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**PORTUGAL: Exclusive**  
interview with a member of a  
commission of the RASP

**REGIMENTO DE ARTILHARIA LIGEIRA N°1**

**Britain: Congress of the  
Labour Party**







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# CICAP: an example

The following interview with a member of the soldiers' commission of the RASP (Artillery Regiment of Serra do Pilar) was taken in Porto on October 15. It describes the struggle against the general staff's dissolution of the CICAP, the Instruction Center for Military Vehicle Drivers in Porto.

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**Question.** Can you tell us why the CICAP was dissolved by the general staff of the northern military region? What was the military and political importance of the CICAP? What is the significance of this measure?

**Answer.** As a military unit, the CICAP was not very important; it didn't have many weapons. It was an instruction center for automobile drivers, and that's all.

Its importance in the Military Region of the North (RMN) was essentially political. The dissolution was supposed to set an example. The chasm between the officers and soldiers in CICAP was very wide, for several reasons. First of all, the training was very reactionary. One of the sergeants, for instance, was an old PIDE candidate. (PIDE was the Salazarist secret police — INPRECOR.) One of the noncoms was an ex-member of the Portuguese Legion. The soldiers, on the other hand, had become the most combative of the whole region. They are working class in origin, which is understandable considering the technical knowledge required in such a unit. Also, the CICAP had played a vanguard

role in April 25 in the North. This had stimulated a radicalization among the militia officers. Some of these militia officers had been in charge of the struggle against the ELP in the North. (The ELP, Portuguese Liberation Army, is a fascist military gang — INPRECOR.) They had recently come back to the barracks. In fact, they had resigned from the general staff when the militarist Brigadier General Veloso was named to replace General Corvacho as commander of the RMN.

This combativity was expressed on September 11, 1975. The soldiers massively paid homage to the struggle of the Chilean workers. (See INPRECOR, No.35, October 9.)

The pretext for the punitive measure of dissolution was the soldiers' disobedience of a purge order given by the commander. Five soldiers and two militia officers were ordered purged. The soldiers held a plenary assembly and rejected this saneamento. The barracks became a real cancer in the North, with confrontations between soldiers and officers taking very severe forms. During this general assembly, for example, all the career officers were tossed out.



The decision to dissolve the CICAP heralded other measures that, if the hierarchy was unable to halt the indiscipline, could go as far as the more or less complete elimination of soldiers and militia officers and the creation of a professional army.

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**Q.** How was the dissolution decision applied, and what was the immediate reaction of the soldiers?

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**A.** The dissolution decision was made on the night of Friday-Saturday (October 3-4). The soldiers were on leave at the time. A company of commandos from the BAAF (Fixed Anti-aircraft Battery, which is now a Copcon unit) occupied the barracks. The few soldiers present were taken unawares. They immediately got in contact with their comrades on leave and organized a meeting on that same night. They issued an appeal to all their comrades to come to the gates of the barracks that Monday (October 6) to demand the reopening of the barracks. Explanation brigades were formed and went through the working-class neighborhoods calling for solidarity from the workers.

On Saturday, October 4, a first demonstration was organized. It marched toward the barracks but was brutally dispersed by the operational company of the RIP (Infantry Regiment of Porto). Groups of workers besieged the barracks on a permanent basis, alongside the soldiers. One worker was wounded by a shot in the stomach.

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**Q.** After that, a much larger response was organized. What role did the SUV play in this mobilization? (SUV: Soldados Unidos Vencerão — Soldiers United Will Win. For the SUV founding manifesto and an interview with one of the SUV leaders, see INPRECOR, No.35, October 9.)

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**A.** The northern secretariat of the SUV immediately organized solidarity in all the barracks of the region and mobilized the workers commissions and tenants commissions for a support demonstration on October 6. Thousands of leaflets were distributed in all the barracks.

Plenary assemblies were held at the RASP and the RTM (Transmissions Regiment) in order to structure the support for the CICAP. On Monday (October 6) Humberto Delgado Square (the main square in Porto) was filled; tens of thousands of workers had mobilized. It was the biggest demonstration since May 1, 1974. Two thousand soldiers participated and combativity was running high. The demonstration marched to the command headquarters and then to the CICAP.

When the march got to the CICAP barracks, the soldiers massed in front of the main gate and called on the soldiers occupying the barracks to join the demonstration. The officers of the RIP did everything they could to hold the soldiers back. The noncoms had torn off their rank insignias and spread through the ranks of the soldiers in order to strengthen the officers' control and assure discipline.

The demonstrators issued an ultimatum giving Veloso half an hour to come over and explain his position to the demonstrators and open the gates of the barracks. When the half an hour was up, they started filing the padlocks off the gates. The demonstration was about to penetrate into the barracks, but the occupying troops made it clear that they were going to open fire. The leaders of the demonstration then gave the order to move to a nearby barracks that was prepared to support the CICAP soldiers. That was the RASP barracks.

And in fact, this barracks opened its doors to the demonstrators. After a discussion with the soldiers of the RASP during the night of October 6-7, the demonstrators occupied the RASP; the red flag was raised over the barracks!

The RASP is an important barracks, because it's heavily armed. It has, among other things, many artillery pieces, tanks, and so on.

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**Q.** The PPD quickly organized counterdemonstrations. (The PPD, Partido Popular Democrático — Popular Democratic party, is the largest bourgeois party in Portugal — INPRECOR.) Can you explain the importance and meaning of this initiative by Sá Carneiro's party?

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**A.** During this period, the PPD wanted to build up its own image as a reactionary striking force. So it tried to offer a very tough response quickly.

On October 6 the PPD had a counterdemonstration that stopped in front of the CICAP barracks. The PPD demonstrators offered drinks, money, cigarette lighters, and so on to the occupying soldiers. When the big SUV demonstration approached, the PPDers took off.


On October 8 the PPD organized a new demonstration with super-reactionary overtones, which corresponds to the policy impressed on this party by Sá Carneiro, who took over again as general secretary a few weeks ago. He was personally present at the demonstration.

The 20,000 demonstrators marched to the CICAP barracks, the doors of which were open to them — against all traditional army regulations! Then the demonstration moved to the RASP. The RASP organized self-defense against this reactionary offensive. The PPD troops were heavily armed with pistols, hunting rifles, and even some G3s (automatic weapons).

There was a clash with the RASP defenders. The soldiers occupying the RASP decided to come out unarmed to separate the two demonstrations. There was some confusion among these soldiers. But the cordon of soldiers was attacked by the PPD militants; then they changed their attitude. The combat tanks rolled out of the RASP courtyard and dispersed the PPD marshalls and the fascist scum.

It was very clear that the PPD wanted to show itself as an important independent force capable of mobilizing





for the "struggle against indiscipline in the army." And with this confrontation, the PPD was also seeking to justify a military intervention against the RASP. The military police regiment had already tried to carry out this project, with the support of commandos and machine-gunners from the RCP (Cavalry Regiment of Porto). But the response of the RASP soldiers was so determined that they had to give it up.

Q. How was the occupation and the struggle organized?

A. During the first few days, the organization of the struggle was rather confused. There had been no experience in this sort of thing; it was the first barracks occupation. On the night of Monday-Tuesday (October 6-7) there was a general assembly of the RASP, the CICAP, and the soldiers of other units who had rallied to this struggle.

The comrades of the RASP were hesitant, especially

since their commander, Castanheira, told them that the unit would be attacked and bombed and that he himself was threatened with imprisonment. And that was possible, in fact!

Nevertheless, the soldiers of all the other units tried to make them understand the importance of this struggle for all the Portuguese workers. They then accepted our presence there, which was confirmed by a plenary general assembly of the RASP the following day.

A list of demands was drawn up: immediate reopening of the CICAP, reintegration of all the comrades, and the removal of Veloso were the main demands.

A "struggle commission" was elected in general assembly. It is responsible to this general assembly and recallable at any time if a meeting of the general assembly decides that it has not carried out its functions properly. The members of the commission completely accepted this decision by the general assembly.



On October 8, during the PPD demonstration, the organization of the struggle proved to be insufficient. Hence, other bodies were formed to be added to the struggle commission: a military commission, a press commission, a financial commission, an internal organization commission.

All these commissions were elected and are recallable and coordinated by the struggle commission, which is the real leadership. Thus, between general assemblies, the other commissions are responsible to the struggle commission.

This self-organization must not be looked at from a purely technical standpoint. In fact, two very important elements have to be stressed. First, it was very important to develop a political leadership subordinate to the decisions of the general assembly and thus able to assure the unity in action of all the comrades in struggle, of all the political components of the movement. Second, a fundamental problem was posed: this occupation posed the necessity of a radical modification of the structures and functioning of the army during this struggle. For instance, squad leaders were elected. In the mess halls, tasks were divided equally among the soldiers and militia officers. This heralded the form that could be taken by a future proletarian army. All the soldiers who participated in the struggle could see concretely that another kind of army was possible.

During the first week of the struggle, the many pressures (PPD and SP demonstrations, threats of attacks, and so on) generated great confusion among the soldiers occupying the barracks. The reflex of automatically assigning the militia officers to the most important tasks was often asserted. Thus, it is important not to idealize the forms of self-organization. The main thing is to see the tendency that is developing and the dozens of significant examples that have already been set.

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**Q.** How did the reformist parties, the SP and the CP, react?

**A.** They did not react in the same way, far from it. The SP tried to mobilize all the living forces of bourgeois democracy to reestablish order and discipline in the barracks and to support Veloso, a pillar of the sixth government.

On October 10 they organized a big demonstration (smaller than the action of the SUV, though). Among the working-class rank and file of the SP there were some reactions against this initiative. For example, an SP leader of the fishermen in Afurada (near Porto) participated in the struggles of the RASP. There were many SP sympathizers among the soldiers, and they obviously did not appreciate Soares's initiative. When Soares attacked the strike of the metalworkers in his speech, the metalworkers left the demonstration.

The SP demonstration stayed in the center of the city and did not move toward the RASP barracks. Neverthe-

less, the fascist groups took advantage of this demonstration to go and attack the headquarters of the UDP (União Democrática Popular — Popular Democratic Union, a Maoist group).

It has to be stressed that the soldiers of the RASP, meeting in plenary general assembly, agreed to allow the SP to demonstrate in front of the RASP barracks if they wanted. But the soldiers decided to respond if any groups tried to attack with firearms.

The CP, after several days of official silence, publicly supported the struggle of the soldiers. But the CP constantly tried to reduce the struggle to a clash between reactionary and progressive officers. The CP members tried to raise the slogan "Corvacho will return!" But this slogan was not taken up. They also tried to use the differences between Fabião (army chief of staff) and Veloso to arrive at a solution of conciliation. Likewise, they tried to insert this struggle into the framework of a reform of the MFA. On the whole, this project failed.

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**Q.** Could you describe the links between the RASP occupiers and the workers commissions and tenants commissions?

**A.** When the constant guerrilla warfare of demonstrations and counterdemonstrations came to an end, two things were clearly understood: First, we owed our resistance and our position of strength to the support of the workers, who supported us from outside the barracks. They stood guard at night and went to work during the day! At around 7:00 at night they would come over to the RASP barracks to show their support. Their courage was fantastic. On more than one occasion, a worker would be wounded, go to the hospital to be treated, and come back to stand guard again.

Second: We had grasped the vital importance of extending and organizing our links with the workers in order to be able to keep the struggle going.

Some workers and tenants commissions came to us to propose a meeting with the "struggle commission" in order to structure the support by creating actual support committees. *Jornal de Gaia*, a newspaper under workers control, offered us machines to produce a struggle newspaper, the first issue of which has just come out. At first, the RASP brigades went to the factories to explain our struggle. But now the work can be shared with the workers and tenants commissions in a coordinated manner.

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**Q.** What was the meaning of Army Chief of Staff Fabião's intervention and what were the results for your struggle of his meeting with the "struggle commission" and the professional officers of the RASP?

**A.** On October 11 a delegation had been sent to Fabião to tell him about our struggle and to discuss our two central demands, around which the delegates were not



empowered to negotiate. When Fabião arrived on October 14 he reaffirmed what he had told our delegation: "Gentlemen, I am with you ideologically, but you almost got me removed by the Council of the Revolution. If you win, I will be finished; if you lose I'm the one who will have to get you."

Nevertheless, he had retreated a little between October 11 and October 14. He agreed to reconstitute the CICAP in another barracks and not to apply any sanctions against the comrades in struggle. Obviously, he offered no date. As a sort of gift, he committed himself to set up — in the old barracks — a battalion that would be demagogically baptized "April 25 Battalion." Finally, he agreed to reintegrate the comrades of the CICAP, who were on indefinite leave, after an inquiry was conducted.

The reformists jumped at this offer and raised the cry: Victory! Victory! It is a saying in Portugal today: "Victory, victory, the story is over." But that's only a dream. In reality, the story is far from over, the struggle is continuing.

The soldiers rapidly understood that they could not leave their struggle in the hands of a general and leave their fate to be decided by the shifting relationship of forces among various factions of officers. Fabião made his

proposals and threatened to charge everybody with insubordination if they rejected them; then he quickly left the barracks before a general assembly could be held to democratically decide on an answer. A little while later, a general assembly was organized and decided to accept the proposals, but to continue the struggle until all our demands are met.

As of now, a limit of ten days has been set for Fabião's inquiry. During this time, we will mobilize in all the barracks to hold a general assembly of the RASP on October 24. This assembly will examine the situation and decide how to continue the struggle. Already, comrades who participated in the struggle are being hit with expulsion measures, which indicates how much the hierarchy intends to honor the agreement.

The struggle of the CICAP takes on an exemplary aspect in face of the measures of massive removal of militia soldiers that the hierarchy wants to take now. Concurrently, the hierarchy is planning on using volunteers (ex-commandos) and on strengthening the police (the PSP-GNR).

To end up, this struggle also points out the necessity of extending and structuring a real independent movement of soldiers on a national scale. That in itself is an important gain of our struggle. ■

## *RALIS: Build Soldiers Commissions*

One of the results of the radicalization of the soldiers in Portugal today has been a questioning of the structures established by the MFA (Armed Forces Movement) in the barracks. For instance, the ADU (Assembly of Unit Delegates — see INPRECOR, No.35, October 9, Interview With a SUV Soldier) in the RALIS (Lisbon Light Artillery Regiment) has called for the creation of soldiers' commissions. This slogan, put forward in the manifesto of the SUV (INPRECOR, No.35) is increasingly tending to be put into practice. We publish below a motion adopted by the ADU in the RALIS barracks.

The ADU of RALIS, meeting on October 9, 1975, considering that the attacks on progressive units and the purges against the left constitute the elements of an attack launched by the forces of the right aiming at the return of fascism;

considering that against this reactionary offensive in the barracks only the independent organization of the soldiers throughout the country can provide an effective response safeguarding the interests of the exploited and oppressed,

decides:

1. To demand the immediate reopening of the CICAP

(Instruction Center for Military Vehicle Drivers in Porto);  
2. To demand the reintegration into the CICAP of all the soldiers, including the seven who were initially expelled;  
3. To call upon the soldier comrades of all units to hold general assemblies of soldiers and to elect soldiers' commissions in order to create an independent organization of soldiers on a national scale.

For the immediate reopening of the CICAP!

No purges against the left!


Workers, peasants, soldiers, and sailors, united we will win!

Forward toward the independent organization of the soldiers!



# «PORTUGAL WILL NOT BE THE CHILE OF EUROPE»

We are publishing below a document written by soldiers of RALIS (the Lisbon Light Artillery Regiment) for discussion in a general assembly. Copies were sent to other barracks. The slogan "Portugal will not be the Chile of Europe" has not only been taken up in soldiers' demonstrations, but is also becoming a subject of study and discussion in the barracks. Solidarity with the Chilean workers, expressed in many barracks on September 11, the second anniversary of the Chilean military coup, is now being extended toward the preparation of plans by the soldiers themselves to prevent — in practice — Portugal from becoming the Chile of Europe. We publish the RALIS text as a document.



## TWENTY-FOUR TRAGIC ERRORS MADE IN CHILE

1. Purge and demotion (and eventually assassination) of officers loyal to the legal regime.

2. Control of broadcasting stations by the fascists.

3. Slander campaign blown up by newspapers in the service of reaction.

4. "Improperly prepared military men" were taken by surprise and shot by the thousands.

5. Lack of information services and lack of surveillance over the launching of fascist operations.

6. Lack of control of "traitorous" elements in the armed forces (active-duty sections, reserves, and retirees).

7. Lack of control over important fascists and capitalists, the CIA, provocateurs, big capital, factories be-

longing to fascists, and foreign relations.

8. Ill-prepared, isolated, and uncoordinated civilian militias.

9. Lack of links between the (unorganized) popular masses and the loyal army.

10. Defense of factories (why?).

11. Resistance in the centers of the cities (which is the worst possible strategy).

12. Military men loyal (to the Allende government) too concentrated in the same barracks (which were, in addition, known).

13. Bad and slow communications.

14. Lack of a plan of immediate reaction.

15. Little or no combat experience of the popular forces.

16. Disunited parties, either passive or effectively linked to traitors.

17. Known, and therefore vulnerable, local assembly points.

18. Well-prepared putschists; scientific and military planning (U.S.A.-style) and support from traitorous military men.

19. Failure to take advantage of the spontaneous resistance of the people and lack of training by loyal military men.

20. Noninterrupted communications and non-sabotage of the means of transport of the traitorous military men.

21. Fragile and localized popular resistance in isolated neighborhoods.

22. Isolated and noncoordinated night-time resistance.

23. Lack of secret arsenals of arms and ammunition (anti-tank weapons, cannon, bazookas, anti-tank mines, etc.).

24. Lack of clandestine radio communication for the revolutionary resistance.

Study the best ways to avoid these errors!



# SPAIN

## FRANCO- NEW ISOLA- TION

The following interview with a militant of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria/Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna-VI (LCR/ETA-VI — Revolutionary Communist League/Basque Nation and Freedom-Sixth Congress) deals with the mass response in Spain and Euzkadi to the murder of five revolutionary militants by the Francoist dictatorship. It is a followup to the interview published in INPRECOR, No.34, September 25, 1975.



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**INPRECOR.** In the context of the final crisis of the Francoist dictatorship, what is the meaning of the regime's decision to execute the five militants?

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**LCR/ETA-VI.** For several months now a process has been going on that leads Franco to make his decisions under the greater and greater pressure of the "carrion of the regime" (that is, the repressive apparatus — INPRECOR) and to base himself exclusively on that fraction of the state apparatus. This has to be seen in relation to the fact that most of big capital is now taking some distance from the regime. We have characterized this tendency as the reduction of the dictatorship to a repressive apparatus.

The murders of the five militants had been demanded by this faction, by the repressive forces. They wanted these murders because they wanted to set an example! It is significant that the dictatorship made this choice against the advice of the "Supreme Council of Military Justice." In fact, in the case of Otaegui and Garmendia, this council had recommended a new trial; but that didn't happen. Only Franco could have imposed such a decision; the government could not!

Hence, these executions mark off a sort of point of no return in the process. For one thing, the decision means that tensions will grow between the dictatorship and the leading factions of the bourgeoisie, especially because of the diplomatic isolation of the regime in Europe. To this is added a confrontation with sectors of the army, some of whom are seeking to become the main pillars of a post-Francoist regime. For another thing, the bourgeoisie knew that the executions would be a real provocation against the mass movement and was also aware that they would trigger off mobilizations that would go beyond those of late August and the beginning of September in both size and militancy.

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**INPRECOR.** What was the mass response in Euzkadi (the Basque country), and could you explain the differences from the previous general strikes?

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**LCR/ETA-VI.** The number of strikers in Euzkadi surpassed all the previous strikes: 310,000 workers were out on September 29 and 300,000 on September 30.



In the first place, it is important to note that Navarro province came into this political general strike, despite the syndicalist tradition of this province. During the Burgos trials in 1970 the mobilizations in Navarro had been limited; they amounted to a few street demonstrations. On December 11, 1974, there were some work stoppages. On June 11, 1975, there were street demonstrations and assemblies in the factories. This time, on Sunday, September 28, an assembly was held at Irujo (Pamplona), a strike was voted, and then a demonstration was organized. On Monday, September 29, forty-nine factories in Pamplona (a city of 170,000 inhabitants) were on strike! On Tuesday, September 30, the workers of thirty-three factories went on strike. This extended to the factories of the region: at Estella in the La Barrantza zone, and so on. Likewise, in the province of Alava the mobilization was of unexpected size, in view of the lack of tradition in this area. In the city of Vitoria on September 29 eleven factories went on strike; on Wednesday, October 1, there was a demonstration of 2,000 people.

Besides the geographical spread, new sectors joined in the struggle: shopkeepers, the fishermen of Vizcaya (Biscay) and Guipúzcoa, the small peasants, the school children. In Guipúzcoa, the province where "Txiki" and Otaegui lived, virtually the whole population participated in the mobilization. One example indicates the level of the mobilization: On Sunday, September 28, a folklore exhibition was supposed to take place in Eibar. Some comrades of the LCR/ETA-VI got on the loudspeaker and broadcast a message, in Basque and Spanish, explaining the political situation and the necessity of transforming this "folklore festival" into a combat demonstration against the dictatorship. After this appeal, everybody — that is, about 5,000 people — sang "Euzko gudariak" (a sort of anthem of the Basque resistance) and then went home, as a sign of protest against the execution of the five militants.

A third important feature of the mobilization was the massive character of the demonstrations. On Friday, September 26, in San Sebastian there were more than 5,000 people demonstrating in the streets; on September 30 there were more than 6,000. In Erandia (near Bilbao) there were 5,000 demonstrators on September 27; there were 4,000 in Mondragon on September 28; 2,000 in Algorta (near Bilbao). On September 30 about 5,000 people met in Bilbao, formed up into contingents, and ran through the streets shouting "Forward to the general strike!"

Also, there was real progress in the politicization of the masses. In Erandia at the Westinghouse factory there was a general assembly of 500 workers on Monday, September 29. A communiqué denouncing the murder of the five militants was voted. This declaration stressed that the assassinations were a result of the death agony of the dictatorship and called for a general strike around the following objectives: respond to the executions, for self-determination, for the dissolution of the repressive bodies and the military tribunals, for preparation of the mobilization against any new sentences.



Guns being distributed from the arsenal of the workers' militia in Barcelona during the Spanish Civil War

After this assembly a new demonstration was organized, and the workers of Ruíz de Velasco, Franco-Española (chemicals), and other factories joined in. The need to strengthen self-organization was one of the central themes of this mobilization. Once again, I want to stress the fact that the working class and the popular strata did not feel these executions as a defeat for the mass movement. The mobilizations against the regime's bloody repression are more and more becoming identified with the struggle to overthrow the dictatorship.

Finally, there was a step forward on the level of self-organization. We have stressed the importance of the united-front organs (see INPRECOR, No.34), which played a decisive role in the previous general strikes.



But we also pointed out the weaknesses of these organs in really centralizing the struggle, in reflecting the development of mass consciousness, and in actually representing the mass movement.

In fact, while in Guipúzcoa and Navarro the mobilization was launched by the two "strike committees," the Euzkadi General Strike Committee did not meet until Tuesday, September 30. Hence, it was the "zonal strike committees" and the "vanguard committees" that took the initiative for an immediate response on September 27 and 28. Thus, for broad sectors of the mass movement, the question of self-organization was posed with new acuteness. In Vergara a decisive and exemplary step was taken in this area. In twenty-one factories "strike committees" were elected either in general assemblies or during meetings of vanguard workers; these committees coordinated among themselves and issued the call for the September 30 strike.

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INPRECOR. Did solidarity take a new step forward on the scale of the whole territory of the Spanish state?

LCR/ETA-VI. There was progress, but still crying insufficiency. In Barcelona, apart from the demonstrations, which drew about 3,000 people, there were partial strikes at SEAT, Pegaso (the civil governor "sentenced" this factory to pay a fine because it had "permitted" an assembly of workers to be held), and Enosa. Also, the workers of about fifteen factories went on strike in the industrial zone around Barcelona.

In Madrid there were work stoppages at Standard and in the banking sector; some solidarity demonstrations were

organized. The solidarity movement also spread to Galicia, where there were many work stoppages and some demonstrations.

But the Communist party did not take any initiative that could have developed the solidarity movement and pushed it across a new threshold. The CP clearly proved that it rejects any central confrontation and above all is afraid of being outflanked. Basically, it acts as a brake.

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INPRECOR. The press attached great importance to the pro-Franco mobilization of October 1 in the Plaza de Oriente in Madrid. Some people went so far as to speak of a recomposition of the social base of the regime. What was the real meaning of this mobilization?

LCR/ETA-VI. First of all, you have to keep things in proportion. This demonstration drew 200,000 people. All you have to do is compare that to the 310,000 workers on strike in Euzkadi and the social importance of the Franco demonstration falls into place.

Second, you have to remember the extraordinary propaganda campaign waged by the regime. The population was bombarded with hours and hours of chauvinist television propaganda on all themes. For instance, Italy was attacked for "trying to steal tourists from Spain." Third, the factories, banks, and insurance companies were shut down to guarantee the "success" of the demonstration. In many of the banks, three or four fascists would try to intimidate the employees into going to the demonstration. Buses were used to drive people to the demonstration from small villages dozens of miles from Madrid. Every person who came by car was given a "bonus" of 500 pesetas. Tickets to football games and movies were given out free.





Besides all that, you have to keep in mind that Madrid is a strong concentration for functionaries who represent the parasites of the regime. Remembering all this allows you to get a better appreciation of this "big demonstration to support the regime." In fact, what clearly appeared to more than one observer on October 1 was the isolation of the regime. This demonstration of self-defense of the dictatorship even created disarray among important sectors of the bourgeoisie, which, aware of the deep crisis of the regime, did not look kindly at the 40,000 fascists who headed the march making the fascist salute. The bourgeoisie is afraid of the repercussions for the future.

The process of decay of the regime is also expressed by the emergence of new fascist gangs that are becoming more and more active. They draw their strength from the BPS (Political-Social Brigade, one of the branches of the political police), the Civil Guard, and so on. Kidnappings of revolutionary militants and members of workers commissions and threats against newspapers (Diario de Barcelona has received bomb threats demanding that it take measures against certain journalists) are on the rise. This "counterrevolutionary resistance" can become a real danger to militants. It expresses the decay of the regime and the failure of the "legal" means of repression. Although these gangs support the dictatorship that fuels them, they are nevertheless not under direct government control. Broad sections of the bourgeoisie are afraid of these developments, because they know that they can have effects on the future that will not be happy ones for the bourgeoisie.

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**INPRECOR.** Could you explain the attitude of big capital in this crisis?

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**LCR/ETA-VI.** First of all, it is obvious that the reaction of the European bourgeoisie must not be understood as a simple reaction to the big mobilizations that developed in all countries. It's a conscious policy that reflects the desires of sections of Spanish capitalists who lack powerful means of expression. The Spanish government has undoubtedly felt the double pressure of the European bourgeoisie and decisive sectors of Spanish capital, but it is incapable of satisfying the demands of these capitalists, economically or politically.

For a dominant faction of big capital, the measures taken by the European bourgeoisie mean only one thing: Get rid of Franco and Francoism in order to avoid his overthrow!

The malaise and fear of the bourgeoisie can be measured concretely. The stock market continues to decline in spite of official support. The lowest point yet reached by stock quotations this year is 91.85. On October 3 the index was 93.55 and on October 10 it was 92.5. In recent months, according to an economic weekly, the flight of capital out of the province of Vizcaya alone amounted to \$300 million. For big capital, or at least for the most important sectors of big capital, it is

more and more obvious that the dictatorship corresponds to no objective at all. It is incapable of controlling the mass movement; the measures of repression only accentuate struggles; the government can't come up with any responses on the economic level. The dictatorship no longer serves as a political apparatus of domination. The maintenance of the dictatorship increasingly undermines the chances for any alternative solution.

Big capital's attention is now directed toward the army, where internal tensions must not be seen solely as evidence of a crisis in the army, but also as the expression of a process of "recomposition" aimed at providing a basis for an alternative political solution. Important sectors of the army are opposed to the policy of the dictatorship. But the resistance of the Francoist apparatus itself makes this type of solution increasingly risky.



Spanish infantrymen on parade

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**INPRECOR.** Can you indicate the short-term perspectives after these mobilizations?

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**LCR/ETA-VI.** First, the mass movement has to prepare for new mobilizations against the trials being prepared by the dictatorship.

Second, you have to be aware that all the partial struggles — struggles around the new labor contracts, struggles around the health service and education, struggles in the neighborhoods — are going to run up against the "antiterrorist law." Because of this, a dynamic of confrontation with the dictatorship is going to develop. With the mobilizations in Euzkadi and the present objective situation as a starting point, the revolutionary general strike is of burning importance.

Against the ravages of the fascist gangs, it is crucially necessary to set up "vigilance committees." This theme must be part of the campaign we are waging around self-organization. ■





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# international solidarity

Since our last issue, we have received further reports of actions in solidarity with the Basque and Spanish militants executed by the Francoist dictatorship:

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**IN LUXEMBOURG**, more than 1,000 people responded to a call from the Luxembourg Committee for the Liberation of Political Prisoners in Spain and came to a demonstration against the murder of the five militants. The Social Democratic party participated in the united front, along with our comrades of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Communist League), but the Communist party did not. At the end of the demonstration, 250 militants occupied the Luxembourg Cathedral to attract greater public attention to the crimes of the Francoist regime.

**IN GREECE**, there was a protest demonstration of 4,000-5,000 on September 28 in Athens. It was called by the Communist party (exterior faction); the far left partici-

pated. The next day between 15,000 and 20,000 people assembled at the University of Athens in response to a united call issued by the CP youth (both interior and exterior), the youth of the PASOK (the party led by Papandreou), and the youth of Karamanlis's party. The meeting turned into a demonstration of nearly 30,000. In Salonica there was a more modest demonstration, called by a united front of the CP youth, the PASOK youth, the EDA youth, and the youth of the International Communist party (Fourth International).

**IN MEXICO**, a demonstration of more than 10,000 people was held in the center of Mexico City on October 3 in solidarity with the victims of Francoist terror. This demonstration was especially remarkable in that two



hours before it occurred (and after it had received support from all the reformist circles) a rumor went around that the action had been banned, which demobilized tens of thousands of potential participants. But the determination of the revolutionaries to go ahead with the march anyway forced the reformists to join the demonstration despite the orders of their leaders. Of the 10,000 demonstrators, the largest contingent was the more than 3,000 people organized under the united initiative of the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista (Internationalist Communist Group) and the Liga Socialista (Socialist League), the two sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International in Mexico. Then came the contingent of Spanish republican emigrés in Mexico, the contingent of workers from Spicer, a striking factory in the suburbs of Mexico City, the contingents of the CP and the teachers union of the university, and finally the contingents of other political groups and independents.

IN CANADA, protest demonstrations against the execution of the five political prisoners drew more than a thousand people in Montréal, 400 in Québec City, and 300 in Toronto.

IN AUSTRIA, the announcement of the executions was met by demonstrations and a partial occupation of the Spanish Embassy in Vienna, organized by the far left. On October 2 some 7,000 people turned out for a demonstration called by all the currents participating in an Action Committee: the Young Socialists, trade unions, the Communist party, and the far left. It should be noted that the far left had been expelled from the committee on the eve of the demonstration. About a third of the demonstrators tried to occupy the offices of Iberian airlines and clashed with the police. During the days that preceded the elections a press campaign was launched against the Gruppe Revolutionäre Marxisten (Revolutionary Marxist Group), the Austrian Trotskyists, accusing them of trying to foment violence. But the aim of the demonstrators was not at all to fight the police, but rather to denounce the representatives of Francoism. The following week there were demonstrations in Innsbrück (organized by the GRM and the Maoists) and in Salzburg (organized by the CP and the far left).

IN BELGIUM, the Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs (LRT — Revolutionary Workers League), Belgian section of the Fourth International, issued a standing call for demonstrations to take place as soon as the death sentences were confirmed. This call got a broad response, particularly in Brussels. A front was established between the Maoists and the LRT and there was a demonstration of about 300. The ground floor of the Spanish Embassy was occupied and destroyed and the offices of Iberian airlines were sacked. The police attacked toward the end of the demonstration. The Communist and Socialist parties did not participate in these actions. About 1,000 people demonstrated in Liège at the call of the workers

organizations. On September 27, after the executions, there were new demonstrations in Brussels, some 4,000 marching against the Spanish tourist office and the Banco Español. The workers of Sabena (the Belgian airlines) boycotted flights to Spain, and the dockers in the port of Antwerp refused to load ships going to Spain for several days. Many of the actions held on September 27 were led by the FGTB and the CSC, the two national trade-union federations. The solidarity movement was broadly followed by the teachers and the metalworkers.

IN ICELAND, the workers movement and the left organizations responded actively to the confirmation of the death sentences against the five militants. On September 27 a demonstration in Reykjavík drew about 1,000 people (the city has a total population of about 50,000). It was sponsored by the Fylkingen (a Trotskyist organization), three Maoist organizations, the People's Alliance (Social Democratic), and several student organizations. The Fylkingen also held four meetings in high schools and at the university.

IN AUSTRALIA, there was a demonstration of about 250 people in Sydney called by the Spanish Communist party and supported by various Australian organizations including the CP and the Communist League, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International.

## PORTUGAL SPAIN


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## Britain

# LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE SUPPORTS REDUCTION IN REAL WAGES

by BRIAN HERON

The congress of the Labour party, held September 29-October 3, marked a critical turning-point for the workers movement in Britain. The dominant feature of the congress was the rejection by a very large majority of a motion proposed by the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) defending free wage negotiations and rejecting any form of state control over incomes. The major speech against this motion was delivered by Michael Foot, ex-leader of the Labour party left grouped around the weekly Tribune and present minister of labor. No serious struggle against the Healey measures, which limit nominal wage increases to £6 a week (about \$13), was launched at the congress. (See INPRECOR, No.31, July 17, 1975.)

This congress was the fourth step in a conscious attempt by the British bourgeoisie and its supporters in the workers movement to shift the relationship of class forces in Britain in their favor.

The first step was the referendum on British membership in the Common Market. That referendum demonstrated that the overall political project of the bourgeoisie — reorganization of industry under the impetus of the EEC — could not be effectively countered by purely trade-union, economic militancy from the working class, however discredited the bourgeois project may be. The victory of the bourgeoisie in the referendum was a result of the absence of any overall alternative solution, which could only be a socialist solution. Because of their fear of dividing the Labour party, the left Social Democratic leaders were incapable of presenting such an alternative during their campaign for a "no" vote on the referendum.

The second test was the vote on the Healey measures in Parliament. Thirty-six Labour MPs, grouped around Tribune, voted against the measures. The only MPs to vote that way were those whose base lies in the local party constituency organizations rather than among the trade-union bureaucracy. The MPs whose base is in the union



bureaucracy did not engage in a real struggle against the measures. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, for example, the most representative spokesman for this section of the Labour party, accepted his removal from the post of minister of industry and did not wage any real fight against the measures.

Although opposition to these measures appeared broad, it did not give rise to any significant extraparliamentary campaign. When the third test of strength occurred, the congress of the TUC (the national trade-union federation), there was general confusion about who was going to oppose the measures and how that opposition would be expressed. Nevertheless, one-third of the mandated votes at the congress went against the measures; the opposition was led by the AUEW, and the breadth of this opposition was especially remarkable in that, once again, it was launched without any overall political perspective and without the opposition leaders' being able to answer the main arguments of Jack Jones, leader of the Transport and General Workers Union and main adviser to the Wilson government.

Jones's arguments got a real response among the least politicized workers. His main theme was that any rejection of the Healey measures would bring about the fall of the Labour government and would seriously worsen the economic crisis and unemployment, which already stands at 1,250,000.

At the time of the approach of the fourth step in the right turn, the congress of the Labour party, it clearly appeared that the Healey measures would reduce the average standard of living of the British workers by about 5-8 percent next year. Measures radically reducing social expenditures would lower the standard of living still further. If no real and massive struggle is waged against these measures, the relationship of class forces will be shifted in favor of the bourgeoisie, undermining the positions of strength the working class won after it brought down the Heath government in 1974.

At this point, the number of strikes, while it has not fallen back to the level of the 1960s, is down from 1973 and 1974. The general conclusion remains: Because of the depth of the economic and social crisis and in the absence of an overall alternative solution credible to the workers, there is a risk that the bourgeoisie's ideological offensive — presenting the sacrifices the Wilson cabinet is imposing on the workers with the support of the bourgeoisie as inevitable under the given circumstances — will achieve success.

### Gravity of the economic crisis

In fact, the crisis of the British economy is the gravest in capitalist Europe. Inflation is still running at 25% a year. It is generally estimated that the annual inflation rate will not fall to 15% until autumn 1976 and will not decline to 10% before the beginning of 1977. The budget deficit is on the order of £1,200 million.







The number of unemployed is expected to hover around 2 million throughout next year. Investment has fallen 11% compared with last year and will fall still further next year. The decline in investment between the fourth quarter of 1974 and the fourth quarter of 1975 will probably be 17.5%. The pound sterling has lost 29.4% of its value relative to other international currencies, which makes imports more expensive and fuels inflation.

Because of the crisis of the Tory party, which is presently dominated by the group around Margaret Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph (the group that wants to abandon the welfare state, halt government subsidies to industry, and provoke even more massive unemployment, proposals that are rejected by the great majority of big capitalists), the Labour government is the only government possible for the bourgeoisie under present conditions. This is openly affirmed, for example, by the London Times. Hence, the struggle within the Labour party is of vital importance for the bourgeoisie, which is now orchestrating a real witch-hunt in the capitalist press against the Labour and trade-union left, which is said to be "infiltrated" by Communists, Trotskyists, anarchists, and Maoists.

### Labour left avoids the struggle

What is significant is the little attention the Labour left has paid to the struggle against the Healey measures. The Labour left is avoiding the struggle on this point in order not to confront the union bureaucracy head on, since the majority of the bureaucracy supports the measures. So the Labour left prefers other fields of battle. The Tribune, for instance, hailed the "victory" won by the shoe workers, who got a motion passed at the Labour conference demanding measures controlling imports in that industry. Capitalist protectionism — that is the battle cry!

The most radical speech at the Labour party congress was given by MP Ian Mikado, a veteran of the Tribune group, at the public meeting organized by that newspaper. Mikado criticized the passivity of the trade-union leaders who, he said, should have demanded an increase in social expenditures and other concessions in exchange for the £6 limitation on wage increases. Jack Jones rushed to the platform and proceeded to denounce Mikado's speech.

The Labour left did win some marginal successes at the congress. The most important one was the ouster of Denis Healey from the party executive. He was beaten by nearly 100,000 votes by Eric Heffer, a left MP who was removed from his cabinet post for his public opposition to the Common Market. Some left motions were carried against the opposition of the leadership. On the housing issue, current cuts in local government budgets were rejected; a resolution was passed in favor of free abortion on demand, the end of all private practice in the National Health Service, and the nationalization of the pharmaceuticals industry. A resolution demanding the



nationalization under workers control of the 250 leading monopolies, with "compensation according to need," got 400,000 votes, that is, the majority of the constituency section of the party. It was rejected because of the bloc vote of 5.7 million trade-union mandates; Wedgwood Benn opposed the motion.

Overall, the balance of the congress was incontestably a crushing victory for the Wilson-Jones-Foot group, which leads the Labour party de facto. The incomes policy and the reduction in social expenditures were approved. The bourgeoisie warmly applauded the apparent break between the Labour left around the Tribune and the trade-union bureaucracy.

## Crisis of Social Democracy

The trade-union bureaucracy can allow itself the luxury of supporting the £6 limit on wage increases because it is not yet feeling the heat of a real attack from the rank and file. Since the gains that were won during the winter of 1974-75 and the spring of 1975, the working class has been taking a wait-and-see attitude, because of the gravity of the economic crisis. This has permitted a drift to the right on the political field. The passive acceptance of the Healey measures by the trade-union bureaucracy has even raised the threat of the bureaucracy's being attacked and even overthrown from the right. Already a campaign, supported by the courts, is being orchestrated against the AUEW leadership.

The Labour left around Benn has based its whole strategy on making a bloc with the trade-union leadership. Consequently, the Benn group has been in turn drawn toward retreat and passivity by the attitude of the trade-union leaders.

Nevertheless, any new push from the rank and file would open up a deep crisis within the Social Democracy under conditions in which the bourgeoisie commands no real alternative government team. That would be the gravest crisis of bourgeois power since the 1926 general strike. But a strong reaction from the rank and file of the working class depends in large part on a leap forward in class consciousness rejecting some of the central dogmas of the parliamentary, electoralist Labour reformism oriented toward class collaboration.

There are some initial signs of such moves within the working class, or at least among the most politicized sectors of the class, which were reflected in the realignment of the left at the Labour party conference. For instance, some attempts to bar right-wing leaders and ministers who openly oppose the resolutions of the party congress from being Labour candidates in future elections, campaigns that have generally gotten no results in the past, have succeeded. Reg Prentice, a right-wing

minister, will no longer be a Labour candidate in the Newham North East constituency. Similar campaigns are now under way in the constituencies of Hammersmith and Hayes, two suburbs of London.

Recently, during a congress organized by the Institute for Workers Control, some 500 delegates, Social Democrats for the most part, voted for a resolution supporting the República workers in Portugal and opposing Soares's right-wing policy. The same conference decided to launch a campaign to support the Election Manifesto of the Labour party, a campaign whose real aim is to install the group around Wedgwood Benn as the leadership of the Labour party. According to *The Economist*, the left has won a small majority (15 to 14) even in the party executive.


These modest moves to the left among the organized workers movement are beginning to have some objective effects among sectors of the working class, permitting struggles that have been fragmented up to now to be centered around the question of removing the Wilson leadership from the labor movement. The workers of the NVT motorcycle factory in the Midlands attracted the attention of the entire country when they occupied the factory to prevent layoffs; their leaders publicly raised the necessity of eliminating the Wilson leadership. The vanguard has waged actions and demonstrations in solidarity with the Portuguese revolution, challenging Wilson's support for his acolyte Soares. Some 25,000 people demonstrated in London against a reactionary amendment to the abortion law introduced by the Wilson government. On October 11 and 12 some 380 delegates, acting with the support of two national trade unions, participated in a conference organized by the Medical Committee Against Private Practice and decided to launch a campaign against private medical care and for the nationalization of the pharmaceuticals industry.

The Institute for Workers Control will organize a national conference in 1976, which will attempt to assemble all the forces in struggle against these measures. It remains to be seen whether this conference will actually be able to coordinate the beginning of a workers counteroffensive on the political level.

The decisive response to the Healey measures can come only from the heavy battalions of the working class assembled in the trade unions. Unity in action with the left trade-union forces opposed to Wilson, whatever their current confusion and hesitation, can create the basis for a struggle against the present leadership of the Social Democracy, a struggle that will mobilize sectors of the working class around a new action program. A massive struggle against the Healey measures will reflect an important recomposition of the British workers movement. For while the massive support of the trade-union rank and file is needed to roll back the capitalist offensive against the working class being waged through the Wilson-Healey measures, the workers counteroffensive also requires a qualitative transformation of class consciousness among the working class, and that cannot be achieved without the strengthening of a new vanguard.



# FINLAND:



President Kekkonen

## *the crisis deepens*

by PEKKA HAAPAKOSKI

The predictions made in this article, written before the parliamentary elections, were fully confirmed by the election results. There were no big changes in the relative strength of the main parties. The most that can be said is that the two large parties that were not part of the previous government coalition, the Communist party and the Conservative party, made some gains. This should be seen as a small sign of a growing class polarization and an expression of popular distaste for the parties of the previous government.

The most important feature of the election results was the absence of any big changes. This means that the government crisis will continue, for the elections will be of no help in establishing a more broadly based government. Negotiations will go on while the caretaker government continues its difficult task. —INPRECOR



Following is a list of the election results (the figure in parentheses indicates the percentage change from the 1972 elections; where no figure is given, the party in question did not contest the 1972 elections):

Party	Percentage	
Social Democratic party	25.0	(-0.9)
Communist party	19.0	(+1.9)
Socialist Workers party	0.3	(-)
Center party	17.7	(+1.3)
Conservative party	18.4	(+0.8)
Unity party	1.7	(-)
Agrarian party	3.6	(-5.6)
Liberal People's party	4.4	(+0.8)
Swedish People's party	4.7	(-0.4)
Christian Union	3.3	(-0.8)
Constitutional People's party	1.6	(-)
Employers party	0.4	(-)



Ever since the second half of 1974 it has been clear that Finland, the political "special case" of the capitalist world, has not been able to remain an economic "special case." Despite the 1973 Free Trade Accord with the Common Market and the "glorious" two-year collective contract reached with the labor unions in spring 1974, the prospects of Finnish capitalism soon began to deteriorate rapidly. The theory suggested by many circles (not least the Communist party), according to which "trade with the east" could save the Finnish economy from the effects of the international recession, proved to be illusory. As long ago as the second half of 1974 the markets for the main traditional Finnish export articles (first wood and then paper) began to collapse. During 1974 the volume of Finnish exports decreased slightly; the steep price increases during the first half of the year had increased the value of exports.

During the first half of 1975 this development rapidly deepened to become a full recession in many exporting industries. Layoffs and short work weeks have become commonplace in the wood and paper industries. Only the metal industry is still functioning at relatively high capacity, mainly because of its long term work projects. Non-exporting industrial sectors have also been hard hit by the recession. In the building industry one can speak of near-catastrophe, for the total number of housing units built in 1975 will be about 40 percent lower than in 1974. The only potential "light at the end of the tunnel" for Finnish capitalism is the possibility of getting big contracts for certain work projects in the Soviet Union, but even these are still open questions, for the Finnish capital involved wants to add the full cost of Finnish inflation to the prices, while the Soviet side is willing to compensate the prices only according to average international in-

flation. Unemployment, presently at about 50,000, is expected to rise to an estimated 100,000 during winter 1975-76. As a whole, it can be said that even though the international recession hit Finland relatively late, it finally came in a very drastic form. Even among the usually optimistic "specialist" circles it is believed that the recession will continue throughout 1976; the most pessimistic circles are already asking whether any upturn at all will begin in Finland before the next international recession.

Although the decline of exports and the stagnation of industry are difficult problems for Finnish capitalism, its two main nightmares today are inflation and the balance of payments. The balance of payments crisis is partially a direct consequence of the recession, for while exports began to shrink rapidly during 1974, imports continued to rise rather far into 1975. In 1974 the balance of payments deficit was 5,000 million Finnish markka (3.9 Fmk = US\$1) but in 1975 it is expected to be much higher, perhaps some Fmk 8,000-10,000 million. The positive balance of services can compensate for only a very small part of this deficit; the lion's share of the deficit must be covered by foreign credits. Already during 1974 Finland's foreign debt grew by 50 percent, and net foreign debt rose to Fmk 12,600 million, while the convertible currency reserves of the Bank of Finland were only Fmk 1,700 million.

The other big immediate problem of Finnish capitalism is inflation, which is expected to continue at the rate of 20 percent in 1975, despite the recession. This is rapidly weakening the relative position of Finnish exporting industries in their major markets (including the "safety valve" of the Soviet Union) and thus makes an upturn more difficult. In the autumn, probably



after the elections (September 21), a new wave of price increases is expected. Thus, even a devaluation of the markka is not completely ruled out, although it would be a last resort. The strategic centers of Finnish capitalism have been preparing many alternative projects described as "painless operations" to "thoroughly stabilize the economy."

## Political instability and economic policy

One big problem for all "stabilization plans" is the mounting instability of the political superstructure in Finland. Ever since the downfall of the "popular front" (1971), Finland has been governed by a coalition of two big parties (the Social Democracy and the Center) and some smaller bourgeois parties. In practice, since 1973 this "center-left coalition," led by Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa, has been paralyzed by internal conflicts occurring at ever briefer intervals; this has been aggravated by the recession. The last year of the coalition, spring 1974 to spring 1975, was little more than continuous internal quarreling. The only force that kept the government together even that long was President Kekkonen, the "supreme judge" of Finnish politics. In the course of several years he had moved step by step from being a godfather of the center to a godfather of the Social Democracy, but all the big parties (including the CP) support him as the guarantee of continuity against "chaos."

By the spring of 1975, however, not even the authority of Kekkonen was enough to hold the government together; parliament was dissolved and new elections called for September 21. The center-left government was provisionally replaced by a "nonpolitical" government composed of Social Democratic and bourgeois technocratic figures from the state bureaucracy. The new prime minister, Keijo Liinamaa, was the main architect of the Finnish incomes policy. At the same time, the growing weakness of the governmental power has forced big capital to drastically increase its direct influence on political decisions. In 1974 a kind of Finnish "zaikai" (employers' association) was formed with the name of "Delegation of Business Life" (Elinkeinoelämän valtuuskunta — EVA). It was led by former UN secretary-general candidate Max Jakobson and has continually strengthened its grip on economic policy.

In practice it is rather difficult to find any systematic and coherent long-term trend in the policies of the Sorsa and Liinamaa governments. Very often the measures taken have been improvised and hasty reactions to the cross pressures of the recession, inflation, and the balance of payments deficit. However, since the second half of 1974 a somewhat clearer trend has been developing, not least because of the influence of the EVA, where the exporting sectors are strongly represented.

The first clear feature of the government policies has been a very heavy concentration of "antirecessionary" measures favoring and subsidizing exports. Already at the end of 1974 so-called export deposits were eliminated and these very substantial funds were pumped back to the exporting industries. Since then, new incentives (tax releases, subsidies, etc.) have been used, and according to presently available information, the budget for 1976 will include a gigantic transfer of income to the exporting industries. Finally, the idea of devaluation is certainly gaining ground, even though no one is talking about it publicly yet.

Another trend is the almost complete absence of "antirecessionary measures" in the internal market. In fact, the policy of the government has been the direct opposite of the "orthodox" Keynesian policy, for in the midst of the recession the government is sharply cutting consumer demand, drastically lowering all expenditures for welfare and public services, and liquidating all "nonproductive" investments. Pensions and other income sources of the weakly organized groups have been among the main targets of this "austerity" policy. The development of medical care and public transport has been hit hard and the thoroughgoing educational reform started in the 1960s has been practically stopped. This trend has been especially clear since the return of the former popular-front prime minister and present director of the Bank of Finland, Mauno Koivisto, from his credit-seeking trip to the World Bank, which no doubt inspired a good part of the "austerity."

As for imports, the most drastic restrictive measure taken by the government has been the import deposit law of March 1975. According to this law, importers must deposit up to 30 percent of the value of their imports in the Bank of Finland for a certain period, unless they are directly used in the export industries. However, all these measures have been unable to solve or substantially ease the problems of decreasing the balance of payments deficit, eliminating inflation, and helping the export industries get back on their feet. "To put the house really in order" the labor factor in production must also be "stabilized." That is why Finnish capital today has more than ever set "improving labor morale," "ending irresponsible strikes," and "creating a really watertight incomes policy" as top priorities.

The winter 1975 negotiations over continuing the wage agreements in the middle of the two year period went better for the employers than most of them had dared expect. After some small additional wage increases and a modest rise in the minimum wage, the union bureaucrats, acting through the votes of the Social Democratic majority, gave a green light to the continuation of the agreements. The CP union leaders protested, but did not even dare to lead "their" unions to struggle, let alone try to mobilize the rank and file of the whole SAK (the national trade-union federation). Even the "rebellious" union, the mainly white-collar technical functionaries' organization (TVK), was pressured back into line. This was a big — and surprisingly easy — victory for the employers, who immediately began prepar-



ing for the next agreements, to be signed in the beginning of 1976. The main aim of the employers for the next period is to arrive at 2-3 year agreements and to strictly tie wage increases to increases in "productivity." At the same time, a law providing for compulsory arbitration of strikes is now in preparation (such a plan failed during the 1960s). The efforts to "improve labor morale" have also been stepped up recently, mainly by pressuring the unions to act as factory cops, by threatening to import foreign labor, and by threatening selective layoffs.

## The coming winter struggles

The parliamentary elections will be held September 21 in this atmosphere heated up by the recession, the governmental crisis, and the aggressive impoverishment policy of the government. This atmosphere has been reflected in the electoral campaign, the language of which has been more aggressive and the political field more polarized than at any time since the 1940s. The two former main governmental parties, the Center and the Social Democracy, have launched extremely bitter attacks against each other. The general polarization is also seen in the closer relations among the bourgeois parties and in their hostility to the Social Democracy, even though relations between the Social Democrats and the Communists have not improved.

As for the results of the elections, they will probably not bring any sensational changes. In the bourgeois camp the bigger parties (Center and Conservatives) will probably gain at the expense of the smaller parties; on the left, the CP will probably gain somewhat at the expense of the Social Democracy. If that is the result of the election, it will be very difficult to form a new government. The present bitter struggle makes the renewal of the "center-left" coalition very difficult at this stage, not to mention a popular front.

In this situation there is a growing possibility of a bourgeois coalition. Such a government would have the advantage of having much freer hands to enact tough measures than a Social Democratic government, but of course it would also be much less able to keep the unions "within limits." The other big problem would be the very slight majority of such a government and the strong contradictions among the interests of the bourgeois sectors represented by the parties. So, while the prospects for "strong" and effective government seem slight, it is possible that the "nonpolitical" caretaker government will have to say in office for some time after the elections and make a series of very unpleasant decisions on such questions as the budget.

But besides the elections there will also be a much more important test of the present mood and fighting ability of the workers during the autumn and winter. In October the metalworkers union (the largest union in Finland) will elect a new leadership; shortly thereafter, the battle for the new collective agreements begins. When

spring 1975 passed without the expected big strikes, this was rather widely understood as evidence of a demoralization of the workers because of the growing unemployment. This was undoubtedly one important factor, and it will come into play even more strongly next winter. At the same time, it is clear that since summer 1975 many new factors have appeared that can badly shake the plans of the "stabilizers" for next winter.

First, it is clear that because of the recession and the continuation of inflation, the real wages of broad groups have begun to go down for the first time, and the expected wave of price increases this autumn will not ease the situation. To this must be added the sharp cuts in social expenditures and public services. In addition to the "consumers" of these services, the "austerity" measures have also hit the workers in these sectors. Already now the teachers are moving aggressively, and the autumn may well lead to a general turmoil in the "social sector." It is also clear that despite the existing fear of unemployment the working class may be pushed close to the limits of "tolerance" by the extremely provocative "stabilization policy" of the government, the next budget, the coming proposal for compulsory arbitration of strikes, and the possible establishment of a bourgeois government; in that event, fear of unemployment may lose its effect. Already during the summer some very militant strikes were fought, for instance the machinists' strike in July and a number of local battles in the metal industries. This is very important, because the metalworkers will play a key role in the events of the coming winter. In October the conference of metalworkers will elect a new leadership, and this time it seems that for the first time in decades the CP has a real possibility of taking over the union, which is a good sign of the developing mood of the working class. In any case, the metalworkers union is by far the strongest union in the SAK, and in the winter it could very well act as the advance guard of the whole class.

But the militancy of the rank and file and the possible CP takeover of the leadership do not in themselves solve anything. A successful struggle needs a concrete, coherent, and unifying platform, and the Communist party has shown no interest in developing anything like that. For the CP, the "union struggle" is a wage struggle, the "political struggle" is a parliamentary struggle, etc. The CP leaders never see the need for using the tremendous strength of the unions to respond to the overall offensive of the bourgeoisie on all fronts. To launch an effective counteroffensive, the working class has to fight next winter not only for wage increases, but also against unemployment, against cuts in social expenditures and for the workers control of industry; the workers must fight against the bourgeois government and for a workers government.

To make the struggle effective, all unions should gather in a common front behind really unifying demands: For one-year agreements with Fmk 4 per hour increases for all; for a sliding scale of wages and index calculated and controlled by the unions; for a minimum wage of



£mk 2,500 per month for all; for a real wage equality between men and women.

No to layoffs, redundancies, and short workweeks! If the workweek is shortened, there should be no pay cut. Every idle factory must be taken over by the workers and put to production again. Such industries must be nationalized without compensation and under workers control.

No to any kind of "forced arbitration" and state intervention in trade-union affairs! No to any kind of "fi-

nancial responsibility." The freedom to strike must be unfettered!

Not a penny off social expenditures, not a penny increase in the prices of services and necessary goods! For price-control committees set up by workers, housewives, etc.

Down with the bourgeois government! For a workers government responsible only to the workers organizations!

September 15, 1975



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
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Park Chung-hee

# korea: the weak link

**1** "THE WHOLE OF ASIA SHOULD FOLLOW THE INDOCHINESE VICTORY." This is the main theme of the Second Asian Youth Conference, and it is important for the Conference to pay special attention to the question of Korea. Following the victory of the Indochinese revolution, the imperialist-colonialist system in the Far East has become the most vital defense line of U.S. imperialism in Asia. Its weakest link and focal point of crisis is the Park Chung Hee regime in South Korea. The former equilibrium of imperialist domination of Asia by U.S. imperialism has been decisively broken. The overthrow of the whole structure of the Far East imperialist-colonialist system is now posed as a strategic task of our anti-imperialist front of Asian liberation. The liberation struggle throughout East Asia against U.S. and Japanese imperialism and the neocolonialist regimes will have its final and genuine victory through the overthrow of the imperialist-colonialist system in Far East Asia. The situation is favorable for the victory of the Asian revolution — with a socialist Asia as its ultimate target. Within this framework, we pose the question of forming our ranks in international solidarity with the South Korean popular masses in their heroic struggle.


The main lines of U.S. counterrevolutionary strategy since the defeat in Indochina are to maintain the relationship of détente with the Soviet Union and China (the relationship with the former being of the first priority) and to strengthen the alliance with the bourgeoisie of West Europe and Japan within the imperialist camp. The Vienna Conference of U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers (May 19) agreed to continue to improve their mutual relations. It has been reported that Kissinger wanted the Soviet Union not to take advantage of the weakened position of U.S. imperialism since its final defeat in Vietnam. In spite of the Vietnamese victory, U.S. President Ford is not changing his plans to visit China this year. On June 18 in a special speech to the "U.S.-Japan Society" Kissinger emphasized the particular importance of U.S.-Japanese relations within the general context of world politics. He stated that the U.S. government was determined to keep the "peace and security" of the Korean peninsula as this was vital for Japan and the whole of Asia. Since the victory of the Indochinese revolution, the core of U.S. policy toward East Asia has been to strengthen its alliances with the Japanese bourgeoisie and to maintain the Far East imperialist-colonialist system of U.S. imperialism, Japanese imperialism, and the neocolonialist South Korean regime.

**2** Just after the victory of the Indochinese revolution, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed his open dissatisfaction with Moscow and Peking, saying that the "détente" with the Soviet Union and China had not succeeded in maintaining "regional stability." This is an indication of the feeling of panic in the White House in the face of the final defeat in Indochina; this defeat immediately followed the failure of the Middle East "peace-keeping" work, the easily foreseeable crisis for the East Asian neocolonialist regimes, and the Portuguese political crisis, which threatens the NATO system.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has testified in the House of Representatives that the U.S. government considers Japan its absolute defense line; that the U.S. military bases in South Korea are being strengthened as a front line for the defense of Japan; that the U.S. military bases in the Philippines will be maintained. (It can be assumed that Indonesia is included in the "defense plan.") While the U.S. ruling circles are still considering the new military strategy and system in East Asia, it is very clear that Washington is determined to maintain the Far East imperialist-colonialist system. The Park regime has lost the last element of political stability.



The report below was presented by Masaru Yokoi, representative of the Korean Solidarity Youth Conference (Japan), to the Second Asian Youth Conference, which was held in Tokyo July 2-5, 1975. The conference, a follow-up to a similar conference held a year before (see INPRECOR, No.8, September 19, 1974), was attended by delegates from Japan, Sri Lanka, Korea, Malaya, Hong Kong, and Australia. The aim of the conference was to discuss the new situation in Asia created by the victory of the Indochinese revolution and to plan anti-imperialist solidarity actions for the coming year. Solidarity with the struggles of the South Korean masses was singled out as one of the central tasks of the anti-imperialist movement in Asia today. The conference concluded with a mass rally attended by about 1,000 people.



This is a real threat to the "security" of Japan. Therefore, U.S. imperialism tends to rely on its military "deterrent" more and more in Far East Asia. North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung's visit to Peking around the time of the fall of Phnom Penh accelerated this tendency of U.S. imperialism. In spite of repeated statements of the determination to keep the "peace and security" in the Korean peninsula, Schlesinger has made an open statement that the U.S. government is ready to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of "a North Korean invasion of the South." The White House, too, has repeated this same threat against North Korea. In one sense, these provocative statements represent an effort by Washington to assure the Park regime of active U.S. support in the event of extreme crisis, that is, to close the "credibility gap" between U.S. imperialism and the Park regime (which is now talking about having its own nuclear weapons). On the other hand, they reflect the deepening crisis of the Park regime and the Far East imperialist-colonialist system. One example of this is the real possibility of the success of a United Nations resolution to abolish the UN military presence in South Korea in the General Assembly this year.

**3** The Korean peninsula is the focal point for U.S. and Japanese imperialism in defense of their Far East Asian system after the victory in Indochina. With the Park regime in extreme political crisis, maintaining the "peace and security" in the Korean peninsula means nothing more than perpetuating the division of Korea into North and South. From the standpoint of the Far East Asian popular masses, the question is how to achieve unification based upon the Korean workers and peasants. The Korean question today is posed as an alternative: a perpetuation of the division or the unification of the North and South by the workers and peasants.

This question of the Korean situation will almost certainly become one of the focal points of world politics this autumn. One indication of this is that the UN General Assembly is to take up the Korean question. The result of the UN debate is easily foreseeable — the UN will resolve to dissolve the Command of the UN Army in South Korea. The U.S. government has veto power in the Security Council, but even the U.S. government cannot ignore the general trend. The disappearance of a party of the Korean cease-fire accord is sure to pose the question of the interrelationship between North and South Korea at the level of world politics. The U.S. government will make maximum efforts to perpetuate the division of Korea into North and South within the framework of the international relationship of détente among the U.S., Japan, the Soviet Union, and China. There is already talk about "cross-recognition" (U.S. and Japanese recognition of North Korea in exchange for Soviet and Chinese recognition of the South). But a key question is, How will it be possible to realize political stability for the Park regime? Political stability is indispensable for the integration of the Korean division into the system of détente. An explosion of a revolutionary crisis in South Korea will definitely threaten the very base of the international system itself in Korea.

**4** The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on the other hand, is conducting energetic diplomatic efforts on this urgent question. North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung's visit to Peking and the Korean-Chinese joint statement are very significant.

The premier's visit provided the first opportunity for direct talks between the two governments since Chinese Premier Chou En-lai visited North Korea in 1970. The North Korean delegation was composed of top members



of the party, government, and army. The visit to China indicated North Korean solidarity with the Indochinese revolution and was intended to demonstrate the interrelationship of North Korea with the revolution (even through the Chinese government). The advance of the Indochinese revolution, shown by the fall of Phnom Penh, objectively strengthened the international position of China and North Korea. It can be said that North Korea intends to utilize the increased international weight of China by establishing an active relationship with the Chinese government. There are two major features to the published joint statement:

First, the strong tone against Japanese militarism that had been clear at the time of Chou En-lai's visit to North Korea in 1970 did not appear at all in the current joint statement. A U.S.-Japanese joint statement issued in 1969 had contained an article saying that both governments were concerned with the "security" of South Korea. In 1970 there was the invasion of Cambodia by the Saigon puppet army and U.S. imperialism. But five years have passed since then. With the ping-pong diplomacy of 1971 and the "normalization" of relations with the U.S. and Japanese governments, Chinese foreign policy embarked on its present line, which fundamentally is to counter the Soviet Union in this region. Peking has made statements explicitly supporting the Japanese bourgeoisie in its campaign for "return of the northern territories" from the Soviet Union and has extended de facto recognition to the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. An important feature of the Korean-Chinese joint statement is that it strongly contradicts the fundamental tasks of the Korean masses: to struggle for the unification of Korea based upon the workers and peasants. The joint statement clearly reflects the line of peaceful coexistence with the Japanese bourgeoisie.

Second, the Chinese government agreed with North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung's "three principles of autonomy, peace, and national cooperation for autonomous and peaceful unification."

"The unification of Korea must be realized on the basis of the principles and policy presented by Chairman Kim Il Sung." This is a reconfirmation of the Chinese position on the question since the 1972 joint statement of the North and South Korean governments. The North Korean premier has sought and received Chinese reconfirmation to support his government on the Korean question, including the demands to dissolve the UN army command in South Korea and get the U.S. army out of South Korea. On June 2, denying rumors of "North Korean invasion," Kim Il Sung stated at a press conference that cooperation should be realized through a federated mutual relation, leaving aside the differences between both systems, in order to achieve the reunification of North and South. He also stated that the realization of this federated cooperation will be realizable only after democratic leaders have been elected through a free election in South Korea.

Having reconfirmed Chinese support, the North Korean government is conducting energetic diplomatic efforts

in preparation for the coming UN General Assembly. The general line of their efforts falls within the framework of an international relationship of peaceful coexistence among the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China.

However, the crucial point is the problems that will be posed by a possible explosion of radical political and social struggles of the South Korean workers, peasants, and soldiers generated by the deepening crisis of the Park regime. The coming explosion of popular struggles, inevitably mobilizing the rank-and-file soldiers of the South Korean army, will pose the urgent task of overthrowing the whole anticommunist state system of the Republic of Korea, the fundamental characteristic of which is its politico-military and economic subjugation to U.S. and Japanese imperialism. A popular struggle for a workers and peasants government will immediately raise demands to abolish all the political, military, and economic subjugation to U.S. and Japanese imperialism, to liberate peasants from the exploitation of usurers, and to break up all the anticommunist military-police apparatuses, such as the KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency) and the army. When the Park regime is broken by popular struggles, the advance of the workers and peasants political struggle for their own government will powerfully pose the question of overcoming the whole system of a divided Korea and of realizing national unification based on the struggles of the workers and peasants. The national unification of Korea is impossible without overthrowing the South Korean anticommunist regime of the imperialist puppet Park or without breaking up the Japanese neocolonialist domination of the South Korean economy. The workers and peasants struggle for the Korean unification must be carried out through their uncompromising fight against U.S. and Japanese imperialism. An explosion of the South Korean popular struggles will threaten the very basis of all attempts to maintain the Far East Asian network of détente.

**5** U.S. and Japanese imperialism work to maintain the Far East Asian status quo. The focal point for their attempts is Korea. Objectively, the governments of the Soviet Union and China stand for integrating the Korean question and resolving it within the framework of their Far East Asian foreign policy. The central question for U.S. and Japanese imperialism is how this will be possible for the South Korean regime.

The Park regime of anticommunism and anti-unification has strengthened its dictatorial police rule. The constitution has been revised according to the needs of the dictatorship. Park Chung Hee personalizes all these powers. The regime is a genuine military-police dictatorship. Under the pressure of heroic resistance by the South Korean masses, the regime has no maneuvering room to take international considerations into account. The dictatorial nature of the regime has significantly deepened since the establishment of official relations between China and the United States and between China and Japan. The crisis of the Park regime has two basic



causes: a profound change in the international relationship of forces and the advance of the tenacious resistance struggle of the South Korean masses. There are four major elements in the crisis of the Park regime:

First, the change in the worldwide relationship of forces between revolution and counterrevolution has an expression in the change of U.S. counterrevolutionary strategy. The normalization of Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese foreign relations and the return of China to the UN have worked to change the former Korean relationship of forces represented by the 1948 UN resolution ("The Republic of Korea is the sole legal Government in Korea."). This means that the South Korean regime has lost its international base for its anticommunism and anti-unification. Finding it impossible to take an international position independent of the politics of U.S. and Japanese imperialism, the Park regime was forced to readjust its policy to the new relationship of forces through the 1972 joint statement of the North and South. This revealed the serious decline of the South Korean international position.

Second, Park's economic policy of intensive industrialization has been hit severely by the world economic recession. The policy of industrialization was expected to support the anticommunist and anti-unificationist stand of the regime domestically. The South Korean economy achieved significant growth (second only to the Japanese economy in Asia). But this economic growth was realized within the framework of a relatively stable expansion of the world capitalist economy. It is entirely dependent on the import of foreign capital, the expansion of the export industries, and severe cuts in the living standards of the toiling masses. Now that the world economy is undergoing a deep recession, the South Korean economy is in crisis.

Third, the regime has not been able to develop any social base in South Korea itself. Such a base would allow the regime to offset the difficulties arising from the changes in the world political and economic situation. The economy had grown at a rapid pace, but the growth had never contributed to any qualitative improvement in the living standards of the workers and peasants. The "wealth" was entirely absorbed by the 600,000-strong army and the extremely corrupt bureaucratic capitalists closely connected with the apparatus of the regime. The fact that the policy of industrialization had been carried out as a new colonial subordination to the Japanese capitalist economy has created a new socioeconomic base that deepens the traditional anti-Japanese consciousness of the toiling masses; that is, the dominant role of Japanese capital works against the Park regime in the consciousness of the masses.

Fourth, because of the above, the regime has no choice but to resort entirely to repressive police rule against the struggles of the toiling masses. Dictatorial police rule has been hardened enormously, especially since 1972. This has fostered the development of tendencies composed of liberal critics of the regime, even among U.S. and Japanese bourgeois circles. Park's dead-hard police rule has resulted in the regime's isolation in international politics. U.S. and Japanese imperialism cannot ignore this in their current purpose. The case of the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jun (a South Korean opposi-

tion figure) by the KCIA during his stay in Japan is revealing. The Japanese bourgeoisie was unable to give full support to the Park regime.

Therefore, it is very clear that the Park regime faces severe difficulties. The regime is now making desperate efforts to establish a "national unity" and to normalize its relationship with the Japanese government. Park complains about the lack of credibility of U.S. imperialism and the supposed threat of "invasion from the North." The regime suppresses any expression of anti-Park sentiment via Emergency Decree No.9 and frame-up spy cases. The workers and peasants are forced to be organized by Park's war-time emergency measures — students' national defense bands and civil defense units, for example. All men between the ages of 18 and 50 who are not members of the army, the national reserve army, or the students' national defense bands must be organized into the civil defense units. Members of the units are forbidden to take part in any political activity. The regime wants a 100 percent police-ruled society. The pretext is the supposed "war danger from the North."

But it is obvious that all these measures can never stabilize the Park regime. The maximal intensification of the police rule might have an effect in postponing the final explosion of the workers and peasants against the regime, but it is absolutely impossible to destroy the very root of the popular explosion. It is also clear that the regime has no prospect of alleviating the economic crisis. Among the U.S. and Japanese ruling circles there are currents that are preparing themselves for the coming explosion of the revolutionary crisis in South Korea. The Ford-Kissinger administration of U.S. imperialism has no alternative but to support the Park regime. However, because the deepening crisis of the Park regime poses the serious possibility of reducing all the attempts of U.S. and Japanese imperialism to a complete shambles, there is a definite possibility that U.S. and Japanese imperialism will take preventive measures when the crisis develops beyond a certain point. They will do this because it is in their essential interest to defend their imperialist-colonialist system in Far East Asia and to perpetuate the division of Korea into North and South.

**6** Imperialism and its puppet Park are moving toward the normalization of Korean relations with the Japanese government. In August, Japanese Premier Miki is to visit the United States to discuss with Ford. Following this, the regular conference of Japanese and South Korean ministers is to be held. We will organize our campaign against Miki's visit to the United States and the regular conference of Japanese and South Korean ministers in Japan. We will continue to campaign for the release of all the South Korean political prisoners from the jails of Park's police-rule dictatorship.

It is absolutely necessary for us to work consistently to mobilize the Japanese working class to overthrow the whole system of U.S.-Japanese-South Korean politico-military alliance and to support the South Korean toiling masses in their fight to overthrow the dictatorial regime of Park. The Korean struggle calls for Asia-wide solidarity, and we must respond to the call. ■



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# SRI LANKA

## Statement of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Marxist Party on the Breakup of the United Front Government

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The various letters and statements published in the newspapers relating to the crisis in the United Front Government, that culminated in its break-up on September 2, 1975, with the expulsion of the three Lanka Sama Samaja party (LSSP — Ceylon Equal Society party) ministers from it that day, have not adequately revealed the real reasons for the break-up at this particular juncture.

We do not believe that it became necessary for Mrs. Bandaranaike to insist on Dr. N.M. Perera's removal from the Ministry of Finance because of anything that he may have stated at the LSSP Hartal commemoration meeting on August 12, 1975, concerning the politics of her late husband or her own political decisions relating to the contemplated take-over of foreign and locally owned company estates.

The letters written to the prime minister, both by Dr. N.M. Perera and Dr. Colvin R. de Silva before their dismissal from the cabinet had already made it clear that they were willing to continue to serve in Mrs. Bandaranaike's cabinet, despite their differences with

her on certain matters. Dr. N.M. Perera expressed his regret for having said anything that might have hurt Mrs. Bandaranaike in reference to her late husband. Dr. Colvin R. de Silva reminded the prime minister that both he and Dr. N.M. Perera had attended a meeting of a committee of ministers summoned by Minister of Agriculture and Lands Kobbekaduwa on August 4, 1975, in submission to her decision that this Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP) minister was to be in charge of the proposed take-over of company owned estates, though Dr. de Silva was to remain minister of plantation industries, and that Dr. de Silva had himself suggested that the minister of agriculture and lands should chair the committee "in the circumstances."

The fact that the letters written by the two LSSP ministers did not affect the prime minister's decision to take the portfolio of finance out of the hands of Dr. N.M. Perera was proof enough that she was no longer prepared to let the LSSP ministers serve in her cabinet on the basis of the agreement between the SLFP leadership and the LSSP leadership that had been the basis for the establishment of the United Front Government, as pointed out by Dr. Perera.

Thus there can be no question that it was Mrs. Bandaranaike who broke up the United Front Government that she had formed and headed with the active collaboration of the LSSP for the last five years.

What is important for the working class and the broad masses to appreciate are the political reasons underlying Mrs. Bandaranaike's decision to break up the United Front Government at this juncture.

We have no doubt that the mutual recriminations and conflicts between the SLFP and the LSSP that have already begun as a result of the break-up of the United Front Government will be accompanied by disclosures of matters hitherto kept secret between them. Such disclosures may cloud rather than clarify the real issues underlying the break-up.

We are of the view that the break-up is the result of the economic crisis in which capitalism finds itself in Sri Lanka, as elsewhere in the capitalist world, in the context of which that section of the capitalist class represented by the SLFP leadership has a pressing need for the consolidation of capitalist rule under a government in which all the key sectors of the administration are held firmly in the hands of that leadership. It is for this reason that the LSSP ministers could not be permitted to be left in control of finance or given control of the plantations to be taken over from foreign and local companies on compensation to be negotiated with them. To have permitted this would have resulted in the LSSP acquiring undue influence within the capitalist state, with enhanced political influence in consequence, from the viewpoint of the SLFP leadership. This is because the plantations remain the main base of the capitalist economy in Sri Lanka and are its principal sources of foreign exchange. The importance of the ministry of finance would itself be further enhanced by the state take-over of company owned estates, for the reason that the



state banks would then play a much more important role in the export trade in plantation products than at present, with increased control over state as well as private investment in consequence.

It was when Mrs. Bandaranaike offered alternative portfolios to Dr. Perera, provided he gave up the ministry of finance, and at the same time offered an alternative portfolio to Mr. Leslie Goonewardene, that the LSSP leadership finally realised that they were to be reduced from a role of service to one of servitude in the cabinet. To have submitted to this would have reduced them to playing no politically recognisable role at all as members of a distinct political party. It was at that stage only that they finally decided to say "NO" to Mrs. Bandaranaike, courting their dismissal from the cabinet which then followed.

The various attempts said to have been made by the Communist party and certain groups within the SLFP itself to "preserve the unity of the United Front" were doomed to end in failure. The leadership of the SLFP, the dominant party within the United Front, was no longer prepared to maintain the United Front with its main left component, the LSSP, on any basis that the LSSP leadership could make out to be even of some political benefit to itself.

There is good reason to believe that the capitalist backers of the SLFP, and particularly the bigger ones said to be wielding a strong influence with Mrs. Bandaranaike and her son, played a significant role in bringing about the ouster of the LSSP from the positions it held in the government. The allegations of Dr. N.M. Perera and the LSSP to that effect only serve to establish that he and his other LSSP colleagues in the United Front Government were permitted to function within it only for so long as they served not only the interests of the capitalist state but also those sections of the capitalist class represented by the SLFP leadership. The policies pursued by the former LSSP ministers were thus in conformity with the "Bandaranaike policies," in pursuance of which the Common Programme of the United Front was expressly declared to have been drawn up and signed in 1968 by the SLFP, the LSSP, and the CP. At no time did the LSSP leadership, right up to the moment of its expulsion from the government, declare its unwillingness to continue to pursue those policies. They have sought to make out to their own following, however, that in so doing they were really pursuing a "tactic" within a capitalist government. They will now have to explain to their following whether they have succeeded in that tactic.

The LSSP leaders now cannot make out that they have been betrayed by Mrs. Bandaranaike. The SLFP leadership has not changed its class character; nor can there be any doubt that Mrs. Bandaranaike took the LSSP leaders into the government to serve the capitalist class in such manner as the SLFP desired and for so long as their services were needed.

The LSSP leaders, as well as all those who may be interested in what has happened to them, would now do

well to note what the United Secretariat of the Fourth International had to say to the Central Committee of the LSSP in a communication dated April 23, 1964, on the question of coalition with the SLFP, which the majority of the Central Committee then contemplated:

"It is necessary to declare at this stage, quite categorically, that we oppose our party entering any coalition government wherein decisive control is held by a party that has proved time and again its reluctance to move against the capitalist order, and furthermore has demonstrated in action its essentially anti-working class character. We do not believe that the character of the SLFP is determined by the declarations of one or another of its individual leaders. Its character has been revealed by its whole history during its years in power. In this sense we see no reason for changing our characterization of it as a party essentially functioning within the framework of capitalism and utilized by certain layers of the bourgeoisie as a possible bulwark against the growing forces of the working class. Any form of coalition with such a party, as long as it remains the dominant majority within such a coalition, can only lead to the immobilization of the left in advance and its becoming itself a target for the growing resentment of the masses." (our emphasis)

Today, not only the United National party (UNP) but even some of the erstwhile colleagues of the LSSP leaders in the SLFP are making it appear that it was Dr. N.M. Perera, as minister of finance, who was primarily responsible for attacks on mass living standards carried out by the United Front Government during his tenure of office. This is undoubtedly a distortion of the true position. There can be no question as to the responsibility of the entire SLFP leadership, as well as that of



Prime Minister Bandaranaike



the CP, for the policies, financial and otherwise, that have been pursued by the United Front Government.

What we have to point out is that the LSSP, together with the SLFP and the CP, has also been responsible for direct attacks on the human and democratic rights of the people under the Emergency that still prevails. The suppression and virtual liquidation of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in 1971 is especially noteworthy in this connection.

It was neither on the issue of the defence of mass living standards, nor on the issue of the defence of the democratic rights of the people, nor for the restoration of the fundamental right of workers to strike, that the break-up of the United Front has taken place.

It is no more than an outcome of sectional differences within the United Front Government on the distribution of power within the capitalist state, and of the political influence and privileges derived by those who wield such power.

What will be the consequences? For a time, there is bound to be dismay and confusion in the ranks of the LSSP and amongst its political following. This will affect the trade unions and the student and other organisations controlled by the LSSP, with demoralisation in and defections from them. There will also be considerable dismay and disheartening amongst those supporters of the CP and the SLFP itself who believed that the United Front Government was anti-imperialist and "progressive" because of the participation of the LSSP and the CP in it. The shattering of the United Front by Mrs. Bandaranaike, with the subsequent endorsement of her action by the Executive Committee of the SLFP, will serve to dispel the illusions of such people.

The Communist party, in any case, will find it difficult, without the assistance of the LSSP, to continue to maintain the myth of the progressive character of the so-called national bourgeoisie said to be represented by the SLFP. They will now have to decide whether to promote "the unity of all progressive forces" from inside the government or from outside it.

Our position has always been that the SLFP is a capitalist party, though it has a mass middle class and some

working class following, and even though there are certain differences between it and the UNP, which is a more conservative capitalist party, in relation to imperialism and in regard to state control in the capitalist economy. When the LSSP first entered into a coalition government with the SLFP under Mrs. Bandaranaike's leadership in June 1964, those of us who then belonged to the LSSP broke away from it and condemned that action as a betrayal of the working class and the left movement. We pointed out then that Mrs. Bandaranaike had turned to the LSSP leadership for its assistance in the maintenance of capitalist rule in this country, as the SLFP leadership had found it difficult to do so by itself in the face of rising working class militancy and mass discontent at that time. Today, the fact that the SLFP leadership has dispensed with the services of the LSSP leadership in the government therefore causes us no dismay and poses no dilemma.

For all those sections of the masses that had realised the counterrevolutionary and essentially reactionary character of the United Front Government in relation to the working class and the broad masses before it was broken up the task continues to be to come together in a united front for the building of a new mass movement of the left. This is an essential task not only for them but also for all sections of the mass following of the three parties that constituted the United Front. There is no other way for them to defend their interests than by the building of such a movement of the left anew. This can be done only on an anticapitalist basis, and only under a leadership that bases itself firmly upon the working class and the development of the class struggle for the overthrow of capitalist rule and the establishment of a workers and peasants government.


In today's context, such a movement must necessarily struggle for the ending of the Emergency, the repeal of all repressive legislation, including the Public Security Act under which the Emergency is maintained, and the Criminal Justice Commissions Act, as well as the release of all political prisoners held in custody under either of those two reactionary laws, the restoration of the right to strike, and the restoration of the human rights and democratic freedoms of the masses to act in defence of their interests against capitalist exploitation and oppression in any form.

Colombo, September 8, 1975



# PANAMA

## *anti imperialist mobilization*



More than 1,000 demonstrators marched on the American Embassy in Panama City September 23 to protest aggressive declarations by various U.S. officials about the "canal zone," which is still occupied by American troops. Organized by the Fracción Socialista Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Socialist Faction, a Trotskyist organization), the FER (Revolutionary Students Federation), the Guaykucho, and various high-school and university associations, particularly the law students, the demonstration was the largest since the *couj d'etat* of 1968.

The demonstrators marched through the city, passing in front of the seat of the government, and held a meeting at Santa Ana park in the oldest part of the city, historically the scene of many demonstrations. Slogans were chanted against the continued American occupation of the canal zone, and there were some slogans denouncing the government of General Omar Torrijos for its refusal to wage a real struggle to gain control over the canal.

From Santa Ana park the demonstrators marched to the U.S. Embassy. The National Guard did not attack the demonstrators during a confrontation at the Embassy, but tear-gas grenades were launched as the demonstrators were dispersing. The American ambassador complained that the Guard had not been sufficiently energetic in repressing the militants. For their part, the demonstrators urged the Guard to turn their guns on the occupiers in the canal zone and not on the people.

Among the major slogans of the demonstration were: No Yankee bases in Panama! No bases for training criminals! Joint defense: betrayal of the people! Rice

and meat, the people are hungry! A government that represses the students is a government that will fall! Sovereignty or death! Chile, Panama, Argentina — Yankees out of Latin America!

The immediate reason for the demonstration were the the aggressive and belligerent statements of various U.S. officials, Henry Kissinger included, about American determination to continue the military occupation of the canal zone indefinitely. The U.S. "lease" on the canal zone is due to run out and is now being renegotiated. The "joint-defense" denounced by the demonstrators is a reference to a U.S. proposal aimed at keeping the estimated 10,000 U.S. troops in the canal zone under the pretext that Panama will be allowed some say in the disposition of those forces. American imperialism's real intentions, however, were revealed by Kissinger's statement in early September that "the United States reserves the right to defend (sic.) the Panama Canal unilaterally for a long period." General D.P. McAuliffe, commander of U.S. troops in the canal zone, pledged to take "all necessary military measures" if negotiations break down and violence erupts.

The September 23 demonstration was an initial response to such declarations. On the evening after the demonstration, the students put out a communiqué saying that Washington had proven that it has no intention of even seriously negotiating the status of the canal, much less agreeing to meet the demands of the people for total sovereignty over the canal. They said that the Torrijos government had to decide whether it would stand on the side of the people or on the side of Ford and Kissinger.



# ARGENTINA HOMAGE TO OUR WOMEN MARTYRS

In early September, four women comrades of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers party) were murdered near La Plata, along with four male comrades. (See INPRECOR, No.34, September 25, for biographies of the murdered militants.) The following article, paying homage to these women comrades, appeared in the September 13 issue of *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly of the PST, on the page normally devoted to the women's struggle.

This page is devoted to extending, defending, and orienting the struggle of one of the most oppressed sectors of society: women.

We have frequently and forcefully expressed the ideas of our party about the thousands of problems women face because of their oppression. We do not do this accidentally or for conjunctural reasons. We are not among the opportunists who talk about the "eternally forgotten and abandoned" just because 1975 is International Women's Year.

We are not among those who have formed temporary women's commissions "this year," commissions that will undoubtedly be dissolved next year.

Our party has always had a consistent practice in favor of women. That is why we presented Nora Ciapponi as a candidate for vice-president; that is why she argued for the rights of women during her electoral campaign, and that is why we have always taken part in all the struggles and actions undertaken by women in our country. We do this because our party, workers and socialist, struggles for the rights of all the oppressed. One of the most important consequences of this political practice as regards women is that a great many women comrades join our ranks and identify not only with our general positions but also with our positions on women.

If some day we write our history, women will hold an outstanding place in it.

And today, in this note, we want to begin to write a part of this history, which, like the history of all those in struggle, has its martyrs.

Today, then, we want to dedicate these lines to four young martyrs that we, socialist women, have given to the cause of the workers, martyrs whose lives were snuffed out by savage murders.

Our homage will be simple. We do not intend to write exhaustive biographies, nor do we want to put forth grandiose exaggerations about our comrades after their deaths.

What we do want to point out about them is the merit they deserve for the simple reason that they took up the cause of socialism. For a woman, the merit is double. For any comrade, to take the road of struggle involves risks and sacrifices in addition to satisfactions; but this is doubly true for a woman, for she has to overcome all the obstacles forced on her by the education of this society.

Our murdered comrades had chosen their road well, and the proof of that is the cruelty of the enemy. Some of these comrades, like Ana María, were leading militants in the workers movement. She fulfilled this role, which we would like to see all women workers play, with great capacity, as is testified to by the ninety-six-hour strike of her fellow workers in protest against the murders.

We are struggling for an equality that society denies us. We are struggling to be able to take up all political and trade-union posts, to make household tasks easier for women, to change their current status as "second class citizens."

And this society, whose laws and social norms close this road to us, is the same society that protects the murderers of our male comrades. From this we must conclude that while we are denied equal rights in life, we have equality in death.

The murderous hands that massacred the bodies of our comrades made no distinction of sex when they pulled the triggers.

Despite our sadness and pain, this fills us with pride, for it means that we socialist women are recognized as consistent fighters, even by the enemy.

Of the fifteen martyrs that our party has suffered so far, Adrianita, Ana María, Lidia, and Patricia are the first women to be added to the macabre and heroic list.

That is why, from this moment on, the demand for the punishment of those responsible will become yet another banner of struggle for all socialist women.