

ZAMBIA

humanist
rhetoric

capitalist
reality



Africa
in struggle

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The Fourth International

The Fourth International is the world party of socialist revolution founded by Leon Trotsky and his co-thinkers internationally in 1938. Its foundation was a direct consequence of the degeneration of the 3rd International, the movement whose most important constituent was the Russian Bolshevik Party, organisers of the first working class overthrow of capitalism in the world.

After the isolation of the new Russian workers' state and the rise of a new bureaucracy which stifled workers' democracy and boosted its own privileges within that state, the 3rd International became an instrument of the new Kremlin rulers. Thus began the treacherous theory of 'socialism in one country' which, for the working masses of the world spelt an end to the independent role of the communist parties and a subordination of their own interests to those of the Russian bureaucracy.¹

The 3rd International was finally dissolved in 1942 at the height of the second imperialist war. This was a gesture by Stalin designed to reassure his capitalist allies, principally Britain and the USA that the Soviet Union no longer harboured ambitions to assist in the overthrow of their capitalist governments. Thus the *Fourth International*, weak though it was, remained the only organisation committed to the international socialist revolution world wide. In addition it was the sole propagandist for the overthrow by the working class of the degenerated and deformed bureaucracies which had taken power in the workers' states.

Throughout the years of the Cold War the International remained a relatively small and isolated body whose main achievement in this period was to keep alive the traditions and theory of revolutionary marxism by an on-going analysis of and propaganda around current events. But since the mid-sixties we have seen a significant turn in the world situation which has been reflected in the renewed growth of the Fourth International. In a whole number of countries our comrades are now capable of intervening independently in the growing struggles which are accompanying the now world wide economic crisis of capitalism. At the last World Congress, held in February 1974, there were delegates representing organisations in 41 different countries.

In Africa our resources and influence have, like that of virtually all socialist organisations, been hitherto extremely limited. But we are certain that in the coming period they will be tremendously increased. All over the continent the bourgeois regimes, civilian or military, which have come to power since the independence wave of fifteen years ago, prove more and more incapable of organising measures of economic development which can even sustain the present inadequate living standards of their own growing populations. Thus African experience is once more confirming the analyses made originally by Trotsky of the impossibility of new independent capitalist development of any size and significance in the era of imperialist decay.² In the south, the repercussions of the decolonisation by Portugal are being felt throughout the white racist bloc. The revolution in this area itself threatens, for reasons developed later in this pamphlet, the entire neo-colonialist structure of this region.

The continent wide socialist revolution which is alone capable of solving the economic problems of Africa is therefore objectively 'on the agenda'. But there is no other tendency in the world working class movement which is capable of measuring up to the task of developing the necessary theory and practice which can carry this revolution to its successful conclusion. As we explain below, the communist parties have never had any important foothold. But more important, are now, whether they fall under the influence of Moscow or of Peking, incapable of acting in an independent revolutionary fashion because the bureaucrats of both these capitals have staked everything on developing a close relationship with precisely the bourgeois African leaderships which must be overthrown. Socialists of the reformist wing internationally are similarly paralysed.

One of the favourite tasks for instance of social democracy internationally has been to bolster the reputations of bourgeois politicians like Kaunda who are built up into 'African socialists' of a unique variety.

We have no doubt therefore that the task of developing the theory and practice which confronts the oppressed masses of Africa as an urgent necessity for their very survival, falls upon the Fourth International and its sympathisers. This pamphlet is a first attempt by our supporters in one area of the continent to begin this task.

1. For a development of these arguments see: *Revolution Betrayed* by Leon Trotsky.

2. See *Permanent Revolution* by Leon Trotsky (Both available from: Red Books, 97 Caledonian Road, London N1 9BT, price £1.50 and £1.15 plus postage respectively).

INTRODUCTION

This pamphlet has been written by a supporter of the Fourth International in Zambia. It makes first attempt to examine the realities of our society from the standpoint of revolutionary marxism.

In attempting this task we are rather conscious of being pioneers. One of the distinguishing features of 20th Century African history is that those ideas which, however distorted the forms of socialism which have emerged, have been responsible for liberating one third of the world from the rapacious capitalist system, have seldom found any firm base within the organisations of the oppressed masses of this continent. Indeed, as we point out below with regard to Zambia, even independent forms of class organisation on the part of the workers or peasant population have been remarkably weak and often totally absent.

Thus the official 'communist' movement, deformed internationally as it has been by the degeneration of the Russian revolution under the rule of Stalin and his successors, has nonetheless secured a foothold of greater or lesser firmness amongst the masses of the other four continents. In Africa, with the exception of the Arab world of the far north and the relatively highly industrialised state of South Africa, it has had no effective presence.

Thus marxist ideas in general have had little or no currency amongst Africans. Indeed one of the most frequent arguments of leaders like Nyerere, Sekou Toure, Nkrumah and Kaunda, who have all claimed formal allegiance to socialist goals, is that marxism is actually irrelevant to the historical experience of our continent. In their view Africa has been somehow immune from the class divisions which have affected society in the rest of the world. The communist traditions of - pre-industrial society are capable of being magically transmuted into an Ujamaa (co-operative) or 'Humanist' modern state.

A first task of this pamphlet is to demonstrate the fallacy of such a view applied to Zambian society. It may be historically correct that class divisions have developed rather later than in those societies which were subject at an earlier date to the twin exploitations of private land ownership or capitalist industry. Nonetheless the colonial exploitation of Africa by Europe which has been the determining feature of our 20th century experience, has produced within this continent forms of class society no less unjust and exploitative for the mass of the population than those prevailing in the more 'developed' areas of the globe.

Indeed we can safely argue that, precisely because of this relative economic underdevelopment of Africa we now see in almost every state the emergence of ruling classes whose wealth is based upon a pathetically tiny exploitative potential. Their margin for manoeuvre is still further limited by the stranglehold which western imperialism exerts on their economies. As a result we now see all over the continent ruling elites which have seized power as a result of the independence wave of the late 1950s and early 1960s whose cleavage from the mass of the population in terms of standard of living and privileges of all kinds is more transparently clear than in many of the more developed countries. In Zambia we have no doubt that these class divisions are already more than a marginal part of the consciousness of the majority of the population. For the underprivileged majority the central feature of the past ten years is not the formal independence won from the British in 1964. Rather it is the replacement of the white master by his black counter-part, leaving the status of the mass of workers and peasants almost totally unchanged.

The existence and continued deepening of class divisions within Zambian society is recognised even by government spokespersons. Repeatedly over the past

years we have heard them warning against the dangers involved in the Zambian elite's aggressive self-enrichment. This, it is said, must be moderated in order to avoid the spectre of revolution. This possibility is clearly recognised by the most percipient of their leaders, Kaunda (*see especially Chapter 15 of his "Humanism in Zambia Part Two", which details the ever-widening gap between the living standards of the political/economic elite and the mass of the population*). Yet this man simultaneously presides over the system which sustains these developments.

Unlike Kaunda we do not believe that class divisions will be eliminated through vaguely worded appeals to humanist motives and absurd begging of the capitalist class to moderate its greed for profit. On the contrary we know that there is only one way by which the system now existing in Zambia will be transformed into socialism. That is through the revolutionary overthrow of the present governing state capitalist class and the total expropriation of the resources of the country from their hands and those of their imperialist paymasters, by the masses of the oppressed workers and peasants.

Revolutionary marxists have no illusions that the road towards this goal will not be long and difficult. Nor do we set ourselves up at this point in time as a self-appointed leadership for such a revolution or as the author of a 100 per cent correct revolutionary theory and practice. If this pamphlet can only achieve the goal of stimulating discussion and debate amongst those whose ideas about the way Zambia is developing approximate to our own, it will have fulfilled its goal. It is to be hoped that this will be a first step towards the creation of a committed nucleus of revolutionaries prepared and able to map out a strategy for and play an active role in the class struggles which we are certain will unfold in the coming period.

the Zambian economy

- the evolution of state capitalism

To understand the present state of our economy and society it is necessary briefly to trace developments immediately before and after the 1964 achievement of independence. What was the state of the Zambian economy in 1964?

Firstly, it was clearly sharply divided into two distinct sectors. On the one hand was copper and other mining and the associated administrative and supply infrastructure around the 'line of rail'. Within this sector could be included the 1,000, mostly white-owned, capitalist farms concentrated in this belt and supplying a large part of the food needs of the urban population. The administrative centres, principally the city of Lusaka and what other industry existed in the area, primarily serviced this sector eg. the Broken Hill (now Kabwe) railway workshops (transport of copper was the railway's main function), the construction industry, supplying housing and other urban necessities, food and drink manufacturing, road transport etc.

Northern Rhodesia's economy was a typical example of the totally distorted pattern of economic development which imperialism imposed in virtually every section of the colonised world. What economic development had taken place has been solely to service the needs of Anglo-American Corporation and Roan Selection Trust and was totally structured to fit their requirements. For the colonial regime the other sector, the rest of the country, had only one significance. It was the source of the labour necessary for the efficient exploitation of the resources of the Copperbelt. In this area virtually the only administrative function undertaken by the colonial government was the collection of taxes. The need to raise these made it necessary for every family to seek some form of cash income. From this time began the process which has, as we shall see later, accelerated since Independence: the progressive relative impoverishment of the rural areas through the draining away of the most economically active sections of their population.

To these debilitating effects of the colonial economy, which were common to most countries within the colonised world, were added, in Zambia the additional distortions brought about by its relations with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Obviously both these territories, with their much larger settler populations, would be likely to develop manufacturing and supply industries which would outsell any based on the limited Northern Rhodesian market alone. But this tendency was exacerbated by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, imposed in 1953. The 10 years of Federation were the occasion for the progressive transfer of wealth, created in Zambia by the copper mines, to the expanding econ-

omy of Southern Rhodesia. This process was accomplished both by taxation (most Federal taxes were collected in the North and spent in the South) and by the policy of centralising all common services eg. railways, airways, in the south. In addition of course, virtually all new industries created in the period were created in Southern Rhodesia which possessed the more substantial market. The general effect of Federation is adequately summarised in the fact that African employment in Northern Rhodesia actually marginally declined during its ten years (from 251,000 to 240,000). Estimates of the total net tax lost to the north in these years (ie. the difference between amount collected and amount spent within the territory) come out at approximately 145 million Kwacha. Numerous statistics demonstrate the total underdevelopment of all forms of public services, notably health, education (where Zambia possessed only 100 University graduates at the time of independence), and road building, which was entirely concentrated in the south.

In 1964 then, the Zambian economy was totally oriented to a single product while it was in tight harness to its white southern neighbours. Copper accounted for 48 per cent of Net Domestic Product and 92 per cent of exports by value. Southern Rhodesia provided 40 per cent and South Africa 21 per cent of imports. Essentially the copper based Zambian economy was merely an adjunct to the fast expanding economy of southern Africa, based on the tremendous post war boom of the economy of the apartheid Republic. But if Zambia depended heavily on its neighbours, the reverse was not the case. The only commodity of any value which she supplied to the South was the labour which went to work in the mines of both countries. The changes which were to take place in the wake of Zambia's independence would have much more far-reaching effects on her economy than on those of her erstwhile 'partners' to the south.

It is not necessary for us to make a long analysis of the struggle against Federation and for independence. This was won in 1964 for the following reasons.

1. The struggle was effectively led by the United National Independence Party (UNIP). By the early 1960s this was a truly mass party in the size of the active support which it could command for its activities and initiatives. We shall have cause to comment later on the precise nature of UNIP's politics and leadership in this period and on its later spectacular decline from its position as a mass party.

2. Unlike in Southern Rhodesia, the specific weight of the white settler population was small. About 1,000 white farmers on the line of rail along with some urban businessmen constituted the main body of the settlers. The bulk of the employed white population, which never totalled more than 30,000 engaged in mining, administration, communications etc, were temporary residents on limited contracts.

Although most of them came from the white south and were therefore naturally hostile to majority rule in Zambia, their stake in the maintenance of colonialism and white supremacy was not anything akin to that of the big population of permanent settlers, especially of farmers, in Southern Rhodesia. The final attempts of politicians like Welensky to whip up significant white support for Federation were generally met with apathy. Indeed the obvious drain of resources from North to South had made the more permanent settler population, farmers, businessmen etc., increasingly hostile to a set up which did not confer any economic benefits on them. The far-

sighted amongst these elements could see the possibility of a more profitable future outside of Federation. In Northern Rhodesia then the grand design of Welensky disappeared with a whimper, with the white population totally sidelined politically.

3. But central to the collapse of Federation were the calculations now being made by the international corporations with investments in Zambia, and above all by the copper companies. Oppenheimer and his fellows had good reason to be happy with the constant reassurances being given by the UNIP leadership



Masterminding 'detente': President Kaunda of Zambia and Premier Vorster of South Africa

that independent Zambia would not interfere in any way with their free functioning in the country. Undoubtedly they now increasingly calculated that investment in a new 'stable' black state would be safer than in a minority ruled state subject to the continual upheavals engendered by the repression of black majority. It was above all the acquiescence of all the imperialist interests with substantial investments in Zambia that persuaded the British Conservative government of the need to move towards the break up of Federation and independence for Northern Rhodesia.

Imperialism's willingness to grant independence in this way to Zambia can be explained clearly only by looking a little more closely at the nature of UNIP at this stage. Without doubt, as we have already stressed, it possessed a mass base in the population, both urban and rural. Its unyielding commitment to majority rule and against Federation had continually outflanked the weak-kneed and flaccid competition provided by Nkumbula's African National Congress (ANC). But the party's leadership was composed almost without exception of members of the aspiring African middle class. Its policies accurately reflected the willingness of this class to collaborate right down the line with imperialism so long as it could itself win *political leadership* of the country. Therefore the pre-independence struggle was conducted entirely on slogans of national independence. UNIP's propaganda stressed the right of Zambians to run their own country, militantly opposed all forms of racial discrimination and called for the massive development of government services, in health, education etc. But in no way did UNIP oppose itself to the imperialist economic interests which were the key to the exploitation of Zambia's resources. Indeed the party went out of its way continually to stress that in independent Zambia, foreign investment would be welcomed, without strings attached. Nor did it question the continued existence of private local capitalism in farming, services and industry. While much was made of UNIP's hostility to the form of government in Rhodesia and South Africa and to the continued existence of colonialism in Africa, no intention was announced to do anything about the manifold links with the white south.

In the light of these policies imperialism could be justifiably confident that the party which was certain to form the political leadership after independence would be a more than competent guardian of its continued interests. When independence came to Zambia in 1964 then, it took place on an exactly similar basis to that in most of the African continent over the previous few years. Imperialism handed over power to a politically articulate minority of the local population which undertook to safeguard foreign investment. Everything was set, it was hoped, for a continued cosy relationship.

For the first few years of the country's independence this 'honeymoon' between Zambia's new rulers and their economic masters continued more or less undisturbed. The period saw the rapid Zambianisation of key positions in government and administration. This was the formative period for the new Party/Government elite, whose standards of living and way of life were rapidly to become far distanced from those of the mass of the community. But the new elite's privileges at this stage rested entirely on its control of the administrative machinery. All industry of importance was monopolised by the international capitalist firms, while large scale private farming and retail trade was almost entirely in the hands of Europeans or Asians. For the new elite such a situation could not continue indefinitely. It meant that they were effectively excluded from participation in any profit making economic enterprises within the country.

The pressure for change in the ownership and control of resources did not come only from this source. The mass of the working population, particularly, continued to be resentful of its continued subjection to alien controls with which they clashed directly in the course of their daily working lives. The dominance of white management throughout industry seriously contradicted the expectations which had been aroused in the period of the independence struggle. Such resentments were reinforced by the total domination of trade and commerce by non-Africans. One of Kaunda's more frequently quoted justifications for the need for legislated Zambianisation referred to the fact that in 1967 there was not a single Zambian owned business in Cairo Road (Lusaka's main shopping street). Such a situation could not continue indefinitely without provoking strong resentments amongst the new governing elite whose power rested on a shadow until it could encompass at least some share in Zambia's economic resources. The mass of the working population could not easily be convinced that much had been changed by the independence struggle when the same white manager confronted them at work and the same Asian face across the counter in the local shop.

In addition the economic results, in terms of real growth, of Zambia's 'open door' investment policy between 1964 and 1967 were virtually nil. This was despite the fact that new 'pioneer' industries were not to be taxed for five years, profits and even capital were allowed to be repatriated to the country of origin without restriction and there were no problems about obtaining work permits for any number of expatriate employees. In fact of course it was not at all surprising that the calculations of international imperialist investors led them to continue to think of Zambia as an integral part of a southern African economic bloc within which it was generally more rational economically to invest in the areas with the larger markets and more readily available supplies of

skilled labour. But the Zambian government was publicly committed to the expansion of employment — the 1966 First National Development Plan named a target of 100,000 new jobs by 1970. It became increasingly clear that this target, which had been given wide publicity and had aroused widespread expectations amongst the working and unemployed sections of the population, could not be achieved without some substantial state intervention to stimulate the development of new industries.

In summary, then the changes initiated in 1968 with the Mulungushi Reforms were not at all an implementation of UNIP's new found creed of 'Humanism' (see later). Rather they were the result of:

- (i) the inability of the 'open door' policy to secure any real economic expansion.
- (ii) the rapidly growing aspirations of the Zambian administrators to possess more than paper control over the functioning of the economy.
- (iii) the need to provide a series of reforms which could be sold to an expectant population as a blow in favour of the creation of an improved, egalitarian, and above all, a Zambian society.

economic reforms

The economic reforms of 1968 can conveniently be divided into two. First were those measures which sought to increase the size and weight of the independent Zambian bourgeoisie through the direct transfer of assets into their hands. Such steps were possible, so long as all transfers were to be effected by purchase, only within the sphere of small scale trading. There just did not exist any Zambians possessed of the financial resources to enable them to take over even the larger enterprises in this sector. Thus the Matero reforms, while proclaiming the Zambianisation of the trading sector, were forced to exclude the 'first class trading areas' of the ten largest towns. Only in 1972 were their provisions extended to include these. Even in this area it was impossible to secure complete 'Zambianisation' without state intervention. Thus OK Bazaars (a South African firm) and Booker McConnell's chain of supermarkets — now ZCBC (Zambia Consumer Buying Corporation) — had to be included in the state participation sector. The main effect of Zambianisation of the small trading sector was to enable the political leadership which controlled the allocation of trading licences to secure for itself and its families a good slice of the available businesses. In addition their contracts gave them relatively easy access to the kind of loans needed to secure these purchases. Actually of course this takeover was avoided by a good number of already established traders who were able to transfer ownership of their enterprises to children who were Zambian by birth. No doubt the continued filial relationship provides an easy means for the repatriation of profits!

But the key form taken by the economic reforms of 1968 and their successors was the series of 'invitations' which were issued to a number of the more substantial manufacturing and distributive enterprises, and later to the mining companies, to transfer 51 per cent or more of their shares to the state. It is these

measures, which brought more than half of the working population into either direct state or parastatal employment, which are most consistently cited by the government as evidence of Zambia's evolution towards socialism. In fact this idea, which is assiduously propagated in exactly the same fashion in many other African countries (Tanzania being a foremost example) is nothing but a carefully constructed illusion. Under cover of a supposed step towards socialism, what has actually happened through the 1968/69 reforms is that:

- (A) the close relationship and involvement of certain imperialist enterprises in the Zambian economy has been strengthened
- (B) the power of Zambia's emergent capitalist class has been increased through its participation in the management of the new enterprises.

(A) The form of takeover.

In 1917, after the Russian Revolution, in 1952 in China, in 1960-61 in Cuba, when the governments of these countries launched their takeovers of the 'Commanding heights' of their respective economies, there was no question of negotiations/compensation etc. It was simply, and correctly, asserted that the wealth of these countries had been created by the labour of their workers. As such it belonged 100 per cent to them and there was not a single possible justification for the idea that the respective imperialist countries were entitled to any sort of compensation for having exploited the resources and labour force for innumerable years.

In Zambia, by way of contrast, every single state takeover of supposedly controlling interest in particular companies was effected by means of give and take bargaining and negotiation between the government and the international corporations concerned. In many cases the final bargain involved, as in the case of the copper companies, the payment of compensation for a period of years out of the future profits of the enterprise. Thus these corporations who had sucked Zambia dry for many years with great profit to themselves, were now to be given more money to secure their agreement to becoming only minority instead of majority shareholders in this exploitation. Such moves by the government were in no way evidence of a socialist orientation. On the contrary they demonstrated a manifest anxiety to maintain Zambia's position as part of the capitalist system internationally. But our governmental spokespersons would doubtless reply to these points that the key thing about the 1968-69 reforms was not the form of the takeover but the fact that by getting a majority share in a whole series of enterprises they have set Zambia on the road to charting its own independent economic development. Actually this argument is also totally illusory. There are in reality a number of reasons why imperialism internationally and particularly those companies directly involved in such 'participation' arrangements, have been considerably strengthened in the new context.

1. In almost every case 'management contracts' were signed with the former owners or (in the case of certain new enterprises) with other international

companies. These have two important effects:

(a) The managers employed are usually expatriate.

Both their employers and themselves had a clear interest in lengthening as far as possible the duration of these contracts. This can in particular be achieved by placing all sorts of obstacles in the way of developing and training local workers with the required expertise to take over the crucial functions in the enterprises. To give just one example, Alitalia's management of Zambia Airways which lasted five years produced not one single fully trained and experienced pilot of Zambian nationality capable of taking over the airline's intercontinental flights.

(b) These contracts mean that it is the parent company which is able to decide on the sources of supply for a whole variety of machinery, technical assistance, materials and other essential inputs. Naturally this is used to the best advantage of the international corporation concerned and of its associates. In many cases such companies deliberately charge inflated prices which increase the profits of the metropolitan firm and serve to drain capital from Zambia.

2. International corporations who have entered into minority shareholdings in Zambian parastatal companies have also found that it constitutes a valuable way of consolidating a monopoly within the local market. Naturally there is considerable pressure within the government to ensure the success of such 'partnerships'. Thus all sorts of advantages may be offered. For instance the recent changes made in government credit policies have established a virtual monopoly for Fiat in small car sales. But the biggest benefit of this is not to the Zambian economy — Livingstone Motor Assemblers has only 400 workers and none of the components used in its car assembly are manufactured in Zambia. This fact which is typical of such enterprises was acknowledged by Kaunda, speaking at the opening of the Ndola Trade Fair on 5th July. There he said: 'Zambia will no longer be satisfied with assembling products from imported and already manufactured parts.' As in so many cases however the gap between expressed intention and reality is certain to be wide. It is inconceivable that the small market provided by car assembly in Zambia could sustain a developed components manufacturing sector. In Britain indeed, where total car production nears one million annually there is actually an even higher degree of monopoly in the supply of components for motor vehicle assembly than in the assembly process itself.

The principle beneficiary of these arrangements therefore is the Fiat international motor manufacturing giant which holds only 30 per cent of the shares but which is the source of virtually all the parts — and therefore collects most of the profit. Such a situation is absolutely ideal for Fiat. By entering into this arrangement with the Zambian government it has, through relatively small cash investment, excluded all its potential competitors in the cut throat market of international car sales. For Zambia on the other hand its sole significant effect has been to effect a stranglehold on its market by Fiat. It is not idle to speculate that in the future the investment which the govern-

ment now has in encouraging Fiat's sales may lead to preference being given to an end-product which is less efficient and whose price is higher than that of potential competitors.

3. There are other quite tangible benefits to be derived by the multi-national companies from such arrangements. The government has a big stake in the prestige and success of the enterprise. It is absolutely committed to encouraging it under the guise of 'economic development'. Thus in Zambia, simultaneously with these developments, the government has passed several pieces of legislation which restrict strikes and wage increases (*see later*). In a world economy where the pressure on profits is immense and can only be relieved by such measures to reduce the living standards of the working class, such moves are of inestimable benefit to the multi-national companies. The trades unions and UNIP, which in the period immediately before independence were the main backers of industrial action, are now the most active opponents of any such defensive moves on the part of the workers. Those who strike are denounced as the saboteurs of economic development.

All these factors have led the most far sighted of the imperialist companies to realise that such majority shareholdings by the state in their subsidiaries in the neo-colonial countries can actually be the most important guarantee for them of future stability and profit.

(B) The development of Zambian 'state capitalism'.

The forms of the agreements established with the various multi-national companies are one key point in establishing that the Zambian reforms do not constitute any breach with imperialism internationally or capitalism domestically. Equally important however is to examine the structures of management and control which have been developed. It is these which can demonstrate most clearly to the workers within the new enterprises and to the mass of the population the fallacy of the claim that Zambia is pursuing a socialist road of development.

1. **Wages and other rewards.** It is fairly widely assumed that a basic principle of socialism is the growth of a more equal distribution of income than exists in capitalist societies. Nobody can claim that such principles are applied in Zambia's parastatal companies. Those in top management jobs do not simply enjoy wages far in excess of the average (latest available figure for average wages of all workers in Zambia are for 1972: K960 per annum). Those for such positions as chairmen or managing directors of the parastatals are not readily available to the public. However we can give at least one verified example of the managing director of INDECO Breweries who receives K15,000 p.a. It is not idle to suppose that those in some larger enterprises like the mines will be considerably higher.

It is certain that the managing director of RCM receives more than K20,000 p.a. Such office holders also possess innumerable fringe benefits in the form of excessively large and luxurious dwellings complete with house servants, gardeners, security guards etc., high powered company cars, access to private medical

care, assistance with childrens' school fees etc. These new Zambian top management personnel who have taken over from expatriates in these positions have ensured that they themselves continue to enjoy similarly inflated living standards which are out of all proportion to those of the average workers and well above their own basic needs. It is these salaries which have been partially responsible for the ability of such 'leaders' to build up an investment capital 'on the side' which is utilised in the private sector through property, farming, distribution, road transport etc. (see section below on Leadership Code).

2. Control of Production. In every major policy statement on these new arrangements lip service has been paid to the idea that a new 'participatory democracy' is in the process of being established in Zambian industry. The words 'workers' control' have frequently been used to specify the aim of our new industrial strategy. It is of course perfectly clear to all workers that they possess no control over even the smallest detail of their working lives. In those enterprises which possess workers' councils and other representative committees of any kind, their role is confined to discussing how best to increase production — i.e. how to get people to work harder. They certainly have no control at all over such key items as pricing policy, job rates etc. They do not have access even to information about the company's financial affairs which would be essential to enable workers to make any real judgements, not to speak of decisions, about the functioning of the enterprise.

Above all of course it is clear that if the Zambian working class did have any real control over its employers the first thing it would do is to strip the 'apamwambas' of their excessive privileges in order to increase those of the mass of workers. Such control could never be *conceded* by either the new Zambian managerial class or by its imperialist sponsors. For the former it would mean the certain end of all the manoeuvres which we have detailed above by which they have maintained an effectively controlling interest in companies in which they have only a minority shareholding. Not least amongst their means of sustaining their own positions is precisely their ability to offer these big-material incentives, not to speak of direct bribes, to the new Zambian elite. Thus these two groups are in fact totally locked in each other's embrace. One cannot exist in Zambia without the other — which is why both will defend the status quo with all the resources at their command.

For the Zambian elite of course the crucial resource which it manipulates is the state machinery. It is therefore no accident that at the top levels there is constant mobility between the state and parastatal sectors of the economy and the government sector. These are the three key wings of the emergent Zambian bourgeoisie's interests. And it is within the political sector that the key decisions are made which safeguard this structure.

It is for this reason that we are entitled to apply the description "*state capitalism*" to the post 1969 structure of the Zambian economy. We have already stressed that, like the bourgeoisies of the majority of the colonised world, that which existed in Zambia was quite incapable of substantial economic development. Indeed for reasons developed in our introduction, the

potential of the Zambian bourgeoisie, which had never existed in Zambia was quite incapable of substantial economic development. Indeed for reasons developed in our introduction, the potential of the Zambian bourgeoisie, which had never existed as an independent factor in any sector, was even more limited than in many comparable countries. The only way in which any 'independent' development could be stimulated would be by utilising the resources of the state to centralise investment on a scale which was beyond the capacity of any single or group of private individuals. Of course there are two ways in which this could be done. Had Zambia been a workers' state in which the majority of the means of production had been expropriated from the hands of the multinational corporations and their local agents and in which the state had established a monopoly of foreign trade, then economic development could have taken place, directed and organised by the state, as part of the planned growth of the economy and of the socialised means of production. But political leadership in Zambia was not in the hands of the working class and its allies but in those of an aspirant middle class. The degree and quality of mass mobilisation required to achieve such measures of expropriation was quite unthinkable to this class which recognised that its own privileges would be swept away in the process. Thus as we have already stressed, the struggle for *political* independence was not accompanied by any similar struggle for *economic* independence from imperialism. The subsequent measures, sold to the world, and above all to the Zambian population itself, as establishing this independence, have served only to strengthen this ruling group and the stranglehold of their key imperialist backers.

Most importantly of all, they have failed the crucial test by which, from its publicised statements, the Party and government leadership is agreed they must be judged. They have not even met the totally inadequate targets set for achieving swift and balanced economic development and a growth in real incomes in Zambia. By this failure they have fully substantiated one of the key observations of revolutionary marxists in the era of imperialism — that it is actually *impossible* for a bourgeoisie in the neo-colonial countries to promote meaningful economic development. This task lies with the working class and its allies alone and can be executed only through the ending of capitalism. Evidence for this assertion can come only from a more detailed analysis of the development of the Zambian economy, particularly over the six years which have elapsed since the much heralded 'economic reforms'.



wages and the standard of living

One of the most widely publicised myths by which the government and its apologists seek to justify measures restraining wage increases is that of the 'privileged Zambian working class'. A simple comparison is made between the money incomes of those in employment in the urban areas and of the population in the rural sector.


Of course the difference is wide, and has indeed widened in the years since independence for reasons which we shall examine later. But does this actually prove, as government spokespersons so frequently assert, that urban workers are a privileged class who are living at an increasingly high standard at the expense of their peasant 'comrades'? It is very important to assert that the answer to this question must be an emphatic 'no'. Not least of the reasons for the centrality of this argument for revolutionaries is that, while the leadership of the future Zambian socialist revolution will without doubt be based in the working class, it cannot be successfully implemented without the support of the peasant masses. The wide publicity given to such assertions is certainly in part designed precisely to prevent the emergence of such links between these two sections of the Zambian labouring population.

What is the reality behind this myth? Firstly it is certain that between 1964 and 1970 average wages in Zambia doubled while the cost of living index went up only 50 per cent. This means that the average member of the working population enjoyed a rise in living standard in this period. However we must immediately qualify this statement. Average wages are calculated for the entire working population. In particular in this period they were inflated by the rapid accession of Zambians into managerial positions in government which were previously the exclusive province of expatriates. This takeover was a once and for all event which occurred mainly in those years and saw large numbers of the more privileged groups in these sectors taking over jobs at the same inflated expatriate wage rates as were enjoyed by their predecessors. If however we were to examine a different section of the employed population which is hidden within this average we would find a rather different story.

Do the government spokespersons who consistently make charges actually believe that the 150 per cent rise from K10 to K25 a month achieved by unskilled local authority and government employees constituted an excessive increase? If they do they certainly possess conveniently short memories which enable them to forget that precisely one of the rallying cries for UNIP's pre-independence struggle was the pledge to raise the sub-human living standards imposed by a colonial government. Without doubt the most important part of the increase in real wages which took place in the period immediately after Independence merely compensated for the deprivations of the colonial era.

If we continue to examine the history of the past five years we find a very different story, the realities of which the government will, in the immediate future, find it more and more difficult to evade. In the period 1970-72 the Central Statistical Office Digest tells us that average wages rose by 9.2 per cent from K878 to K960 per annum. In the same period the low income consumer price index rose by 11.2 per cent. Thus it is irrefutable that there was a marginal decline in real living standards in these two years. Unfortunately statistics on wages are not yet available for the following period. However we do know that by June 1975 the Price Index had risen by a further 25½ per cent. Throughout this period there has existed legislation limiting wage increases in any sector to 5 per cent per annum. We can therefore be certain that, at the very most wages will have increased by 12½ per cent. The net effect is that the real income of the average Zambian worker certainly declined by at least 15 per cent between 1970 and mid 1975. Recent visible movements of both prices and wages, far from suggesting a reversal of this trend, indicate rather that the acceleration of the divorce between price and wage increases which in this period is continuing unabated.

There is a third point, less precisely estimable statistically, but of undoubted importance in reinforcing this picture of declining living standards for the working class. In 1969 there were 1,192,116 persons registered as resident in urban areas. By 1974 this figure had increased by 29 per cent to 1,656,000. In the same period employment had increased from 363,000 to approximately 425,000 — an increase of only 17 per cent. In hard terms it meant that every worker's wage now had to support 4 persons instead of 3 for which it was responsible in 1969. It can validly be objected (a) that not all of the working population is resident in urban areas — but that would of course actually serve only to increase our estimate of the ratio of dependents to employees; (b) that not



all the registered urban population are totally dependent on wage labour (eg. marketeers, small farmers etc.) Nonetheless the general trend is unmistakably one which reinforces our contention that real living standards have declined significantly in the past five years and suggests that they have done so by a rather larger proportion per capita than is apparent through a simple setting of average wages against the consumer price index. Certainly they place into a real perspective the sort of self confident sleight of hand achieved in a memorable section of the 1970 2nd National Development Plan which triumphantly proclaims that while African employment was increasing by 6.5 per cent yearly population was only going up by 2.7 per cent!

employment

Central to both the first (1966 and second (1971) National Development Plans was the proclaimed attempt to increase the amount of paid employment by 100,000 in each of the four year periods covered. The reality has fallen short of the aim, particularly during the period covered by the Second Plan.

Thus in 1966 employment (excluding domestic service) stood at 301,990. In December 1970 it was 342,970. By June 1974 this had risen to only 386,830. The stated aim of the 2nd Plan was to increase it to 505,000 by 1976. There is a certain amount of ambiguity in this figure because domestic service is not included in the reported statistics of employment while it does feature in the planned targets. But even with a generous estimate of 35,000 employment in this sector we still find that in December 1973 the number of jobs is 90,000 short of the 1976 target.

Furthermore the record over the past period gives no indication at all that a rate of growth can be achieved which will come anywhere near attaining this target. Over the three years December 1970 to December 1973 the average number employed rose by 13,600 annually. But this conceals the fact that between December 1971 and December 1972 the number rose by only 2,000. The immediate reason for this is seen when we note that 1971 and to a lesser extent 1972 were years when income from copper sales fell sharply from its 1960 peak. When speculating about the possibility of big increases in the labour force by 1976 we should bear in mind that we are currently living through a period which is precisely similar and which has already, because of the gravity of the recession internationally, been prolonged for far longer than previous such collapses in prices. No statistics have yet appeared on employment beyond June 1974. But recent news of numerous redundancies, especially in small scale manufacturing suggests that the year 1975 will at best show a nil growth in employment.

Even the most optimistic commentators would find it hard to argue that employment in Zambia, including domestic service, was liable to be more than 440,000 by the beginning of 1976. Confirmation of the essential facts of this argument came from Kaunda himself in his June 30 speech to UNIP National Council at Mulungushi. The economic crisis was now biting so hard at the Zambian economy that it was necessary to begin a drastic restructuring of the parastatals and to cut down by 60 per cent on their K100 million annual subsidies. In the resolution passed we read: 'Appreciating that this will mean a lot of re-organisation, possibly resulting in redundancies, (National Council) directs the government to see that all such workers as will be declared redundant should be drafted into the rural reconstruction programme and that workers so drafted will be helped to settle down on the land in their districts of origin.' What is being proposed here is an actual

cutback in the labour force, at least in certain sectors, accompanied by forced redirection of the redundant workers into the rural areas.

It is when we examine the sectoral distribution of employment that we can appreciate even more vividly the real state of the economy.

mining

Mining employed 52,000 in 1964. 10 years later it had 62,000 workers. It is quite clear that, despite the existence of a number of new projects of a limited scale there can be no significant increase in this sector in the future.

manufacturing

Manufacturing. The figures for employment in this sector provide a basic indicator of the success achieved by Zambia's development plans in shifting the base of the economy away from mining and subsistence agriculture into new productive fields. The record shows the total failure of this aim. The Second National Development Plan projected 63,000 workers in manufacturing by 1976. The figures for the last four and a half years for which statistics are available are as follows:

December	1970	38,160
"	1971	42,020
"	1972	40,800
"	1973	42,060
June	1974	43,130

These figures do not simply indicate a total failure by government to fulfill its much vaunted aim of increasing job opportunities. They are irrefutable proof of the fundamental stagnation of that sector which is the most crucial to the development of a modern economy. The much publicised enterprises initiated by INDECO in partnership with a variety of multi-national capitalist corporations (see above) have had a marginal effect on job opportunities or on the overall growth of the economy. In general this is because such projects which are usually in themselves extremely capital intensive, have not at all stimulated any independent economic development within Zambia itself. On the contrary they have succeeded only in tying the Zambian economy more firmly to a series of overseas lines of supply.

agriculture

Agriculture. In this sector the picture of stagnation is even more stark. Between 1964 and 1973 there was an increase of exactly 1,000 jobs in the field of 'agriculture, forestry and fisheries'. Since the second of these has been the subject of limited government sponsored and organised expansion we can safely assume that the numbers employed in farming have actually declined over the ten years since independence. Of course, under certain circumstances, this could be a sign of real advance within this sector. eg. by rapid mechanisation of jobs previously undertaken by intensive labour and a consequent expansion in output. But as we shall see later it is only within a very limited number of fields that we can find any significant growth in agricultural production. The stagnation of employment in this field is undoubtedly a reflection of the halt to any real growth in production.

What sectors do show some kind of growth in employment? Obviously the big expansion in government spending since Independence led, especially in the late 1960s to a big growth of employment in the 'community, social and personal services' sector. This also had its effects in increasing employment in construction and in transport, although the former has now settled down to oscillating along with the rest of the economy. But the fastest increase over the past few years has been in 'finance, insurance, real estate and business services' which showed a 50 per cent jump from 9,460 workers in December 1970 to 14,510 three years later.

Of course this rate of growth will also certainly begin to slow in the near future, but its rapid expansion at this time set alongside the virtually total stagnation of agriculture and manufacturing provides a more than adequate commentary on the direction in which the economy has developed. Far be it for us to argue that all of the services involved here are unnecessary to a developed society, capitalist or socialist. But we have no doubt at all that their recent flowering in Zambia is connected with the growth of a significant class of land and property owners. Who exactly is involved in dealings with the 'real estate and business services' sector except those with considerable income and capital at their disposal? Concretely what these figures mean is that while industry and agriculture stagnate, the economic activity into which significant numbers of the new Zambian propertied class have 'retreated' is the kind of speculation in land and property which is well known to have artificially inflated eg. land prices in the centre of Lusaka.

It provides a more than adequate commentary on the bankruptcy of the bourgeoisie of many such neo-colonial economies that the committal of their capital in such totally unproductive fields is their most ambitious economic activity. Unable to compete with the multi national giants in the field of manufacturing etc. their influence over the political machinery is used to further their interests in such 'property development' Far from such investment furthering the development of the economy in general it serves only as a means of diverting large amounts of state funds into the private hands of such speculators. Undoubtedly a first class example of this is about to be enacted in public as we watch the unfolding of the recently announced development plan for 'Greater Lusaka', paying particular attention to the amount of land purchased by the state which will be necessary in order to obtain any effective planning capacity.

The measures announced at Mulungushi on 30 June regarding land tenure were made the centrepiece for that day's supposedly radical reforms. We should be clear that they will not end profiteering in land:

(i) To put a freeze on further purchases of land does not solve the problems already created in Lusaka e.g. by the private ownership of land, nor does it end the profiteering which can be engaged in by existing owners. Only the immediate and total takeover by the state without compensation of all land could do this. The existing owners will in the present situation still be able to sit on the land concerned until the price rises to a level at which it becomes profitable to sell.

(ii) The precise implications of the conversion of all freehold land to 100 year leasehold are not yet absolutely clear. In particular we have not been told if this will involve the payment of any sort of ground rent to the state and if so on what basis this will be assessed. It is nonetheless clear that this measure postpones the ending of private ownership of land for 100 years leaving the door wide open for continuing profiteering by our aspiring property speculators.

We wonder incidentally at this point whether in his anxiety to find a means of apparently striking a blow at property speculators, while keeping existing owners' wealth intact, Kaunda has not managed to get himself into a considerable contradiction. We note that a whole section of his most recent Mulungushi speech was concerned with the inappropriateness of a whole number of English legal hangovers from the days of colonialism. However the introduction of the English concept of leasehold, hitherto quite unknown in Africa (along with, incidentally, any kind of private ownership, before colonial times) is apparently acceptable because it can appear to provide the solution to a problem which was making for more and more embarrassing publicity for the government.

We cannot leave this section on employment without referring once again to the 'domestic service' sector which accounts, according to the government's estimates, for almost as large a number of persons as are engaged in manufacturing industry. It is of course, quite improper to include such workers in any realistic estimate of employment, since they are dependent for the inadequate incomes, on the better paid section of those employed in other areas. One of the clearest indictments of the backwardness of the Zambian economy is the seemingly inexhaustible supply of labour for this grossly underpaid and overexploited sector.

agriculture and fisheries

Without exception in every year since independence the government has declared its intention of pursuing the development of this sector of the economy. The objective necessity of this is easily seen with reference to the country's constantly declining capacity to produce its own food needs. The 1st National Development Plan stated: 'The agricultural and lands sector must aim at achieving self-sufficiency in the major agricultural commodities before 1975.' In 1971, the 2nd Plan was a little more cautious: 'The expansion of agricultural production is a top priority with the aim to improve the income and nutritional standards of the population; cut substantially imports of food, expand economically justified exports and provide industrial inputs.'

How far have these aims been achieved ?

First of all, in overall terms we should look at the increasing volume of agricultural imports. In 1964 these totalled K14 million. In 1971 (the peak record year to date) they were K48 million. The latest available figures are for the first six months of 1974 when they came to K20 million (K40 million at an annual rate). When we examine the progress in the fields of local production of individual commodities the picture of progressive decline in Zambia's production, relative to its consumption becomes absolutely clear:

Milk Production

1964	16m litres	
1968	17.07 "	(Sales: 22.39)
1973	14.94 "	(" 34.24)
1974	12.17 "	

Planned production 1976: 30-35 m. litres.

Note that these sales figures relate only to milk, and not to dairy products in general such as butter, cheese etc. The picture is therefore much grimmer than these figures suggest. Recent estimates published were that Zambia produces for itself only 20 per cent of its total consumption of dairy products.

Beef Cattle Production

1964	35,000 carcasses
1968	38,000 "
1973	28,000 "

Groundnuts Production

1963/4	29,894 bags
1968	4,985 "
1973	10,636 "

Tobacco Production

1964	12,583,000 Kg
1968	6,579,000 "
1973	6,260,000 "
1974	6,631,000 "

Planned production 1976: 9,600,000 - 13,000,000 kg

Fish Production

1964	33,941 tons
1968	30,040 "
1973	34,953 "

Planned production 1976: 55,000 tons

There are indeed certain areas, notably pig and poultry production, the state-owned sugar plantations and, to a lesser extent vegetables, where some rises have been recorded in saleable produce since independence. Anyone familiar however with the chronic shortages of a whole variety of vegetables and fruit particularly, could scarcely assert that anything near self-sufficiency has been achieved in this field. The overall picture then is that Zambia has undergone a progressive decline in its capacity to feed itself.

The state of agriculture can only be understood by examining its place in the calculations of our bourgeois political leadership. When we look at the politics surrounding this sector we find that the direct interest of the Zambian ruling class in the promotion of significant development in this field is in fact low. It is of course true that large numbers of these individuals own farms. But these are usually, within the independent commercial sector along the line of rail or are merely smaller plots in their home areas upon which they do not depend economically. In neither case does the need for large scale state assistance arise. The massive investment which would be required to promote agricultural development over most of the country and to raise the incomes of the rural population, does not therefore form part of the ruling-class's appreciation of its own interests.

There are other powerful objective reasons for this. Because of the income assured over the past period from copper exports, the balance of payments has usually remained fairly firmly in surplus. Large scale importation of food has not therefore threatened the kind of massive economic crisis which it would cause

for an economy less well endowed with exportable min- erable resources. There is actually not particularly pressing reason therefore for our rulers to prefer eating Zambian produce to imported food. In any case their own inflated incomes assure them against the effects this has on the pockets of poorer workers.

On the other hand we cannot deny that the govern- ment does, for a variety of reasons, pay unceasing lip service to the idea of rural development. The reality is not however as impressive as the rhetoric. In money terms only K468 million government expenditure in the year 1974 was to be devoted to the Department of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development. If we examine the provincial distribution of capital expenditure on the improvement of communications and other infrastructure we find that low priority is accorded the rural areas. The results of this are seen in the all too familiar stories of tons of produce of all varieties rotting by the road side for lack of trans- port. We should also note that the prices offered by NAMBOARD (the National Agricultural Marketing Board, chief buying agent for farm produce) are often far short of what would be required to stimu- late really efficient agricultural production. Nor can it be denied that the provision of health, education and other basic social services in the rural areas falls far short of even that inadequate level maintained in the towns. The overall picture is then of a govern- ment which is increasingly abandoning the population of the countryside to a continuation of its subsistence existence. We should be clear on two very important points here:

1) Whenever the government wants to excuse the lack of dynamism in Zambia's agricultural sector it refers to the supposedly inordinate consumption of resources by the urban population, suggesting that the latter is in some way 'sucking the peasants dry'. Such crude propaganda serves the government well as a hop- ed for means of setting the urban and rural populat- ions against each other and preventing their ever un- iting in struggle against the real parasites. This is of course mythical for three reasons:

(i) As we have already explained above, the *real* situ- ation of the majority of urban workers can anyway only be seen when one accounts for the massive dif- ferential between the higher and lower paid sections of the population. Of course it is also absurd to use the money incomes of the two sectors as a measure of their relative prosperity. Those in the low wage brack- et in urban areas who are totally dependent on pur- chasing all their items of consumption may often be much worse off materially than those with lower cash incomes who are able to grow most of their own food needs.

(ii) The lack of investment in a development of the rural areas has a directly adverse effect also upon the urban workers who suffer from constant shortages of readily available fresh farm produce and from the con- sequent profiteering which takes place in these commo- dities.

(iii) The idea (which is implicit in the statements) that by reducing the incomes of urban workers one would automatically, even marginally, increase those of the rural population is quite fallacious. Its only eff- ect would be to increase the profits of the former's employers. The mass of the rural population cannot be raised from their subsistence existence without the diversion of resources by the state into real rural recon- struction on a massive scale. But the imposition of such a revolutionary set of priorities cannot be envis- aged without the overthrow of the present capitalist state and its replacement by a government of peasants

and workers.

2) In the present period we have seen a new initiative which deserves some attention. The 'Rural Reconstruction Programme' projects that 60,000 unemployed young people annually should be processed through a series of camps located in different parts of the country. Here the inmates are supposed to be taught the principles of 'self-reliance' with a view to their becoming independent farmers in their own right. This programme has little to do with increasing agricultural production. Its main aim is to try to reduce the threat to 'social stability' presented by the ever-increasing number of unemployed youth in the towns. Each year there are at least 80,000 Grade 7 school leavers for whom the government is unable to provide either secondary school places or employment opportunities. It quite rightly assesses that this is a potentially unstable force which, growing as it does year by year and mainly concentrated as it is in the urban areas, can be a motor of revolutionary upheaval. Their attempted mass deportation into Rural Reconstruction Camps has the central purpose of moulding these youths into pliable material and ultimately of 'repatriating' them into the rural areas as subsistence farmers.

Of course the idea that this exercise can meet any kind of success is quite ludicrous to any except the most naive of government spokespersons. Firstly, recruits to the scheme have been virtually driven into the camps. This is particularly obvious in the Copper-belts where the UNIP organisation has been brought into the drive using its familiar intimidatory tactics to 'persuade' volunteers. But on arrival the recruits have been rapidly disillusioned (if they weren't already) to find that they are not to receive any wages or cash of any kind at all. Secondly the viability of the scheme must be in question from the start since it is being organised and run, not by people with any kind of agricultural expertise, but by the Army whose personnel completely lack the kind of specialised training required in this field. No doubt however they are well-versed in the kind of heavy-handed treatment of individuals, which the government hopes will whip its new recruits into line!

At the time of writing it is six months since the Rural Reconstruction Scheme was introduced with a fanfare of publicity for its goals of 'humanism and self-reliance'. The reports made available on its actual progress suggest that the scheme is in ruins. In most camps, large numbers have rapidly deserted, complaining particularly of the lack of any wage or indeed any material preparation for their arrival.

This situation has led to some of the camps (e.g. in Chingola Rural) quite predictably to become centres for petty criminal activity. There has not been a single report of any successful productive achievements by the camps. Of course we should not be at all surprised by the reaction of the mass of youth to these blatant attempts to railroad them into what could be more accurately be described as 'Rural Concentration Camps'. Not doubt their inmates, whose life in towns has given them a good bird's eye view of the way of life of Zambia's new governing class, will have been struck by the contrast between the living conditions this class prescribes for its 'drop-outs' (i.e. those for whom places were not available) and for itself!

More recently the Rural Reconstruction Programme has received a new 'boost'. Part of the economic sections of the latest national council resolutions which we have detailed above refers to the drafting of redundant parastatal employees into the programme. No doubt this, like the drafting of youths, is an attempt by the government to offset the possible political con-

sequences flowing from the existence of numbers of redundant ex-employees in the towns. Particularly indicative of the trend of this policy is the phrase in the resolution which refers to the repatriation of these workers to their 'districts of origin'. There is another country in Africa where this kind of concept is part of official policy. In South Africa all black Africans in urban areas are regarded as citizens of the Bantustans or 'homelands' and only temporary residents of the urban areas. In this latest statement of the Zambian government, we are confronted by precisely similar thinking, which was incidentally also a feature of policy under the former colonial regime. The subtle reintroduction of the notion that urban workers are only 'temporary residents' in their place of employment, able to be deported to their 'home areas' at will, marks a new stage in government policy which must be exposed and implacably resisted. We do not think it is over-alarmist to suggest that the serious application of this resolution will make freedom of movement for the Zambian population as restricted by government controls as it is for the citizens of the apartheid state.

rural co-operatives

In the early years after Independence, the government appeared to place all its faith in co-operatives as the central means for increasing agricultural productivity. In the 1970 National Development Plan for instance, it was asserted that: 'The development of the co-operative movement plays a central role in the philosophy of humanism'. Such proclamations were one of the central pillars of the government's claim to a 'socialist orientation'. Significantly however such gestures to the importance of co-operation have now almost totally disappeared from the government's rhetoric. Clearly this is because they have totally failed to make any significant impact on the rural sector. Central to this has been the absence of any democratic structures in those which have been started which would have enabled the members to participate meaningfully in the formulation of policy. Most of them have collapsed after burying without trace the government trants which had financed them. Without doubt most of this money was appropriated by those politically influential individuals who had won leadership positions in the movement and used these as an invaluable way of enhancing their own self-enrichment.



We do not claim in the above remarks to have presented a total survey of Zambia's economic development since 1964. Such an analysis would be far beyond the scope of this pamphlet. Our aim has been rather to illuminate the extent to which the economy which has developed in this period actually lives up to the claims which the government has made for it. This process of 'demystification' is the first necessity for the development of a socialist theory of the realities of Zambian society today. Let us re-emphasise the main points we have tried to develop:

1. Far from being socialist or 'humanist' (whatever that means), the economy remains clearly capitalist. Not only is it still tied into dependence on the capitalist world, albeit with a slight shift of emphasis in favour of the new sections, but Independence allowed, for the first time, the growth of a significant local capitalist class whose power and influence is based on their control of the state machinery.

2. In terms of growth the economy has never lived up to the targets which even its own controllers have set for it. This is particularly the case in the crucial fields of agriculture and manufacturing industry. In the past few years we have seen a stagnation of economic growth of a kind which contains the certainty that the Second National Development Plan's targets will not be reached in any significant productive field.

3. The imbalance in the economy which we highlighted in our introduction as being a clear feature of the colonial period has not begun to be rectified. In the latest figures available for 1974, 93 per cent of export earnings came from copper. While it is true that dependence on imports from South Africa and Rhodesia has been reduced, this has not been through their replacement with domestically produced items. Rather has this been a period during which Zambia's dependence on one area of the capitalist world has been replaced by an equally heavy reliance on others. This close relationship with imperialism has been strengthened by those reforms which supposedly gave Zambia control of its own economy.

As we showed above their results have actually been to safeguard the imperialist concerns in their assured exploitation of the Zambian worker and the Zambian market. It is these fundamental economic facts which are central in establishing that, whatever the pretension of our government, Zambia remains a class divided society, which is firmly embedded in the capitalist world. We can obtain additional evidence of the hypocrisy of UNIP's claim to be running an egalitarian society if we look at a few further key manifestations of class division and imperialist influence within our society.

the education system

To a large extent the development of the education system has been the most widely trumpeted 'success story' of the post 1964 government. It is true that there have been big developments in the availability of schooling and studentships for a far larger number, and that these have allowed for the rapid Zambianisation of a big number of jobs. But the level of official expenditure remains pitifully inadequate to meet the needs. While there is officially proclaimed to be universal primary education, at least for the first four years, it is quite obvious to observers of the annual rush for Grade 1 places that even this is not achieved. The fact that only 20 per cent of Grade 7 leavers annually can expect to find secondary school places is of course the most obvious sign of the inadequacy of the system. But in this sector needless to say we also find some very clear class divisions. Those who can afford the fees are able to by-pass the selection procedures by sending their children to one of the fee paying schools. This is not to speak of those who can afford, as many government leaders can, to send their children to expensive schools abroad. The latter was actually defended in a notable outburst by Mainza Chona, then Prime Minister, on 14th March this year. In a parliamentary debate on education he stated that this practise was perfectly reasonable: 'As one who has not yet sent my child abroad, I feel I am more competent to defend those who have had to do so. If for instance a very young child of mine has not been able to get into Form One and we may feel we have the means to pay for his or her education overseas, I strongly feel we should be allowed to do so'. i.e. the sons and daughters of the privileged will be the privileged of the next generation.

We cannot close these brief remarks on education without drawing attention to one of the most revolting contradictions stemming from the government's firm commitment to oiling the wheels of cooperation with the multi-national corporations. Expatriates employed in the government and in the parastatals are entitled to send their children to any country in the world for education at the expense of their employers. The result is that large numbers, particularly the offspring of the white mining population, are being educated at the expense of Zambia in the white racist oriented education systems of Rhodesia and South Africa.

health services

Most people, and certainly everyone with a pretence to socialist convictions, would argue that the right to equal health care for all persons, irrespective of their social class or capacity to pay, was fundamen-

tal in a society with any pretensions to egalitarian principles. In Zambia we are constantly told in governmental propaganda that health care is free for all members of the population. This is of course a distortion of the truth. One of the most fundamental needs of a community's efficient health care is a general practitioner doctor service capable of providing surgery and home visiting for its families. But we are quite unable to obtain the services of a GP except through paying fees to doctors who operate privately. This excludes from this area the vast majority of the population who cannot pay the fees charged.

In addition, while there certainly exist government hospitals providing free treatment, albeit far too few and grossly overcrowded and understaffed, there is also an important private sector in this area too. In the mining towns of the Copper-belt for instance it is usual for there to be two hospitals under the mine's administration. One is generally very crowded, badly staffed, serves rotten food to its patients, but is open to all employees. The other is well staffed, serves excellent food, is usually half empty, provides and exceptionally high standard of medical care and is restricted to those who can pay K13 medical insurance out of their wages each month. In addition it is usually open to any other person with sufficient cash to pay its fees. Since the Zambian government now holds a controlling interest in the mines and appoints their management are we to assume that the continuation of this blatantly class divided system indicates the extent of their 'humanist' application of the equal right of all persons to adequate health care? In fact of course it represents the determination of this government to maintain the glaring division between the privileged (amongst whom they themselves number) and the underprivileged.

The measures regarding the health services which were announced at Mulungushi on 30 June do not make any fundamental alterations to this picture. The 'nationalisation' of privately run nursing homes and the restriction of expatriate doctors starting private practices upon completion of their contracts, do not change the inequalities which we have described. The former affects at the most 500 beds within the hospital service. The latter does not challenge the existence of private medicine, and crucially, does not affect the future of the increasing number of Zambian doctors who will be fully capable in the future of filling the place of expatriates in private practice.

The only measures which can establish complete equality of access to medical services involve:
(a) the total abolition of any forms of private practice
(b) the creation of a common service for all sections of the population, irrespective of capacity to pay.

housing

In the days of colonialism the housing arrangements in our towns were of course quite clearly determined along racial lines. The best houses were reserved for the privileged white population. Now this form of division is abolished. But it has been replaced by an equally obnoxious and more insidious

set of divisions. Now it is no longer the 'white' but the 'low density' area. It continues of course to be inhabited by the privileged sectors, both black and white, while the lower paid workers remain in the overcrowded, badly serviced 'high density' part of town. Such a survey does not of course even begin to take into account the vast number of casual workers of all kinds forced to 'squat' in the burgeoning shanty compounds around our major urban areas. The residential distinctions which we find in every town are amongst the most striking evidence for the continued class divisions in our society and of the lack of concern of this 'humanist' government with the living conditions of the vast majority of its urban population — more than 50 per cent of whom live at a density of more than 4 persons to a room (2nd National Development Plan). Let us be clear. As well as initiating massive programmes of urban development to provide decent housing for everyone a socialist government would immediately allocate all available housing by reference to need, judged by size of family alone — not by such criteria as 'job ranking', income, political status etc.

The latest measure announced 30th June regarding urban housing can only worsen the present situation. A provision which was slipped in along with the supposedly radical reforms concerning land tenure was to effect that no person can build on any piece of land without permission from the local authority. This is obviously aimed not primarily at speculators but at squatters who will henceforth be denied any place to settle.

foreign policy

It is one of the themes most constantly repeated by government spokespersons that Zambia has stood for the last eleven years in the forefront of the struggles against imperialism and racism in southern Africa. Positively sickening through their constant repetition, especially in the past year or so, are the invocations of the 'sacrifices' which we supposedly made to support the struggles of the oppressed black populations of the white dominated areas. Such statements become more frequent at a time, as now, when the government is seeking to impose its policies and priorities upon the movements operating in these areas. Particularly has this been a feature of recent comment and action concerning Zimbabwe and Angola.

To clearly understand Zambia's foreign policies for the past eleven years, and particularly their development over the past two, we have to see that they are basically a product of the dialectic between three factors:

1. Zambia was itself born as a result of a struggle against colonialism and the domination of the local white minority. Its emergence in 1964 as an independent black-ruled state was a defeat for the forces in southern Africa which had counted on maintaining a block of white-ruled territory whose extreme boundary would run along the northern borders of Angola, Zambia and Mozambique. The political consciousness of the mass of the population was thus founded on these years of struggle against white racism. It was

therefore, and continues to be, absolutely essential for the new government to be on paper in principle against the white minority regimes.

2. On the other hand, as we have explained above, the new state was firmly and remains still, part of the imperialist system internationally. There is no doubt that the southern African complex, and particularly the apartheid state of South Africa itself, is likewise an integral part of that system. Further: while imperialism could tolerate the transfer of power into black hands in states such as Zambia, it could not concede such a regime within South Africa itself. This is because the white domination enshrined in the apartheid system is a crucial guarantee of imperialism's continued exploitation of the black masses of the most industrially developed state on the continent. For the multinational corporations with big investments in South Africa apartheid is a ready made means of maintaining the subjection of the work force, enabling them to extract enormous profits from their operations in that country.

In addition, the racist consciousness of South Africa's white working class is a key obstacle to any, even minor, tampering with this system. As such it is supported through thick and thin by imperialism. This is not because the latter has itself any particular preference for racist forms of government in the abstract, but because in these concrete circumstances such government provides the long term insurance against the disruption of its interests after which it hankers.

Such determination is expressed constantly by the defence, in the United Nations etc., of South Africa by countries like the USA, Britain and France, and by their mutual willingness to maintain a constant supply of arms to its government. It is reinforced by their understanding that, unlike other states in Africa during the independence wave of the late fifties and early sixties, South Africa is most unlikely to be enabled to undergo a peaceful transition into a neo-colonialist black ruled state. The degree of mobilisation which will be necessary to achieve the overthrow of white minority rule when combined with the commitment of international imperialism to the system will mean that the South African revolution cannot fail, from its earliest stages, to challenge the very existence of capitalism.

It is this consideration which explains the anxiety of the surrounding neo-colonialist states like Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana, rapidly to reach some form of 'settlement' in southern Africa. For it is certain that any serious outbreak of effective anti-government action in the white south would have repercussions far outside the territory of South Africa. For the Zambian government it is impossible to overestimate the problems which will arise when the black masses of South Africa begin to move in strength against the structures of the racist state. The strains between the two contradictory determinants of Zambian policy with which we have already dealt, will be stretched to breaking point. At best we can hope that in this situation there will take place the rebirth of a genuinely anti-imperialist consciousness among the Zambian masses and a determination to bring the utmost solidarity of all kinds to bear on the struggle. At the least it is certain that it will be impossible for the government not to continue and step up its

present verbal denunciation of apartheid. But at such a point in time even this necessity, borne of its own history, would destroy for the Zambian bourgeoisie its present cosy relationship with imperialism. For the fact is that, from Oppenheimer's Anglo American Corporation with its 49% stake in NCCM downwards, almost every imperialist concern with a stake in the Zambian economy is similarly involved in South Africa. As we have explained above, these multi-national giants are not going to give up their stake in the fruits of racism without a struggle. They are already anticipating such an event through the arming of the South African whites by their own governments. When the inevitable revolution of the oppressed masses of southern Africa does break out, there will without doubt be strong pressures on these governments to engage in active military intervention. The repercussions of such moves on the process of radicalisation amongst the masses of the whole of this part of the continent are incalculable. But it is certain that they would furnish the objective conditions for the birth of a genuinely anti-imperialist consciousness amongst the population of countries such as Zambia. It is above all the fear of such a situation developing that determines the current overwhelming concern of Zambia's foreign policy makers with seeking some kind of 'permanent settlement' in southern Africa.

3. As we have detailed in the foregoing sections, the economic history of Zambia during the past eleven years has been a story of failure. A central part of the strategy of the Zambian elite consisted, particularly after 1967, in attempting to break its previous dependence on the relatively more industrialised states of South Africa and Rhodesia and to set out on the path of independent economic development. But the net result is reflected in the stagnation of employment in industry and the country's perennial dependence on importation of the overwhelming majority of manufactured goods. Imports from South Africa have stagnated in volume and those from Rhodesia have undergone a spectacular decline (from 40% to 2% of the total) over this period. However they have not been replaced by indigenous manufactures but by, in many cases more expensive products of West and East European, Japanese, Australian etc. origin. During the boom of 1972 - 1974 this situation was cushioned by the spectacular escalation of copper prices to all time record levels. But for the past eighteen months it has been expressed in the inability of the government to guarantee adequate foreign exchange to cover the demand for a whole variety of commodities. In January 1976, despite the expectations of an upturn in the developed imperialist economies there is absolutely no sign that the present Zambian crisis will be resolved within the next year. Its effects constitute an ever heavier burden on the Zambian consumer, expressing themselves in perennial shortages of a whole variety of goods, some of them vital (e.g. cooking oil, matches, soap powder) for the very survival of the urban population.

It is this third factor which has determined the timing of the government's even more obvious change of direction in foreign policy. It is now possible to assert that the foremost priority of the Kaunda government in foreign relations has become the reopening of

'normal' relations with the white south.

Three essentially short term benefits will accrue to the Zambian ruling class.

(i) The reopening of the shortest route to the sea via Salisbury and Beira which became an ever more urgent priority with the closure August 1975 of the Benguela railway which had carried 45% of the country's trade.

(ii) The total reopening of trade relations with South Africa and Rhodesia thus providing a course of a large variety of manufactured goods at prices considerably lower than those currently being paid.

(iii) Already well substantiated reports have appeared in the world press which confirm that part of the 'detente' deal involves South African backed measures to shore up the Zambian economy. For instance, the London *Economist* of 20 December 1975 reported:

'South Africa's minister of economic affairs, Mr J.C. Heunis, visited the Zambian capital in October and arranged an export credit deal with the Zambian government worth up to £71m. — equivalent to about one quarter of Zambia's current import bill. Mr Jan Marais, a leading South African banker visited Lusaka at the end of October and held 'extremely fruitful' discussions with President Kaunda about the 'tremendous advantages' to be derived from economic co-operation in southern Africa. And the *South African Financial Mail* reported in November that South Africa is now believed to be Zambia's most important foreign supplier. The Pretoria government, it was said, was providing long term export credits to Zambian importers of capital and consumer goods. A meeting of general managers of the Zambian state-owned conglomerate, INDECO, was told on 30 October that import policy had changed and that imports from South Africa were now to be encouraged. A regular air freight service has begun to operate between Johannesburg and Lusaka Rumours are also circulating in Lusaka that South Africa has agreed to finance Zambia's soaring oil bill. The country's oil imports jumped in value from £13.6m. in 1973 to £36.2m. last year. To avoid political embarrassment, the Zambian government has apparently made secret arrangements for South Africa to pay Iran directly for Zambia's oil imports'.

It is these factors, born of its present economic desperation which have above all determined the foreign policies pursued by the regime during the past eighteen months: policies which find their clearest expression in relation to developments in Zimbabwe and Angola.

A. Zimbabwe. The manner in which the Kaunda government has dealt with this question in the past year is one of the most blatant examples ever of an attempt to superimpose the will and interests of an outside party onto those of an oppressed and struggling nation.

Centerpiece at the initiation of the events were the Lusaka talks which took place at the end of 1974 and which were stage managed by Nyerere, Kaunda and Khama. Here the leaderships of the three Rhodesian opposition movements at that time committed to armed struggle were delivered an ultimatum requiring them to merge under the wing of Muzorewa's ANC and to be party to all the attempts to convene a

constitutional conference with Smith. The price of disobedience was without doubt held up as the deprivation of all forms of support for their existence. Thus a paper unity was determined through the intervention of these outside 'statesmen' by four individuals from each of four supposedly mass organisations without any consultation with or decision by their memberships. This unity was acclaimed as a great new step forward for the Zimbabwean masses, heralding (according to the Zambian press) the achievement of majority rule within 'a matter of months'. The latter was supposedly to be about to occur with the active support of Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa who was just itching to ditch his erstwhile ally to the north.

One year after this agreement the real motives behind Zambia's appeals to unity in order to forward the Zimbabwean struggle are now crystal clear. This country's central object throughout the exercise has been to achieve a constitutional 'settlement' which can be sold to the world and to the Zimbabwean masses as an excuse for the ending of any form of sanctions against trading relations. Preparations for the latter have just now got into top gear with a well orchestrated campaign initiated by Arthur Wina and taken up by numerous Members of Parliament which has demanded an end to the 'sacrifices' supposedly made by the Zambian masses for the sake of the liberation of their perennially ungrateful continually quarrelling brothers and sisters to the south.

Central to the strategy which has been adopted by the government was the destruction of the wing of the Zimbabwean movement committed to armed struggle. At first it was clearly hoped that this could be done simply through the operation of the Lusaka agreement. But it rapidly became clear that a whole section of the movement was not prepared to accept unprincipled unity whose objective was to foist a sell-out settlement onto the Zimbabwean masses. More stringent measures were needed to destroy this wing and prepare the way for the current Smith/Nkomo talks.

The exercise commenced in April this year after the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, ZANU's chairman, in Lusaka. This was used as an excuse to round up the entire leading cadre resident in Zambia, thus totally disrupting the organisation's ability to supply its fighters in the field. Chitepo's death was used by the government as an opportunity to whip up the most treacherously chauvinist campaign against Zimbabweans. The latter were accused of having, through their factional struggles, disrupted the whole potentially smooth transition to majority rule initiated by the beneficent Zambian government. This trend culminated in a UNIP stage managed demonstration in Ndola which denounced the nationalists for their supposed treachery to the unselfish support rendered them by Zambia. Such manifestations continue up to the present (the latest held 25 January featured 'popular' demands for the deportation of all Zimbabweans from the country) and play the sole function of trying to cover up the real reasons for the failure to achieve the timetabled majority rule settlement.

Having thus by mid-1975 effectively destroyed the leading cadre of ZANU, resident in Zambia and

committed to armed struggle, the government proceeded to deal with the rank and file fighters. In September came news of the killing by Zambian Army soldiers of 13 guerillas at the Kabwe Training Camp. This incident was supposed to have resulted from attempts by the army to break up factional fighting between rival groups. But later reports said that the excuse for the massacre was protests made by the trainees about their living conditions — hardly an excuse for killing 13 people. Further evidence that the government has something to hide about this incident was the fact that relatives and comrades were refused access to the bodies, prompting immediate suspicion that they had been shot in the back.

At the time of writing Zambia's destruction of any form of effective functioning for ANC's external wing appears complete. Although the latter's official office remains in Lusaka all its leadership have retreated to Dar es Salaam, while the overwhelming majority of its fighters appear to have moved to camps in Mozambique. The net result of a year's 'detente' activity has been the sabotage of the capacity of the Rhodesian guerillas to back up their operations and this is reflected in the decline to an all time low level in the number of incidents reported in the North East of that country in the last few months of 1975.

Simultaneous with its destruction of the armed struggle wing of ANC has been the Zambian government's gradual shift to open promotion of the Nkomo wing. Although spokespersons insist that it is simply awaiting the results of the latter's attempts to reach a constitutional 'settlement', the government has jetted in and out of Lusaka for frequent consultations with Kaunda. The latest reports on these negotiations indicate that any settlement which is

reached will fall far short of the principles of universal suffrage to which all sections of ANC have proclaimed formal adherence. The rumoured addition of an extra 200,000 Africans to the voters' roll will be hedged about with qualifications which will entrench the capacity of the white minority to veto any proposals which threaten their permanently superior status. The net effect will be to give token representation in the administration to representatives of the aspiring African petty bourgeoisie of which Nkomo is a foremost example. Simultaneously the mass of Zimbabwe's workers and peasants will be deprived of any share in power.

It is a settlement along such lines which will be of benefit only to the tiny black elite and to their white partners which the Zambian government is now in the process of trying to secure via its backing for the Nkomo leadership. Needless to say such a deal will denote the final end of any support by Zambia for the armed struggle which alone will secure the destruction of minority rule in Rhodesia. We are unfortunately not too far from the day when, anxious to preserve its supply lines to the south and to the Indian Ocean, the government will take up the language of the racists in denouncing those elements who determine to continue the struggle for a free Zimbabwe as 'terrorists'.

B. Angola. If the lines of development of Zambia's actions on Rhodesia are perhaps not yet totally clear to the public, the events of the past six months in relation to Angola have stripped naked the logic of the policies of detente.

For the ten years of the liberation war support both diplomatic and logistic was given to the MPLA. But this has changed dramatically in the past eighteen months. First a consistent campaign was waged for a whole period on behalf of Jonas Savimbi, UNITA

(Cont. on insert)

The Political Structure

One of the most oft repeated claims of the Zambian government is that the country now lives under an humanist administration which presides over a 'participatory democracy' in which the mass of the population are able to exercise direct control over their lives. We have already referred on a number of occasions above to the evidence which can be found to refute this view through an examination of the economy and social structure of Zambia.

It remains to examine in a little more detail the precise nature of the political structure which has evolved since independence in order finally to nail the lies which are peddled in the name of 'humanism'.

evolution of UNIP

First let us reiterate what we asserted in our remarks about the pre-independence struggle. At that stage UNIP definitely possessed a mass character which was expressed in its ability to organise effectively for basic democratic demands. In particular its effectiveness was in marked contrast to the comprom-

ising attitudes of Nkumbula's ANC (African National Congress).

We repeat that UNIP's leadership in this sense without doubt accelerated the advent of Independence in 1964. But for all its militancy on the independence issue UNIP did not possess a political and social programme of any kind for a decisive break with imperialism. Thus it could not possibly main-

foreign policy (Cont.)

Despite the genuine claims of the former two movements to have historically been based upon the nationalism of sections of the Angolan population against the Portuguese, there is no room for doubt that these movements now act directly as the agents of the imperialist powers who seek to derail the dynamic which may be set in motion by a victory for the MPLA. The latter is without doubt not genuinely anti-capitalist in either its programme or its leadership. Spokespersons continually assert that a free Angola ruled by MPLA would welcome foreign investment and guarantee its security within the country. The main body of MPLA leaders are drawn, like those in the majority of independent Africa, from the intellectual and comprador petty bourgeoisie. Over the past year the position of MPLA in this respect has been exposed by their negative attitude towards strikes which have taken place in areas under their control and towards the independent neighbourhood structures which have arisen especially in the muceques of Luanda. In their attempts to suppress these manifestations of popular struggle they have clearly demonstrated the anti-working class logic of their own 'popular front' politics.

Yet it is quite clear that the potential of the struggles which have taken place in MPLA controlled areas and the potential effect of a victory for that organisation in the present civil war have been the main factors leading to the present de facto coalition of US imperialism, South African racism and independent African neo-colonialism, represented by the Zambian and Zairian regimes. It is exactly because these struggles threaten to touch off a response amongst the masses of the whole of southern Africa that these regimes are involved in the present attempt to abort them.

In the words of a resolution of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, 23 November 1975:

'The struggle of the Angolan masses has opened a breach in the reactionary bastion of southern Africa, under the hegemony of the racist regime in Pretoria...

Given this situation, and given the prospect of the dynamic of the mobilisation of the Angolan masses developing towards objectives that are not simply anti-imperialist but anti-capitalist as well - especially in Luanda where the workers component has significant weight - all the partisans of colonialism, both old and new, and all the defenders of imperialist interests, both North American and European, have blocked together to crush the Angolan revolution and impose the establishment of a reactionary regime through a civil war. The leaderships of the FNLA and UNITA, which defend tribal and regionalist positions and the interests of bourgeois layers in formation, are taking part in this operation. They have established a common front with the imperialists, the racists and the neocolonial regimes in Zaire and Zambia.'

For the Zambian government of course collaboration at this point in time with the efforts of the racist Vorster regime has a further significance which we have described above. Assuredly its moves on Angola fit perfectly into the central objective of maintaining

the status quo in southern Africa and re-opening 'normal relations' with the apartheid state.

The public overthrow of Savimbi from the position of 'favoured son' has not at all been reflected in practice. In November correspondents travelling in a jet supplied by the Lonrho corporation from Lusaka airport to Huambo, capital of UNITA held territory, found themselves accompanying crates of arms addressed to Zambia's ruling party, but clearly destined for the UNITA forces. Savimbi is a regular visitor to Lusaka for 'consultations' with his co-sponsors, while UNITA remains the only movement allowed time for its broadcasts on Zambia radio. While this assistance is marginal to UNITA's military effort it possesses great importance in enabling that movement to assert itself as a genuine liberation movement and particularly to counter the adverse publicity arising out of its support by the Vorster government. For a whole period until early December 1975 the Zambian media maintained complete silence on the mounting evidence which was available to the rest of the world of direct South African involvement in support of the FNLA - UNITA alliance. Now, but only after the Vorster government itself has admitted this, it is conceded to exist. However instead of condemnation we read only explanations of and justifications for that presence. Here is what was said by the Editor in Chief of the *Daily Mail* in a centre page article 7 January 1976 which was described as 'Vincent Mijoni forcefully puts forward Zambia's viewpoint':

'President Kaunda last week put it aptly in an interview to a foreign correspondent: "the United States arms help for FNLA and UNITA is an effect of the situation not the cause".

"And if the OAU will do justice to the people of Angola it must condemn the Soviet military assistance to the MPLA on a scale which gave encouragement to the MPLA to defy the other two political parties to the extent that it has plunged Angola into a civil war

"It was because of this miscalculation on the part of the Soviets together with their badly timed adventure that has been responsible for the South Africans to move into Angola."

Later Kaunda is once again quoted as saying:

'Much as we condemn South African presence in Angola we cheat ourselves if we think that by condemning South Africa we are settling things. The South African presence too is an effect of the problem and not the cause'.

These are the fawning words of the leading representatives of the pitifully weak Zambian bourgeoisie as he seeks to cover up for the intervention of his new found masters.

The positions which the Zambian government has taken over the past year in relation to Angola are inextricably tied up with those similar positions on Rhodesia. As we have shown they boil down to placing collaboration with the racists of Pretoria above the needs of the population of these two countries. Both are crystal clear examples of the manner in which the black nationalists of 11 years ago are now the most obedient and willing servants of imperialism.



tain its mass character once the independence struggle was over. Since it was to be essentially 'business as usual' there was no chance of the party keeping up the same level of popular involvement. Only a party based upon the oppressed mass of the population and expressing their aspirations could have maintained such a level of support — and that only upon the basis of a programme for the socialisation of the country's resources.

At a branch and section level the story of UNIP since 1964 has been one of a progressive decline. In 1975 we find that there is virtually no political activity and certainly no substantial political debate within the party at local level. The overwhelming majority of its organs are empty shells whose officers tend to be a small self-perpetuating clique. Their 'political activity' is limited to periodic card selling or card checking drives in which a generally reluctant population is forced to subscribe to party funds. From time to time such drives apparently go well beyond 'humanist' principles. On 1 August 1975 for instance we read of party youths in Livingstone who were planning to exclude from hospitals and clinics any persons not holding cards. The party youth sections actually appear to be more active but are in reality only acting through the 'Youth Brigades' and the UNIP 'Special Constables' as auxiliary wings of the state machine.

Pardoxically therefore we find that, despite its position as the sole legal political formation in Zambia, UNIP is actually now a less truly 'popular' formation than at any time in its history. The overwhelming majority of the population are openly sceptical of the party's claims. Most see its local officers with whom they have any contact as being overwhelmingly a bunch of careerists, bent upon self advancement and self enrichment. As the only legal avenue for political activity in Zambia the battered hulk of UNIP is living (or perhaps more accurately, half-dead) proof of the farce involved in terming our society a 'participatory democracy'.

evolution of the one party state

For a whole period the only opposition political formation with which UNIP was faced was Nkumbula's ANC. This was a conservative right wing formation whose support came mainly from trade union bureaucrats and petty traders. A demonstration of the general nature of its politics is that one of the main planks of its policy was opposition to any cut down in economic relations with the white south. The severing of these relations was the sole explanation by which ANC could account for Zambia's stumbling rate of economic progress. But despite its dominance as a result of a long history of operating there, in the electoral field in Southern Province, ANC never presented any real threat to UNIP nationally. Its final capitulation was embodied in the 1973 decision to secure its existing parliamentary and other bureaucratic positions by dissolving itself into UNIP.

Of much more importance in the development of the one party state was the history of Kapwepwe's

UPP (United Progressive Party) which finally emerged in 1971. This faction had a long history, beginning with the 1967 Kabwe convention. On that occasion a struggle around the position of Vice President which ran along basically tribalistic lines, led Kaunda to secure the abolition of this post. The elements which were to form the UPP were involved on this occasion as supporters of Kapwepwe's candidature but it was another four years before they finally seceded from the party. During the whole of that period and during their brief lived existence as a separate organisation the distinguishing feature of the UPP leadership was that it had absolutely no alternative political programme to that of UNIP. Thus even when it emerged from the shadows in 1971 it did not appear at all as a political split. Rather the new party was quite clearly the only way to circumvent the limitations which had been placed on the various factions within UNIP by administrative measures and selective promotions. Throughout its brief history the new party never articulated any clear alternative to the Kaunda leadership. Criticism was confined to seizing upon certain perfectly evident grievances without presenting any kind of alternative. The emergence of UPP then was essentially a manifestation of a struggle for position within the ruling bureaucracy. Nonethe-

less it presented a far bigger threat to the dominant grouping than did ANC:

1. The new party was able to capitalise on the general discontent which existed with the state of the economy. We have already explained above that in the period 1970-72 there was a marginal decline

in living standards and virtually no increase in employment. The fact that UPP came to the surface precisely in the depths of this recession meant that a large part of its support (eg. Kapwepwe's election victory in Mufulira, December 1971) was engendered by this situation. A vote for UPP was in other words a basic expression of protest against the evolution of the economy.

2. Its support was also increased by the fact that its leadership was generally made up of people who had had a long history of political association with the masses and who were direct products of the struggle engaged in for a long period before independence. But support for the UPP did not last long. When it was banned five months after its formation there was no substantial reaction to the announcement. For a brief period it had acted as a vehicle for the articulation of substantial discontents amongst the masses. But once it had been cleared from the stage by administrative action it disappeared as rapidly as it had emerged.

This failure to build any durable following is testimony to the fact that UPP's opposition to UNIP failed to touch on fundamentals. Evidence of its complete opportunism was given by its forming an alliance with ANC. This led it to adopt all kinds of rabble rousing anti-communist and conservative positions. For instance it made an absurd attack on the Tanzam railway project as encouraging the alian creed of communist by allowing so many Chinese to 'infiltrate' as workers on the railway. It also embraced ANC's opposition to any severance of links with the white south. The adoption of these positions showed

clearly that we were only witnessing an essentially intra-bureaucratic wrangle. Consequently the new party rapidly dissipated all its potential support. When its leadership was detained in February 1972 it disappeared almost without trace.

The collapse of UPP was clear evidence that Zambian politics in the 1970s had no place for the emergence of new bourgeois political formations which attempted to raise mass support on the basis of a series of demagogic criticisms of the ruling party. Such groupings, which themselves represent only a temporarily excluded wing of the ruling bureaucracy, are congenitally incapable of winning any kind of durable mass support. This is because they can never articulate a programme which challenges the whole bureaucratically controlled state capitalist structure of our society.

After the defeat and disintegration of UPP the road to the One Party State was straight and rapid. The Choma Commission which was set up late 1972 to collect evidence on the form this should take was a sham. Its terms of reference expressly excluded any consideration of whether the concept of the one party state was or was not acceptable. Thus it had already been determined in advance by the UNIP leadership that there would be a monolithic structure which did not allow for any form of organised opposition. In 1973 the One Party State was duly inaugurated.

Why did the majority of the new Zambian ruling class decide on this step? For years after all, their main spokesperson had been declaring that he would only accept a one party state as a result of UNIP's winning 100 per cent of parliamentary seats in an election democratically conducted and involving other parties. The main reason is clearly that although the policy of UPP in no way challenged UNIP's position, the very fact of its emergence in a period of increasing economic problems had made it an automatic pole of attraction for discontent. Although it was certain that UPP's leaders would never espouse the sort of socialist politics which would alone be capable of providing a solution to these problems, the very existence of the party made it more possible that such a line might step by step be developed in the future as the discontent of the masses with the state of the economy became increasingly represented in any such centres of organised opposition. It was for this reason above all that the bourgeoisie had to act rapidly to destroy any chance that the situation would get out of their hands.

'participatory democracy' ... ?

The logical accompaniment of the development of the one party state has been the virtual elimination of democracy within the ruling party itself. To give just one example: local branches of the party can now have their decisions on the suitability of candidates for election to Parliament arbitrarily reversed by the Central Committee. Thus the party is effectively controlled from the top downwards. Essential to this process has been the increasing personality cult built around the leadership of Kaunda. The latter

has arrogated to himself powers which make a farce of the democratic idea. For example during the recent 30 June speech to National Council at Mulungushi which was supposed to be the opening of a debate, he constantly referred to his statements as 'directives'. Many of his policy changes were acted upon immediately and before the completion of the week long debate which was alleged to be taking place. Such actions are a clear negation of any concept of 'democracy' or 'collective leadership' which are so often claimed as the virtues of the Zambian system.

Nor have such developments stopped with the effective end of debate within the Party. One of the more embarrassing hangovers from the western bourgeois democratic institutions inherited at Independence was the supposed supremacy of parliament in the state, along with its members' immunity from prosecution for statements made within its walls. But at Mulungushi Kaunda served notice that this "parliamentary privilege" which had led to some clashes between MPs and party officials, would disappear in favour of the Party's dominance. This principle will in the future be effectively written into the Standing Orders of Parliament. No doubt this move has been prompted by the desire to avoid the arising of any situation similar to that which has recently embarrassed the Kenyatta regime in Kenya. There the ruling party, KANU, holds all the seats in Parliament. But the latter is nonetheless frequently used by its members, the late J.J. Kariuki being a foremost example, as a forum for the development of comprehensive attacks on government policy.

Actually, the kind of personalised leadership which has now emerged in Zambia has a very real value for this country's new managers of the state capitalist economy. The virtually absolute powers of President are vested by good chance in the hands of a person with a finely developed sense of public relations. The President has a reputation as a deeply religious, highly emotional, incorruptible, hard working "man of the people". His person acts as an invaluable screen between the masses and the rapacious managerial caste. He stands surely for their ventures and closes his eyes to their fundamental greed. His carefully nurtured reputation serves as a most important brake on the awakening consciousness of the masses.

After ten years of independence of course it is inevitable that Kaunda's image is wearing progressively thinner. Incapable of breaking with the caste which provides his power base, he is forced by the ever worsening economic conditions to call for greater and greater sacrifices from the masses. In return he offers them nothing to look forward to—only stale replays on the theme of how far we have come.

humanism

Constant reference is made by our leaders to the fact that Zambia is engaged in constituting socialism with the ultimate aim of establishing a 'humanist society'. From our foregoing analysis we can safely conclude that the sheer lack of any democracy in Party, state and industrial structures is a negation of even the most elementary principles of socialism.

Therefore the only purpose we can identify for the elaboration of such a mystifying philosophy is to blanket the masses by giving them hope that the 'good days' are still to come. The contention that capitalist Zambia can somehow be transformed into a sort of mutual aid society where rich and poor are equally committed to fair shares for all shows a total lack of appreciation of the basic operation of such a society.

Like Nyerere with his 'Ujamaa' (co-operative) philosophy, Kaunda claims that Marxism is irrelevant to Africans. He summons up a utopian vision of the supposedly egalitarian village society and suggests that the future humanist state can be peacefully evolved using such rural society as its model. Yet even Kaunda is forced to accept the realities of our society which argue against such a possibility. In Chapter XV of his most developed exposition of his philosophy, 'Humanism Part 2', published in October 1974, he talks of the increasing disparities of wealth and income between rich and poor in Zambia since Independence. In his Mulungushi speech, 30 June, he again railed against the greed of the new Zambian bourgeoisie. Precisely because he is the foremost spokesperson and defender of this class Kaunda refuses to accept that their emergence is not at all a matter of individuals' failure to apply the creed of 'humanism'. On the contrary it is an expression of the inexorable laws of development in the economies of *all* capitalist societies in which an ever increasing concentration of wealth is a basic feature.

Nor is Africa miraculously excluded from these laws. Certainly it has only been incorporated fully into the global imperialist system in the late 20th Century, at a time when that system has itself been destroyed in one third of the world. Exactly because of this it is bound to be subjected to the most harsh and primitive workings of this system.

The idea that the inequalities of Zambian society can miraculously be eliminated by appeals to the humanist goodwill of its capitalist class is nonsense. The function of such ideas for the Zambian ruling class is precisely to discourage the development of the only kind of movement which will threaten this system: the alliance of the exploited against the exploiters in the class struggle against capitalism nationally and internationally.

the armed forces

The most recent events in Nigeria give clear evidence of the key role played by this group within a majority of African states. In Zambia the officer class of the armed forces, who are the potential leaders of any 'coup' attempt, have been deliberately co-opted into the ranks of the ruling caste by a policy of integration and economic appeasement. They enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the country. Their integration is demonstrated by the appointment of the Army Commandant and Police

Chief as junior ministers in the Office of Home Affairs. The unity of interest between the officer caste and the ruling caste has been extended to the Party structures by the formation of branches of UNIP throughout the ranks.

Further the officer class has been provided with a buffer against the effects of inflation in comparison with any other sector of the population. Their expenditure is heavily subsidised—on some items such as alcoholic beverages, up to a level of 200%. Clearly the Zambian managerial caste has done its best to avoid the same fate as that which has befallen so many of their contemporaries at the hands of the armed forces.

the role of the labour movement

During the struggle for national independence the African trade unions, especially on the Copperbelt, were perhaps the most decisive factor. At the time of the formation of UNIP in 1958 it was realised that the very survival of the party depended on retaining their support. There was a very rapid movement of trade union leaders into leadership positions within UNIP e.g. Chisata, Mutemba, Chakulya.

In the post independence period this same labour movement, which the nationalist leaders had used in the fight against the colonial administration, posed a threat to the continued existence of the administrative machinery which the latter had inherited. This threat was crystallised in the March 1966 miners' strike which forced the government to appoint the Brown Commission and to grant substantial wage increases to the miners.

From this time onwards there was a conscious policy of integrating the trades union leaderships into positions in party and government with the aim of ending the threat posed by an independently organised labour movement. Thus in every Cabinet since this date the labour portfolio has without exception been given to a person with previous connection with the Trade Union movement.

State participation in industry from 1968 onwards made even more possibilities available for the government to apply brakes on the independent action of the unions. Production now had to be protected 'in the national interest'. To this end legislation was passed which outlawed strike action and a wage freeze was announced. The latter was later changed to the presently operative 5% per annum whose effects on real wages in the past few years we have noted above.

While the workers were expected to accept this sort of meagre ceiling on wages, the management class busted it with impunity. For example a ceiling of K10,000 per annum was supposed to have been established for INDECO managing directors when the enterprise was established. Evidence since then clearly shows that none of the managing directors ever got anything less than K10,000, and that many earn double this amount. In order to buy the support

of labour leaders directorships were offered to them. For instance the Secretary General of the MUZ (Mineworkers' Union of Zambia) sits on the board of directors of INDECO.

The strike breaking function which the labour leaders now undertake is exemplified by the role they have played in two strikes that took place earlier this year.

At Lenco Engineering, Lusaka, a dispute was sparked off by management's announcement that the workers would get an increase of only 2 ngwee per hour on their wages this year. The union leadership teamed up with the management in trying to break the strike, threatening that they would refuse to negotiate on behalf of the workers if they did not immediately return to work. Eventually a return was secured with the workers under the mistaken impression that their leadership would be bargaining for a higher increase. Far from this happening, they acceded to the company's demand that each worker re-apply for his or her job individually. By this means they succeeded (by refusing their applications) in getting rid of 120 of the workforce who were not re-employed. Meantime the union leadership did nothing about attempting to increase the previous offer.

Similar tactics were applied by the Mineworkers Union leadership to crush the strike at Broken Hill mine, Kabwe. Here workers were demanding that they received parity of pay scales in relation to miners in the Copperbelt. The miners were isolated by the Party, M.P.'s, the Union leadership and the press. They were accused of sabotaging the national economy by disrupting production at a time when the slump in copper prices made their product even more essential to the economy. The MUZ refused to make the strike official. Police harassment was applied. Eventually the miners returned to work after an ultimatum from their union president, Mr. Mwila MP, that the union would take no responsibility whatsoever for the consequences they would suffer if they did not immediately return to work.

These two examples from the recent past could of course be repeated a hundred fold if we were to examine the history of labour disputes in Zambia over the past period. They demonstrate that the governing class has succeeded in co-opting the labour

movement into the state structure in a way which renders its official representatives quite incapable of rendering support to the basic demands of the workers they are supposed to represent. Instead the trade union movement is effectively a part of the state machinery. Through the operation of the Industrial Relations Act the Minister of Labour is able to declare virtually any strike illegal. In addition he can intervene in the affairs of the unions, determining which ones can be allowed to exist and which are outlawed. This grip by the ruling party upon the trade unions is reinforced by the constant mobility which we have noted above between the state bureaucracy, party and government posts and the trade union leaderships. In this way the UNIP leadership has been able to render impotent those bodies which have previously represented the aspirations of the working class and which possessed the potential to offer a threat to their own domination.

CONCLUSION

Let us attempt briefly to summarise the main points of the preceding analysis and to suggest the areas within which we believe the activities of revolutionaries in Zambia should proceed in the coming period.

1. Contrary to the claims of its apologists, Zambia is not an independent, humanist society with a satisfactory rate of economic development which is moving towards the establishment of a unique form of socialism. In reality it is a state which is embedded firmly within the imperialist world. It is one of the least developed countries of that world and possesses almost total reliance upon the production of a single commodity. Substantial economic development which is capable of raising the living standards of the mass of its population cannot be envisaged inside this framework. Every economic indicator available points to an economy which is totally dependent on the vicissitudes of the imperialist system internationally.
2. This system is itself in the middle of an acute crisis which is acknowledged by all its leading spokes-

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persons. For the first time since World War Two we are currently living through a *synchronised* recession of the economies of every major imperialist country. This recession cannot but hit hardest at the economies of its most dependent constituents, amongst which Zambia ranks high. Even the most optimistic apologists for world imperialism now say that, despite their expectations of a resurgence of the world economy in 1976-7, this is certain to be followed by a recession in the late 1970s which will be even deeper than the current downturn.

3. In this situation it is impossible to foresee anything but even more disastrous setbacks for the economies of imperialism's client states.

4. Specifically, for Zambia, we cannot envisage any substantial upturn in the price of copper for the next 9-12 months. At present every mine in Zambia, except for RCM's Mufulira working, is producing at a loss relative to world price. This has already demanded a huge international loan of 100 million dollars recently negotiated on behalf of NCCM in order to cover its day to day running costs. The broad facts of this slump were elaborated in Kaunda's Mulungushi speech, 30 June. For the first three months of 1974 returns from the sale of miners were K268,957,547.

In the same period 1975 the figure was K134,174,027. It is fanciful to speculate that in the next year the government could be forced to agree to the temporary closure of at least one of the loss making mines.

5. Overall we can be certain from present trends that when the final post mortem takes place on 2nd National Development Plan, we shall see a failure to have achieved its targets in any significant field.

6. The effects of these developments upon the working class will without doubt accelerate the already discernible trend towards declining living standards.

7. The Zambian ruling class will almost certainly react to this situation by seeking still more to ladle the blame alternately upon external pressures and upon the greed and excessive beer drinking of Zambian workers. Whatever demagogic gestures are made will not however be able to cover up the fact that their continued partnership with world imperialism is the central fact which ensures the present stagnation of the economy.

8. We have no doubt that as this situation worsens and as real wages for the masses continue to decline, the Zambian working class will begin to react by seeking ways and means to defend its living standards. In attempting this it will rapidly realise that the official trade union leaderships are quite incapable of leading the necessary struggle. This is because these national organisations have been effectively incorporated into the state machinery. The result is that we now have a trades union movement which is mainly concerned not with the defence of its members jobs, conditions and living standards, but with how to increase productivity, labour discipline, etc. Even the most cursory scrutiny of our leaders public statements will adequately reinforce this point. Whenever it does come to confrontation with the employers their only response is to urge a return to work *on any terms* (see above references to the recent Lenco and Broken Hill strikes).

One of the first tasks confronting Zambian workers as they begin to fight back against their exploiters will be to re-establish the independence of the trades unions from Party and state and place them firmly in the hands of the working class. Further, to develop forms of organisation in factory, mine, workshop, building site, which can react to each and every attack on working conditions and living standards. The establishment of such independent fighting organisations will be a huge step forward towards laying the basis for a real working class response to the crisis.

9. If we can most easily see at this stage the likely lines of response in the coming period from the wage earning minority of the population, this is not because we discount the importance of the peasant majority. On the contrary we are certain that the future Zambian socialist revolution cannot be won without their active involvement. We know that within the rural population also the repercussions of the present crisis cannot fail to be severe. For instance, the government will certainly not be able to increase in any way its grants for basic services like education, health, communications. Nor are they likely to be able to increase the purchase prices for agricultural products to a level capable of maintaining the peasantry's presently totally inadequate level of consumption. Certainly this excludes any possibility of stimulating more economic and efficient production, which will continue to fail to meet targets. The process of abandoning the subsistence farming majority of the population to a life of poverty, ignorance and disease is likely to accelerate in the coming period. It will be all the more important for the working class to demonstrate that it does not in turn propose a similar development. On the contrary the fate of Zambia's peasant population is inextricably tied up with the class nature of the state. Only a socialist government, based on the working class and totally independent of imperialism, will divert the necessary resources to rural development.

A. As we have described above the government is, rightly from its viewpoint, much concerned with the problems presented by increasing numbers of unemployed youth. 'Rural Reconstruction' is the formula by which they are just now trying to 'solve' this problem. We have no doubt the degree of repression involved in such exercises will grow in the future as the government becomes every more desperate to defuse this explosive situation. We think that, just as the youth played a leading role in the struggle for independence, the young people, particularly from this group, will, precisely because of the frustrations of their expectations, be one of the most potent forces within the movement towards socialist revolution.

B. At the International Womens Year Conference in Mexico, Petronella Kawandami, speaking on behalf of the Zambian delegation, made the priceless statement that Zambian women had no problems in a society which catered for their needs and guaranteed their equality of opportunity in every field. No doubt this is true for Miss Kawandami and the few others of her social class and political position, but it would be vehemently denied by the majority of Zambian

women. The fact is that in Zambia, in common with women throughout the capitalist world, the majority are relegated to an inferior role as the suppliers of services, whether they be cooking, washing or sexual, to the dominant male. Such an arrangement in which woman's main job is to oil the functioning of one cog (the male workforce) in the capitalist system, has been one of the key means by which the latter has survived. The position of our women was accurately, if advertently, described by Central Committee Member, Mrs Chibesa Kankasa, at a Copperbelt International Womens Year seminar in Ndola on 18 May this year: 'We are women and men are the heads of the house. Some women even go to the extent of asking their husbands to wash baby napkins. This is wrong and women who do this must stop because this is a sign of being a bad wife.' With thinking like that from women members of the Central Committee we can be certain UNIP will never be responsible for any advances in the second class position of women!

The same seminar passed a resolution condemning the whole idea of family planning and calling on the Party and Government to shelve 'the whole nonsense'. Obviously we are in desperate need of some education that family planning is not a dictatorial means of keeping down the population but a way of limiting her own fertility which should be freely available to every woman, married or single, without exception.

As the crisis of the Zambian economy worsens, it is the women who will most rapidly be conscious of its effects in terms of poorer diets, health facilities, housing, education, etc. As such if they can free themselves from the slave mentality of a Kankasa, they are likely to become a key factor in the development of opposition. Socialists should make propaganda amongst women a key feature of their activity.

10. The International Dimension

It has been impossible adequately to discuss the fate of the Zambian revolution without accounting for the events which will form its context in the immediately surrounding world. We have stressed that the current diplomatic moves of the government are motivated by their pre-occupation with finding a solution to the problems presented by continuing white rule in southern Africa. From the viewpoint of imperialism and of the Zambian rulers a 'stabilisation' of this situation becomes ever more urgent. For African revolutionaries, particularly in Zambia, the tasks presented by these diplomatic manoeuvres are clear. We should make propaganda in favour of, and if possible organise concretely for 100% per cent solidarity with the oppressed masses of these countries. Such actions should be directed towards the creation of a truly internationalist consciousness amongst the Zambian masses. Such a commitment would involve:

A. Opposition to any attempts to impose organisational and strategic conceptions from outside upon the liberation movements; a fight for the rendering of the most massive possible aid to those movements committed to the inevitable armed struggle for the liberation of their territories; total opposition to any negotiations or contact of any kind between Zambia and the governments of the white racist south.

B. Uncompromising opposition to any kind of collaboration—economic, diplomatic or military—with South Africa. As we have explained above,

the South African revolution poses a threat to the stability of the entire imperialist world and particularly to that of its African portion. Its outbreak will be the catalyst for revolutionary change in a whole number of areas on the continent. Among these Zambia will be a central point. It is all the more important therefore to campaign actively against what has become the central thrust of African neo-colonialist diplomacy.

C. For unconditional solidarity with the struggles of the southern African masses against white rule. The artificial division introduced, particularly by Zambian spokespersons, between Namibia and Rhodesia on the one hand and South Africa on the other is designed to ensure that the peoples of the latter will be left with absolutely nil assistance to their struggles. Our solidarity must be 100% with those fighting imperialism and white racism until *every inch* of African soil is under the rule of its rightful heritors.

D. For total removal of all intervention by South Africa, USA, and their African allies in Angola. For unconditional solidarity with the MPLA until final victory.

11. But the concept of internationalism has to go further than this. A central effect of colonialism on the continent was to balkanise it into a whole series of states based only on intra-imperialist compromises. In the early days of the independence wave pan-African notions of unity had wide currency. These have rapidly disappeared into the background as the bourgeoisies which acceded to power have developed their own interests in the maintenance intact of the new state structures. The artificial divisions continue to be one of the key means by which imperialism maintains its hegemony over the continent and by which its economic development is slowed down.

The future development of an African socialist ideology will not be confined within the boundaries of a particular state but will develop a commitment to internationalism which will see the socialist revolution in Zambia, Tanzania, Zaire, Angola and a host of other states as a necessary interlinked process without which an isolated socialist state would be quite incapable of survival.

Limited as we are just now by national boundaries we are unable at this stage to essay detailed analyses of developments in such neighbouring states. But we are convinced that it is necessary to move towards an internationalist theory of the domination of our continent by imperialism and its local agents and of the need to fight against it: a theory which is capable of uniting the disparate struggles of the oppressed masses throughout Africa in the struggle for the socialist revolution which alone can end the cruelties of economic underdevelopment.

