinist state of continental proportions has been established outside of Russia and on the basis of its own conquest of power. An historic event of indefinable magnitude has occurred.
Already the cautious wait-and-see of the White Paper is outdated, since the time for decision has arrived. Anglo-American discussions have been taking place for weeks without solution of the differences. The Americans can continue to postpone action indefinitely, though with increasing difficulty, in the hope that the new regime will be forced to make certain concessions in return for trade. The British are not in such a happy position. They cannot afford to look askance at any trickle of trade nor can they ignore the pressing issue of the fate of Hong Kong.
In many ways the British have gained by the CP victories, replacing the U.S. as exporter to China. Hong Kong has taken over much of the trade formerly passing through Shanghai, which is under blockade. More than ever, Hong Kong is the entrepot and key port. London cannot, then, take its attitude from the relatively dispassionate heights of long-term and over-all strategy in the cold war. It will probably determine its policy on the basis of the regime’s attitude toward Hong Kong. If, as is likely, the Stalinists continue for a period to maintain the status quo, British pressure for recognition will be irresistible.
It is difficult to see on what basis recognition can be put off indefinitely. It would be incredible for London alone to take the step. The most likely formula at this time appears to be de facto recognition which would establish all the requisite conditions for trade but withhold de jure recognition until after the UN session at least or longer. It is doubtful if Washington will attempt to hold Formosa, Hainan Island or any other section of traditional China unless substantial non-Kuomintang resistance develops, as in Tibet.
In the larger framework of the international balance of power the problems are only becoming apparent and new ones will arise. The U. S. has been outflanked in the entire North Pacific, for example. With Manchuria under the Russian thumb, with connections to the industrial complex of Mukden and Changchun, and with rail, air and road connections to Siberia secure, the Russian bases in Dairen and Port Arthur arc substantial fortresses. They are located less than an hour from Japan and two hours from Okinawa. The Philippines are within easy range of even short-range bombers. For the first time a Russian Asiatic fleet can have permanent and extensive berths.
South Korea has been reduced to a helplessly surrounded island which can be overrun at will. Japan can be little more than a new Bataan and there are strong movements among all classes to reach an agreement on at least a modus vivendi with the Russians. In any case Japan is an unsuitable U.S. base and has been strategically neutralized. U.S. policy of support of native reaction has turned popular sentiment against MacArthur’s occupation. From its Chinese base Stalinism will now be in a position to launch a political offensive against the U.S. inside Japan. Nor are the Japanese Zaibatsu any more reliable for the U.S. Already many of them look to China as the only major market possible to them. American refusal to permit such trade will create new antagonisms.
These developments explain the hysterical cries for help from the reactionaries in power in South Korea, from the Philippines and from Chiang Kai-shek in their pressure for a Pacific Pact. And because commitment to such a pact would involve an enormous but hardly compensated outlay Washington has rejected these appeals. Looming over tomorrow’s horizon is the threat to Southeast Asia—Viet Nam, Burma and Malaya.
Thus far the Russians have not only gained through their relations with the new Stalinist regime in Peiping but also through direct expansion of their own power. In Manchuria a separate economic pact, plus joint administration of the railroads and many plants as well as control of the chief military bases, gives Russia what is in effect a sphere of influence in the traditional imperialist sense. Mongolia has been set up as an “autonomous area” with more connections to Russia than to China. For a long time the Russians have intrigued for a special position in Sinkiang. Last week Sinkiang adhered to the Peiping government with the understanding that henceforth Russian power would be dominant. A split-off government has been operating in the north of Sinkiang for several years.
These vast territories of almost one and three quarter million square miles and forty-five million people form a great arc from Tibet in Central Asia to the Japan Sea. As in Europe, Russia has acquired a buffer belt of weak and sparsely populated provinces whose connections with the center of Chinese power is quite tenuous.
The manner in which a new state is established is usually a good indicator of its character. There is no attempt to obscure the domination of the Communist Party. Not only are the heads of state CP leaders but “the working out of the initial draft [of the program of the state] was entrusted to the Communist Party of China,” according to Chou En-lai. The army and the state apparatus are monopolies of the party. Yet other elements are participating and the Political Consultative Conference, as well as the regime, is described as a coalition.
It should be noted that this PCC was not a constituent assembly. It was not elected nor in any way charged by the people with any political power. The delegates are rep-íesentatives of various types of organizations and in all cases they were appointed by or are themselves the leaders of these organizations. Thus the CP delegates were not elected by the CP membership or by a convention.
Fourteen political parties are represented. But these are parties only by courtesy. Actually only the CP has a membership and local organs over a wide area. Most of the rest are cliques of renegadea from the Kuomintang or new creations of the CP. Delegates came from six army units, all CP leaders, but not elected by the soldiers, who do not have any democratic organs. Of the total of 510 delegates, 206 claim to come from “sixteen people’s organizations,” such as the All-China Federation of Literary and Arts circles which had 15 delegates, only one less than the CP itself. The Preparatory Committee of the All-China Social Science Workers Congress had a like number, while the national minnorities within China were assigned ten seats. “In addition 75 noted individuals [representing themselves only] were specially invited to participate in the conference” with votes.
Obviously there is no question of whether "Western-type" democracy is or is not applicable in China. This farce was arranged by the. CP as its program for the composition of the new state. It has need of diverse elements around the banner of national revolution. It is not able to rule unilaterally ds yet nor does if dare establish popular arenas of discussion with power of election. Problems of political and economic reconstruction enforce alliances with diverse classes at this time in the absence of a great people's upsurge. But all these classes are given their status by the party, which thereby retains the power to move against them when it becomes expedient.
For the CP the major problem of consolidation is how to create a new national ruling class around the party as a core by recruiting elements from many sections of the population, especially the young intellectuals. Over a country as huge and varied as China, this is a matter for many years. In Russia, which was economically more advanced, the Stalinist consolidation took about ten years. That is why the theoretical leader of the CP, Liu Shao-chi, stated: “we deem it inappropriate [he is referring to the insertion of the goal of “socialism” in the program] because the taking of considerable socialist steps in China is a thing of the rather far future.”
However, the main thing is the retention of state power in the hands of the party. Under this aegis the goal will be pursued as rapidly as it can be.
The PCC, far from being a democratically determined congress empowered to establish a new government, has more of the characteristics of a fabricated junto. What kind of state did it set up? Mao Tze-tung said: “The present Chinese People’s PCC represents the people throughout the country. Therefore it exercises the powers of a national people’s congress.” It is therefore unnecessary to project such a congress for the near future. Instead the present structure requires a full meeting of even this PCC only once every three years.
This plenary session of the PCC is given full powers of “framing and amending the organizational statute of the central people’s government.” This plenum elects a national council, which will be the actual state, exercising both legislative and executive functions. For the first time “the principle of democratic centralism,” whereby “the minority submit(s) itself to the decision passed by the majority,” has been written into state law. As interpreted in every CP in the world, this means the banning of factions. In a governmental structure this means that every attempt to organize a political opposition is illegal. Nothing so blatant has been instituted in the “people’s democracies.” (All the quotations above have been taken from the official releases.)
It should be noted that one of the chief accusations against Chiang Kai-shek was his claim for the monolithic rule of the Kuomintang during “a period of tutelage.” The CP government, in effect, does the same but in the name of “national democracy”; it can do this because of the enormous power it has developed in its bureaucratic revolution. Its state is a bureaucratic centralized authoritarianism based on the emergent class of bureaucrats which for the moment has side alliances with selected non-representative leaders of the peasantry, small landlords and petty bourgeoisie.
It may be objected that this is much too definitive a characterization for what exists in China today. Surely this state and the Russian state are not identical? It is, of course, true that the Chinese Stalinists have not yet consolidated their power and this may take some years. Nor have they organized the economy to the degree that holds even in East Europe.
But these are differences of degree only. With the political power they have captured, the direction of the state is unmistakable. That there will be many obstacles goes without saying. But the entire energy of the state will be bent toward the consolidation of the new class had the extension of its power over ever larger areas of life. That is why it is entirely proper to designate this state as being of the same order as all other Stalinist states.
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