

The American **Socialist**

**Balance Sheet
of the
United Nations**

The Next Round:

**Why
Labor
Wants
More
In '55**



AUGUST 1955

25 CENTS

CLIPPINGS

IN the past month, there has been a little letup in the witch-hunt, as indicated by the favorable decisions in the passport cases of Max Shachtman, chairman of the Independent Socialist League, Clark Foreman, secretary of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, and Professor Otto Nathan. On the credit side should also be recorded the dropping of the prosecution against Owen Lattimore and the favorable Supreme Court decision in the contempt cases against Emspak and Quinn, two officials of the independent United Electrical Workers, and Philip Bart, business manager of the Daily Worker.

It is obvious, however, that there is no intention of relaxing the basic witch-hunt, as witness the continuing Smith Act prosecutions, the new round in the everlasting Bridges case, the five-year Taft-Hartley sentence against Hugh Bryson, president of the defunct Marine Cooks and Stewards, on the elusive ground not of membership but of "affiliation" with the Communist Party, and the deportation drive against Cedric Belfrage, editor of the National Guardian. Also to be noted in the past month's atrocities was the conviction of Mrs. Marie Natvig, an ex-informer who confessed that she perjured herself in previous testimony she had given. There is also a government attempt to intimidate all and sundry by new Federal grand jury indictments out of New York against Harvey Matusow, R. Lawrence Siegel, lawyer for the Nation, Miss Hadassah R. Shapiro, a law associate of Siegel's, and Martin Solow, assistant to the publisher of the Nation, who had held private conversations with Matusow. Freda Kirchwey, editor and publisher of the Nation, declared: "Any attempt to involve the Nation is wanton nonsense. It can only be interpreted as a desire to smear and silence a publication which has played a leading role in attacking the use of political informers."

ARTHUR S. FLEMING, Director of Defense Mobilization, has announced that a bigger and better civil defense exercise would be held next year, and disclosed that suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is contemplated, along with the application of martial law, in the chaos following a nuclear attack. This little-noticed piece of news gives a foretaste of what our rulers have in store for us in the event of war. In the entire history of the United States, even including the Civil War, martial law has never been imposed on the whole nation.

In the course of the recent civil defense exercise, 23 demonstrators, including Dorothy Day, editor of the Catholic Worker, and Rev. A. J. Muste of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, were arrested because they picketed in City Hall Park, New York, against the air raid drill.

PAUL MUNI, the noted actor, is currently winning new laurels on Broadway with his characterization of the late Clarence Darrow in the famous Scopes "monkey trial" of 30

years ago. The play, "Inherit the Wind," is based on this event and makes a strong plea for freedom to think. The American Civil Liberties Union asked Governor Clement of Tennessee, on this thirtieth anniversary of the trial, to take steps for the repeal of the anti-evolution law, which still remains on the state's books, because the law interferes with "freedom of thought and speech." The jury had found Scopes guilty at the trial, which featured the great debate between Darrow and William Jennings Bryan. An appeal to the state Supreme Court reversed the conviction, but upheld the constitutionality of the law.

THE three-month strike of Greyhound bus drivers in ten Southern states resulted in a victory for the strikers, who won a five percent wage raise and other supplementary gains including the first union contract which Greyhound has signed in the area. Meanwhile, a three-month strike against two Louisiana sugar companies by the CIO United Packinghouse Workers is being militantly fought by the 1,500 Negro and white workers involved. Among other repressions faced by the strikers is a trial for contempt of court of the entire executive board of the local union, under a sweeping injunction issued at the start of the strike. But the strikers continue solid.

In the Miami and Miami Beach hotel strikes, picketing has increased in scope and effectiveness after a Dade County Circuit Court ruling

throwing out an anti-picketing injunction. In an important development to assist the strikers, who are out to unionize the plush, low-wage hotels, Dave Beck, president of the AFL Teamsters Union, called on the AFL Executive Board to "give immediate attention to the organizing efforts in Miami Beach." He wants a union organizing structure and financial help, and a joint AFL-CIO campaign to make the organizing drive effective.

ANOTHER three-month strike, that of the Landers, Frary and Clark workers organized in the independent United Electrical Workers, has also seen an anti-picketing injunction lose out. Judge Raymond Devlin of Superior Court in Connecticut threw out the company's demand for such an injunction.

Company attempts to break this strike came to a climax on June 20, when the company insisted that all those who failed to return to work by that date would be fired. But the 1,800 strikers held firm, and a mass meeting of 3,500 strikers and delegations from other unions in the area convened outside the plant on that date. There has been no weakening in spite of company threats. The strikers are contesting a company refusal to grant any wage increase, and want other union gains in grievance procedure and seniority.

In the Midwest, the flareup of local strikes that broke out after the auto union signed an agreement with GM has won the workers in some of the plants larger wage increases than the national settlement had provided. AC Sparkplug in Flint won a ten-cent increase for women workers and a five-cent boost for skilled workers, and similar adjustments were won at Cadillac in Detroit, Buick foundry in Flint and Fisher Body in Lansing.

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The Next Round: Why Labor Wants More In '55

WHEN the Ford and General Motors contracts were signed by the auto union in June, some may have reasoned that this represented only a special case, and did not necessarily set a new sizable pattern for the labor movement. True, the package added up to about 19-20 cents an hour, but one could only get that total by totting up many tiny fringe items, and the average auto worker could only count on seeing 6 cents of that amount (and the skilled worker 14 cents) in his pay envelope right away; all the rest was in "contingency" benefits. The worker could lay hands on that money only if he were laid off and fulfilled all the many requirements of the layoff pay plan a year from now, or if he were sick, or pensioned, or in some other such contingency. There were also the special conditions of the auto union bargaining after a five-year contract and naturally looking for a big boost to make up for the years of stagnation. Perhaps, many reasoned, "Detroit's hot house incubated a mutation," as *Business Week* put it, and there would be no other substantial settlements.

But the new steel contracts soon answered that question. The winning


of a 15- to 16-cent average raise, all in cash, showed that the labor movement was on the move for a higher overall pattern than has been seen in recent years. It is true that the steel settlement, by taking part of the gains in the form of a spread between job classes—without apparent objection from the union—has increased the dangerous tendency towards a higher-paid elite and a low-paid, low-seniority substratum in American labor. But on the whole the steel workers feel they got a better deal than the auto workers by getting theirs all in much-needed cash, and the steel settlement has convinced the rest of the union movement that it is in the running for a fair-sized piece of change this year.

THUS we are apparently on the way towards a 1955 round of wage increases comparable to the gains of the early post-war years. In 1946, the pattern was an 18½-cent wage increase, comparable to 30 cents in today's prices. In 1947, the pattern was 15 cents an hour, and in 1948 about 13 cents. In the years immediately following, the pension plans became the big issue, and more modest gains

were won on that front for the next year. But then, beginning with the fifties, the pattern collapsed to measly 5-and-10-cent settlements which did not even keep up with the rising cost of living, so that in the years immediately following the outbreak of the Korean war, which brought sharp increases in both taxes and the cost of living, there is no question that the American worker experienced a decline in his real living standards.

The pattern collapsed for reasons that are clear and obvious. The American labor movement is a massive and cohesive body, which, as its treasuries and membership lists have risen, has exhibited a mounting sense of "responsibility" and caution. That's why it tends to move as a body; that's why its various sections look to each other for a lead before taking a new step; that's why there is such a thing as a "pattern" which all the unions strive for once it is set. But, in such a situation, stagnation can easily set in in the absence of a pioneering section which leads the movement to higher ground by taking a bolder initiative than its fellows.

The outstanding pace-setters of the union movement have been the mine and auto unions. The mine union broke ground for the formation of the CIO, and opened the new paths towards higher wages, which other unions later followed, in the wartime strikes, and towards pension and welfare arrangements in the post-war period. The auto union smashed the union-government barriers on the wage front in the great General Motors strike of 1945-46, and became the



STEELWORKERS AND . . .



. . . AUTO WORKERS

Sent the new wage round on its way.

spearhead of the wage gains for a number of years afterwards.

BUT in 1950, the auto union removed itself to the sidelines with its five-year contract. Nineteen fifty-two saw the last of even small wage gains for the mine workers, and then Lewis bowed out completely because of the sick condition of his industry. The rest of the labor movement—deprived of its customary pace-setters, beset by the Taft-Hartley Law, hounded with a new post-Korea outcry over “national defense,” meeting stiffer employer resistance—proved incapable of breaking through to higher ground; wage settlements oscillated for a number of years within a paltry range, the labor unions were stagnating.

There is no question that the main credit for the new higher pattern must be given to the activities of the auto union, which, to the evident relief of its members, finally finished serving its five-year term of hibernation and went into action once more. From this one fact can be seen the harm which Reuther did to the entire labor movement by signing such a long-term contract in 1950. He helped the employers increase the average length of all union contracts—by 1952, one-fourth of all existing labor agreements were for three years or more, where prior to 1950 anything longer than two years was very uncommon.

The determined strike preparations in auto, the militant temper of the membership, the new national interest aroused by the auto union’s re-entrance onto the contract scene, the year-long publicity campaign carried on before the negotiations opened, all must be given first place in the shaping of the new round of increases for which labor has now begun to fight in many industries. The effect upon the steel negotiations was clear from the moment the news came down to Pittsburgh from Detroit.

Prior to the auto settlement, the steel companies had been holding fast to a ten-cent offer, hoping to keep the concessions within the range of recent years. But then, as *Business Week* for June 11 records:

Increased militancy was quickly evident in the [steel union’s wage-policy] committee after the auto terms were announced. For a time,

it appeared likely to push the USW demands up higher. . . . David J. McDonald, president of the steel union, found it necessary to caution against “unreasonable” demands this year. . . .

Thus, like the man who fell into the water and came up with a fish in his mouth, the head of the steel union emerged from his negotiations in an even better position than Reuther. He got the increase in much-appreciated cash, and he is going to bargain again next year, where Reuther has no more bargaining to do until 1958!

ANOTHER factor lies behind the new pattern among the big industrial giants, and that is a certain change in the temper of the top corporate circles as against a year ago. When the economy started drifting downwards in the middle of 1953, America’s rulers were, whatever they may say now, really scared. Despite all they claim about “automatic stabilizers” and “cushions,” not one of them really knew just how long the trend would continue or how deep it would go. All their confident remarks had a false ring, and many of them thought that this might be “it.”


With the recovery that began towards the end of 1954 and has continued to the present, America’s ruling class heaved a sigh of relief. The fat cats are fatter than ever, profits are at a record rate among the biggest companies, business continues to look good, and all of this creates a somewhat different picture from the harsh antagonisms engendered in a period of decline. The consequences have been seen in many fields—civil liberties and McCarthyism, foreign affairs, labor—where occasional compromises are being made, and the more “reasonable” heads prevailing against those counseling extreme decisions. No one who examines the entire American scene objectively can fail to be struck by this development, and it had its effect in the auto and steel settlements as well.

With an aura of harmony and good-fellowship surrounding the top negotiators, it wasn’t long until the every-swallow-makes-a-spring theorists were mapping out a “permanent new era of collaboration between capital and labor” in the U.S. The reality, even for the immediate future, is likely to

be far different. These opening negotiations have been only with the top-most firms, the richest, the foundation rocks of the American economy where a strike would have meant a national crisis. Now, as the pressure spreads to other companies, bargaining is likely to get tougher, and 1955-56 may very well see considerable labor and strike activity. The Atlantic and Gulf Coast Maritime strike, the long-drawn copper strike, the increased ferment in the South, all point to that. And much of the sweetness and light will turn sour as the unions begin the campaign for the liberalization of local compensation laws to make the supplementary-job-less-pay plans workable under the law, for in the state legislatures, the influence of many NAM bitter-enders is strong, and there is no assurance that this fight is already settled.

THIS much of the trend is already clear: The auto and now the steel settlements have heightened labor’s militancy and bolstered its self-confidence to the point where aggressive movements will spread through the various industries to win sizable wage and contract concessions. This struggle for a new pattern will come up against employer resistance in many places, and we are therefore facing a period of increased union activity and battles. At the same time, the generally prosperous conditions still make possible the granting of some concessions to labor, and have been the factor helping maintain the country’s general political setup for the present at dead center.

Even in this restricted form, it is a welcome awakening from the stand-still psychology of the past few years. But most of the effects will be lost if labor permits itself, after a brief rally, to sink back again into another three or five slow-motion years. In this day of rising productivity, automation, merger and runaway shops, with a constant threat of labor-displacement moves hanging over its head, and with the unorganized South threatening at its back, labor cannot afford to settle back without menacing all of its gains and organization. The full benefits of labor’s new activity will be gleaned if it becomes the starting point for a determined organizing campaign of the South, and goes on to a militant counter-offensive on the political front.



The United Nations didn't turn out to be the "world government" that many hoped for. But the great debates between the two worlds and the role of the Asian-African bloc have made it more of a forum than the old League of Nations ever was.

Balance Sheet of the United Nations

by Wm. Raleigh

When the Egyptian nationalist forces convinced a weakened British imperialism that it had to get out of Egypt, the U.N. helped give Britain a face-saving exit. The *de facto* division of Palestine into two nations was recognized by the U.N. in its proposal for partition, but to this day it has failed to quiet the border wars between Jews and Arabs—mainly because none of the major powers wants to intervene decisively to insure the victory of either side. In the conflict over Berlin in 1947-48, during the blockade and air-lift, the U.N. was a feeble bystander.

But when Washington decided to risk igniting a global war to throw back the advancing tide of revolt in Asia by its Korean intervention, the U.N. provided a framework of oratorical support to the counter-revolutionary effort. Later, when the negotiations for a cease-fire took place, the truce was not achieved by U.N. intervention, but by face-to-face negotiations between the powers involved. The U.N. only recorded the accomplished fact.

THUS, in its main outlines and power-configuration, the U.N. has not dazzled the world with any achievements to distinguish itself above the old League of Nations. But, between the U.N. and the League there are some significant differences, produced by the profound changes sweeping the world—changes which have perforce injected their effects into the structure and life of the new world organization.

The League of Nations never included within it the world's major power, the United States. This limited its role. It was, moreover, conceived as an instrument of the Anglo-French imperialist partnership in imposing the rigorous terms of the Versailles Treaty. The League was set up under the terms of that treaty, to enforce its provisions. The U.N., by contrast, was formed in the absence of a general post-war settlement, and this difference dictated a function quite distinct from the League. Thus the U.N. became a sort of prolonged debating and negotiating conference, arguing the shape of the post-war world, instead of a would-be policeman of the already established post-war settlement, as the League tried to be.

WHEN the United Nations was launched ten years ago at the close of World War II, it was under the auspices of a charter which pledged its signatories to the preservation of peace, good-neighborliness, economic cooperation and the securing of the independence and freedom of every nation. Moreover, the U.N. was widely regarded as the first move in a campaign to establish some sort of world government. But, like the earlier League of Nations, the U.N. has not lived up to the ideals of its baptismal dedication. Like the League, it has functioned primarily as an instrument of imperialism. Like the League, it has disappointed the hopes of those who saw in it a germ of world government, proving once again that deep-going changes in society will have to precede such an authority.

Like the League in the cases of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the Nazi remilitarization of the Rhineland, the U.N. has been impotent and without any real power of its own outside of the contending world forces. In the one case which is cited as proof of U.N. authority, Korea, it was plainly used as a thin camouflage for U.S. intervention in an internal struggle. And, in almost every important case to come before it, the U.N. has ruled—when it has actually taken a formal stand—in the interest of the imperialist powers which control it, mainly the United States.

By its very nature, the U.N. can settle nothing which is not first decided power to power by the decisive forces involved. It can function as a mediator where it becomes convenient for the major powers to use this device. As an independent force, the U.N. as such has not attained any significant stature.

But, even more important than this, the U.N., by its scope of membership, does do in a partial and distorted way what the League never did; it mirrors to some extent the relationship of forces in the world. And the world balance of power has shifted steadily, ever since about 1943, in the direction of the anti-imperialist forces.

While it has thus far been able to refuse membership to the People's Government of China, representative of one-fifth the world population, it has not been able to close its gates or its forums to India or Burma, Egypt or Iran, Indo-China or Indonesia, or as a matter of fact, to spokesmen for the entire Asian, African and Near Eastern peoples either newly risen to independence or determined to fight on until the goal is achieved. These insurgent forces, which had no power in the old League of Nations, are a significant force in the U.N. They are a force growing in influence and power, and they often make of the U.N. a most embarrassing forum for world opinion against imperialism. If nothing else, they are an audience before which the powers must argue, as they are not fully committed to either side in the struggle.



The U.N.'s World Health Organization has innoculated millions, like this little Tunisian child, with anti-tuberculosis serum, but has barely started the huge health job the world needs.

IT was precisely on the issue of Chinese representation in the U.N. that the possibility of a loss of U.N. control presented itself to the United States. It is well known that the Washington representatives have been able thus far to have their way on this question only by applying the most murderous pressure. As Trygve Lie explained in his book on his seven years as Secretary General, "In the Cause of Peace," in 1950 when the issue of unseating the Nationalist Chinese representative and seating a representative of the genuine Chinese government was raised by the USSR, "five members of the [Security] Council had already recognized Peiping: the USSR, Norway, Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom and India. If two additional members, say France and Egypt, would vote to seat Peiping, that would be the requisite majority of seven which the United States had agreed to accept."

The issue of Chinese representation is only a symptom of the relative instability of Washington's control of the

United Nations. The U.N., unlike the League, is no one-sided affair; it is sharply divided. The three major blocs—the American-British forces, the Soviet states, and the bloc of neutrals including India, Burma, Yugoslavia and others—reflect decisive dynamic forces among the world powers. Far from being a mere agency, therefore, to enforce a treaty, like the League of Nations, the U.N. is a forum for debate and an arena for propaganda, as the world's powers struggle over the bitter issues ensuing from World War II and its aftermath.

INFLUENCE by the Asian nations, and of the colonial world in general, was felt from the very beginning of the U.N. These nations felt from the start that the U.N. should not be a tool for the imperialist subjugation of nations, as they would have been the subjugatees. Although they have by no means succeeded in transforming the U.N. into an instrument for the freeing of the subject peoples, they have functioned as a propaganda bloc on their own behalf, and thereby have limited American freedom of action. The old League legalized imperialist domination in its Covenant, which had a short and simple clause on the matter: "The tutelage of such peoples [colonies] should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility." But the U.N. Charter, under pressure of the raging colonial revolution, devotes a lengthy section to this question. No less than seventeen articles relate to the U.N. "trusteeship" system ("mandate" had become a bad word). These articles declare that the purpose of the trusteeship system is the "progressive development [of the trust territories] toward self-government or independence" and "to encourage respect for human rights . . . for all without distinction as to race. . . ." The very wording of the two declarations gives a hint as to the different pressures of the times. The fact that the colonial revolution threatens the life of imperialism finds its way into the U.N. The Asian-African bloc, in many cases supported by the Soviet bloc, is a threat to U.S. control. It would be an exaggeration, however, to say that it is thus far much of a threat.

The case of Tunisia alone is sufficient demonstration. In 1952 eleven Asian and African members of the U.N. jointly demanded that the Security Council take up the Tunisian situation. The French government had arrested and expelled the Tunisian prime minister and his cabinet, and instituted a reign of terror against Neo-Destour Party, party of Tunisian independence. The top councils of the U.N. after much debate refused to consider this appeal. There was a sharp division; the imperialist nations voted solidly in a bloc, and the Asian-African nations did the same. The United States abstained, along with its puppets, thereby assuring defeat of the motion.

Despite their defeat, the bloc which the Asian-African nations were able to muster in this dispute was of great significance. Should a labor government under Bevan, for example, and a socialist government in France or Italy, enter the scene, the United States could well be isolated in the U.N. on such questions.

Thus the U.N. reflects what is one of the central dilemmas of U.S. imperialism: the limited number of strong allies and the instability of those whom it can call

allies. On the other hand, both the Soviet bloc and the newly self-confident Asian-African group grow stronger.

In the old League of Nations the Soviet Union was isolated and weak. The colonial world had no independent spokesmen, and there was never a question as to who was boss. When Lenin called it a "thieves' kitchen" he was perfectly accurate; since the League was never more than a front for British imperialism, it never attained any degree of importance in the eyes of humanity or of governments. But while most of its founders may not have planned it that way, the U.N. has assumed a different coloration. The anti-imperialist world has made its voice heard in the halls of the shining structure for which the Rockefellers donated upwards of \$60 million to symbolize the "American Century."

IT must be kept in mind that the use of the U.N. as a forum, while of great importance to the colonial revolution, is neither completely effective nor completely free. The voice of the people forces its way in through the cracks and crevasses, and even then only by means of representatives who do not speak clearly in the name of the hundreds of millions determined to achieve complete freedom from foreign control and influence. Even Nehru, who has refused to be a tool of U.S. imperialism, is a man fearful of the dynamic forces of the mass upheaval in Asia, and in his own country. Thus it would be wrong to overstate the case, both as to the influence and the policies of the Asian and Africans as now represented in the U.N. It must be remembered that when the U.N. intervened in the Korean Civil War on the side of the hated Syngman Rhee, India abstained from voting on the United States resolution. The genuine voice of Asia, which feared American intervention in a civil war as a plague, was not heard in the U.N. at that time.

And while the U.N. was used against Korea it was *not* used in many other instances in which the Asian or African nations raised issues involving independence struggles. There never has been any question, for example, that the U.N. might intervene in Malaya on the side of the people against their British murderers and oppressors; nor was there ever any possibility that the U.N. would take resolute action to enforce its resolution against apartheid in South Africa. Nor was there ever a threat that the U.N. would halt the British slaughter of the population in Kenya colony.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the Asian-African bloc not only haunts the councils of the U.N., but is a very real force within them. The old League lived a relatively insulated life, completely in the atmosphere of the "white man's burden." To this extent the profound changes in the colonial world are expressed in the diplomatic jockeyings which constitute the U.N.'s most important function.

THE Western European powers are almost as much in fear of the political and military strength of the Soviet bloc as they are of the economic power of the U.S. Above all they fear the consequences to themselves of a third World War. The possession of nuclear weapons by both sides has dampened any warlike spirit that remained among the European capitalist countries. This impotence of the Western capitalist nations has contributed to the stalemate in the world struggle for power.

The U.N. has put this situation on public display. Dulles' speeches, for example, announcing the determination of the United States to "free" the Eastern European nations from Soviet control, found no sympathy from any of the Western European representatives. There was never a chance that the United States could get U.N. support for intervention in Eastern Europe, let alone the Soviet Union.

Above all in relation to the Asian powers, the Soviet Union has increased its influence. The U.N.'s sponsorship of the Korean war did not set a precedent for decisive counter-revolutionary action. On the contrary, the tremendous strength demonstrated by the Korean revolution and the New China was a bitter lesson. Thus, when the French attempted to crush the Viet Minh in Indochina, the response was cold in the U.N., not only among the Asian and African nations, but in Europe as well. Suggestions that the U.S. Air Force would intervene with the atom bomb sent a tremor of fear through the U.N. It is true that the U.N. did not settle the Indochinese war; it was settled power to power. But it is also true that no nation in the U.N. outside of the United States was in a mood to fight on the side of the French imperialists.

In recent times there has been much discussion of revision of the Charter of the United Nations. The central question is the elimination of the veto, which the smaller countries see as a limitation of their ability to force through their position by majority vote. It is instructive that not only the Soviet Union refuses to abolish the veto, but that the U.S. also will not relinquish it. For Washington fears that without the veto, a bloc between the Soviet countries and the Asian-African bloc could hamstring U.S. control. This situation in itself demonstrates the difference between the U.N. and the League.

ACTIVITIES of the U.N. in the fields of health, education and economic development are in sum total not qualitatively different from the gestures made by the League. But the atmosphere under which the U.N. operates is far different. The newly independent nations clamor for assistance in raising their productive capacity, in combatting the diseases, springing from poverty, which decimate their people, and in training and educating themselves in all fields. The record of the U.N. is scrutinized by vitally interested masses. They cannot fail to note that while the United States fed billions of dollars into the destructive war in Korea, only a few paltry millions have been spent to combat disease.

Trygve Lie stated in his book that "In the middle of the twentieth century, most human beings still are hungry most of the time; half the world's peoples have yet to be taught to read and write, are constantly ill and expect to die before the age of thirty-five. Calculations show that the per capita income of almost two-thirds of this total is less than a hundred dollars a year; . . . hundreds of millions still live in bondage and peonage not far removed from slavery." None of these conditions have been basically affected by U.N. efforts. But representatives of the underdeveloped nations have used the U.N. to push for aid. Between themselves, through U.N. commissions, they have exchanged experience and help in the fields of agriculture,

preventive medicine, and education. But the rich nations have given little help. Above all what has been needed is capital for the development of industry, but this has not been forthcoming. Such a world organization as the U.N., given sufficient funds, scientifically trained personnel, industrial and agricultural experts, could do much to speed the world economic and cultural development. But under the domination of the United States and its capitalist allies, the U.N. can never assume this role.

Because of the division of the world into two antagonistic camps constantly on the brink of war, the U.N. has been more of a battlefield than a clearing house for social betterment.

It is indicative of the limited place of the U.N. in the affairs that determine the fate of humanity, that as the conflict between East and West reaches a new stage, the Big Four conference, and not the U.N. General Assembly, meets to discuss and negotiate. Should the threat of the H-bomb war be reduced for a period, however, and the Soviet nations and the former colonial countries be given a protracted time for internal development, this could only result in a growing self-confidence of the anti-imperialist world—a self-confidence that could be reflected in the U.N. This much is sure: The U.N., unlike the League, does not dwell in any safe and secure fortress of imperialism.

Union Wins a Crucial Skirmish in the Bitter Kohler Strike

Milwaukee

A TREMENDOUS demonstration of labor solidarity has resulted in a significant defeat of the strikebound Kohler Company. As a result of the labor victory a serious crisis has gripped Milwaukee's city government.

The crisis was touched off Tuesday, July 5, with the arrival of the Norwegian ship M. S. "Fossum" at Sheboygan with a cargo of 1,700 tons of English ball clay destined for the Kohler Company. Union sources say that the company has only a two-week supply of clay on hand and is in desperate need of it. Last year the union had permitted four such cargoes to be unloaded at Sheboygan. This year the "Fossum" met a different reception. A mass demonstration of more than 2,000 strikers and sympathizers prevented a crew of strike-breakers from unloading the ship. Sheboygan's mayor Rudolph Ploetz ordered the ship to leave Sheboygan. Ploetz had been elected last April with the support of Sheboygan's Farmer-Labor Political League.

The "Fossum" then headed for Milwaukee on the verbal assurance of Port Director Harry Brockel that the cargo would be handled here. Milwaukee's dock workers had other ideas. Two AFL unions representing the workers on the municipal docks, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees and the Operating Engineers, announced that they would not touch the hot cargo. The CIO threatened a county-wide general strike if the city attempted to move the cargo.

After the harbor commission advised the "Fossum" to go back to Sheboygan, the ship left port bound for Montreal, Canada. Apparently the ship's owners had given up hope of meeting a friendlier reception in any American port.

The departure of the "Fossum" did nothing to end the crisis which now involved Milwaukee's Mayor Frank Zeidler, the common council, the harbor commission and the state government. The Kohler Company revealed that another clay-carrying ship, the M.S. "Divina," was in the Great Lakes, and that four more were expected in this year's shipping season, and that all these ships were to discharge cargo at Milwaukee.

Mayor Zeidler talked the unions into accepting a "compromise" which involved a promise by the unions to let the "Divina" unload in return for Zeidler's appeal for presidential intervention in the strike. This "compromise" blew up the very next day when the Kohler Company contemptuously dismissed the proposed White House mediation as just "another attempt to get the union off the hook." The unions then announced that the "Divina" would be picketed and that the dock workers would respect the picket lines.

Thereupon the struggle shifted to within the Milwaukee government. Under threat of lawsuits by the shipping firms and pressure from the Milwaukee and Chicago daily papers,

the harbor commission by a 3-to-2 vote adopted a resolution announcing that in the future any cargo would be handled regardless of whether there was a strike at the consignee's plant. The minority on the commission consisted of Frank Ranney, secretary-treasurer of Local 200 of the AFL Teamster's Union, and Milwaukee's one-time Socialist mayor, Dan Hoan. Hoan however joined the majority in voting to unload the "Divina." Mayor Zeidler also felt that the city was committed to unload it. However the ship's owners, judging that in view of the continued opposition of the unions the mayor and harbor commission majority would be unable to handle the unloading by themselves, announced that both ships would be unloaded at Montreal and the clay shipped to Kohler by rail.


MILWAUKEE'S Common Council, which, unlike the appointed harbor commission, has to face election in less than a year, was far from enthusiastic over the commission's actions. By a vote of 18 to 10, the council passed a resolution stating that it cannot and will not guarantee unloading of Kohler ships.

This resolution was promptly vetoed by the mayor. In his veto message he said, "I find that for me to sign this resolution would be to go back on my own action of informing the Port Director that I felt the ship could come into the harbor without incident on the basis of information I then possessed."

Meanwhile, Governor Walter Kohler had met with Sheboygan city officials and rebuked them for ordering the "Fossum" to leave the port. Kohler reportedly stated that as long as he is governor there will be no interference with lawful commerce. This was interpreted to mean that he was prepared to call out the National Guard to break up future demonstrations. The guard was used to break the 1934 Kohler strike. The governor, who claims to have no present interest in the Kohler Company, is the nephew of Herbert Kohler, president of the firm. Governor Kohler served as a strike-breaking "special deputy" in the 1934 strike.

The big newspapers all sided with the company. The liberal *Milwaukee Journal*, while denouncing the Kohler management as arrogant and headstrong, demanded that the ships be unloaded, and reserved its strongest fire for the threatened CIO general strike. The *Chicago Tribune* published an hysterical editorial headed "Wisconsin's Cowards" which applied that epithet to the governor and the mayors of Milwaukee and Sheboygan, raved of an invitation to anarchy and CIO goons, and demanded the use of the National Guard and a Taft-Hartley injunction. Hearst's *Milwaukee Sentinel* ran a front page editorial, "Not Big League," which denounced the refusal to unload Kohler's clay. The *Sentinel* covertly suggests that Milwaukee's port may be boycotted by shippers in the future, and warns of industrial stagnation to follow. This threat was echoed by the State Chamber of Commerce.

R. H.



REUTHER AND MEANY

CONSOLIDATION is the order of the day. Corporations are consolidating and small businesses are failing. Not uninfluenced by the trend, unions are uniting in the hope that they can match the powers with which they must do business. The rationale for weight and counter-weight is understandable, as is the impact of the corporation on the union with which it does business. (There are times when I think that the "personality" of the corporation or corporations is the most significant factor in the developmental history of a union.)

It is also understandable that unions are influenced by the society in which they exist. And their leaders particularly so! Didn't the Steelworkers, by constitutional amendment, raise Dave McDonald's salary to \$40,000 per year, and all officers correspondingly, without a single murmur? And wasn't the argument advanced by the Autoworkers in convention that Walter Reuther should be paid a salary equivalent to that of the corporation chiefs who sat across the table from him? And wasn't the self-same Reuther considered naive when he objected to the level-of-living in Miami taken for granted by his peers? And didn't Reuther conform by staying in Miami?

Now it is my thesis, simply stated, that the labor movement best serves its age when it is a transforming influence, not a conforming one; that is, when it challenges the economic, political, and moral values of the age, is in tension, if you please, with both Republicans and Democrats.

The sect is the disturbing influence in religious life, simply because the sect is in tension with the values of the world. The church, on the other hand, makes its peace with the world so that it can survive in it. What is amazing is the short span of time it has taken the CIO to settle down and become a church with Bishops in well-pressed suits,

Professor Kermit Eby of the University of Chicago organized the first Teachers' Union at Ann Arbor and later served as Executive Secretary of the Chicago Teachers' Union, helped organize the auto workers' union and was its first legislative representative at Lansing, Michigan, served as Assistant Director of Education and Research for the CIO to 1945 and, from 1945-48, as Director.

What will CIO-AFL unity mean? The plans for one big federation have given rise to much comment. Here are the stimulating opinions of an educator and long-time union activist who helped organize the CIO in its spirited and crusading rise.

Labor Unity Doesn't Excite Me

by Kermit Eby

who are busy serving their denominations. Once the CIO was prophetic—perhaps because its leaders were hungry.

So, in the first place, I am not excited about labor unity simply because it is possible. Just as I am not excited by church unity when it is possible; for when salvation in either area is determined by check-off or birth instead of conversion to a way of life, the Kingdom is seldom advanced, here or hereafter. If an example is wanted, study the German national church and labor movement.

I KNOW, of course, that the membership lists are increased! But an affirmation of statistical growth is no assurance of spiritual growth or influence. (I sometimes think the check-off is destructive of any development of the *participation sense* in the union, as the automatic payroll deductions are destructive of the individual's sense of participation in his government.) I think that the decision to lead a meaningful life must be a personal one. From the whole check-off system of life, results, quite often, merely apathy and an inclination to stay home and watch television instead of going to union or political meetings. To carry the analogy of the church to its conclusion: the church might be a greater influence for justice and for brotherhood if becoming a part of it placed a few demands—or even renunciations—upon its members. I have always been fascinated by the fact that the CIO almost reached its maximum membership from 1936 to 1941, and that the AFL doubled its membership during the same years. Certainly, the historical time was right; but there was also a dedication in the ranks.

Today, as everyone knows, it is the sects, noisy and non-conformist, who are converting the worker and far outstepping the conventional churches in membership gains. The Southern Baptists are not very ecumenical; last year they built 400 new churches and added thousands of new members. The Southern Baptists are sectarian. They hold

revival meetings; they "raid"; they sing; they testify; and they grow.

It is my conviction that labor unity is possible because there are no fundamental ideological differences to keep the AFL and CIO apart. It is likewise my contention that the unorganized worker, particularly, would be better served if this were not the case. As would the nation! There is no more significant fact in American political life today than the obvious one that we have struck dead center in our political alignments. There is no real debate on issues because there are no significant disagreements. This is one of the few times in our history when we have no gadflies to sting the complacent into action: no socialists, no wobblers, no progressives, not even any good old-fashioned anarchists. And we are in such a state because our pride is in our conformity. Like the Germans, as Pastor Niemoller confessed, we think that we can secure our own liberties by keeping quiet when the liberties of so-called undesirables are violated.

THE American labor movement does not profess to challenge the economic powers which rule America, nor does it really challenge the war system on which our prosperity rests. The American labor movement is not anti-capitalist; in fact, it is confessedly pro-free enterprise. Its chief economic affirmation is "a larger share for us in the fruits of increased productivity." The annual wage, the arguments for which are so profoundly *moral*, is no challenge to the system. Instead, the equity of the elite of labor is to be protected at the probable expense of those not embraced by it, and certainly at the expense of those employed by independent automobile manufacturers who cannot meet the increased labor costs because they are not powerful enough to pass them on to the public.

Here the trend in CIO which makes for unity with AFL is obvious. The industrial unions, which are in a monopoly position vis-a-vis their bargaining counterparts are joining with the AFL unions which have long been in such positions. In other words, it is a unity of the elites, in a sense, the unity of the *haves* of labor.

The argument advanced by those who favor consolidation is that combined resources will be used to organize the unorganized. I doubt very much that the impetus will be generated which will organize the white collar and service workers who so desperately need organization. The reason is obvious: self-perpetuating bureaucracies are too engrossed with their own internal power struggles, too conformist, to recapture their revolutionary ardor.

Organization comes about when the spark of idealism in a man strikes the tinder of social unrest in the society. And men who live on the same middle-class standard as their neighbors are not inclined to develop much spark. But there are more subtle reasons. A united labor movement inevitably means more power from the top down. (I wonder how many secondary or tertiary leaders were asked their opinion on the merger, and how many hard-working staffmen?) Such a topheavy power structure as a united labor movement promises, will result in increasing pressure on all the little chessmen of the system to conform, and conformity is the greatest stultification of creativity. Leaders surrounded by yes-men are soon without ideas. Hollow brass drowned in their own eloquence. Even labor educators in such a circumstance become apologists

for *what is*. Political appointees themselves, they become the rationale-builders of the structure which supports them.

HERE I would affirm that no true education takes place unless all the facts are given to the membership, all facts are discussed. Union leaders must believe that the right to knowledge is so sacred that it must be protected even though it may be turned against them. Pragmatically, this means that there is no real union democracy possible unless there is a willingness to study power as it impinges on the membership. For example, there can be no really democratic Steelworkers' union until the program and policies of Mr. David McDonald are freely discussed. Then, out of the discussion, there may grow opposition. Opposition which is open and loyal to its definition of what is best for the Steelworkers. Democracy is dependent upon factionalism, a two- or three- party system. (Here the Communist Party really did us a disservice, because it gave the power boys a handle by which to beat down opposition. Communists are factionalist. Communists operate from an external power base and with external loyalties. Q.E.D., so does *any* opposition; hence any opposition is communist.) I have always been intrigued by the fact that a movement which came to power by taking advantage of a two-party system in politics, is afraid of this same two-party system within its own internal political structure. "Reward your friends and punish your enemies," Gompers said. Doing so when there is only one caucus and one party—your own—is a neat trick, if you can do it.

Probably the most hysterical political experience I have ever had occurred when I worked for the labor movement, in the Teachers' Union. The mere suggestion of opposition produced violent reaction in both the Chicago Teachers' Union and the AFT. These scenes would usually end up with charges of disloyalty and subversion being hurled against the challengers of the in-group.

Today, for all practical purposes, the labor movement and the Democratic Party in the industrial North are one and the same. And, as a result, since 1954, there have been some decided victories for labor, particularly in Michigan. However, when I try to analyze any differences between Republicans and Democrats, I have great difficulty in doing so. And when there are differences they seem to be differences of degree rather than kind. For example, what real difference is there on the questions of peace and war? If anything, the Democrats of the labor-liberal coalition are more dangerous to peace than the conservatives among the Republicans. Having once flirted with dissent, they must now affirm their righteousness. What, if you please, is the Democratic answer to unemployment, except more war contracts and more inflation!

EVERY competent source I know affirms the fact that our civilization faces generic death, and that the survival of man is the only significant question of our time. And how little debate is there to bring out alternative choices? On Quemoy and Matsu, none. Only the blank checks for the great white father to fill in. And the labor movement supports the "holy war" all the way, when it might be appealing to the peoples of the world above and beyond its government.

Yes, I know that the "revolution begins in the rice



SITDOWN STRIKERS of the thirties illustrate the type of spirit which founded the CIO in its crusading days.

fields" of Walter Reuther. I also know the "but" which follows: "*but* we must be strong militarily." Could it be that we have no real answer for a stabilized economy except death? Why cannot someone spell out in detail what would be possible if we spent even a third of our present budget for the cause of peace? Instead, we denounce the Stockholm Pledge as written by the Devil, Stalin, Cesare Borgia, with Machiavelli as secretary. Perhaps this is so, but what I want to know is why we so often lose the moral initiative? Why is the unfulfilled hunger of all the peoples of the world, for peace, not increased by labor's concern?

Why aren't we telling our members that bombers bomb houses, and workers die in houses that are bombed! That there is no real certainty of defense. (Try evacuating Chicago, and watch the traffic jams.)

Labor as the hand-maiden of the Democratic Party does not excite me. And while Mike Quill is not my political mentor, I don't think his third party argument should have been dismissed so summarily with a quotation from Scriptures; at least, Mike should have known his Bible well enough to be able to reply, "neither do ye place new wine in old wine skins."

Consistent with the American tradition of conformity and success, those who lead labor want to win today, while the age in which we live demands a leadership which wants to be right tomorrow. Certainly, the best education takes place when issues are developed and debated as well as forever explained. For example, I would wager that 40-hours pay for 30-hours work strikes more of a response among the rank and file of autoworkers than the economics of the guaranteed annual wage—partly because the former is understandable, and certainly because its demands are more intensive, therefore more rationally idealistic.

I know that it is pleasant to live in a situation (such as between 1932 to 1952) when the little white fathers of labor have access to the big white fathers in the White House; it becomes embarrassing when the latch string is no longer out. But it might be better for the world if fewer

men could sit down quietly and make the arrangements; for after all, it is our life that they are bargaining with. I would not rejoice too soon in unanimity and consolidation; the risks are too great; let us, instead, risk the otherwise-minded and the prophetic. Might we admit that both labor and America would be better served if we had a militant labor party with a militant program for world peace in our time? And perhaps a prosperity not forever and ever fed by blood! Who knows, even the Russians might respond. At least, if we must die, we might prefer to do so on our own moral terms, and not on the terms of our enemies.

AMERICA needs an indigenously radical movement, and such a movement does not exist. It certainly does not exist in the labor movement, where the proponents of a nickel-more-an-hour have trampled over the prophets who once had a vision of the Kingdom. It is interesting to note here that men are far more inclined to die for the vision than for the nickel. That man was right who said, "Without vision the people perish." It may be purely an academic question, but I have often wondered why the worker is reluctant to support his leaders when they move from the problems of labor to the problems of politics? Could it be that the worker expects unilateral action vis-a-vis the boss, but distrusts it in government? And could it be that their leaders give them no real choices? I don't know. I wish that I did.

Certainly, here in Chicago during the last mayoralty election there was little choice between political organizations, except that the Democrats were "little thieves" and the Republicans potential big ones! Of course, face to face with such a choice, the sensitive chooses the little thief or stays home!

It seems to me, when faced with facts like this, that it is time that labor began producing its own leadership in the political world: men who can place the larger interest above their own. Here again, I return to Chicago and the record of labor's men on the Board of Education. With one possible exception, they were a disgrace; they were men who never got beyond plumbing or some other special interest. For twenty years, it was the women on the Board who spoke for *all* the children.

I would argue that labor leadership can only mature as it moves from the pattern of pressure and manipulation to that of public leadership and party responsibility. I cannot, therefore, become excited about "one big union" in Washington matching corporation strength. For it is my thesis that government must always be greater than any of its parts, "owned by no pressure group."

TO conclude, I can best illustrate my reaction to unity by explaining my feeling about the "spontaneous demonstrations" so well organized in most labor conventions. As I recall it was Philip Murray who used to time spontaneous demonstrations in the CIO: 28 minutes for himself, 14 minutes for Jimmy Carey, and 9 to 11 minutes for the vice-presidents.

The *CIO News*, in reporting the election before last in the Autoworkers Union, reports that the officers "were nominated without opposition and declared elected amid a wild display of enthusiasm. Hundreds of delegates par-

aded across the platform to greet the candidate at each nomination while a band blared, noise-makers raised a thunderous din, cheers roared, and gaily colored balloons soared in long strings to the towering roof of the hall."

It is these demonstrations by men of themselves which are increasingly made easier by unity, for each man in a sense is cheering himself as a part of the power jigsaw, and he is not incapable of imagining how a shift in the arrangement might benefit himself.

It seems further, that increasing unity and the merging

of interests into more powerful interests is another facet of the deeper regimentation of individual men beneath the benign pictures of a multitude of Big Brothers.

I conclude that unity does not excite me because I fear that it widens the breach between the whole and the parts; it is easy to think of 16,000,000 dues-paying members; but more difficult for those 16,000,000 to make their will felt!

And in the end, I want my spontaneity spontaneous. I want a movement prophetic and in tension with the political world—transforming not conforming.

Three Views on the Road Ahead for Progressives

The debate on the role of progressives and radicals in American politics, previously reported and analyzed in the American Socialist, has been continuing. Early in June, a report by Peter K. Hawley, state chairman of the New York American Labor Party, was adopted as a policy statement by the ALP state executive committee. The National Guardian

printed a brief report of a dissenting opinion by John T. McManus, ALP candidate for governor in 1950 and 1954. And finally, the Minnesota Progressive Party, dissenting from Hawley, has drawn up a reply to his report which it is sending to all state PP organizations for discussion. We print below excerpts from each of the statements.

* * *

The Hawley Report

SINCE the 1954 elections, members and friends of the ALP have been asking a number of basic questions. What is the role of the ALP? What are our electoral perspectives? . . .

In our own state we find that the defeat handed the Republicans at the last election, plus the people's continued pressure during the state legislative session, resulted in some modest gains and in the blocking of many pernicious measures. . . . That the Democratic Party leadership was something less than vigorous in its espousal of the people's needs, is a reflection of the as yet inadequate pressure from the grass roots. . . .

Where do we of the ALP stand . . . ? First: The ALP alone has a sound and coherent program designed to meet these needs. Whereas the Democratic Party purports to favor the people, there is no indication that it has broken basically with the cold and hot war policies of the Republicans. . . .

Second: The ALP, through the electoral issues we advance, the struggles we initiate, the unity we foster, can have, as we have had in the past, an appreciable influence on the policies, candidacies and activities of Republican and Democratic candidates. Our work as a "pressure group" in this area can be most useful in advancing the cause of peace and progress. . . .

In the fall of '55 it should be our goal to campaign for mass registration and enrollment by the voters of both parties, in order that they may be able to participate in the 1956 spring primaries—so as to elect peace-oriented delegates to the presidential conventions. We will support peace-minded labor-backed candidates, Republican, Democratic or independent, and we'll work for the defeat of reactionary candidates, regardless of ticket. It means running our own candidates or supporting the candidacy of an independent, where the major parties refuse to offer a meaningful choice.

As to our enrollees, who cannot continue to enroll ALP because of our loss of ballot status, it is not now possible to suggest a specific enrollment policy. However, whatever policy is subsequently worked out, it should serve to provide maximum leverage in the choice of candidates and program.

McManus' Viewpoint

JOHN T. McMANUS, ALP gubernatorial candidate in 1950 and 1954 and a member of the state executive committee, did not concur in the adoption of the report printed here. He proposed instead a policy of immediate organization in each Congressional District in the state for independent Congressional candidates in 1956 in the event that incumbents or proposed new candidates fail to declare satisfactorily for a

program of peace, jobs and rights. He proposed that present ALP members be urged not to enroll in other parties in 1955, in order to preserve independent status for the initiation of independent candidacies in 1956; and that organization start now for regaining statewide ballot status in the gubernatorial election of 1958. . . .

Statement of Minnesota PP

IN response to the Peter K. Hawley report on the role of the American Labor Party, we Minnesota Progressives wish to elaborate our stand in support of the *National Guardian's* call for an independent peace, jobs and rights party in 1956.


The crux of the discussion is to indicate the tasks of progressives between now and the time when the basic organizations of labor, the farmers, the Negro people and others are stirred to action in a great independent political movement which will shape our country's destiny. . . .

In no real way can the two major parties serve as forums in which we can educate the people to the need for a third party. The price for participation in one of the old machines is support for its candidates, defense of its policies, or at best silence in the face of its crimes. Thus the Hawley report in appraising the Harriman-Tammany machine says that "the Democratic Party leadership was something less than vigorous in its espousal of the people's needs." That kind of understatement is dictated by a turn towards the Democrats. It can never inspire a sentiment for political independence. . . .

A strong grass-roots pressure on the Democrats swung Truman far to the left in the 1948 election. This pressure found expression in the Wallace campaign. The labor movement is a potentially far stronger political force than were the Progressives in '48. Yet because they have supported the Democrats over the years, the powerful unions have been incapable of pressing for significant changes in the Democratic policies. . . .

Isolation of the war-now forces in both major parties would indeed serve the interests of the whole human race. A growth of independent popular pressure can help bring this about. But even if a "bi-partisan peace policy" should replace the present bi-partisan cold war, the need to develop the independent third-party movement would not come to an end. Experience teaches that neither the Republican nor Democratic parties can be depended upon to remain anti-war.

Progressives will understand that the peaceful utterances and gestures which will emanate from the two old parties in the months ahead will have no more lasting value than the radical campaign oratory of Truman in '48.



TITO, KHRUSHCHEV AND BULGANIN

With the public recantation by Khrushchev of the Russian charges against Yugoslav Communism, there remains only one account of the Tito-Stalin break on the table. That is the Yugoslavs' own story, and here is a summary of it.

The Yugoslav Version:

What Caused the Moscow-Belgrade Rift?

by Harry Braverman

FROM the moment when the amazing Mr. Khrushchev stumped rapidly down the staircase at Belgrade airport onto the Persian carpet and delivered his apology to Marshall Tito and the Yugoslav Communists, world opinion has come alive to Yugoslav-Soviet relations. The move has generally been accounted a shrewd one. Why not, after all, throw Stalin's quarrels back into the grave with him when in so doing you may win or at least neutralize a country with so many armed divisions?

With all eyes focused on the cold-war maneuvers of the Atlantic Alliance and on the Soviet responses to them, the foreign-policy aspects of the move have received primary attention from the various commentators and analysts. There is, however, another side to the story. The seven-year-old Tito affair represented a deepgoing rift in international communism, was fought long and bitterly on both sides, caused schisms in parts of the radical movement around the globe, featured a series of trials in Eastern Europe in which leading Communists were put to death on charges of "Titoism," and raised a wide range of pressing practical and theoretical issues which, though symbolized in the Tito controversy, are not confined to them.

To think that all this can be and has been settled with a fast brush-off by the jovial Khrushchev, by a fairy tale which no one is expected to believe about an imperialist agent named Beria leading Stalin around by the nose, would be fatuous. While Khrushchev's action represents a long step forward from the bitter-end intolerant grudge-fighting and vindictiveness displayed up to Stalin's death,

and while it shows a heartening flexibility in international relations which cannot help but do the cause of socialism and of peace much good, it leaves a parcel of loose threads which every serious socialist must attempt to tie up in his mind.

UP to the moment on May 26 when Khrushchev spoke, there had been two versions of the Yugoslav affair in world circulation. One had been put there by Stalin, Molotov and their subordinates, and was blared out to the world with a wealth of epithet to make up for the paucity of documentation. On the other side, there was a lengthy and detailed account circulated by the Yugoslavs giving their view of the matter.

But now the situation is changed. Of the two accounts, one has been flatly, unequivocally and apologetically withdrawn. "We studied assiduously the materials on which had been based the serious accusations and offenses directed at that time against the leaders of Yugoslavia," said Khrushchev. "The facts show that these materials were fabricated by the enemies of the people, detestable agents of imperialism who by deceptive methods pushed their way into the ranks of our party." Thus there is only one account of the reasons for the Tito-Stalin break on the table as of right now. The Yugoslavs' story has been told in many documents. After the break took place, they held a Communist Party congress in July 1948, and all the top leaders made reports in which most of them dealt extensively with the split. Later on, additional pamphlets were written and further speeches were delivered and printed.

Louis Adamic, an American sympathizer of Tito, initiated a publication called *Trends and Tides*, in which he printed much of the available information. Later, Vladimir Dedijer's biography of Tito, containing the clearest and simplest factual account of the break, was published by Simon and Schuster in this country and circulated widely.

THE first differences and frictions between the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party and Stalin came during the Partisan uprising in Yugoslavia during World War II. Yugoslavia, under the regency of Prince Paul, was sympathetic to the Axis and Hitler calculated on giving that country a satellite position in his European lineup similar to that occupied by Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. In the second year of the war, on March 25, 1941, the Yugoslav monarchy signed in Vienna a pact proclaiming adherence to the Axis, an action which was extremely unpopular in Yugoslavia and led two days later to an uprising in Belgrade and a *coup d'état* by a group of young air-force officers. Hitler immediately ordered a military offensive against the new regime. Resistance was weak and short-lived, and within a few weeks, Hitler had apparently achieved his goal. The entire land was occupied and partitioned between the Germans, the Italians, the Hungarians and the Bulgarians.

In this situation, the Communist Party, which had been illegal for many years and was not very large, but which nevertheless represented a determined and stubborn force, decided to try to organize an uprising, and actually issued a proclamation calling for an immediate revolt on the evening of the same day that Hitler began his attack on the Soviet Union, June 22, 1941, some two months after the country was occupied and partitioned. The proclamation was implemented with a series of bold and electrifying actions: Quisling newspapers were seized and burned in broad daylight by groups of young Communists in Belgrade, acts of sabotage against railway lines were committed, telephone wires were cut, and German trucks and motorcars were attacked. These actions, which in another situation might have led to nothing but reprisals, in this case because of the rebellious mood of the population caught hold and many groups with no direct contact with the Communists began to emulate them. The conditions for the formation of Partisan fighting units were soon prepared, the Communist leaders left the major cities and assembled in the countryside, pacts were concluded with some other political tendencies, old stores of arms were unearthed and military formations began to be organized in accordance with a plan worked out after Hitler's attack on the country.

The bold move was well rewarded. Within a few months a considerable army of fighters was under Tito's leadership, linked to central direction by a system of province commands, arming themselves rapidly with weapons wrested from the invader's hands, and a growing area of Yugoslavia was coming under Partisan control as village after village was cleared of occupying soldiers.

IN the given circumstances, the war of national liberation began rapidly to assume the character of a political and social revolution as well. The old authorities, in the main,

collaborated with the fascists, and the Partisans soon found themselves in the governing as well as in the military business. Tito found that the movement could only be inspired by the thought of a goal, a better order after the war, with the old parasites cleaned out and a popular



regime in its place. He learned also that the entire movement could be given a more determined and fortified character if the best and most class-conscious fighters, the city workers who flocked to the Partisan units in great numbers, were organized into "Proletarian Brigades" and given a leading role. The result was that, without any previous theory about the matter, almost in violation of previously held theories about a "pure" and "universal" national movement, the uprising began to take on a working-class and socialist character.

Tito's headquarters was in constant communication with Moscow by radio, and, within a few months, differences and clashes began. One of the Yugoslav leaders, Mosha Piyade, has written this story in a pamphlet entitled "About the Legend that the Yugoslav Uprising Owed Its Existence to Soviet Assistance." It is fully documented from the messages exchanged between Tito and Moscow, as well as from files of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, which continued to hang on in London throughout the war. He summarizes the entire story in his foreword:

In other words, they [the Soviet leaders] make out that they gave the People's Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia support which in fact they did not give it at all—indeed, which they refused to give it—for fear of spoiling their good relations with "allied" King Peter and his run-away government, even though they had ample proof that this [government] was pursuing a traitorous policy of collaboration with the German and Italian invaders, against the People's Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia. . . . The documents reveal the depth of hypocrisy of the Soviet rulers, who, in response to Tito's appeal for assistance adduced a cock-and-bull story about the technical impossibility of lending such assistance, all with fine words about admiration for the

fight put up by the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, while at the same time they were offering the very assistance requested—to collaborator General Mihailovich.

In February of 1942, arrangements were made for a Soviet airlift of supplies and munitions, and Piyade himself dispatched to the meeting point to supervise preparations. Instead of sending aid, however, the Soviet leaders suddenly engaged the Yugoslavs in a discussion of their tactics and orientation. While Piyade and his men waited in vain for 37 nights, the discussion went on, and in the end there was no aid. In a dispatch to Tito dated March 5, Moscow wrote:

Study of all the information you give lends one the impression that the adherents of Great Britain and the Yugoslav Government have some [justification] in suspecting the partisan movement of acquiring a communist character, and aiming at the Sovietization of Yugoslavia. Why, for example, did you need to form a special proletarian brigade? . . . We earnestly request you to give your tactics altogether serious thought. . . .

SOON another telegram was received from Moscow urging the Yugoslavs to "take into account that the Soviet Union has treaty relations with the Yugoslav King and Government. . . ." The background for this was as follows: A Yugoslav government-in-exile, based upon the monarchy and the capitalist and landowning politicians who had fled the country when Hitler attacked, was in existence in London all through the war, backed strongly by the British and Americans for a return to power after the war. This government was connected with the so-called "chetnik" forces of a Yugoslav army colonel (later a general) Mihailovich who had retreated to the mountains after Hitler's victory. The chetniks, while being given a great name throughout the world by capitalist press propaganda, did not undertake a serious war against the invaders, leaving the field almost entirely to the Partisans. Instead, they became ever more worried about Tito's successes, and soon began to organize military harassment of the Partisans. The old reactionary forces, in other words, saw no profit in a war against Hitler if it were going to wind up with a new popular Yugoslav regime.

Within a short time, the Mihailovich chetniks were collaborating with the Italians and had a virtual truce with the Germans, all sides turning their guns against Tito. In his war memoirs, even Winston Churchill, strongest prop of the Yugoslav royal regime and the chetniks, recorded this: "Mihailovich drifted gradually into a posture where some of his commanders made accommodations with the German and Italian troops. . . ." The Partisans were several times subjected to ferocious military attack by the chetniks in this very period, and were able to send captured documents proving these "accommodations" to Moscow. But Moscow remained adamant. Tito was forced to conclude, in a message he sent to Piyade while the latter still waited for the Soviet airlift:

There is however another thing at the bottom of our not getting any visits, namely: yesterday I got a tele-

gram from Grand-dad [Moscow], in which he informs us we are to hold up publication of our proclamation to the peoples of Europe, till the relations between the Soviet Government and the Yugoslav Government in London have been settled. From which one can see that the Yugoslav Government and not our policy is the main bar to our receiving assistance.

This went on through most of the spring of 1942, and finally, in August 1942, the Partisans, instead of aid from Russia, received the news that the Soviet Government had raised the Royal Yugoslav legation in the USSR to the rank of an Embassy. At this very time the chetniks were receiving aid from both Churchill and Mussolini, and had a truce with the Germans. The Yugoslav Partisans protested bitterly. Later, from captured documents of the Yugoslav government in exile, the Partisans were to learn that all through this period Moscow was conducting negotiations with the London exiles, offering them freely the aid it refused to the Partisans, and accepting their conditions that the London Government and General Mihailovich be given favorable treatment by the Moscow press and radio. Tito's biographer Dedijer summarized the matter as follows:

Essentially, a conflict had already arisen between the National Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia and Stalin. The latter was displeased by the fact that we had proceeded to establish new forms of authority against his will. Stalin undoubtedly desired the struggle in Yugoslavia to develop, but only in order to render the operations of the German army more difficult. Stalin never wanted a progressive movement to be created with roots of its own, which would rely only on its own forces, and would not await liberation from the Red Army. It was for that reason Stalin did not encourage the development of the uprising in Yugoslavia and for that reason the Soviet propaganda never mentioned the Partisans, although Stalin received detailed daily reports on the situation in Yugoslavia, broadcast through the secret transmitter in Zagreb.

The Russians were the last to send any aid or any military liaison missions to Yugoslavia. The British, even the Americans, were before them, all through 1943, and it was not until April 1944, after the whole world was conscious of an imminent all-Yugoslav victory by the Partisans, after a year of British aid, that the first Russian help arrived.

THUS, almost all through the war, the Soviet Government, impelled by an attitude of super-caution towards the royalist, capitalist and landowning Yugoslav London exiles, and by the most conservative worries about the British and American attitudes, looked with disfavor upon the militant social, political and military struggle of the Yugoslav Communists, and tried to sidetrack out of existence the sole European popular revolution to arise from World War II. But this phase eventually passed as the British and Americans reconciled themselves to Tito's power. Now a new phase opened. The imperialist powers, failing to find a way to shove Tito out of the picture by

direct action, turned to the Soviet Government and tried to accomplish the same thing by means of joint agreements.

In the fall of 1944, according to accounts in the memoirs of Hull, Stettinius, Churchill and many others, Stalin and Churchill settled upon a division of the Balkans into spheres of influence. The Yugoslav territory was to have been dominated 50-50 by Russia and Britain, and Greece was to be given over 90 percent to British influence. Although the Yugoslavs knew of this only through hints and rumors, they soon began to feel the weight of the agreement. In Tito's first conversation with Stalin, the latter insisted that the bourgeoisie of Serbia was very strong, although Tito dissented and said it was very weak. Stalin next urged Tito to reinstate King Peter, which Tito flatly refused to do. Then a significant incident occurred which Tito relates in these words:

At this moment, Molotov returned to the room, which he had left a moment back. He carried a telegram from a Western news agency reporting that the British had landed in Yugoslavia.

I leaped to my feet: "That's impossible."

Stalin, angrily: "Why impossible! It's a fact."

I repeated that it was impossible, and probably the agency was mistaken; that we had asked General Alexander to send us three batteries of heavy artillery to help our Fourth Army in its operations toward Mostar and Sarajevo, and the arrival of this artillery had probably been mistaken for an invasion of Yugoslavia by the British.

Stalin was silent, and then he asked the direct question: "Tell me . . . what would you do if the British really forced a landing in Yugoslavia?"

"We should offer determined resistance."

Stalin was silent. Obviously this answer was not to his liking. Was he at that moment pondering over the arrangements he had made for a division of spheres of influence in Yugoslavia?

That evening Stalin was permanently angry. . . .

The sequel to this came later with the crushing of the Greek partisan movement by the British while the Soviet leaders stood idly by. The Yugoslavs were at that time aiding the Greek fighters, but they were told by Stalin to end that assistance: "That struggle has no prospect whatsoever." The Stalin-Churchill secret agreement, thwarted in Yugoslavia by an aroused revolutionary movement with vast popular support, was fully honored in Greece, because of the CP's slavish obedience to the Kremlin, with tragic results for the Greek people.

IT is clear that the Yugoslav socialist government, the only one to arise in Europe as a direct result of a popular struggle and not as a result of Red Army occupation, was created in spite of Stalin, and owes its existence to a determined struggle by the Yugoslav Communists against Hitler and Mussolini, against the native capitalists and landlords, against the British and Americans, and also against Stalin's pressures as well. This must be accounted as one of the greatest revolutionary achievements which history has to record, all the more so in

that the Yugoslavs were totally unprepared for meeting many of the obstacles, having had the most complete confidence in Stalin up to this time and even afterwards.

But new blows were to come, new differences to arise. Once the new regime was firmly established, Stalin began to treat it as he treated the Red Army-occupied countries of Eastern Europe—as a conquered province.

With the arrival of the first Soviet missions, some of the Russian officers began, apparently as a matter of course, to try to recruit individual Yugoslavs into the Soviet secret service. They implied to those whom they approached that a watch would have to be kept over the Yugoslav leaders, that the Soviet Government needed its own direct sources of information and loyal agents in Yugoslavia. This naturally got back to the Yugoslav leaders, and they demurred, telling the Soviet missions that they could have any information they needed by coming to the top authorities. But the Russians stood firm, proclaiming it as an absolute principle that they had superior and overriding rights in the country, and should be served directly by anyone they approached. For their own part, however, they withheld much essential information from the Yugoslavs, especially in foreign relations.

The Soviet experts were paid by the Yugoslavs, and the Soviet government insisted on scales of pay upon which the Yugoslavs, accustomed to the more Spartan standards, looked with amazement. Their pay was four times that of Yugoslav army commanders and three times that of Yugoslav government ministers. The Yugoslavs protested in vain. The Russians tried to graft certain practices into the Yugoslav regime, practices which horrified the Communists fresh from a revolution. They urged secret courts; the Yugoslavs refused. They wanted their officers supplied with orderlies and body servants; the Yugoslavs refused. They flooded the Yugoslav press offices with so many articles about Russian affairs, Russian culture, Russian economy, etc., that the Yugoslavs almost had no room left for their own news and features, and obstinately insisted that it all be published. But, in return, they gave almost no place in their own press to the achievements in Yugoslavia, and returned many contributions from Yugoslav writers without publishing them. The Yugoslavs published 1,850 Soviet books, but the Russians published only two by Yugoslavs.

BUT the main source of conflict was the resistance of the Yugoslav Communists to the economic exploitation of the nation. In this sphere the demands of the Soviet negotiators were truly amazing, and have been fully explained, documented and analyzed by the Yugoslavs in a number of places, including an excellent little booklet entitled "On Economic Relations Among Socialist States," by Milentije Popovic (London, 1950).

Here the Russian experts were very formal, insisting on the most business-like trade relations, and often repeating the proverb: Friendship is friendship, but business is business. They insisted on organizing trade between the two countries on a capitalist basis entirely, using world prices as the foundation. Since the Yugoslav productivity of labor is naturally much lower than the Soviet, this placed the Yugoslav regime at a distinct disadvantage, similar to the relation between a capitalist industrial na-

tion and a colonial country. The Yugoslavs were sending products of two and three days' labor to Russia in exchange for products of one day's work. But the Russians refused to make any adjustment.

When, however, it came to the organization of joint-stock companies for various projects, the Russians suddenly dropped their businesslike capitalist mien and drew surprising arguments from the arsenal of Marxism. The Yugoslavs were to get no credit for the natural resources they were donating to the mixed companies, because "natural resources don't represent economic values; only human labor creates value." On the other hand, the USSR insisted on special and favored rights, similar to those of capitalist companies in colonial countries. The companies with Russian capital would be exempt from control by local authorities, would not have to maintain the standards set by labor legislation, etc., and would get monopolies in their fields. They would be exempt from provisions of the Yugoslav economic plan, which meant in effect that they would have a veto over it. In brief, the Russians insisted upon conditions far more onerous than those it gained in negotiations with such semi-feudal countries as Iran.

In the sphere of films, for example, the Russians insisted upon a block booking contract, so that the Yugoslavs had no choice of films and had to pay prices many times in excess of those it paid to the West. For example, they got Lawrence Olivier's "Hamlet" for about \$2,000, but had to pay some \$20,000 for "Exploits of a Soviet Intelligence Agent."

YUGOSLAV resistance continued stubbornly, and, early in 1948, Stalin's resentments at being balked began to flow over. All pressures, maneuverings and entrapments

proving fruitless, he resolved upon an open frontal assault and public excommunication, counting upon this extreme action to bring the Yugoslavs to their knees, or, failing that, isolate them and make their overthrow easy.

At the Cominform meeting in Bucharest in June 1948, all lesser arguments failing to intimidate many of the Eastern European delegates, the Russian representative Zhdanov finally stood up and said: "We possess information that Tito is an imperialist spy," upon which all resistance collapsed. Russia was later to expand this story with the tale that all the leaders of the Yugoslav Partisan war and most of the leaders of the Yugoslav government after the war, mentioned individually by name, had been agents of Hitler's Gestapo all through the war they led against the Germans, and, starting in 1943, had gone over to the American intelligence service. Also that Tito's government was a fascist regime. From the time of the Rajk trial in Budapest in the autumn of 1949 with its charges of Titoism and espionage, until the day that Khrushchev withdrew the story, this remained the official stand of the Soviet Government.

A generalized appraisal of the entire experience was made by Tito some years later, and is worth quoting at some length:

[Stalin] was influenced by the number of failures suffered by the workers' movements in the world between the two wars, and deep distrust toward everything outside the Soviet Union had taken root in him. And it is just he who is responsible for such a development in the workers' movements, which came about at least in part because the leaders in those countries followed his instructions blindly. This is the result of his inflexible view of things, his faulty estimation of the situation, and above all his methods of rigid leadership from one center. . . .

Stalin depreciated, still depreciates, the entire workers' movement outside the Soviet Union; he thought we in Yugoslavia would never triumph without his help; he was worried by our militancy even while we were fighting Hitler. . . . He never for a moment tried to understand that something new was happening in Yugoslavia. . . ."

In Tito's view, the Yugoslav Communists and people were able to resist Stalin's effort to subordinate Yugoslavia to the role of a satellite, where the other countries of Eastern Europe were unable to do this, because of the independent resources and energies released by the Yugoslav revolution, where in the other countries, the phenomenon of "revolution from above" provided the Communists with no such resources.

This then was the Yugoslavs' own account of the break with Stalin. This story is important not in order to rake over old quarrels, but because it brings to the fore sharp and clear the extremely important questions about proper and improper relations between the present chief territorial center of socialism, the Soviet Union, and all socialist movements elsewhere, whether in or out of power, and illustrates that Lenin's avowal of national self-determination retains its importance even after countries take the socialist path.





What Is a "Security Risk"?

by Charles C. Lockwood

Charles C. Lockwood, attorney-at-law of Detroit, has tangled with the government witch-hunt apparatus a number of times, and has come away with an exceptional record. Two of the cases which he fought became national issues. In the case of Lt. Milo Radulovich of the U.S. Air Force, a decision to withdraw an officer's commission entirely on grounds of family associations was revoked after a wide public outcry. And in the case of John Lupa, an attempt to blackmail a Detroit worker into serving as an FBI informer on his fellow workers by discharging him from his job at the Detroit Tank Arsenal and threatening him with further reprisals was also defeated and the firing reversed.

Two things were noteworthy in both these cases. The victims did not keep silent, but fought their cases militantly, and both cases received considerable support from the auto union and the CIO which kept up a consistent pressure upon the government. And both had an attorney who does not restrict his progressive efforts to the courtroom alone. As an officer of the Citizens Committee Against the Trucks Law (a Michigan "Smith Act" with even more onerous provisions), as attorney for the Greater Detroit Consumers Council, and in other community activities, he has courageously fought for what he believes.

In this article, Mr. Lockwood has dipped into his files and brought up some interesting information.

THERE are few charges which can be brought against an individual more heinous or damaging than that of being a security risk. Naturally, most people assume that responsible government agencies will not bring such charges except on relevant and positive evidence of sufficient seriousness and credibility.

It might be of interest to readers of the *American Socialist* to know something of the actual innuendoes and childish accusations on which American citizens are being branded and forced to stand trial as "security risks." My introduction to this type of fantastic proceeding began in 1953 as attorney for air-force lieutenant Milo Radulovich. The public is acquainted with the guilt-by-relationship features of that case. Here are some other cases typical of the many in which I have taken part since the Radulovich case.

Case 1 involved Mr. A., who is a professor at Wayne University in Detroit. The main charges against Mr. A. were the following: "It is reported that you acted as chairman of a meeting of the Detroit Federation of Teachers (AFL) at which academic freedom was discussed. You attended a class in 1937 at Harvard University taught by Professor X."

Case 2 involved Mr. B., who was an engineer at the Holly Carburetor Co. in Detroit, and a graduate of the University of Detroit, a Catholic institution. The main charge against Mr. B. was the following: "It is reported that you were brought up by your father and mother to hate the United States."

Case 3 involved Mr. C., who was an employee of the Naval Ordnance Division in Detroit. I was retained by Navy Captain Hart, who was in charge of Navy Operations in the Detroit area. The only charge against Mr. C. was the following: "It is reported that while you were a student at Wayne University in 1947 you joined an organization known as Youth for Democracy."

Case 4 involved Mr. D., who was an employee at the Detroit Tank Arsenal. The main charge against Mr. D. was the following: "It is reported that while you were a regularly enrolled student at New York University in 1947 you took a special course in Marxism at the Jefferson School for Social Science."

Case 5 involved John Lupa, also an employee at the Detroit Tank Arsenal. Mr. Lupa had served honorably for 18½ years in the army, navy and air force. He volunteered and was accepted for service in the Korea conflict. The main charges against Lupa were the following: "It is reported that you attended one or more meetings of the Socialist Workers Party and that you had association with one or more members of that party. It is reported that at one time you received publications of the Socialist Workers Party."

AT the government hearing, I introduced in evidence an affidavit by Mr. Lupa. Both Mr. and Mrs. Lupa testified under oath as to the facts set forth. Because of the insight which it gives us into the methods employed by "security" agents and the way in which attempts are made to recruit informers, I have appended that affidavit to this article. [See box.] In view of the serious nature of the charges made by Lupa and his wife in their affidavits, a formal demand was made on both the Hearing Board and the FBI to produce Agent Clifford for cross-examination. A personal telegram was even sent to J. Edgar Hoover acquainting him with the contents of the affidavits and demanding that Clifford be produced. However, Mr. Hoover and the FBI maintained a very discreet silence through it all, and Agent Clifford was never produced.

After a long delay, John W. Lupa was completely cleared of all charges against him, and is now working again at the Detroit Tank Arsenal.

Case 6 is a case which was heard April 21, but in which no decision has been rendered at the time this is written. The accused is Jesse C. Rutherford, a young Negro who lives in Willow Run Village, near Detroit. The main charges were the following: "You were a candidate on the Progressive ticket for the office of State Representative. You sat on the same platform with Paul Robeson at a political rally of the Progressive Party."

Now it so happens that Mr. Rutherford was employed as an orderly at the Veterans Hospital in Ann Arbor, Michigan, at the time he was suspended as a "security risk." At the hearing I asked him what his duties were

How the FBI Tried to Recruit an Informer

State of Michigan)
)SS
 County of Macomb)

JOHAN W. LUPA, of 6212 Baldwin, Detroit, Michigan, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

On April 7, 1954, I was working my job when my immediate supervisor handed me a note telling me that I was to report to Mr. Phelan, the Security Officer. . . . Mr. Phelan handed me a brown envelope with a receipt stapled which he asked me to sign and open. I did so, and found the Letter of Charges dated March 30, 1954, in it along with the book of Special Regulations No. 620-220-1. I read the Letter once and then read it again slowly, and carefully, and finally I asked Mr. Phelan what all this means. He gave me to understand that I was a security risk and being suspended as the Letter states. Then I asked him, "How do I go about clearing this up?" He said, "Look into your Regulations. They are all outlined."

I told him, "It is a big book and I want to start at this right away." He answered, "Why don't you go down to the FBI attorney?" I asked, "Who do I see down there?" He said, "Mr. Clifford." I asked, "How do I go about seeing him?" He said he would arrange it. . . .

He [Clifford] sat down by the desk and I sat next to the desk, and he said, "What is this all about?" I showed him the Letter of Charges. He glanced over it quickly, and said, "Yes, I know a little bit about this case already. Well, what do you think about it?" I said, "I think it is a raw deal. I don't like it. I was told to come down here. What I feel like is to take this letter right down to the Detroit News, throw it on the editor's desk and walk out." He said, "Don't do that. You are all excited. Calm down." I said "How can I calm down with a dirty deal like this? How can anybody think I am a security risk with all my military service. How do I go about getting my job back?"

He replied, "Well, these are tough cases and you are in a tough spot. These sec-

urity cases are all resolved in favor of the government. But you have helped yourself greatly by reporting directly to the FBI."

Then I told him, "I have got to fight this. I don't know how. It would take a Philadelphia lawyer to understand this book of Regulations. I have got to hire a lawyer, but what lawyer? If I hire the wrong lawyer, it will not be good."

He agreed with that right away by saying, "That's true. I understand a little about these cases. They drag on and on. Maybe I can help you if you would give us a little help on rooting out subversives." I said, "Fine, I will give you all the help I can on rooting out subversives."

He said, "I have a little influence at Packard and Ford and maybe I can get you in, if you will go to work there and penetrate the Socialist Workers Party and find out what certain people . . . are up to. We want to know what is going on." I said to him, "I don't know about going to work. I got a raw deal on this case and I hope to clear myself by a hearing. I don't like the idea of spying on people. I just want to earn a good living for myself and my family and go my own way."

Then he said, "How many children do you have?" I said to him, "I've got three small boys, my wife and my mother, whom I support." He then said, "These charges against you are very serious. In fact, they are so serious that when your kids grow up and apply for a job, they could be used against them. They would have a rough time finding a job. Why don't you reconsider my offer?"

I felt the blood rush up to my head, and had a difficult time controlling my emotions. It looked to me like a "be a stool pigeon or starve" proposition. I said to him, "I don't want any part of this kind of a deal. I'm not going to starve and you can't get me to go for something like that. I can go into business for myself." He said, "Don't do anything rash. I have an appointment now, but how about you going home for a few days, and I'll call

you. I know you are all excited. Calm down a little and think it over. I have to go now." I said, "Fine, I have a class to attend," and then I left. . . .

HE did come, and I introduced him to my wife. She was busy for a few minutes with my baby boy. I told him, "I am going to fight this case. My wife and I have talked it over and we also talked to our priest and we decided we must fight this. I have a lawyer and he drew up an answer to the Letter of Charges." I then showed him a copy of the answer. He read it and then said "That is very good. Will you be looking for a job?"

I said, "I don't think so. I am thinking of going into some kind of business anyway. He said, "Have you thought of what we spoke about in connection with the Socialist Workers Party?" By this time my wife had got through with the baby and sat down with us.

He continued, "Does your wife know about this?" I said, "She does. We talked it over." He said, "What we would like for John to do is to go into the shop and get some information on subversives. I can get him into either Packard's or Ford's immediately. He could help us get some information. . . . As it is, John is in quite a jam, and it will be quite difficult for him to clear himself."

I then told him, "This whole thing is repulsive to me. Even if I did become an informer and went to work at Packard's immediately after being fired as a security risk, how could I penetrate the Socialist Workers Party? It would look fishy. The whole business looks fishy to me anyway. I'm against subversives as well as the next man, but I am against the idea of being a spy or informer on anybody. I don't see that it will accomplish anything."

Shortly afterwards, Mr. Clifford left my home, and I haven't seen or heard from him since.

/s/ John W. Lupa, Affiant
 Subscribed and sworn to this fifth day of June 1954.

as orderly, and he replied, "My duties were to sweep floors and empty bed pans." I asked him: "Was the nature of your work such that it would have been humanly possible for you to be a security risk?" and he replied: "Absolutely not."

In none of these cases did the government produce a shred of testimony or evidence to back up its charges. In none of these cases did we confront a single accuser. In fact, rarely do the members of the Hearing Boards themselves know who the accusers are, and yet without this all-important information, the Board members must determine the reliability of the accusations.

In every one of these cases except No. 6, which is still

pending, there has been complete clearance. In some of the cases, however, there was a long and unnecessary delay, causing extremely cruel hardship and mental strain.

In thirty-five years of active practice as an attorney, I have never experienced anything that even remotely resembled the vicious, slanted and undemocratic procedures of a typical "security risk" hearing.

I am convinced that if the public really knew just what is happening to countless decent, law-abiding American citizens by reason of scurrilous and baseless accusations made by faceless accusers, we would have such an aroused public opinion as to force immediate and drastic corrections in our whole investigative procedure.

German pre-World War I socialism, proudest and strongest in the world, went smash in 1914. A search of the ruins shows many signs of weakness that led to downfall. An instructive essay on opportunism.

German Socialism and the First World War

by Bert Cochran

UP to 1914 the German Socialist party was considered the model by socialists throughout the world. Even Lenin, who followed its developments carefully, upon receiving in 1914 a copy of *Vorwärts*, the party's Berlin newspaper, which announced that the Socialist delegation in the *Reichstag* had voted war credits to the Kaiser, was convinced the paper was a forgery put out by the German General Staff. As the truth became known, and as Lenin began to think over the reasons for the betrayal, he came to the conclusion that the party's socialist integrity had been gradually undermined over many years through opportunist adaptation to imperialism. Carl Schorske, associate professor of history at Wesleyan University, reaches essentially the same conclusion in this analysis of the German movement,* which is an absolutely first-rate study if we disregard the occasional patronizing note of the college professor.

The British Labor Party, considered up to 1914 to be at the opposite end of the political spectrum from the German, was organized by the trade unions at the turn of the century as an avowed reformist organization, which did not even incorporate the socialist goal into its program until the lapse of a number of years. The German party, in contrast, born of a fusion of the Lassallean and Marxian organizations in 1875, when the German trade unions did not amount to very much, hardened its revolutionary character under Bismarck's repressions, and gained in stature and strength through unyielding opposition to the Prussian state. But despite the different line of development, the same forces that tamed the British labor movement began to operate on the German party, so that with the outbreak of the first World War, the inner nationalistic kinship of the two organizations was exposed for all the world to see.


The author develops his theme by describing how the conservative forces first gained strength at the turn of the century with the emergence of a powerful bureaucracy in the trade unions, now grown big and wealthy. The unions' successes in raising the workers' living standards and the growing political importance of the party were generalized into a comprehensive gradualist theory by Eduard Bern-

stein, who had lived for a number of years in England and had there come under the influence of the Fabians. Bernstein challenged the Marxian program all along the line. Theorizing from the absence of any world economic crisis for the two decades after 1873, he advanced the idea that capitalism had now developed a capacity to eliminate major economic crises by means of newly established credit mechanisms, cartel controls, and intensive exploitation of the world market. At the same time, there was taking place, according to him, a more equitable distribution of wealth. Bernstein therefore urged the Social Democratic Party to concentrate its attention on immediate welfare aims, in which effort he believed it would win increasing support from the capitalists themselves if only the party emancipated itself from out-of-date revolutionary phraseology. As can be seen, Bernstein's propositions read like a more mature and rounded statement of the ideas we hear today from liberals and labor leaders in the United States. Actually, this theory was first formulated in 1899!

THE Marxist tradition was, however, still very strong in the party, and both the convention of that year and the one in 1901 reaffirmed the traditional program. The opportunist tendency, apparently repulsed by the overwhelming majority of the party convention, was in fact gathering strength and its influence was permeating every part of the organization. This was shown in the new struggle that swept through the party in 1905 in the wake of the first Russian Revolution, repercussions of which were felt throughout the European labor movement.

That year Germany was in the throes of an unprecedented strike wave involving half a million workers, more than the total of the previous five years combined. The employers were powerfully organized and battled the unions aggressively, in many cases to the latter's exhaustion. The rising cost of living and the ferocity of the strike struggle generated militancy in the ranks, dissatisfaction with the traditional parliamentary and electoral activities, and receptivity to radical political solutions. In this atmosphere, Rosa Luxemburg, who had played a prominent part as one of the Left leaders in the controversy with Bernstein, reintroduced the idea of a general strike, or as it was called by the Germans, the political mass strike, designed as a militant tactic to mobilize the working class

**GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: 1905-1917*, by Carl E. Schorske. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1955, \$5.50.



behind far-reaching socialist objectives. Sparked by the left wingers, the idea spread like wildfire in the ranks.

The trade union leaders got thoroughly frightened and reacted violently to the challenge. They adopted ahead of the party gathering a statement of their position in which they branded the very idea of a general strike as "non-discussable," and warned the workers "not to let themselves be distracted from the small day-to-day tasks of building up the organization of labor." The unions' spokesman, Theodore Bömelburg, head of the mason's union, declared emphatically: "Our literati [have] no conception of the practical labor movement. To develop our organization further, we need peace in the labor movement. We must see to it that the discussion of the mass strike ceases." The trade union heads in effect declared open war on the party left wing.

BOMELBURG'S statement unleashed a battle royal between the party and trade union press. Tension was at a peak as the party convention met at Jena on September 17, 1905, with the mass strike as the principal item on the agenda. Everyone was eagerly waiting for the position of the party's revered chairman, August Bebel, who had not expressed himself on the question prior to the convention. Bebel, who conceived it as his supreme duty to preserve the unity of this exceptional party mechanism that had been forged by the German genius for organization, spoke for three and one-half hours. He tried in his masterly address to reconcile the opposing viewpoints within a broader conceptual framework, in which the political phraseology, however, was far more aggressive than the tactical course actually outlined. He concluded by proposing a resolution on behalf of the party executive committee which declared it labor's duty to employ every means of defense, including, under certain circumstances, mass work stoppages, against attacks on either universal suffrage or union rights.

Bebel's highly qualified approval of the general strike was restricted to the brief demonstration variety such as the Belgian, Dutch and Swedish socialist parties had successfully employed in 1902 and 1903 to win universal suffrage or to combat restrictive anti-union legislation; it was not the same thing as Luxemburg's idea of the strike as part of labor's revolutionary mobilization. Nevertheless, this resolution was generally regarded as a Left victory at the time. But like previous victories over Bernstein, it was soon demonstrated to be an empty one.

WITHIN a few months after the Jena Congress a new electoral crisis was precipitated in the country by reactionary moves to further restrict suffrage rights in the Federal States where the Socialist party was strong. The German electoral system outrageously discriminated against the working classes. In Hamburg, for example, which had one of the better three-class systems, the "third class" was permitted to elect half of the city council. In the summer of 1905, Hamburg's governing body decided to further subdivide the "third class" into two parts, with the lower-income group to be permitted to elect only 24 out of 160 councilmen. Proposals of a similar character were introduced in other parts of Germany.

The crisis strengthened the Left, which was further reinforced by dramatic events occurring abroad. In the last weeks of October, Russia was swept once more by a series of mass strikes which forced the Czar to grant a constitution. The Austrian Socialists, at their Congress of the same month, adopted the mass strike as a weapon to win universal suffrage; and, cowed by mass demonstrations that took place throughout Austria, the government promised to introduce a bill for electoral reform.

The suffrage movement now assumed major proportions in Germany. But instead of hailing it, the party executives looked askance at the new wave of insurgency. In a secret conference with the trade union heads they arrived at an agreement on party and trade union cooperation in which they pledged to discourage any attempts at mass strikes. If a general strike broke out nevertheless, it was agreed that the party would assume the sole burden of leadership and bear all the costs. Only if lockouts and strikes continued after the mass strike was called off would the trade unions contribute financially. When the contents of the secret agreement leaked out in the local trade union press, it put a damper on the suffrage movement. Put to the test, the party leadership showed it did not take its own Jena Congress resolution seriously.

The left wing, convinced that the trade union bureaucrats were sapping the revolutionary vitality of the party, pushed at the 1906 Mannheim convention to subordinate the trade unions to the party. The sentiment of the convention was clearly with the left wingers, but the party executive, using a trick that was to become increasingly familiar in the next years, added to its own motion some of the general phrases from the Left resolution, while omitting the essential clauses that called for enforcement, and jammed it through the convention, before most of the delegates could fully comprehend the situation. The trade union bureaucracy thus demonstrated its ability to thrust the party back into a reformist mold.

The *Leipziger Volkszeitung* lamented that ten years of warfare against revisionism had been in vain, "for the revisionism we have killed in the party rises again in greater strength in the trade unions." Rosa Luxemburg observed that the new relationship of "parity" established between the party and the unions was like the arrangement by which a peasant woman sought to regulate her life with her spouse: "On matters of question between us, when we agree, you will decide; when we disagree, I shall decide."

THE Left, at first preoccupied with the theoretical aspect of the dispute, did not fully comprehend the implications of the increasing bureaucratization of the movement. As a matter of fact, federalism, decentralization and states' rights were in the early years the watchwords of the reformist tendency, which by these means sought to gain more elbow room for itself from the domination and discipline of a hostile party leadership. But as the struggle progressed, the roles became reversed, and the Lefts began to stress democracy within the party against the over-centralization of a conservative executive now in alliance with the trade union heads. This turnabout is not surprising, as organization concepts never possess an independent status, but are invariably conditioned by the political aims of the protagonists, and how organizational distribution of power affects their political aims.

All these years, the Prussian state continued sitting on the question of granting universal suffrage. The Kaiser's Germany remained an essentially dictatorial monarchy with a democratic facade. By 1910, the "suffrage storm" broke again, and the Social Democratic party began one of its longest agitation campaigns. Huge demonstrations took place in the major cities, clashes with the police were numerous and violent, and the campaign merged as in 1905 with a growing strike movement. The mood of the socialist rank and file waxed stormier as the hopelessness of reform from above became apparent. And as in 1905 demands rose for a general strike. Luxemburg, who again assumed intellectual leadership, argued that the suffrage movement would either have to go forward into demonstration strikes and perhaps develop into a general strike, or the mass will to action would weaken and the movement collapse of its own weight. Everything, she insisted, depended on the determination of the party; she therefore urged official encouragement of demonstration strikes and a general discussion of the mass strike to see how far the masses would respond to the idea.

But at the height of the campaign, Karl Kautsky, the theoretical authority of the party, and previously associated with Luxemburg, broke with the Left. He wrote that the mass-strike advocates would only raise vain hopes for reform, and lead masses to wear themselves out in a costly struggle from which only defeat and discouragement would result. Kautsky recommended the strategy of Fabius, the Roman general who avoided any head-on battles with Hannibal of Carthage. The right wing was jubilant. Wilhelm Kolb, one of their leaders, publicly jeered at the split in the Left's ranks:

The attempts of the Marxists of [Kautsky's] school to demonstrate the correctness of their teaching breaks

down in the face of reality. K. Kautsky permits railroad workers, yes, even minor officials, to take part in a general strike—in theory. But as soon as Comrade Luxemburg comes along and wishes to make a practical test, Kautsky, the adamant man of principle, transforms himself with the turn of the hand into an opportunist. . . . The breakdown of the breakdown theory has never been so clearly illuminated as in the controversy of Rosa Luxemburg vs. K. Kautsky in the matter of the mass strike.



AT the Magdeburg convention of 1910, the emergence of a Kautskyst Center faction was finalized, and the party was now up against a three-way division. As before, a fictitious compromise was engineered on the question of the mass strike with a motion to adopt Luxemburg's statement of principles while the specific recommendations for a broad discussion of the mass strike were dropped.

The next year, a new crisis rent the party over the Agadir incident when the German cruiser, "Panther," sailed into Agadir harbor to protect German imperial interests in Morocco. Camille Huysmans, secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, sent to the secretaries and delegates of all socialist parties a note calling attention to the international crisis and asked if they thought the time had come to call an international gathering. Bebel was away in Zurich when Huysman's note arrived, and Molkenbuhr, one of the full-time secretaries, sent a reply that he saw no need for a meeting, and that, in any case, were the German party to bring the Morocco question to the fore, it would harm it in the coming *Reichstag* elections. Luxemburg thereupon threw a bombshell into the party by publishing Molkenbuhr's letter, a copy of which she received as a member of the International's secretariat, in the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, along with a vigorous denunciation of its contents.

The publication of this letter caused an upheaval inside the organization and brought discontent with the party leadership to the boiling point. "The control commission, whose function it was to check the activities of the party

executive," writes Schorske, "met immediately after the publication of the Luxemburg article. Its majority, composed of centrists, expressed its conviction that the executive had been negligent in the Morocco affair, that it should have acted more quickly and more decisively, and that it should launch an agitation to make up for lost time. The executive was thus forced into a position of acute embarrassment. At the same time, but in a very different quarter, the executive created difficulty for itself in 1911. At the request of the general commission of the trade unions, it issued a so-called 'secret circular' to party district leaders to moderate the attacks of the party press on the trade unions. Again there was a leak. A bourgeois paper in Saxony published the circular, and a great hue and cry arose over the attempted censorship."

GENERAL discontent came to a head at the Jena convention of that year with the demand to reform the leadership, but after a year of maneuvering, study commissions, and enlargement of the committee, the Lefts got nowhere and the conservative forces succeeded in further tightening their hold on the organization:

By 1912 the Social Democratic Party numbered nearly a million members. Yet it stood powerless in the German political arena: powerless to win the fundamental constitutional reform upon which in turn further social reforms depended; powerless to stop the armaments race and the recurrent threats of war; powerless to resist increasing pressure upon the labor movement from the employers, the bureaucracy, and the courts. The problem of the party, posed in its broadest terms, was how to break out of the closing ring of its hostile environment, how to achieve some success commensurate with its numerical strength.

The impasse sharpened the divergences, and inner-party strife reached almost unbearable proportions. The faction struggle penetrated right down to the local levels. In 1913, in the midst of all these difficulties, the annual report of the party executive was published, which contained the shocking news that the party membership had increased by merely one percent in 1912-13; only 12,000 new members as against a gain of 140,000 the previous year. "Stagnation"—the word swept through the party and dominated the press discussions throughout the summer. By the time of the party convention in September, the unstable Center faction, frightened by the party's steady drift to the Right as exemplified by the *Reichstag* delegation's vote for the record-breaking military expansion bill of 1913, united with the Left against the leadership, and even supported Luxemburg's resolution on the mass strike, which it had opposed in 1910. The convention battle attained unusual ferocity when the united Left broke all party precedent and ran its own candidate in opposition to the executive's nominee for the executive committee, losing out by the close margin of 269 to 211. The bonds of unity were close to the breaking point on the eve of the war.

WE now come to the part of the story that has been told many times and is well known. "By its unani-

mous vote for the war credits on August 4, 1914," relates Schorske, "the Social Democratic *Reichstag* delegation made its crucial contribution to the creation of national unity in defense of the existing state. The slogan, 'To this system, not a man, not a penny,' was finally abandoned for the slogan which had competed with it since 1907: 'In the hour of danger, we shall not leave the Fatherland in the lurch.' To one who had followed the evolution of Social Democracy through the pre-war decade, the vote for the war credits on August 4, 1914, is but the logical end of a clear line of development."

Having turned their backs on decisions of party and Socialist International congresses, the Social Democratic leaders now had to impose an iron discipline upon the organization in order to silence their critics. The very concept of discipline was stood on its head: "Karl Liebknecht and those who joined him later in voting against war credits were condemned and ultimately expelled for adhering to the decision of the congresses which the parliamentary majority violated."

After the first shock over the betrayal had passed, the old oppositions reappeared on the scene in practically the same forms and involving very much the same leading personalities as before the war. Because of the nature of the contest and the grimness of the time, the Left was infuriated at the shilly-shallying of the Center toward what it regarded as life-and-death questions and abandoned its former diplomatizing attitude. Rosa Luxemburg, in an analysis of one of the Center peace declarations, began with the Biblical quotation: "I know thy works, that thou art neither cold nor hot; I would thou wert cold or hot. So then because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spew thee out of my mouth."

On New Year's Day 1916, the left wingers, now beginning to be known as Spartacists, held a national conference and adopted a program which aimed at "the intellectual liberation of the proletariat from subservience to the bourgeoisie which expresses itself in nationalist ideology." Unity with the Center on the latter's "broad and crooked path of compromise" with national defense was ruled out. Its proclamation declared: "Not unity, but rather clarity on every point. . . . Through merciless exposure and discussion of differences, to unanimity on principles and tactics, and therewith to capacity for action and to unity."

With the deterioration of the food situation in 1916 the first signs of mass discontent began to appear. The growth of opposition was answered by the military authorities with more violent and extensive repressions; the lawyers of the Center were overwhelmed with civil-liberties cases. In March, the majority expelled the Center delegates from the *Reichstag* delegation after they had voted against the war credits for the second time. The party was beginning to crack up: "With the workers' cooperation in the war effort rewarded neither by a successful termination of hostilities nor by any tangible political and social reforms, but only by economic misery and political oppression, the party's war policy became discredited. Reformism had had its day; the party had gone the whole way, as it had never been able to do before the war, to meet the state and the ruling class on their own terms in the hope of some con-

cessions. As the failure of the policy became manifest, the hour of the intransigents struck."

IN January 1917 in the depth of the "turnip winter," the leaders of the Center held a conference of all the oppositionists. Within ten days, the party leaders declared that the opposition, by the very act of holding a conference, had separated itself from the party. Thus the split became an accomplished fact, and at a specially called Easter congress held in Gotha, the Independent Social Democratic Party was formed, ranging from Kautsky at the right all the way to the Spartacists on the extreme left.

Within scarcely more than a year the revolution that the left wingers predicted swept over Germany, and in very much the form that they had anticipated: mass actions and strikes largely spontaneous in character. But these struggles and the emergent Workers and Soldiers Councils "were not bound together by any centralizing authority and their very members were often ready to surrender their powers to the reconstituted authorities of the old order. Here the pre-war radical theory of the spontaneous revolution, the reliance on the democratic will and institutional ingenuity of the masses proved a fatal weakness. There was no central leadership, which, like Lenin's in Russia, pursued a conscious strategy in the interest of the single aim of the seizure of power. . . ." Schorske observes:

Bureaucracy has long been singled out as a leading characteristic of German Social Democracy. The party won the reputation of being managed by a neatly structured hierarchy of professional politicians, by a huge apparatus extending from the party executive at the top to the shop leaders and block leaders at the bottom. The reputation is essentially correct. The German Social Democratic Party was the first to devise the great bureaucratic institutions for mass control which were subsequently adapted to their own purposes by the Communists, Fascists, and National Socialists. . . .

The bureaucratization of Social Democracy has been regarded as one of the principal factors making for conservatism in the party. Robert Michels, whose pioneering work remains the most penetrating study of the structure of Social Democracy, advanced the thesis that the need for organization inevitably dooms any democratic movement. Because the working class is completely at the mercy of economic forces, because, as individuals, the workers are the weakest members of society, Michels argued, their only strength lies in numbers. These numbers must be given structure, they must be organized. Organization, the sine qua non to democratic action, is also "the spring from which conservative waters flow into the democratic stream." Michels maintained that organization meant a "tendency to oligarchy": "The power of the leaders grows directly in proportion to the expansion of the organization" . . . Michels marshaled the evidence to show that the bureaucratization of Social Democracy led to an identification of its functionaries with the status quo.

MICHEL'S was completely correct in his analysis of the socialist bureaucracy becoming middle class in its

thinking. But he erred in giving a universal character to a phenomenon that was the creation of specific historic factors of a specific period in European history. Schorske makes this shrewd observation: "The Communist parties too have built centralized, hierarchical, paid bureaucracies; but in non-Communist countries these have not been a conservative force, nor have their functionaries been tied by material interests to the *status quo*. In order to understand the political coloration and influence of a bureaucracy it is necessary to examine it genetically. A bureaucracy is constructed for the purposes of those who build it. Political and social aims enter into its fiber at its birth, while the mentality and outlook of its framers are reflected and perpetuated in its lower echelons. If we are to discern the factors—political as well as sociological—which made the Social Democratic party apparatus a conservative force, we must examine its genesis and historical development. . . . Unlike Lenin's corps of professionals, Ebert's [Friedrich Ebert, Secretary of the Social Democratic Party and later first President of the Weimar Republic] was built primarily to compete with other political parties, to get members and voters, not to shatter the existing order. It was constructed almost entirely in the years 1906-1909 when the radical wave had temporarily receded, when the trade unions were consolidating their hold on the party, and when the executive itself was tending in a more conservative direction."

What conservatized the Social Democratic machine was not essentially or even primarily innate laws that govern all mass organizations at all times and places, but the specific ability of rising German capitalism to give the masses for a time improved living standards and even a measure of civil liberties. But if the sociology of Michels and his teacher, Max Weber, was too static and one-sided in its analysis of the bureaucratization of Social Democracy, it broke down completely in its lack of perception of the other side of the coin: the steady growth of an opposition to the official leadership, which in time led to a split and the eventual creation of the rival mass Communist movement in Germany.

The following item is reproduced in full from Business Week, June 11:

THE old trick of making a foreman out of a union steward may have more to recommend it than a sly attempt to weaken a union. That's one conclusion you can draw from a comparison of stewards and foremen as leaders made by John A. Patton, head of Management Engineers, Inc., Chicago consultants.

When Patton engineers are called in on consulting jobs, one of the first things they do is to train representatives from both labor and management to make time studies on various operations. That way both sides know what's going on. To pick the best qualified men, Patton tests both foremen and stewards on leadership qualities—vocabulary, practical judgment, mathematics, and so forth. In nearly every case the shop stewards outscore the foremen. The union representatives are as much as 36 percent ahead of the foremen in practical judgment and vocabulary, and show an edge in mathematics.

Why did the union men make better grades? Patton figures that it's because most foremen got their jobs by being good producers and "there is no known correlation between manual dexterity and being a leader of men." On the other side, Patton says "union stewards are selected usually because they manifest natural abilities as leaders of men."

Mammon's Fables

by David Herreshoff

HOW I MADE A MILLION, compiled by Noah Sarlat. Leon Books, Inc., New York, 35c.

THE Gilded Age—the hectic decades after the Civil War which saw the formation of many great American fortunes — nourished an American cult of success which has never since then been without numerous adherents. “How I Made a Million” is but the latest in a series of votive offerings to the bitch-goddess,



perpetuating the tradition of Russell H. Conwell, Horatio Alger, and Andrew Carnegie. But in this little compilation of 22 success stories, as in some of its spiritual forebears, the note of thanksgiving is drowned out in a blare of self-worship. With a couple of honorable exceptions, these 22 fortunate pilgrims in the land of opportunity can manage nothing more gracious by way of acknowledgement than forced and perfunctory gestures in the direction of wife, mother, Uncle Sam, or Lady Luck. They

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really believe they are self-made men.

In its pristine form, the doctrine of the success cult was anything but subtle. Russell H. Conwell, an itinerant preacher and later a university president, spread the glad tidings through the country in a lecture which he first delivered in 1861 and repeated no less than six thousand times in the next half-century. Conwell told eager audiences “that the opportunity to get rich, to attain great wealth is here. . . . I say that you ought to get rich, and it is your duty to get rich.” Piling up money, in Conwell’s view, is the holy work of sainted men. Rich men are honest. “That is why they are trusted with money.” Poverty is the fruit of depravity, for “there is not a poor person in the United States who was not made poor by his own shortcomings, or by the shortcomings of someone else.” It follows that charity tends to interfere with the judgments of God. “To sympathize with a man whom God has punished for his sins, thus to help him . . . is to do wrong, no doubt about it. . . .”

It was not long before Andrew Carnegie smoothed the edges of this flinty doctrine. In “Wealth,” an essay he wrote in 1889, Carnegie taught that it is permissible for a capitalist to slug his way to the top in the economic jungle but that once having arrived, the capitalist must transform himself into an urbane philanthropist, “becoming the mere agent and trustee for his poorer brethren, bringing to their service his superior wisdom, experience, and ability to administer, doing for them better than they could do for themselves. . . .” Conwell had preached vanity and stinginess, but Carnegie practiced vanity and generosity. As Finley Peter Dunne’s Mr. Dooley ob-

serves, Carnegie’s supreme generosity consists in the fact that every time he spoke he gave himself away.

THIS kind of generosity is well represented in “How I Made a Million.” Take for instance Louis Feder’s account of how he revolutionized the toupee industry. Feder was studying the heads of his fellow-passengers as he rode home on the subway. “Suddenly, the explanation of what was wrong with the toupee business came to me in a blinding flash! . . . Stumbling blindly out of the subway like a man possessed, I crossed to the other side of the platform, took a train back to my shop and began experimenting all that night.”

Feder ultimately built a better toupee. “With the help of a chemist”—an anonymous chemist, of course—he managed to produce a new kind of adhesive to keep his new kind of wigs from coming off. Feder’s supreme moment had arrived. Like blind old King Lear, Feder rushed into the open to test himself against pitiless nature. He went to Florida. “The next day, Florida was hit by a hurricane. I left my hotel room, went out in the middle of the street and dared the storm to do its worst.” A stern Shakespearean hurricane would have whisked the wig from Feder’s pate and sailed it away into the dark recesses of eternal night. This, however, was an American hurricane, and it was freighted with bounty for Feder. “The roaring winds knocked me over but the toupee stuck right with me.” Feder has since marketed 15,000 “Hurricane Resisters” for a gross of \$3 million.



Next consider the case of Alex Lewyt. Lewyt owns a plant which exhales a vacuum cleaner every 15 seconds while Lewyt inhales dollars at the rate of 200 a minute. Lewyt is a mechanical engineer. His inventive genius first revealed itself when he was a lad of 16. “I dreamed up a bow-tie which could be clipped onto a cada-

ver's collar in presto time. Undertakers ordered 50,000 . . . on a half-cent royalty basis. I'll wager to say there are a lot of well-dressed corpses in heaven today."

When his father became a well-dressed corpse, Lewyt was put on his mettle. "Now I had freedom. I was tempted to take some time out to sow some wild oats, but the ambition to build up the business got the better of me." It is no wonder that Lewyt is a bachelor. He serves the bitch-goddess with single-minded devotion. "You might say," he explains, "that I am married to a vacuum cleaner. But I don't mind, vacuum cleaners don't talk back."

LEWYT has no pastimes. "I figured out that it was costing me \$200 a minute to relax, in time taken away from my work. Who can enjoy a hobby at that price?"

He may have some unappealing traits, but didn't Lewyt, after all, invent a splendid vacuum cleaner? The man seems absolutely determined to deprive himself of any redeeming accomplishments: "I'm not a sports enthusiast. Instead, I get my exercise hiking through the 10 floors of my plant, where I enjoy listening to the syncopated rhythm of the production lines. I owe my idea for my vacuum cleaner to one of these walks. During the war I had developed a special device for removing dust from the gun turrets of battleships. . . . One day, as I was making my rounds, a girl on the assembly line remarked: 'What a wonderful vacuum cleaner this could make!'"

"After VJ Day, when I decided to manufacture something . . . that would bear my name—ham that I am—I recalled the girl's suggestion. . . . I can't remember the name of the unknown young lady who inspired my machine, but there is a mink coat waiting for her if she ever identifies herself."

Good, kind, generous, dear Alex Lewyt!

Most contributors to "How I Made a Million," like Lewyt, stand by the Conwell preachment that money-grubbing is an end in itself. The Carnegie tradition of capitalist philanthropy is represented in the book among others by F. C. Russell of Rusco storm windows. "I realize, too," writes Russell,

"that financial wealth is a hollow accomplishment unless one realizes his social responsibilities. . . . I'm especially interested in youngsters."

Russell has started a movement "to set youths on the Horatio Alger trail. . . . Boys and girls from 12 to 16 years



old . . . receive a junior salesmanship manual, are given instruction, and then are encouraged to go out and set up appointments for Rusco salesmen." Russell knows that some people don't go for this sort of thing. "I'll frankly admit that it builds business. On the other hand, the scoffers forget that the American economy is based on salesmanship. The program teaches youngsters salesmanship. . . . I can think of no better training. . . ."

Andy Frain practices the direct form of philanthropy which consists in paying out wages to the people who work for him. Frain is a "crowd engineer"; that is, he directs "the movement of tens of thousands of people with the same kind of technique that engineers use to direct the flow of water in an irrigation project." In other words, Frain runs an ushering service. Frain, the philanthropist, lavishes part-time jobs on college boys. "I guess I've helped more young men through college than any other man. . . . I feel really honored that I've been able to create so many professors, engineers, doctors, lawyers, scientists, and government officials."

Think how many college men would have remained common clay had it not been for this creator! Carnegie could teach him nothing about vanity.


IN another act of special creation, Frain provided a sanctuary for himself. "What have I done with the money I've made? Well, I'll tell you. I've got a big, comfortable house in

Chicago, and when any of my relatives come to visit me they can have their pick of any one of FIVE glittering bathrooms. Ever since I had my first taste of crowd engineering as a kid, I promised myself that I'd have plenty of toilets in the house if I ever made good."

"How I Made a Million" is teeming with all the monstrous little adages. Thus John W. Rollins, the lieutenant-governor of Delaware, lays it down that "the only sure-fire million-making gimmick" which young Americans need "to bare-knuckle their way up the ladder" is "bare knuckles, and a 100 percent effort, nothing less." Elmer G. Leterman points out that "the salesman who can sell himself can sell anything." Patsy D'Agostino feels that "anyone working in our organization should feel he is working *with* us, not for us." Near the beginning of his incredible article Alex Lewyt writes: "I don't want to sound like one of those bootstrap-raising shavers out of Horatio Alger, but . . ." And F. C. Russell chimes in: "I used to think those stories were pretty corny—until I realized my own life story was just like a Horatio Alger tale."

Irving Rosenthal, who has bare-knuckled his way up the ladder in the amusement park game, is the master adage-handler of them all. He fashions his little sermon around the sentence, "It's the little things that count." As a youth he was skeptical: ". . . I used to think this slogan was the corniest and phoniest I had heard. Yet, as I look back. . . ." At the end of his narration, Rosenthal returns to his starting point: "Now . . . my first job at Palisades each morning is to sample the weenies just as I did 38 years ago. I've learned that when a hot dog sours a youngster's stomach you will lose him for a customer. . . . I take no chances . . . as I said way back in the beginning—it's those Little Things that really count."

Those are the last words in "How I Made a Million" and they summarize its meaning quite well. Whatever you do, never feed poisonous hot dogs to children. The little imps might not come back any more and think what that could do to the business. Reading "How I Made a Million" renews one's determination to see the earth rise on new foundations.



BOOK REVIEW

Pathology of a Disease

THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW, by C. Vann Woodward. Oxford University Press, New York, 1955. \$2.50.

A BOOK by a college professor which is clear, comprehensible, digs down into essentials and does a good job of analyzing them is a rarity. The orthodox schema for writing social science studies calls for smothering the reader in a meaningless academic jargon (never say "race chauvinism" when you can say "inter-group tensional factors"; don't say "Jim Crow laws," say "biracial cultural pattern") to cover the lack of real thought. By piling up quotations and citations, by skirting all essentials with scholarly foxiness, by cultivating a monumental dullness which some professors have spent a lifetime perfecting, by spreading an ivy curtain between themselves and the common and vulgar world, the colleges have worked out a practical formula for dealing with "controversial topics."

C. Vann Woodward, professor of history at Johns Hopkins, has written a book which reverses this pattern in almost every essential. With care, thought, clarity and comprehension he has briefly set forth the stages of the development of Jim Crow, and has attempted, with considerable success, to explore the underlying causes behind each turning point. The book is to be recommended as among the best on the subject.

When Northern capitalism wiped out the old slave system, the Southern states were reconstructed by the occupation forces, together with the Southern Negroes and sections of the whites, in a new mold. The North, says Woodward, was in a "revolutionary mood, determined to stop at nothing short of a complete and thoroughgoing reformation." Yet within a dozen years, in the compromise of 1877, the federal troops were withdrawn and the way opened for a return to rule by a minority of upper-class whites. This much is common historical knowledge, but that which is not so well appreciated is that, in the first two decades after 1877, the Jim Crow system as we know it today was not yet in existence. How and why it was brought into being is the main subject matter of this book.

OF course, even before the present Jim Crow system, the Negro population was exploited, oppressed, and generally sinned against by every method of chauvinism. Even the Reconstruction measures of the Northern radicals, when they were in control, had not succeeded in eradicating

the social, economic and political effects of two hundred years of slavery. But segregation in public places was not practiced, there was not a single Jim Crow law on the books of the Southern states, and there was no visible movement to alter that fact. Northern abolitionists who toured the South after the compromise of 1877 in the expectation of finding abusive treatment of the Negroes after the withdrawal of the protection of federal troops did not generally find it. "I can assert that, carrying with me the eyes of a tolerably suspicious abolitionist," wrote one of them, "I saw none of these indications." A foreign observer was "impressed with the freedom of association between whites and blacks, with the frequency and intimacy of personal contact, and with the extent of Negro participation in political affairs." "The humblest black rides with the proudest white on terms of perfect equality," he wrote of the transit facilities, "and without the smallest symptom of malice or dislike on either side. I was, I confess, surprised to see how completely this is the case; even an English Radical is a little taken aback at first."

Negroes were admitted to theaters, lectures, exhibitions, served in bars, soda fountains, practiced in the law courts on terms of equality, sat in the legislatures and voted freely. There was racial chauvinism in plenty, but it was mainly unofficial, and, after the emphatic lessons of the Civil War and Reconstruction, somewhat repressed. There is also evidence that it was declining rather than rising.



As it emerges from Mr. Woodward's description, the central reason for the sudden outburst of Jim Crow at the turn of the century was the agrarian discontent and the rise of a Southern protest movement which became extremely effective in the form of Populism and which had the audacity to stretch out the hand of political friendship to the Negro people. The Southern Populist movement was a movement of Negro and white solidarity, and the ruling class of the South, with the cooperation of Northern conservatism, moved to smash that before it got too serious.

FOR as long as it lasted, the black and white Populism of the South was a power, and it was also an anticipatory forecast of the way in which black and white unity will again arise in the South. The white Populists, the rebellious small farmers and poor whites, approached the Negro with a "new realism"; it was "an equalitarianism of want and poverty, the kinship of a common grievance and a common oppressor. As a Texas Populist expressed the new equalitarianism, 'They are in the ditch just like we are.'" Woodward quotes the outstanding leader of Southern Populism, Tom Watson (later to become a foremost racist demagogue after the debacle of Populism): "The People's Party will settle the race question. First, by enacting the Australian ballot system. Second, by offering to white and black a rallying point which is free from the odium of former discords and strifes. Third, by presenting a platform immensely beneficial to both races and injurious to neither. Fourth, by making it to the interest of both races to act together for the success of the platform." Watson told his white and black followers: "You are made to hate each other because upon that hatred is rested the keystone of the arch of financial despotism which enslaves you both."

When a Negro Populist in Georgia who had made 63 speeches for Watson was threatened with lynching, two thousand armed white farmers guarded his home for two nights. Populist state conventions elected Negroes to state executive committees, to national conventions, and to all other levels of party leadership. Negro and white shared the party ticket and the party platform in campaigns. "It is altogether probable," Woodward summarizes, "that during the brief Populist upheaval of the 'nineties Negroes and native whites achieved a greater comity of mind and harmony of political purpose than ever before or since in the South."

In one of the best portions of his book, Woodward describes how the Southern rulers, seizing upon the handiest weapon to combat Populism, used Jim Crow to divide black from white and to smash opposition in the South: "There had to be a scapegoat. . . . The bitter violence and blood-letting recriminations of the campaigns between white conservatives and white radicals in the 'nineties had opened wounds that could not be healed by ordinary political nostrums and free-silver slogans. The only formula powerful enough to accomplish that was the magical formula of white supremacy, applied without stint. . . ."

MR. WOODWARD has also exposed to view the role of the Northern rulers in this process, their acquiescence and assistance in the courts and in the press. He has also pointed to the connection between the rise of an American imperialism in the Caribbean and the Pacific, which oppressed the colored races in those areas and took for granted their "inferiority," and the rise of Jim Crow in the U.S.

Southerners taunted the Northern politicians that they could now have no complaints about the treatment of the Negro in the South, as they were doing the same in the Philippines, Hawaii and Cuba.

Thus began the modern career of Jim Crow, and the enactment of that monstrous series of laws which robbed the Negro of his franchise, his rights as a citizen, and as a human being, the intent of which was to keep the races as separate as if they lived in different lands, coming into sight of each other only when necessary in the master-servant relationship.

The concluding part of the book, dealing with the victories over Jim Crow during the last two decades, is likewise a thoughtful piece of work, although here the ground has been combed so carefully that Mr. Woodward is left with correspondingly less to say that is fresh. Like other commentators, he features among the causes for the recent rollbacks of Jim Crow in the South the militant Negro movement which has arisen since World War I, the industrialization and urbanization of the Negro, the pressures of a prolonged world struggle upon rulers and politicians who have been compelled to pay some attention, finally, to the opinions of the world's colored masses. Inexplicably, he omits from his account the impact of the modern industrial unions upon the industrial cities of the North and South in which the Negro has settled in such numbers. Without the fight of the unions uniting black and white on the industrial battlefield, without their pressure—which has been consistent on the race question—it is doubtful that the victories would have been won.

To his credit, Mr. Woodward remains sufficiently unimpressed by the hoopla of recent months over "the end of Jim Crow" to point out that "segregation is still the rule and non-segregation the exception," and to explain that Jim Crow can continue to thrive in many ways without the direct support of laws. He does, however, give the impression of confidence in a ceaseless gradualism now inexorably under way. But the history of the South, and the tensions and social conflicts now building up as a result of runaway shops, future union drives in the South, the automation and mechanization trend which displaces Negroes from industry in large numbers—all these things point to the likelihood that Jim Crow will die hard, and that it will take a new Populism, a Labor Populism this time and victorious, to ensure the funeral.

H. B.

Awakening of Africa

THE GOLD COAST REVOLUTION, by George Padmore. Dennis Dobson Ltd., London, 1954. (Order from British Book Center, 122 E. 55 St., NYC.)

THE LAND AND PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA, by Alan Paton. J. P. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1955, \$2.75.

THE last few years have seen a veritable flood of books on Africa. This literary outpouring is not the response to a revived esoteric interest in the Dark Continent. It is nothing else than the heat lightning foretelling the coming storm. In the different countries of Africa, each in accordance with its own inner development, masses are rising to their feet and demanding an end to imperialist tyranny and exploitation. Inspired by the successful fight for independence by India, Burma, Indonesia, the indigenous peoples of Africa are on the move.

The most advanced national movement of Negro Africa is that of the Gold Coast in equatorial West Africa.

After plundering the country for years as a source of slaves and raw materials, Britain converted it into a crown colony in 1874 with the inauguration of its modern finance imperialism. By this time, a considerable nationalist movement was already in existence and a confederation uniting the coastal states into a mutual defense league had been set up by the local "stools," or chieftains, several years before. The British declared the confederation illegal and arrested its leaders. Thus began the 75-year struggle between these proud Africans and the imperial government in London.

In 1897, the chiefs and a number of the educated upper-class Negroes organized the Aborigines Rights Protection Society to serve as a link between the traditional rulers and the British government. A delegation was sent to England to oppose certain legislation which would have converted the "stool" lands into crown lands. Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Colonies, instructed the governor to withdraw the measure, since at that time the mosquito made it impossible for Europeans to colonize the malarial and yellow-fever-ridden forest country. Padmore wryly remarks: "The mosquitoes saved the West Africans, not the eloquence of the intellectuals."

This early victory of the Society gained it great prestige, and made it the bargaining agent with the government on all native affairs. The British thereupon moved to split the native chiefs from the intellectual and professional class by setting up a native administration system of the Paramount Chiefs, converted the latter into servants of British rule, and guaranteed them autocratic power over their people such as they had never possessed before the coming of the white man. With various constitutional jugglings, this system of "indirect rule" continued for several decades.

IN 1920, the West African National Congress was established by Joseph Casely Hayford, a distinguished African lawyer, to provide a medium through which the aspirations of the rising urban middle classes throughout the British West African colonies could find expression. The Congress carried through important constitutional struggles and won various secondary concessions, but

disintegrated by the end of the decade because of the weakness of the urban middle classes and their lack of ability or desire to mobilize the plebeian masses behind their program for self-government.

After more years of nationalist agitation, mass actions and unceasing government repressions, a new organization, the United Gold Coast Convention, was formed in 1947 by a number of prominent African lawyers and capitalists "to ensure that by all legitimate and constitutional means the direction and control of government should pass into the hands of the people and their chiefs in the shortest possible time." The following year a countrywide boycott swept the Gold Coast to make European and Syrian merchants reduce their exorbitant prices. When two African ex-servicemen were killed and five wounded in connection with an independent peaceable political demonstration, the economic and political battles merged, and for days the country was in the throes of uncontrolled rioting. By the time "law and order" was restored, 29 people had been killed and 237 injured. The British ordered the arrest and deportation of six of the UGCC leaders.

Before another year was out, the UGCC had split into right and left wings. The Right was led by the traditional type of leaders of the past nationalist movements, lawyers, wealthy business men, upper-class professionals. The Left was represented by the rising plebeian mass: workers, artisans, petty tradesmen, market women, clerks, teachers and the small farmers of the hinterland. After the old guard arbitrarily removed the Left leader, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, from office, a new Convention Peoples Party was launched in June 1949. The split was brought on by the growing intensity of the independence fight. The old guard feared that its influence would slip out of its hands if it became dependent on the "ignorant masses," and began clutching increasingly at the imperialists for support against their own people. Hence, the more decisive the struggle, the more their ardor for immediate independence began to cool.

On December 15, 1949, Dr. Nkrumah informed the governor that if the British continued to thwart the legitimate aspirations of the Gold Coast people for reform, a Gandhian non-cooperation campaign of "positive action" would be launched. The governor replied by jailing the main independence leaders. On January 8, 1950, the campaign was started and soon merged with extended strike actions backed by the Trades Union Congress. The campaign lasted until March 6, during which time the government instituted a veritable reign of terror.

On March 27, less than two weeks after the lifting of the emergency regulations, over 50,000 people gathered at the party's first public rally in Accra and pledged their support to Nkrumah. A few days later they went to the polls and voted all seven CPP candidates into the Accra town council, defeating overwhelmingly the candidates of the UGCC.

BY 1951 the first general election was called under the new Coussey constitution. The CPP decided to participate along strictly party lines. This forced the old guard regrouped as the National Democratic Party to come out into the open and explain their stand. Its leader, Nii Amaa Ollennu, a well known lawyer-politician, declared that he was opposed to immediate self-government as the country would not be ready to dispense with foreign tutelage for another fifteen years. The CPP campaigned under the slogan, "Self-Government Now." The party did not deny that the constitution under which the government would be formed was "bogus and fraudulent," but took the position that its entry into the assembly in full strength "will open up better opportunities to struggle for immediate self-government."

Its victory at the poll was overwhelming. The CPP won 34 out of 38 seats assigned to the municipal and rural divisions; 2 went to the UGCC, and 2 to independents, one of whom later joined the CPP. Furthermore, 8 of the Territorial members who were elected by the Councils of Chiefs on a non-party basis, decided to throw in their lot with the CPP, and by the time of the first session of the Legislative Assembly, several additional Territorial representatives jumped on the CPP bandwagon, giving the party a majority in the Assembly. The unexpected sweep of the victory produced consternation in British official circles and near panic among the African chiefs and old-line party leaders. Several days after the election, the governor ordered the release from prison of Dr. Nkrumah and his colleagues. Nkrumah walked out of James Fort Prison in Accra on February 12, 1951, to be greeted with wild acclaim by 100,000 supporters. The country had never witnessed such a scene of public rejoicing.

The landslide CPP victory had knocked all the devious calculations and over-clever "checks and balances" provisions of the 1950 Coussey constitution into a cocked hat. The design had been to give the Gold Coast an appearance of self-government while denying it any of the substance. But the mass upheaval forced the creation of a Nkrumah party government and his selection as Prime Minister.

PADMORE relates: "Unless one visited the Gold Coast and travelled throughout the country, which I was fortunate in being able to do in the summer of 1951, it would have been difficult to appreciate the fundamental changes which have taken place since the first general election only six months before. Never has so much been achieved in a colonial dependency in so short a time. The country is undergoing a veritable *risorgimento*. . . . Even before these reforms had been implemented, the common people, conscious of their newly won power, had begun to de-stool those Paramount Chiefs who had abused their powers when the white man was still in a position to protect them against their subjects."

The CPP membership has risen to over one million out of a population of less than five million. It is the first African nationalist organization which has been able to overcome tribal exclusiveness and religious differences by means of a disciplined party. The victory set the Gold Coast on the high road to independence but has not yet achieved it. Padmore, in relating the Gold Coast movement to Indian nationalism, compares the present Nkrumah government with the 1935 Government of India Act which provided basically the same sort of internal self-government as the present Gold Coast constitution. The CPP contrasts significantly with the India Congress Party in one major respect—its more plebeian leadership. Thomas Hodgkin in "Freedom For the Gold Coast" has written: "What has in fact been happening in the Gold Coast national movement during the period since February 1948 has been a process of splitting along lines of economic and social interest. Every movement for national independence in a colonial country contains, of course, these two elements: the element of revolt against poverty and exploitation—the demand for political independence and the demand for improved economic standards and social justice. What is interesting about the Gold Coast is not that this cleavage should have occurred, but that the CPP, representing the left wing of the national movement, should have emerged so quickly as the dominant force."

Padmore describes this unusual development but makes no attempt to explain it. It is probably to be accounted for by the Gold Coast's backwardness in comparison with India, which made impossible the growth of a strong capitalist class which could dominate the nationalist movement; the mantle consequently fell into the hands of the petty bourgeois and plebeian masses.

THE CPP has declared itself to be not only a democratic but a socialist movement. Its constitution states its aims to be "self-government now and the development of Ghana (Gold Coast) on the basis of socialism. . . . To establish a socialist state in which all men and women shall have equal opportunity and where there shall be no capitalist exploitation." How much effect this program has on the actual activities of Nkrumah and his associates is difficult to tell. The Gold Coast is desperately poor and undeveloped. While malaria and yellow fever saved its peoples from the fate of the African tribes in Kenya, the independent cocoa farmers, producing 92 percent of the agricultural export, and 70 percent of all exports, were until recently thoroughly fleeced by the foreign trading corporations, which underpaid them for their crops and charged exorbitant prices for all manufactured products. The United Africa Corporation, an amalgamation of many older trading companies, is the biggest unit of the worldwide Unilever empire and uses its monopolistic position to fiercely plunder the peoples of West Africa. To escape from its clutches, the colonial government set up a Gold Coast Marketing Board which partially

eliminates the middle men, and has broken the absolute monopoly of the trading firms. The country has gold and diamond production industries controlled by the big foreign companies, but secondary industries are non-existent. It is dependent on imports for such simple items as matches, soap, cornmeal, bottles, chocolate, textiles.

After six months in office, the Nkrumah government presented a Development Plan which reads like a midget edition of Nehru's Five Year Plan in India. But the Gold Coast peoples are starting virtually from scratch and face a long and difficult struggle before they will achieve the economic and political independence they so ardently desire. The remarkable progress that they have already made is a harbinger of the African struggles to come.

George Padmore, the author of this work, has a long, honorable history of participation in the African liberation movement and is the author of a number of authoritative books and pamphlets on imperialism. This book is the product of faithful study of the subject matter, and a seriousness of approach to the whole problem of colonialism. One might criticize him for his too great interest in the legalistic side, so that the reader at times gets lost in the welter of constitutional detail. But it is undoubtedly the most comprehensive analysis of the remarkable transformation occurring in this section of West Africa.

ALAN PATON'S book has no similar pretensions. It is quite frankly a travelogue on the Union of South Africa, but of a very superior kind. Simply and beautifully written, Paton manages to weave into its 139 pages a large amount of the country's history, its economic life, political makeup and conflicts.

We visit the diamond mines at Kimberley, the gold mines at Johannesburg, the African laborers in their "compounds." We see the Negroes living in the shanty quarters in the large cities, and in the tribal reserves on the South coast. We go to the Kruger National Park where tourists have to stay in their locked automobiles and remain on the roads, and where lions, elephants and all manner of wild beasts wander at will, and then we visit the famed Victoria Falls, which is outside the Union proper. We leave this strange country with the conviction, above all, that it is a social volcano due to explode. In one of the concluding parts Paton writes: "Into this planning (of *Apartheid*, Jim Crow legislation) is going more time, more money, more energy, than has ever been used before in any planning in the Union of South Africa. It is fantastic to stand before these Houses of Parliament, and to realize that most of this work will be undone. How? Peaceably, we earnestly hope. When? Who knows? But I will venture to predict that the undoing process will be in full swing by the year A.D. 2,000." Paton's prediction will come true faster than he imagines.

B. C.

The Odyssey of a Crazy Mixed-up Kid

THE ECSTASY OF OWEN MUIR, by
Ring Lardner, Jr. Cameron and Kahn,
New York, 1954, \$3.00.

WITH a caustic pen guided by a knowing eye, Mr. Lardner traces the strange development of an upper-class youth's unconscious search for roots.

Endowed with a sensitive nature, and at an early age repelled by his father's cash-nexus values, Owen Muir becomes a "fervent church-goer" and, in answer to his draft board's summons, a professed conscientious objector. Although his father earnestly explains that "a stunt like this could kill a job I've got lined up in Washington. . . . It's one of those dollar-a-year things that if I played it right I would make enough to retire on," Owen, already stalked by the demon of the absolute, remains adamant and chooses to go to jail.

In powerfully written pages, the young pacifist forcefully interferes with an attempt by some inmates, goaded by an American fascist, to castrate a Negro. This experience is sufficient to make him effect a sudden reversal and request immediate war duty. The end of the war finds him at a loss as to his future course, and filled with "a restless craving for the certainties of a fixed belief."

After discussion with his father, during which a "reasonable" capitalist mentality is admirably portrayed, Owen goes into business. He soon falls in love with his secretary, April, who happens to be a Catholic. The heart of the novel revolves around their relationship, and the problems created by both the Church and by Owen, before and after their marriage.

In what is unmistakably a satire on this country's favorite ecclesiastical television personality, a leading figure of the Catholic Church, Monsignor Frasso, seizes upon this wealthy Protestant prey and undertakes to dissipate Owen's misgivings about Catholic doctrine and practice. The young lover immerses himself in the Right Reverend's opiates far beyond the conceivable requirements of his situation. He is incapable of "tepid piety."

His doubts dissolve into a mystical illumination after a conversation in which his ubiquitous mentor reveals that Jesus was not opposed to private property. Owen rushes into conversion, even though April, whose faith never clashes with reasonableness, has become wary of his zeal and offered to be married in a civil ceremony.

DURING their first years of marriage, Owen manufactures, among other gadgets (and always with qualms of conscience), television aerials "for people who couldn't afford sets yet but wanted an aerial on their roof so the neighbors would think they had one," and a novel cigarette

lighter which, when snapped open, reveals itself as a box of matches. He spends a good deal of time with vacuous acquaintances and agonizes his wife with a growing religious fanaticism. He reaches the conclusion that his conversion had been too shallow, "a formality, without any revolutionary effect on his life."

Impelled to consecrate his days more actively to the greater glory of his new faith, he becomes an outstanding and crusading member of the Catholic War Veterans. From there he rises into an organization master-minded by Frasso, the Catholic Action Council Against Communism and Creeping Socialism, or CACACACS.

April's pregnancy, complicated by rheumatic fever, confronts them with the need for a medical abortion, but here they face the uncompromising attitude of the Church. From this point on the story progresses at a swift pace to its startling culmination, and in fairness to the author we leave it to the reader to discover at first hand how the plot and ideas are resolved.

Much of the material on Catholicism is of a somewhat scholarly nature, unlikely to be very familiar to the average layman, and must be estimated by the reader on the basis of whatever experience or knowledge he possesses. This reviewer, at any rate, found himself quite convinced. The sketchy presentation of psychoanalysis, however, is inadequate and artificial.

Mr. Lardner is amusing and stimulating when he deals with such questions as the penal system, advertising, business ethics, the informer racket, and the mores of the upper class. Unfortunately, irony and straight narrative are freely alternated, and one sometimes wonders about the author's intent. Some of the sloganeering by Mrs. Couto, an officer of the Council for Permanent Peace, borders on the ludicrous, but it is doubtful whether it was meant as such. Tessie Couto's admirable human and political qualities are evidently sacrosanct. But surely the progressive cause would not suffer if the foibles of some of its adherents were subjected to friendly criticism, and might even be the more vigorous for it.

MR. LARDNER sometimes resorts to the heavy-handed manufacture of episodes designed to make an obvious point even more obvious. Mrs. Couto's Communist son, who is revealed as an FBI agent in the Communist Party, testifies against his mother. As though this were not sufficient illustration of the author's feelings, the informer subsequently attempts to rape April on her sick-bed. On the whole, however, even the most ridiculed characters are treated fairly and permitted to state their case in their own terms.

But the book's inadequacies do not prevent this from being a highly arresting work. For a variety of reasons, social satire is not an easy artistic task in America today. Mr. Lardner, however, has made a fruitful and welcome contribution to this genre.

"The Ecstasy of Owen Muir" is recommended for exhilarating intellectual fireworks, provocative and courageous probing

of many varieties of obscurantism, and a sparkling yet delightfully controlled style. It is a refreshing departure from leftist woodenness in the field of fiction.

F. G.

Segregation in the Armed Forces

BREAKTHROUGH ON THE COLOR
FRONT, Lee Nichols. Random House,
New York, 1954, \$3.50.

THE main theme of this book is a paean of praise to the "men of courage and foresight" including just about every top General, Admiral, and Wall St. banker-politician who, according to Mr. Nichols, "pushed and prodded" the services into "ending" segregation.

In the first chapter Mr. Nichols, a rewrite man on the U.P. night desk in Washington, says he is writing the story of Negro men and women "who battled through nearly two centuries for the 'right to fight.'" Precious little of that story gets into this book. A few incidents in the book, however, show that the pressure to end segregation in the Armed Services came not from the top but from below. From people like the grade-school principal at Fort Bragg who ended segregation on her own, or the junior-grade officers at a camp in California who ended segregation because the recruits were coming in so fast that the separate facilities to maintain segregation just weren't there. When the Pentagon found out about these cases, there were angry directives, but the deed had been done and was not generally undone because of the pressure from the outside, from leaders of the Negroes and from progressives and liberals, from delegations to the White House, and from campaigns in the Negro press. It was this pressure that forced the politicians and brass to allow integration to go ahead.

Mr. Nichols praises the politicians and the brass, but what he shows is that they frustrated and slowed every attempt at integration. As integration proceeded by fits and starts and began to work without incident, he also shows, though indirectly, that these same politicians and top brass had no hesitation about taking credit for what many times they had not even known was taking place.

The book also leaves one with the impression that segregation has been completely abolished in the Armed Forces, and that this fine example is being rapidly imitated all over the U.S., even in the South. As we well know, though the legal props are being knocked out, the racial barriers still remain.

Mr. Nichols is not much of a prose stylist, and this is to the good, for the holes in the narrative—which a better writer might have covered—stand out, leaving one to consider how the story would go if it were rewritten without the distortions and, so to say, from the bottom going up.

H. H.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

For Mass Consumption

Forthright and Honest

Permit us to congratulate you on the quality and content of your magazine. We sincerely hope it remains forthright and honest as it is at present, not like so many progressive publications and movements in the past that fell by the wayside by compromising away the principles and freedom of the American people and the working class.

Enclosed find a contribution. We are not able to send very much at the moment but will do our best to raise funds and promote the circulation of the *American Socialist*. Please do not apply any of this money to our subscriptions. This is to be strictly to help sustain and increase the circulation of the magazine.

Our aim is to start building up the circulation of the *American Socialist* as it brings back to memory the *Appeal to Reason* which was the best there ever was.

We would appreciate it if you could inform us if and when a speaker makes a tour of the Pacific Coast. We would like to know in time to organize a public meeting or forum. We would also like to know if it is OK to form a readers' circle to promote the *American Socialist*.

Three Readers Portland, Oregon

Translated into Dutch

I have recently, as well as I could, translated Mr. Cochran's article "The Next Ten Years" [June 1955] into the Dutch language, and I have sent copies thereof to a couple of my friends in Holland. I thought it was greatly worth my trouble, and I hope there was no objection as far as you people are concerned.

Enclosed find a check for a two-year subscription. I wish I could send a donation, but . . . it cannot be done now.

Y. V. Pennsylvania

The article on the Salk vaccine ["They're Not in Business for Your Health," July 1955] was the finest article yet to appear in the *American Socialist*, showing really deep concern for the needs of the people. The article "Socialism and Democracy" by Bert Cochran was a great piece of work of lasting significance. These two, together with others, made the July issue human and capable of moving people profoundly.

H. W. Chicago

An Excellent Force

I have read every issue of the *American Socialist* since the first. I have found it to be interesting, informative and incisive. It is an excellent force for the achievement of socialism in America.

It reminds me in many respects of the old *Modern Monthly*, in which V. F. Calverton, its editor, made a real vital contribution to radical thought in the thirties.

The *American Socialist* might borrow a page from the *Modern Monthly* by also including reviews of movies, plays, art and an occasional poem.

J. G. Brooklyn

I can imagine it is one hell of a job to keep out of jail if you attack the boss class too vigorously, so just take it easy until all (or at least most) of the scissorbills get overloaded with debt and start drawing pay checks that just *won't* keep them going and then perhaps there will be some right kind of action, I hope.

Your magazine is very educational and informative, to say the least.

B. B. Flint

Comment and Criticism

After reading this month's issue of the *American Socialist*. . . . I thought I'd set down some comments I have been storing up. . . .

First of all, let me say that I think the magazine has shown continuous and excellent improvement throughout. I am glad to see the continued expansion of the range of contributors, and I hope that this will continue to grow. Right now, along with *Monthly Review*, I feel the *American Socialist* to be at the top of the left-wing press in the U.S., and I hope that both will continue to grow and expand. Some of the pieces in the magazine lately have been very fine, there has been an improvement in both quality and style, and the artistic features, layout and illustrations show both taste and thought. I don't mind saying that when it comes to monthly analysis, I find that *Monthly Review* presents a more balanced and thorough analysis than the *American Socialist*. . . . On the other hand, I find that the broad variety and range of topics on which the *American Socialist* publishes material makes it a little better rounded than *Monthly Review*.

A few months ago (March) you ran a review on Masani's book on the Indian CP. While extremely interesting and valuable, Masani's book should not be taken at face value as your reviewer seemed to do in his outline of the history of the Indian CP. . . . With regard to the message of the CP of China to the Third Congress, your reviewer states that the author claims the message was not read. . . . It should be noted that the *New Age* announced the message and its communication to the delegates.

Further, the lack of critical comment on Masani's claims and fears concerning a "Yenan" in India because of the Tibetan border should not have been left unscathed. Anyone talking to Indians in the U.S. or with a knowledge of the geography of North India would realize that this is hogwash. The highest mountains in the world constitute the border and make transport entirely inconceivable. . . .

H. O. Minneapolis

What about a twentieth century rewrite of "Looking Backward"?

The suggestion is based upon the belief that American socialism needs to be grounded for mass consumption. How will it work in respect to daily needs? What will it mean to the automobile mechanic, to the printer, the farmer, the civil service employee?

In talking about socialism to a wide audience, these are the reactions I get: A housewife asks, "Would everyone wear the same kind of clothes in a planned economy?" A hotrod enthusiast: "Will all cars be built alike? Will they have as much power, color, etc.?" A person looks at dreary rows of public housing and asks: "Is that what socialism would mean?"

People like Aldous Huxley, in "Brave New World," and George Orwell, in "Nineteen Eighty-Four," have painted a grim picture of planned economy in terms of daily existence, not political abstractions. . . . What could be done by an articulate, imaginative American socialist to offset such books?

Mechanics could be informed in simple language about such things as psychic income, about the expression of their highest craftsmanship without sabotage from the profit motive, about using the best possible automotive parts instead of existing inferior ones. People on a broad scale could be shown how consumer goods could be greatly increased, improved and placed within everyone's grasp. They need to be shown that uniformity results from cost-shaving due to high profits. That individuality could actually flower under a truly liberal democratic socialism. . . .

What a lot of advocates of socialism don't seem to realize about the opposition to socialism is that much of it is not based on conscious venal motivation but rather is due to simple ignorance.

A good step in this direction is Leo Huberman's "ABC of Socialism." This book, however, is still too high in the clouds, too concerned mainly with the analysis of power and such abstractions, for mass consumption.

What American socialism needs is less cocktail-party abstraction and more down-to-earth communication.

C. F. California

Your magazine seems to increase in interest and value of content with every issue. It's full of straight thinking and positive calls to action for a better economy.

M. W. Iowa

I am very much impressed with the financial difficulty in publishing the *American Socialist* at the present-day high cost of everything, so I enclose this contribution. As to sending in the names of new subscribers, I would like to call your attention to the difficulty we have here in this state, especially as the strategy of the molders of public opinion is causing the majority to reject all new ideas.

F. C. R. Wisconsin

Many Thanks to All

OUR fund appeal, which was sent out in letter form to subscribers and reprinted in this space last month, brought very fine results. Many readers sent us check, cash or money order in amounts ranging from \$1 to \$20, and there was even a good scattering of larger amounts. The response was gratifying both financially and politically. We cannot help but feel that, for a fairly young magazine, we already have a stalwart body of rooters and supporters and thus an assurance of a good future. The editors wish to extend hearty thanks to all who contributed, in whatever amount, and to the many—some of whom sent us notes begging off this time—who we know would have contributed had they been financially able.

Most of our contributors simply sent us their donations and filled-out coupons with no other comment, believing—with good reason—that their aid was comment enough. But some who added letters gave a big additional boost to all of us who produce and circulate the AMERICAN SOCIALIST. We call your attention to the note printed in our letters column from Three Portland Readers, who made donations of \$5 each, and then wrote the following: Compared us to the old APPEAL TO REASON, the most widely read socialist periodical in this country's history; proposed

to spread this magazine further in their area; asked to be included in any future tour of the Pacific Coast so that they could arrange a meeting for us; and asked permission to form a readers' group to promote the AMERICAN SOCIALIST. Such responses, coming in addition to the financial contributions, were in the nature of an extra dividend—the kind we'd like to see more of. We are ready to extend help and cooperation to any such readers' groups that are formed.

It is our policy to bring to our readers, as often as possible, coverage of important labor, civil liberties and political events around the country at first hand. There are, unfortunately, still many areas from which we have no one writing us regularly, and it may be that there are some among our present readers who can help to fill this gap. Writing experience is always helpful, but it is by no means essential, as our editors can testify to receiving some of their clearest, soundest and best-written copy from a Midwestern crane operator and an East Coast drill-press man.

If you think you can do something along this line, please communicate with the editors, or send something right along for their consideration. Of course, opinions articles continue to be welcome, and will be judged solely for their interest and quality, not the particular opinion they happen to express.

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