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SPECIAL ISSUE

FROM THE PEARL HARBOR AFFAIR TO THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

**An Examination of the Policy of World Imperialism
in the Second World War.**

BY

G. CRANE

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Address Communications to:-

THE RED STAR PRESS
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F R E E B A C K I S S U E S

In this issue there are listed over twenty titles of articles on the nature of the "Second World War," on the deceptions of the opportunists in this sphere and on the Marxist line for the workers. Many of these articles are still available. SEND FOR FREE BACK ISSUES. Please specify the titles as given in this issue.

FROM
THE PEARL HARBOR AFFAIR
TO
THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Since this article begins with the revelations about the Pearl Harbor affair, it is apropos to make certain observations concerning bourgeois investigations of crimes committed by the bourgeoisie themselves. Anybody who has read Gustavus Myers' History of the Great American Fortunes will recall his numerous citations of official exposures by the capitalists themselves of crimes committed by the bourgeoisie. The origin of the exposures cited by Myers is an unending series of clique fights among the capitalists; one clique of bourgeois scoundrels is cheated by a stronger clique and begins to "squual" in court actions, governmental investigations and what not. In the course of these clique fights, many valuable facts came to light of the raging criminality of the capitalists in amassing their huge plunder.

At the present moment, by virtue of an incidental political circumstance, i.e., a forthcoming election, there is a clique fight in course between the Republican and Democratic politicians. The former have seized upon an event in the so-called "Second World War," namely, the Pearl Harbor affair, as a source for making a case against the Democratic Party administration. It should be noted, nevertheless, that two of the most prominent officials in Roosevelt's Democratic administration were a couple of big-shot Republicans, Stimson and Knox, who, interestingly enough, were appointed Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, respectively. Their eminent positions placed them in the very center of the affair. The feature of the official investigation arising from a political squabble between two groups of equally putrid bandits should not blind the workers to the valuable revelations which have been made publicly available. The machinations of the Washington administration which prepared the way for Pearl Harbor remain a concrete fact regardless of the origin of the whole investigation.

For their purpose, the politicians need go no further than an investigation of Pearl Harbor. For our purpose, which is to expose the real nature of the so-called "Second World War" between the "democratic" and fascist capitalist powers, we have investigated all the major aspects from the very start in September 1939. If only Pearl Harbor were involved in the whole "Second World War," or if Pearl Harbor were unique, the matter could be left at that. We have proved in past issues of this publication, however, that the unopposed attack on Pearl Harbor was neither the first nor the last episode of its type. The entire pattern of the "Second World War" between the "democratic" and the fascist powers fundamentally bears the character of the mysterious Pearl Harbor affair. The 1939 attack on Poland was absolutely unopposed by the "democratic" imperialists. The Sitzkrieg that unfolded in the days almost officially designated as the Phoney War, the Nazi occupation of Holland, Belgium and France carried out with the connivance of the "democratic" imperialists, the unopposed landing of the Nazis in North Africa, the unopposed occupation of Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong, and many other major episodes of the "Second World War" were all along the Pearl Harbor pattern. Naturally, the bourgeoisie are not going to disclose anything about the character of these events. The full and final investigation will come only when the revolutionary proletariat has overthrown the power of the capitalist class and the members of the investigating tribunal will be workers devoted to discovering the truth about the so-called "Second World War."

It is necessary to recall the fact that immediately after the occurrence of the events in Pearl Harbor four years ago, this publication already presented the real gist of the affair. Our material at that time was relatively scanty, but the line was clear to us from our understanding of the nature of the "war" supposed to be in progress between the financiers of the "democratic" and fascist capitalist countries. The new information made public by the Army and Navy Official Pearl Harbor Reports and the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee completely confirms the conclusions the Leninist League drew four years ago (see our article, The "War" Reaches the Pacific, in THE BULLETIN, January-February 1942.)

"PERFECT FOR AN AIR ATTACK"

The first thing that must be made clear is that the ruling gang in this country from the top officials in Washington down to the staffs in Hawaii on the eve of the events were living in the atmosphere of expectation of the air bombardment which occurred on December 7, 1941. This is made quite plain in the Official Pearl Harbor Reports:

"We must, therefore, conclude that the responsible authorities, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Staff in Washington, down to the General and Admirals in Hawaii all expected an air attack before Pearl Harbor." (The Official Pearl Harbor Reports, published in The New York Times, Aug. 30, 1945, p. 10S.)

By now everybody is aware that the situation at Pearl Harbor was noteworthy for being perfect for the success of an air bombardment of the great naval base. In fact, the Official Reports also specifically draw this conclusion:

"In short, everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack and the Japanese took full advantage of it." (Ibid., p. S13.)

Now the question arises: How did it happen that the situation in Pearl Harbor was so perfect for the success of an air bombardment? Was this an accident or some anomalous circumstance? When the scattered pieces of evidence are put together, there is revealed an enormous intrigue on the part of the ruling authorities in this country. This intrigue was participated in by a large number of the very top officials and military leaders.

WHY ADMIRAL KIMMEL WAS APPOINTED

For an air bombardment on a great naval base like Pearl Harbor to be assured of success, one thing which is necessary is for the fleet attached to the base to be inactivated by being bottled up in the harbor. In such a situation, the fleet is virtually helpless and forms a wonderful target for the planes overhead. Such a situation existed at Pearl Harbor. This fact was noted in the press at the time of the Pearl Harbor affair and some pointed questions about it were raised at that time:

"The fact that a large part of the fleet - an unusually large part considering the routine that the fleet had been following prior to hostilities - happened to be in Pearl Harbor on the fatal Sunday, Dec. 7, may also require some explanation, because it is apparent that if international tension is serious, the place for the fleet

is at sea." (Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, Dec. 9, 1941.)

The recent investigation reveals that the fleet did not just "happen to be" in the harbor on December 7th. The bottling up of the fleet at Pearl Harbor could be accomplished only through the channels of the naval command at that base.

Evidently, at first the high authorities tried to work it through Admiral Richardson. The latter, however, insisted that the fleet be based on the U.S. Pacific coast rather than at Pearl Harbor. There was a whole wrangle between Richardson and Roosevelt-Knox. When it became clear that Richardson could not be budged from his position, he was suddenly detached from his command in an unusually high-handed manner. Richardson is quoted as saying: "Never in my experience had I known of a flag officer being detached from command in the same manner." (The New York Times, Nov. 23, 1945.)

Then there occurred a most mysterious event. All of a sudden Rear-Admiral Kimmel was jumped over sixty-two officers who were above him in seniority and was appointed to the post of naval commander at Pearl Harbor:

"Asked about the 'jump' over the seniority list which Mr. Roosevelt approved in appointing Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel as his successor, Admiral Richardson replied:

"He (Admiral Kimmel) was pretty far down the list. He was a rear admiral. He was what we call a type commander, a commander of cruisers then." (Ibid., Nov. 21, 1945.)

Kimmel carried out the policy which Richardson was against. It was Kimmel who was in charge of the fleet which was bottled up in Pearl Harbor and made a perfect target for an air bombardment.

Kimmel assumed command on Feb. 1, 1941. His counterpart, General Short, was appointed commander of the Army at Pearl Harbor by General Marshall and took over his post a few days after Kimmel. We shall have more to say about Gen. Short's part in the Pearl Harbor affair later on.

DISARRANGING NORMAL DEFENSES

Prior to the sending in of Kimmel to Pearl Harbor, there had been in existence an efficient air reconnaissance system covering an enormous area around Pearl Harbor and utterly eliminating the possibility of any force approaching the base without being sighted far in advance. The outstanding significance of long-distance reconnaissance was clearly brought out in the investigation:

"Long-distance reconnaissance was obviously the very heart of the defense of Oahu because upon its results would depend not only the opportunity to destroy the carriers and carrier-borne planes of the Japanese but also put the forces on Oahu on the alert for an effective reception of the attack if it got through." (The Official Pearl Harbor Reports, The New York Times, Aug. 30, 1945, p. S9.)

On the eve of the aerial attack on Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu there was an adequate force at the base to maintain reconnaissance:

"There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles." (Ibid., p. 4S)

In spite of this - that there was the wherewithal to conduct reconnaissance, that it was a recognized fact of great importance that long distance reconnaissance was "the very heart of the defense of Oahu" and that the atmosphere among the entire high officialdom was one of expectation of an air attack, - Kimmel, ten days before December 7th, decided to call off distant air reconnaissance:

"Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on Nov. 27 that there should be no distant reconnaissance." (Ibid., p. 4S.)

The Official Reports definitely exclude the alibi that there were not sufficient planes:

"This failure to do distant reconnaissance cannot be excused for lack of planes under Navy control because the Navy had 50 PBVs available." (Ibid., p. S 13.)

Thus - on Nov. 27, 1941, Admiral Kimmel called off long-distance reconnaissance. It is a remarkable fact that, as shown in the Official Reports (ibid., p. S 9), the Japanese task force which did the bombing job on Pearl Harbor left its base for the journey to Hawaii on Nov. 27-28, 1941. What is even more remarkable is that on Nov. 27, 1941, Kimmel received a "war warning" from the Chief of Naval Operations which stated: "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned." (Ibid., p. 2 S.) How Kimmel understood his "tasks assigned" is clearly shown by the fact that on the same day he called off distance reconnaissance!

This date, Nov. 27, 1941, is an important one and the reader should keep it in mind. On Nov. 27, 1941, a regular pattern of highly peculiar activity was set off by the commanders at Pearl Harbor which resulted in the conclusion that, to quote the words of the Official Reports, "everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack."

SETTING THE STAGE AT PEARL HARBOR

Prior to the appointment of General Short there had existed a system of defenses at Pearl Harbor. This system had been instituted by Gen. Herron who had preceded Short in command. Herron had been notified by Washington on June 17, 1940 that radio contact had been lost with a Japanese naval force in the Pacific and he was ordered to alert his command. He did so immediately, going into what he had set up as Field Order No. 1. This all-out alert, the only one in use at the time, utilized completely planes, troops and guns, with live ammunition at the guns. This all-out alert remained in effect for six weeks.

After Short took command at Pearl Harbor, he changed the system of alerts and instituted a three-alert system: No. 1- defense against sabotage and uprisings; no threat from without; No. 2- security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface and aircraft, in addition to No. 1.; No. 3- requires occupation of all field positions.

Just as in the case of Admiral Kimmel, Gen. Short on Nov. 27, 1941 received a "war warning" from the Chief of Staff which stated "hostile act-

ion possible at any moment." (Ibid, p. 10 S.) On this very day, Nov. 27, the same day that the Japanese attacking force left its home waters, and the same day that Kimmel called off distant reconnaissance, Short put into effect Alert No. 1, the alert which signified that there was NO THREAT FROM WITHOUT. This alert remained in effect up to the time of the bombing of Pearl Harbor!

"This alert concentrated equipment and personnel and in effect set up almost perfect conditions for a successful enemy air attack." (Ibid., p. 8 S.)

It goes without saying that Washington knew what was going on at Pearl Harbor. Short had immediately informed the Capital that he had ordered Alert No. 1.:

"As has been repeated so many times, there was positive evidence in the War Department that it was only a matter of days before war would ensue and the War Department had notice that Hawaii was on only a sabotage alert, inadequate for full warfare." (Ibid., p. S 15.)

The significant feature of this, especially in view of its own "war warning" of Nov. 27, 1941, is that Washington did not instruct Short to institute Alert No. 3 for an all-out defense. General Marshall, at that time Chief of Staff, directing Short's movements, was questioned on this vital point in the hearings held after the publication of the Army-Navy Official Reports. The exchange of remarks on this detail is priceless and worth quoting in full:

"Representative Gearhart insisted that General Marshall 'give a reason' why General Short was not directed to put on broader measures in Hawaii after he had replied on Nov. 28 that he was on guard against sabotage.

"First recalling that he had testified that he had no recollection of having the Short message, General Marshall went on:

"That was my opportunity to intervene, and I didn't take it. Just why, I do not know." (The New York Times, Dec. 9, 1945. My emphasis - G.C.)

In a word, Gen. Marshall's reply to the question of why after his "war warning" of November 27, he did not see to it that Pearl Harbor was prepared for defense was: "Just why, I do not know." In the Official Reports there is a lengthy exchange of remarks between Marshall and one of the investigators on the question of whether or not Marshall actually saw Short's reply to the Chief of Staff's November 27 "war warning." The circumstances were extraordinary. It was Marshall's customary practice to initial all reports he received, but for some mysterious reason he did not initial Short's reply, which he had on his desk, before sending it through routine channels. Hence, he was not pinned down on the question of whether he had actually seen Short's reply. Marshall stated: "The presumption would be that I had seen it." (Official Pearl Harbor Reports, The New York Times, Aug. 30, 1945, p. 10 S.) On the question why he did not initial Short's reply, Marshall's final answer was: "I do not know what the explanation is." (Ibid.) At that the matter was dropped and the mystery left unsolved. It is apparent that the bourgeois investigating committee had not the slightest intention of exposing the real story of why "everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack."

HOW ONE GETS A PROMOTION

Prior to Nov. 27, 1941, the radar detection system at Pearl Harbor had been operating on a twenty-four hour basis. On this day, when the Japanese task force left its home base, when the "war warning" was received by both commanders at Pearl Harbor, with the result that the commanders called off distant reconnaissance and put the naval base on an alert system meaning "No threat from without," another very significant thing was done. On that same day, Gen. Short cut down the radar detection system from twenty-four hour service to a very limited service of only three hours, from 4 to 7 A.M.:

"The commanding general, Hawaiian Department, ordered alert No. 1 (see next succeeding paragraph) into effect on November 27, and it was maintained in effect until December 7. At the same time he ordered that the aircraft warning system operate daily from 4 to 7 A.M." (Roberts Report on Pearl Harbor, Senate Document No. 159, p. 10. January 1942.)

During the Joint Congressional investigation, it was pointed out "that it was 'strangely significant' that radar on the Hawaiian Island of Oahu was ordered shut down at 7 A.M., an hour, he said, which was recognized as the most propitious for attack." (The New York Times, Nov. 17, 1945.) In the Army-Navy Official Reports it is shown that Gen. Short "has no adequate explanation for not using the radar twenty-four hours a day" precisely "after getting the message of the 27th." (Ibid., Aug. 30, 1945, p. 10 S.)

It is a well-known fact that the best-laid schemes often hit up against some chance or accidental event which leaves a tell-tale trace. This was peculiarly so in connection with the question of radar at Pearl Harbor. There were several radar stations at the naval base. They were to be shut down after 7 A.M. according to Short's orders. On the morning of December 7th, two army privates, by sheer accident, due to their having to wait around after duty for transportation, were observing at the radar equipment after 7 A.M. when they were officially off duty. One of them was showing the other how to use the instrument. Suddenly, at 7:02 A.M., they noticed that an unusually large formation of planes was approaching Pearl Harbor. They immediately phoned the Information Center and told Lt. Kermit A. Tyler what they had observed. Instead of acting on this information, Lt. Tyler performed, according to the Official Reports, an indefensible action (Ibid., p. S 11), breaking with routine procedures and irresponsibly telling the two privates to "Forget it." What happened to Lt. Tyler? He was subsequently steadily promoted until he reached the rank of Lt. Colonel!

HIDING BEHIND SOME DIRT

The reader will recall that prior to the appointment of Kimmel and Short there was in effect an all-out alert routine which on one occasion brought the troops into the field with planes, guns and live ammunition for six weeks (Army-Navy Official Reports, ibid., p. S 9). After the November 27 "war warning," everything was changed, as has already been shown, in such a way as to make the base perfect for a successful air bombardment. Not only was there a misleading alert in effect, but contrary to the previous system, live ammunition was withheld from the guns. What was the excuse for this peculiar circumstance? The Ordnance Department alleges it did not want to get the ammunition dirty!

"Ammunition had not been issued because the Ordnance Department objected to having it out convenient to the guns because it might get dirty." (Official Reports, *ibid.*, p. S 13.)

Now it is a well-known fact that an alibi can be cooked up for any fishy circumstance. But when there is a whole chain of fishy circumstances, it becomes obvious that these ridiculous excuses cannot be taken seriously. The whole chain of mysterious circumstances points to something systematic, something in the nature of a policy.

ANOTHER CASE OF WITHHOLDING INFORMATION

The Army-Navy Official Pearl Harbor Reports are shot through and through with cases of vital information being withheld by various high authorities with the result that Pearl Harbor was a perfect set-up for an air bombardment. An interesting illustration is the case of the Japanese submarine which appeared in the outer harbor of Oahu over an hour before the Japanese airforce arrived. This submarine, a tiny two-man affair, was not only sighted by the American naval authorities but was even sunk over an hour before the Japanese planes appeared at Pearl Harbor. The presence of this midget submarine clearly indicated that other Japanese craft were undoubtedly in the vicinity. The sinking of this submarine was reported to the Naval Chief of Staff at Pearl Harbor (Official Reports, *ibid.*, p. S 13). To begin with, absolutely nothing was done to prepare the Pearl Harbor warships for defense or to protect the lives of the thousands of sailors and soldiers at the naval base. Furthermore, the Navy withheld its information from Gen. Short: "The Navy admits that it did not advise Gen. Short as it should have done." (*Ibid.*, p. S 13.)

Again it should be pointed out that if this were just an isolated case, it would not mean much. But this incident is part of a whole pattern of circumstances which produced the successful bombardment at Pearl Harbor. An isolated incident or two could be attributed to mere accident, but a whole coordinated pattern of such circumstances can point to nothing but a purpose.

THE BICYCLE - THE "FASTEST" MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

Some of the crudest aspects of the whole intrigue are those concerned with the delaying of messages to Pearl Harbor by the high authorities in Washington.

At 1 P.M. on December 7th, the Japanese envoys, Kurusu and Nomura, had an appointment with Secretary of State Hull which was interpreted by many high-ranking officials as being of the greatest importance. First, it was definitely expected this visit would signify the formal breaking-off of relations between the two countries; secondly, and of even greater importance, the time chosen, 1 P.M. in Washington, was dawn in Hawaii, recognized as the most propitious time for attack. Under such circumstances, one would imagine that the Washington officials would utilize every means at their disposal to notify as speedily as possible all their outpost commanders of the latest developments in the situation and call for all-out alerts for almost instantaneous action. They had every means at their command, the latest and most highly-developed devices of communication including the so-called "scrambler" which automatically translates what is spoken into a telephone into code and at the other end of the wire automatically decodes the message and translates it into ordinary language.

By these means they could communicate by coded message from Washington to Hawaii in ten to fifteen minutes: "The Hawaiian Department had a scrambler telephone connection direct with Washington by which you could ordinarily get a message through from Washington to Hawaii in ten or fifteen minutes." (Official Reports, *ibid.*, p. S 11.) Gen. Marshall, however, refrained from using the telephone at his elbow or any other efficient means, for "reasons" which we shall go into later, and the message was sent by the ridiculously slow and cumbersome means - the commercial telegraph! This act on Marshall's part was most extraordinary and a gross violation of all regulations:

"It is important to observe that only one means of communication was selected by Washington. That decision violated all rules requiring the use of multiple means of communication in an emergency. In addition to the War Department telephone there also existed the F.B.I. radio, which was assigned a special frequency between Washington and Hawaii and over which it only took twenty minutes to send a coded message from Hawaii to Washington or vice versa." (*Ibid.*, p. S 11)

The investigating committee found Marshall's action inexcusable:

"We find no justification for a failure to send this message by multiple secret means either through the Navy radio or F.B.I. radio or the scrambler telephone or all three." (*Ibid.*, p. S 11.)

The last act of this aspect of the affair was a piece of high comedy. Marshall's message arrived in Honolulu twenty-two minutes before the bombardment of Pearl Harbor began. It should not be lost sight of that this was a message from the Chief of Staff himself. How was it handled in Hawaii by the military officials? Somewhere along the line it was given to a boy who mounted a bicycle and pedaled his way along the roads. Naturally, this boy was caught up in the air bombardment and the message arrived at Pearl Harbor seven hours after the bombardment began:

"That the final warning Gen. George C. Marshall sent on Dec. 7, which arrived after the Japanese struck, 'was given to a boy for delivery on a bicycle. The boy was caught in the bombing and did not deliver the message until after the attack.'" (The New York Times, Dec. 12, 1945.)

Why they couldn't get hold at least of some second-hand auto or even a horse has never been explained. One thing is clear; the way the stage managers timed these things was perfect.

If Marshall had used even the most ordinary means available, plain language telephone, his message could have arrived in Pearl Harbor two hours before the air bombardment. (Official Reports, *ibid.*, p. S 3.) Before going into Marshall's alibis, it should be made clear that while he did not phone his "final message" to Hawaii, he did phone it to the Philippines. The Official Reports speak of "the failure of the War Department to use the telephone as the Chief of Staff used it to the Philippines." (*Ibid.*, p. S 11) The main one of Marshall's alibis on the failure to phone Hawaii is that he wanted to maintain secrecy and prevent interception by the Japanese. (Official Reports, *ibid.*, p. S 11). The question arises: If Marshall was so worried about secrecy, why did he phone a message to the Philippines? And since he did phone to the Philippines, what was the sense of being so reticent with regard to Hawaii? Furthermore, suppose the Japanese did intercept the message giving a final warning, what could they do? Obviously, the most drastic action they

could take was to call off the attack on Pearl Harbor since all was known, or risk an attack on a naval base which was prepared in advance and waiting for them with all guns loaded. From the standpoint of a real, not a sham war, if the objective of the defenders was to prevent an attack, the best thing would be to let the message be intercepted with the view of frightening off the attackers. Or, if secrecy is maintained with the idea of trapping the attackers, then the Pearl Harbor base would have been carefully prepared in advance instead of being left completely paralyzed. From every angle, there is absolutely no logic to Marshall's alibi.

Actually, in the final analysis, Marshall had no alibi, as can be seen from his own testimony at the Joint Congressional investigation. He was asked four questions:

"The third was whether General Marshall, by using a 'scrambler' attached to a telephone, could not have sent his final warning of Dec. 7 to General Short that way and thus averted what turned out to have been a long delay occurring over commercial telegraph and over-seas facilities.

"Possibly," said General Marshall, 'this might have been done.'" (The New York Times, Dec. 14, 1945.)

In other words, his answer to this question falls into the same category as his answer to the question of why he did not give Gen. Short correct instructions on the alerts ("Just why, I do not know."), or his answer to the question of why he did not initial Short's reply ("I do not know what the explanation is."). For one of those who were deeply involved in an enormous undertaking, the General was woefully lacking in ingenuity in digging up explanations.

ONE ASPECT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PEARL HARBOR

The American, Japanese, British and other masses of the world at the time of Pearl Harbor were sold the yarn that the "victory" of Japan was due to an alleged superiority of forces on its part as well as to a peculiar tactical genius ("surprise, sneak attack.") The true picture reveals that this so-called victory at Pearl Harbor had nothing whatever to do with the relative strength of the two empires or with any kind of tactics. The Japanese "victory" at Pearl Harbor did not even have its source in any military factors as such. It arose from an entirely different quarter. This "victory" was a cooked-up affair. It was the result of an intrigue, of the policy of the American imperialists in their relations with the Japanese rulers. This is the reason for all those mysterious events which "made the situation perfect for an air attack." We shall show that this policy by no means began with Pearl Harbor nor did it end there. Moreover, we shall show that the Japanese rulers at a certain stage of the developments also pursued a "Pearl Harbor" policy. Before going to the roots of the entire matter, we shall describe the continuation of the Pearl Harbor policy in the Pacific area and then draw the threads of the real story of the so-called "Second World War" from its start in September 1939 to its end.

One thing which has been completely forgotten is that the American imperialists both before and after Pearl Harbor had industrial, naval and airforces far superior to anything that the Japanese could ever hope to muster. Even after Pearl Harbor, the bourgeois press itself contained a wealth of information on this score. We shall cite a few samples. For

example, on air power:

"The entire air force of Japan would be no match for the United States Navy air arm alone, let alone the navy combined with the army air force." (New York Sun, Dec. 8, 1941.)

"Japan is not an air power. At best she rates sixth among the major powers, far behind Britain, Germany and the U.S.A., weaker even than Italy." (P.M., Dec. 8, 1941.)

It should be realized that in addition to the U.S. airforce there were the British and Dutch who together had thousands of planes and personnel in the Pacific area.

On sea power: In the Pacific area the American and British imperialists had a huge aggregation of warships of every category, remarkable not only for number but also for high quality. A very typical statement is that of ~~The~~ New York Times:

"Also, British and American sea power in great strength has been concentrated in the space of a horseshoe, forming a wall between the Japanese Navy and the treasure of raw materials to the southward." (Nov. 30, 1941.)

Concerning industrial strength, the chief barometer of the real strength of a nation, it is hardly necessary to speak. The great backwardness of Japan is well known. In steel production Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor was rated at less than 10% of the United States.

During the air bombardment of Pearl Harbor, the damage to U.S. warships was utterly insignificant in relation to the total strength of the U.S. and British imperialists in the Pacific area. The remarkable thing is that only a few days after Pearl Harbor the reports came in that the Japanese fleet was fleeing from the U.S. naval vessels. "Jap Fleet On Run," declared a headline of Dec. 12, 1941 (New York World-Telegram). And Secretary of the Navy Knox declared:

"The entire balance of the Pacific Fleet, with its aircraft carriers, its heavy cruisers, its destroyers and submarines, are uninjured and are all at sea seeking contact with the enemy." (The New York Times, Dec. 16, 1941)

This, by the way, is an interesting point, for it raises the question of what was so difficult about finding the Japanese fleet which at that particular moment was unloading men and supplies at the Philippine, Midway and Wake Islands. For some mysterious reason never explained, the U.S. authorities pretended the Japanese fleet could not be found. But let us not anticipate our story.

THE PHILIPPINES - ANOTHER "PEARL HARBOR"

In the Army-Navy Official Pearl Harbor Reports, one of the alibis given by the authorities to cover up the machinations involving Pearl Harbor is that they were head-over-heels preoccupied with the Philippines. One would imagine, therefore, that the story of the Philippines would be quite different from that of Pearl Harbor. It should be recalled that the Japanese began to enter the Philippines several hours after Pearl Harbor. Moreover, the story has been given out that in the Philippines, the Nov. 27,

1941 "war warning" from the Chief of Staff had resulted in full preparations so that, to quote the reply of Gen. MacArthur, "everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense." (The New York Times, Nov. 30, 1945, evidence presented at the Joint Congressional investigation.) The Army-Navy Official Reports also pointed out that on December 7th Gen. Marshall had direct telephone communication with MacArthur, giving him the "final warning."

What all this meant in the real plans of the imperialists is clearly shown by what happened in the Philippines. The story was a repetition of Pearl Harbor.

Immediately upon the outbreak of "hostilities," members of the bomber airforce stationed in the Philippines wanted to go into action and bomb the Japanese base lying to the north, in Formosa. They were ordered not to attack. Fighter forces were in the air, however. How "serious" an attempt was made by the Philippine command actually to repel the Japanese attack can be seen from the report that these fighters were ordered down; they then went to lunch! Some of the anti-aircraft crews were also sent to lunch. As if prearranged, just at that moment the Japanese bombers came over and wiped out the airforce, the planes and the air field:

"Junior members of the air force were eager to carry out an immediate attack on Jap bases in Formosa. ^{However,} Gen. Brereton was reluctant to issue orders for the attack until photographic reconnaissance had been made of two fields in the southwest and southeast corners of Formosa.

"While preparations for taking the reconnaissance photos were under way, a mysterious telephone call was received at Clark Field from Manila. The instructions ordered the bombers not to make the attack.

"The source of this call has not been determined, records show. It definitely did not come from Gen. MacArthur's headquarters, which issued its orders only directly to Gen. Brereton.

"In accordance with this message, the bomb loads were removed from the Fortresses. However, the fighter forces were active, and twice during the morning took the air to turn back attempted Jap attacks.

"At noon, according to reports of those present, the fighters were ordered down and the airmen went to lunch. Some of the anti-aircraft gun crews were also reduced for the lunch period.

"At just this moment the Jap bombers swept over in force, with the Fortresses on the ground, and in a single blow virtually eliminated Clark Field and the precious B-17 force from the defense of Luzon." (New York World-Telegram, June 5, 1945.)

It should be noted in the above the important part played by "a mysterious telephone call" whose source "has not been determined" although it was this call which grounded the bombers and played a part in the wiping out of Clark Field. This "mysterious telephone call" is in the same category as the mystery of the uninitialled reply to Marshall's "war warning." Both the Army-Navy Official Reports and the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee failed to give any rational explanation for the fact that the Japanese so easily destroyed Clark Field. The destruction of the planes on the ground at Clark Field was a duplication of what had happened at Pearl Harbor about nine hours before. At the Joint Congressional investigation, the following bit of dialogue is quite characteristic of the whole intrigue:

"Was any report ever made to the War Department as to why planes were destroyed while on the ground on the afternoon following Pearl Harbor?" Senator Lucas asked.

"I don't think so," General Marshall replied." (The New York Times, Dec. 14, 1945.)

This is all the information that has come out on the Philippine aspect of the intrigue. Pearl Harbor has been whooped up by the bourgeois fakers as a "national symbol." Hence, the Republican politicians seized on Pearl Harbor to make a case against the Democratic administration. The Republican politicians, just as the Democratic, have not the least interest in exposing the real policy of the American imperialists in relation to the Japanese. The whole affair of the Philippine occupation by the Japanese has remained hushed up. Even the little that we have cited on this matter is sufficient to indicate that an investigation of the Philippine affair would bring to light a mountain of secret machinations similar to the case of Pearl Harbor. At Clark Field in the Philippines, as at Pearl Harbor, "everything that was done made the situation perfect for an air attack."

On Dec. 10, 1941, three days after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese landed on Luzon, the main and best-fortified island of the Philippines. It almost goes without saying that they landed without opposition:

"The enemy effected unopposed landings in limited numbers at Vigan, Legaspi and Apari." (The New York Times, Dec. 15, 1941.)

It can be plainly seen from the type of "army" used by the Japanese that they knew in advance that there would be no opposition. In an unopposed parade from the landing area to Manila, the "army" they used was of the following character, as described by the American capitalist press itself:

"The Japanese army pushing south toward Manila from the Lingayen Gulf area is an ill-uniformed, untrained mass of young boys between fifteen and eighteen years old, equipped with small-calibre guns and driven forward by desperate determination to advance or die." (The New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 26, 1941.)

The phrase, "desperate determination to advance or die," is, of course, a bit of American journalism to make it "reasonable" to the reader that a mob of boys with insignificant equipment and no training could "defeat" the seasoned American army in the Philippines, in a word, to cover up the fact that there was no opposition. An American cavalry colonel was quoted as saying that "the Japanese troops invading the Philippines are distinctly fourth-raters - and that, he says, is a charitable estimate." (New York Post, Dec. 29, 1941)

All the while that the Japanese forces were landing in the Philippines under convoy covering, the American Pacific Fleet was said to be at sea hunting the Japanese fleet. We have already cited the statement of Secretary of the Navy Knox to this effect. But for some mysterious reason - this also has never been explained - the American fleet never put in any appearance at the Philippines. The whole world know that the Japanese were landing in the Philippines, but it would seem that the American Navy Department didn't read the newspapers, or perhaps some telephone was not working. This fakery led to a fairly frequently asked question in those days: Where is the navy?

"Whether the subject considered is the retarding of Japanese troop landings on the Philippines, infliction of losses on enemy warships or air attacks on Japanese bases, the one question is, Where is the Navy?" (New York Post, Dec. 26, 1941)

Not only was the way for the Japanese from the landing places to Manila left open by the high authorities managing the affair, but Manila itself was handed to the Japanese on a silver platter. Manila was a powerfully fortified city and the Japanese publicly declared over the radio that it could not possibly be considered an open or undefended city. Despite strong protests on the part of the population of the city and throughout the Philippines, the American authorities declared Manila an open city and dismantled its defenses:

"Manila's anti-aircraft batteries were dismantled; military stores that could not be removed were destroyed; the last soldier and sailor left the city." (The New York Times, Dec. 27, 1941.)

"Everywhere there were demands that the army and air force, which left Manila when the capital was declared an open city, return to make a bitter-end fight." (New York World-Telegram, Dec. 27, 1941.)

The opening of the path for the Japanese to Manila and the handing over of that city without a fight showed plainly that the plan was not to defend the Philippines. However, if absolutely no fighting had taken place, this plan would have been perfectly obvious and everybody would have wondered about the nature of the "war" supposed to be in progress between the "democratic" and the fascist powers. The American forces were withdrawn and herded in Bataan and Corregidor. There was a so-called "last-ditch fight" in those places which acted as a cover for the fact that the Philippines were being turned over to Japanese custody for reasons which we shall go into in subsequent portions. The "victory" of the Japanese in the Philippines was as much of a cooked-up affair as Pearl Harbor.

THE BRITISH "PEARL HARBOR"

In the clique fights within the bourgeois camp in England, no group has resorted to the tactics of the Republicans in this country with the result that there has been no investigation in England the equivalent of those held in the United States. This does not mean that the British rulers did not engineer a "Pearl Harbor." The British "Pearl Harbor" consisted of the sinking of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, two huge warships, on Dec. 10, 1941. The circumstances of the sinking of these ships could be the subject of a most interesting investigation.

There are three outstanding circumstances in connection with the sinking of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales; first, that two hours before the Japanese bombed the ships from the air, Japanese scouting planes were seen on the horizon and nothing was done about it; secondly, the British warships were sent out without air protection; thirdly, after the attack began, no air protection was sent them although there was a great amount of it available only thirty minutes away. The reports of the event in the papers showed all these circumstances clearly. For example, on the easily accessible air support not being sent to aid the warships:

"Royal Air Force fighters 'half an hour away' failed to go to the aid of the British warships Repulse and Prince of Wales when they were attacked and sunk by Japanese airmen last December. Admiral

Thomas C. Hart, former commander of Allied naval forces in the western Pacific, asserted today." (New York World-Telegram, Oct. 7, 1942.)

Or that the British had a sufficiency of air power in easy reach:

"The RAF had a considerable force in Malaya, within easy flying range. The British battleships received no aid from the RAF, either in reconnaissance or in defense by fighter planes against the Jap air attack, which resulted in the loss of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales and their commander.

"We have never heard why the RAF fighters, which were half an hour away, gave Admiral Phillips no help whatever." (Ibid.)

Finally, the New York Herald-Tribune of Dec. 14, 1941 reported that: "Two hours before the attack took place Japanese scouting planes were seen on the horizon."

These are the main outlines of the British "Pearl Harbor." What can be the conclusion from the fact that the two British warships were sent out without air protection and that none was ever given them after it was known that Japanese air forces were in the vicinity? And from the fact that to this day, the whole affair is left unexplained by the high authorities? Again, let it be pointed out that if this were just an isolated occurrence, it would not mean much. But it was part of a whole pattern of such events on a world-wide scale and hence indicates a purpose, a policy.

Just as the American Pearl Harbor affair set the ball rolling in the form of an unopposed occupation of the Philippines, so the British "Pearl Harbor" marked the unfolding of a whole number of unopposed occupations by the Japanese fascists of the most powerful British fortresses in the Orient.

THE OCCUPATION OF BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN THE ORIENT

The focal point of the events set off by the British "Pearl Harbor" was the Japanese occupation of Singapore and the attendant circumstances.

The immediate prelude to the Japanese occupation of the great fortress of Singapore consisted of the events in Malaya. Many hours after Pearl Harbor, Japanese transports, on Dec. 8, 1941, landed troops on the coast of Malaya without opposition. This, by the way, was before the sinking of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, in other words, when the British had their full naval force in the zone covered by Singapore. The Japanese began an unopposed march down the Malay peninsula toward Singapore. During the whole period of the Japanese march down Malaya, the British fleet never put in any appearance, so that it was reported in regard to the naval situation at Malaya that the Japanese "...seem to move about the coastal waters at will..." (The New York Times, Jan. 9, 1942.)

The alleged "Battle of Malaya" was another one of those "battles" that never took place. What actually happened was this:

"The battle in Malaya as reported officially probably gave the world the impression of a bitter, hard-fought defense. Actually it was a retreat planned from day to day. Each day the Imperials fell back 10 miles or so 'en scedule.'" (New York World-Telegram, Feb. 17, 1942.)

The British ruling gang had a whole plan worked out for withdrawing from Malaya, with the result that there was no fight in the peninsula. The plan of the British to withdraw hundreds of miles to the Johore Causeway at Singapore was actually dated ahead to January 31, 1942, i.e., to around three weeks after the Japanese made their unopposed landing on the coast of Malaya. A U.P. correspondent reported:

"Once, when the campaign was not so old, I saw a high staff officer's map dated ahead to January 31 and marked at the Johore Causeway, leading from the mainland to Singapore Island." (The New York Times, Feb. 17, 1942.)

The whole affair proceeded according to schedule; on January 31, 1942, the British announced their withdrawal from the Malay mainland to the Island of Singapore.

The Japanese forces moving toward Singapore were a very flimsy affair. In regard to them, the reports declared that: "...all the points are lightly held, all the conquests half made, with no true subjugation, and that such a system can well collapse in the face of a well organized and well supplied counter-attack." (New York Post, Jan. 22, 1942.)

In a real war, these lightly-held Japanese lines would have been decimated by a counter-attack by a sizeable force. It is a remarkable fact such a force of trained troops was actually located immediately in the rear of the thin Japanese lines in Malaya. Reports revealed the existence of hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops which could be used for purposes of counter-attack: "Hundreds of thousands of trained Chinese soldiers are located within striking distance of the thin Japanese supply lines in Thailand and the comparatively thin Japanese rear in Malaya." (Ibid, Dec. 29, 1941.) But these large Chinese forces were not used! They were within striking distance, they were trained, they were available - as a matter of fact, at the time they were not busy with anything in particular - but they were not permitted to attack the Japanese forces!

"Who is blocking permission for China to send hundreds of thousands of trained soldiers to strike at the rear of the Japanese invasion forces threatening Singapore and the Burma Road? The troops are available. They are idle in China's Yunnan Province. Chungking has offered them. What stops them from going?" (Ibid., Dec. 31, 1941.)

"What stops them from going?" is another question which would form the basis of a most enlightening investigation on the actual relations of the "democratic" to the fascist imperialists during the so-called "Second World War." What was involved was a policy of deliberately opening the path for the fascist powers for reasons which we shall soon see. For the moment, let it be recorded that permission was never given the Chinese troops, and the Japanese forces were given free access to Singapore.

A whole series of unopposed occupations of important island defenses of British imperialism preceded the actual occupation of Singapore by the Japanese and points to the real policy of British imperialism.

Penang is an island off the west coast of Malaya, and for the defenses of that region is a naval base second in importance to Singapore. The latter, Hong Kong and Penang are the foundations of British imperialist naval structure in the Orient. How did the British rulers "defend" Penang from the Japanese? The British imperialists demilitarized Penang and turned it over to the Japanese without any fight whatsoever. There were very

peculiar circumstances connected with this, such as leaving intact public utilities and the radio station as well as turning over huge piles of supplies to the Japanese:

"Events connected with the abandonment of Penang without a fight are receiving unsparing publicity in the Singapore press in a fashion that reflects the extent of the freedom of expression existing in the colony in spite of the war, and Singapore is acting to forestall here the failures of administration, policing, fire fighting, air-raid precautions and civilian morale that occurred to a disastrous degree in Penang. The revelations about Penang now disclose that the Japanese were able to take over the island virtually as a going concern.

"Defenses were destroyed and guns removed or wrecked, but public utilities were left intact and large stocks of goods, including warehouses of rubber and several months supplies of rice, were not removed." (The New York Times, Dec. 23, 1941.)

Of course, the story about Singapore acting to forestall a repetition of Penang was the sheerest fakery. The writer of the above dispatch fell in line with the treachery of covering up the fact that what happened in Penang was the result of the policy of the British imperialists. That policy meant to enable the Japanese fascists "to take over the island virtually as a going concern." The New York Times of Feb. 12, 1942 reports that even shipping and the whole treasury were left intact for the Japanese fascists to pick up at Penang. Furthermore, The New York Times of Jan. 13, 1942 reports that Spitfires were left in their packing cases on the dock of the British auxiliary naval base as well as fifty large barges of tin and rubber. There was a considerable rumpus in the newspapers about this at the time, but the matter was eventually dropped and no more was heard of it.

Another case. The Andaman Islands are a vital defense base of British imperialism strategically situated off the southwest coast of Burma in the Bay of Bengal: "The Andamans offer excellent harbors for warships, especially submarines, and perfect concealment as well as taking-off places for seaplanes." (New York World-Telegram, Mar. 26, 1942) It would seem that the British imperialists who held these islands under their forces would make a special effort to defend them. The pattern of the "Second World War" at that time was such, however, that quite consistently the British rulers turned over the Andamans to the Japanese without a fight. This marked the start of the so-called Burma "campaign." Under a sub-heading, "OCCUPATION IS UNOPPOSED," a New York Times dispatch of March 26, 1942 stated:

"Japan occupied the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal last Monday, it was acknowledged in New Delhi today. Apparently the enemy moved in without having to fire a shot, as the British troops evacuated together with a 'considerable portion' of the population 'some days previously.'"

Here is a third example of this consistent pattern of policy. One of the chief approaches to Singapore is the adjacent and heavily fortified island called Ubin. It was occupied by the Japanese without opposition: "Japanese shock troops today established themselves unopposed on Ubin Island at the eastern entrance to the Strait of Johore, and thus achieved a new strategic position for an all-out attack on Singapore Island." (The New York Times, Feb. 9, 1942.) It should be noted that this occurred before the Japanese occupation of Singapore. Of course, it follows automatically that: "The landing on Ubin Island was not explained by the British." (Ibid.)

One of the greatest hoaxes of all in the "Second World War" is the myth about the British suffering from lack of supplies and men, an official lie spread under the well-known formula, "too little and too late." What was actually involved was a deliberate policy of withholding vital supplies and forces which were on hand and available in the crucial areas. The Singapore situation is a very typical one. A sensational revelation on this score was made by the C.B.S. correspondent, Martin Agronsky. He relates the story of a convoy enroute from England to Singapore containing shiploads of planes and pilots:

"On board one ship of the convoy were a large number of R.A.F. ground personnel accompanied by a large number of fighter pilots, veterans of the Battle of Britain. In another ship were the crated planes that the pilots were to fly. My and other warships took the convoy southward through the Banda straits off Sumatra and into Singapore, in the face of continued Jap bombing attacks." (The New York Times, Feb. 23, 1942.)

These pilots were specially trained in such detail that they were ready to take off from the streets of Singapore should this be necessary:

"They had gotten in England a detailed map of Singapore Island, realizing that the airdromes might be unusable, they had laid out on the maps streets from which they could take off with fighters. On the long cruise they had drilled on board ship until they were letter-perfect in the use of the Beaufort and tommy guns they carried." (Ibid.)

These ships carried not only planes and pilots, but a well-trained ground personnel with whom "every detail of assembly of the crated planes had been worked out beforehand." (Ibid.) Subsequently, Agronsky learned the fate of these pilots and planes. They were given the most flagrant runaround. When they arrived in Singapore, they were informed that they were not expected and could not operate from there. Then they were sent on a wild-goose chase to Java, five hundred miles off, under the pretext that there they would receive instructions from the High Command:

"After much searching they reached an R.A.F. Headquarters officer and asked that they be allowed to go into action immediately. Instead they were informed that as they were apparently not expected in Singapore, they could not operate there but would have to go to Java and receive instructions from the High Command." (Ibid.)

Why they could not radio from Singapore to Java for instructions was never explained. While these pilots were off on this wild-goose chase, the Japanese forces were coming down the Malayan Peninsula toward Singapore. The report goes on to say that: "This is one example of an innumerable series of similar incidents." (Ibid.)

The "defense" of Singapore was such a farce that even the loyal flunkies in Parliament could not let it pass without comment, especially in view of Singapore's well-known impregnability: "Lord Addison read in the House of Lords today sections of a letter he had received from the colonel in command of a Scottish regiment at Singapore, on which he based a demand for a Royal Commission to inquire into Singapore's fall. The letter called it a 'disgraceful show.'" (The New York Times, Mar. 26, 1942) His Lordship was just shadow-boxing; the British bourgeois politicians had no need for plying one another with investigations. There was no more involved in Addison's "demand" for an inquiry than a little letting off of steam.

In the enumeration of the fakery that goes to make up the so-called "Battle of Singapore," special mention must be made of the Johore Causeway. It was the only link connecting Singapore Island with the Malayan mainland. It was a well-known fact that the Causeway could be blown up instantly: "It (Singapore) is an island approached only by a narrow causeway which can instantly be blown up." (Editorial, The New York Times, Dec. 20, 1941.) Hanson W. Baldwin stated about three weeks before the Japanese reached the Causeway that according to reports, the British had completed the work for the destruction of the Causeway: "This causeway extends from Johore Bharu to Woodlands and, it is reported, has long been prepared for destruction." (Ibid., Jan. 12, 1942) On the map of Singapore printed in the New York Post of Jan. 7, 1942, it is stated: "Causeway mined. Only link to mainland, it can be destroyed by pressing a button." This meant that the Japanese fascists seemingly could not hope to use the Causeway for marching onto the Island of Singapore. The capitalist writers on military affairs agreed that this link between the Island and the mainland would be blown up the moment the Japanese army would attempt to use it.

All of a sudden a "miracle" was reported. Two days after the Japanese landed on Ubin Island, their radio made an announcement, picked up in the United States, that their troops marched right over the Causeway onto the Island of Singapore: "A steady stream of Japanese troops and supplies this morning poured over Johore causeway, reinforcing Japanese forces battling on Singapore Island." (New York Post, Feb. 10, 1942.) Now, how did that happen! Why was not the Causeway instantly blown up? When it became known in the newspaper editorial rooms that the Causeway had not been blown up by the British, all the pen prostitutes instantly changed their tune. With Hanson W. Baldwin, the dignified military expert of The New York Times, leading the chorus, the flunkys poured out the variety of "explanations" given them by their capitalist masters. Flying in the face of all the known facts they themselves had published time and again, the bourgeois scribblers now declared the Causeway was never meant to be blown up after all.

Once the Causeway was turned over to them, the Japanese within a few days occupied Singapore, one of the mightiest fortresses in the world. The rest of the story in the Orient in the period we are discussing was more or less the same.

THE NATURE OF THE "SECOND WORLD WAR"

The policy which unfolded in the Pacific area after Pearl Harbor was one of turning over important territories to the fascist rulers. We have stated that this policy did not begin with Pearl Harbor, but that the latter was only a continuation of a world-wide policy which had been in progress before. What was the nature of this policy; what was its source? The answer to these questions requires an outline of what constitutes the real character of the so-called "Second World War" in respect to the relations among the capitalist powers.

Since the October Revolution, the fundamental policy of world imperialism in the international sphere has been the destruction of the Soviet Union and the restoration of capitalism in that vast territory. The contradiction between capitalist private property and the nationalized property issuing out of the October Revolution was and remains the basic historical contradiction on a world scale. All contradictions among the imperialists themselves have been subordinated to this major one. This does not mean that inter-imperialist contradictions have disappeared, for while the cap-

italist system exists, they can never disappear; it means that the inter imperialist contradictions had to be held in check in order to solve the more basic historical dilemma created by the October Revolution which tore away a huge section of the capitalist world.

What world imperialism required in order to put its anti-Soviet plans into effect concretely was a powerful war machine on the European borders of the Soviet Union. Only an enormous German industrial and military machine could serve materially and geographically for this purpose. The policy of the "democratic" imperialists, the chief capitalist powers in the world, was therefore twofold: to prop up German imperialism from within by economic assistance and to advance it toward the Soviet borders. The advent of the Nazi regime in 1933 created first-class conditions for such a project. The German proletariat was brutally crushed and soon incorporated into a rebuilt war machine. The stage had only to be set in the geographical sphere, to advance the Nazi forces toward the borders of the Soviet Union.

In the European sphere, this fundamental policy of world imperialism was represented by what in past years was popularly labelled "Munichism." This consisted of turning over important territories to Nazi Germany in the scheme to maneuver her toward the borders of the Soviet Union. This policy had been prepared for in the years before Munich (1938) by economic and material aid from the "democracies" to the German imperialists. The Munich period marked the territorial expression of this policy. The imperialists covered up their anti-Soviet machinations by pretending that they were "appeasing" Hitler in the interests of maintaining peace. The "appeasement" fakery, while not understood in its anti-Soviet essence by the masses of the "democracies" in general, was looked upon by them unfavorably from the standpoint that the Nazi monster was being built up to prodigious proportions. Intense dissatisfaction among the masses of the "democracies" marked the unfolding of the "Munich" policy. Any scheme can be worked only within certain limits, and clearly, the "Munich" scheme was limited in its application. If it continued indefinitely, it would be apparent to everyone that Hitler was not being "appeased," but deliberately built up and reinforced. By 1939, the "Munich" tactic had already reached the end of its rope. The "democratic" imperialists had to find a new way of continuing the same fundamental line. Obviously, the most important thing the "democratic" imperialists had to do was to cover up their fundamental anti-Soviet machinations with a pretense of opposing Hitler. In September 1939, in line with this pretense, the British and French imperialists declared "war" on Germany. Under the cover of "war", the imperialists continued the "Munich" policy. *

* See the following articles in THE BULLETIN of the LENINIST LEAGUE, U.S.A.

On Hitler's Seizure of Norway. The Case of Holland, Belgium and France. A Post-Script on the "Battle of France." More About Norway. The Opportunists and the "Second World War." Answers to Questions on War. "Mysteries" of the "Second World War." Under the Cloak of War. The Sham British Blockade. The Shachtmanites "Explain" the Imperialists' Policy. The Trotskyites and the Soviet Union. The Imperialist Attack on the Soviet Union. The Invasion of Iran. The "War" Reaches the Pacific. Marx on a Sham War. The Case of Singapore. Behind the Fog of the Aleutian Affair. "Why Burma Fell." Labor Action's Own "Facts" on Malaya and Burma. The Issue of the Second Front. A Reply to Shachtman. Oehler: 1939, 1933, 1943. The War on the Soviet Union and the Trotskyites. The Second "Battle of France." The Second "Battle of the Philippines." From the Munich Pact to Unconditional Surrender. The R.W.L. on the War; a reply to a criticism.

Prior to the attack on the Soviet Union, it was necessary for certain preparatory steps to be taken by the imperialists. There were two fundamental preliminary steps. One was to eliminate Poland and with it the Balkans, i.e., to establish the Nazi power in those territories as direct bases for the attack. The other was to crush the French masses who were a danger in the rear of Hitler's army.

The first task was solved by dividing Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union. The division of Poland accomplished several important things for the imperialists. It brought the armies of the German imperialists and of Stalin face to face. The signing and carrying out of the Stalin-Hitler Pact enabled the imperialists to blacken the Soviet Union before the masses of the world. It was pointed to by the capitalists throughout the world as the spark that set off the "Second World War." From Stalin's standpoint, he extended his borders well beyond the Soviet Union where the first shock of the Nazi attack was absorbed. His opportunistic seizure of territories was palmed off by his counter-revolutionary bureaucrats as "Stalin's wise foreign policy." The Soviet masses, lulled to sleep with a false feeling of security, had to pay for this Stalinist opportunism with oceans of blood. Stalinism's international policies never serve the interests of the proletariat.

During the attack on Poland, the "democratic" imperialists did not lift a finger in aid of their official "ally." The "Munich" policy continued, now under the pretense of war. With the march into Poland, there unfolded the famous Sitzkrieg on the Western "Front" which lasted up to the Nazi occupation of France. This period was almost officially designated as the Phoney War.

A most important preliminary step in preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union was the crushing of the French masses. For many years overwhelmingly pro-Soviet in their sentiment, highly class-conscious, the French masses could not be left unsubdued by the imperialists if the Nazis were to be free to attack the Soviet Union. An attack on the Soviet Union by the Nazis would immediately eliminate any reversal in that sentiment which was caused by the Stalin-Hitler Pact. An open alliance between the "democracies" and Nazi Germany would have resulted in powerful outbursts of mass fury in England and particularly in France. Nor could the imperialists risk having the "democratic" countries simply sit by while the Nazis marched on the Soviet Union, for this also would have made it obvious that the "democratic" rulers were actually in collusion with the Nazis. The pretense of war inaugurated in September 1939 went a long way toward deceiving the masses, but this was not sufficient. The Nazis needed also the manpower and industrial machine of France for their war against the Soviet Union. This need was fulfilled in May-June 1940 by opening the gates of France for the Nazis to enter. It was in this context that the vital bridges were left intact in France for the Nazis; that powerful fortresses like Eben Emael, Sedan, Verdun and Metz were occupied by the Nazis without a fight; that a large, powerful and modern French airforce was kept in storage and never used; that the famous French artillery, the 75's and the tanks were conspicuous by their absence; that a narrow corridor to the Channel ports was left open in France through which poured a few thousand Nazi motorcycle troops surrounded on the North and South by millions of "Allied" soldiers whose Command never lifted a finger to stop this "invasion." A classical description of the Phoney War in France occurred in the New York Herald-Tribune on July 23, 1940: "It now seems quite clear that there never was a Battle of France, a battle for Paris, or whatever it was called in the days before the country's collapse." Thus was summed up the most important European "battle" so far in the "Sec-

ond World War."

By November 1940 Hungary and Roumania had become "Axis" partners, thus further strengthening the Nazi forces for their intended task. In March 1941 Bulgaria openly joined the Nazis and the following month Yugoslavia and Greece were occupied in three weeks.

It was in March 1941 that the Nazis landed in North Africa, crossing the British-controlled Mediterranean without opposition. At the time there was actually nothing going on in Europe which even remotely resembled war, and hence to give the impression of war, the imperialists chose the African deserts on which to chase one another around, back and forth, in eight so-called campaigns. Meanwhile, the Nazis were integrating the European economy into their war plans and were transferring millions of slave laborers to the German factories, mines and farms while their own workers were shunted into the ever-larger army.

The continent of capitalist Europe was now under the heel of the Nazi war machine and the stage was set for the real job, the attack on the Soviet Union.

On June 22, 1941, the imperialists began their second intervention of the Soviet Union. This time, however, their preparations had been on a far greater and more efficient scale than those of 1918-1921. The invasion was being accomplished this time not by small numbers of soldiers who had gone through four years of bloody fighting and were battle-weary, but by huge armies that were fresh and backed by the entire capitalist world.

Where did the Japanese imperialists stand in this development? World imperialism had been using the Japanese forces against the masses of Asia for many years. In September 1931, with the secret and objective acquiescence of the American, British and other imperialist powers, the process of handing over Manchuria to the Japanese ruling gang began. The opposition of the "democratic" imperialists and of the League of Nations was a sheer pretense and a cover for their collusion with the Japanese capitalists. The puppet of the "democratic" rulers, Chiang Kai-Shek, worked together with the Japanese rulers in crushing the revolutionary masses of China, turning over the most important areas of China to Japanese fascist policing. We see, therefore, that for ten years before Pearl Harbor not a finger was lifted by the "democracies" to stop the Japanese imperialists. More than that! All aid possible was being sent to Japan by the "democratic" imperialists throughout this period; shipments of scrap iron, oil, raw products, etc. This aid helped to offset the drain on the Japanese economy that was entailed in the drawn-out campaign in China.

It was in this context that the "Second World War" was concocted in September 1939. That the policy of all the imperialists was to equip German imperialism for its assigned task of destroying the Soviet Union and restoring the capitalist system there, we have already shown. Only German imperialism could serve as a military spearhead in such an attack. A third-rate, weakened power like Japan could not possibly play a major role for such a purpose. While Japanese-occupied territory (Manchuria) was contiguous with Stalin's borders, it was not contiguous to the main areas of the Soviet Union as a whole which were in the West, in Europe. This was another reason why Japan could play only a secondary role in the imperialist plan to destroy the Soviet Union. The immediate function of the Japanese imperialists had been and continued to be to compel Stalin to keep big forces in Siberia. If the imperialists contemplated using

the Japanese forces for a supplementary invasion of the Soviet Union, this could materialize only when the defeat of the Soviet Union by the Nazis was already assured. In the Army-Navy Official Pearl Harbor Reports, there is a very interesting item in connection with this. On July 7, 1941, the U.S. Adjutant General sent Gen. Short at Hawaii a telegram dealing with the role of Japan. The gist of the message is the following sentence:

"This policy is present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action against the maritime provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia." (The New York Times, Aug. 30, 1945, p. 8 S. My emphasis - G.C.)

The "democratic" imperialists pursued the same policy with regard to Japan as they did with regard to Germany. At the appropriate moment, they began to turn over territories to Japan as we have outlined in the foregoing sections.

As the Nazi campaign in Russia unfolded, however, it did not at all become evident to the imperialists that "Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia." In September 1941, only two months after the Nazi attack against the Soviet Union began, it was already evident to the imperialists that a serious setback for the Nazi war machine had developed outside of Leningrad. The plans of the Nazis had called for taking the city at the earliest possible moment to break the back of Russian resistance. In this they failed. The second fundamental setback for the Nazis, also manifesting itself in the first attack, was the failure to capture Moscow in October-November 1941. In the winter of 1941-1942, Stalin's armies even went on the offensive and regained a strip averaging 125 miles in width along the entire battlefront. Up to this point, the Nazis had made tremendous advances which gave a promise of final victory, but far from an assurance,

During the 1942 offensive up to August, the Nazis made further advances in the Soviet Union, chiefly in the southern sector. Despite these advances, not only was there no assurance of final victory, but even the promise disappeared, for in the battle of Stalingrad (August 1942 to February 1943), the Nazi army met a terrible catastrophe. After all these efforts, they ended up with the complete annihilation of a major section of their forces.

The role which the world bourgeoisie assigned to Japan in the war on the Soviet Union, the role which in his telegram of July 7, 1941, the U.S. Adjutant General informed Gen. Short Japan would play, became clear as the Nazis were stalled before Stalingrad. The telegram stated that Japan would attack Russia when a decisive Nazi victory in Russia became evident. While the Nazis were advancing into the Soviet Union, the Japanese army moved through China toward Siberia in expectation of a Nazi victory. The movement was evident until the Nazi army was stopped in the battle of Stalingrad. As soon as it became clear that the stand before this city was to be a decisive one with victory in the Soviet Union in the balance, the Japanese stopped moving toward Siberia and subsequently stopped all major action in China, confining their activity to some piddling operations against the Chinese. This cessation of activity was so striking to observers as to call forth lengthy comment. An editorial in The New York Times during the last stages of the battle of Stalingrad raised the significant question:

"WHERE IS JAPAN'S ARMY?"

"Query: What has happened to the Japanese Army, and why? Six

months ago it was apparently on the march toward Siberia. A month or more ago it was apparently on the march from Burma toward Chungking and the heart of Free China. And all that has been heard of it since is a few minor campaigns against Chinese forces, local actions of the kind that, however difficult they may be for China, now that China can get little or no outside support, can be of no decisive effect in Japan's larger strategy. It is no way to win a war when three of the strongest Powers of the world, whose strength is just coming to fulfillment, are on the other side. Of this fact the Japanese Army leaders are as well aware as anybody else.

"Why, then, the passivity? It is the military mystery of the present stage of the war." (Jan. 7, 1943)

February 1943, the end of the battle of Stalingrad, marked the turning point in the attack upon the Soviet Union and in the maneuvers of world imperialism. The purpose for which the world imperialists had organized a pretense of war among themselves, namely, as a cover for the attack upon and destruction of the Soviet Union, had failed. The territories which had been lent to the fascist spearhead, Nazi Germany, and to its auxilliary, Japanese imperialism, began to be taken back by the "democratic" stage managers of the entire affair. This taking back followed the identical pattern that the handing over had done. In subsequent portions we shall show in dealing with the Pacific aspect of this, that the same sham war features which marked the turning over of the various territories to Japan, also marked the taking back.

A few observations on some of the tactics the imperialists must resort to in conducting a pretense of war among themselves. We must point out again that during the first eight months after September 1939, during the Sitzkrieg, there was nothing in the West that even remotely resembled a real war. Such a policy could not have been continued indefinitely because it would have become obvious that the Nazis not only were not being stopped but were actually being aided by this policy to continue taking over territory after territory. The Sitzkrieg was becoming a public joke. In other words, realistic-looking props had to be put on the stage by the imperialist schemers, shooting and bombing had to take place, casualties had to be created, ships had to be sunk, air raids had to be organized. As the situation grew older, the relative intensity of the show had also to be stepped up to allay any suspicion of what was actually taking place, namely, that the Nazis were actually being given a free hand to organize the attack on the Soviet Union. The casualties and destruction which have taken place in the inter-imperialist aspects of the "Second World War," following the Phoney War (Sitzkrieg) inactivity, acted as a cover to hide the basic inter-imperialist policy of collaboration. That there were human lives involved made no difference to the imperialist butchers who are ready to slaughter millions on the least provocation if it suits their particular needs at any time. At this point and in connection with the question of destruction of human lives and property, we want to refer to an article in THE BULLETIN of March 1942 entitled Marx on a Sham War. It provides an excellent illustration of the method of analysis used by Marx and Engels in the face of a sham war among the imperialist powers. In the 1850's there existed a secret understanding between the Czar and the British rulers to partition Turkey, the "sick man of Europe." In 1853, a real war broke out between Russia and Turkey. Mass sentiment in Britain against the Czar, especially when hostilities broke out, was rising rapidly. It reached the stage where the British imperialists, in order to make it appear that they would assist Turkey against the aggressions of the Czar, formed a paper alliance with Turkey. France also participated in this "alliance." In spite of this paper alliance, the so-called allies of

Turkey, i.e., England and France, were actually working in cahoots with the the Russians against Turkey. The war between Turkey and Russia was real. But the war between the other "enemies" was a sham, and Marx and Engels so characterized it. There were, however, huge casualties and destruction. This, nevertheless, did not blind Marx and Engels to the fundamental policies involved in the situation. Had they looked merely at the surface features of "battles" and had they stuck mechanically to the generalization about imperialist rivalries between the countries involved, they would never have understood the situation. Franz Mehring in his biography of Marx put the whole question of Marx-Engel's evaluation of the so-called Crimean War quite succinctly: "Despite the million lives and the millions of pounds which the war cost, both Marx and Engels regarded it as a pseudo-war as far as France and, in particular, England were concerned." (p. 267) Marx and Engels saw the basic collaboration between the Czar and the Anglo-French imperialists before the "war," they saw the concrete situation developing out of that "war," the innumerable "mysteries," shams, fake battles, lack of opposition, military assistance to Russia, their "enemy," against Turkey, their "ally." On these concrete facts, Marx and Engels based their evaluation of the so-called Crimean War as a sham war. We cite this position by Marx-Engels merely to show that the concept of a sham war in which the major alleged enemies are secretly allies who deliberately create casualties and destruction as a cover of the alliance is not as foolish as has been made out by the pseudo-Marxists of today. Our evaluation of the "Second World War" in its interimperialist phases as a sham war does not hinge in any respect whatsoever upon any past precedents, but is based entirely upon the facts of the present, as we have shown in this article and in many other articles in THE BULLETIN.

THE SHAM WAR CONTINUES - IN REVERSE

To get back to the situation in the Soviet Union in 1943. As we have said, by February of that year the Nazis had received a catastrophic setback at Stalingrad. It can be termed catastrophic because not only were the Nazi forces annihilated, but this defeat represented the end of the imperialists' second intervention. The war situation, we must repeat, had two major aspects; the one between the Nazis, as the spearhead of world imperialism, and the Soviet Union was a real war. The other "war" between the "Axis" and the "democracies" was a sham one. Since the sham war was organized for the purpose of handing over territories to the fascist powers to prop them up for the task of destroying the Soviet Union, and since this purpose failed, the imperialists had to dismantle the temporary structure they had built.

We shall now deal with the "re-occupations" by the "democracies" of the territories they had handed over previously to the fascists. Incidentally, what lent an air of reality to these phoney re-occupations was the fact that there was a real defeat being administered to the Nazis by Stalin's armies. It must be noted, and very carefully, the the "democratic" re-occupations did not start until after the battle of Stalingrad which sealed the fate of the Nazi forces. In other articles in THE BULLETIN we have dealt at length with this matter in the West; here we shall confine ourselves to the Pacific aspect.

In the Pacific area the Japanese began withdrawals from territories that had been temporarily handed over to them. These withdrawals were preceded, as we have shown above, by a remarkable cessation of movement on the part of the Japanese Army in general, which evoked the question in the final phases of the battle of Stalingrad: "WHERE IS THE JAPANESE ARMY?" At first a whole series of insignificant places were re-occupied (Jan. 1943, Papua; February, Guadalcanal and Buna; May, Attu; June, the Trobriand and Woodlark

Islands; August, Munda, Kiska, Vella Lavella, New Georgia; September, Lae, Salamaua, the rest of the Aleutians and most of the Solomons; October, Treasury Island; November, Makin, Tarawa, Abemama; December, Western New Britain; Jan. 1944, the Marshall Islands; February, all of New Britain, the Admiralty Islands, Truk, Saipan.) On some of these places there were even staged some skirmishes which were splashed all over the newspapers as big battles. All this jumping around from one remote island to another was palmed off on the masses as great strategy; it was called island-hopping and was officially pictured as a matter of obtaining air bases for the bombing of Japan. In all the noise that the propagandists made about this island-hopping, there was one outstanding point which was very carefully omitted, namely, that it was actually totally unnecessary because there were huge land bases under "Allied" control in China which, in a real war, would have been utilized. These land bases referred to are those large areas immediately behind the few coastal cities held by the Japanese. In fact, many airfields were established by the "Allies" in these areas about 800 miles from Japan. In this "war," however, these Chinese-held and excellently-situated land bases were never used for bombing expeditions against Japan. Instead, the imperialists created a tremendous hullabaloo about winning air bases in such far-fetched places as the little coral reef in the Pacific called Tarawa over 2,500 miles from Japan! The business of island-hopping was sheer "busywork." Its real purpose had nothing to do with getting air bases, but was intended solely to create a popular impression of a great war, i.e., it served as a cover for the sham war.

For the real character of the so-called war, it is necessary to see what happened when such major places as the Philippines, for example, were re-occupied.

THE PHILIPPINES - A FAMILIAR GAME IS RE-ENACTED

When the Japanese occupied the Philippines in 1941-1942, the American forces offered virtually no resistance. Remember the order to the air force not to attack; the unopposed landings of the Japanese at Vigan, Legaspi and Aparri; the type of Japanese "army" used, "an ill-uniformed, untrained mass of young boys between fifteen and eighteen years old, equipped with small-caliber guns;" the failure of the U.S. Navy to appear; the dismantling of the defenses of Manila by the Americans; the unopposed parade of the Japanese from the landing places to Manila; the handing over of the city to the Japanese without a fight. This was the basic pattern of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. The American re-occupation followed the same pattern in reverse.

The American re-occupation began in December 1944, after three years of Japanese occupation. The Philippines, it must be stressed, are a highly strategic area which, if there had been a real struggle, would have been vigorously defended by the Japanese. Once the Philippines are occupied, the next step is Japan itself.

The main island of the Philippines is Luzon, geographically the one nearest to Japan, and on which is situated the capital, Manila. We have pointed out that on a number of outlying and insignificant islands in the Pacific, the imperialists staged some fights about which tremendous noise was made in the headlines, giving the impression of a fierce war. The closer the scene shifted to Luzon, the main Philippine island, the more clearly did the basic sham war pattern unfold. Thus, when the Americans landed on the island of Mindoro, 155 miles from Manila, the landing and occupation occurred without a fight: "U.S. FORCE LANDS UNOPPOSED ON MINDORO WITHIN 155

"MILES OF PHILIPPINE CAPITAL" read a headline in The New York Times of Dec. 15, 1944. Fifty-five miles closer to Manila, the island of Marinduque was also occupied without a fight: "MARINDUQUE WON. AMERICANS OCCUPY ISLE 10 MILES FROM LUZON AND 100 MILES FROM MANILA. LANDING UNOPPOSED." (The New York Times, Jan. 6, 1945)

Then came the landings on and occupation of Luzon itself. It is significant to note that the Americans landed at the very same places that the Japanese had three years before. They did not land in some out of the way spots in small groups, but sailed into the main landing areas in full view from the shore and in large numbers of ships. The outstanding factor in this entire episode was that there was no opposition from the Japanese. A big American convoy sailed right into Lingayen Gulf, but: "Not a shore battery fired as the hundreds of American vessels steamed into the gulf before dawn." (The New York Times, Jan. 10, 1945)

That the Japanese never intended to occupy the Philippines indefinitely can be seen by their lack of plans for defense. They had three years to carry out some plans for defense, but: "At no place did we run into any organized resistance, and we found little evidence that the Japs ever intended to offer any." (New York Post, Jan. 10, 1945)

The re-occupation of Luzon continued and so did the basic pattern of lack of opposition. In what was described as "a prime defense area," 67 miles from Manila, the same story is repeated. The Japanese, it seemed, had disappeared: "Yanks Can't Find Any Japs To Fight." (New York World-Telegram, Feb. 2, 1945)

After a while, the landings grew into an "invasion" and a large-scale move down Luzon to Manila, but still no war: "For the third day, the American troops on Luzon pushed down the road from Lingayen Gulf to Manila without a contact with the enemy." (New York Herald-Tribune, Jan. 12, 1945)

On the road to Manila there is a vital defense area, the Agno River, where, in a real war, a strong stand would have been made by the Japanese. But instead of a defense, it was handed over to the Americans without a fight: "The Japs, whom they had expected to make a strong defense of the Agno River, gave it up without a struggle." (Newsweek, Jan. 29, 1945, p. 33) This pattern repeated itself also at other river barriers: "The Americans likewise crossed other river barriers on the plain without having to force them." (Ibid.)

A few years ago when the policy of the imperialists was to hand over territories to the Japanese in the Pacific area, the fakery was spread that the "Allies" could not hold them - places like Malaya, for example, - because allegedly they were inferior jungle-fighters to the Japanese. Now, when the imperialist game called-for re-occupying such jungle territory, it suddenly turns out that the Japanese never heard of jungle-fighting or even of taking advantage of such natural defenses as swamps, rivers, bogs. An American officer is quoted as follows: "These swamps, rivers and bogs could have been the bloodiest battlefield in the world, and they are letting us get through it without fighting." (Ibid., p. 29)

A by-now familiar question was raised regarding the Japanese airforce. When the Nazis were being brought into France, thousands of first-line French planes were kept out of action in order to facilitate the occupation. Here too, in the Philippines, with the American re-occupation, the Japanese airforce was conspicuous by its absence:

"Everybody is wondering where the Japanese air force is. In the

past three days there has been virtually no enemy air activity and the American troops on Luzon have yet to undergo bombing and strafing." (The New York Times, Jan. 16, 1945)

"The enemy's non-appearance in the air and on the sea at Luzon is still a mystery." (Ibid., Jan. 17, 1945)

The city of Tarlac is the main center on the road from the north to Manila. The American approach to this place did meet with some opposition, however. The opposition consisted of "nothing much worse than mosquitoes and heat." (New York Sun, Jan. 18, 1945)

Tarlac was occupied without a fight:

"The march of Link's men into Tarlac, the only important town between Lingayen and Manila, resembled a summer maneuver more than an important seven-mile gain against the Japanese." (New York Herald-Tribune, Jan. 23, 1945)

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"There was no sign of the Japanese." (Ibid.)

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"There was absolute quiet on this strangest of beachheads. Some front-line troops had been marching for ten days without firing a shot." (Ibid.)

* * * * *

"'This war is making me sleepy,' yawned Staff Sergeant Robert V. Quinn, of Utica, N.Y." (Ibid.)

By the latter part of January 1945, the Americans were already rolling peacefully down the highway to Manila. A correspondent travelling with the troops remarked quite pointedly that they could not find the front lines, meaning by that the battle-lines, "because there was no war":

"HIGHWAY TO MANILA PEACEFUL, QUIET

"Spin Down Good Road in Hunt for War Miles Below Tarlac Finds Just the Countryside.

"We boiled southward in a jeep driven by Pfc. Clifford Johnson of Birmingham, Ala., looking for the front lines and the war.

"We didn't find the front lines because there was no war. Or maybe it is viceversa. Anyway, the Japanese had declared a holiday on fighting and our troops were rolling southward unimpeded along beautiful two-line highways." (The New York Times, Jan. 23, 1945)

A second landing, also totally unopposed, was effected on Jan. 29, 1945. In this particular case even the preliminary show of bombarding empty beaches was dispensed with. A colorful description of this is given by an eyewitness, Wm. J. Dunn, C.B.S. correspondent, under the headline, "NEW LANDING GALA HOLIDAY":

"I have just witnessed the most amazing amphibious operation in more than three years of covering this Pacific war, the landing of more than a division of American troops on the west coast of Luzon and just above Subic Bay without the firing of a shot.

"What might have been a bitter battle turned out to be a gala holiday for the Filipinos of Zambales Province who swarmed to the beaches to greet the landing elements of the 11th Corps with cheers and songs.

"It was the first major landing ever made in this area without any preliminary shelling." (P.M., Jan. 31, 1945)

A third landing was made on January 31st. The same pattern is seen - no opposition, no war. This basic pattern runs throughout the "global war" in the major situations of the inter-imperialist phases.

"The first wave hit five miles of Batangas beach from landing ships Wednesday morning without firing a shot and speared quickly inland through the town of Nasugbu without meeting serious opposition." (New York Herald-Tribune, Feb. 2, 1945)

Thus we see that the re-occupation of the Philippines followed the same pattern as its original occupation, - no opposition. The show was topped off by some Japanese troops being herded in one section of Manila where a good deal of shooting was staged. This filled the headlines for a short time. The fundamental pattern of the re-occupation of the Philippines was that of the whole "Second World War" among the imperialists.

THE SHOW ON THE MOLEHILL - IWO JIMA

The unopposed re-occupation of the Philippines was now relegated to the back pages of the press and the reports of a great struggle on Iwo Jima filled the front pages. The Philippines with their enormously rich natural resources and their population of over 16,000,000 are one of the most important territorial possessions of the American imperialists. For this ripe plum the Japanese put up no resistance. But on Iwo Jima, a coral reef, a speck in the Pacific, the Japanese are supposed to have put up great resistance. This strange policy must be viewed in the light of the entire "Second World War."

When the Nazis occupied France, such tremendous fortresses as Verdun and Sedan were turned over by the "Allies" without a fight. When the Japanese occupied Singapore, the greatest fortress in the Orient, there was no opposition. When the "Allies" re-occupied France, again Verdun and Sedan were not defended, this time by the Nazis. At every important and crucial point there was no real struggle in the entire war - outside of Russia, that is.

But on Iwo Jima, as in a number of out of the way, insignificant places, fights were staged by the imperialists. Not at Verdun, however, not at Sedan, Metz, Eben Emael, Hong Kong, Singapore, not in the Philippines, and not in Japan itself, to mention just a few of the vital spots. Impressive motion pictures have been exhibited of the fighting on Tarawa, Iwo and Okinawa. But there are no films recording any "fight" at Verdun, Sedan, Metz, Eben Emael, Singapore, Hong Kong, because there was no fight. Unless the imperialists had staged some fights in remote, out of the way places, there would be nothing visible but one unopposed occupation and re-occupation after another in the main centers of the world. In short, without the Iwos, Tarawas, Guadalcanals and Okinawas, there would have been nothing visible but the clear pattern of a sham war among the imperialists.

WHY THE "DEMOCRATIC" IMPERIALISTS HAD TO OCCUPY JAPAN

The re-occupations we have discussed so far were merely a preliminary to the big job, the occupation of Japan itself. This occupation of Japan is organically connected with the whole development of the "Second World War." The plan of the "democratic" imperialists of building up the fascist powers for an attempt to destroy the Soviet Union ended in failure.

The fate of the Nazi Army as well as the fate of the Nazi regime depended on the results of the invasion of Russia. The failure of the Nazis in Russia had great significance everywhere and especially on the continent of Europe. It meant that the days of the Hitler regime were at an end. The "democratic" imperialists made sure that they and not the workers would remove the Nazi regimes throughout the Western occupied countries. Thus, the re-occupation of Western Europe by the "democratic" imperialists was directly motivated by their urgent need to prevent the collapse of the capitalist system. The so-called war in the West was no more in evidence during the "Allied" (Anglo-American) re-occupation of Europe in 1944-1945 than it was during the Nazi occupation of France and the Balkans in 1940-1941. The alleged "Atlantic Wall", the Siegfried Line, and the "German Redoubt" disappeared in the same mysterious way as had the Maginot Line in 1940. In comparison with the Eastern Front, where the slaughter was huge and lives were lost by the million, the "Allied" losses in the West were relatively very small. The losses of the Nazi Army in the West were primarily in the form of mass surrenders to the Anglo-Americans. The pattern of sham war was clearly evident right up to the entry into and occupation of Germany by the "democratic" imperialists. The pattern of real war in the East, between the Soviet Union and the Nazi Army, also was evident up to the entry into and occupation of Germany. On May 5, 1945, the final curtain was drawn on the events in Europe.

The failure of the imperialists in the Soviet Union necessitated not only the ending of the sham war in Europe but also the ending of the sham war in the Pacific. Only the wind-up remained to be accomplished - the occupation of Japan itself. With the necessity of occupying Germany went hand-in-hand the necessity of occupying Japan. It followed that the major "Axis" partner of Germany, i.e., Japan, had to be treated in the same way as Germany and be occupied.

The Japanese empire in Manchuria and China, just as Hitler's in Europe, had been created and existed by the grace of the powerful American and British imperialists. Both the Hitler and the Japanese empires were temporary creations. When it was necessary, the "democratic" imperialists handed over territory after territory to the fascist powers to prepare them to attack the Soviet Union and for policing purposes. When the assigned task failed, due to the defeat in the Soviet Union, the justification for the fascists' holding these territories no longer existed and they were given back.

The finale of the sham war in the Pacific area followed the same pattern as the handing over of territories to Japan - no opposition.

In July 1945, the "invasion" fleet of the United States and Great Britain steamed into Japanese waters off the main islands of Japan. The first reported activity occurred over the 100 mile wide Kanto plain when carrier planes swept over the airfields and aircraft installations, the largest concentration of any area its size in all of Japan. Seventy to eighty airfields were reported hit in an attack lasting over eight hours. Yet not one of all the planes on the ground rose to challenge the American

force. This was on a Tuesday:

"Broadcasting company correspondents aboard ships of the fleet reported that the carrier attacks had lasted more than eight hours and that no air opposition against the fleet had developed. One said that the naval fliers had struck seventy to eighty airfields." (The New York Times, July 10, 1945)

On the following Saturday, more than 1,000 American carrier planes bombed the northern section of Japan. Again, there was absolutely no opposition:

"Japan's mainland felt the weight of direct American gunfire as more than 1,000 carrier planes swarmed over the northern homeland in unopposed attacks.

"Reports from the powerful fleet, steaming deeper into enemy waters than ever before, said no Japanese aircraft had appeared in the sky to challenge the naval planes." (PM, July 15, 1945)

One would think that some coral reef was involved here and not the mainland of the Japanese empire itself. The battleships themselves were right off the shores of the main Japanese island, Honshu, but still there was no resistance:

"For two hours the squadron swaggered back and forth almost within rifle shot of Honshu, drawing only most meager and apparently timid opposition.

"It was as if you strutted back and forth on some enemy's front porch, poked in his front door, messed up his parlor and asked him what he proposed to do about it.

"The Japanese chose to do very little about it." (The New York Times, July, 15, 1945)

The whole thing was labelled "incredible" by the newspaper PM, one of whose correspondents was aboard a battleship there. He points out that although his ship was surrounded by land on three sides, not a Japanese shore battery fired on them:

"This mighty battlewagon is sitting within sight of Japan, firing screaming salvos into Muroran, but still the Japanese aren't fighting. Not even an enemy pistol has been levelled at our warships, although we are within 1,000 yards of land.

"It is incredible that we could venture this close to the enemy homeland without a fight. There is land to port, land dead ahead and land to starboard. There must be Japanese shore batteries on that land, but they aren't firing." (PM, July 16, 1945)

The article continues to show that his ship had to sail 125 miles between the main Japanese islands, Honshu and Hokkaido, in order to get into firing position, yet: "There was no Japanese attempt to attack us from the air or from shore batteries." (Ibid.)

Tokyo, of course, was constrained to "explain" to the Japanese masses why nothing was being done to counter the American blows. The story of "surprise" that was put out by the American commanders was denied by the Japanese. They stated that they knew full well where the American task forces were - how could they deny it when the American ships could be seen practically from the shore - but that they were offering no opposition for "strategic" reasons:

"Radio Tokyo, commenting on the complete lack of Japanese opposition to Adm. Halsey's task force strikes against northern Honshu and Hokkaido, indicates that the enemy would make no large-scale attempt to challenge the pre-invasion operations of the U.S. Fleet in the air and waters around Japan.

"The broadcast denies that Halsey's carrier planes and warships had achieved 'tactical surprise,' as claimed by Adm. Nimitz in a Guam communique. It insists that Japanese air and sea forces had not been caught napping; that they 'were in full knowledge of the position of the enemy task forces operating near the Japanese shores' but refused to act for 'strategic' reasons." (PM, July 16, 1945)

Even when advance notice was sent that certain cities would be attacked, not even an anti-aircraft shell was thrown up to counter the bombing even when Tokyo itself was involved:

"Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay of the Twentieth Air Force warned the residents of eleven Japanese cities of forthcoming attacks. The next day he sent his fliers against six of these places. Air defense was almost wholly lacking. Of the 550 to 600 B-29s used, it was reported that not one was lost. Fighter pilots returning from a sweep over Tokyo say that not a single anti-aircraft shell was fired at the white-starred planes cruising at low altitude." (The New York Times editorial, July 31, 1945.)

The "attack" was now one month old and still there was no opposition to the "Allied" force. If this were anything but a sham war, what were the Japanese rulers waiting for?

"The Third Fleet now is in its fourth week off the home islands, bombing and bombarding, without apparently having sustained a single retaliatory attack." (Ibid.)

Anybody who imagines that Japan was "knocked out" by the show put on by the American and British forces has been grossly deceived. In the first place, at the time the official surrender of Japan was staged, the overwhelming bulk of the Japanese army remained intact. Indeed it was never even engaged in any military action! Furthermore, the kind of "bombing attacks" conducted by the Anglo-American forces were of the kind usually witnessed in the sham war. Insignificant places, militarily speaking, especially workers' quarters, were singled out by the airforce commanders and pounded to bits. But the chief industrial centers were carefully by-passed. One of the most significant reports to come out on the alleged damage done to Japanese industry by the bombings and bombardments appears in the information bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Washington, D.C. The article, written by two Russian representatives who toured Japan after the "surrender," points out that the Tokyo plants of the biggest industrial empires in Japan, the Mitsui and Mitsubishi companies, the equivalent of the Ford and Rockefeller interests, were totally undamaged! The miserable bamboo hovels of the workers and the small business districts were wiped out -

"But the backbone of the city remained intact. The sewers, water supply and electric system escaped. The European-style buildings - banks, ministries and embassies - are intact. Life in Tokyo as the center from which war and industry were directed could go on despite the sufferings of the population. All the main industrial plants in Tokyo survived. There are the motor works of the Mitsui concern and the assembly plants of Mitsubishi. Likewise, almost all metal plants survived. We have

seen these plants with their numerous new machine tools now standing idle because of the shortage of raw materials which formerly came from Manchuria." (Vol. V, No. 113, Oct. 27, 1945. pp. 6-7.)

The basic pattern of the occupation of Japan followed the basic pattern of the whole "war" between the "democratic" and the fascist powers. Nevertheless, since the plan of the imperialists was to occupy Japan quickly, i.e., without dragging the show out as in the case of Germany, it was necessary to stage some spectacular event to make the affair plausible in the eyes of the masses. Otherwise, it would be palpably fantastic that an intact nation like Japan could simply be entered and occupied without any resistance. At this point, the American imperialists combined propaganda necessities with scientific experimentation by exploding two atom bombs, choosing two Japanese cities as their laboratory and destroying scores of thousands of working class families. The public sensation was enormous and the propaganda effects were completely realized.

The entrance of Stalin into the picture by his declaration of war on Japan finished the affair. It was clear now that the sham war in the Pacific was being drawn to a close, especially after the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima on August 6th. At this stage, on Aug. 8, 1945, only two days before the Japanese gave the official signal for ending the whole affair, Stalin jumped into the picture by declaring war on Japan. By this act Stalin, first of all fortified the illusions of the masses throughout the world that he and the "democratic" rulers were genuine allies. Furthermore, Stalin greatly enhanced his political and military status in the eyes of the world. This entry into the Japanese picture also laid the basis for Stalin's future participation in the occupation policies of the "democratic" rulers in Japan.

THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE SOVIET UNION

In 1918-1920, the first imperialist intervention against the Soviet Union failed; in 1939-1945, the second also failed. The historical contradiction between the form of economy in the Soviet Union and in the capitalist world remains the fundamental historical contradiction on a world scale.

The present world situation is the prelude to the third imperialist intervention against the Soviet Union. Whether such an intervention will materialize concretely depends upon many factors. If the proletariat succeeds in shaking off the chains of opportunism, primarily Stalinism, and embarks once more on the path it took in October 1917, the ground will be cut from under the efforts of the imperialists to organize another attack on the Soviet Union. Should the proletariat remain bound to the various opportunist political forces which now shackle it, the hand of the imperialists will remain free to organize the third intervention. It is the worst illusion to imagine that because the effort of 1939-1945 ended in a debacle for imperialism, the latter has broken with the policy of destroying the Soviet Union. Imperialism has no choice in the matter. The need to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union flows from the need to save the capitalist system as a whole; it is a matter of economic and social necessity from which there is no escape for the capitalists.

The role of Stalinism remains the same as it has always been. Stalinism, by propping up the tottering capitalist system, prepared the path for the attack which unfolded in June 1941. Untold millions of toilers were massacred as the result of the Stalinist counter-revolution

which facilitated the attack on the Soviet Union. By sheer military efforts the defeat of the Soviet Union was prevented in the 1941 attack. But the toilers are still in the same old blind alley. Today Stalinism continues its treacherous policy of saving the imperialist system from the collapse which it faces, and thus continues to prepare the path for the third intervention. Stalinism is laying the grounds for a new slaughter. In no sane system of thought can Stalinism's "defense" of the Soviet Union be considered a real defense. Stalinism plays the role of the criminal physician who deliberately poisons his patient and then keeps him alive in order to fleece him. Workers are deceived by the military efforts of the Stalinist bureaucrats against the imperialist armies. The sheerly bureaucratic-military efforts are misconstrued to be a real defense of the Soviet Union. A genuine defense has as its foundation a proletarian revolutionary political line. With such a defense, Stalinism is incompatible. Only the proletariat under a genuine Marxist leadership can conduct a genuine defense of the Soviet Union, a defense based on a line of overthrowing the capitalist system and establishing an international workers' republic governed by democratically-elected workers' councils.

THE ROLE OF THE PSEUDO-ANTI-STALINISTS (TROTSKYISTS)

In all basic respects, the Trotskyists follow the line of Stalinism. This line is to pretend that the imperialists were actually divided into two camps, one fighting on the side of the Soviet Union. The Trotskyists, like the Stalinists and the imperialists, pretend that the so-called "Second World War", was a real struggle in so far as the inter-imperialists phases were concerned. There are many workers who are capable of understanding the vital antagonism that exists between the private property form of economy in the bourgeois world and the nationalized property form in the Stalin-ridden Soviet Union. It was this antagonism that forced the imperialists to work together to attempt to tear down the state which originated in the overthrow of Russian capitalism. Because of their respective internal political situations, it was impossible for a united attack to be organized, hence the collaboration under the cover of a "war." This fundamental fact has been so distorted by the opportunists and the bourgeoisie that the class conscious masses have been led to swallow hook, line and sinker the fantasy that the imperialists were engaged in an attempt to destroy one another, with Stalin as a partner of one side.

The basic and consistent role of the Trotsky leadership has been to act as a prop of Stalinism, covering this function with a lot of "critical" noise. Today, the Trotskyists are urging upon the workers the line of calling for Stalinist-dominated governments in Europe, (Stalinist-Socialist coalition regimes in France, Italy, etc.) This is a policy of strengthening Stalinism and facilitating its betraying role in a period when capitalism is over-ripe for destruction by the revolutionary toilers. It is a policy of saving the imperialist system and thus of preparing the path for the next attack on the Soviet Union. In this counter-revolutionary function, the Trotsky groups act as a wing of the Stalinist system, a bulwark of reaction.

G. Crane
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