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EDITORIAL

RHODESIA... The squalid finale

THE MYTH OF UDI

During the political spectaculars that have erupted since November 1965 when the Smith regime declared UDI, attention has been focused on the so-called 'five principles' laid down by the Tory Government in 1964. Now, when the UDI crisis has reached its squalid finale the same hogwash about these 'five principles'—together with revelations of Lord Goodman, also the hammer of the London printing workers,— remain at the centre of political debate. Denis Healey and the Labour Party rightly argue that the settlement doesn't satisfy even the terms Home himself laid down; the Tories insist that flexibility, even in such shallow principles as they hold, is a ruling class prerogative. The point however is that the argument is completely irrelevant as far as the African masses of Rhodesia are concerned. The place these bogus 'five principles' have led in politic discussion is nevertheless no accident, for it has helped to obscure the whole past history of racist white settler rule backed by British imperialism. UDI it was argued was the decisive turning point in the fortunes of the African majority in Rhodesia. But for the "wicked Rhodesian rebels" imperialism would have 'prepared' the black Rhodesians for self government in accordance with the pattern of Britain's withdrawal from the rest of Africa. UDI was in fact a godsent opportunity to strengthen the myth of latter day British colonial policy as a combination of paternalistic aid to 'emergent' countries, and firm leadership in world affairs, through the Commonwealth framework.

But in the Rhodesian context a further myth followed. It was that

sanctions were designed to alter the situation of the African. In fact sanctions were specifically designed to return Rhodesia to *legality*—that is to say, business as usual—in the interests of British capitalists their Rhodesian friends, the political stability of Africa and British standing there, as well as farther flung diplomatic interests. That African interests took no place in the scale of priorities of both Tory and Labour governments was evident from constitutional proposals of Wilson during the ‘Tiger’ and ‘Fearless’ talks, which were less “liberal” than those of the 1961 Rhodesian Constitution.

Had UDI not been declared the situation of the African masses could only have continued to deteriorate, as it had done since the beginning of imperialist exploitation of Rhodesia. The idea that British imperialism would have been able, even if willing, to force a movement in favour of the Africans when in the face of outright “rebellion” it was powerless, is completely wishful thinking.

Nevertheless this liberal ideology found a reflection in those layers to the British left which huffed and puffed for more sanctions, and even for military intervention to ‘crush’ the Smith regime. At bottom it reflected ignorance and a dearth of thought on the left as to the nature of the Rhodesian regime.

IMPERIAL CONQUEST

On the 13 September 1890, the ‘Pioneer Column’ of the British South Africa Company ceremonially hoisted the British flag over the new settlement of Fort Salisbury. Rhodes, an ambitious speculator had caajoled and bribed around British ruling class circles to secure the Royal Charter for the BSAC which enabled him to claim the Rhodesias for the Crown. He pulled off a veritable coup in gaining the backing of the City of London and Joseph Chamberlain for his dream of a British Africa from the Cape to Cairo. Behind Rhodes’ dreams lay the interests of British imperialism during the scramble for Africa in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. What was at issue was the defence of the British world-wide freedom to trade wherever there was profit to be made. As Lenin pointed out imperialism involved the struggle for territorial ‘spheres of influence’ to exclude or anticipate rivals.

The path for Rhodes’ company was not as smooth as he hoped and there followed seven years of bloody warfare between “settlers and natives”. The outcome of the Matabele War was in the end disastrous for the Africans. The land they needed to carry on their traditional economy of cattle rearing was seized by white farmers. Where they remained to try and eke out an existence the land was sold out from under them to white settlers who demanded labour services as a condition for the Matabeles remaining on the land. In return they gave no security of tenure. The African could be evicted at any moment. In other words the colonised had less security in exchange for their labour services than under feudalism.

The last rising of the Matabele came in 1895 when they took

advantage of weaknesses of Rhodes' political position as a result of the calamitous 'Jameson Raid'. Unlike the earlier war where the Matabele had used the fatal military tactic of direct confrontation with the better armed white enemy, this time they fought in small guerilla units and relied more on rifle power than the traditional *assegais*. But again strategy and leadership was wanting, though the Company was forced to call in Imperial aid to pacify the country, eventually starving the resistance into a piteable surrender.

The defeat inflicted on the Africans in this period was fairly decisive, and doubtless contributed to their passivity during the First World War when the European population was considerably depleted, and could have been wiped out without too much difficulty.

From the First World War until 1923 Rhodesian politics was dominated by the attempt to establish an autonomous state firmly in the control of the white settlers. British imperialism on the other hand has been cripplingly weakened by the War during which the tendencies in world capitalism that had been threatening to destroy her industrial and trading supremacy were accelerated. Consequently, it was forced to rely more on the white regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia to protect its interests. This was the context in which these regimes gained more or less complete autonomy. As a result the Rhodesian settlers gained the unique position of a self-governing colony within the Empire. The white farmers rejected the idea of unity with South Africa under the influence of the remaining prosperity of the post-war boom.

COLONIAL STRUCTURE

The basis of the colonial structure of Rhodesia which developed in the early twentieth century and which crystallised between the wars was first and foremost the white rural bourgeoisie of small and medium mine owners and farmers. The character of this exploiting class was unlike that of nearly all other African colonial territories where the tasks of imperialism were taken on completely by the large international companies. Its national character committed it to the development of the country in the long term, whereas the interests of imperialist corporations tended to be much less permanent. Thus the white farmer bourgeoisie were the key class in the colonial structure.

Similarly the formation of the white working class was strikingly different to that of other settler colonies in that it did not precede industrial development but was a consequence of it. Therefore from the very beginning the white working class lived in a high wage economy and by the end of the thirties, together with the small manufacturing petty bourgeoisie constituted the bulk of Rhodesian whites.

The problem for the white farming bourgeoisie up to the Second World War was to expand the internal market for their produce while harmonizing the interests of the other white classes, and international

capital. Industrialisation, while the answer to this problem and approved by international capital, could not be achieved by the proletarianisation of the Africans. Firstly this would create a dangerous competitor to the white rural bourgeoisie in the form of a class of African capitalist farmers. Secondly, a black proletariat would create unwanted competition for the white workers. The solution was found in a series of major racist Acts designed to reduce the threat of African competition in every area. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 effectively divided the economy into non-competing racial groups. As well as confining the Africans to the worst land, specific measures were taken to ensure that Africans had little or no access to markets, or means of credit for improvements. This effectively blocked the emergence of a black rural bourgeoisie while ensuring a supply of cheap farm labour for the whites because of the resultant impoverishment of African farming.

Side by side with this came the exclusion of African labour from the industrial market by the Industrial Conciliation Acts of 1934, and the Native Registration Act of 1936. Under these laws Africans were specifically excluded from the definition of employees. If Africans were employed, however, they would have to be paid the same rate as whites. Under these laws of course, no employer would employ an African where a white could be found. The white workers also had extraordinary power to regulate the terms of apprenticeship and control immigration thereby creating a situation of labour scarcity to keep up wages. To complete the system dubbed 'separate development' legislation to set up a structure of education for whites was passed while not even a 'parallel' structure was built for blacks. Not only were Africans excluded from skilled employment; they were prevented from gaining such skills.

White power was therefore consolidated in this period by pushing the Africans into a state of semi-destitution.

CONTRADICTIONS OF RACIST CAPITALISM

After the Second World War big changes took place in the Rhodesian economy. The first important structural change was the emergence of a black proletariat slowly severed from the relative security of the land, more class conscious, and with strong social and political roots in the peasantry because of their common exploitation. Secondly, came the growth of manufacturing capital whose share in National Income rose from 9% in the thirties to 15% in the early fifties and over 18% in the early sixties. For this sector new outlets were needed and it came to depend more on the growth of purchasing power of the African workers. Import substitution and European migration provided the initial growth of the manufacturing sector but the question of the African market could not be put off. At the same time the demand for labour in all sectors of industry was by no means satisfied by European migration. The interests of international capital, which had gained a hold in every industrial sector now no longer coincided with that of the white rural bourgeoisie. In agriculture the white farmers had changed the main crop to tobacco, which also meant a switch to the external

market, and together with import substitution tended to offset for a time the slow growth of the market for agricultural products internally, even if in the long term the condition for rapid growth remained the expansion of African purchasing power.

These changes in class interests were reflected in post war Rhodesian policies. Even before the War as early as 1948 Premier Huggins had seen the threat of the growth of a black proletariat, as well as its necessity, and had called for the creation of an African middle class as an insurance against the mass of Africans. After the War a series of reforms were initiated to encourage the growth of African middle class and rural bourgeoisie, as well as proletariat.

But the response of the white rural bourgeoisie and working class, who could see that these policies would harm their interests, tended to create a settlement of compromises which satisfied no one in the end. The Land Husbandry Act of 1951 enabled the creation of an African proletariat by removing the right of free access to land but at the same time denied the right to hereditary transference of land which stopped the growth of an African rural bourgeoisie. Educational reforms were also a failure. To avoid a militant response in the fifties from these white classes a compromise between manufacturing and international capital and agrarian capitalism was made at the expense of the African. The militant response of the African by this time however, brought about the major post war crisis in the relations between the white classes. The *national* capitalists, the white petty bourgeoisie and the white working class decided it was time to call a halt to the very marginal liberalisation since 1945. They polarised around the Rhodesian Front Party, which obtained power in 1962.

CONDITIONS OF THE MASSES

Despite the doubling of manufacturing output by 1954 when Rhodesia entered the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the growth of industry from 1946 was not reflected in the growth of African industrial employment. Although there was an initial rise African labour in mining in fact fell from 19% to 7%; in construction from 11% to 6%; while in manufacturing it rose only from 11% to 13%.

In Rhodesia income is distributed between the wealthiest 4-6% of the population more unequally than in any other country for which data is available. The additional difference is that this 4-6% in Rhodesia is the whole white population. In 1964 the whites were 3.8% of the population in Rhodesia and took 49.4% of all personal income. In 1968 they were 4.8% of the population and took 56.5%.

The evidence of African economic retardation during the 'liberal' period of the fifties and the Rhodesian Front regime is fairly conclusive. The ratio of white to African incomes remained more or less constant at around 25.

	White Income per Head	Black Income per Head
1956	£637.8	£24.8
1968	£628.2	£24.5

But these figures exaggerate the true position of the majority of Africans. What has happened is that African rural incomes have fallen absolutely from £14.6 a year in 1956 to £11.1 a year in 1968, and that the real difference in income is that white incomes are a staggering 56 times higher than black rural incomes.

While white industrial workers incomes are in comparison a modest 12 times the income of black industrial workers, the actual number of black workers is insignificant in the black population.

Number of Black Workers 1968	
Mining	48,400
Manufacturing	85,200
Construction	37,900
Total	171,500
Total African Population 4,700,000.	

Nor are the African urban workers in any sense a privileged layer. They are desperately poor. A report in 1958 showed that only 23.5% of urban African households had incomes equal to an estimated poverty line and that the overall picture was one of great poverty. The extremely high rate of exploitation can be indicated by the fact that in the above sectors of industry average black earnings in 1968 were between £161-222 per year, compared with 12 times that rate of wages paid to white workers.

What emerges in the balance sheet of the conditions of the Rhodesian masses is one of steady and increasing exploitation since 1889 and the occupation of the Mashonaland. First during seven years of bloody warfare by the settlers to crush all resistance, which reduced the Africans to a status which was literally worse than serfdom. Later during the inter-war period the consolidation of the colonial structure meant that the undifferentiated masses of African peasants were forced onto the worse land and remain in an ever increasing rural squalor as the construction of a massive white racist superstructure went on a pace. Thirdly, since 1945 despite the emergence of a black proletariat in embryo its growth has been blocked by the frightened whites. This together with the tightening of the racist land legislation, culminating in the 1970 Land Tenure Act has meant that the overwhelming number of Africans who live from subsistence agriculture, have been *absolutely* impoverished.

IMPERIALISM AND APARTHEID

UDI produced only a marginal worsening of the African's position, mainly through the shifting of the burden of sanctions onto the black

workers in white agriculture and mining. This was a severe blow to the African masses as 25,000 jobs were lost in the first two years of UDI while population rose absolutely. Nevertheless the loss of legal rights and other progressively repressive measures came before UDI after the Rhodesian Front was itself in turn a result a consistent history of imperialist and white settler exploitation of the Rhodesian masses. Thus, the liberal solution of the 'five principles' is sheer cant.

The 'crisis' of the last six years essentially lies in the contradictions of capitalist development in a racist superstructure, which had come to a head in a clash between the *national* capitalists and white working class settlers, and the needs of Rhodesian manufacturing capitalism and international capitalist interests. This had happened in South Africa a decade or so ago. For national and international capitalism in Rhodesia *apartheid* has become the only way of even temporarily maintaining stability. It is the only way any expansion at all can be achieved without setting off a massive growth of the African proletariat to threaten the white political power. Nevertheless, by forcing the rural masses to bear the whole of the burden of an ever increasing impoverishment of African farming the formula for long-term economic stagnation is being applied. The racist white regime and its imperialist backers are therefore heading along a road of deadly contradiction. But there is nothing inevitable about its fatality. The struggle to decapitate it has to be well prepared.

The proletarianisation of white-collar workers

This article is based on notes of a lecture given by Mike Cooley, President of the AUEW Technical and Supervisory Section, in London on the 27th March 1971.

The proletarianisation of white-collar workers can only be fully understood when seen in the broader context of the effect technological change is having on the working class as a whole. It is therefore necessary to analyse the nature of technological change to establish if it abides by laws of development and certain discernible patterns, and to see how these patterns affect white-collar workers and the whole nature of social and productive organisation.

Technological change is a powerful force which has moulded the course of history from earliest times, not merely in the sense that it tends to raise the standard of living of all or sections of the community but also in a much more profound political sense in that technological change alters the whole character of society.

It was the invention of agriculture and subsequent flow of inventions such as metallurgy and the use of wheeled transport which transformed the simple life of primitive Communism into civilisation with its complexities and class distinctions.

"Democracy" of iron

About 3,000 B.C. a discernible change was taking place in the structure of society. The communities of equal farmers were gradually replaced by states in which the vast majority lived at subsistence level, while all

the surplus products of their labours were used for a small class of kings, noblemen and priests. Class division became the basis of social structure. That age obtained its name from the metal used to provide implements at that stage—Bronze. However, due to its rarity and costliness, bronze never greatly extended man's control over nature. Its rarity also ensured that it was only available to the prosperous class.

When man learned to produce iron as well as bronze, the then society was profoundly affected by this technical advance. At this stage, metal tools became generally available to the farmer and enormously increased the productivity of agriculture. From 700 B.C., iron axes made possible the clearance of great forests and hence a further expansion of agriculture. The increased productivity of agriculture yielded a surplus which could then support a large number of craftsmen. The commodities produced by the craftsmen became more generally available, and were no longer merely produced for the wealthy. The craftsmen provided the farmer directly with tools in order to increase the productivity of his work. There then existed for the first time a balance relationship between industry and agriculture.

This changed relationship ended a stage in which agriculture provided good for the craftsmen, but the craftsman's product went to the select few. The craftsmen, by using iron, were able to provide themselves with ever improved tools, thereby increasing the productivity of their crafts which in turn tended to enhance their economic status. Thus the advance in technology from the production of bronze to that of iron tended to break down barriers between classes which had brought about a stagnation in the Bronze Age.

Power Driven Machinery

It can therefore be demonstrated that even from earliest times technological change has had a profound effect upon the structure of society. The more "democratic" Iron Age societies created circumstances in which technical advance could be made. This progress was however limited by the fact that although slavery created the conditions for the accumulation of wealth into fewer hands and therefore laid the basis for a further development of the productive forces; yet, in its decline it was responsible for holding back the full development of techniques such as animal power and the water wheel. Thus technological change necessitated a social change in which slave states had to be replaced by mediaeval feudalism. This structure of society provided a higher status for the master craftsman, and thereby stimulated a wealth of technical innovations including the first development of power-driven machinery.

By the end of the Middle Ages, the scale and nature of machinery had become too large for the social organisation which had created it. Thus the master craftsmen and their powerful Guilds which had introduced the machinery then became an impediment to future progress. The further development of the productive forces could only be brought about by the newly arising capitalist class.

Thus it will be seen that technological change has a profound effect upon the social organisation at any given time. It is desirable at this stage to attempt to quantify the rate of technological change. The scale of development in the last 20 years is probably equal to that accomplished in the whole of man's existence. The scale of scientific effort, which is closely allied to technological change, in the present century has increased out of all recognition. It has been asserted by Professor J. D. Bernal that in 1896 there were perhaps in the world some 50,000 people who between them carried on the whole tradition of science, not more than 15,000 of whom were responsible for the advancement of knowledge through research. Today the total number of scientific workers in industry, government and academic circles must be in the order of 3 million.

Thus the rate of change must be at least exponential and we shall attempt to see how such a rapid rate of change interacts on social organisations and the sort of stresses it gives rise to. To do this we shall merely examine technological change over the last 100 years and attempt to identify the changing role of the white-collar worker during that period. A useful basis from which to do this is to consider the organisation of a typical factory over that period. A factory 100 years ago would have been owned and managed by the same person. This owner-manager would be responsible in all but the most trivial detail for the complete running of the factory. He would determine the tempo at which people worked, the purchasing of materials, the design or nature of the product, and the actual price at which the product was sold.

Let us firstly consider the type of equipment he would have had as a means of production. He could rest assured in those days that if he bought a piece of machinery it would last for his lifetime, and even be an asset which he could pass on to his son. In the 1930s, however, the life of equipment was reduced to something like 25 years; in the '50s it was about 10 years, and now capital intensive equipment is obsolete in about 4 or 5 years. We can therefore say that it is an objective law that the rate of obsolescence of equipment is increasing.

The second thing is that the actual cost of the means of production for any commodity, as distinct from the price of the commodity, continues to rise. If again we use our analogy of the factory 100 years ago, the most complicated lathes one could get would cost about the equivalent of 10 men's wages for a year. Today, however, the most complicated lathe with its complete environment of NC (Numerical Control) tape material is something like the equivalent of 100 men's wages per year. The capitalist of today is therefore confronted with machinery which is becoming obsolete by the minute and is involving him in enormous capital investment. The effect of this is that he will seek to exploit this equipment for 24 hours a day, and in doing so will seek to ensure that the entire workforce which interfaces with this equipment will also work 24 hours a day. He will seek in the process to introduce shift working and eliminate so-called "non-productive" time. Since this kind of

equipment greatly changes the organic composition of capital we find that the greater "effort" in the productive process is made by the machine than by the operator. Hence employers will seek to ensure that the rate at which the machinery is utilised is set by somebody other than the operator himself. Therefore we will find more and more that workers of all kinds will be put under pressure to move away from payment by results and begin to accept measured day work.

More and more white-collar workers are now finding that high capital equipment is being used in their work environment. Typical examples are the use of computerised systems. Many of these, particularly in the design environment, are directly synchronised with high capital equipment on the shop floor. These systems are used, for example, for the preparation of NC tapes for NC control machines, such as jig bores or lathes on the shop floor. Employers are therefore attempting to ensure that this high capital equipment is exploited for 24 hours a day for the reasons already given.

My own union is finding, for example, increasing pressure on a whole range of our members to work on shift. The effect these developments are having on white-collar workers is quite dramatic. Previously these workers, including graduates, really believed that they were not members of the working class at all, and that trade union organisations were entirely appropriate for the shop floor, and none of their concern.

They are now being compelled to work shift, and accept work measurement as shop floor workers have had to for many years. They are also driven to accept the same organisational forms of resistance to these trends as the shop floor workers have done.

Shift working is having a profound effect upon the social life of white-collar workers. I know of a suburban estate composed almost entirely of extremely status-conscious white-collar workers. Their social life is geared to a normal nine to five existence. Some belong to a small theatre group, others to tennis clubs and even a small operatic society. There was some consternation three or four years ago when the council built an estate within this suburban island. Quite apart from the quality of the property and the clothes of the occupants, the council tenants were distinguishable by the irregular times which they departed for work. Many were engaged in three shift working at a large engineering firm. During the past 18 months, a science based firm where several of the white collar workers are engaged as mathematicians, has installed a computer complex. These are now in turn required to work in shifts, and depart at the same time as those on the council estate. Not only has a further symbol of their status been removed, but they will in addition experience the same social effects of shift working as manual workers have done for some time.

A number of studies demonstrate this. P E Mott et al. 'Shift Work, the Social, Psychological and Physical Consequences,' Ann Arbor, 1965, 'found that day workers get an average of seven and one-half

hours sleep per night, which is an hour more than the overall average of rotating shift workers. But when they are working the night segment of their shift, rotating workers average only five and one-half hours of sleep. The biggest problem for rotating shift workers occurs when they move from their turn on the day shift to the night shift.' One study 'report that only 37 per cent of the orkers adjust to the new sleeping times immediately, while 28 per cent of the workers said that they took four days or more to adjust to the night shift Another study of operators in two different power plants in the United States found that only 31 per cent of the men working under an extended seven-day week rotation reported that they adjusted to their hardest shift change within a day or less. Even fewer, just 5 per cent of the men working a monthly rotation schedule, stated they could adjust to their hardest shift change in one day. Under the latter schedule, 70 per cent reported that their adjustment to the new schedule took four days or more.'

'A higher proportion of night and rotating shift workers reported that they were fatigued much of the time, that their appetites were dulled, and that they were constipated much of the time.'

'The ulcer rate (among German workers) was eight times as high for the rotating shift workers as for the fixed shift group.'

'The most frequently mentioned difficulties in husband-wife relationships concern the absence of the worker from the home in the evening, sexual relations, and difficulties encountered by the wife in carrying out her household duties'. . . 'Another area of family life that seems to be adversely affected by certain kinds of shift work is the father-child relationship.'

Factory Control and the White Collar Worker

If we return to our example of a factory 100 years ago, we can trace the manner in which control of the work force has changed. Initially, the owner manager would have exercised a direct control himself. With the increasing complexity of production and a growth of the number of workers involved, he was compelled to delegate responsibility to the subordinates. One of the most obvious examples is the emergence of the foreman—a white collar worker. Gradually, the assessment of earnings was undertaken by other white collar workers (subsequently to develop into work study engineers). Material purchasing and supply and a whole series of ancilliary functions were also undertaken by them. These were in fact organisational functions of the factory owner manager at an earlier historical stage. In consequence, these white collar workers although exploited themselves were also the objective oppressors of the workers on the shop floor. In order to secure their loyalty, the management provided them with "privileges" denied to manual workers. They had sick pay, insurance schemes and paid holidays. They had far greater protection against unemployment arising from minor slumps. Many of them felt a great adherence to the management, and in some instances felt

themselves to be part of it. The objective role of some of these workers, for example, that of foremen tended to make them hostile to trade union organisation. Indeed at one stage, because of the role they played, D.A.T.A. refused to have such people in membership. During the last 20 years, technological change has fundamentally altered the role of these people. In many technologically advanced firms, the tempo of work is no longer set by a foreman or a work study engineer, but is determined by the rate of the process itself. Foremen increasingly find themselves supervising technical processes rather than people. In consequence their relationship to the general work force is rapidly changing. During the past four years, we have recruited many foremen, and some of them have demonstrated militancy and class consciousness which would have been regarded as an aberration ten or fifteen years ago.

Economical Consequence of Technological Change

It is worth identifying some of the major consequences of technological change at this stage.

- a) Increased cost of the means of production of most commodities.
- b) Increased rate of obsolescence of all high capital equipment.
- c) Increased research and development costs.
- d) Diminishing rates of returns (See Fig. 1)

The effect of the above is that the manipulation of markets (to effect economy of scale), takeovers and rationalisation become the prime function of top management. A moribund stage is reached in which the production of capital becomes more important than production itself. Hence we will see more financiers such as Arnold Weinstock in top industrial positions; and fewer technicians such as Sir Denning Pearson. This will result in a shift of power inside the companies themselves. The white collar superstructure of design engineers, technologists, metallurgists and chemists were all part of the management chain leading quite directly to overall managerial decisions. Such decisions will increasingly be taken by the financiers as control of the company passes into the hands of the market manipulators. The design/engineering hierarchy is now confined to the control of production, and undertakes the role of non managerial skilled workers. With this change in status, has come an alienation from management and a much greater willingness to join trade unions as they recognise their gradual proletarianisation.

Fragmentation of Skills

The fragmentation of skills on the shop floor is well known. A similar process is taking place in white collar areas. The draughtsman of the thirties could design a product, draw it, stress it, select the materials, write the test specification, etc. Each of these is now quite separate specialised function. White collar workers are coming to realise the basic reality that employers see them also as mere units of production!

RATES OF PROFIT FOR COMPANIES 1954-1963

Size-Group	1954	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	Average (54-63)
£65m and over	15.17	17.41	16.74	14.80	13.94	13.80	14.46	12.21	11.10	11.91	13.93
£35m —£65m	21.81	21.60	18.86	16.77	16.22	14.78	16.37	13.89	12.42	12.49	16.47
£15m —£35m	15.86	15.20	14.85	13.89	13.97	13.46	14.40	11.96	10.59	11.60	13.48
£10m —£15m	19.94	18.49	16.82	17.74	16.68	17.30	15.71	12.60	12.61	13.02	16.09
£5m —£10m	16.96	18.07	15.91	16.54	16.01	15.25	17.09	15.33	13.53	13.75	15.83
£2.5m —£5m	18.41	19.53	17.54	16.48	14.81	14.46	14.54	13.72	12.98	13.73	15.65
£1m —£2.5m	21.12	22.14	20.96	18.96	17.07	16.82	15.06	14.56	14.02	14.32	17.52
£0.5m —£1m	23.58	23.54	22.33	21.89	21.49	18.77	19.21	18.97	17.72	16.56	20.39
£0.25m—£0.5m	17.62	15.92	15.19	14.47	14.56	16.36	17.45	18.63	15.32	15.46	15.68
Under £0.25m	21.78	21.08	18.53	19.18	18.19	17.46	17.22	18.94	18.40	18.63	18.70
Averages	19.31	19.38	17.84	17.18	16.42	15.96	16.20	15.17	13.95	14.15	16.54

SOURCE: *Economica*, May 1968, Vol. 35, No. 138.

This directly affects their working conditions, for when an employer deals with units of production his main concern is to cut costs. This has always been obvious in the case of machinery. For example, an employer does not buy a machine with a tape control if he can get away with using a manual one. But this also extends to the environment in which that unit of production is situated. You provide any productive unit with the minimum environment in which it will work. You do not use it in a temperature controlled room if you can get away with putting it in an old shed. You do not provide it with exotic oils or rare and expensive raw materials if it will work with cheaper ones. In other words you provide the unit of production with the minimum capabilities necessary to do the job and you put it in the minimum environment it will work in. These principles are now being applied more and more to white collar workers. People are now provided with the minimum education and intellectual development necessary to enable them to do the job. It is no longer the case that even intellectual white collar workers have had the broad education that they had in the past. Like the man on the shop floor they are to be trained to do a job and not as human beings. All this is becoming very evident in science courses where the sole object now is to turn out a technician who can do his job and not a person who can think of the implications of what is happening.

What is happening to white collar workers can even be looked at in terms of maintenance. Just as you give a machine the minimum maintenance so the working class has always been given the minimum 'maintenance' in the form of the National Health Service. If anyone thinks that that is an exaggerated analogy just let them remember the statement made by a Doctor at Willesden Hospital that there was no need to resuscitate National Health patients over the age of 65. Just like a machine these people had to perform a particular work cycle, but once that was accomplished they are no longer necessary.

This tendency to produce and train workers for a particular work cycle is becoming increasingly obvious and is beginning to act very brutally against older workers, and in particular against older white collar workers who find it difficult to adapt to the new techniques of computerisation, etc. In most 'rationalisation' schemes whereas in the past white collar workers would have been protected against the full effects, for the historical reasons mentioned earlier, now in many cases it is the white collar workers who are the first to go and in the main it is older white collar workers who are the first of all to be made redundant.

These processes we have just described are of such importance that it is necessary to look at them in some detail. They are going to get increasingly important as the rate of technological change increases. It is in particular important for all younger workers to understand them as unfortunately it is a biological fact that we are all going to get old.

Many highly skilled white collar workers now have a specified life span in their particular area of work, and after that their experience what American Sociologists now term "Career de-escalation." They say, for example, that a mathematician has given of his best in about

10 years and that you have soaked him of his most fruitful ideas by the age of 35 and thereafter you should 'de-escalate' him down the hierarchy and get some up and coming young technologist to take his place. This position has not of course yet been reached for the mass of white collar workers, but the trend is present. The concept of designing a life span for people is already quite open and brutal for manual workers. For example, at Standard Triumph of Coventry they calculate that they have burned up a man on the main production line after only 10 years. They even tried to get the AEF to agree that these 10 years should start not later than 30 so that they can get young healthy workers to slave at a terrific pace for 10 years.

Increasing Specialisation and the Dominance of the Machine

Just as the work done by all units of production is becoming more and more specialised so too is the work of the white collar workers. Furthermore they are beginning to be appendages to machines. For example, a clerical worker will no longer be responsible for the entire control of wages and all the conditions relating to wages, but becomes just a computer specialist in the preparation of piece work rates and so on. White collar workers now find that at an increasingly early stage they are pigeon holed into a particular kind of job from which it is extremely difficult to change. Any training they receive will be geared to that particular job and to nothing else. This is perfectly obvious if you look at the time-table of studies of people on day release.

One subject that has been discussed a great deal is the effect this is having on embryonic white collar workers such as students. Here the pattern is more complicated than some people would like to believe. It is certainly the case that firms such as ICI see all graduates as potential industrial fodder, but there is a very big difference in the roles which different types of students play once they have entered industry.

The 'revolt' of students seems to be strongest amongst social science students. Yet it is these students who, when they leave university, will be amongst the worst and most direct oppressors of the working class. They will go into general management or, even worse, the personnel departments. Some will even become what one West London firm now refers to as "Pacification Experts." These type of people see men who have had nervous breakdowns (as a result of the frantic tempo of work) and try to convince them that what the real trouble is their relation with their wives, etc. On the other hand it is the engineering students, who are most backward at college who actually enter into the most proletarianised white collar occupations. In this new context it is they, and not the ex-social science students, who are most likely to join trade unions and stand up to the boss.

Other layers of students fall between these two extremes both in terms of their proletarianisation and in terms of their reaction to it. Consider, for example, the case of teachers. These are not directly concerned in relations at the work place, but their status and style of work

has changed remarkably. At one time to become a teacher was a relatively well paid and reasonable way for bright young people to escape from the working class. Now, however, no graduate leaving university would think about becoming a teacher simply from the point of view of money or status. If he or she does decide to become a teacher then either they have to accept genteel poverty or they have, like other workers, to stand up and fight. This second alternative brings them into contradiction with the whole concept that because you have a degree you have an assured status, have earned the right to a decent living standard.

This tendency towards proletarianisation will also be helped by the increasing mechanisation that is occurring in teaching with the introduction of language laboratories and such like. In addition modern developments such as computer graphics will take away much of the mystique of certain fields of teaching. This technique means that the most complex mathematical functions can be displayed visually and thus be made more readily comprehensible. This leaves far less opportunity for the rigmorole and special airs which teachers of these subjects previously used to adopt for no other reason than to enhance their own status.

With the introduction of these new teaching methods exactly the same process will occur as we have already discussed concerning the introduction of highly capital intensive equipment into industry. I can't see local councils with the attitude that they have towards education, setting up big science laboratories or language laboratories and then only seeing them used from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. Teachers will then be confronted with the problem of shift working either for the purposes of adult education, or, as they are already talking about, in order to introduce shift systems into secondary schools.

These processes are as yet only trends amongst many white collar workers, for some, however, they are everyday facts of life. These has been carried to extreme lengths in, for example, the case of design workers. They are now performing many functions which in the past were performed by manual workers. In the past a designer drew something which he then gave to a manual worker, a very highly skilled one, who would transform the drawing into the physical commodity. What is now happening is that with tape controlled machines on the shop floor white collar workers in preparing the tapes are destroying some of the most highly skilled shop floor jobs and instead the machine setting function is being carried out by white collar workers. In companies like Ferranti's you now have a situation where all the Jig Borers have been eliminated and have been replaced by a combination of semi-skilled workers on the shop floor and white collar workers in the offices. The effect on the white collar workers is that the employer now presses them as hard as he pressed the skilled manual workers. This has greatly increased the work load on the white collar workers, and transformed the situation whereby if our members have a work to rule the employer could hardly tell for several weeks. Now they aim to press as much as possible out of each worker and they soon know if we are having a work to rule, a think-in or any other form of action.

In their desire to squeeze all possible effort out of this type of white collar workers, managements are desperately trying to find ways of assessing their effort and increasing it. This is particularly the case with for example designers, where in the past it has been difficult to tell if he was really working or not. Now firms aim to control the environment in which such people work so as to remove any such latitude. In the case of a designer for example, the United States Department of Labour reckoned that previously a designer would only spend 5% of his time actually taking design decisions. The rest of his time was spent on routine referencing, talking to other people about how he should deal with a problem and going to libraries to consult standard works. With the introduction of computer graphics however, you can eliminate all the reference work and by so doing increase the decision making rate of the worker by 1900%. The strain this puts on the worker is quite enormous. This applies even down to little things such as going to the library to consult a reference. This has often seemed to me a very human thing to do giving an opportunity to chat to mates, get away from the direct atmosphere of the work place, and so on. I think that we need this type of civilization in industry and in fact with the present tempo of work it is almost a therapeutic necessity. But firms have now virtually succeeded in eliminating this. You now work interactively with the computer and in some jobs, such as optimising a wing configuration, you can now do a job in 5.8 minutes which took 6 months by traditional methods of work.

In fields such as design mathematics the changes have been even more marked. The integration of the man into the machine system and his domination by the machine has here become total. Firms now see the man as a component of a man machine system and interface him with a computer which constitutes the machine component. A man in a mathematical sense is, of course, completely unreliable, totally inconsistent, but highly creative. When you interface the two you therefore get an extremely volatile relationship which completely revolutionises the workers conditions of work. For example, the set of calculations that were carried out for the space frame of Expo 67 took 2 hours of a graduates time to do and it is reckoned that to do the same calculations by traditional means would have taken 30,000 years. The machinery to do this is of course extremely expensive and this means that as far as the management is concerned it can no longer have its white collar workers free to walk about the factory with drawings under their arms chatting to their mates, etc. Instead, these highly trained personnel will be tied down to their machine just like a manual worker. In addition, they are compelled to respond to that machine in a way that a worker does on the shop floor, and the very tempo at which they work is determined by the machine.

The Theoretical Explanation

It is necessary to relate the situation which has been described to classical Marxist theory. Although almost all white collar workers would recognise the changes and trends which I have described, of course,

relatively few of them know that Marx was able to predict that these trends were inevitable unless the ownership of the means of production was not transferred into the hands of those who actually produce the goods themselves.

The process of fragmentation of skills and reduction of all work to a common denominator was of course foreseen by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto when they wrote that "The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage labourers and "Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to the division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently all charm for the workman, he becomes an appendage to the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him." This process is now occurring more and more to white collar workers.

Other contradictions produced by capitalism are also becoming apparent in the case of white collar workers. More and more of these workers are beginning to have to work 3 shifts at a time when in Britain we are beginning to have a pool of unemployed technologically displaced persons. This is going to become worse because the present situation is not just a minor slump with everyone getting a job again after a short period of time. We are approaching a situation like that of the United States where there is a permanent pool of unemployed labour. This idea was reintroduced by the Social Democrats in Wilson's famous double negative when he began to talk about "a not unacceptable level of unemployment." Again this process was foreseen by Engels' when he said in Socialism Scientific and Utopian that "thus it comes about that the economising of the instruments of labour become at the same time from the onset the most reckless waste of labour power and robbery based upon normal conditions under which labour functions, that machinery the most powerful instrument for shortening labour time becomes the most unfailing means of placing every moment of the labourer's time and that of his family at the disposal of capitalist for the purpose of expanding the value of his capital."

This remark of Engles also relates to what I have said about the disruption of family life through shift work, the reorganisation of family life in order to fit in with the needs of the capitalist mode of production and so on.

I had pointed out that the introduction of tape control machines was eliminating completely skilled jobs on the shop floor. It is also eliminating jobs in the design area. Marx also saw this tendency when he said "Modern industry never looks upon or treats the existing forms of a productive process as final, the technical bases of industry is therefore revolutionary while all other modes of production were essentially conservative, by means of machinery, chemical processes and other methods it leads to a continual change not only in the

technical basis of production but also in the function of the labourer and the social combination of the labour process. At the same time therefore it revolutionises the division of labour within society and incessantly transfers masses of capital and people from one branch of production to the other, large scale industry by its very nature therefore necessitates changes in work, variability of function, universal mobility of the labour, and on the other hand, in its capitalistic form it reproduces the old division of labour, with its ossified peculiarities, we have seen how this unsurmountable contradiction robs the worker situation of all peace, of all permanency, and all security, how constantly threatened by taking away the instruments of labour to snatch from his hands his very means of subsistence, and by supressing his particular subdivided task to make it superfluous," and that is precisely what is happening to a whole series of jobs at the moment.

I also tried to show that because a white collar worker is seen by a capitalist simply as part of the means of production, he will, just like manual workers, be supplied with the minimum brain, the minimum maintenance, the minimum food and the minimum clothes consistent with his satisfactory performance as part of the means of production. Again Marx spelt this out absolutely clearly. He said, "Political economy conceives the enstrangement inherent in the nature of labour by not considering the direct relationship between the worker and production, it is true that the labour process produces for the rich wonderful things, but for the worker it produces privation, it produces palaces but for the worker hovels, it produces beauty but for the worker deformanity, it replaces labour by machines, and it throws a section of the workers back to a barbarous type of labour and turns the other workers into machines, it produces intelligence, but for the worker it produces stupidity and cretinism" and he then went on to talk about the capitalist reducing the workers needs to the barest and most miserable levels of physical subsistence. By reducing his activity the most abstract mechanical movement, the says "man has neither need of activity or enjoyment." So in fact, the predictions that Marx made in respect of these trends were absolutely correct.

The subjugation of the worker to the machine which he himself created was also clearly foreseen by Marx when he wrote that the worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces for the more his production increases in power and size, the more the worker becomes an even poorer commodity and that the increase in the value of things produced by men is in direct proportion to devaluation of the world of men. In this situation the products of his labour face the worker as something alien, as a power independent of the producer. This whole process of increasing alienation as it is now affecting white collar workers is going to produce a most volatile situation if unions and the revolutionary movement are prepared to understand it theoretically and to articulate this situation.

The Positive Aspects of Technological Change

So far mainly the negative aspects of technological change have been dealt with. This was necessary in order to demonstrate the effect it is having upon white collar workers, the manner in which it is proletarianising them etc. But any such process of change will always proceed dialectically and other aspects must be considered. The major contradiction from the employer is that the more capital he accumulates in any one point, the more vulnerable he becomes to economic action. This is rather the same situation as Mao-Tse-Tung has discussed in his military writings and is analogous to the situation in Vietnam where with the Vietcong with thirty shilling shell can destroy an aircraft costing something like 2 1/2 million. Through capital concentration in industry we now have a situation where twelve workers in a foundry can bring the entire motor industry to a halt. (And good luck to them they should do it more often and more vigorously.)

In the case of white collar workers a new strike power is becoming available to them. When a white collar worker goes on strike it is no longer the case that all he does is lay down his pencil and rubber. Now when such workers go on strike they are immobilising whole computerised installations. Clerical workers going on strike, for example, can disrupt the whole wages structure of a factory. This occurred recently at GEC in Coventry where a strike by clerical workers put nine thousand people out of work in a very short period of time indeed.

This increase in strike power caused by concentration of capital is something which must be taken into account in drawing up strike tactics and in selecting the people who will play a Vanguard role in any factory struggle.

We should recognise the contradictions these concentrations of capital create for the employer and use them against him. He will need docile, pliant workers to exploit his capital investment without disruption (The industrial relations bill is part of the effort to do this. However, the very processes which compel him to turn white collar workers into docile units of production, simultaneously opens up new possibilities for working class action and the creation of new allies for the working class. The utilisation of these opportunities will be one of the most important factors bringing about the creation of a revolutionary situation in Britain.

I believe that the three basic demands which the working class must fight on are:-

- 1) Wage increases without productivity strings.
- 2) No anti trade union legislation
- 3) The right to work.

White collar workers will increasingly see the relevance of all these demands. By utilising the opportunities being created, and with pro-

per leadership we can show people like Weinstock, Paul Chambers and the rest, that they are all absolutely helpless. Although they may have all the paper money in the world they can't eat it, they can't drive around in it and they can't live in it. It is still a fact that without the people who produce the real wealth, the working class, their money is all worthless, whereas if we succeed in destroying them, not only would we be able to continue without them, but in fact we would be freer. We would be able to do all the things which we do now, and an increasing range of things that technology would make possible, but in an environment in which we could begin to control the products of our own labour. This is the kind of perspective we should seek to advance to white collar workers just as much as to any other workers.

To assert that white-collar workers will be pressed to accept shift work and work measurement (including stop watch techniques) is no longer a matter of prediction. It is happening here and now. Last year DATA was involved in a confrontation with Rolls Royce. Some of the conditions the company sought to impose were shift working to exploit high capital equipment and the setting of synthetic times for specific functions and then comparison with "actual performance".

The Union was able to resist this as part of a dispute which cost some £250,000. The real significance is that 10 years ago a white collar worker would never have believed that a company would seek to 'proletarianise' him in this manner.

The problem of strikes in Yugoslavia

Introduction.

Popov's article, *The Problem of Strikes*, is one of the most significant pieces of Marxist analysis to come from Eastern Europe in recent years, comparable to that of Kuron and Modjelski in Poland, although it is in a very different form from the latter. *The Problem of Strikes* appeared in an academic journal of sociology, and thus suffers from a certain tendency to jargon and convolution of expression, which can be a cover by which sentiments can be expressed which could not be more clearly stated without getting the author into difficulties. But it is much more than an article about strikes, or rather Popov examines strikes in a Marxist way, relating them to the structure of Yugoslav society as a whole. In so doing he is able to exhibit the gross deformations of this society, and indicate clearly the power of the negative trends at work, which will clearly lead to attempts to restore a complete capitalist system to the country in the near future. Popov shows that major structural trends can be observed in recent years, including:

- (a) a marked growth of unemployment.
- (b) a large scale export of labour.
- (c) a massive growth in internal inequality, in economic terms between social groups and between areas of the country, and in terms of housing standards (Popov does not go into other differences for instance in health and educational provision, which are equally striking.)
- (d) a removal of the working class from all areas of political power, whether it be from elected political bodies, industrial organisations, trade unions or the league of communists.
- (e) a widening gap in value systems, especially expressed in ideas about differentiation of incomes, with the working class demanding reduced differentials, and the political/economic bureaucracies defending and advocating increased differentials.

There are two further important trends which Popov does not develop, but which confirm the seriousness of the situation which he analyses at the end of his article. The first is the ever more powerful assertion of the influence, mainly economic, but increa-

*singly political, and vital in terms of attitudes, of the petty bourgeoisie. The laws restricting private ownership were never powerful enough in Yugoslavia, and with the stimulation of the market economy, they have become largely ineffective. Not only do they hardly operate in the tourist industry or in the catering industry, but many loopholes are exploited fully in regard to the ownership of land, sub-contracting to enable more workers than the legal maximum to be employed, etc. This means that there is a very extensive group which has been able to amass considerable private capital, and there is a strong trend for this group to merge with sections of the economic bureaucracy, which has also been able to amass capital by manipulation of their positions. The laws, however, do restrict the reinvestment of this capital in large scale industry, so it constantly circulates (inefficiently) on the margins of the economy, an ever growing threat to the socialized base of production. Some firms have already taken to issuing 'bonds' to investors.

The second trend is that of increasing capitalist investment in the economy from outside, in the form of joint schemes in which a part of the capital becomes foreign owned. (c.f. Topham, 1970). This type of penetration has become quite extensive. In addition, some companies maintain semi-legal 'front' companies to spread sales and influence in Yugoslavia. These companies are nominally Yugoslav, and the employees are Yugoslav, but salaries and training derive totally from abroad. I.B.M. operates in this way in Yugoslavia.

What Popov does not really elaborate is an historical analysis of the forces involved in these developments, and the contradictions which have given rise to them. Some of the new oppositionist groupings that are emerging in Yugoslavia, horrified by the trends of the recent period, and having lacked access to the analysis of the basis of the degeneration of the workers' states developed by the Fourth International, have stated that Yugoslavia is already capitalist, that it is run by a 'new bourgeoisie', that there is a 'new class' of exploiters, and even that things were better before the revolution. Such mistakes are extremely serious, for they play into the hands of those who would like to be able to bracket opposition from the left with counter-revolution, and groupings such as the Chetniks and the Ustase. This type of analysis is certain to be rejected by the Yugoslav working class, which alone can safeguard socialized property relationships, the self-management system, and re-direct them towards socialism. In order for the Yugoslav left to integrate with the working class opposition, it is essential, firstly, for the real gains of the revolution to be recognised, and secondly, for the dilemma presented by the bureaucracy - that the only alternative to the market is stalinist centralization - to be resolved.

In the immediate post 1945 period, the Fourth International made serious mistakes in its analysis of Yugoslavia, refusing to recognize it as a workers' state. But although we have not done an analysis in depth, there is sufficient work to be able to present the outlines of such an analysis with some confidence (See International Socialist Review, 1967, and Riddell, 1968 - the latter article supplements the more correct political analysis in the former).

1. The nature of pre-war Yugoslavia should not be in doubt. It was an under-developed neo-colony of German, and to a lesser extent French and British Imperialism, with in the thirties a completely repressive, though not necessarily very efficient, political system and containing some of the poorest areas in Europe.
2. The Yugoslav Communist Party was a working class based party with widespread actual and latent support throughout the country, which can be said of no other political organization.
3. The Yugoslav revolution was a genuine one with a power base created by the military arm of the Party, the Partisan armies, and must be characterised as a socialist revolution because it eliminated the state of neo-colonialism, expropriated such local bourgeoisie as existed, and began the implementation of a programme of industrial development which would ensure the predominance of the working class as an occupational category and lay the basis for a transition to socialism.
4. The revolutionary leadership in Yugoslavia had a particular dual character. On the one hand it was a genuine, proletarian based, widely supported leadership, every

one of whose members had made total personal sacrifices for the revolution with no obvious prospect of gain (in the partisan war). On the other hand, its political training, organizational conceptions and policy were totally stalinist (with one difference in respect to peasant policy). This dual character has influenced the whole course of political decisions until the more recent period.

5. Thus, although the industrialization programme was bureaucratic from its inception, and proletarian democratic forms were excluded totally, it was not initially diverted by powerful interests of personal gain of the bureaucracy, and had elements of a genuinely popular character. Evidence of this may be seen in economic terms in the clear reduction of economic differences between the various republics in this period and the significance and popularity of the large scale voluntary labour projects for railways, highways, etc.

6. The structural position of political monopoly by the party leadership encouraged over time tendencies towards the accretion of material rewards and privilege, which in turn became an increasingly important element in motivating the retention of power by this group.

7. The break with the Soviet Union represented a determination to safeguard the Yugoslav revolution from becoming subject to the perceived interests of the Soviet bureaucracy. The resulting institution by the political leadership of the self-management system was a major and historically important step on the path to socialism.

8. A system of workers' self management either develops towards becoming a system of social control, the means by which the working class determines the allocation of social resources according to a democratically decided national plan, or it denies itself, and reverts to a manipulative system, since key decisions which affect the internal running of firms are taken outside them. (Davis, 1970). In Yugoslavia the development of the self management system therefore logically involved the continuous extension of the area of political control, therefore actually posing an ever increasing threat to the real control of the bureaucratic layers consolidating themselves at all levels. The first Congress of Workers' Councils gave a clear indication of this as demands were made for an extension of self management above factory level. This is why the second Congress has come only 14 years later, after numerous postponements to enable a 'safe' Congress to be staged.

9. Since, having instituted self management, it was politically impossible, as well as economically disastrous to revert to stalinist planning methods, the political leadership was left with only two choices:- either extend the self management system to the whole society, which would remove the power and privileges of the leadership itself, or find a means of retaining a modicum of workers' management at factory level, and its own political positions at higher levels. The extension of the market, 'market socialism' seemed to them to be the solution of the problem.

10. The institution of the market was propagandized in three main ways:

(a) The market provided an efficient means of increasing the range and quality of consumer goods (in comparison with a bureaucratically planned system, it probably does, for those who have the purchasing power to make use of it).

(b) The market enabled the decentralisation of control, so that *more* power was held locally (the increase in the autonomy of enterprises in fact increased their vulnerability to factors arising from unplanned production competition, etc., while new groups of local political leaders relatively increased their power, and the factory director and his managerial assistants, as the people who had to move in the area where the crucial decisions really did take place - i.e. above factory level - gained in real power at the expense of the workers' councils who were constantly faced with fait accompli and whose members either tended to become integrated with the management, or to drop out of the system into apathy (c.f. Riddell, 1968, p.66).

(c) By the suggestion that there are only two alternatives, a bureaucratically planned system or a market system (totally ignoring the third alternative, the only one that can take Yugoslavia towards socialism, the progressive extension of the self management system to cover all areas of social life at all levels, an alternative which involves

the assertion of its own power by the working class).

11. But the market system has its own logic, which leads inevitably towards regional disparity; the strengthening of the efficient firm at the expense of the less efficient; pressure by firms to take over the investment of capital they have realised; in the absence of a free trade union movement a tendency for those in positions of economic power to increase their economic reward at the expense of those without; and thus to the reduction of the labour force in the interests of lowering costs, i.e. increasing unemployment. In the interests of 'efficiency' foreign capital begins to penetrate the economy in various ways, from licensing agreements, to foreign loans from GATT with convertibility of the dinar as a corollary.

12. Thus an economic basis is provided for the re-emergence of regional and republican chauvinism; reduction of expenditure on 'non-profit making' areas such as education, health, culture; the stimulation of individualist, anti-collectivist and anti-socialist attitudes among large sections of the population; and increasing differentiation of the economic sections of the bureaucracy, managing directors and their colleagues, who, allying with the petty bourgeoisie become an increasing threat to the socialized property relations as a whole, and thus to the basis of the political bureaucracy, especially as further links begin to be forged with foreign capital.

13. The political bureaucracy is caught between two fires; the mounting social power of the economic groupings it has helped to create, and the mounting anger of the working class at the sacrifices it is making in terms of unemployment, reduction of social services, relatively poorer and poorer. It thus vacillates in its policies, not knowing where to turn, dividing into internal warring groups, with sections becoming clearly and undeniably corrupt.

The reality of the development of Yugoslav society is of course extremely complex. It cannot be reduced to one factor alone. Many other cultural, economic and political factors are also involved. But the correct identification of the central contradictions is essential if a political movement capable of solving them and moving forward to socialism is to be built. The 1968 student movement in Belgrade was moving towards articulating such a programme, which is why it was so vigorously isolated and suppressed from all quarters of the bureaucracy. The situation has rapidly deteriorated even since then.

Defend the Yugoslav Revolution.

Neither bureaucracy nor the market!

Confiscate private fortunes. Reduce the maximum differentials to 1 to 3.

For a socialist democracy based on workers' councils!

R. Davis

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'Socialism, the negation of the negation that is capitalism, has contrived a meta-syndicalist hocus pocus: - by striking in socialism, strikers strike against themselves alone, becoming a negation of the anti-capitalist negation, and thus logically anti-socialist'.

- M. Krleza (P. Matrejevio, *Razgovori s Miroslavom Krlezom*, Zagreb, Naprijed, 1969, p.56.)

Twelve years have passed since the first strike in contemporary Yugoslav society. For almost half that time elementary information about them has been concealed from the public.⁽¹⁾ Only after 1964 did the political police gradually relax control over matters related to strikes, and trade union circles began to become interested in them. Only from then did the first factual consideration of strikes reach the scientific, and from that the wider, public.

At first, strikes were regarded an unpatriotic activity, either because they took place at all, or because of the use that might be made of them (by propagandists, etc.). But there was never any substantiation of this argument (at that time measures would undoubtedly have been taken to find the guilty parties).⁽²⁾ Even today such an interpretation has not entirely disappeared. (It mainly reveals itself in a fear that the arrival of strikers on the streets would be an opportunity for unpatriotic elements, etc., to be drawn in.)

The second tendency in interpreting strikes is based on a proposition that they are absurd in a self-managed society, the latter taken a priori as given (following from the unproved assertion that workers really are the controllers of the means of production and in fact control political power). Thus, allegedly, workers strike only against themselves. An element of neutralism in this position has contributed to the development of the most frequent explanation at the time of writing, that is, that strikes occur as a result of a conflict between the possibilities and realisation of self-management, a conflict between the aspiration for self-management and frustrations in its practical realisation.⁽³⁾ But most interpretations do not establish a social basis for such a conflict, nor do they examine the real origins of the strike. As empirical enquiries into strikes have increased there have been many variants of this interpretation. A detailed examination of them all has not been undertaken here, though they have been kept in mind at the appropriate point in the article⁽⁴⁾.

What should we call the phenomena under consideration? Terminology varies between *work stoppages*, *protest stoppages of work* and *strikes*.

Authors who avoid making use of the term strike emphasise that they are not talking of strikes, since these are characteristic of capitalist society in which an antagonistic class conflict exists, while in socialist society there is no such conflict. In this view workers under socialism stop work, not in order to achieve new rights, but only in order to realise those rights which are given them in a normative sense, but which, for different reasons, are not realised.⁽⁵⁾ A more precise definition is sought by two more thorough investigations. B. Kavcic proposes that:

'We can talk of a protest stoppage of work only when a (relatively) large group of workers stop work as a means of realising some of their rights, normatively given, but not realised in the concrete case, and after unsuccessful attempts to get a satisfactory answer in a normal way.'⁽⁶⁾

Basically, N. Jovanov accepts the same definition, but he attempts to give a broader historical explanation - considering the history of strikes after the October Revolution and especially the opinions of Lenin in regard to strikes and his position towards them.⁽⁷⁾ Jovanov tries to give a precise delineation of the idea of the contemporary phenomenon of the strike, distinguishing two variants, related to whether the interests involved are lasting or momentary.⁽⁸⁾ This sort of conception is probably a result of the author's orientation towards enquiry limited to the framework of the working organization. But the strike is a *social phenomenon*, and in order to understand it, it is necessary to consider broader social relations.

In my view, the term *strike* (we distinguish two forms - of active and passive resistance) is adequate for what we are investigating. A strike is a specific form of workers' struggle (worker refers to those employed in manual jobs) for better conditions of life and work in a given organisation of society. That is to say, a strike is a manifestation of a *wage* system, and more especially a conflict between those in the system with regard to the level of wages. In such a conflict, the working class is primarily led by the logic of its monetary interests and does not act as a class against another class. Only if a political movement arises do its actions become directed towards the abolition of existing financial relations (the general strike is the transitional form between these two basic types of workers' struggle).⁽⁹⁾ In this article we examine the strike as a *social phenomenon* and in this way try to show the factors making for strikes in contemporary Yugoslav society and the means of controlling them.

I

Description

The basic data at our disposal has not all been systematically gathered; the sources are various (often data has not been satisfactorily gathered from a broad public), and have been put together as a result of different needs, while the initial theories of the authors are naturally not unitary. In spite of all this, a relatively reliable reconstruction of the basic characteristics of strikes can be made on the basis of the available facts.

First we give a brief outline of two strikes, not because they are typical of all strikes, but because they make it easier to understand the meaning of the facts presented later. Also they illustrate some tendencies which it is important to discuss at this stage.

1. Two Examples

The strike of the Zasavski miners is the first registered event of this kind, and the strike in Rijeka harbour one of the latest at the time of writing (considerable data is available on these two strikes).

a. The Zasavski Miners' strike (January, 1958)⁽¹⁰⁾

On the eve of Republic Day, 1957, the enterprises in Trbovlje all paid an increase in wages, except the Trbovlje-Hrastnik brown coal mine. The mine was in a difficult financial position because of an increase in the price of electric energy and very heavy amortization which increased the cost of production, while the selling price of coal had been fixed by a clear Federal regulation. The leaders of the mine, the miners' union branch and the factory committee of the League of Communists, under the pressure of the miners' dissatisfaction, turned for help to the government, and to the leaders of the trade unions and League of Communists of the Opstina, District, Republic, and to the appropriate central committee of the trade unions of Yugoslavia. After 14 days of discussions and delegations had not changed the critical position, a strike broke out.

Everyone employed in the Trbovlje mine (about 3800 production workers and about 300 officials, among them 300 members of the League of Communists), excepting only those whose working places were in other parts of the country, stopped work for a period of 52 hours (from the evening of 13th January to the forenoon of 15th January, 1958). On the 14th January the miners of Hrastoika joined them in solidarity. The strike did not spread beyond the area of the enterprises, there weren't any demonstrations, either within the mines or out of them, nor was any violence shown by the strikers to people or machines.

When the strike broke out, no strike committee existed, but immediately work stopped, the workers' council, together with the union branch, announced the results of the discussions that were under way, and in doing so underlined the basic demands they were making on political leaders outside the working organisation, especially in Federal bodies. They asked for an increase in personal income, the payment of a supplement one step above the statutory basic tariff regulation of the enterprise, and the prospect of safety measures (hygienic and technical aids). Finally, they insisted on agreement to change the basis of the mine's income. A delegation of miners twice travelled to Belgrade, and after the second journey they got a promise that the strikers' demands would be met, after which the strike ceased.

News of what had happened at Trbovlje quickly spread by informal channels in the immediate vicinity. About 1200 of 1860 miners employed at Zgorje ob Savi joined the strike in solidarity. The situation in this mine was not as difficult as that at Trbovlje. A group of miners initiated and organized this sympathy strike. Workers from two more enterprises in Trbovlje and one in Zgorje also joined the strike.

In all these strikes, about 5500 workers took part. Probably out of fear that the strike would broaden yet further, energetic measures were taken to prevent a repetition and eventual broadening of the events that had occurred. For example, the Republican leadership of Slovenia dismissed the District, Opstina and miners' committees of the League of Communists, and dissolved the basic organisations in the separate mines.

The local press, radio and television did not carry any information or news of the strike, a fact which was to remain the case for several following years.

b. The Rijeka Port Workers' Strike (June, 1969)

For months before June 1969, Rijeka harbour was in a difficult financial situation because of which there were four smaller strikes in 1968, the overture of what was to happen later.⁽¹¹⁾

'An examination of the economic plan of the enterprise for 1969 shows that the following were foreseen: a decrease in the actual amount of cargo by 8.6%, with a decrease in returns of 2.4%; an increase in business expenses of 6.6% with a corresponding decrease in returns, and an overall reduction of personal income by 21.6%'.⁽¹²⁾

So holiday payment was cancelled - 30 new Dinars for every day of holiday, the price of breakfast was increased, compensation for some sickness was cancelled, and the allowance for workers' transport was reduced. All this particularly hit the workers, who anyway had a lower income than other employed people, and whose 'real standard dropped by at least 30%', leading to a worsening in conditions of life, conditions already bad, for, as it says in the report of the union investigation:

'Many workers with families live in bunkers, stables, abandoned buses and other places unacceptable in the time we live in, and incompatible with a socialist society'.

The above mentioned measures came into force by means of decisions of the workers' council, without any sort of preliminary consultation with the workers themselves. The workers discussed these acts for a long period. Bad feeling became rife, and latent conflicts developed into a strike immediately before the measures were due to come into effect.

The strike began on the first of June, when 300 workers at a job in the harbour stopped work. Early the next day, about 1500 workers (from 4600 altogether) from the docks started to move towards the enterprise offices. They broke into the building, took it over floor by floor, and threw the surprised officials and leaders on to the street. They began to berate the general and financial directors, the presidents of the union and party organisations, the main planners and other leaders and officials of the enterprise. Some of them were harried on to the streets of the town and beaten up.

On the same day, a meeting took place between representatives of the workers on strike (a strike committee existed) and the town's trade union leaders. It was stated that a meeting would be held next day between representatives of the government, and the forum of social/political organisations of Rijeka, to which Republican representatives would come.

The next day at the docks, a meeting was held which was attended by about 3000 workers. The individuals who had beaten up the leaders were criticised, regret at such acts was expressed, the strike was abandoned, with the demands of the workers fulfilled: the newly adopted regulations about personal income and work prices were cancelled and the period of validity of the old ones was lengthened; a difference of 10% between earnings and wages paid for the first four months of the year was made up. The whole of the May salary was paid, a better organisation of work and distribution of jobs was promised, as well as an enquiry into the possibility of decreasing the difference between earned income and wages paid. A short term

credit was taken from the bank for the payment of the above-mentioned outlays, compulsory management was introduced, and the dissolution of the organisation of the League of Communists was proposed. Seven strikers were arrested because of attacks on leaders of the enterprise.

Press, radio and television carried more information and commentary on the strike.

2. From Trbovlje (1958) to Rijeka (1969)

a. The extent and duration of strikes

In something more than 11 years (in which period facts have been detailed), there have been 1732 strikes registered in Yugoslavia. All investigations indicate that the figure has been significantly larger.⁽¹³⁾

Strikes occurred at first in Slovenia, the most economically developed republic, then quickly spread to Croatia and Serbia, and finally to the other republics. They now involve all of Yugoslavia - strikes have been registered in more than two fifths of the opstina in the country.⁽¹⁴⁾ In fact, they have not occurred evenly on the whole territory, but more frequently in districts where there is more developed industry, more especially in larger towns, and most of all in industrial centres.

According to incomplete data, there were 28 strikes in 1958, 35 in 1959, 61 in 1960, while the number more than doubled to 130 in 1961, and further increased to 225 in 1962.⁽¹⁵⁾ In 1963 and 64 change was less than before - 213 and 273 strikes respectively. From 1965 to 1967 the number of strikes fell (1965 - 231, 1966 - 153, 1967 - 113), and began to increase again in 1968 - 135, while there were 136 strikes in the first eight months of 1969. The growth in the number of strikes has clearly occurred in periods when there have been broader changes in the economic system, with broader and deeper implications.⁽¹⁶⁾

From Jan. 1964 to Dec. 1966, the number of strikes by republic was as follows (total 654). Serbia 30.3%, Slovenia 28.7%, Croatia 16.4%, Bosnia and Hercegovina 13.5%, Macedonia 4.7% and Montenegro 0.6%⁽¹⁷⁾. In total, Serbia is first, then Croatia, followed by Slovenia and Bosnia, and Macedonia and Montenegro.

According to economic type, for the 513 strikes for which precise details are known, strikes have been most frequent in industry and mining. The most numerous are in the metal industry (22.7%), textiles (9.3%) and the wood industry (9.5%), then in building (7.4%), building materials (4.9%), electrical industry (5.7%), mines (5.8%) and transport (5.1%). Strikes are most rare in the chemical industry (hardly 1%). Over and above this a strike of doctors occurred in Kraljevo, among the personnel of a medical clinic in Ljubljana, among judges and court officials in Lazarevac, and among educational workers in Ptuj and Osijek, etc.⁽¹⁹⁾

b. The number of participants, the duration and location of strikes

For the first six years (1958-63) it is almost impossible to find out the number of participants in strikes. According to incomplete data, the yearly number of participants varied between 9000 (1965) and 20,000 (in the first nine months of 1969).⁽²⁰⁾ Some more information is contained in the en-

quiry into 403 opstina.(21)

Duration	No. of strikes %		No. of participants %	
less than 3 hrs.	175	34.2	19,522	26.8
3-7 hrs.	109	21.2	15,284	21.0
1 working day	111	21.6	12,852	17.6
2 working days	50	9.7	10,541	14.5
3 working days	14	2.7	7,169	9.9
4 working days	7	1.4	1,082	1.5
more than 4 working days	23	4.5	2,396	3.3
no details	24	4.7	3,933	5.4
Total	513	100	72,779	100

The biggest strikes occurred among metal workers (21.2% of all strikers) and textile workers (16.4%), followed by miners (12.5%), wood industry workers (9.5%), building workers (4.0%), etc.

3. Motives, Demands and Results

The basic causes of strikes will be discussed later. Here we are concerned with the motivation of strikes. Every investigation shows that strikes are most frequently motivated from two areas of relationship in working organisations: *questions of personal income* (low personal income, unpaid income, unpaid bonus, big differences in personal incomes, over-high norms, lack of knowledge of the basis of personal incomes, etc.). This category contains about $\frac{3}{4}$ of all strikes where motivation is known. Second comes the lack of functioning of self-management (insubordination, conflicts with leaders of the enterprise, conflicts between groups, etc.). The remaining motives are various - increased productivity, and dismissals, unfulfilled promises, bad housing situation, the cancelling of some financial benefit, and so on.(22)

As to the first group of motives, it should be said that it is not only a question of financial sums which should be paid, nor only of demands for an increase of personal income, to approach real living expenses. There is also a question of a disagreement about the basis of the differences in the distribution of personal income among different groups of those employed. Usually it is only direct producers who have norms or other concrete standards on the basis of which their earnings are fixed, while those who are outside direct production have a stable statutory payment, which in some circumstances means a guaranteed wage. Direct producers are deprived of such security - it can occur that all except workers get full wages, but that workers' wages are reduced. This is probable one of the basic reasons why there are conflicts within working organisations when strikes occur. Over and above this, since those with high qualifications have an important influence on the income levels - an influence made greater in as far as there are less worked out standards for the real contribution to work and results for this group - so workers with low qualifications and the poorly paid most frequently take resort to a strike. It can thus be said that the division of working groups according to qualifications also contributes to conflicts am-

ong groups within the working organisation.

Workers and those outside the productive process have no different status except in the division of personal incomes, but they nevertheless participate unequally in the division of political influence within the work organisation (later we shall see that workers in general are deprived in the division of two most influential determinants of life and work - material goods and political power). Polarization inside work organisations is not limited only to a conflict between workers and officials, but also often occurs between different groups of workers:-

There exists in fact a tendency for triangular conflicts to develop and intensify. The triangle is formed by a group of productive workers who strike. They have weak influence on decision taking, poor conditions of work and low real income. Secondly, the group who have decisive influence on decision taking at the level of the work organisation, and additionally another group of productive workers who do not strike because in relation to the first group they have a stronger influence on decision taking and better conditions of work and real income. (23)

The demands of strikers are related to their motives. Most frequently the demands concern the amount and payment of income. There are sometimes demands for change of personnel in the enterprise, better organisation of work and management, and demands may touch on general conditions of the enterprises business, and tendencies in social relations. The extant enquiries do not give a complete picture of the extent to which strikers' demands are fulfilled, but there is enough material to suggest that those concerning personal income are most frequently satisfied, followed by those concerning changes in work organisation, and rarely those concerning changes outside the work organisation. Change in social relations in broader social communities does not result. As we shall see later, the causes reproduce themselves at the same level, and so it is not strange that since the environment is the same, strikes recur, although as a rule the motives for them have been removed.

4. General tendencies in the praxis of strikes

The detailed account of the two strikes given above indicates some general tendencies which are characteristic of other strikes.

1. The fact that strikes first occurred in the most highly developed republics, and developed from there draws attention to the correlation between industrialisation and the development of the working class, which becomes more conscious of its position and interests, and the possibilities of their realisation. The relative isolation of the economic sphere from other spheres of social life prevents the growth of the potential *social unity* of the working class, so that strikes remain by force of circumstance localised in the economic sphere. Only recently have they broadened in scope (educational workers, legal officials, students, medical personnel, private transport workers, etc.).

The motives of strikes are found in the area of working relations, and

above all relate to the level of personal income, and how to actually obtain full earnings. Strikes are certainly effective in solving problems of the moment, and cease when they are solved. But the strike does not touch the causes of dissatisfaction so no real solution is found (causes lie in the economic condition of the enterprise and of the economic sector it is in, the relations between the working organisation and the broader social community, the nature of the management of the means of production and the division of surplus labour, conflicts of interest at the society level). Because of these underlying causes the conflict situation in the working organisation is renewed, and in a short time period a strike is repeated.⁽²⁴⁾ Strikes are the final means of struggle for the realisation of the immediate interests of workers, using the method of extra-institutional pressure on the official power structure, when attempts to use legal methods of solve fundamental problems have been completely unsuccessful.

3. Workers of a whole working organisation achieve solidarity only exceptionally, and it is rarer still among wider groups of workers (there is a certain informal influence and latent solidarity). Usually there are sharp clashes between groups with different interests within the working organisation. Such conflicts are becoming sharper, and emerging on a physical level. The restriction of the framework of the working organisation, together with the pressure of official opinion ('Let everyone solve his own problem'), increases the violence in internal relations. No one lifts his head over the fence (of economic, political and ideological indoctrination) of idealised conflicts.

4. Strikes are not always limited to working organisations themselves; workers sometimes go out into the streets and demonstrate publicly.⁽²⁵⁾ More and more frequently strike committees are created to represent workers on strike in discussions about fulfilling their demands, by-passing the official structure of leadership. Through these can develop a means of struggle by which strikes, general strikes included, can be transformed into a workers' political movement. One might add that strikes in Yugoslavia are getting larger, and that increasing numbers of workers are participating in them.⁽²⁶⁾

5. There is more and more public comment about strikes, which even approaches a public discussion - although not a proper dialogue. All these writings are limited to the working organisation as their framework, and quite rarely, and only, it appears, when authorisation is given do they discuss broader social relations involved.

6. In a number of cases, some strikers have been taken to court (Nis, Jesenice, Rijeka, Slavonski Brod), probably an indication that earlier informal pressures (interrogation, etc.) have in more recent times been institutionalised (the judicial process).

II

Causes and Possible Consequences of Strikes

So far we have considered strikes themselves. It is now time to go a little further and try to answer the basic question: why do strikes occur in contemporary Yugoslav society? At the least we can suggest some ideas for further investigation in regard to this complex social phenomena. Because

of the unsatisfactory nature of investigations of the general problematic, the material, largely from secondary sources, is presented as working hypotheses, and put forward as one of the ways of investigating the structure of society as a whole, and of integrative and disintegrative processes in it, especially contradictions and conflicts.

What we have already written about the form of strikes indicates that something of broader significance is in question. Although strikes are usually limited to a partial framework, the wider structure of society is involved. There is a special type of interest group conflict, and strikes are only one of the forms of conflict by which deeper conflicts are spontaneously articulated.

In order to find the answers, we have to investigate the degree of stratification of the whole social structure. This section therefore involves an investigation of important differences between particular sections of society, and this in three basic directions - the division of material wealth; the distribution of political power (as a specific form of social power); and differences in terms of value orientations.

1. Differences in material standards

When discussing contemporary social differences, it is differences in material standard that are emphasised usually, and the criterion is, as a rule, the span of personal incomes in particular enterprises. But this usually amounts to a manipulation of the facts, and 'shows' an ostensible equality.

Real relationships, as we shall see, do not support this latter assertion. It holds neither for broad social groupings, nor when we examine relations in society as a whole. The evidence indicates the real differences in material position of different sectors of society, and shows clearly the material position of workers.

It is also necessary to bear in mind the differences in economic development of the different regions of Yugoslavia, as this is a material background of the differences in citizens' living standards. Whatever may be said, no real estimate of the actual position can exclude contradictions in the structure of society deriving from economic differences. Such contradictions are implied by regional indices. In 1967, the ratio between districts was 1 (636 n.d.) to 55 (35064 n.d.). The poorest region was Dragas opstina in Kosovo, and the wealthiest Ljubljana Centra opstina (the number of inhabitants is taken from the 1961 census).⁽²⁷⁾ The same facts show that in Serbia, the difference between Pragas and Belgrade-Ole Town opstina was in ratio of 1 to 43.

By using differences in income taken only from individual working organisations, it appears that the differences are of the order 1 to 2.5. But if we do not limit ourselves to this framework, the differences are several times greater. For instance, the ratio in Serbia was about 1:20 if we take the highest and the lowest average personal income from enterprises.⁽²⁸⁾ Since differences exist within working organisations, it can be assumed that differences are significantly bigger, since:

'it is calculated that the highest personal income in

working organisations is three times bigger than the average personal income for the organisations, while the lowest is about half the average'.(29)

As it is known that average personal incomes outside industry - where strikes do not usually occur - are higher than those in the economy, it is most important to examine variations in those average personal incomes below the overall average for the economy. Average income in 1968 was 862 n.d. For the 335,200 workers in the textile industry (9% of all employed in the socialised sector), the average was lower - 659 n.d., and a little above them, though still below the average are 939,300 workers in other sectors of the economy - 715-794 n.d. (27.8% of all employed in the socialised sector).(30) Thus, rather more than one third of all those employed in the socialised sector received a personal income less than the general average, and when we link this with the differences within the work organisation of the order of 1 to 2,3,4, or 5, we can begin to get a realistic picture of the actual differences.

The manipulation of levels and averages, however, hides the actual relations between rich and poor, which are shown by the extreme positions in the material standard of citizens. Groups of poor workers are neither negligible, nor can they be ignored, not only from a moral point of view, but from an economic one, for from the viewpoint of the endangering of an increased reproduction of labour power, it has significant consequences for the efficiency of the productive process. The number of such workers is growing. In 1968 the minimum personal income was received by 89,567 workers employed in 500 work organisations, but in 1969, in the first three months alone, the situation was almost the same - 65,475 workers in 336 enterprises.(31) As to real differences in material standard, a 1968 enquiry into personal expenditure shows that 16.5% of non-agricultural workers in four member households had 499 n.d. or 120 per member; 28.8% had 799 n.d. and 11.9% over 2000 n.d.

In the same period there was an unexpectedly fast rise in the cost of living (the whole problem of standards is not our concern here - the unexpected tempo of the rise is, which indicates that for some groups of workers the situation was even more difficult. For example:

'A 28% rise in the cost of living was expected from the reform without a definite time period for the rise. Even by the end of 1965, the rise was 21.5%. In 1968 the rise reached 51%, almost twice that foreseen. In 1969 the rise continued. For the first six months of this year, the rise was 9% in relation to 1968'.(33)

According to the trade unions, real personal incomes were 28% higher in 1968 than in 1964, and grew by 2% in the first seven months of 1969.(33a) As well as this, the perception of workers as to the growth of differences between rich and poor suggests that this has a significant effect on their mood. In a study undertaken in Serbia at the end of 1967, the respondents (a stratified sample of 845 workers from all sectors of Serbian industry) believed that the polarities were increasing, that they were not justified by differences in work, nor were they a stimulant to the development of social relations.

ons.(34)

In the allocation of flats, there is also a significant difference between workers and other social groups. It has often been affirmed that workers get flats relatively more rarely, but there are unfortunately no systematic details. Two things can be established, the first related to the means for building flats, and the second to the social implications of urban and housing policy.

In 1965, the means of finance for house building were as follows:.(35)

Source of finance	%
Industry	18.6
Other working organisations	6.2
Banks	2.1
Social-political communities	72.8
Citizens	0.3
Total	100.

The second example relates to the legalisation of social inequality in urban policy. Take for example the investigation of the development of towns in the Sarajevo area in 1967, which shows that there are important differences in the housing area possessed by the citizens - some have 2.5 square metres while others have 35 square metres. The investigator writes:

'The process of social stratification and differentiation is legally reflected in the urban sector, and leads to the phenomenon of segregation. Of five new districts in Sarajevo, three are segregated, one is a completely segregated district of 'elite' tendency, and one is a 'poor ghetto'.'(36)

The facts presented could be multiplied; they cover only a short time period. The evolution of material differences should be the subject of broader enquiries, over a longer time period, for existing material differences did not appear today, nor yesterday. They do not date from either the first phase, or from the contemporary phase of the development of self-management. They date from earlier, partly from the legacy of the pre-revolutionary society, but also in direct correlation with the type of political organization (professional revolutionaries) by whose model social relations were formed during and after the liberation war.(37) Later we will show how differences in material standards originating from this basis relate to the social processes we are discussing. It may be said in passing, that the social consequences of acts usually have an independence from the intentions of the actors in social events.

National income, personal income and living space are only some of the indices of real differences in material standards. To them must be added others, which we shall only mention - the growth of unemployment, mainly among workers; differences in other cash benefits (payments for holidays,

etc.); the abolition of the right of travel at a reduced fare; of free health services, etc. - all this fills in the picture of real social differences.

We are led to the conclusion that significant stratification exists in our society in terms of material position, and this leads to the reproduction and broadening of the groups who live in poverty or on the edge of poverty, while at the other end of the social structure there exist, and are growing, groups who mainly, or largely have few problems about their material existence. In the first group workers are most frequently to be found (and not only those with low qualifications). It is not composed only of the unemployed or the idle. M. Vojnovic is quite right when he says that:

'It is necessary to adopt a broader concept of poverty, that is, poverty of producers, pauperization located in production, and further in the political process.'(38)

This position of workers, unless it is within a clear perspective of positive change, naturally results in a definite form of social behaviour. Secondly, social differences and the conflicts based on them are importantly linked to the possibility of their legal positive solution - that is, by means of the official power structure.

2. Workers on the margins of the official power structure

As we have seen, strikes take place outside the institutional structure of power, which limits their direct effect. They do not succeed in penetrating the political wrapping inside which conflict situations are reproduced. If such 'wrapping' is so firm, it is natural to ask how the people who make up their minds to strike share in political power, and how strong their political influence is inside their own working organizations.(39)

Among the active working population, according to the census of 1953 (7,390,000 active) and of 1961 (7,960,000 active), the number of peasants fell from 67.8% to 55.4%, the number of industrial workers (including miners, industrial and handicraft workers) grew from 26.2% to 36.3%, the numbers of those outside industry from 3.1% to 5.1% and the number of state officials from 3.0% to 3.1%(40). As we are interested in industrial workers, who are most frequently involved in strikes, we should note that they represented 42.6% of the active working population in 1969(41).

a. **Representative bodies.** The statistics give a clear picture of the social composition of the Skupstina. Here are details for the last six years.

Skupstina	Median value	Election years			
		1963	1965	1967	1969
Federal	3.0	5.5(670)	3.9(670)	1.9(670)	0.8 (610)
Republican	4.8	7.0(2887)	4.6(2621)	2.8(2880)	no data
District	13.1	13.3(4486)	13.0(2734)	ceased to exist	
Opstina	14.9	14.6(42994)	15.4(41445)	14.6 (40279)	no data

Participation of miners, industrial and handicraft workers in the social composition of the Skupstinas. Figures in brackets show total numbers elected (42).

The participation of workers in the social composition of the Skupstina has two basic tendencies. First, the number of workers falls from Opstina to Federal level. The significant differences in the scope of different levels of government (especially differences in decision as to the distribution of surplus value), together with differences in actual political power, show that the greater the political power of the representative bodies, the lower the participation of workers in them.⁽⁴³⁾ Secondly, the facts show a continuing decrease in the number of workers above the level of the Opstina (in which it remains at the same level).

b. Work organisations. To discover the distribution of political power inside work organisations, it is important to discuss the nature of their relations to a broader social context, and especially to higher organs of government. It is a well known fact that the predominant part of the surplus of labour goes outside the working organisation. This indicates that the economy is not emancipated from the political sphere, that it is still not freed from state control.

'The industrial structure grew from the political-administrative, and is deeply linked with it.'⁽⁴⁴⁾

As well as this integral link, there exist very deep personal ties. A regular channel of entry into leading functions, particularly directors jobs, ties the state with industry. This gives directors a strengthened influence within the work organisation itself:

'Because they, more than anyone else, possess political-administrative information and news which is of the greatest importance for communications between work organisations and their surroundings.'⁽⁴⁵⁾

Around this axis, which represents a vertical line for the formation of informally structured groups of power holders, originate different variants of personal groupings so that an informal transmission mechanism of political influence exists. Such mechanisms still further strengthen the influence of the formal leading group, while narrowing possibilities of democratic initiative in the framework of the formal self-management structure. It can confidently be stated that there exists a gulf 'between social processes and organisational structure'.⁽⁴⁶⁾ If we, further, take individual working organisations as isolated units, although workers have a significant representation on self-management organs and social-political bodies, almost all the investigations establish a lack of realisation of workers' political influence. One of the indicators of the real position in this respect is the way respondents perceive the distribution of political influence. Enquiries show that leaders are usually felt to have most influence on decisions, while Zupanov's study found that this applied to people with positions in the official hierarchy more than to other leaders, and that workers were felt to have least influence of all.⁽⁴⁷⁾

For our discussion, it is especially important that among workers questioned in some enquiries in the last two years, the desire for formal participation in decisions has declined. Earlier a mood existed in favour of changing the existing autocratic structure of influence to its opposite, a democr-

atic one, but more recently workers have become to come to terms with the existing distribution of influence, subject to certain corrections.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Such a mood, in as far as it is representative, warns of the possibility that apathy is present, gained from experience of the impenetrability of official political structures. This could, under specific circumstances, lead not only to wider strikes, but to more powerful social upheavals which would break the period of truce and acceptance of submission.

c. **The League of Communists.** Facts on the social composition of the League of Communists are not completely reliable. Some material has been written because of the last Congress. As long ago as the days of the introduction of self-management, there were contradictory tendencies, which were expressed more clearly at the Fourth Congress. Of them, two are of most significance; one which was oriented towards the realisation of the conception of a self-managing democracy without parties, and the other oriented towards the prolonging of classical political relations (the monopoly of all political power at the top of the party hierarchy). Judging by the difficulties of success in realising the generally accepted notion of the *avant garde* democratic political role of the working class, it seems that the second tendency is still very powerful.

One of the key assumptions essential for the realisation of the first tendency, which has been insisted upon for many years, not only in the League of Communists, but outside it, is that increasing participation by workers in the League would give a greater prospect of a broadened workers' influence, not only within the League, but also in the politics of broader social communities.

However, the tendency has not been in the direction of the democratic tendency, as the following facts show. From 1946 to 1966, the percentage of workers in the League of Communists has risen insignificantly, while the participation of officials has markedly increased. Their number has quadrupled, at the expense of peasants, who are seven times less frequently to be found in the League.⁽⁴⁹⁾ The members of the League of Communists in 1964 comprised 2% of the peasants, 19.5% of other workers (including industrial workers), and 60.4% of those in the state apparatus.⁽⁵⁰⁾ If we divide the categories further we find 60% of the leading cadre, 50% of intellectual workers, 40% of routine officials, 25% of highly skilled and skilled workers, 7% of semi and unskilled workers, and 2% of peasants. More recent data shows that at the end of 1968, 31.1 of the members were workers, which represents 13.4% of all employed workers.⁽⁵¹⁾

d. **The trade unions.** Instead of giving percentages and averages, in this case we shall detail an event which gives equivalent insight into the need and preparedness of workers to have influence on the vertical line of political organisation of society, and the real limits to the realisation of these aspirations.

The comments of several of the delegates to the 6th Congress of the Yugoslav Trade Unions (June 1968), immediately after the student demonstrations) indicate in a lively way the mood of the Congress. The speech of a motor industry worker from Rakovic, M. Kicovic, which was made after consultation with delegates of the metal industry of Skopje, Zagreb, Ljublj-

ana and Belgrade, had the approval of a large number of delegates, especially when he spoke of the bureaucratisation of the trade unions:

'In the unions we don't need professionals - they only hold back the action of the workers and blunt the sharpness of our demands. Functionaries often think only of their positions and - understand - protect them ...'(52)

He spoke of the union as a surrogate of workers' self management, unnecessary to workers because it served to amortize conflicts and delay their solution. On the same theme, I Gregurincic, a printing worker from Zagreb, spoke. Speaking of bureaucracy in the framework of broader social communities, and not only of the factory, which in his opinion it was not difficult to go out of in the end, he warned of the power of bureaucracy outside working organisations:

'But the Federal and Republican administration which carries off all our surplus labour makes my head ache. '(53)

Both speakers suggested some concrete measures by means of which they believed some basic social problems could be solved. Thus M. Kicovic:

'Isn't it true that individuals have enriched themselves at our expense? If it is true, and it is true, it is necessary to take their property from them.'

I. Gregurincic suggests the same position in his article:

'With all our strength we should endeavour that a law is passed on the confiscation of property gained in a dishonest manner and by corruption, no matter who is involved.' (54)

In such an atmosphere, it was necessary to elect new members to the Central Committee of the League of Unions. The electoral commission produced a closed list of candidates which aroused the resistance of a large number of delegates, who demanded a wider list, without success. The conflict continued as to the manner of voting - public or secret - statutes provided for secret voting. The leaders proposed that it should be public. Then confusion arose. On the counting of the votes on this matter there was an allegation of an incorrect count. In the end there was a secret vote on a closed list. This method did not satisfy one section of the delegates, for:

'About 300 delegates left the congress, and did not agree to the list of 107 candidates proposed by the commission. '(55)

The conflict about the nature of the election is summed up by Gregurincic:

'Individuals themselves ensured their paid positions as functionaries because they were afraid that if there was a broadened list of candidates they might very easily lose their bread and butter, which would certainly have happened to them. '(56)

And at the end, he says:

'I ask myself, whose congress was it? '(57)

The facts disclosed indicate that the workers have no real possibility from

their local positions to influence the contents of political decisions within the institutionalised structure of power. The influence of other social groups is dominant.

We may note in relation to this, that parallel with broadened institutions, *normatively* pluralistic which ought to allow the interplay of the interests of different sections of the community to achieve successful compromise solutions, an oligarchic distribution of power is reproduced, which represents a powerful barrier against the realisation of the interests of workers.

An informal hierarchy of power and transmission of influence in formal structures exists not only in our conditions, but also in highly developed industrial societies. The type of hierarchy we have does not only derive from industrial organisation itself, but from a particular type of political organisation which has a long tradition. It is characteristic of such a type of political organisation that a narrow group exists, which concentrates to itself more or less all organisational power.

'That form,' suggests J. Zupanov, 'seems to have been an important part of the structure of revolutionary groups before the war, and then into the post-war period.'(58)

The influence of these monopoly groups spreads out towards all decision making centres, holding back real possibilities of democratic initiative. This influence represents the skeleton of a vertical structuring of social groups from which develop conflicts of interests.

III. VALUE ORIENTATION

The third aspect of stratification of the society as a whole is related to the value orientations. From different sectors of society grow value systems which, in specific circumstances, come into conflict as only one of the various aspects of overall conflicts.

We can investigate the tendency of diffusion of value orientations related to the basic normative values of the proletarian movement: a free integrated personality and a communistic community of free people, and secondly in terms of an instrumental, but no less significant value, linked with the first, social equality. This complex area of social life is a delicate and relatively little investigated one, and only its basic contours will be sketched.

The totalization of political power in peasant worker revolutions from October onwards has a tendency to transcend the conditions which were responsible for it at the time. In such a framework, there is an inevitable reduction of personality in a political sense, because it is one of relations of domination and subordination inside a petrified hierarchical political organization of society. In this way the personality is repressed in one of its possible spheres of affirmation—the political sphere, in which self-realization is distorted, without regard to whether a person is servant or master.

On a broad social plane, the possession of power represents the basis of vertical social divisions by which the classical differences of interest and conflicts in society are reproduced on a new basis. The authoritarian potential of political power motivates old and new impulses and in some cases leads to the physical liquidation of people. Self defence of achieved freedom from those who would threaten it in different ways is necessary. But this necessity can be overstepped by pressures from material interest (the fruits of political monopoly) and by irrational impulses of will to power, motivated not only from cultural backwardness but also from anxiety characteristics of modern civilization. In such cases, where there are variations in political ideology, with all their practical consequences, one can obtain the exclusive means of absolute good or absolute evil. And from there to a drastic settling of accounts is only a short step. Then, in terms of such experience, comes the crystallization of divergent value orientations, and above all two basic ones, democratic (self-governing) and authoritarian.

The polarization between tendencies which desire to reduce the personality in the political sphere and aspirations for a many sided fulfilling of the potentialities of personality express themselves in a contradiction about which there is often concern: equality or social differences. The official persuaders of public opinion insist on this dilemma. We have already seen how little reason there is to speak of the spreading of equality in society when there are marked differences in the material position of different parts of society, even tens of times bigger than those that are assumed or presented.

A number of actual investigations shows that there exist marked and spreading aspirations, particularly among workers, for the lessening of existing material differences. Thus, for example, J. Zupanov in his work asserts that there is a disharmony between the position and aspirations of the respondents. The actual spread in nominal income was 1:5 and there was a desire for it to be reduced to 1:3. (59). Those who had least (up to 450 N.D.) wanted the highest increase in income (94%), those with from 450 to 600, 73%, and those with the highest income wanted a 4 times smaller increase in pay -23%, which, it can be seen, would not eliminate the differences.

Further investigation of the relation between a wish for an increased income and other variables (amount of nominal income, qualification, type of work place, family situation, technical-economic efficiency of the enterprise) suggested that none of them was as significant as one unforeseen factor (60). That factor lies in the "norms of egalitarianism" which are "implicitly present in Yugoslav culture" and which act not only as internalized, but as external norms (61). My own enquiry at the end of 1967 suggests a similar result, but in a rather more concrete way. (62). Workers are, according to this investigation, above all interested in the growth of social wealth and the progressive elimination of poverty in society, and that it is necessary to limit maximum incomes. Such limitation has for its purpose the prevention and control of tendencies to enrichment of one part of society at the expense of the pauperization of another part. Particularly this is related to people with political

functions, who, when they professionalize the evasion of social control and influences, represent a significant barrier to democracy. The egoism of this layer, which in certain circles comes to be privilege, links income directly to the distribution of political power, is related to the egoism of those groups in society who have a preferential economic position from which they extract extra income (profit).

The attitude of these groups towards the idea of social equality is negative. But because these groups have dominant influence on public opinion, it is no surprise that there is a broadening fear of the spectre of equality and everything related to it. And the real values for which these social groups are pressuring are only implicitly given; we can say that they accept existing material differences or pressure for even bigger ones, with all the social consequences that they would produce.

In connection with this, it is important to draw attention to earlier cases of decisions in conflict with "equality". After Lenin's attempt to realize some of the important intentions and decisions of the Paris Commune (that the wages of officials be no higher than those of workers), Stalin, at the beginning of the 1930's, began a decisive battle against what he called "uravlinovka", against "ultra-left leveling of incomes". The criticism of "uravlinovka", became, as Zivotic points out, "the curtain behind which hid the bureaucracy's struggle for ever greater material privileges for itself." (63).

The cutting short of a new experiment in such a way has made it impossible right till the present day to explore solutions which would represent a fundamental contribution to the realization of the value orientations of the proletarian movement as well as the democratic political organization of the process of socialist transformation of social relations (64).

Equality as it is represented, has never existed, neither in any period of the existence of the communist movement, nor in the organization of society which came into being after revolution, as we have shown in the first two sections of the article. It is nearer to the truth to say that there have been inner social groupings which have had essentially different and not equal political influence and material position, even where perhaps relatively small differences in material standards existed. This in no way signified that equality in society also existed; society has always been significantly divided in this respect. It should not be forgotten that there were existing differences which the revolution did not, and, following from the above, could not, abolish. This whole problem, of course needs further investigation.

The social differentiation, excluding that previously existing, is not even today based on work, but is based in the hierarchy of power, that important factor which determines the material position of groups and individuals within them. This is a result of the fact that,

"To a large degree, many of the economic functions of the former capitalist state are concentrated in the political sphere, and so political

inequality expresses itself as a specific totality of all social forms of inequality" (65).

All this shows that aspirations for the realization of the idea of social equality cannot be based on calls for a return to an old state of things in which equality never existed. They can only be based on a progressive realization—a principle accepted in countries which don't verbally accept a socialist orientation. It is not possible to strive for social integration by insisting on differences. It seems that some interpretations insist that only after the increase of differences can they be reduced!

A breakthrough the political restrictions of contemporary society would involve real opening on a broader plan for the practical affirmation of the potential development of the personality. But such a social course would naturally imperil the power of those who maintain the restriction. Therefore there are two tendencies in real conflict. The mutual incompatibility of the value orientations represents a relatively independent expression and contribution to broader conflicts in society.

The material above, it is hoped, gives a satisfactory basis for proposing two *basic causes* of strikes in contemporary Yugoslav society.

1. Workers, who are in fact those who strike, exist on the margin of economic and political processes in society, and thus have no possibility of changing their social position from inside those processes. The process of material and spiritual impoverishment in terms of the given level of development and real possibilities of the society, gives an additional impulse to their resistance and to the struggle for the provision of improvement of the actual cash income necessary for the reproduction of labour power, in fact for everyday living.

2. Strikes remain on the margins of the official political structure, in the sphere of political economy, because workers are not adequately integrated as a social group in the existing centres of political power. The results of strikes are similarly on the margins. As a result of deep social divisions, the official political structure is paralysed and closed to outside influence, but this does not disturb the reproduction of such social relationships.

These propositions lead us further to the question of the relations of production; and in the first place to the dominant form of ownership relation in contemporary Yugoslav society. Considered in a normative and formal legal way, the monopoly of ownership of the means of production is excluded. From that viewpoint they are socially owned. The question is, however, what is the character of ownership relations as economic relations? (66).

The relationships of distribution as an expression of ownership

relationships (Marx) suggest an answer. There are undestroyed wage relationships as an important, but not the only, characteristic of the relations of production. Understood in this way, ownership relations represent even today the source of social division, and the focus of vertical structuring of society. Simply, the workers (with certain sub-groupings), and the "politocracy" (also with sub-groups of which the most significant is the bureaucracy), represent opposing poles in the social structure (67). Social ownership as an economic relationship (disposal, use of the surplus of labour) is still restricted to a nucleus by powerful political controls, but it has powerful potentialities for development. It can grow into a central social tendency in as far as it penetrates society as a whole. One of the basic requirements for the opening up of this process is the taking of key positions of political power by the workers; this would be in total contradiction to etatism.

As long as wage relationships exist in society, there is no reason why strikes should not also exist as a natural result of them. They grow from and remain in the framework of wage relationships (68). This is not to say that they do not contain in themselves the possibility of transformation into a political movement as a higher form of workers' participation in the overcoming of wage relationships. This is particularly true in conditions when the idea of self-management, including the results which are achieved so far, is one of the dominant integrative social values.

Finally, it is necessary to consider two significant aspects of strikes, and thus try to answer, as far as is possible, the problem of why strikes have happened since 1958 and what is their future.

1. Yugoslav society, like other societies, is not homogeneous. Although the first steps towards that were strongly made, existing social differences were not removed and there are, as we have seen, some new ones, which derive from a specific type of political organization in which political power dominates the political organization of society. But although there has been social stratification for a long period, strikes have happened only recently.

The reasons are clearly complex and numerous. One of the most frequently put forward is that the power of the police apparatus was such that real differences could not be expressed (69). However, this is not a sufficient reason because strikes happened while the power of the political police was still untouched. A further reason for their expression was the broadening of the normative rights and material basis of self-management gained a deeper basis in society, and the rationalization of the relations between government and economic processes (the market economy and the principle of efficiency) (70). In addition to this, there are two other reasons. Firstly, we have seen that strikes are more intense when there have been crucial changes in the economic system, so that a significant number of workers felt social instability (the growth of unemployment, etc.). Secondly, an ever more persistent

insistence on the "fatal" consequences of equality hides in itself symptoms of an aspiration for the legalization of existing social differences (and their sources), by means of the establishment of a specific "dualism" of political and economic privileges, which would be a stable basis for gaining political and economic rights. That would allegedly be achieved by means of the emancipation of the economic sphere of society, but under the conditions that the monopoly of the political sphere is not broken—perhaps we can find the real obstacles to the reform in that. Such a situation has been the cause of a stronger wave of workers' strikes.

2. It is more difficult to answer the second part of the problem. However, we shall indicate three possibilities, probably the most likely in regard to the destiny of strikes in Yugoslav society.

a) The revival of a workers' movement and the development of a progressive social consciousness could lead to the coming about of a modern communist movement which would be based on a dialectical inter-relationship between the traditional value orientations of the proletarian movement and the results of the scientific and technical revolution. Such a movement could make an important new attempt to reconcile reason and rationality, spontaneity, and the means of realization of the historical potentialities of a movement, thus eliminating the dilemma between radicalization and functioning.

S spontaneous workers' movement whose autonomy would not be absorbed into a political machine would constantly pressure towards the direction of the socialization of politics, with all the important consequences of such a process.

b) The second possibility is the reproduction of the status quo in such a way that conflicts outside institutions would be built into a positive institutional mechanism, which would ensure the control of extra-institutional conflicts, and which would, as was seen many years ago, indicate in fact a recognition that there is no possibility of socializing politics and economics (71). Polemics about this have recently been renewed (72). On the one hand, it is argued that institutionalization has positive sides in the more efficient solution of conflicts, a complex procedure of arbitration would complicate the conditions in which a strike could take place, and this way reduce their number, the competence and thus the responsibility of leading personnel and of social-political organizations would be increased, and the balance between leaders and workers would be regulated. In opposition to this viewpoint are those who believe that the institutionalization of strikes would indicate a recognition that the self-management method of solving conflicts is not efficient.

The institutionalization of conflicts, particularly when their basic focus and courses in the society as a whole are untouched, would facilitate the reproduction of the existing social structure, including in that even the possibility of a longer lasting symbiosis of politics and economics on the principle of the unity of the egoisms mentioned earlier.

c) We cannot exclude another possibility, the real prospect of which grows with the lessening of the probability of realization of the first two. The possibility is, namely, that the impoverished parts of society in a moment of hopelessness and because of uncertainty about the future, would turn towards powerful individuals who would promise an exit from the difficulties on condition that they were given unlimited power in law and in reality.

Although we are sure that the first possibility is the most progressive historically, we shouldn't exclude the other two. It is also true that the possibilities may not appear in a pure form, but the question is, which of them will become more dominant.

NOTES

1. Some writings appeared earlier, but they almost exclusively mentioned strikes without internal knowledge, mainly as events which did not correspond to self-management.
2. Only in one enquiry was it suggested that in two cases of strikes, workers returning from economic emigration (to West Germany), had a significant influence, and their remarks on standards there contributed to an atmosphere of dissatisfaction, but this would be difficult to attribute to unpatriotic activity. See R. Lampret, *Nekatera protislovja in navskrižja v gospodarskih organizacijah, protestne ustavitve dela*, diploma thesis, VSPV Ljubljana, 1965, supplement, table 3.
3. M. Svab, *Konflikte med mošnjostjo in uresnitvijo*, in a symposium on the theme 'Prekinitve dela,' *Teorija in praksa*, 1964, no. 2.
4. The reader can find complete and relatively systematized information about the different positions concerning strikes and interpretations of them in *Obustave Rada*, Centar za političke studije i obrazovanje, Belgrade, May 1967.
5. See M. Svab, op. cit., p. 258, and R. Lampret, op. cit., p. 9. O. Kozomara takes a similar position, except that she equates strikes in capitalism with a political movement. O. Kozomara, *Obustave rade juče i danas*, *Kulturni Radnik*, Zagreb, 1968, no. 3.
6. B. Kavcic, *O protestnih ustavitvah dela*, *Teorija in Praksa*, Ljubljana, 1965, no. 9, p. 1445.
7. N. Jovanov, *O protestnim obustavama rada*, in the book *Obustave Rada*, Belgrade, 1967.
8. N. Jovanov, *Neka opsta pitanja protestnih obustavama rada*, *Gledista*, Belgrade, 1967, no. 2.
9. See on this concept K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Kultura, Belgrade, 1946, p. 154-155, and V.I. Lenin, *What is to be done*, Selected Works, Kultura, Belgrade, Vol. 3 (both Serbo-Croat editions).

10. Source of data, R. Lampret, op. cit., p. 22-36, and 'Reflektor', Borba, Belgrade, 27/9/1969.
11. Informacija o obustavama rada u Hrvatskoj (from II,68 - 31VII 1969) RVSSJ za Hrvatsku, Zagreb, 9X, 1969.
12. Detailed in the report of the Central Committee of the unions of workers in transport and related industries, Belgrade, 27VI, 1969, and from Borba, 3VI, 17VI and 27IX, VUS, 11VI, and Vecerne Novosti, 8VI, 1969.
13. Konfliktne situacije u radnim organizacijama i uloga komunista u njihovom razrešavanju, Komisija Predsedništva SKJ za unutrašnja politička pitanja i razvoj društvenih odnosa, za ekonomsku politiku i za razvoj SK i komisija Veka SSI za društveno-ekonomske odnose, Belgrade, 6X, 1969, prilog 1.
14. Facts from the enquiry undertaken by the Federal Labour Council of the Yugoslav Trade Unions, in the first half of 1969. Enquiries were sent to 478 opština, of which 403 answered, 202 giving details about strikes (op. cit. appendix 1). Nine tenths of these had happened between the beginning of 1966 and August 1969, when there were 516 and 500 opština respectively. (Statistički Godisnjak Jugoslavije, 1969, p. 62).
15. Konfliktne situacije, prilog 1.
16. 1961-2 was a period of new economic measures, and the second period was that of the economic reform. In both cases it could be suggested that the growth of strikes represented insecurity and uncertainty deriving from these measures.
17. Konfliktne situacije, appendix 1.
18. As above.
19. Politika, 5VII,68, 3IV,68, 2VI,68, Borba 25V,68.
20. Konfliktne Situacije, App. 1.
21. As above.
22. Most information on this is given by R. Lampret, op. cit. N. Jovanov, O. Protestnim Obustavama Rada, op. cit., and Obeležja i tendencije razvoja strajkova u Jugoslaviji (introductory essay in a discussion about strikes), in O Obustavama Rada i Pitanjima koja su u Direktnoj Vezi sa njom, CVSSJ, Belgrade, Jan. 1968.
23. N. Jovanov, O. Obustavama Rada, op. cit., p. 14.
24. As well as the Rijeka harbour case, where in less than a year there were five strikes, the case of the motor factory at Rakovica is also significant. In less than half a year there four small strikes in which some groups of the collective took part, which didn't prevent a fifth in which all employed workers took part. (Politika, 11V,69).
25. Strikes have turned into street demonstrations in many cases. Among the first were those of the hospital personnel in Ljubljana, then educational workers at Ptuj and from there the Rijeka strike, as well as earlier in Kopar, where the workers of the Tomos factory demonstrated in the streets on the 17th and 18th of May, 1968.
26. Jovanov's work shows that, 'a tendency exists for the reduction in the number of strikes with a small number of participants and an increase in the number of strikes in which a larger number of strikers take part.' Jovanov, Obeležja i tendencija, p. 11, 12.
27. Dromene u Kretanjima Nekih Elemenata Životnog Standarda of 1964 do 1969 godine, Vece SSI, Belgrade, June, 1969, p. 9.
28. See Statistika Licnih Dohodaka Posebno Saopštenje, No. 5, Sept., 1967, Statistički Zavod S.R. Srbije, Belgrade, Nov. 1967, p. 3. In terms of averages, the stratification of the population is indicative: 'In the distribution of working organisations and employed personnel according to the amount of average personal income, the largest percentage of working organisations, 37%, in which 43% of workers are employed, have an average personal income of between 500 and 700 n.d.... 22% of working organisations, with 19% of employed people, have an average personal income of less than 500 n.d.... 3% of those employed in working organisations have an average personal income of above 1200 n.d. To this 3% goes about 6% of the total personal in-

come paid in industry and mining, while income paid to those in enterprises with average personal income of above 1400 n.d. - 1% of all workers - amounts to 3% of all personal income.' (p. 3 and 4).

29. As above, p. 3.

30. Promene u Kretanjima Nekih Elemenata Zivotnog Standarda, p. 46.

31. As above, p. 48.

32. As above, p. 52.

33. As above, p. 51.

33a. Razlike u Ostvarivanju Licnih dohodaka i Njihove Implikacije na Razlike Penzijskih Osnova, VSSJ, Belgrade, Oct. 1969, p. 7.

34. N. Popov, Radnici i Princip Socialne Jednakosti, *Polet*, Zagreb, 1969, nos. 25, 26, 27.

35. Material from the pre-congress discussion of the SSJ, Belgrade, Feb. 1968, Sveska 4, p. 21.

36. M. Zivkovic, Jedan Primer Segregacije u Razvoju Nasih Gradova, *Sociologija*, Belgrade, 1968 (3), p. 54.

37. See on this the more detailed discussion by M. Caldanovic in *Diskusija o Teoriji Partije*, *Pregled*, Sarajevo, 1964(6), p. 626. This author discusses the same problem in another article: 'In contrast to the influence of revolutionary changes, a negative part was played by a firmly set up and detailedly worked out system of economic and political privileges as well as an ideological monopoly by the leading layer, the 'revolutionary elite.' Closedness, illegality and hidden special distributions in a period of general need, frequent misuse, and many extra-legal acts to ensure privileges led to the crystallisation of an oligarchical hierarchy and to the mystification of authority.' *Drustveni Procesi i Drustvene Vrijednosti*, Institut za Drustvena istrazivanja Sveucilista u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 1968, p. 18.

38. M. Vojnovic, *Diskusija na Kongresnim Razgovorima*, III Kongres, Psinologa Jugoslavije, Belgrade, 1969, p. 62. In the congress a wide discussion of poverty took place - see the same publication, p. 46-83. The same theme is frequently discussed in the review *Susret*, see nos. 78 and 79. (20III and 3IV, 1968).

39. See also on this question, S. Suvar, *Daleko od Vlasti*, VUS, 25XII,68, *Daleko od Polemike*, VUS, 5II,69, and *Elite Mase i Moc*, *Omladinski Tjednik*, Zagreb, 29XI,69, nos. 70,71.

40. B. Horvat, *Ogled o Jugoslavenskom Drustvu*, Mladost, Zagreb, 1969, p. 225.

41. *Statisticki Bilten*, Belgrade, Jan. 1964, no. 206, Nov. 1965, no. 372, Oct. 1968, no. 491. *Jugoslovenski Pregled*, July/Aug. 1969, no. 78. The same sources show more precisely the following:- in the elections of 1963, 1965, 1967, and 1969, the percentage of workers in the Federal Parliament was 2.1, 1.1, 0.5, and in 1969 when the General chamber was elected, there were 0.2% workers. In the newly formed social political chamber there was not one worker, in the Economic chamber (18.3, 14.2, 5.8, 0.6), in the Educational chamber there was no representative before, or in 1969, in the social Health chamber in 1963 there were 0.8% and later no workers, in the Organisational/Political chamber percentages were 8.3, 5.8, 4.2. In republics, the participation of workers changed as follows:- Bosnia-Hercegovina (5.7, 4.5, 2.3), Montenegro (3.6, 1.2, 0.8), Croatia (4.1, 4.1, 3.2), Macedonia (10.3, 4.4, 3.3), Slovenia (12.8, 6.8, 1.7), Serbia (7.7, 5.2, 3.2), Vojvodina (7.7, 6.3, 4.0), and Kosovo (4.4, no data, 3.7).

43. On economic changes in the distribution of surplus value see: *Sumarna Analiza Privrednih Kretanja i Prijedlozi za Ekonomsku Politiku*, Jugoslovenski Institut za Ekonomska Istrazivanja, Belgrade, 1968.

44. J. Zupanov, *Samoupravljanje i Drustvena Moc*, *Nase Teme*, Belgrade 1969, p. 107.

45. As above, p. 107.

46. V. Rus, *Socijalni Procesi i Structura Moci u Radnoj Organizaciji*, *Sociologija*, Belgrade, 1966 (4), p. 11.
47. J. Zupanov's investigation shows that leaders are the most influential group in both hierarchies. In the first ('representative') leaders of economic units come from them, then immediate leaders and workers; in the second hierarchy ('leading') behind this group comes the workers council and management committee. (Op. cit., p. 173).
48. For more information see J. Jerovsek, *Nesporazumi o Modelih Samoupravljanja v Delovnih Organizacijah*, *Teorija in Praksa*, Ljubljana, 1969, no. 3, p. 432f.
49. The number of workers changed from 27.6% (1946) to 32.2% (1952) to 33.9% (1966). In the same period, the number of peasants lessened seven times (from 50.4% in 1946 to 42.3% in 1952 to 7.4% in 1966, and the number of officials has increased four times (from 10.3% to 18.9% to 39.1%). See B. Horvat, op. cit., p. 248.
50. As above, p. 255.
51. M. Tripalo, *O Problemima Daljeg Razvoja i Aktivnosti Saveza Komunista*, *Komunist*, Belgrade, no. 664, 11XII, 69.
52. VUS, Zagreb, IOVII, 68.
53. J. Gregurincic, *Zadaci Sindikata Poslije VI Kongresa Saveza Sindikata Jugoslavije*, *Kulturni Radnik*, Zagreb, 1968, no. 5, p. 44-45.
54. VUS, same no. and *Kulturni Radnik*, same no., p. 50.
55. I. Gregurincic, p. 47.
56. As above, p. 49.
57. As above, p. 50. Following on from that question, here is one other fact which also tells us something about the relation of workers and trade unions. The Opština T.U. Committee of Pozarevac demanded that the Executive committee of the trade unions elected at the Congress should submit its resignation because they had allegedly altered the decisions of the Congress, and because 'members of the higher T.U. forums, without any great opposition graciously agreed to many decisions of the Federal and Republican authorities, although those decisions were opposed to the vital interests of, and constantly reflected back on all workers. We think this tolerant position derives from the high personal living standard of members of the highest trade union circles.' *Politika*, 26II, 69.
58. J. Zupanov, op. cit. p. 138. On the same phenomenon, M. Caldarovic writes: 'The subordination of discussion, the concentration of power initiative and responsibility into the hands of the leaders, drastic differences in information, particularly in conditions of illegality and conspiracy, between leaders and members, these are the basic characteristics of revolutionary organisations in the movement between the two world wars (p.13).' And after the war, a hierarchy crystallized during the war is realized, 'An already formed bureaucratic hierarchical structure comes after the war into conflict with the revolutionary life experience of broad masses, particularly those in liberated towns, which were not exposed to such 'ideological training', during the war.' p. 17.
59. J. Zupanov, op. cit., p. 279. See also D. Tadic - J. Zupanov, *Ekonomске Aspiracije i Društvena Norma Egaltosti*, *Sociologija*, Belgrade, 1969, no. 2. Data was gathered from ten enterprises in an industrial centre in Croatia (1156 respondents) from a 1966 investigation.
60. J. Zupanov, op. cit., p. 297.
61. As above, p. 299.
62. N. Popov, op. cit.
63. M. Zivotic, *Covek i Vrednost*, Prosveta, Belgrade, 1969, p. 159.
64. See for more on this, S. Stojanovic, *Između Ideala i Stvarnosti*, Prosveta, Belgrade, 1969, p. 201-221.

65. M. Janicijevic, *Socijalizam i Ideja Društvene Jednakosti, Sociologija*, 1967, (3-4), p. 52.
66. For further material see A. Bajt, *Društvena Svojina - Kolektivna i Individualna, Gledista*, 1968, no. 4.
67. "Politocracy" is a better term than bureaucracy because by the latter we usually understand the social composition of the state apparatus and there we are speaking of groups who are related to the bureaucracy as a political power (a broader idea), and not as the administrators of the state apparatus (a narrower idea). In addition, if we use the term politocracy, the principle by which social relationships are formed becomes clearer, i.e., the place of the hierarchy of political power in the whole. This is only a working definition, while a more solid definition would require deeper and broader investigation. Then we could also answer the question whether we have a quite new historical type of society which is not divided by class in the traditional sense, or whether there is a new grouping which is analogous to castes, estates, and classes, but cannot be reduced to any of these types of grouping.
68. See Da Li strajkovi Jacaju ulogu radnicke klase?, discussion in the review *Susret*, Beograd, 1969, No. 68.
69. A clear example of the degree of power of the police apparatus, particularly the political police, is the *arbitrary* application of the "Administrative Law" (Zakon o Prekršajima) from 1947 (repealed in 1967). After the student demonstrations, there were attempts to reintroduce such practice (propositions known under number AS1139—see *Susret*, No.97, 2/4/69 and *Nin*, No.944 and 945, 1969), which was not completely successful, but only partially so, in the new administrative law in Serbia.
70. Authors who have written about this have already been mentioned, particularly R. Lampret and B. Kavcic.
71. V. Rus wrote already in 1964 on this. His view was that if the socializing of plan and market, to be achieved through self-management in working organizations and in society as a whole, was not possible, then the optimum democratization was by institutionalizing opposing tensions. V. Rus, *Simbioza Dela in Lasnista, Perspektiva*, 1963-4, No.36-7, p.858.
72. See J. Jerovsek, *Konflikti u nasom Društvu, Sociologija*, 1968, No. 4, J. Perko-Separovic, *Konfliktni Interesi u Socialistickom Društvu, Gledista*, 1969, No. 1, and Z. Vidakovic, *Dva Prilaza Protestnim Obustavama Rada (strajkovima), Gledista*, 1968, No. 1, p.32-33.

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Armed struggle in Venezuela Interview with FALN militants

1. WHAT IS THE HISTORICAL COURSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GUERRILLA EXPERIENCE?

It is difficult to summarize the wealth of experience and the lessons of the history of guerrilla struggle in Venezuela. There was a whole conjuncture of historical factors behind the formation of the existing guerrilla forces in this country. As in most countries, in Venezuela the forms of guerrilla struggle emerged in the heat of a crisis in which the forces of the people were in confrontation with the ruling class.

The present guerrilla struggle is the product of social conflicts which sharpened in Venezuela with the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez (1) dictatorship. Even at the time of the struggle against the dictatorship, the military preparation of a small nucleus of CP members had begun—albeit at a very rudimentary level. With the overthrow of Perez Jimenez, a vast, intense mass mobilisation began. The 23rd of January (2) brought to a close a whole period of struggle for the democratization of the State, and opened a new period, of struggle for national liberation and socialism. In fact from 1928 to 1958 a radical transformation of the economic structure had occurred, changing our country from a semi-feudal system, governed by absolutist military cabals, to a new system with a capitalist basis. The whole period of struggle from 1928 was dominated by the great contradiction between absolutist and bourgeois-democratic forms of government. At the culmination of this bourgeois democratic process, the reformist parties which had been leading the political

struggle came into power: concretely, Accion Democratica under Romulo Betancourt (3). The bourgeoisie and the representative of imperialism, temporarily disoriented in the days immediately after the 23rd of January, acted with great caution, skill and precision. They fell back momentarily, and as the jubilant masses took to the streets, they made sure of their control over the instruments of power. The Patriotic Junta (4), which had led the masses in the struggle for the overthrow of Perez Jimenez, followed a mistaken policy. This was the result of the line followed held both by the reformist parties and by the Communist Party. The CP stayed tied to the policy it followed before the overthrow of Perez Jimenez, claiming that it was maintaining unity with the parties of Romulo Betancourt, Rafael Caldera, and Jovito Villalba. Meanwhile, the governing Junta joined forces with two of the most distinguished representatives of the bourgeoisie: Eugenio Mendoza and Blas Lamberti (5). The Patriotic Junta was relegated to oblivion, and finally wasted away. The CP carried on under the slogan of 'Back to the Constitution' which simply meant entering into the electoral process in which the reformist parties had every certainty of gaining power. At that time consideration was given to the absurd idea of a unity candidate, agreed among all the parties. The potentially revolutionary process begun on 23rd January, was partially frustrated. It was in these circumstances that the victory of the Cuban Revolution took place and became a kind of catalyst of the factors for revolution present in our country. Even in 1958, some of the leading cadre had recommenced the preparation of small nuclei on the basis of good planning. The plan was called 'The 500' because of the number of militants who were to be trained and organized for the coming struggle. Many of them began the work of penetrating the peasant zones which would later serve as bases for the first guerrilla forces. However, the idea of developing a long term plan was replaced by the adventurist spontaneist conception put forward by Guillermo Garcia Ponce (6) and approved by the whole Political Bureau (7). This policy was based on the forces which the PCV (Venezuelan CP) had inside the army, where a great number of officers were members and many others followed the party line. It was a very important force, but on its own it was not capable of guaranteeing a revolutionary victory. Had there been a really revolutionary leadership, which was clear about the prolonged nature of our war of liberation, the results would have been quite extraordinary. The forces within the army would have acted in co-ordination with the guerilla units which were already active in both the city and the countryside, alongside the growing mass upsurge which was still being kept up for the moment in which the uprisings of Carupano and Puerto Cabello took place. They were brought in fact to an end by a disastrous military and political defeat, and it became clear, by Guillermo Garcia Ponce's aspirations to power.

The first organized guerrilla focus appeared in 1960 in the area of the plains (llanos) where the Guaitero brothers and the Faria and Noboa

brothers began the work of political penetration and organization of guerrilla units. In the same period some initial steps were taken towards the formation of joint revolutionary forces between Columbia and Venezuela. In the Vichada zone some meetings took place with Tulio Bayer and Minuto Colmenarex (8). These plans could not be crystallized because of the difficulties and errors which every revolutionary undertaking normally encounters in its early days. But the idea of organizing a guerrilla persisted and, even in 1961 guerrilla groups appeared in El Charal (Portuguesa) (9), where Juan Vicente Cabezas (Pablo) began to play an outstanding role; in the Sierra de Irapara (Falcon State), the area of operations of Domingo Urbina, Elias Manuitt, Teodoro Petkoff, and Douglas Bravo. On this front, Felix Faria had begun preparatory work: he was to become one of the outstanding leaders. In the Cerro Azul area (Yaracuy State) Luben Petkoff was operating; Alfredo Maneiro was in Azulita (Merida State) (10). In other zones too, such as Turimiquire (Sucre State) and Vigirima (Carabobo State) guerrilla forces began to organize, but existed for very brief periods only. At this period the MIR and the PCV were acting in collaboration (11).

In 1962 armed struggle in the countryside was extended. The errors committed, together with the great offensive launched by the enemy, had the consequence of dispersing most of the initial focus to the point where only a few drastically reduced forces remained in Lara and Falcon. In the same year intense mass struggles took place in the cities, reaching their crisis point in a transport strike, which acquired the character of an unsurrection. As I have already indicated, there was no revolutionary leadership with the ability to unite the conjuncture of favourable factors which had developed up to this moment. The guerrilla, the revolutionary and progressive forces within the army, the party and the masses, went each their own way, without any real coordination. This gave Betancourt a breathing-space, and the opportunity to unleash a repression of great proportions which ended by seriously weakening the revolutionary movement and destroying the radicalism of some leaders. Some began to vacillate. In spite of them, fronts were reorganized in Portuguesa with Fabricio Ojeda, Luben Petkoff and Lunar Marquez, and in Lara with Argimiro Gabaldon; in Oriente the 'Manuel Ponte Rodriguez' front grew up, led by Alfredo Maneiro, and in Falcon the 'Jose Leonardo Chirinos' front was maintained under the leadership of Douglas Bravo (12). The MIR organized the 'Ezequiel Zamora' front in El Bachiller (Miranda State). But the vacillations within the PCV as well as the MIR became increasingly acute; until they assumed crisis proportions. Immediately after the victory of Raul Leoni, Domingo Alberto Rangel published a document declaring that he was against armed struggle. In the PCV the crisis came to a head at the end of 1965. From the San Carlos barracks, where they were being held, Guillermo Garcia Ponce, Pompeyo Marquez, the Machado brothers, Teodoro Petkoff and Freddy Munoz, launched a veritable offensive against the line of armed struggle. They based this on what they termed the necessity for a 'tactical retreat'. According to them, the defeats suffered by the revolutionary movement demanded a

halt to armed struggle, but now no longer simply in terms of a truce, as had been the case on previous occasions, but in terms of a retreat all along the line. They added that armed struggle was becoming an insuperable obstacle to the development of the mass struggle. Clearly, those like Teodoro Petkoff and Pompeyo Marquez, who had been the most ardent proponents of armed struggle in the moments of upsurge and victories, chose a formulation which amounted to a grotesque subtlety—the paradox is valid—since they referred to a retreat to recover forces. In reality, the retreat turned out to be what Douglas Bravo had so strongly warned against—and this brought on him the hatred which led to his expulsion by the majority of the PB of the PCV—that is: a revision of the revolutionary line of armed struggle adopted at the 3rd Congress of the PCV and ratified in successive plenary sessions of the Central Committee. A line representing the most open betrayal of the revolution was imposed by a small group of renegades. The overwhelming majority of the cadre who had borne the weight of the armed struggle, quickly reacted to oppose the betrayal. The confrontation within the party became very bitter, and a split became inevitable. So in April 1966 there was a Conference of guerrilla and urban cadre and cadre from the mass fronts, under the leadership of Douglas Bravo and Fabricio Ojeda. It took the decision to found a movement independent of the PCV which could vigorously follow the revolutionary road of armed struggle, correcting the errors which had led to the downfall of the adventurist leadership of the PCV. This was the origin of the FLN—FALN, and the foundation of the Party of the Venezuelan Revolution (PRV). To date, these organizations have played the decisive role in working out a revolutionary line, and therefore, a revolutionary practice, expressed in the formulation of a theory, a strategy and tactics for the Venezuelan Revolution.

The measures then taken by the armed revolutionaries have been amply endorsed by the events which have followed. It was not a question of a simple 'tactical retreat' 'to recover forces'; it was a betrayal. In their 8th Plenary, the renegades went on from their thesis of retreat to formalize 'the end' of armed struggle, and later to participate in the elections under the name of UPA, while they carried on a campaign of denunciation of the armed revolutionaries, to the point where it has now become extremely difficult to make out whether a declaration against armed struggle comes from the mouth of Garcia Villasimil (Minister of Defence) or from Teodoro Petkoff. The latter has sometimes been more successful in the wealth of denigratory epithets he has employed. But despite the profound crisis which threatened the revolutionary movement with destruction, for we know not how long, the achievement of basing our action on correct theory and on a firm and decisive leadership, allowed us to overcome the moments of greatest danger. Today we can say that even though we are still going through difficult moments, the crisis has been overcome. The guerrilla columns have been able to consolidate themselves and have shown the inability of all the enemy's power to destroy them. In Oriente, the PCV dismantled the 'Manuel Ponte Rodriguez' guer-

rilla front. But comrades Carlos Betancourt, Gabriel Puertas and Americo Silva have been able, in the space of five years, to build a guerrilla force which has been notable for its combativity, and has inflicted heavy blows on the enemy. The consolidation of the guerrilla forces in Occidente, Oriente and the llanos, under the leadership of FLN-FALN and Bandera Roja; the process of integration going on between these two organizations, towards the formation of a united party and army; the progressive overcoming of many of our past errors and weaknesses, which had brought us into dangerous isolation from the masses; the revival of the popular movement which reaches new heights each day, together with the bankruptcy, daily more complete, of the reformist and revisionist parties—these are the most eloquent measures of our beliefs and of the correctness of the revolutionary road that we are opening for our people.

As I told you, it is very difficult to convey this whole process in a short resume. Here I have only attempted to point out some of the most striking aspects.

2. WHAT INTEREST DOES THE VENEZUELAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT HAVE IN RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES?

In the first place we can say that there is an interest of historical origins. In this sense, as our comrade Douglas Bravo has put it, all the peoples of the continent have been engaged in a common struggle for 500 years, in which time they have experienced two great upheavals: the war of conquest unleashed by the Spanish colonial empire, and the war of independence which united the whole continent in struggle against this empire. Today we are faced with the third great continental upheaval: the war of our peoples against the exploitation and oppression of US imperialism, the war for national liberation and socialism. In the second place, there is a politico-military interest: before all the peoples of Latin America there rises an aggressive imperialist force which has not hesitated to carry out military occupations of our countries when it has seen the least shadow of danger to its economic, political or military interests. This imperialist force has numerous methods of guaranteeing its rule over our peoples. In every moment of danger, apart from its own forces it can count on the servile forces headed by the reactionary governments of the continent. That is, in the face of the interests of the people of the whole continent, there is a close identification between the interests of imperialism and the ruling classes of each of our countries. Che Guevara pointed out a very important fact about the triumph of the Cuban Revolution: it represented an exceptional lesson for it showed with the force of historical fact that it was possible for our peoples to achieve their independence despite the power of yanqui imper-

ialism. But the reverse of the coin is that it was also a clear and painful experience for imperialism, which would not let itself be surprised again after that. The invasion by over 40,000 yankee and puppet soldiers of Santo Domingo—where the rebellion led by Caamano and Aristy was just beginning to point towards the instalment of a democratic regime—was the most incontrovertible demonstration that the aggressive nature of imperialism, far from diminishing, was daily being exacerbated while it was suffering defeats.

We should note on this point too what Latin America means for U.S. imperialism. It finds here its safest rearguard, which constantly provides it with all kinds of raw materials, in which it gains a growing volume of superprofits, and which forms one of the most important and stable markets for its products. This means that Latin America, after the US itself, represents the most vital point for the interest of US imperialism. Without any doubt the liberation of this continent would be a death blow to US imperialism. It will do anything in its power to avoid a defeat on this continent; even more since the Cuban revolution and the defeats it is suffering in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The weight of this reality imposes clear, identical interests on the peoples of Latin America, and more specifically, on their revolutionary vanguards. So among the basic points of our conception, we clearly single out the continental armed character of the liberation struggle in Latin America. This shows the reality that it is more than impossible—since the Cuban Revolution—for National Liberation and Socialism to come in a single country on our continent. They will be the product of a long painful and bloody process in which once more—as in the days of Bolivar—our continent will be the scene of great battles between our peoples united in a single army, and the armies of imperialism.

In the third place, the Venezuelan revolutionary movement has an interest in the countries of the continent, for a principled ideological reason: we identify ourselves absolutely with the ideas formulated by Marx, Engels, and Lenin on proletarian internationalism. We consider that our struggle is no more than a part of the struggle of all the peoples of the world to break decisively with imperialist dominion and exploitation. In this sense we now identify not only with the interests of the people of Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala, Domingo, etc., but we are completely identified too with the interests of the Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian, and Palestinian peoples and with the interests of the North American People themselves, who now see their sons dying not only in Vietnam, but on their own soil, as a result of the politics generated by the North-American imperialist system.

3. IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT PERSPECTIVES DOES THE CASE OF CHILE OFFER THE LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT?

At the time of Salvador Allende's electoral victory, we put out communiques in the name of the Political Bureau of the PRV and of the National Command of the FALN (Armed Forces of National Liberation).

In these communiqués we expressed an opinion which can be synthesized in the following terms: the cardinal problem of every revolution is the problem of political power. A real revolution implies, as history has shown up to our own times—not simply taking over the State machinery but its destruction, and substitution by a new State of the people. In the case of Chile, it is clear that President Salvador Allende is standing at the crossroads: he can orient towards a revolutionary road by means of a thorough application of his socialist programme, or follow the way of many reformist governments which have ended by frustrating the hopes of the people. In the first case, if he follows a revolutionary road in which the interests of American imperialism would inevitably be liquidated, and the interests of the Chilean bourgeoisie at least considerably affected, there is not the slightest doubt, as we see it, that Allende will have to take on a tough armed resistance from imperialism and Chilean reaction. In this sense, being able to apply really revolutionary, socialist measures poses as a condition the organisation and preparation of the people for struggle, and concretely, for armed struggle. For that he would be able to count on many favourable factors, such as: the fact of having obtained an electoral victory within the institutional framework of the system, which poses for the ruling class the need to violate its own bourgeois legality; the absolute majority of the people would be at his side, just as would the other peoples of the continent and, another factor which should not be forgotten, in Chile an armed movement had already begun to develop, as the embryo of a revolutionary army: the MIR. Clearly in this perspective, the Chilean experience would be an extraordinary driving force for the revolutionary movement—and its expression in the guerrilla—on a continental scale. If the intervention in Cambodia by the imperialist troops let loose a wave of protest through our whole continent, an intervention against Chile would find all the peoples of the continent united. Chile would become the centre of all the contradictions of Latin America. The efforts of all the revolutionaries of the continent would have to be turned towards it. The war of liberation would reach a much higher level. From being a series of physically separated fronts in various countries, it would become a co-ordinated movement, united over very concrete tasks. For our part, as far as our strength and the strength of our people permits, we shall be ready to give of our strength and of our lives for the independence of Chile, which is part of the independence of our continental homeland. On the other hand, if the road Allende chooses should end in a policy of mere superficial reforms, despite the fact that this would be harmful for a time to the struggle for liberation and socialism, given the illusions which would be created in the masses, still in the end it would lead to a break with a possible myth, with the 'democratic superstition' which still exists in considerable sectors of the revolutionary movement and of the masses. We think that the consistency of Salvador Allende, expressed in positions held for many years, offers a security for hoping that he will orient towards a revolutionary perspective, even though he will have to confront the violent response of imperialism and its allies.

In any case, it will be future events which allow us to give a conclusive reply to your question, a question which in fact many people are asking.

4. WHAT POSITION DOES THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT TAKE TODAY IN THE FACE OF PRESIDENT CALDERA'S PACIFICATION POLICY?

Exactly the same as we took as soon as Caldera assumed power and launched his pacification manoeuvre. Our struggle has not been undertaken as a rebellion against one particular government. Our struggle is the product of the confrontation with the system of imperialist exploitation and oppression of our country. The violence which has wrecked Venezuela for years is not simply the product of the conscious action of the revolutionary movement. Before the first urban and rural guerrilla units were organized in Venezuela, there was already violence. Violence is no more than the expression of the oppression exercised over our people for centuries. The root of the problem is that for the ruling classes, there is only one kind of violence: the kind employed by the exploited and oppressed when they fight for their emancipation. Nevertheless, their violence scarcely deserves the euphemistic title of 'Public Order', 'Respect for the Constitution and the Law' and other similar phrases, which are essentially no more than a mask to try to hide the violence evident in the appropriation of riches by a tiny minority, in the growing misery of our people dying of hunger and disease, watching their children die on the hillsides of the big cities, devoured by rats. This violence, evident in the existence of armed forces charged with the repression of any popular protest, of police, reactionary laws, jails, and of sacrosanct private property, is the violence which we meet with revolutionary violence. For Caldera, peace means leaving things as they are, that is to say, maintaining and increasing the imperialist exploitation of our country, allowing our people to continue being exploited and reduced to misery, not raising the slightest word of protest against the arch-reactionary, fascist policy of his regime. This is his ideal of peace. But for the poor there is a peace of a completely different kind. There can be no real peace where there is exploitation and domination of one class by another. This is a law of history and our country is no exception. Here the exploited classes have begun to use revolutionary violence. With his 'Pacification policy' Caldera wanted to reduce us to impotence through a double mechanism: a political mechanism, based on offering us life and freedom on the condition that we betray, trying to create the impression in the masses that we were blinded and immovable. In this way he tried to create the conditions for the operation of the other mechanism: an offensive of great proportions by the military and the police. We understood the manoeuvre in time and unmasked it. Within a few months of the launching of his 'pacification' offensive, his troops and police forces were already going for the first victims among the students who were protesting against the constant aggression against the universities. And so the pacification manoeuvre has only registered a few doubtful victories, in the persons of a handful of renegades and desert-

ers who like Rafael Faria (Miranda) and Freddy Carquez, together with the renegades of the PCV, form a real trail of excrement in the political history of our country. Faced by these renegades, the struggle of the people increased notably. 1970 was rich in workers' strikes and student protest. The great part of the strikes were declared illegal by the government, which by a variety of legal subterfuges, always finds a way of denying the working class its rights. On many occasions the workers found themselves facing Caldera's troops. 'The Hunters' who were organized by the Green Berets—as an anti-guerrilla force, went into action against students and workers. So despite the fact that during 1970, because of the measures of reorganization which we had been carrying out within the armed revolutionary movement, not many military actions were carried out, class struggle reached a much greater degree of violence than in previous years. Caldera's manoeuvre was worth nothing, for even if we had got ourselves forgiven for the mortal sin of being serious revolutionaries, violence would still have been on the increase and other revolutionaries would have taken up the banners of National Liberation and Socialism.

5. BY WHAT CRITERION DO THE COMPONENTS OF THE VENEZUELAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT JUDGE THE REFORMIST PARTIES OF THE COUNTRY? ON WHAT DO THEY AGREE AND WHERE DO THEY DIFFER?

In Venezuela the whole political process of the past 40 years has unravelled under the direction of the petite bourgeoisie. Practically all the political parties which have risen up since 1928 have been formed under the leadership and ideology of the petite bourgeoisie. In so far as the struggles are posed against absolutist forms of government, of which the most outstanding example was Juan Vicente Gomez (13), these parties played a progressive role. In this manner, they let the mobilisations of 1928 and 1936-7 (14), and up to January 23rd 1968, in the struggle for the conquest of democratic objectives. This was possible in the circumstances I described to you in answering your first question. But as soon as the bourgeois democratic process reached its peak in Venezuela, it can be said that those parties had exhausted their revolutionary potential, and were no longer capable of leading popular struggles towards a new stage of *liberation and socialism*. This can only be done by a truly revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist party. Hence all those parties began to suffer from internal quarrels which have led to the formation of a veritable constellation of groups and small parties. In brief, we can say that these parties played a progressive role until the fall of Perez Jimenez. In some cases their leaders still take positions with which we agree. For example, the General Secretary of URD, Jovito Villalba, recently made declarations in which he denounced Caldera's pro-imperialist policy; he showed his determination to develop the struggle against the daily increasing penetration of our country by imperialism, and proclaimed the need to form a nationalist front with this objective. At the same time he declared the need for self-criticism in relation

to the support his party had given to Accion Democratica in previous governments. The main point of divergence lies in what has historically separated reformism from revolutionary concepts. The former tries to solve serious problems affecting the people while ignoring completely the inevitable struggles between opposed class interests which until today, have only been resolved through armed violence. In this way all the reformist parties of Venezuela, including the Communist Party, cling with a vehemence worthy of a better cause to electoral formulas, opposing and fighting the revolutionary line of armed struggle. And so agreement can only be concretised in relation to partial struggles, on very concrete and temporary objectives.

6. IS IT AT ALL POSSIBLE THAT A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT CAN COME TO POWER IN VENEZUELA BY THE ELECTORAL ROAD?

No. Even in 1968 the Central Committee of our Party and the National Command of the FALN made their position clear, demonstrating that the concrete conditions of the Venezuelan electoral system did not allow the revolutionary movement to participate. The history of the last few years, which have been precisely those of bourgeois-democratic forms of government, has been characterized by growing violence. After the 23rd of January, when the flames of the struggle against Perez Jimenez had only just died down, Romulo Betancourt obtained a decisive electoral victory, with the support of imperialism and important sectors of the oligarchy, with whose interests he was clearly identified. It was Betancourt's role to elude the serious dangers which had surrounded the ruling classes when a revolutionary situation had been created, raising the possibility of seizure of power by the people. As I already indicated before, the absence of a real revolutionary leadership which was clear on the problem of power, led the PCV to practise an electoral policy, tailing the bourgeoisie. Since then the Venezuelan people have experienced in the flesh a violence much more intense and extensive than that suffered at the time of Perez Jimenez. The AD and Copei governments have equalled the monstrosity of the methods used by Juan Vicente Gomez, surpassing him by far in refinement and cynicism.

There never has been in our country, as in Chile, a democratic tradition through which the people could make gradual gains. In Chile, the parties of Popular Unity have acted for years on a clearly defined policy, with a programme of government and a candidate who has kept a firm and consistent line on the side of the people. Salvador Allende's attitude towards American imperialism, to the Cuban revolution, the socialist countries and the peoples struggling for liberation, has allowed him to obtain a growing influence among the working masses of Chile. This has not happened in the remotest degree in Venezuela. All the parties, without exception, have been characterized by the most abrupt and sharp zigzags imaginable. One day

they hold a demagogic programme which is thrown in the rubbish bin as soon as the electoral business is over. Take the example of the most radical party of the petite bourgeoisie: the PCV. In 1958 it went in for the elections; in 1963 it raised the need for armed struggle; in 1966 it declared that armed struggle was an error; in 1968 it called for participation in the elections and since then it has gone on raising storms against armed struggle. What consistency, what clarity, what definition can the people find in a spectacle of this kind? And so among the masses, the system of parties and the 'rules of the electoral game' have created a profound scepticism. Their participation in elections is by way of inertia produced in them by the absence of class consciousness and the still notable weakness of the armed revolutionary movement, rather than by a firm belief that they are going to attain their objectives by way of the electoral urns. In so far as we are able to practise correct politics directed towards the masses, we shall be using the necessary means to break decisively all the machinery of deception and compromise represented by the Venezuelan electoral system. And so despite the fact that we are not blind admirers of a particular form of struggle, we declare quite firmly that the only possible way to attain National Liberation and Socialism is through an armed process with an armed conclusion. On the part of the government as much as on the part of the masses, violence is an unavoidable fact. The level of struggle in Venezuela has already transcended the straight political battle on the level of a war between opposed classes. If you have been reading the national press you will have come across a tragicomic article: a headline brings out the fact that the government had declared a strike *legal!!* This attracted a lot of attention because it was a real find in a country where all strikes are illegal. But there was a reason for this exception: the strike was of the employees of the University of Zulia. As you know, in Venezuela the government has adopted the aim of adjusting the whole educational system to its fascist conception of the State. So it is progressive by converting all the national universities into regimented institutions. Whenever you look, you will find a scene of violence. A short time ago Caldera let loose a real 'rathunt' under the name of 'Operation Vanguard.' In less than a month a veritable record was chalked up: more than 30 people shot in the street by police units acting, like James Bond, with licence to kill. This was how Caldera tried to solve the problem of delinquency which generates its own system of misery and poverty. With this 'Operation Vanguard', Caldera stepped back several centuries in the practice of criminal justice: the delinquent converted into the object of damage to society, must as such be exterminated.

Would it be correct within this framework, of which I have given only the bare outlines, for revolutionaries to accept an electoral way forward? This would be to return to the same mistake of the 23rd of January: when the masses were pressing for more extreme measures, creating the conditions for the formation of a popular government—not by electoral means but by means of direct action by the masses—the

petite bourgeoisie, dragged along by the bourgeoisie, led them towards the electoral course which resulted in the painful experience our people have lived through in the past decade.

7. WHAT VIEW DOES THE FIN-FALN TAKE OF THE RECENT SPLIT IN THE PCV?

Even before the split we were giving a certain amount of attention to the internal divisions of the PCV. From the analysis we made of the Draft Programme edited by Pompeyo Marquez, which was to be approved at the IVth Congress of the PCV, we reached the conclusion that there was 'nothing new under the sun with the PCV'. They were the same ideas as always, dressed up in clothes which through repeated use no longer serve to cover up the private parts of a scandalously reformist ideology. If during the government of Romulo Betancourt the PCV took the slogan of a fantastic 'Turn to the left' against a government which was defending yanqui interests and killing the people on the streets, now, with Caldera in power, they plan struggle to achieve a 'reorientation in public administration'. On this there was no divergence between the two factions. In its essence, the conflict had nothing to do with revolutionary ideology nor with the specific problems of Venezuela. The fight became sharper over the invasion of Czechoslovakia. While the ultra-right under Guillermo Garcia Ponce was in agreement with the invasion, Teodoro Petkoff, leading a shame-faced right, was condemning the invasion. Shortly afterwards a book by Petkoff appeared (Czechoslovakia, Socialism as a Problem) in which he made a passionate defence of the theses upheld by Dubcek and Ota Sick. For the rest, the internal struggle of the PCV acquired all the characteristics of a fight for the control of bureaucratic positions within the organization, to the point of provoking the split and occasioning two IVth congresses. So the PCV gave birth to a new group called 'MAS'. From the documents we have been able to read, we can find no fundamental difference in their concept of struggle. The two groups coincide in stubborn opposition to armed struggle. Both qualify us in the same way. Both agree on the need to form electoral fronts with the same forces. But that is not all. Within the MAS, as its own leaders recognise, there are tendency struggles. There is an important number of militants grouped in it, who have clung to the idea of a united PCV, with the hope of winning it to a revolutionary line. It will not be long before they see the abortion of their hope that this can be achieved within the MAS. Some of them are already beginning to come close to our organisation. They no longer regard us as infernal beings who have to be 'reduced to dust'—as Pompeyo Marquez demanded—. They listen to our opinions and are beginning to join our ranks. This phenomenon, still very small, will grow in step with our ability to maintain a broad line and with the intensification of the struggle, revealing all the opportunism which permeates the two factions. To sum it up, it has been a split which by its nature has been unable to produce either a warm or cold response from the mass of the people.

8. WHAT IS YOUR FUNDAMENTAL CRITIQUE OF CALDERA'S GOVERNMENT?

It's difficult to choose from among the many which could be made. If we take the root of the problem, we could locate it in the critique of the close identification of the ideology and policy employed by Caldera, with the imperialist interests which exploit our country. All the vices of COPEI flow from this. To be able to sustain the system of imperialist exploitation, Caldera has been assuming more blatantly each day, the character of a fascist government, which is mediated through a progressive militarization of all the organs of the State, through systematic violence against the masses, torture, assassination and constant disappearances.

A few months ago—with the support of Accion Democratica—COPEI approved the so-called 'Service Contracts'. This is a dolled-up reproduction of the national territory, containing our great wealth in oil, was handed over to the oil companies. The growing indebtedness of the State in order to cover the expenses of the military and bureaucracy, falls on the poorest sectors of the people through a tax policy of a 'developmentalist' slant which deems it inconvenient to 'the national interest' to reduce the super-profits obtained by the imperialist companies. The increase in the oil quota and the 'preferential treatment' so strongly demanded by Caldera from the US government, represent nothing but an increase in the exploitation of our principal wealth. There is an inversely proportional relationship between Caldera and Venezuela: what benefits him, is bad for the country; and what benefits the country is bad for Caldera.

9. WHAT LINKS EXIST BETWEEN THE VENEZUELAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF FIDEL CASTRO?

I shall begin by repeating what I said in reply to one of your earlier questions: our movement is based on a fundamental principle of all revolutionaries, I mean proletarian internationalism. The Cuban Revolution led by Fidel Castro, was the first really damaging blow struck at American imperialism on this continent. At the same time, it is the first socialist experience in Latin America. So for those of us who are engaged in struggling for National Liberation and Socialism, nothing that occurs in Cuba can be indifferent to us. There is a very concrete link of fraternity. Going from this elementary principle, we discover that in the international camp we are confronted by the same dangers: on the one hand, imperialism which exploits our people and fights to frustrate the success of socialism in Cuba; on the other hand, revisionism which as the negation of revolutionary theory and practice, carries out politics of confusion in our country, boycotting the revolutionary struggle, and at the same time, fights to divert the revolutionary course of the Cuban Revolution, separating it from the other revolutionary movements of the continent, trying to convert it into an island, not just geographically but from the ideological and political point of view. In so far as the Cuban government

confronts imperialism and revisionism, its links with the Latin American revolutionary movement in general, and the Venezuelan movement in particular, will become closer. For our part, we can say with pride that the most active form of solidarity which can be demanded from a revolutionary in relation to the Cuban Revolution, is practised consistently by us, without any kind of vacillations. Even though it is not explicitly a part of your question, I should like to take this opportunity to underline what Comrade Douglas Bravo said in the interviews with Solioni and Mattei (15), about some twisting of our words by the bourgeois and imperialist press, according to whom we made a series of slanderous accusations against the Cuban Party. If there are differences, which it would be wrong to deny, these differences can lead to a positive result if they are correctly handled. Each time we have referred to this problem, in documents as well as in declarations, we have done it in the style which should distinguish polemics among revolutionaries, basing ourselves on the same principled politics with which we have faced other situations. The differences which can and do exist between the Cuban revolutionaries and ourselves, however complicated they may be, will never lead us into the area where our common enemies wish to see us. For now, our fundamental task is the struggle against imperialism, and we know that everything we do against it will have beneficial results for the Cuban Revolution.

10. HOW DO YOU JUDGE THE STRUGGLES OF THE PEOPLE TAKING PLACE IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE PRESENT TIME?

Imperialism, as the highest form of exploitation and oppression which humanity has known to date, feeds equally on the blood and sweat of the oppressed peoples and of the exploited sectors of its own lands. It is clear that the effects of imperialist exploitation generally make themselves felt more intensely and rapidly in the exploited countries. It is for this reason that the first disturbances are appearing on the periphery: Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Palestine, Latin America, etc. But in step with the sharpening of anti-imperialist struggle in the exploited countries, imperialism finds itself obliged to maintain a permanent state of war within its own boundaries. This fact, together with internal exploitation, ends by generating a growing resistance on the part of its own people. Within the United States two major factors are today united to feed the resistance of ever growing sectors of the people: in the first place, the exploitation of Puerto Rican origin, and the Chicanos, together with the constant repression of the student movement. This has the consequence of an increase of the protest mobilisations which are already beginning to employ forms of armed struggles. In the second place, the criminal war which imperialism is waging against the peoples of Indochina. Day by day the North American people see how their sons are dying thousands of miles from their country in a struggle which has no meaning for them. What motive can a North American Black have for shooting at the Vietnamese people, if in his own country he is affected by the same forces which have unleashed the war against the peoples of other countries? Slowly

what begins as a struggle between races acquires its proper character of a struggle between classes, even though certain privileged sectors of the North American proletariat make common cause with imperialism in opposing the struggle against the war in Vietnam. And so the struggle of the American people is increasingly closely identified with the struggles of the North American people. The most tangible example is the growing world campaign which is being carried out to save the life of Angela Davis, who today symbolizes, with her striking firmness and serenity, the decision of all her people to struggle until they reach victory, even at the cost of their lives. Here I must emphasise that the whole Venezuelan revolutionary movement, our party and the FALN, unite their words and their efforts to the fight to save the life of Angela Davis, who is threatened with death by those who already are feeling the symptoms of the death agonies of a system which has plagued the peoples of the world with misery in the name of freedom—as Simon Bolivar prophesied.

NOTES

- (1) The dictatorship lasted from 1948 to 1958: it was characterised by vast speculation out of oil revenues on the part of the government and its officials, and by wage freezes and rising unemployment for the Venezuelan working class.
- (2) On this day in 1958 a general strike brought down the Perez Jimenez regime: but it was a coalition of bourgeois democratic parties which came into power.
- (3) A petit bourgeois party with a mass following, with its main objective to increase the national share of the oil revenue and develop a national share of the oil revenue and develop a national company. Betancourt had already had a brief period in power before the Perez Jimenez coup of 1948, backed by imperialism, deposed him.
- (4) The alliance which took over from Perez Jimenez: COPEI, the Christian Democrat Party led by Caldera (who is now President); URD, basically a bourgeois nationalist party which received the votes of the CP in the subsequent elections; and AD, led by Betancourt, which won them. The Junta had been organised as a clandestine opposition largely under the leadership of Fabricio Ojeda, who gained the co-operation of both workers' and students' groups. Later, disillusioned with the outcome of this experience, he was to become one of the main guerrilla leaders. He was assassinated in prison in 1966.

- (5) The Junta which immediately assumed the reins of government in the name of the coalition of "democratic forces" was in fact led by high-ranking military officers under Admiral Larrazabal (who was supported in the Presidential elections later in the year by the URD and the CP). They naturally formed strong links with the interests of finance capital.
- (6) CP Secretary and Parliamentary Deputy.
- (7) The plan was to use risings by discontented army officers to spark off a generalised struggle for power. Barracks revolts took place in Puerto Cabello and Carupano in early 1962, but were quelled, and the mass movement, which was not prepared militarily, suffered severe defeats in the towns. The context in which this plan was adopted is not discussed by the comrade here: it is necessary to point out that the rise in the mass movement represented by the overthrow of the dictatorship had not been entirely quelled by the establishment of a bourgeois government; it received fresh impetus from the success of the Cuban Revolution. Castro himself visited Caracas soon after the formation of the Accion Democratica Government: the resultant demonstrations made clear to Betancourt the need to develop repressive activity very quickly, and the army began to operate to break up students and workers' actions in Caracas. The CP leadership was therefore faced by strong pressure from the base for a response.
- (8) Part of the Eastern Plains area of Colombia, bordering the Southern Venezuela plains where the early guerrillas started. Bayer led a local grouping there supported by the Colombian MOEC (Workers', Students', Peasants' Movement) and the FUAR (United Armed Revolutionary Forces), politically influenced by Castro and by left-wing Gaitanism.
- (9) In South Venezuela.
- (10) These groupings, the basis of the fronts which were to have the greatest success, were in the northern mountain areas near the Colombian border. Those in the northern plains next mentioned were more easily destroyed.
- (11) The MIR (Left Revolutionary Movement) was the left-wing split from Accion Domingo Alberto Rangel. Some of the major guerrilla leaders, however, including Douglas Bravo and Teodoro Petkoff, had been organisers of the armed CP units which had worked for the overthrow of Perez Jimenez.
- (12) Now joined also by Fabricio Ojeda.
- (13) Dictator of Venezuela, 1902-1935. Stayed in power on the basis of the early boom in oil and in direct alliance with imperialism.
- (14) 1928 was the year of the first great upsurge against the dictatorship: there were strikes, student demonstrations, and political parties began to organise. Again after Gomez's death in 1935 there were two years of sharp struggle during which the basis was laid for the formation of Accion Democratica as a mass movement.
- (15) Further documentation of Bravo's views is published in French by the Ligue Communiste in Cahiers Rouge's "Reformisme militaire et lutte armee en Amerique Latine", available from Red Books.

A congress of the Czech C.P.

Translator's Introduction

The following material is a report presented to a European cadre school of the Fourth International on the problems of the degenerated workers' states of East Europe. The original was presented in Czech, but this is translated from the French version, with occasional references to the original. The real 14th congress of the Czech Communist Party took place in a Czech factory in September 1968. The congress referred to here would therefore be the 15th if it were to be recognized as valid at all. The analysis presented here is not "Sovietology". Study of the dreary liturgies of the bureaucrats is worth while if it is undertaken in the light of an understanding of the contradictions specific to the development of bureaucratically degenerated transitional societies, which are not the same as those of capitalist societies, nor clarified by the convolutions of state capitalist "theory". The reader is referred to three publications by Ernest Mandel—*Marxist Economic Theory*, Vol. 2, Ch. 15: On the Bureaucracy (shortly to be published by I.M.G. publications); and a forthcoming article based on the main report to the cadre school which will appear in *Critique de l'Economie Politique*, the economics journal of our French Section, the Ligue Communiste, which we shall translate in due course.

R. Davis
Oct. 1971

The "Fourteenth" Congress of the Czech Communist Party

Introduction

The so-called 14th congress of the Czech Communist Party can be summed up as having stabilized the power of the bureaucracy. It has taken more than 2 years to normalize the situation in Czechoslovakia, or more precisely that of the Czech party. In order to do it, 1/5 of the party members according to official figures, 1/3 in actuality were expelled. The party has recovered its "leninist character"; that is to say the bureaucratic order has been restored to that it is once again "ready for action".

We shall attempt, using official reports to analyse the manner in which the bureaucracy has safeguarded its positions, and to deduce whether the stabilisation is transitory or of more or less long duration. Such an analysis is very important in assisting us to choose a strategy for our action.

The Strengthening of the Technocracy as the Basis of the Reconstruction of the Czech Economy

The crisis of the Czech economy, which led at the beginning of the 60's to the critiques of economists like Ota Sik in regard to the inadequacies of bureaucratic planning, underlies all the political changes in Czech society. If the intervention of the Warsaw pact troops did have as its object, as the official stories go, the safeguarding of "socialist" relations of production, it cannot be denied that it has solved nothing in terms of the *cause* of the problem, the crisis of bureaucratic planning. As Strugal's report to the congress shows, the principal problem of the Czech economy remains the profitability and efficiency of production in world terms. "Our success to come depends above all in knowing at what point we succeed in profiting from our accumulated material and intellectual resources and in what manner we will increase the efficiency of and return from our economy."

Party bureaucrats have never been able to organize planned production in a really competent manner. Now with the presence of the Soviet troops they have reinforced their political positions, but if the economy runs as badly as ever, a new menace to their positions coming from the activity of discontented masses is only a question of time. The economic reform has been given a new and specific form as a result of the lessons of the Prague Spring. At that time the economic reform completely escaped from bureaucratic control, and threatened to transform itself into a general mobilization of workers, and thus to an eventual political revolution, supposing the Revolutionary Socialist Party or another organization had been able to play its *avant garde* role.

First of all the objectives of the party should be noted. "The development of the national economy depends above all on the degree in

which we are able to increase the efficiency of the whole machinery of production," repeated Strugal, and he cited 5 main points which required "daily attention":-

1. To make better use of scientific and technical innovations, to introduce them more rapidly in practice, to increase the efficiency of our own scientific-technical base.
2. To use the potential of production better by increasing the level of qualification of our workers.
3. To improve the quality of the management of our economy at every level.
4. To make changes in the structure of production in the direction of greater concentration and greater specialization.
5. To deepen and improve the degree of international economic integration.

What organizational methods were proposed to realize these general objectives?

For Strugal's type of bureaucrat only one possibility exists; the support of factory directors at every level, the provision of economic benefits to individual enterprises, and a hierarchical scale of payment for work in each area of activity. Thus, in respect of science; . . .

"Not only the process of research, but also that of direction out to have a creative character. It is regrettable that scientific workers have ceased in their scientific development and in participating in creative work. Our support ought to be directed towards those leaders and creative scientific workers who take on the risks of the struggle for new inventions, and who, passing all obstacles, create and put to work". . . . Thus centrally at the level of production:-

"The success of our economic politics is absolutely linked to the quality of the leading cadres, their political maturity, their decision making capacity, their responsibility, and their skill in competent political direction of their work collectives Directors cannot fulfil their role except on condition that they are tied to the party and its objectives. . . ."

"The increase of political maturity, of competence and of authority of those leaders who act directly with workers is very important. It is particularly necessary to put on the order of the day the position and the role of foremen."

The leaders, that is to say the industrial and scientific technocracy, have become the principal object of the party's interest. If Strugal mentions the workers it is only to draw the attention of the leaders to the fact that they have to work with them in a particular way. It is clear that technocratic cadres, fully supported by the bureaucracy have a surveillance role to play in production in order to achieve greater profitability. In return they will receive total political support:-

"The function of a leader will require that more than once he will

have to put into practice measures which are delicate and unpopular. In his decisions not everything will be clear in advance, and the leader has to take responsibility even for risks. . . We have said, and we repeat to this Congress, that active and capable leaders in their efforts to increase the efficiency of enterprises and to improve the output of workers will receive our complete and entire political support."

More than this, it isn't a question of political support alone. Much more important, especially in its material aspect is the economic support. By hierarchical payment levels for workers there is a bureaucratic "solution" for several problems at once.

- The possibility of the activation of workers and the development of their class consciousness is made more difficult by the wage hierarchy. (Attempt to atomise the working class).
- The introduction of market and monetary relationships leads to the obscuring of relations of production and increases alienation.
- High payments to technocrats and low ones to workers leads to a recreation of a labour aristocracy.
- By wages hierarchy and inequalities of income a type of competition between workers is introduced, the so-called "discipline freely agreed to". This does not derive from a conscious decision but from external mechanism—competition.

To introduce these devices, it is necessary to change the entire system of payment." The consolidation of discipline in work, in technology, in salaries, the elimination of egalitarianism, the re-introduction of order in norms of work; requires the transformation of the system of payment. Its aim is to make more effective the realization of the socialist aim of payment according to work done and at the same time assist in the separation of the labour force in accordance with the objectives of the plan."

"The fundamental principle will remain payment according to work, and the strengthening of the relationship between output and payment. . . We must make a clear distinction between workers who are stable, efficient and who have initiative and those who don't carry out their task. We have to eliminate with greater strength elements of disruption and misconceived egalitarianism."

But it is not merely a question of establishing the "healthy atmosphere of competition within the enterprise alone, but also in regard to relations between enterprises:-

"We naturally support rewarding scientific and technical effort, and those enterprises which introduce innovations. At the same time, those enterprises which don't modernize their products, are technically backward; have to submit to the economic consequences. The leaders of the enterprise have to show proof of social responsibility and to become the motive force of technical progress".

The resemblance of these proposals to the objectives of Sik's reforms is undeniable, and this is no matter of change. We have also to draw attention to the way that the economic support given to the techno-

crats is limited by the bureaucratic apparatus so that it will not to political consequences, as happened in spring 1968. Strugal is brief, but clear on this matter:

"On the basis of what we have achieved in the national economy it is possible to go on with economic reform, purified of its revisionist aspects."

As we can see from the quotations from Strugal's speech, what is to be eliminated from the reform, the deepest revisionism, is the activity of the mass of workers, and their organization. Even if the councils proposed by Sik would have more or less functioned as an alibi for the autonomy of each enterprise, it would be wrong to deny the role they could have had in the political activation of the workers. Even if the reason Sik proposed workers' councils in 1968 was to use them in the struggle against the stalinist wing of the bureaucracy, he was obliged, without wishing it, to allow a mobilization of the workers. In 1971, Strugal does not find the least need to mention workers when he discusses the system of management: "For this reason we think it worth while pointing out firmly that no system, whatever its qualities, can replace the direct organizational and managerial work of the leaders of the enterprise, those who are made responsible for practical results, and not a council of any sort." (applause).

We can conclude this section with a brief outline of the "new economic reform" as presented by Strugal and Co. There are new aspects of the consolidation of the political power of the party bureaucracy. The completely compromised old guard of the Novotny type has been partially replaced by a new generation which has drawn the lessons of the Prague spring on the one hand and from the experiences of the East German and Hungarian bureaucrats on the other, and is trying to build its politics on the basis of two fundamental principles.

1. The reinforcement of monetary and market relationships labelled as "socialist" to justify their existence.
2. Tensions between the technocracy, bureaucracy and proletariat are handled by political organizational measures on the part of the party apparatus. The first objective is the depoliticization and fragmentation of the workers in a careful and well organized way.

By these two measures, as the East German experience confirms, it is possible to ensure for a relatively long period,

- a) an adequate functioning of the transitional economy;
- b) that the power of the bureaucracy is not directly menaced.

The solution arrived at is very "centralist". It neutralizes the conflicts and consciously isolates them in place of solving them, and the maintenance of the status quo affects the inner life of the bureaucracy as well as its relations outside the party. The basic character of the economic reform resembles very closely that proposed by Sik. Only the "liberal" consequences deriving from the decentralization of authority in production are removed by every means possible.

(see below). Czechoslovakia rejoins the other societies in transition, confirming once more that the solution of its problems does not lie in one country alone, but is a common problem of the working class in the East, as in the West.

The Organizational Consequences of the New Economic Reform (1971)

As we have shown, the support from the bureaucracy to the technocrats is a double edged weapon. On one side it will make production profitable, essential to overcome the actual crisis of the Czech economy. On the other side efforts to make things profitable by means of economic stimulants involves decentralization, and, by making enterprises partially autonomous, the possibility that the decentralization will escape from bureaucratic control. To avoid this, the party is concentrating all its efforts to destroy the activity of all the organizations which in 1968 were used by the working class to defend its justified claims. Thus, the trade union organization has become once more, as it was in the 50s, a party instrument for implementing the directives of the so-called 14th congress. For example, the trade union president, Karel Hofman:

"The trade union organizations must struggle openly against every disorder and indiscipline among the work force. They must not keep quiet in situations where weak management devalues the results of the labour of conscientious workers."

The role of the union, according to Hofman, is thus to assure work discipline, in this aiding "improvement of the level of management and organization of work". This is a formulation of the interests of the bureaucracy, but certainly not those of the workers:

"One of the most important aspects of the solution of these problems consists in the correct application of the socialist principles of remuneration. We must make a clear distinction between payment for those who work well and conscientiously and for those who are dilettantes."

To infer what role the trade union ought to play to become an organization of workers struggle, it is only necessary to consult the self-criticism of the old president of the Czech unions, Karel Polacek, who, up to around April 1969, defended the reform politics, then switched to Husak's side. This didn't stop him from losing his post. In the Party paper *Rude Pravo* he recently listed his "errors": "As for me, I succumbed to the illusion that the union could be an independent political force in the state. My erroneous opinions had the result of disorienting numbers of officials. Because of my mistakes the effort of the party to consolidate society was slowed down. I wish, by honest work to make up for my mistakes." The size of the purge in the Czech trade unions at every level (central, regional, local, and at the enterprise) is indicated by the fact that since January 1970, 51,490 officials were removed in Bohemia and Moravia, and 13,740 in Slovakia.

These figures indicate the massive size of the purge, and leave

no doubt as to the methods used. Before passing on to the analysis of the main organization of the bureaucracy, the communist party, we may add something on the views of the present bureaucracy on the role of the *State*. Husak, certainly not the most dogmatic, said:

"We are going to reinforce our Czech State, make real its different components and functions so that it can fulfil in every respect its mission of the development of society. We give great importance to the perfecting of socialist legislation so that it corresponds with the actual needs of the development of the state. Respect for the law should become a natural thing in our society."

If Husak, in the light of his personal experience, wishes to insinuate by this statement that framed trials are not possible today, the recent trial of the Revolutionary Socialist Party denies it, and gives the real sense to Husak's words. "The actual needs of the development of the state" refers to the legislative changes judged necessary by the bureaucracy.

In the same way as the communist party is nothing but a caricature of the proletarian vanguard, so the state is not more than a tool for carrying out bureaucratic interests, and not those of the working class. It follows that the strengthening and development of the state means the consolidation and development of the power of the bureaucracy.

We may now attempt to situate the role of the *Party* and its politics, using the reports of government head Strugal and control commission president Jakes as well as the modifications made to the statutes of the Czech party. It follows from the concessions necessarily made to the technocrats by the bureaucracy that the main task of the party is to retain the technocracy as well as the working masses in the framework of its control. Jakes makes no attempt to hide this. "To regulate the achievement of the main tasks adopted by the 14th congress, to transmit information on the results of this regulation to the appropriate party organs, to participate in the general strengthening of the job of party control, observing the principle of Lenin by which people are checked and what they have done is regulated, that and that only is the essence of all political work." Thus, the old "avant-garde" of the working class has degenerated in a 20 year process into a regulatory institution whose parasitic character can no longer be hidden.

Jakes report on internal party training indicates the way the party fills its ranks and recruits new cadres.

"In the period since the 13th congress, 891 people have finished the higher political school of the Party control commission. 6757 have passed through short courses. Training has developed intensively since 1970. For example, from September 1970 to February 1971 more than 6000 people passed through the party regional schools. Considerable assistance in this work has been given to us by the Soviet Communist Party."

This makes it easy for us to imagine the level of political devel-

opment of party members. In the same way, a representative picture of the degeneration and deformation of democratic centralism is given by the recently modified party statutes. Para. 22, article 3 (Internal party democracy) is particularly striking. Its aim is to stifle every embryonic activity of workers in the party, by allowing the dissolution of any base organization by a higher organization without other control.

"The establishment and dissolution of a base organization is ratified by the regional committee of the party. If the activity of an organization of the base is in contradiction with the party's politics, infringes the statutes, does not fulfil the decisions of the congress and the central committee of the party, or shows serious passivity, the regional committee can, after consultation with the area committee, dissolve the base organization. The area committee must make judgement on the attitudes of each member or candidate member, and draw conclusions in conformity with the party statutes as to their eventual placement in other base organizations of the party."

"The total power of the bureaucracy in the whole society is present in this conception of "internal democracy" in the party. The way the bureaucrats can manipulate as they want according to the needs of the moment is shown by the appearance in the party statutes of the idea of cooptation:

"In the election of party committees from base organizations up to the central committee, it is necessary to make sure of a constant introduction of new forces, while conserving continuity of leadership. Party organs, elected at conferences and congress have a right between elections to co-opt in exceptional cases up to 10% of the number of elected members. Co-option is to be ratified by a higher organ of the party (at first by the area committee and the area control commission. The party central committee and the central control commission will decide on cooption to their own ranks."

As we have shown, the present party bureaucracy is trying to eat it's cake and have it. The fear of a new Prague spring and of a worker's uprising, like that of 70-71 in Poland has led it to a massive purge of the party, lifting the average age of members to nearly 50, and limiting internal democracy in a manner with no precedent in the history of the Czech party. These measures alone indicate that the Czech bureaucracy is less sure of its power than might appear at first sight. It's insecurity derives initially from the special contradictions of all transitional societies (plan-market). The limited possibilities of bureaucratic planning are not able to satisfy the growing requirements of the technocratic layers. At the same time demands of the workers grow, giving the whole bureaucratic system insuperable problems.

It is thus clear that the stabilization and the domination of the bureaucracy cannot have a long term character. However, we must not forget the concrete experiences and lessons to draw from the way the bureaucracy maintains and defends its positions. There is no

chance that workers discontent will automatically grow over into organized political resistance. That is where the job of the revolutionary groups begins. We have to politicize the masses, make use of contradictions between bureaucracy and technocracy in the struggle for political revolution. We think that the programme for political revolution elaborated in 1964 by the Polish comrades Kuron and Modzelewski in their "Open letter to the Polish workers party" remains appropriate. We conclude with one section:-

"Our ally against the intervention of Soviet Tanks is the Russian, Ukrainian, Hungarian and Czech working class. Our ally against the pressure and threats of imperialism is the working class of the industrialized West and the developing colonial revolution in the underdeveloped countries. Against the understanding between the international bureaucracy and the international imperialist bourgeoisie, which maintain systems of anti-popular dictatorship in their respective spheres of influence, we proclaim the traditional working class slogan—proletarians of all lands unite!"

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REVIEWS

Debray's Conversations

Regis Debray, "Conversations with Allende"
New Left Books £1.05, pp 190.

The reader will not find in this book a completed Marxist analysis of the perspectives for Salvador Allende's Popular Unity Government in Chile—rather it is an invaluable source book and document for developing such an analysis. Regis Debray's lengthy introduction is packed with historical information and allusive political insights, none of which adds up to a clear political evaluation of Allende's 'Chilean road'. Debray's evident reservations about the course on which the Allende Government is set are wrapped up in such formulations as the following: the 'successful conclusion' of the class struggle in Chile 'requires more from the popular officials, and from the people themselves than what they can yet give in organisation, leadership and defensive and counter-offensive ability (in the politico-military and not just the technical sense of the term)'. Cautiously critical reflections such as this lead to the following conclusion: "This cascade of gaps and dislocations leads finally to a certain lack of a *political leadership* capable of mobilising and

stimulating the mass movement at every level. *The governmental function cannot of itself stand in for the function of the political vanguard.....* This relative failure of political leadership is not without its immediately practical and universally obvious effect: the divorce that exists today between the under-mobilisation of the mass revolutionary forces and the virtual and actual over-mobilisation of the minoritarian counter-revolutionary forces". However Debray's awareness of these discrepancies does not prevent him from expressing the weak hope that everything will turn out for the best after all. The second section consisting of two long conversations with Allende is much more satisfactory since Debray is in no way over-awed by Allende and presses him hard on many vital issues. Allende emerges as an almost classically centrist figure. Interestingly enough this man who now embodies the hope of every left social democrat and Stalinist is himself not quite either of these. He has courageously defended the Cuban revolution and the guerrilla fighters when it would have been safer to keep quiet. He likes to quote not only Lenin and Marx but also Che Guevara and Trotsky. But somehow he always managed to insist that the teachings of these men do not quite fit the Chilean situation, that the Chilean 'revolution' can magically escape the laws of the class struggle. In some ways the class content of the Allende Government is more advanced than the conventional experience of Popular Front Governments: it is overwhelmingly dominated by workers parties, the Communist Party and the Socialist Party, the former a conventional Stalinist Party similar to those to be found in France or Italy, the latter a 'left socialist' Party of a distinctly unconventional type, unaffiliated to the Second International and embracing in its ranks a politically disparate coalition. This adds up to being something very like a 'Workers Government' inhabiting a quite unreconstructed bourgeois state machine.

Debray's questioning clearly brings out the nature of the political trap which this constitutes for the Chilean working class. Both the Chilean CP and Allende are prepared to deliver lengthy sermons on the need for mobilising the masses. All they seem to mean by this is huge street demonstra-

tions of the sort that the Chilean trade unions can mount easily. The mobilisation of the masses and their support for the Workers Government totally lacks any permanent and institutional expression. At the time of the elections Popular Unity Committees were established by the Communist and Socialist Parties but neither party was willing to see these emerge as autonomous expressions of a new workers power which could eventually sustain a conflict with the bourgeois state machine. Instead their members were bureaucratically appointed by the Party leaderships and not directly elected by, and responsible to, the workers they were supposed to represent. Needless to say there was never any question of these Committees becoming the nucleus of popular force in any armed confrontation with the Army or Police.

Although the nature of the political trap for Chilean workers is strikingly visible in these conversations, Debray does not sufficiently explore the complementary economic trap in which they have been placed by the Allende Government. The best Marxist analysis of the changing nature of imperialism in Latin America all emphasises the swing away from the traditional sector for investments (mining, plantations and the like) and towards subsidiary light and medium industry and services (see for example E. Mandel *International* Vol. 1, No. 5

and A. Quijano, 'Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru' *Monthly Review* July-August 1971). Seen in the perspective of this shift in the axis of imperialism the Allende Government's economic program, even if it is permitted to pursue it, could become little more than a rationalisation of imperialist investment in Chile. Unfortunately Debray does not really probe Allende on the implications of his economic policy in such a thorough manner as he does with the more strictly political issues.

Debray's notes to the Conversation section give valuable summaries of the Chilean political history and current situation and can be recommended to all those whose interest was only recently awakened. A basic orientation document produced by the MIR on the Allende Government is published as an appendix to the book. They seek to raise all those questions about the state and popular power which the Allende Government is determined to dodge. At the same time they have sought to mobilise the rural and urban masses at the base through seizures of land, occupation of buildings etc. However although their actions and their program as outlined in this book seem admirable it is of course difficult to know from this distance whether the MIR really possesses all the necessary attributes for the most demanding of all roles: that of the revolutionary Party in a revolutionary situation.

