

The American **Socialist**

Joseph Starobin on:

**Capitalism,
Socialism, and
Economic Growth**

AUGUST 1957

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*What's
Happening
In Russia?*



Behind the Civil Liberties Rulings:

The Court Decrees a Thaw

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

"You give great hope . . ."

Since picking up your magazine in a library a few months ago, I have come to look forward to every issue. You seem able to present your socialist ideas and opinions without that scetchy, arrogant tone which has so marked the socialist movement for many a decade.

I am very much interested in the widespread discussion and exchange now going on among Americans of socialist and radical opinion. Your magazine is making the best contribution to this new revival. In the spirit of this new ferment, I would like to express some opinions on your magazine which may or may not be of help.

1) Your articles on auto, steel, and other labor centers are most welcome. It is almost impossible to get a clear picture of many developments now going on in the labor movement and the contribution which socialists and radicals are making. I believe you will be doing your best job if you continue to give attention to the labor movement, and make your magazine attractive and interesting to people in labor. This has always been first base for those Americans seriously interested in building a real socialist movement.

2) I believe you should place more emphasis on the political action machinery of the labor movement. Dislike its limitations as we socialists may, this is the most direct and ready means to re-awakening the political consciousness of large numbers of American workers.

3) I believe socialists in our country have for too long placed their accent on the differences that exist between the many socialist groups. Now, many seem to be turning to the problem of how to bring them together. Although this is important, the real problem is how to get socialists to re-appraise their relationship with the whole American people. Certainly there are many factors which have contributed to the decline of socialist thought since the days of Debs, but one of the biggest is the almost complete divorcement that has occurred, particularly in the last 15 years. We cannot attack our own people, their lack of understanding of the "really important things in life," etc., and still expect to accomplish the great educational job that is needed.

Finally, in all the discussion about what form this socialist revival will take, I lean heavily towards a very loose association of people interested in propagandizing socialist ideas with an American outlook. This, I believe, would have a similar tone to the Fabians in Britain, but of course could not be patterned on them. I would welcome anyone to join in this work, except *present* members of the Communist Party. As much as I agree with your sober and non-factional analysis of present currents within the American and world Communist movements,

I cannot accept the idea of working with people who still defend and support this socialist fraud in the world.

I know this letter is too long, but I know you would want to hear from a *young* socialist worker who has been deeply stirred and encouraged by your magazine. You give great hope to that small group of socialist workers of the younger generation who are sick of talking about the old days, and who want to start anew on the long and rocky road towards a socialist America. Of all the radical and socialist magazines that I have read you seem more than any to understand our great country, its labor history, and its great possibilities. Only that there were more who were concerned not with their rigid positions and ideas, but with a great devotion for the job that lies ahead of us. If you sometimes feel that it isn't worth it, and that you're getting nowhere, please be assured that there is a great potential and need for your work.

New England Reader

How to master bureaucracy?

I have begun to get caught up on my homework, and have just read your February article on bureaucracy ["Socialism, Power Elites, and Bureaucracy," by Bert Cochran] two or three times.

It was a very stimulating article. It puts the finger on what is surely our central problem today—how to master bureaucracy, and how to assimilate the experience of the last few decades. Your summary of Weber, Pareto, Michels, *et al* seemed a bit brief, but that may be because I was bottle-fed on those birds, and haven't gotten over it. I think you may err in details, but are right in basic points.

Pareto and Mosca *are* non-historical; a more telling criticism can hardly be made

(though none of my professors ever made it). "Annotation" is just the word for the Weber vogue in the universities today. However, we have yet to dispose of Weber's thesis that bureaucracy is the emerging framework of modern society.

It is still (thus far) a fact that bureaucracy, in the sense of large-scale, specialized organization, is the apparently indispensable framework of the urban industrial world. How to control it in the popular interest? By rival bureaucracies? Wouldn't they perhaps compete till one finally subdued the other, leaving us as badly off as before? Can we put everyone to work at the lesser-skilled jobs for a few years (as part of a revision of our education system) before permitting specialization? Yet industrialization depends on specialization. My present hunch is that the conquest of scarcity is our first big goal. Once we eliminate private ownership of producer goods, greatly raise the minimum living floor, then we don't leave much for the bureaucrat to withhold from us. But we will still have job differences. Prestige is bound to be unequal. Maybe we'd better get used to that. We will eliminate one great source of inequality and exploitation, but leave the other: job and power distinctions.

A. D. Vermont

Wants more on "saints"

You deserve a great deal of credit for your exceptionally fine article on Gandhi ["Did Gandhi Have the Answer?," by Harry Braverman, June 1957]. While it would be difficult to agree in full with all the points made, the substantial charges of the inadequacy of Gandhi can hardly be refuted. It deserves to be issued as a reprint. Perhaps you will somehow find time to make an evaluation of Albert Schweitzer and other "saints" who capture the popular imagination, yet fail to meet the basic social issues of our time. Our real saints are too disrespected to be recognized.

Rev. E. K. Illinois

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What's Happening in Russia?

FOR five years after Lenin's death in 1924, the Soviet governmental structure was convulsed with ferocious in-fighting in its top staff. Only in 1928 when Stalin finally destroyed his rivals and emerged as dictator did the regime achieve some semblance of structural stability. The battle of the post-Stalin era began literally the day after the old tyrant's death in March 1953. It is now clear that with time out for truces, it has, in various forms and through different combinations, been going on for over four years. With the elimination of Beria, and now of Malenkov and Molotov, does Khrushchev step into Stalin's shoes? Is the era of "collective leadership" coming to an end?

Let us briefly recapitulate the high points of the four-year struggle to gain higher vantage ground from which to assess the meaning of the current explosion and the direction in which Soviet political and social currents are flowing.

As stated, a faction fight erupted among the top hierarchs immediately upon Stalin's death. Undoubtedly, the greed for power and place was a considerable element in the contest. We can recall that two weeks after his ascension, Malenkov was forced to resign as Secretary of the Central Committee in favor of Khrushchev. But whatever the precise purposes of the various contenders, the fight was at once caught up in the historic crisis of the regime which made it impossible to continue running the country along Stalin's previous course. The facts showed that from March to June a reform wing in which Beria figured prominently was in control, while the Stalinist die-hards were compelled to yield ground. In this four-month period sweeping reforms were promulgated along these lines:

1. *Improved living standards*: A big reduction in prices; reduction by half of the new (compulsory) State Loan; essential goods to be placed on the market at once; a program to speed up housing construction and the manufacture of consumption goods.

2. *Political liberalization*: Attack on the "leader cult" and campaign for "collective leadership"; the March 28 amnesty and subsequent release of numerous prisoners; the January frameup of the Kremlin doctors declared null and void; the third-degree methods of the secret police excoriated and strict adherence to law enjoined upon all officials.

3. *Liberalization for nationalities*: Denunciation of anti-Semitism and all racist propaganda; dismissal of a number of leading "Russifiers" in the Ukraine, Georgia and other republics accompanied by press attacks against chauvinism.

4. *Foreign policy*: Attempt to relax international tensions, which resulted in Korean truce, re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and Israel, dropping of territorial demands on Turkey.

IT was the June 16 uprising of the East German workers that threw the reform bloc into turmoil and confusion and led to Beria's isolation. It is impossible to say whether Beria actually made a bid for absolute power or whether the other chieftains were afraid he might attempt such a coup. Whatever his exact role in the four-month struggle, Beria's reputation as Stalin's butcher fixed him in the public mind as a symbol of the secret police. He was a dread figure and as boss of the ubiquitous secret police was feared by the others. At any rate, the protesta-

tions of the new Soviet legality were forgotten for the occasion and he was purged in familiar Stalinist style and dispatched to the hereafter with the usual threadbare accusations of espionage.

The second phase began with the emergence of the Malenkov-Khrushchev combination at the August meeting of the Supreme Soviet. The new Kremlin rulers outlined a halfway-house policy: no return to Stalinism in the raw, but a definite slowdown on the political loosening-up. On the economic front, they went, if anything, beyond the provisions of March-June. Malenkov pledged more consumer goods, more housing, more food, and not in the sweet bye-and-bye, but within two to three years. Khrushchev chimed in with an impressive agricultural reform to increase payments for state deliveries, reduce obligatory deliveries and taxes on collective farms, step up rural electrification and production of chemical fertilizers and farm machinery. But Malenkov's lengthy report passed over in silence the question of liberalizing the police regime, he never mentioned the March amnesty or the promised legislation to ease labor discipline or to humanize the penal code. The Berlin uprising had apparently put a fright in all of them and had effectively scotched talk of political reforms for the time being.

The program to raise food production appreciably by large-scale concessions to the collective farmers yielded little results in the next year and it became clear that living standards could be rapidly improved only by sharply downgrading investments in heavy industry. The opposition to such a course steadily mounted in the ruling circle, and Khrushchev, taking a leaf out of Stalin's factional jockeying in the early twenties, made a switch to bloc with the Stalinist faction, came up as the champion of the "Leninist policy" of the overwhelming priority of heavy industry, and forced Malenkov's resignation in February 1955. Of course, the Premier of the USSR couldn't simply resign because his policy of "consumerism" was rejected. He had to be humiliated by being made to announce his withdrawal on the grounds that he was too "inexperienced" to hold down the job. Still, it was an improvement over the Beria

trial. The same gathering that accepted Malenkov's resignation heard Molotov lay down a line that sounded like a return to Stalinist rigidity.

BUT Khrushchev proved to be a nimble and unscrupulous manipulator. The alliance with the Stalinist wing was quickly broken off. By April, the new Khrushchev-Bulganin team shouldered Molotov aside and resumed the previous "peaceful coexistence" course by uncorking a whirlwind of a peace offensive as a riposte to Washington's remilitarization of Germany. Within a matter of weeks, it had the world's chancelleries dizzy with its fast-paced diplomacy: the neutralization of Austria, an offer for the withdrawal of all occupation troops from both zones of Germany, straightening out relations with China, and last but not least, the team's fantastic pilgrimage to Belgrade-Canossa for the purpose of patching up the quarrel with Tito. By July, they were already meeting with the Allies in Geneva to signalize, amidst banquets and toasts, the international *detente*.

At home, Khrushchev decided on a new gamble in an attempt to break the agricultural log-jam through bypassing the collectives and opening up a new vast hinterland of state farms on 85 million acres of virgin land.

The Kremlin system of government by clique in a closed sound-proof chamber prevents us knowing the exact role of each individual in the fast-moving game, but it is clear now that both the foreign and domestic policies were the subject of heated acrimony and bitter feuding in the top council with Molotov and Kaganovich leading the die-hard Stalinist opposition.

The third phase opens with the Twentieth Congress in February 1956 just a year after the ouster of Malenkov, and must on all counts be considered as a major turning point of Soviet history. With all its zig-zags, backtracking and changes of leaders, liberalization had been the basic course for the three post-Stalin years, and the reforms were considerable in comparison with the frozen era of Stalin's autocracy. But they clearly ran far short of assuaging the people's deep thirst for freedom and better living. What was worse, they aggravated and gave more scope, rather than eliminated or

eased, the dangerous tensions accumulating at the base of Soviet society.

From a restricted but immediately pressing consideration of power mechanics, Khrushchev faced the necessity of dealing a crushing blow to the Stalinist die-hard faction which was waiting like a hawk to pounce on its victim the moment he was off balance. From this narrow point of view, the massive assault on Stalin's perfidies and crimes was designed to bury once and for all the possibility of a comeback of the Stalinist die-hard group. Then, as in all the previous shifts, the ruling junta sought to ingratiate itself with the people by promising lots of new reforms, a shorter work week, higher pay, bigger pensions, more lenient penal and labor codes, etc. The revelations of the Stalinist nightmare which set off a fearful chain reaction throughout the Soviet bloc and ripped the Communist parties the world over undoubtedly cowed the Stalinist die-hards. But the sought-for stabilization of the regime still eluded the grasp of Khrushchev and his coadjutors.

KHRUSHCHEV revealed the limitations of the administrator and bureaucrat in thinking that he could open the window on Stalin's charnel house while preserving the honor of Stalin's co-workers and retinue and consolidating the Stalinist structure—under a somewhat liberalized version—that the junta had inherited from its erstwhile leader. The genie that he had let out of the bottle was not to be thrust back so easily. From every side questions began to be asked. Explanations were demanded. Some of the Western Communist Parties went into convulsions. By the end of the year, the discussion reached its climactic as revolutions swept over Poland and Hungary; and with that, and the conflict in the Middle East, the shaky *detente* gave way to a new freeze in the cold war.

Again the path of limited reforms from the top had led to a revolutionary outburst from below, and again the Stalinist die-hards, reinforced by new supporters, moved in. A new fourth phase opened of Stalinist backing and filling. The revolution in Hungary was put down by brute force. Gomulka cheated out of the Kremlin a grudging compromise only by the threat of war.

Khrushchev, clearly hard-pressed, now rediscovered that "Stalin was a great Marxist" and that "we are all Stalinists," relations with Tito were poisoned again, and the Communist Party hacks of the other satellites and the West reasserted their rule by slandering the Hungarian revolution as "an imperialist plot." The complexity of the policy debate in the Kremlin councils is plumbd by the fact that concomitantly, for the first time since his dismissal, Malenkov felt strong enough to renew his attack on the new Five-Year Plan from his consumerist viewpoint. Bulganin admitted that the Plan was unrealistic and Saburov was made the scapegoat and dismissed. Pervukhin, associated with Malenkov, was appointed as the new head of the Planning Commission and a partial revision of the first year of the plan in a slightly consumerist direction was adopted. The Malenkov group in combination with the Stalinist die-hards seemed again to be in the ascendant.

But Khrushchev enjoyed great support in the party machine, and had a feather in his cap when his virgin lands program proved a big success in 1956 after flopping the year before. He quickly moved on to a new offensive when on March 30 of this year he announced his far-reaching scheme to decentralize planning and industrial management. This set off a new explosion that racked the leading staff. The new reform, if actually carried through, is anything but picayune. It contemplates the scrapping of the vertically organized industrial trusts where all decisions are made in Moscow and dividing up management responsibility within ninety-two regional economic councils to be appointed by the sixteen Union governments. Of course, Moscow is to retain the right of veto over appointments and important decisions, but the shift in management is weighty nonetheless. Furthermore, planning, which heretofore has been blueprinted down to the last individual target by Gosplan is now to be handled regionally, with Gosplan then integrating the ninety-two plans into a single comprehensive whole. Here, too, Gosplan retains over-all directive power through its hold on credit and the channeling of financial resources. But the change is enormous as industrial profits will no longer be funneled to Moscow, and



ON KHRUSHCHEV'S RIGHT: Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, who, together with former Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov lost their posts and power in top Soviet councils, shown with the victor at Lenin Memorial last April.

the regional councils, if they are permitted to exercise their prerogatives, will become actual managerial subdivisions in place of satrapies. Ironically enough, this reform, at least in its embryonic form, was also first inaugurated by Malenkov who, immediately on assuming the premiership, cut down the number of ministries from forty-five to fourteen. After his fall, the ministries re-emerged.

THE debate raged for five weeks between Khrushchev's announcement and the meeting of the Supreme Soviet on May 7, but Khrushchev carried the day with surprising ease (although he was forced to make some concessions in the case of the defense ministries). Pervukhin was thrown out, and an unknown economist replaced him as head of Gosplan. Foreign correspondents expressed amazement that Khrushchev managed so easily to push through such a large-scale breakup, or at the very least, reshuffle, of the industrial bureaucracy. Several commentators suggested that the reason was that the party machine was all behind the move as it hoped to gain increased power at the expense of the industrial bureaucratic enclaves. Isaac Deutscher concluded that Khrushchev succeeded in setting the provincial bureaucrats against the Moscow industrial hierarchs and that he was able to rest on the nation-wide revulsion against the bureaucracy: "This tide of popular hostility has half-paralyzed the leaders of the managerial groups and made it impossible for them to rally to the defense of their positions." Whatever the truth of the matter, it is now clear that the opposition was simply biding its time for the most propitious moment to oust Khrushchev and make its bid for power.

From Warsaw accounts, the story shapes up that Khrushchev's opponents succeeded in welding together a majority of the 11-member Presidium and at a hastily gathered meeting of June 17 with only seven members present launched a determined attack intending to topple him from leadership. Khrushchev refused to accept the hostile decision of the Presidium and demanded a Central Committee plenum which was finally summoned for June 22. Here it became obvious that he commanded the majority, and, according to newspaper accounts, his position had been reinforced throughout by demonstrative support of Marshal Zhukov. In the course of the week's plenum, he succeeded in turning the tables on his foes and secured the unanimous adoption (with the exception of Molotov's abstention) of the resolution which expelled Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov and Shepilov from the Central Committee and demoted Saburov and Pervukhin.

That this is no mere reshuffle of the 1955 kind is clear from the resolution's designation of the deposed leaders as an "anti-party group" and the ominous campaign now in progress linking Malenkov and Kaganovich with Stalin's frameups. Few among the Soviet public will swallow the fable that Khrushchev and his team-mates come into court with clean hands on this score. At any rate, for the present, the deposed leaders have been given minor posts and there is no flow of blood. A new fifth phase thus opens with Khrushchev and his cronies now in complete domination of the party and government apparatus and with the effective destruction of all civilian rivals.

This protracted see-sawing struggle has lighted up a vast area of Soviet

affairs and enables us to draw some meaningful conclusions concerning Soviet life and the mainsprings of its current history.

FIRST, it must be put down that the four-year attempt to reform the Soviet state has not basically affected the dictatorial apparatus that the present Kremlin dwellers inherited from Stalin. In the final analysis, it is still ruled by a dictatorial clique that manipulates the various sectors of Soviet society. A year and a half after the Twentieth Congress and the denunciation of Stalin's evil ways there is still no method of resolving differences of opinion except by cloak-and-dagger intrigues, attempted coup d'états, and purges. This is hardly surprising as the Soviet people are inexorably kept out of the arena of decision and there is no other instrumentality to settle arguments or leaders' pretensions.

Even calling the Soviet Union a one-party state is a misnomer, as the seven million party members are told nothing about these debates except to be invited to constitute the Greek chorus of enthusiastic supporters for the winning side after the decision has been made. Neither do the 130-odd members of the Central Committee constitute any sort of legitimate parliament or body of appeal as they are all hand-picked by the machine and beholden to the major chieftains for their positions. All the reforms promulgated up to this point and all the reforms that may and probably will be instituted in the months to come do not and cannot therefore transgress the confines of a non-responsible police state. The ruling hierarchy has been laboring mightily to relieve tensions in various spheres. But given its origins and history, and the multifarious vested interests upon which it must rest, it fears like the plague any initiative and independent organization from below, and will go—if it is able—to all lengths, as it did in Hungary, to stamp out opposition to itself.

Khrushchev's four-year struggle has similarity to Stalin's techniques from 1924 to 1928 in the intertwining of clique maneuvers and machine politics with basic policy questions. Khrushchev, like his predecessor, does not scruple to steal an opponent's policy

after disgracing him, to forge power blocs with people of contrary view, and break the blocs after his machine purposes have been served. Of course, the others came out of the same school, and the Malenkov-Molotov combination was probably just as unprincipled as the Khrushchev-Molotov combination of 1955. In the underworld atmosphere that prevails behind the Kremlin's walls, political debate, shut off from the people's knowledge or influence, necessarily becomes envenomed, and invites intrigue, double-dealing and caucus unscrupulousness. Nevertheless, despite the several backslidings to Stalinism, the basic line has been maintained of trying to assuage discontent by continuing with reforms. This indicates that the leaders are being carried headlong by swift currents of history which they are unable to control.

AN examination of the latest fracas should give us a good idea of the platforms of the contending sides and what the Khrushchev victory means in terms of government policy. But here is the rub: the opposition has not been permitted to state its platform to the country, and the Central Committee resolution which condemns the policies of the opposition clearly consists of an amalgam which arbitrarily ties together different personalities and garbles at least some of the facts, judging by what we know of the past positions of its main proponents. For instance, the resolution accuses the whole group of opposing "the Leninist policy of peaceful co-existence," but this is palpably false, at least in the case of Malenkov, under whose leadership this policy was militantly pursued. The resolution goes on to accuse the whole opposition of fighting industrial reorganization, the abolition of obligatory deliveries from the collective farmers' private plots and of resisting "measures . . . to do away with the consequences of the personality cult." We have no way of knowing whether these accusations are accurate for all the people involved, but they are suspect to the extent that they slur over the repeated shifts of position on the part of Presidium members. Then, inserted in the common resolution against the whole group, are a series of accusations directed solely at Molotov but which reflect on the others be-

cause of the way they are dumped into the common resolution. In a word, we are up against unscrupulous methods of in-fighting; with the old Stalinist technique modified certainly to this extent: that none of the opposition is accused of espionage on behalf of a foreign power, and no one, thus far, at any rate, is being turned over to the secret police.

Whatever the factional bias of the resolution, it does bring out forcefully that Soviet society is beset with unbearable tensions: Nationalities incensed against forced Russification, mass dissatisfactions with the abominable housing conditions and poor living standards, passive resistance of the collective farmers against government exactions, hatred of the overbearing bureaucracy, abhorrence of the strait-jacket regulations, fright of another war. Khrushchev, playing to the gallery, seeks to portray his regime as standing on the side of the angels on all these matters, whereas his opponents, "shackled by old notions and methods . . . stubbornly cling to obsolete forms and methods of work" and are trying to drag the country back to the bad old Stalinist ways.

EVEN before the current blowup, it had been clear that Khrushchev was anxious to liquidate the renewed international tension arising in the wake of Hungary and the Middle East clash and get back to the status quo ante. At the moment it is difficult to see any substantial accomplishments in this sphere in the light of Washington's obdurate policy and the absence for either side of easy areas of compromise (unless there is an unexpected early breakthrough on arms limitation). Internally, some concessions in a consumerist direction are clearly indicated with the new farm decrees and with the revised plan providing for the building of 30 percent more houses for this year. But in the absence of an international *detente*, it is more than doubtful that these will go beyond palliatives and slow improvements. Politically, Khrushchev's conduct in Czechoslovakia does not bode well for any notable liberalization.

All dictatorships have an innate tendency to centralize power in the hands of one supreme authority as that becomes the only stable method by

which differences can then be arbitrated and conflicts within the ruling circle resolved. Thus the party bureaucracy raised up Stalin to a position of unquestioned authority to ensure stability to the crisis-ridden regime and to safeguard its own favored positions in the new Soviet state. Are we witnessing something of the same sort today where the party machine, after being buffeted by four years of uncertainty, is now banking on Khrushchev to bring sweetness and light with the policeman's club? On the narrow arena of the Kremlin checker board, it may be that Khrushchev has attained a position of power somewhat analogous to that of Stalin in 1927. But we would be depriving ourselves of all possibility of understanding the dynamics of Soviet society were we to confine our analysis to the sphere of Kremlin power moves. Here, as in most cases, the play of social forces is the durable stuff of which history is made.

Stalin grasped all threads of power when the clash of peasant, worker and bureaucrat had reached a deadlock, when the people were in a state of exhaustion, and when the overwhelming backwardness and lack of trained personnel threatened to sink the country into a mire of chaos and particularism which only the ruthlessness of the mailed fist could stave off. Khrushchev comes forward as First Consul when the people of what is the world's second industrial power are astir, are thirsting for a voice in the direction of the country's affairs and find the dictatorship wasteful and unnecessary.

While the Khrushchev victory may have created for the present a greater stability in the governing councils, his regime appears unstable in the extreme on the broader social canvas. It can ameliorate difficulties but it cannot resolve the contradiction between the desires and needs of a modern country and the governing methods of an Oriental police despotism resting on a wasteful bureaucracy. There are clearly going to have to be some forcible pressures from below before the Soviet peoples can create the kind of socialist government that they want, that they need, and that they deserve. The tempo, the duration of the process, and the various forms it may entail, no one, of course, can foresee.

Industrialization of underdeveloped lands:
The question is no longer whether this will
take place, but how. Two important recent
books dealing with the subject are here
analyzed, and a viewpoint presented.

Capitalism, Socialism, and Economic Growth

by Joseph Starobin

UNDERLYING some of the biggest headlines of recent years—whether these deal with governmental chaos in Indonesia, the Suez Canal, the birth of Africa's new nation of Ghana or the monetary crisis in Brazil—is the forward surge of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples for rapid economic growth. This overdue demand for development comes at a juncture in world history which is particularly perplexing for the United States, since the “uncommitted peoples” now have an alternative to capitalist methods of economic advance in the shape of the Soviet and Chinese experience. Having come to the pinnacle of its power late in the capitalist era, and assuming the heaviest responsibility for maintaining the system everywhere—as the condition of its own existence—American capitalism bears the brunt of a double challenge. A rival society is trying to equal and outstrip American productive levels. And this has its impact on that near-majority of the human race which lives as the Russians and Chinese did only a while ago but is determined to improve its conditions rapidly. This vast and backward part of the world economy, now definitely on the move, may adopt non-capitalist paths of economic growth.

If they adopt this path, or even if they *adapt* it to any considerable degree, the strategic balance between the systems is at stake. If American capitalism cannot contribute decisively to the economic advancement of the semi-colonial peoples, this will alter the prospects of competition in a manner unfavorable to itself. Yet, to contribute effectively is no simple matter. Industrialization of the underdeveloped countries is more than a problem in “foreign economic aid”; it goes to the heart of the structural make-up of Western capitalism and involves its most fundamental drives. The struggle over opposing policies is bound to have major importance in Western political life and the impact of the colonial upheaval generates organic changes within it.

IN his Harvard address of 1954, Adlai Stevenson acknowledged that we are in the midst of a “world revolution” and an “age of transition.” “Great movements and forces, springing from deep wells,” he said, “have converged on this mid-century point, and I suspect we have

Mr. Starobin, author and lecturer, is at work on a new book dealing with, among other topics, some of the ideas presented in this article.

barely begun to comprehend what has happened, and why. . . .” Yet the facts, as well as their implications, are not as mysterious as Mr. Stevenson suggests.

The developed countries with some 15 percent of the world's population currently get about 62 percent of the world's income. Taking the poorest countries of the non-Soviet orbit as a separate category—and here I am using the figures of Dr. Gunnar Myrdal in his valuable book, “An International Economy”^{*}—these poorest peoples, with an average per capita income of less than \$100 a year in 1949, comprise some 48 percent of the population, but get only eight percent of the income. Moreover, the population in the underdeveloped countries is increasing faster than economic growth. Since pre-war times, the underdeveloped nations have gained some 30 percent more people; India alone grew in numbers by some 44 percent between 1921 and 1951. Obviously, only a systematic and rapid economic development could make this increase supportable and contribute the factors that would slow down its rate. Without economic growth, the outlook is for regression into even greater stagnation, atrophy and decay.

For while Dr. Myrdal discounts the Marxian prediction of a growing gap between rich and poor *within* the Western nations, it is interesting that he credits this increasing gap as *between* nations. He is much alarmed by the fact. He cites another authority, Prof. P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan that despite “industrial revolutions and great technical progress, the degree of inequality of distribution of income as between different nations is considerably greater today than it was a hundred or even a hundred and fifty years ago.”

All these matters have been much debated over the past decade. Eight years ago, it was Truman's “Point Four” which held the spotlight. Then Nelson Rockefeller called for action in his “Partners in Progress” report. The commission headed by Gordon Gray surveyed the whole field only to be followed by an ambitious study in the first Eisenhower Administration from Clarence B. Randall, of the Inland Steel Company. Recently, we have had still another report from Benjamin Fairless of the United States Steel Corporation. All these proposals and plans have some good points, but they miss the main ones. There is a striking gap between what they *know* should be done,

^{*} *Harper & Brothers. See also “What The Colonial Peoples Want,” American Socialist, March 1955.*

and what they are able to propose given the hard realities of how capitalism works. In this field, as in so many others, "free enterprise" simply does not live up to its claims as the indispensable motive force of economic development.

The basic characteristics of American foreign investment were given in a special report* of the Department of Commerce based on the 1950 Census; the August 1956 *Survey of Current Business* brings these figures up to date, and while it shows a sharp rise in the amount of foreign investment, there is little change in its character.

DIRECT, private investment (that is, in manufacturing and extractive operations abroad) had reached \$11.8 billions by 1950 and risen to \$19.2 billions at the end of 1955. But about 80 percent continues to be concentrated in the Western hemisphere, mainly Canada and the Caribbean countries; the balance is mostly in Western Europe, with a rise since the war in the Middle East. Half of the investment growth in the 1943-1950 period was accounted for by petroleum, and two-fifths by manufacturing facilities. Thus, the main flow of dollars has been to Canada and some Latin American countries, as well as selected areas of the Middle East where populations are relatively small compared with the countries of Asia. Britain, which had one-third of the whole European investment in 1943, took one-half of it seven years later.

While there has been a rise in the proportion of investment which goes for manufacturing, the great bulk of it remains in the extraction of raw materials, and in selected agricultural goods useful to the American home market. The degree to which American overseas investment serves the particular needs of given industries and markets at home—and not necessarily the peoples of the countries where the dollars are invested—can be seen from the striking fact that *one quarter* of all American imports from abroad come from companies established by American investment abroad. And the high profits which are earned tend to be ploughed back into the same concerns, partly to avoid taxation at home, partly because profitability in existing fields is so high. Thus, the tendency of American investment is *not to flow where capital is most needed*. This investment is not as diversified as the economic growth of other peoples requires. And it hardly touches the largest populations which are pressing for rapid development; it tends to go where a definite degree of development already exists, and can be made the base for rapid profits.

The very boom within the United States exercises a magnetic distortion, a sort of tropism, upon the American capital exporter which makes it illusory for the colonial peoples to expect very much assistance from him, all other considerations aside. For the rate of profit, as August Maffry, vice-president of the Irving Trust Company pointed out in February 1950, is great enough at home so that even if some overseas investments are a bit more profitable, the differential does not compensate for the risks involved. "Nothing will remove the present chief deterrent to foreign investment" Maffry said, "which is

* *US Department of Commerce, special supplement to the Survey of Current Business, 1953.*

the high return on domestic investment, free of the peculiar risks of foreign investment."

Despite the sharp rise in the money value and amount of American overseas investments since the war, the total sum is only a drop in the bucket compared with the huge amounts of capital which have been available and have found investment opportunities within the expanded American domestic market. The contradictory way in which American internal expansion operates is also seen



in the strong flow *from overseas* to the booming American market. Although capital is desperately needed by the colonial world, and although it is by comparison far less needed within the American market, overseas investors have shipped in such large amounts that by the end of 1955, \$29.6 billions were invested in American stocks and assets—on foreign account. This was, in fact, a slightly larger figure than the total of American capital invested abroad. Thus, the colonial peoples cannot expect any great quantities of capital, either from the investors of other capitalist countries or from the savings of their own ruling classes: capital is more attracted to the American market than it is to development abroad. The disproportion between the American economy and the low levels of the underdeveloped world which private investment is supposed to overcome is exactly what tends to perpetuate this state of affairs.

IF private investment hasn't done the job, despite all the inducements and the ten-year boom so favorable to itself, neither has the United States government. The Committee for Economic Development, a leading agency of the more farsighted American businessmen, reported in April 1957 that of the \$57 billion spent in loans and grants between 1945 and mid-1956, \$18 billion went for military aid, and of the balance of "economic aid" *no less than two-thirds went to Western Europe. Less than one-fifth of the total, says the CED, went to the underdeveloped countries.* Seven of these were points of major military interest such as Taiwan, Greece, Indo-China, South Korea, the Philippines, and Turkey. It could be shown of course that American governmental grants are not usually of a developmental character anyway; but it is important to keep in mind that the sums have been pitifully small. "All the remaining underdeveloped peoples received \$3.3 billions, or about one eighteenth of the

total aid, during the eleven years," says the CED.

This sketchy canvass of the problem will serve as a background to the discussion of two recent books, both from American academic circles, written about the same time, but on the basis of very different viewpoints. The first comes from Max F. Millikan and Walter W. Rostow, professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and it is entitled "A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy."* It is a plea for a fresh start in assisting economic development abroad, and comes out of a study group organized in 1954 by C. D. Jackson, formerly special assistant to President Eisenhower; it is known to have gained the ear of the National Security Council and its influence is being felt in the attempt of the "modern Republicans" to grapple with their problem. The second book is written by Paul A. Baran, professor of economics at Leland Stanford University. It is "The Political Economy of Growth."** This book is not likely to gain much attention in the circles to whom Millikan and Rostow speak. Yet its impact on American thought may be profound and lasting, nonetheless.

THE MIT professors offer a program of some \$2.5 to \$3 billion for economic development of a more fundamental kind than American aid programs have attempted until now: projects that would be part of a comprehensive developmental plan for major parts of the world. Their thesis is that once a backward country begins to make headway with the aid of a certain amount of "seed corn" in the form of grants or very long-term loans, the rate of accumulation reaches a certain "take off" point after which economic growth can be more rapid. They calculate that at the level of ten to twenty percent of the savings from growth, a point is reached where loans become feasible, and development tends to become diversified and cumulative.

In the MIT plan, the American fund would be appropriated for a long-term period, to avoid having to pass the Congressional gauntlet each year; it would be handled by a new agency under the present International Bank. Millikan and Rostow even toy with the idea of inviting the Russians to take part in extending capital assistance through the agency proposed, provided the Soviet Union agrees to the "criteria" which the West considers essential; but the authors indicate in advance (and with obvious relief) that they doubt any Soviet acceptance. Their main concern is to persuade American ruling circles, and especially Congress, that a couple of billions a year, on top of the present flow of private investment, ought to be made available. And part of their plan is to spend fifteen to twenty-five percent of this sum in the form of agricultural goods from the American surplus crops; this is to help reduce the surplus and to tide the underdeveloped peoples over the transition from agrarian scarcity to the higher levels which industrialization should provide.

What is striking in the Millikan-Rostow approach is their complete sophistication which makes incongruous the meagerness of what they offer. They understand that

nothing less than the world balance of power is at stake. The ten-year emphasis on military pacts and cold war calculations has been self-defeating. They realize that the United States "has come to be regarded in the uncommitted areas of the world as a power at best neurotic and at worst aggressive . . . no longer identified, as once we were with the aspirations of people for social and economic improvement. . . ." They emphasize that the underdeveloped peoples have entered inexorably into revolutionary change. They know that the Western-educated ruling groups in the colonial areas are out of touch with the "grass roots" of their own peoples. Millikan and Rostow call for the mobilization of the youth, for self-help by the underdeveloped peoples in order to accomplish drastic changes and get tangible results quickly. They even warn that too much horror should not be expressed because strong, centralized governments will be needed to foster development, and that in most places this will proceed under the banner of socialist objectives.

Yet their proposal grows more pale as they elaborate it. The more they explore their "criteria" for investment, in which the emphasis on "international division of labor" becomes a fine phrase for paying attention to the raw materials requirements of the United States, and with advice to the underdeveloped peoples to use "foreign management" as much as possible—of course under conditions of non-interference—the more the reader is impressed with the limitations of even such a relatively *avantgarde* proposal. The Millikan-Rostow plan is clearly the work of men whom Dr. Baran calls the "agnostic apologists" for the present society. They comprehend what ails the system. But their critique remains marginal. They do not face up to the ailment as a whole.

BY contrast, Dr. Baran has written a much different, and very ambitious book. His concept of the historical process is Marxian. The crisis of the underdeveloped countries is, in his view, related to the problem of capitalism in the West. No hesitant and inhibited proposals, however useful, will solve the crisis unless it is understood to be part of the irrationality of the social relations that have their roots in historical development. As he puts it, "economic development has always been propelled by classes and groups interested in a new economic and social order, has always been opposed and obstructed by those interested in the preservation of the status quo, rooted in and deriving innumerable benefits and habits of thought from the existing fabric of society, the prevailing *mores*, customs and institutions. It has always been marked by more or less violent clashes, has proceeded by starts and spurts, suffered setbacks and gained new terrain—it has never been a smooth, harmonious process unfolding placidly over time and place. . . ."

This central concept is unraveled polemically, and defended on many fronts. How can economic growth be started? In his view, "where far-reaching structural changes in the economy are required if the economic development of a country is to shift into high gear and is to outstrip the growth of population, where technological indivisibilities render growth dependent on large investments and long-range planning, where tradition-bound

* Harper & Brothers, New York, 1957, \$2.75.

** Monthly Review Press, New York, 1957, \$5.

patterns of thought and work obstruct the introduction of new methods and means of production—then only a sweeping reorganization of society, only an all-out mobilization of all its creative potentialities can move the economy off dead-center.”

What then is the relationship between the crisis of Western capitalism and the backwardness of the semi-colonial peoples? The answer involves some grasp of how



capitalism works, and specifically, how it generates the surplus within it. After the introductory passages in which the problem is stated generally, Baran devotes two major chapters to “standstill and movement under capitalism.” In these he elaborates the concept of an economic surplus, a surplus which has grown enormously as the society has passed from the stage of competitive capitalism to its monopolistic and oligopolistic stages. But the surplus at the disposal of the society does not automatically go into investment for the benefit of the society as a whole. The surplus tends to become society’s millstone. The very productive powers of capital have to be frustrated and inhibited so that the present way of using capital profitably can be continued. This finds expression in distinct features of contemporary capitalism: the under-utilization of productive capacity, the under-employment of skills, the waste represented by economic crisis, the fantastic proliferation of unproductive labor, and finally, the irrationality of war preparations. The latter feature becomes most fantastic as the society is prepared for wars which have become much more difficult to fight.

What we have then is a tendency for capital to be accumulated in surplus in the advanced capitalist countries, where in order for the process to continue, much of it has to be squandered, while the under-developed countries are hungry for precisely this capital. Dr. Baran’s analysis of the “roots of backwardness” and the “mor-

phology of backwardness” show how this contradictory state of affairs comes about, and is maintained, and cannot be easily changed, no matter how well-meaning the programs, without a drastic breach in imperialist relations and drastic measures of social transformation.

THIS lays the basis for his discussion of the “forced march” toward socialism. In Dr. Baran’s estimate, this is the only way the underdeveloped peoples can make an advance as swift as their plight requires. They cannot imitate the historical evolution of the West, for their own background is profoundly different and so much of the advance in the West was made possible by its exploitation of the colonial world. Their problem is to mobilize, to husband, to expand their economic surplus. In his view, this requires a simultaneous development of cooperative agriculture and a harmoniously proportioned investment in heavy and light industry. Collectivization of agriculture becomes the only way to mobilize the existing surplus in a predominantly agrarian society, as well as the technique whereby the many-sided backwardness of a semi-feudal society can be overcome. Heavy-industry growth is the only way to lay the basis for higher levels of consumption as well as to give agriculture the means whereby it can become more productive and thus help generate the surplus which society needs.

The final passage is a peroration on the inner problems of socialist development. Dr. Baran envisages a tenacious struggle with the habits of acquisitive and self-centered man, product of many centuries. In his view, however, this is the only way forward. It is a broad-beamed argument. Sometimes the level of the analysis is too high. Dr. Baran meets his contemporaries in the field of economic theory on their own ground, which the lay reader may find rather rarefied. Sometimes the digressions become difficult to follow, although it is enjoyable to read an author who can make effective use of the best his opponents have to offer in order to score his triumph over them. The writing is full-chested, sometimes awkward, but hard-headed and hard-hitting, and spiced with humanity and humor. Dr. Baran has brought to the American scene the sweep of Continental scholarship, derived from German, Russian and British sources. And while he spares neither himself, nor his opponents, nor often his readers either, it is a book that instructs, that stimulates argument and study. Coming at a moment when the American Left wanders in a desert so largely of its own making, since the fundamentals of present-day society and especially American capitalism have not been studied, this book should have an important impact.

Two major problems could have, I think, been more rigorously treated or at least more clearly defined. The first is Dr. Baran’s judgment of Soviet development. In the preface to his work, written as late as last December, he argues that “socialism cannot fairly be charged with the misdeeds of Stalin and his puppets—it is the *political system* (the italics are his) that evolved from the drive to develop at breakneck speed a backward country threatened by foreign aggression and in the face of internal resistance.” Putting the matter in another way, he argues that the social system which arises in the backward

and underdeveloped countries "has a powerful tendency to become a backward and underdeveloped socialism," all of which, however, "casts no reflection on the fundamental rationality, desirability and potentialities of a socialist transformation in the West. Indeed, it accentuates its desperate urgency."

IN the main body of his vital chapter on "The Steep Ascent," however, Baran discusses the decisive relation between collectivization and industrialization. He points out that Engels had viewed this problem in Europe as one of demonstrating to the small landholder the superiority of large-scale production, of making the "peasant understand that this is in their own interest, and that this is the sole means of their salvation." In the opinion of the co-worker of Marx, this could not be done "forcibly but by the dint of example and the proffer of social assistance for this purpose." Lenin also thought in terms of a voluntary changeover.

But in the Russian experience, neither Engels nor Lenin were followed. As Dr. Baran says, "the voluntary principle was in fact flouted," and "compulsion and terror were decisive." But was this, as he claims, "the only possible approach"? Does he not have to make a correlation between forcible methods of transforming agriculture which on the one hand he considers justifiable by their economic results and the "political system of Stalin and his puppets" which in another part of the book he deplores? Is the backwardness of Russian socialism simply the consequence of its authoritarian traditions, or did not the way in which agriculture was handled help to perpetuate the "political system" and have its harmful economic as well as political and social consequences? And the harsh political system continues to exist even after the forces which brought it into being have receded and created the material foundations on the basis of which it can be ended.

What then is the present dynamic of Soviet development? How is what Dr. Baran calls a "backward and underdeveloped socialism" to be altered? It is necessary to explore how the new political superstructure can arise on the basis of the material results of a successful industrialization. For the problem of changing a "political system" is much more than merely overcoming "error." These are some of the matters on which I find Dr. Baran's analysis neither sufficiently rigorous nor ample.

The second problem refers to the rather static portrait which is drawn of the dilemma of contemporary capitalist society. It is well to analyze how in turning "full employment" to their own uses, the ruling circles are riding a tiger, and in staving off crisis are risking inflation; it is well to explain that war preparations have the character of a narcotic, not a cure. By relying on war preparations for a war which they know and admit they dare not fight, the ruling circles develop an excruciating tension for themselves, their system, and for all of us who live in it. What is the dynamic of this tension? Are there no forces which can intervene to undo its inner drives, to make it more tolerable or alter it profoundly?

It is not enough to hold out a socialist alternative. For such an alternative, and the appeal to it, becomes rather

abstract and static if the position is taken that the consequences of the tensions of an irrational society *cannot be affected or changed short of a total change, and if the prospects for a total change tend to be defeated by the very nature of the devices which capitalism now has for evading its inner difficulties.* For what we are living in today is a phase in a prolonged political crisis, which is agonizing without any prospect of ending for the very reason that capitalism is able to postpone and evade some of the major consequences of its own irrationality.

THERE is a fleeting paragraph in an early part of the book in which Dr. Baran suggests some answers, without exploring them. He points out that in times of war or great emergency, "objective needs become recognized as fully ascertainable and are assigned a significance vastly superior to that of individual preferences. . . ." But, he continues, "as soon as the emergency passes, and further admission of the existence and identifiability of objective reason threatens to become a source of dangerous social criticism, bourgeois thought hastily retreats from whatever advanced positions it may have temporarily reached, and lapses once more into its customary state of agnosticism."


Yet suppose our present political crisis is prolonged and becomes more complex, amounting to an emergency? Will not a certain degree of "objective reason" force its way through the barriers of society so that rational solutions can pervade an increasing part of it, and are not easily banished? Prolonged competition between American society and even so backward a socialism as the Russian variety might have such an effect. "Objective reason" in the evolution of Western capitalism would break out at every point, and in fact come from all the social forces at work.

I am speaking of the problems of the transition from an irrational to a more rational order. This is the terrain which neither Dr. Baran's powerful indictment of capitalism nor his faith in a socialist alternative helps us to explore. Yet it is vital terrain. For the appeal of socialism in the West is today dependent more on the methods of the transition than on the analysis of how irrational capitalism is. It is the problem of transition that has to be argued and unfolded. The wrenching of the social forces out of their historical orbits in a more rational direction may depend not only on the consciousness and power of the labor and socialist movements, but a valuable ally may be found in "objective reason" which penetrates more and more the whole of society, and is facilitated by the new world juncture of obligatory competition between two societies. Objectively reasonable proposals in all domains of the crisis are likely to come from a wide variety of circles, including those who are ideologically committed to capitalism, but who are compelled by the realities to treat its ailments rationally. I should have wished Dr. Baran to explore this terrain. Until that is done, the argument has not been persuasively completed.

In a coming issue of the *American Socialist*, a further review of Prof. Baran's book will appear discussing some of the problems raised from another point of view.

What's behind the Supreme Court move to put limits on the witch-hunt? A decision made back in the days of the Army-McCarthy fight comes to fruition.

The Court Decreases A Thaw



by Harry Braverman

WHAT has been most surprising in recent months is not the weakening of the witch-hunt—which has been slowing down for some time—but the quarter from which the most telling blows against it have been struck.

The Supreme Court was shaped early in the game by John Marshall as a powerful defender of the prerogatives of wealth and privilege. When he died and Andrew Jackson was able to revamp the Court under Roger Brooke Taney, it soon became the prime bulwark of slavery, and made its name infamous in the Dred Scott decision. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, as farm revolt rose in a tide of Grangerism, Greenbackism and Populism, the Court stood four-square behind the industrial and financial interests; it stood the same way against the growing demands of labor for restraints on the sweatshop system. In the New Deal era, as many recall, the Court was the last-ditch defender of unregulated capitalism.

Particularly in the field of civil liberties, the Court has in the past displayed a most reactionary outlook. The "due process" clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments were used repeatedly to invalidate carloads of federal and state social legislation on the far-fetched ground that keeping bakers from short-weighting housewives, or factory owners from sweating little children twelve hours a day, was "depriving" them of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." These same clauses have been invoked only three times in the Court's long history in order to declare unconstitutional laws which made the holding or dissemination of opinions a crime.

Yet, in a devastating day's work on June 17, the Court handed down opinions which may mark the changing of the tide of civil liberties in our time. The California Smith Act decision, the Watkins and Sweezy decisions, and the Jencks decision which preceded them by a few weeks, have not set new standards of individual liberty in this country, but they have gone part of the way in restoring some of the old ones.

SINCE 1948, 89 Communist leaders have been convicted under the Smith Act of advocating the "overthrow" of the government "by force and violence," and another 38 cases are still pending. The first case was appealed to the Supreme Court which held, 6-2, with the then Chief Justice Vinson writing the majority opinion and with Justices Black and Douglas dissenting, that the convictions were valid both as to law and the conduct of the trial. From that time until the present case, the Court refused to hear appeals from Smith Act convictions.

For the main technical ground on which the conviction of 14 West Coast Communists was set aside (with five of them getting an acquittal and the other nine an order for a new trial), the Supreme Court is indebted to the California trial judge, who overrode both the defense and the prosecution in refusing to repeat Judge Medina's mumbo-jumbo charge to the jury in the first Communist Smith Act case. Instead of telling the jury that "incitation to action, now or in the future," is required for proof of guilt, the judge insisted on coming out into the open and charging the jury that advocacy of the abstract doctrine of "overthrow of the government" is in itself a crime under the Smith Act—thus merely saying what everyone already knew: that the Act punishes people for their opinions. This, plus a strict interpretation of the meaning of the word "organize" were the grounds for the Court's first Smith Act reversal.

In the Watkins case, a union organizer had refused to answer a Congressional committee's questions about former associates charged with being Communists, saying that he couldn't see where the questions were pertinent to any legislative purpose. The Court backed his stand, and also backed *Monthly Review* editor Paul Sweezy's refusal to answer questions about his lectures when quizzed by a state Attorney General.

HISTORICALLY, the Supreme Court has always been a political body, making its rulings primarily on a policy basis. The very same laws and Constitutional wordings have been interpreted in precisely opposite senses by the very same judges as the requirements of government and political power have veered. In any realistic view,

as many historians of the Court have pointed out, it is a policy branch of our government which has often raised itself above the other two branches, rather than the pure wielder of legal litmus paper of conventional pretense.

How the lawyers work out the rights and wrongs of technical points of legal pettifoggery is usually a mystery, of interest mainly to specialists attracted by the formal side of the law. Mr. Dooley tells us that a law which looks like a stone wall to the ordinary person is a triumphal arch for a lawyer. Sweeping decisions that changed the course of the nation have been hinged upon obscure technicalities that could easily have been adjudicated either way by a lawyer possessing the flexible verbal proficiency that is the adornment of his trade. It is for this reason that the recent Supreme Court rulings are everywhere taken to mean, not that a trial judge in California or a Congressman in Chicago slipped up on the right combination of words, but that a major policy shift is being accomplished, with the Supreme Court as its instrumentality.

The Supreme Court is implementing a policy which dates back three years, to the time when our dominant political-corporate combination was involved in a fight with the late Senator McCarthy, who, with his pirate-cohorts, was using the anti-Communist cry in his threatening drive for power. He had smeared the Democratic Party as a party of "treason" and had let the brush trail carelessly but unmistakably over the Republican Party as well. A host of government agencies were in his direct grip or under the sway of his terror. He had the Army on the ropes, and the State Department in tow. In other words, the anti-Red hysteria had let loose a buccaneer mob of calculating adventurers whom no one seemed ready or able to face and fight.

What spelled the doom of the McCarthyite challenge was that the orthodox conservative financial and industrial centers of real power could not see the merit in such measures of extreme desperation. It is true that the world challenge of Communism and colonial revolution had them—and still has them—badly alarmed. But at home, opposition to their basic policies had just about disappeared, the economy was running along confidently, the labor movement appeared tame, radicalism in the population at large was nearly extinct. Given such broad-based stability, hysterical measures and fascist-like adventures appeared to them unnecessary and likely to endanger the balance of a structure which needed no such extreme protections. Nor was there the kind of social discontent that required the raising of bugaboos as a lightning rod.

WHILE the general outlines of the security program and the basic measures of thought-control seemed warranted to our ruling oligarchy at that time, and still do today, they determined to bring under control a witch-hunt which had gotten out of hand, was breeding a dangerous stultification in intellectual and scientific circles, was making ever more difficult the cool discussion of foreign-policy alternatives (and the breaking of the H-bomb monopoly by the Russians had made such cool discussion imperative), and had made the United States the laughing stock of the world. The decision was made to stop McCarthy, and to put limits on the witch-hunt be-

fore it got completely out of control in an unnecessary (from the big-capitalist point of view) and riotous extravaganza. The Senate undertook the job of curbing McCarthy, and, after much cowardly hesitation finally sent the signal abroad in the form of a censure veto. And the job of restricting the witch-hunt within agreed-upon bounds was given over to the courts, which have made a series of decisions curbing the worst excesses, capped now by the Supreme Court's June 17 rulings.

That the present decisions reflect the policy-viewpoint of the central corporate interests around which our political structure revolves is hardly to be doubted. A number of periodicals have seen fit to remind us, for instance, that Chief Justice Warren "keeps in social and political touch" with the ruling chieftains of the Republican Party. But even apart from any such indirect indications, there is the open fact that the bulk of the authoritative organs of capitalist opinion, led by the *N.Y. Times*, gave nearly unreserved endorsement to the rulings. Especially noteworthy was the opinion of *Business Week* (June 29):

Nor does the implication in Clark's dissent in the Yates [California Smith Act] case seem justified. Here, he seems to be saying that the majority view renders us more vulnerable to domestic Communists. Taking off from the Clark opinion, one newspaper headlined its editorial on the decision, "Communists, Come and Get us."

In actual fact it is events, not argument, that make or unmake Communists. The Depression, the period of Soviet-American amity, the Russian claim to anti-fascist leadership, to peace leadership, to humanitarianism—before these ended or were exposed as egregious sham they fertilized the ground for Communist recruiting. Prosperity, the Nazi-Soviet pact, manifest Russian imperialism shook people off the Red Express as no pleas or polemics ever could. It is history, much more than legislation, that has decimated the American Communist Party. . . .

. . . Our espionage and treason laws seem to be effective, our citizenry more sophisticated; a recrudescence of Communist strength will not flow from the Court's action.

The growth in political sophistication in the ruling class stands out clearly in such sentiments as the above. While big business may not have become more liberal in its purposes, it has certainly learned a bit of wisdom and objectivity in its political reasoning. At any rate, when so conservative and highly placed an organ of capitalist opinion not only goes along with the Supreme Court rulings but explains them with such cogent sociology, it is clear that the Court has put into law the dominant sentiment of that class.

THE fact that it was the Supreme Court which, after years of acquiescence and hesitation, took the first big step in putting limits on the Inquisition speaks not so much well of the Court as ill of the other two branches of government. The FBI is, after all, a bureau of a government department under the direct jurisdiction of the



WHEN COURT WAS AT LOWEST EBB: Tom Clark being sworn in as Associate Justice by Chief Justice Vinson in 1949. Truman, looking on, told assembled guests: "We have had a great Attorney General for the past four years and will have a great Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from now on."

President; yet it was the Supreme Court which had to step in and tell the political police in the Jencks case that it must obey at least a few rules in its conduct. Congress has a lot of liberals sitting in its chambers, yet almost all of them raised their hands when the Congressional witch-hunt committees came around demanding money or contempt citations. The Court was forced to find a way to rule that the Watkins hearing served no clear legislative purpose, despite the fact that Congress was always willing to say, with unwonted unanimity, that anything the House Un-American committee did served Congressional needs and purposes.

We were so far gone in the madness that neither the legislative nor the executive branches possessed any longer the independent resources for a reversal of course. If Congressional liberals some day have occasion to lament this increased centralization of power in the Supreme Court, as well they may, they will have only their own cowardice to thank for it, as it was the capitulation of all other organs of government to the witch-hunters that made it possible for the Court to step in and flex its muscles, albeit liberalistically.

Nor, in the contest for laurels between Republican and Democrat, does the self-styled party of "liberalism and the common man" show up well. Two of the old New Deal appointees, Douglas and Black, it is true, are the core of a new Court majority on civil liberties questions. But the record of the Truman-appointed quartet, which dominated the Court at the peak of the witch-hunt and two of whom remain as the Court's solid reactionary nucleus, is appalling. In particular Tom Clark, a cop-mentality elevated to the highest bench reportedly at Chief Justice Vinson's insistence because he wanted someone on the Court who knew less law than he did, remains as a monument to what the Democratic Party has become in recent years.

Does all this mean that the witch-hunt is over? Attorney General Louis C. Wyman of New Hampshire, a bush-league McCarthy, has cried out that the Supreme Court rulings "set the U.S. back 25 years." Justice Department officials are wailing that Smith Act convictions will be

very hard to obtain. Before Congressional committees, witnesses have already started responding to questions by leaning back in their seats and inquiring: "Now, just why did you want to know?" And yet, much as we would like to start setting off firecrackers in celebration, the likelihood is that when the smoke and confusion clear away we'll still have a limited witch-hunt with us.

Twisted standards of justice, thought-control attitudes, and hate-all-radicals thinking have dug their way very deeply into our national life, and have left a marked residue. Even a return to a Hardingesque "normalcy" would probably leave us with civil liberties standards lower than any other time of this century, unless and until upheavals in the social groundwork rebuild a strong libertarian tradition. Besides, there is as yet no indication that the courts and the business class have in mind anything more than limiting the witch-hunt within stricter bounds—and that's a far cry from ending it.

THE small segment of radical opinion that continues to operate in America is quite naturally preoccupied with belittling the claims of orthodox schools of thought that capitalism has a permanent future here. Because of that, and because of a heavily ultra-leftist tradition that has plagued American radicalism for much of its history, there is a general tendency among socialists of most schools to underrate the very real resources and stabilities of American capitalism.

It is true that we live in an era of the general decline and even collapse of world capitalism. But it is often hard to draw guidance in particulars from an overall schema, accurate though it may be. The fact is that, due mainly to the phenomenal boom in the economy, American capitalism is enjoying an amazingly broad-based stability, and while we all have our ideas as to the future, none of us really knows just how long this will go on.

The Supreme Court rulings ought to be another lesson to the Left to stay away from fevered barricades-rhetoric and hasty conclusions-by-analogy with other lands and other times. Three years ago there were many who saw fascism practically in the saddle, and brushed aside warnings from this magazine that the manifest social stability made such a conclusion unwarrantable. True, the dictatorial trend was very disturbing, and it was hard not to exaggerate its implications at times. But there is a great merit in precision and accuracy even in times of stress, as the boy who cried wolf too often discovered to his dismay.

Now that an important turn has come in the other direction, some of the same kind of mythomania has been cropping up again. From some quarters on the Left we hear that it was "mass pressure" which caused the policy change. We know of no mass movements sufficient to explain the turn, and we don't think anyone can produce the evidence to back up that claim. Rather, as we have tried to explain, this has been a coldly reasoned upper-class decision, and while it was naturally made in the light of all sorts of national and international pressures, real large-scale civil liberties movements among the American people did not figure in the reckoning. In this case as in all others, it is better to keep our feet on the ground and know precisely where we are at, rather than spin myths that will boomerang later.

The growth of science has encouraged the spread of philosophic materialism. But rival outlooks in the form of organized religion and academic positivism contend that the materialist view is unproven.

Science, Truth, and Religion

by Hans Freistadt

I

IN an earlier article,¹ I have tried to summarize the basic methodology common to all sciences. The central element of the scientific method turned out to be the *theory*. To deserve the title of theory, an explanation had to pass the rigorous *internal* test of logical consistency and elegance, and the *external* test of agreement with observed facts; it must have predictive value. I suggested that all genuine knowledge was theoretical.

This raises the question: Is a scientific theory true? We shall interpret this question to mean: Do the elements that constitute a theory really exist? Are there really atoms, classes (in the sense of Marx), forces, thyroid hormones, micro-organisms, etc., or are these but figments in the imagination of scientists?

Perhaps we should start with the simpler question: Do tables and chairs really exist? Contrary to what some readers may feel, asking this question is not *prima facie* evidence of lunacy. For all that we have of the table is the impression of seeing it, of touching it, if we like, of driving a nail into it or sawing it in two. All this does not formally prove that the table exists. Alternative explanations are possible: We might, for instance, be having a very long and consistent dream; or our observation of the table might be a mental phenomenon in God's mind. Now, I myself believe that the table I see is really there. I cannot prove it, but the real existence of the table is, in my opinion, by far the most reasonable explanation of my ability to see and touch it. If the table exists, then I can see and touch it. But note that if I am dreaming about a table, then I can also sometimes see and touch it; like-

1 "What is Science?," American Socialist, April, 1957.

Dr. Freistadt, who teaches physics at Newark College of Engineering, writes regularly for the American Socialist on scientific topics.

wise if the table and I exist only in the mind of God. Here we meet the one-way street of logic: From my sensations about the table, I cannot prove its existence, although the assumption that the table exists predicts correctly the outcome of many observations, both past and future.

THE statement: "The table that I see in front of me really is there" is thus a *theory*, albeit a very good one. I would prefer not to call it a "fact," for the word "fact" is of dubious meaning. It really conveys an element of absolute certainty which is best reserved for undisputed recorded events. I accept the theory that the table is really there, not because I am *certain* that it is so, but because I consider it eminently reasonable to believe it. This is simply a short way of saying that in my evaluation of probabilities, there is an overwhelming probability that the table really is there. Now, the same type of reasoning applies to concepts more abstract than a table. For instance, atoms or social classes exist in the same sense in which a table exists. They are elements of the most reasonable theories which explain all observations.

Some philosophers have tried to distinguish between things (such as tables) that could be verified directly with one or more of our senses, and more abstract constructions, such as atoms or classes. According to this point of view, the existence of a table is a "fact," while the existence of atoms and classes is a theory; likewise once we were able to see micro-organisms, their existence ceased to be a theory and became a "fact." I do not think that such a distinction is very profound. Admittedly, no one has ever seen an individual atom, but those of us who have studied physics and chemistry have seen (with the naked eye) measuring instruments behave exactly as predicted by the theory that there are atoms. Most of us find the atomic theory quite reasonable, and are not at all disturbed by the fact that there is an intervening chain (not needed in the case of the table) between the theory (atoms) and what we see (the pointer on a dial). By seeing the pointer on the dial, we essentially "see" the atoms, i.e., we have optical sensations which we interpret in terms of what the atoms do, just as we interpret other optical sensations by saying there is a table. Seeing micro-organisms in a microscope does not make their existence a fact. It merely provides further, stronger and more direct evidence in support of a theory.

II

AT this point, some will object as follows: "Why do you insist in believing that there *really* is a table, and that there *really* are atoms? What good does it do? You know that you cannot disprove those who assert that all our observations are really mental phenomena in God's mind, or that you are engaged in a rather long dream. There is, however, a certain amount of *positive* knowledge, about which we can all agree, because we can verify it directly. We can all agree that we see the table, or that the pointer does stop at an expected place on the dial. You should not say: 'There is a table,' or 'There are atoms,' because these statements cannot be verified directly. Tables and atoms are elements of successful theories, but whether

they really exist is a moot question, which belongs to the realm of speculation rather than to science. Only the predictions from the theory constitute positive, verifiable knowledge. The theory itself, formally, is only an aid in thinking and a tool in predicting. Granted that we cannot predict without theory, that does not tell us whether the content of the theory is reality or fancy. The latter, in fact, is scientifically a meaningless question. Let us not quarrel about it, because practically all scientists (except in 'sensitive' fields such as the social sciences) use the same theories, regardless of their fundamental philosophical or religious views about the nature of reality. By stressing positive, verifiable knowledge, we have established an international community of scholars, who speak a common language as soon as they leave behind the shifty ground of metaphysical speculation."

This point of view is called *positivism*. One of its tenets is trivially obvious: Some statements are directly verifiable, others are not. The statement: "The table (or the atom) really exists" is not. It is also true that it is very pleasant to find some common ground of discussion with a Catholic or religious fundamentalist physicist. But one need not build a philosophy of science out of this. Positivism has served one useful purpose. It has stressed that a scientific theory must have some relation to observation. Statements such as: "Liberty herself fought with the fighters of the French Revolution," or, "Human destiny is controlled by the stars [in the sense of astrology]" are poetic or speculative figures of speech. One might even argue that they give us a certain esthetic insight into the world, and thus supplement the picture of reality given to us by science. But they are certainly not science.

Now many positivists assert that statements about the reality of tables and atoms likewise belong to the realm of poetry. We must, they admit, assume the concept of atom to explain the laws of chemistry. But why, positivists ask, should we assume the *reality* of the atom and of the world? To what verifiable consequences does such an assumption lead? That is the principal quarrel between positivism and consistent materialism.

III

ONE point will bring out the chief weakness of positivism: Science should explain, not only the laws of chemistry or the reasons for depressions, but it should explain why there can be science at all. Surely, the primary requirement for the success of science is that observations should show some detectable regularity. That such regularity exists is obvious even to small children: The sun rises in the morning, glasses dropped on the floor break, etc. Those engaged in scientific pursuits become so impressed with the regularity of observations that whenever some phenomena appear to be erratic, the obvious and first reaction of a scientist will be: There is some relevant variable factor on which I have not yet laid my hands. We have become so accustomed to this regularity that we rarely think of it. But we cannot ever be *certain* that this regularity will continue; perhaps the next glass I drop will rise to the ceiling and there transform itself into a pumpkin. The fact that one need not seriously

worry about such contingencies is, when one meditates about it, quite amazing, and deserves some explanation. It is also quite amazing that usually, when several persons look in the same direction, they see the same things. The regularity of our observations is itself an observation, i.e., a verifiable consequence.



The materialist explanation for the regularity in our observations is that the theoretical constructions which we build to explain our observations are really there; tables and atoms really exist and are subject to natural laws. The objective idealist explanation asserts that all our observations are mental phenomena in the mind of God, who likes regularity. The competing statements: (a) The universe of science and nothing else really exists; and (b) God and nothing else really exists, are *theories*, both of which explain the regularity of our observations.

It is not true, as asserted by positivists, that the real existence of the world is a poetic statement rather than a scientific theory, because it does not have any verifiable consequences. The trustworthiness of science is a verifiable consequence of the theory that the world really exists and is subject to laws. What is true, rather, is that there is a competing theory which one cannot reject out of hand. It would be very comforting if one could point to some observation or experiment the outcome of which would definitely junk one of the two theories. Unfortunately, such is not the case. But one may meanwhile decide between the two theories on the basis of reasonableness. Such a situation is admittedly embarrassing, but it is not unique. There are, for example, two distinct theories² which explain the mechanics of the atom; as far as is known to date, the predictions of the two theories are exactly the same, and there is no way so far to decide between the two except reasonableness and philosophical preference.

WHERE one must decide between two theories on the basis of reasonableness alone, the probability of being right is admittedly smaller than where all hypotheses but one have been contradicted by observation. That, however, is a quantitative, not an absolute, distinction. I would suggest that a choice between materialism and objective idealism based on reasonableness alone clearly favors

² The usual formulation of quantum mechanics, and the casual formulation of Bohm, deBroglie, and Takabayasi. One hopes that in the future it will be possible to modify one or the other of the two theories to pave the way for settling the controversy by an experiment. But we cannot be certain that this will be possible.

the former. *Most believers in God are themselves of that opinion*, since support for their belief is usually claimed *not* as the most reasonable explanation of the *regularity* of our observations, but rather to account for alleged *exceptions* from regular behavior, i.e. for so-called *miracles* or *supernatural* events. An authentic miracle, i.e. a clear break in the regularity of natural phenomena, would in fact shake most supporters of materialism; but so overwhelming is the faith in regularity, that most materialists consider hallucination, fraud, garbled records, poor statistics, or laws of nature as yet unknown, but ultimately amenable to human understanding, as more plausible explanations for recorded "miracles."

An alternative observation often cited in support of the theological explanation is in the nature of an *emotional experience* (or direct revelation in the form of a *vision*). Such experiences may be very convincing to those to whom they happen, although they can, at least partially, be explained in terms of psychological aberrations. In any case, they are purely individual, not subject to repetition or verification, and thus of doubtful general persuasive value.

Without miracles or direct revelation, there remains only the impersonal God of the Unitarians (and of some Reformed Jews), Who does not manifest His presence by breaking the laws of nature, but Who simply exists as a vague source of ethical inspiration or as a paraphrase for the laws of the universe. This impersonal God is so close to what I have called the material universe that the debate becomes a sterile quarrel over definitions.



THE fact that more and more persons nowadays prefer the materialist theory to explain the orderliness in nature is certainly connected with the overall this-worldliness of an industrial society, as well as with the concomitant growth and spread of science, which has greatly reduced the incidence of miracles. Scientists cannot afford to think in terms of miracles in their professional work. Since their chief task is to predict, miracles are altogether too unreliable. Industry found out long ago that to make cars it is more profitable to call on engineers than on priests.

It is interesting to dwell for a moment on the adjustment which religion has made to the age of science. I have already mentioned the de-personalization of God at the hand of Unitarians and of some Reformed Jews. This avenue of approach, however, is not open to some sects, such as Catholics and fundamentalists, who are bound to a fairly literal interpretation of Scriptures written in an eminently unscientific age.

These thinkers have first, the possibility of rejecting completely the results and even the methodology of science. That road, however, is barred to those who are themselves competent scholars in some field of science. Many Catholic priests are in this category.

Some (especially Dominicans) have tried to combine theology and natural science. Those phenomena not yet amenable to explanation by a natural (i.e. material) hypothesis are explained theologically. This represents, in a sense, a return to the universal approach of Aristotle: There is room for only one interpretation of nature; the natural and the theological must blend. The drawback of that outlook is that every major scientific discovery further restricts the realm of Divine intervention.

To avoid this pitfall, others (especially Jesuits) have turned to positivism—but with an added structure. According to this view, it is essential that no claim of reality should be made for any scientific concepts or theories. Despite its valuable and essential predictive powers without which an industrial society would be unthinkable, it is said, science gives us at best a fleeting and tenuous picture of a transient and superficial structure. Although we spend most of our time in this-worldly preoccupations, there is, behind the world of perception, and inaccessible by scientific methodology, the transcendent reality of the realm of God. To this Truth, there is no access except by revelation. The same event can thus be interpreted in two entirely different ways, by science and by theology—without any conflict between the two interpretations. Science should not claim any reality for its concepts, while theology should not claim any immediate and direct predictive value for the concepts it puts forth. A depression or a war may have scientific causes, but its real meaning may be quite different—perhaps a Divine chastisement of mankind for its iniquity. Adopting this two-layer view of reality, a surgeon can pray before an important operation, or a statesman before an important meeting, without in any way hoping for direct Divine tampering with the laws of nature. Instead, what he hopes to achieve by prayer (apart from personal solace)

is a favorable attitude in the upper tier (the realm of God) which will manifest itself in a favorable outcome at the lower tier (the realm of science) through the regular mechanism of natural law.

One difficulty with the Jesuit solution of the science-religion dichotomy is that if God operates only on the upper tier, what evidence is there for His existence? Here, one is usually referred to miracles (a departure from the two-layer view of reality, since God now intervenes in the lower tier), or to personal revelation, or to one of the standard proofs for the existence of God, which, however, are convincing only if one accepts the premises on which they are based.

V

ORGANIZED religion, by and large, can no longer afford to enter the lists as a challenger to science. Religion has found it necessary to seek an accommodation with science, to allow it a niche in the theological panorama. This was not always so. Much of the mythology of antiquity, for instance, revolves around explanation of natural phenomena in supernatural terms. We might inquire why we have departed from the earlier state of affairs, in which supernatural explanations were the rule rather than the exception. This will shed some light on why many scientists are now unwilling to accept supernatural explanations at all, either as rule or exception.

Some have argued that a supernatural explanation does not really violate the scientific method. We proceed exactly as outlined in my article "What is Science?" but the hypothesis which we conjecture as a mechanism for the phenomenon to be explained now involves concepts such as gods, devils, witches, etc., instead of atoms, hormones, classes. Why should the latter be accepted to the exclusion of the former? In principle, if the bad will of a "spirit" turned out to be, on the basis of the evidence available, the most plausible explanation for drought or disease, and if, for instance, appeasement of the spirit by exorcism or sacrifice were shown, by convincing evidence to be a fairly reliable remedy,³ a person trained in the scientific method would feel compelled to accept the existence and power of that "spirit" as a theory.

What is wrong with this "spirit" theory of drought and disease? The argument that it is unsuccessful is only part of the story. Faith can sometimes heal the sick too, as the occasional successes of Christian Science and faith healers demonstrate. At least, faith can convince many that they are healed, and, if they obviously are not (for instance, if they die) the faithful can say: "If the prayer was not answered, the wish was plainly not worthy of fulfillment."

ACTUALLY, the slightest refinement in methodology has usually sufficed to discredit supernatural explanations. Most supernatural explanations of natural phenomena strike us today as based on an incredible methodological sloppiness. Careful consideration of alternative explanations, nowadays considered essential, was certainly not the rule, and not even considered desirable. The distinction

³ *Jomo Kenyatta, in Facing Mount Kenya (London 1953) claims that this is so.*

between a poetic interpretation and a scientific hypothesis was not clearly understood. Few mythological explanations survived the first controlled experiment. In fact, performing a controlled experiment was often viewed as "tempting God," and had to fail. An explanation which explains any possible outcome of an observation equally well is nowadays looked upon askance; for a supernatural explanation, it was usually considered an obvious advantage.

If most scientists, at least in their professional work, no longer think in supernatural terms, that is due, not to a perverse anti-devil prejudice but to the circumstance that innumerable instances of supernatural intervention have become discredited by refinements in methodology. The rejection of supernatural explanations can thus itself be erected into a valid theory belonging to the science of methodology: The explanation of observations is not to be found in the supernatural; concepts such as gods, ghosts, devils, spirits, witches, are not acceptable elements of scientific theories. That this theory is generally accepted, though rarely stated formally, is supported by the lack of success of what I have called the Dominican resolution of the science-theology controversy, and the much greater vogue of the Jesuit and Unitarian solutions.

As I had occasion to state in my previous article, one can always patch an explanation so as to make it fit what has already been observed. Some theologians and mythologists have specialized in such attempts. But the preponderance of opinion as to what constitutes a reasonable explanation has been against them. The successes of Christian Science and faith healing have been satisfactorily explained, not in terms of Divine intervention, but in terms of the psychology of suggestion. Similar results have been achieved by the judicious use of placebos.

THIS leaves us with the question: Why should methodology be refined? Why should we adopt the scientific method, in all its rigor, as the sole path to knowledge? By its own terms of reference, extra-scientific (supernatural, mythological, religious) explanation of natural phenomena can be eminently successful. One steeped in the theocratic, next-wordly outlook of the Middle Ages can accept as reasonable that which, to the modern scientific mind, is entirely unreasonable. Even consistent failure can be accepted as a manifestation of God's will, and need not result, from the vantage point of the medieval mind, in rejection of an otherwise attractive explanation. In terms of the medieval outlook, the scientific method is not even especially successful. It is only in terms of modern, this-wordly values, that the success of science becomes apparent. The days are past, despite some efforts to the contrary, when incurable diseases, depressions, and wars are accepted as the wrath of God.

One cannot formally refute the medieval outlook, according to which our present-day concern with comfort, health, scientific rigor, and freedom is a Satanic disease. Nor can one formally prove the correctness of the scientific outlook. One can justify the method of science only internally, in terms of the humanist criteria which, historically, evolved with science. The ultimate justification of the scientific method is that it satisfies the needs, both material and intellectual, of modern society.

Notebook of an Old-Timer

by George H. Shoaf



Will History Repeat?

AMERICANS must submit to high taxes, high prices, inflation and vast expenditures for "defense" against "Russian aggression" assert spokesmen for the Eisenhower administration. Ike may possibly believe this propaganda as he reads for public consumption the pieces prepared for him by ghost writers employed by those interested in putting over the deception, but certainly the wise ones within and without the administration know better. They have their agents and spies in the Soviet Union and they know that the last thing the "men in the Kremlin" want or need is a foreign war. Russia, they can see, is on the threshold of tremendous internal development and change, and neither the leaders nor the Russian people want war to interrupt that development.

Why, then, do advocates of American armaments continue the fiction that U. S. economy must bankrupt itself by operating day and night factories and plants wherein millions of men and women are working feverishly manufacturing and stockpiling the deadliest war weapons imaginable? The people can neither eat, wear nor use these weapons for comfortable living. Once manufactured and stockpiled, they are stored to rust or become obsolete, a monument to the stupidity and duplicity involved in the current American way of life.

Mr. Shoaf, whose Notebook is presented in these pages from time to time, was star correspondent for the old Appeal to Reason in its pre-World War I peak days.

Let us be plain and frank in this matter. Politicians hedge and trim in discussing it. The editorial policy of the commercial press is either evasive or commendatory. Even the liberal and labor press is not as outspoken as the situation warrants. Only now and then someone with no job to lose and no economic interests to risk dares to challenge the wisdom, justice or necessity of the so-called cold war.

One of the big reasons, why the cold war is continued is to prevent a breakdown of American economy. While wars ended past depressions, other factors of momentous consequence were also involved. Take the Spanish-American War, for instance. Texas born, I lived in San Antonio when Teddy Roosevelt came there to organize the Rough Riders to fight for "Cuba Libre." Several of my boyhood friends joined the Rough Riders, went to Cuba and returned emaciated physical wrecks. They had eaten too much of "Alger's embalmed beef." I refused to join for several reasons. I was an active member of the Socialist Labor Party, opposed war as an instrument of settling international disputes, and I knew my native land was absolutely wrong in interfering in the Cuban situation.

THE Spanish-American War was projected to end a devastating depression. The poverty of American workers because of joblessness was indescribable. I know, because I was out of work and hungry. I could have joined the Rough Riders, gone to Cuba, eaten hard tack and embalmed

beef, supplied by American packing corporations, and come back home an invalid, but I knew my economics, and I knew what the war was cooked up for. To free Cuba for the Cubans? Forget it! That war was publicized by Hearst, whose papers manufactured fake inflammatory stories, thereby inflaming Americans and provoking them to champion the war. It was engineered by the McKinley administration, which, in addition to ending the depression, was designed to benefit U. S. sugar and tobacco corporations that wanted to import their Cuban products free of the taxation imposed by the Spanish authorities. And, of course, to enable U. S. corporations to manufacture for a price the military equipment necessary to fight the war.

By 1907, the economy again had broken down and unemployment in every department of commercial and industrial activity began to make itself manifest. Ten years later, Woodrow Wilson, instigated by high financial circles that had loaned England enormous sums of money, came out with a declaration of war. Wilson had been elected President of the United States because of his promise he would keep this country out of war. The principle involved was highly moral, but the exigencies of practical politics and the requirements of economics overrode all high moral considerations, and the United States plunged in.

Two decades later, a European war again gave the United States an opportunity to end the depression that followed the crash of '29. Roosevelt, like Wilson, was elected President on the promise that never, if President, would he consent to the sending of one American boy to fight and die in a foreign land. Since he had pledged himself, as President, to maintain peace, Roosevelt found himself hard put to concoct an excuse for doing what really he wanted to do; namely, to put the United States on the side of England in fighting Germany. U. S. corporations began the manufacture of war weapons for England and France to use in fighting Hitler, but until the tragedy of Pearl Harbor, public sentiment in this country was opposed to becoming involved in the European conflict.

SPACE will not be taken here to summarize the findings of the investigators who dug out the facts relating to the sinking of the U. S. fleet at Pearl Harbor by Japanese flying squadrons. Suffice to say that the lethargy of Americans in the matter had to be aroused. As in the case of the sinking of the Maine, an "incident" of such enormity was necessary that the American people would be electrified, and the horror of the tragedy would be such as to incite them to demand war. Well, the tragedy at Pearl Harbor did just that!

Large numbers of new millionaires emerged from the first and second World Wars. World War II did good for the U. S. economy. It ended the depression and inspired corporations to resume activity in operating their factories and plants in producing and, ultimately, in flooding the market with every conceivable variety of commodity. The workers got jobs and started buying homes on the installment plan.

In 1950, Truman's "police action" again revived sagging American industry and commerce. Possible, if not probable "Russian aggression" was heralded to the American people as a

danger against which it was imperative to provide. Congress was called on to appropriate billions of money. Workers were employed by the million to service the factories and plants. Home building corporations began to activate themselves in subdividing tracts of land and building homes to be sold to the workers on the installment plan. Government money lavishly spent right and left resulted in creating boom conditions. Since the war factories started manufacturing war weapons, never have the workers, nor the corporation owners, "had it so good." Living in homes in which they have a shoestring ownership, supplied with furniture and gadgets for which they have gone in debt, and driving cars they congratulate themselves will be their own when they have made the last payment, American workers imagine prosperity is here to stay.

What is the actual situation, as of today? Stores and warehouses the nation over are again jammed with commodities and goods that by every device known to advertisers are seeking to be sold. Vacant lots everywhere are filled to capacity with new cars, and

old, which, if the people could afford, would be bought and used. But again the wages of labor are insufficient to enable the workers to buy and consume the products of their toil. While millions of workers are apparently prosperous in an insecure economy, others, working part time, or facing layoffs, are getting ready to scratch the beggar's backsides. In other words, this nation, grand, glorious and golden with wealth congested in the hands of an upper crust of plutocracy, is heading toward a depression whose mere contemplation, according to his own confession, is making the hair curl on the head of the Secretary of the Treasury.

Well, the remedy? Will history repeat, and the war for which our militarists are preparing break, with Soviet Russia the target of attack? Or, will Americans be reborn, and get ready to abolish the cause of war—private ownership and the profit system—by exchanging capitalist economy for socialism, thereby assuring the brotherhood of man in a world free from war? Truly, as H. G. Wells said, it is a race between education and catastrophe.



Not Every Age Is an Age of Heroes

THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919-1933, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1957, \$6.

HISTORY, said an old Roman, is the branch of literature most like epic poetry. A good many writers of history have been captivated by this idea and have tried to give the events and people they write about a Homeric sweep and grandeur. Some of these attempts fail; the available materials of history are apt to be intrinsically unheroic and resist all the efforts of the historian to invest them with epic dignity. One thinks of the time of "normalcy" (it was officially dubbed the "New Era" by the Republicans) and of its embodiment in Warren Gamaliel Harding and Calvin Coolidge.

Of Harding his father said that it was

lucky Warren was born a boy because, if he had been the girl, he would have been perpetually in a family way. He didn't know how to say no. This frailty of Harding's of course has its redeeming side. The man who said yes to Albert B. Fall when Fall hankered after some choice portions of the nation's oil lands was incapable of saying no to Eugene V. Debs when Debs asked to be released from Atlanta Penitentiary. By contrast, dour, righteous Woodrow Wilson, who probably wouldn't have been willing to give Fall the time of day, was willing to let Debs rot in jail. Clearly Harding was not a heroic soul. He was simply, in the words of one of Carl Sandburg's songs, "an old bum, loved but unrespected."

Calvin Coolidge is remembered for his few words, fitly spoken. While it was Gertrude Stein who said "A rose is a rose is a rose," it was Coolidge who said: "The business of America is business," and "The man who builds a factory builds a temple. . . . The man who works there worships there." Once, however, it occurred to the public relations boys that Coolidge should not be identified exclusively with business. There survives in this country the agrarian myth according to which the most virtuous citizens and statesmen are farmers. So they photographed Coolidge sitting on a haystack in overalls. But when it came to thinking up unfunny jokes Cal himself was probably well ahead of the public relations help. It is told by Ike Hoover, the White

House usher, that Coolidge used to conduct his own version of push-button warfare against the White House staff. Coolidge would push all the buzzers on his desk and then hide.

It is easy to crush the Republicans under an avalanche of anecdote and irony. It is rather more difficult to adorn Franklin D. Roosevelt and his entourage with the laurel wreaths of pure heroism—to do it convincingly, that is. In "The Crisis of the Old Order," the first volume of an epic history of the "Age of Roosevelt," Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. tries to do both these things, but with uneven success. The book takes the nation and its hero from 1919 to the inauguration of Roosevelt in 1933. Almost like a true epic it begins at a point of climax, March 4, 1933, and then flashes back to 1919 and a leisurely, panoramic view of the Republican years after Wilson.

IN the aftermath of the first World War, the possibilities, as Schlesinger puts it, "appeared illimitable. Hardly a fortnight passed without an essay in the liberal weeklies on the imminence of a new social order. Talk of 'revolution'—peaceful, of course—was everywhere in the air." And the atmosphere which inspired liberal and radical minds with hope stirred police minds to frenzy. Wilson's Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer had the hallucination that in 1919 "the blaze of revolution was sweeping over every American institution of law

and order." The Communists, just making their American debut and involved in the toils of ultra-radical sloganeering, were clearly not the only people who misread the real situation in the U.S.

The year 1919 broke the spirit of Wilson's followers for it killed their hopes for a just peace and the "New Freedom." "As Clemenceau slew the liberal dream in Paris," writes Schlesinger, "so Palmer slew it in America; and in each case, Woodrow Wilson was the accomplice. To the liberals who had opposed the war, all was coming about as they had foretold: war had destroyed progressivism."

With the hopes for a democratic peace and for civil liberty at home expiring together, the Wilsonian entourage, it seems, succumbed to demoralization even before the Republicans won the election in 1920. The history of the Democratic Party in the twenties is in the main a tale of stagnation and disintegration. Like many another stymied political organization, the party was convulsed by an exhausting factional struggle which appeared likely to destroy it as a national force.

At the Democratic Convention of 1924 the William Jennings Bryan agrarian wing of the party, steeped in fundamentalism, prohibitionism, and racism, vied for dominance against the Catholic and city-machine forces, the growing social weight of which was signalized in the 1920 Census which showed that industrialism had finally reduced rural dwellers to a minority of the population. The balance of forces at the Convention is suggested by the fact that the delegates rejected by one vote a proposal to condemn the Ku Klux Klan by name. In the balloting for presidential nominee the Bryan forces grouped in support of William Gibbs McAdoo, while the city politicians rallied around Al Smith. The factional deadlock resulted in the nomination of John W. Davis on the 103rd ballot. Davis was a J. P. Morgan counsel and he fought the campaign in the conviction that it should be the Democrats' "controlling aim and ambition to keep the road open for private enterprise and personal initiative."

At the next convention in 1928 the urban machines, winning the upper hand, got Smith nominated, but the Bryan wing took its revenge by refusing to go along with the candidate in the campaign and at the voting booths. Yet despite the obvious disarray of the Democrats in the national elections of the twenties, they were in those years beginning to consolidate majorities in the Northern cities as a consequence of the developing tendency of people to vote along class lines.

MEANWHILE under the "New Era" administrations of the Republicans the wheels of fate were creaking the country along toward the abyss of 1929. "The unsatisfactory level of wages and farm income," writes Schlesinger, "meant that 'prosperity' was steadily less able to generate buying power in sufficient volume to meet the steadily rising productive capacity—or,

in time, to carry available goods off the market."

Schlesinger's post mortem on 1929 is that "unless it was to be assumed that depression was inevitable under capitalism, one must assume that the depression of 1929 could have been averted by wise national policy." He believes that there was a "crucial period when a small amount of spending might have checked the cumulative forces of breakdown." But Hoover let the crucial period slip by and "found in pledges an acceptable substitute for action." Although Schlesinger affirms that what happened was not Hoover's fault, he conveys the impression that if Hoover had been a Keynesian, there would have been no depression. For Schlesinger the moral is that a businessman's government "had mistaken the class interest for the national interest. The result was both class and national disaster."

"Business had insisted on all the credit for prosperity. Now it could hardly escape blame for adversity." Hoover himself was "dragged despairingly along by events. . . . Doctrinaire by temperament, he tended to make every difference in degree a difference in kind and to transform questions of tactics into questions of principles. . . . As his term wore on, the ideological obsession grew. . . . His was the tragedy of a man of high ideals whose intelligence froze into inflexibility and whose dedication was smitten with self-righteousness." This portrait is interesting, among other reasons, because in it Hoover emerges as an anti-hero whose character traits are polar opposites of those of the hero who is waiting in the wings. Schlesinger's Roosevelt will not be dragged despairingly along by events: he will be the cheerful leader. He will not be doctrinaire: he will be experimental. He will not quibble over tactics, be obsessed by ideology, freeze into inflexibility, or be smitten with self-righteousness.

By 1932 the country, as Schlesinger views it, was politically at the cross-roads. The issue was democracy versus chaos, or something worse. "The election in the fall would determine whether democracy could restore the confidence and loyalty of its people, or whether the years ahead would breed more embattled farmers and more BEF's, more Khaki Shirts and more Communists . . . 1932 was providing a last chance for politics." Clearly, the stage has been set for the entrance of the heroic figure.

Franklin D. Roosevelt belonged from birth to the Hudson River gentry, and his life ran in established channels through Groton, Harvard and Columbia Law School, to boredom with the life of a country gentleman, from which he escaped at the age of 28. "He was a Democrat, and politics offered an outlet for his ambition, his high spirits, his idealism and his realism. It allowed him at last to be himself." However, "The public face could never be relied on to express the private man."

You can get an insight into what Schlesinger is driving at in counterposing the public face of Roosevelt to the private man by noticing the effect of a couple of

Roosevelt quotations he chooses to juxtapose: "Business must get out of politics. The people must make a stand against it," said Roosevelt during his first political campaign. And Schlesinger adds that "Actually Roosevelt himself had no compunction about consorting with Wall Street attorneys. . . . 'All Wall Street is not bad,' he observed privately to one of them, 'as a residence here of four years has shown me.' Nonetheless, the words helped create the symbol."

This was in 1910, and Schlesinger is about right that words helped to create the symbol. The Roosevelt who at the start of his political career could denounce business in public while reassuring it in private is assuredly a symbolic figure in our political life. Does Roosevelt in this behavior become Schlesinger's ideal man of politics, the flexible man who is not obsessed by ideology or smitten with self-righteousness?

SINCE a politician's utterances and actions have objective results which are independent of the quality of his motives, it would be unjustifiable to appraise Roosevelt's performance primarily with the criterion of sincerity. Roosevelt's views are important, whether they reveal the inner man or are simply chameleon reflections of the leading ideas of his milieu. As Wilson's Assistant Secretary of the Navy he led the big-Navy faction in the Administration. "Roosevelt, reared in the tradition of Mahan and T. R., saw the war as a practical exercise in protecting the physical security of the nation; if security required bigger ships, more men under arms, or even military action itself, so much, perhaps, the better for the people." The sentence appears to be a euphemistic circumlocution for the fact that Roosevelt had a jingo impulse which led him to endorse intervention in Mexico ("I do not want war but I do not see how we can avoid it. Sooner or later, it seems, the United States must go down there and clean up the Mexican political mess.") and cause him to fret and chafe under the restraint imposed on him by Wilson's policy of neutrality during the war's first two years ("I just *know* I shall do some awful unneutral thing before I get through!").

While the frenzied Red hunt of 1919 was going on, Roosevelt took an ADA-ish, middle-of-the-road stand. When the Boston Navy Yard fired some workers as loyalty suspects, Roosevelt thought that three of them who were Socialists should be kept on the job but approved discharging a machinist charged with distributing Communist literature. "This," he said, "is a very different thing from being merely a Socialist."

In the twenties, Schlesinger tells us, Roosevelt did important work laboring to keep the disintegrating Democratic Party in one piece. He strove to unite the party around the conception of "Progressivism with a brake on"—a conception he distinguished from the conception of "Conservatism with a move on." In this extraordinary sensitivity to the nuances of moderation Roosevelt revealed

himself as the true forerunner of such spokesmen of the vital center as Stevenson and Eisenhower.

The role of politician of the golden mean indubitably demands artistry and finesse, and Roosevelt was amply endowed with the necessary qualities for the role. He was, in Schlesinger's words, "evasive about programs" but had "a considerable commitment to policies." Whatever that may mean. Once in the 1932 campaign he was called on by his quarreling aides to establish the party line on tariffs. Two drafts of speeches on the issue, one protectionist and the other with a free trade slant, were submitted to Roosevelt. As Raymond Moley recounts the incident, "He read the two through with seeming care, and then he left me speechless by announcing that I had better 'weave the two together.'" The ultimate product was a speech which Roosevelt accepted as "a compromise between free traders and protectionists."

There is a good deal of hilarity in the book about political ideas and their inconsequential role in practical politics—so much indeed that Schlesinger at times seems to be forgetting that his aim is to present Roosevelt as the central hero of an epic history, to show him as a leader who will "appeal to underlying convictions," "stir people over specific events," "make government the affirmative instrument of the people."

When Schlesinger does remember what he is about, as at the close of the book, he piles on solemn rhetoric which seems to accord poorly with the substance of his narrative: "Many had deserted freedom, many more had lost their nerve. But Roosevelt, armored in some inner faith, remained calm and inscrutable, confident that American improvisation could meet the future on its own terms. . . . The only thing Americans had to fear was fear itself. And so he serenely awaited the morrow. The event was in the hand of God."

NOT every age is an age of heroes, although heroes live in every age. Silent Cal was a contemporary of the eloquent Vanzetti, just as in Russia Stalin, the gray eminence of the Soviet Thermidor, was the contemporary of Trotsky. The age did not belong to the heroes but to Stalin and Coolidge. Later, in the thirties and forties, we had the age of Roosevelt, Hitler, and Stalin. Now, perhaps, it is the age of Eisenhower and Khrushchev, although living contemporaneously with the big names of the last quarter of a century have been nameless, or at least powerless, heroes, village Cromwells and Miltons whom fate has doomed to obscurity and helplessness. Vernon Parrington thought that the historian's task is to rescue such heroes from oblivion. But Parrington's was the generous liberalism of another day, and I would not insist that today's historians follow his precept. But is it too much to ask that the historians refrain from inflating the moral and intellectual dimensions of figures who happen to be, or to have been, powerful?

If Schlesinger would accept that fact

that we have in the main been living in a pretty unheroic time, he would be a better historian. For then he would be in a position to learn a lesson from the literary practice of the English eighteenth century. The great historian Edward Gibbon must have realized that the dumbbell Hanoverian kings and corrupt Whig politicians of his England were not the stuff of heroes. At any rate, he didn't try to write an epic about them but turned to the Roman past for heroic characters and themes. And the men of the English eighteenth century who did write memorably about contemporary society were not tempted to represent what was going on about them as epic or tragic manifestations. Swift reduced the Hanoverian monarchy to Lilliputian dimensions. John Gay in "The Beggars Opera" transformed the king's first minister into the leader of a gang of thieves and parodied a court levee in the chatter of a circle of whores. And Alexander Pope wrote "The Rape of the Lock," a mock-epic account of a lovers' quarrel, as if to affirm that the effort to fit contemporary experience into the epic form could only result in an elaborate joke.

DAVID HERRESHOFF

Our Plastic Constitution

THE CREATIVE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, by M. Ramaswamy. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1957, \$3.

THE Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court of India has written a penetrating, if conservative-minded, essay on the Supreme Court of the United States. The author has compressed an amazing amount of constitutional history into 119 pages. His insights are sometimes new, yet seem self-evident once they have been expressed. As against this, his point of view reflects Indian upper-class conservatism: The dedication to former Justice Robert H. Jackson sets the tone of the book.

The three lectures on which the book is based, now constituting three chapters, are entitled "The Supreme Court and the Constitution," "The Supreme Court and the Federal System," and "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties." Under each of these subjects, Mr. Ramaswamy first shows how the Supreme Court filled in the details of the outline which is sketched by the Constitution; second, how over the years, the court has from time to time changed this detail; and third, in some instances, gives his own critical evaluation of the Supreme Court's decisions.

Viewing the United States, as it were, from a distance, he gains both detachment and perspective, which our own citizens rarely, if ever achieve. From this perspective is made the introductory observation that in the United States the Constitution has become a symbol which is the "rallying center for the people's loyalty and affections" much as the Crown in England, or the classical heroes in India.

So his position as a spectator rather than a participant permits him to give a short and simple answer to the much mooted question whether constitutional principles change with changing times and conditions. Mr. Ramaswamy has no doubt that they do: "It would not, I venture to say, be an exaggeration of the role of the Supreme Court to observe that it has through the years functioned, of course within its limits, as a permanent Constitutional Convention. . . ."

RAMASWAMY points out, as de Tocqueville before him, that the federal system set up by the United States Constitution was "a new technique in organizing the political setup of a large country by distributing the totality of governmental powers between a central government on one hand and a number of regional governments on the other, the sphere of operation of each being defined in a written constitution." In older federations the central government had acted on the member governments only, who in turn were supposed to act on the individuals. Under the American setup, "There was no trace in the Constitution of any intention to create a dependence of the government of the Union on the governments of the States for the execution of the powers committed to it."

The first detail which the Supreme Court filled in on the sketch of the Constitution was its own power to hold acts of Congress unconstitutional. This Chief Justice Marshall did in 1803 in the case of *Marbury v. Madison*, 1 Cranch, 137. Mr. Ramaswamy gives his unstinting approval. He examines this first case not only from the standpoint of the court's power to declare laws unconstitutional, but also in the light of an ever-present but seldom-mentioned problem. The court can only announce judgment. It cannot of itself compel obedience. What if the other departments of government refuse to comply—as President Jackson is said once to have done, and as is the case in the South today? As a practical matter, in making its decisions, the court must always weigh the question how far its decisions will be obeyed by the co-ordinate branches of government.

In his last chapter, the author comes to "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties," which he defines as "the great problem of reconciling majority rule with minority rights." He examines this in three categories: "(1) freedom of speech and press, (2) freedom of religion, and (3) the protection afforded to civil liberties by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."

Despite his conservative bent, he recognizes what is now often forgotten: that "Freedom of discussion is necessary not only for the proper functioning of a democracy, but also for progress in all sectors of human knowledge—science, literature, art and philosophy."

But the Indian constitution has been chary about free speech (as recently pointed out in an article (Harvey M. Grossman,

Freedom of Expression in India, University of California, Los Angeles, Law Review, December 1956) and Mr. Ramaswamy shares its point of view. He agrees with the decision in *Dennis v. U.S.* 341 U.S. 494 (the Smith Act conviction of the eleven Communist leaders), saying "Frankly, I think, the 'clear and present danger' test has no place in a case of this kind." He gives his approval to Justice Jackson's concurring opinion which expressed the fear that "if applied as it is proposed here, it means that the communist plotting is protected during its period of incubation—the government can move only after imminent action is manifest, when it would, of course, be too late."

This view of the "incubation" period betrays a curious lack of confidence in public debate. The implicit picture is that advocacy of violent overthrow will proceed unopposed—no voices will be raised in favor of the *status quo* or peaceful change, or else they will be without effect. But this is altogether unrealistic. If the society is viable there will be opposition to advocates of violent overthrow; if there be no such opposition, the society is probably on its last legs, anyway. Again, if the eve of violent outbreak were always "too late," no revolt could ever be successfully suppressed. History shows otherwise.

ISSUE must also be taken with the author's criticisms of *Bridges v. California*, 314 U.S. 252. Here his error springs not so much from basic conservatism as from a (for him) unusual failure to grasp American social processes. *Bridges v. California*, and its companion case, *Times-Mirror Co. v. California* concerned public criticism of judicial cases that had not yet been finally decided. Both *Bridges* and the Los Angeles *Times* were adjudged guilty of contempt by the California courts; both convictions were overturned by the United States Supreme Court on the ground that there was no "clear and present danger" that the courts would be influenced in their decisions. Ramaswamy believes that "the case of *Bridges v. California* . . . illustrates the unsuitability of the 'clear and present danger' test to cases in which the issue of contempt of court is raised with reference to comments made on pending cases." In an Epilogue, he adds, with approval, "This view of Mr. Justice Black in the *Bridges* case in regard to the limits of permissible comments on pending litigation has not been accepted by the courts in India."

English law has very strict rules against comments on pending legal cases. Mr. Ramaswamy and the Indian courts undoubtedly approach the subject under the influence of English jurisprudence. The rule of no comment on unfinished legal cases works in England because most newspapers observe it voluntarily. In the United States, the anarchic tendencies bequeathed by the frontier and other turbulent influences have caused newspapers to disregard the rule pretty much as they felt like it. It has long been a dead letter, resurrected spasmodically in an isolated case. The Supreme Court

made a virtue of necessity and held such comment protected by the clear and present danger rule, relying on the judge's firmness to safeguard the fairness of his decision.

The author's analysis of the Supreme Court's work in the field of civil liberties is otherwise unexceptionable. Freedom of religion as we know it has evolved from something quite unpromising: "Most of the early immigrants who came from the Old World to escape religious persecution were no more tolerant of dissident views than their erstwhile persecutors were." In its totality, "The work of the Supreme Court in the field of civil liberties has been important in two directions. In the first place, the Court has been able to afford invaluable help for individuals to defend at least some of their basic freedoms against the arbitrary exercise of governmental power. In the second place, the Court through the broad sweep and persuasive power of its opinions has been able to set up proper patterns of behavior for both governments and individuals in a free society."

A word about the author's style. The lectures were delivered at Stanford University to a general audience, not specifically to the law school. They are clear and intelligible to a layman, without sacrificing substance. Occasionally there is a flash of epigram, e.g., "The dynamic forces of life cannot be imprisoned in neat legal formulas or be reduced to precise mathematical equations . . . life's processes cannot be cabined by mere logic."

Within its limits, an excellent book.

GEORGE OLSHAUSEN

Widening Hiatus

THE PARADOXES OF DEMOCRACY, by Kermit Eby and June Greenleaf. Association Press, New York, \$3.50.

IT is one of the paradoxes of America today (not discussed in this book) that intellectual circles should be so absorbed with questions of morality at a time when intellectuals have been supremely *gleichgültig* into the goose-stepping armies of national states; that there should be such an outpouring of books devoted to ethics in an age of brutality and denigration of the individual. There are two social explanations for the paradox: One, is that overwhelmed by the temporal power, intellectuals have abdicated their professed roles as independent teachers and carriers of ideas, and now seek surcease through tending the gardens of their own souls. Such moods have swept over people before in modern times as, for instance, when after the defeat of the 1905 revolution, Russian intellectuals turned away wearily from what appeared to be a foredoomed and hopeless battle against Czarist autocracy and for a number of years preoccupied themselves with philosophical problems of morality and writers busied themselves with schools of "God-building" and "God-seeking."

A possible contrary explanation is that by now numbers of intellectuals, grown frightened of the consequences of witch-hunt and conformity, are seeking to explore the causes for the widening hiatus between the shining ideals and the brutish practices of American democracy. This book taken in conjunction with other writings of recent days would indicate that both explanations have validity.

"It is paradoxical," our authors write, "that in a country which puts so much emphasis on liberty and freedom as the keystones of national idealism and national goals, the nonconformist is treated openly with the harshest social brutality." As they see it, the present-day American is over-socialized and over-organized, dwelling in a too complex institutional framework created by mass technology, mass education and the closing of the frontier. For a long time there existed the universal belief that this country was a vast melting pot where all might find equal opportunity. At a later date, Americans viewed education as a means by which their children could compete for the social and financial rewards at the end of the rainbow. But the dream of a "classless society" evaporated with the exhaustion of free land in the West, and with the depression of the 1930s there was the dawning realization that mass education could not provide equal opportunity either. Now we face the immense irony that automation and the second industrial revolution hold out the possibility of a paradise on earth for mankind while at the same time the mushroom cloud makes possible the fulfillment of the ancient prophecy that the earth will be swallowed by fire.

THE authors argue that the democratic idea cannot be separated from the Christian concept of life. "Because we believe in a cosmos rather than a chaos, we believe in the power of reason to find the patterns in the cosmos, to describe those patterns. From this comes the democratic concept that men are capable of making their own choices, of governing themselves, of mastering their destinies. . . . He has faith in democracy who can continue battling for the fulfillment of his dream, even though harassed by the day-to-day, the small, the needling disappointments. It takes more courage to stay in and take the buffeting than to withdraw into the island of the like-minded."

This review touches on only a few of the many propositions discussed, but in its multiplicity of themes and extraordinary discursiveness lies the book's fault, not its virtue. Throughout, the authors try to make a couple of paragraphs do where at least one or several chapters of close analysis is required; time and again, a theme is introduced only to be peremptorily dropped in favor of the next one. The result is that the work takes on the appearance of a series of rough notes that remain to be elaborated and integrated. There are a lot of valuable gold nuggets in the rough ore, but they haven't been smelted down. A. S.

Here is One Instance—

IN our May issue, we carried an editorial analysis entitled "Embarrassment of Riches." With the aid of a chart on manufacturing capacity and manufacturing production, the article showed how in the past few years the facilities for producing goods have been outrunning the market. The data were analyzed, facts back to the twenties brought in for illustration, and economic reasoning about the trend and its meaning as well as causes was also supplied.

Now, in the July 13 Business Week, a large spread comes down hard on the same point. "Output Lags as Capacity Grows," the title reads, and the article points out that "economists for Congressional committees have noted the recent rise in the ratio of capital investment to output, and they're wondering if it's becoming a trend, and whether that trend is dangerous to the economy." The bulk of the article is devoted to detailed information about 11 important industries, all of which show a widening gap between capacity and output, a gap which has become very marked in the past six months.

We do not cite this to show that we have inside information. The facts we used were generally available, most of them coming from the McGraw Hill Department of Economics. We cite it as an illustration of the kind of analysis of important developments in the economy which this periodical attempts to supply as fully and regularly as possible.

And, it should be added, super-cautious business periodicals, since they don't want to impair "business confidence," don't probe too deeply into the dangers and significance of a lot of these trends, whereas this magazine has no such inhibitions.

REGULAR readers know that this is just one illustration of the kind of information and analysis carried in these pages. Our book review section comes in for a lot of praise; readers find it, many have told us, tops in the field. Political and social analysis, historical review, current events tackled always from the point of view of their long-term meaning, problems of American socialism—all of these have their prominent place.

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