

# **Dynamics of the Youth Radicalization and**

# **Perspectives for the Young Socialist Alliance**



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"Dynamics of the Youth Radicalization and Perspectives for the Young Socialist Alliance" was drafted by the National Executive Committee of the YSA for the Young Socialist National Convention to be held in Cleveland, Ohio, November 23-26, 1972.

This resolution analyzes the development of the youth radicalization and outlines a course of action for young socialists in the period after the 1972 elections. The resolution focuses on events in the antiwar, Black, Chicano, and women's liberation movements and the YSA's participation in them, as well as the importance of a stepped-up effort to get out the program of the YSA to radicalizing youth.

This document should be read in conjunction with the resolutions and reports approved by the 1971 YSA convention, most of which were published in Young Socialist Strategy for '72. The high school movement report approved by the convention was published separately by Pathfinder Press in the pamphlet The High School Revolt.

This draft resolution and any others submitted will be discussed and the general political perspectives outlined in them will be voted on at the Young Socialist National Convention. They are being circulated prior to the convention to assure the fullest possible discussion on political perspectives and activities before the convention meets.

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- Marty April 2014

# Vietnam and World Revolution

The Vietnamese revolution and the efforts of U. S. imperialism to crush it remain the central issue of American and world politics.

The significance of the war in Vietnam has gone beyond considerations of the immediate economic or military-strategic value of the area to U. S. imperialism, although this value is great. What has come to the fore is the political significance of this showdown between an insurgent colonial people and U. S. imperialism. Vietnam has become the focal point of the global conflict between the forces of revolution and counterrevolution.

Moreover, the economic, social, and political consequences of the war, which have exacerbated already existing contradictions of capitalism, have become increasingly important issues, especially within the U. S. These consequences include a higher rate of inflation, deteriorating public services, and accelerating urban decay, as well as the sparking of a deep-going radicalization of young people.

The current period is a crucial one for the development of this conflict. The events of the last several months--the Vietnamese offensive, Nixon's escalation of the air war, and the Peking and Moscow summit meetings--point to, on the one hand, the weakness of imperialism's position in Southeast Asia and the failure of its "Vietnamization" schemes, and, on the other hand, the grave danger to the Vietnamese struggle posed by the counterrevolutionary policies of the bureaucratic rulers of China and the Soviet Union.

## VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION

The Vietnamese workers and peasants have been struggling for decades against French, Japanese, and now American imperialism. The central demands they have fought for are national liberation, that is, independence from imperialism, and land reform, that is, taking the land away from a handful of rich landlords and giving it to the poor peasants who work it.

The interests of the Vietnamese capitalists, who are also the big landowners, place them on the side of imperialism. Together with their generals and government bureaucrats, they are completely tied to and dependent on U. S. support to keep themselves in power. The imperialists, if they are to maintain their foothold in Vietnam, cannot allow any real and thoroughgoing land reform. They and their Saigon clients cannot grant any real concessions to the Vietnamese masses without undercutting the weak social base of the South Vietnamese regime. Thus, consistent struggle for

national independence and land reform inevitably brings the Vietnamese into conflict with both foreign imperialism and the native ruling class. The question at stake is which class will rule in Vietnam.

## STRATEGY OF U. S. IMPERIALISM

The basic goal of imperialism is to defeat the Vietnamese revolution and maintain a capitalist South Vietnam. The U. S. rulers would like to inflict a stunning defeat on the Vietnamese as a lesson to national liberation struggles around the world, and as part of an overall strategy aimed ultimately at rolling back the victorious social revolutions in North Vietnam, North Korea, China, and finally in Cuba, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union itself. This was the goal pursued by Truman and Eisenhower through support to French imperialism until its defeat in 1954, then through aid to the Diem regime, and by Kennedy through increased aid and the introduction of U. S. military "advisers." These measures were insufficient to prop up the Saigon regime, which became increasingly isolated as the peasant struggle developed.

In 1965 Johnson began large-scale U. S. military intervention, including bombing North Vietnam and introducing hundreds of thousands of U. S. ground combat troops. Each step of the escalation was preceded by a cautious probing of the reactions of the U. S. S. R. and China. But the two powerful workers' states never went beyond token protests of U. S. aggression, and the escalation proceeded. However, even 500,000 U. S. troops and millions of tons of bombs and shells proved unable to crush the Vietnamese revolution, and the stakes increased as Vietnam more and more became a test of strength between imperialism and the colonial revolution.

Johnson initiated a major tactical shift in 1968. He rejected General Westmoreland's request for 200,000 more troops and announced the beginning of the Paris negotiations and a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam. This tactical shift, which was continued by Nixon as "Vietnamization," involved beefing up the Saigon army and placing increased reliance on air and naval bombing, while slowly withdrawing U. S. ground troops.

The shift was necessitated by the growth of antiwar sentiment and action in the U. S. and inside the imperialist army. It was an attempt to buy time to continue the war, while retaining the goal of a military victory of such scope as to decisively reverse the social revolution in South Vietnam. This tactical shift indicated that the antiwar movement had become a significant political force on a world scale, limiting

the ability of U. S. imperialism to bring its full military strength to bear against the Vietnamese.

The "Vietnamization" approach contained a fundamental contradiction of explosive potential: while the troop withdrawals were politically necessary to maintain social peace at home, they left the Saigon regime in a steadily worsening military position. At a certain point the U. S. could face a choice of either losing militarily and being forced out of Vietnam altogether, or else reescalating its involvement. Furthermore, Nixon's promises about "winding down" the war only increased antiwar sentiment and expectations of peace, thus heightening the danger of a major social upheaval if he did reescalate.

Attempting to escape this contradiction, Nixon carried out several reescalations of limited duration. These included periodic bombing of North Vietnam, the invasion of Cambodia in May 1970, and the invasion of Laos in February 1971. These maneuvers backfired. The Cambodian invasion not only led to a deterioration of the U. S. military position, but also provoked a nationwide student strike and massive antiwar upsurge at home. May 1970 confirmed the necessity to continue the appearance of "winding down" the war. The disastrous invasion of Laos helped undermine the basic premise of "Vietnamization"--that the Saigon army plus U. S. airpower could defeat the Vietnamese revolutionaries. The Saigon troops were mauled and forced into a disorderly retreat, suffering casualties estimated as high as fifty percent.

The reductions in ground troops have been compensated for with other forms of destruction, on a scale unprecedented in history. From February 1965 through January 1969, Johnson dropped about 3.25 million tons of bombs on Indochina. From that time through June 1972, Nixon's bombing totaled about 3.55 million tons. Herbicides or defoliants have been sprayed over almost ten percent of South Vietnam's cropland and thirty percent of its total forest acreage. "Rome Plows" (32-ton bulldozers) have scraped away about 800,000 acres of land, roughly the area of Rhode Island. It was revealed this year that the U. S. warmakers have seeded clouds to try to increase flooding in Indochina, and used incendiary bombs to try to create firestorms in South Vietnamese forests. But all of these measures have failed to terrorize the Vietnamese people into submission.

Nixon found himself in an increasingly desperate situation. Unwilling to give up South Vietnam, but sensitive to the political danger of reescalation (especially with the 1972 elections approaching), the only angle left was to try to secure the help of the Soviet Union and China in imposing a "Korea-type" negotiated settlement--that is, one that would maintain the imperialist beachhead in South Vietnam. This aim was the basic reason for Nixon's detente with Mao.

#### ROLE OF THE WORKERS' STATES

The perfidious role played by the Soviet Union in relation

to the Vietnamese revolution has long been clear. The Kremlin bureaucrats regard the stubborn struggle of the Vietnamese as an embarrassment in their quest for "peaceful coexistence" with imperialism.

The principle of "peaceful coexistence" is based on the nationalistic and utopian theory of "socialism in a single country." This theory, originated by Stalin in the 1920s, is used to justify the subordination of the world revolution to the narrow diplomatic interests of the bureaucracy. This false theory is at the heart of Stalinism--whether of the Moscow or Peking variety.

The Soviet Union has provided pitifully inadequate material aid to their supposed ally, North Vietnam. For example, in 1970 and 1971, the Soviet Union's military aid to North Vietnam totalled an estimated \$170 million, while in the same period it provided Egypt, a capitalist country, with \$670 million worth of the most sophisticated weapons.

The Moscow Stalinists have not encouraged or supported revolutionary struggles in other parts of the world to relieve the pressure on the Vietnamese. They have refused to mobilize in antiwar actions the millions of people around the world who follow the leadership of Communist parties. And they have been more than willing to serve as a channel for putting diplomatic pressure on the Vietnamese to negotiate a compromise settlement.

But until recently it was widely believed that Peking played a more revolutionary and internationalist role in relation to Vietnam. Maoist rhetoric about "people's war," and the smattering of aid provided to some guerrilla groups blinded many radicals to the fact that underlying Peking's foreign policy were exactly the same principles of "peaceful coexistence" that motivated Moscow. It was the unwillingness of U. S. imperialism--not Mao--to achieve a rapprochement that kept this fact in the background for years.

In fact, China's support to the Vietnamese revolution has always been more verbal than real. Chou En-lai played an important role at the Geneva conference in 1954 in pressuring the Vietnamese into concessions. Although China did furnish some material aid, this actually declined from \$145 million in 1967 to \$75 million in 1971, according to estimates published in The New York Times.

The Sino-Soviet dispute was a major development encouraging the imperialists to escalate the war in Vietnam. Although primary responsibility for the split rests with the Soviet Union, China has never taken the initiative of proposing a united defense of the Vietnamese revolution. The convulsions of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," which was really an intrabureaucratic struggle aimed at purging opponents or potential opponents of Mao, further encouraged the U. S. to escalate without fear of Chinese intervention. China, like the U. S. S. R., made no attempt to mobilize its followers around the world to defend the Vietnamese.

It was precisely the success of the Vietnamese resistance, which led to an alteration in the world balance of power by weakening imperialism, that forced Nixon to defer for the time being imperialist plans for the reconquest of China for capitalist exploitation and seek Mao's help in stabilizing imperialism in Asia and the Pacific.

That he could expect such help, a possibility already indicated by Mao's statements about "peaceful coexistence" and his low-key overtures to Nixon, was made even clearer by several foreign-policy actions of Peking in 1971. Peking supported Pakistani military dictator Yahya Khan's attempt to liquidate in blood the Bangladesh freedom struggle; Peking supported the bourgeois coalition government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike in Sri Lanka in crushing an uprising of tens of thousands of Ceylonese youth; Peking supported the Sudanese military dictator Nimeiry's slaughter of pro-Moscow Sudanese Communists. Thus the stage was set for Kissinger's secret trip to Peking, Washington's de facto recognition of China, China's entry into the United Nations, and Nixon's trip to Peking in February 1972, complete with televised great historic moments and off-camera secret diplomacy.

Nixon could expect to gain from this maneuver in four ways.

- 1) He might win assurances that Peking would not respond in any significant way to new escalations of the war.
- 2) He might enlist Chinese help in putting more pressure on the Vietnamese to negotiate a settlement that would preserve some form of imperialist hold on South Vietnam.
- 3) He would be in a better position to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split. The Kremlin, afraid of the consequences of a Washington-Peking deal, might then hurry to improve their own relations with Nixon, and they would not have to worry about Mao criticizing them from the left for selling out the Vietnamese.
- 4) At the very minimum, the China trip was a big propaganda windfall for Nixon, bolstering his image as a world statesman seeking peace and hurting the antiwar movement by raising hopes that a Vietnam settlement was in the works.

Nixon moved quickly to put his new strategy to the test. In late December 1971 he ordered five days of the heaviest bombing of North Vietnam since 1968. As The New York Times reported, "China's relatively restrained reaction to the five-day American bombing of North Vietnam indicated a wish to go ahead with President Nixon's trip in February even at the cost of additional strains in Peking's relations with Hanoi."

#### DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WAR IN 1972

On January 25 Nixon went on television to present a new "peace plan" that essentially called on the liberation forces to stop fighting in return for promises of "internationally supervised" elections and withdrawal of U. S. troops at some point in the future. This move was intended to lay the groundwork

for further escalations of the war, and, indeed, in early February Nixon began reinforcing the fleet of B-52s for bombing in Indochina.

On the eve of the China trip, U. S. bombing of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia was stepped up to the highest levels since 1968, with scarcely a peep of protest from Peking. The bombing, including raids on North Vietnam, continued while Nixon was in China. The fact that in the first ten weeks of 1972 more air strikes were flown against North Vietnam than in all of 1971 was one of the first fruits of the Nixon-Mao detente. Emboldened by Mao's complicity, Nixon cancelled the Paris talks on March 23. One week later the Vietnamese offensive began.

As the Saigon army buckled before the revolutionary advance, the credibility of "Vietnamization" was shattered. It was strikingly clear that the only prop of support holding up the Saigon regime was massive bombing and shelling by U. S. ships and planes. "Without U. S. air support," said U. S. News & World Report, "great chunks of South Vietnam would have fallen to Hanoi--and with it, perhaps, the entire South Vietnamese Government." Nixon rushed additional bombers, aircraft carriers, and other warships to Southeast Asia and escalated the bombing to the highest levels ever, including, in early April, the first use of B-52s against North Vietnam since 1967. On April 15 and 16, U. S. bombers hit Hanoi and Haiphong.

Even though four Soviet ships in Haiphong harbor were hit, neither the Soviet Union nor China issued more than a muted, purely verbal, response to the U. S. escalation.

The international antiwar movement, however, was galvanized into action. In the U. S., the movement had been in a downturn, largely as a result of the troop withdrawals, the 1972 elections and the illusions created by the China trip. Response to publicity for the April 22 demonstrations, previously called by the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), picked up markedly as the U. S. escalation began. Then the April 15-16 bombing touched off a wave of student strikes and local demonstrations that culminated in the April 22 actions. Over 150,000 participated in the three major actions in the U. S., and antiwar demonstrations were held on or around April 22 in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Great Britain, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Japan. Although the level of activity decreased somewhat after April 22, nationally coordinated demonstrations were held on April 29 and then May 4. Nixon's announcement of the re-opening of the Paris talks and a brief cutback on bombing the North, as well as a widespread attitude of waiting to see what happened on the battlefields in Vietnam, contributed to the slackening of activity.

The contradiction described above--between the need to escalate further and the political consequences of doing so--was pinching Nixon more acutely than ever. Even the highest

levels of bombing had only been able to slow down--not roll back--the Vietnamese offensive. Yet to reintroduce U. S. ground troops would not only pose the danger of a major political explosion in this country but, in that context, also raise the question of the reliability of the army. That Nixon had cause to worry was indicated by the refusal of about 100 GIs to enter combat in April, on the grounds that they were supposed to be withdrawing, not taking combat duty. Fissures were opening up in the ranks of the ruling class, as some sectors became nervous over the possible consequences of Nixon's tactics.

Nixon reacted with what appeared to be a desperate gamble. On May 8 he announced that U. S. forces would attempt to interdict all supplies into North Vietnam by mining the harbors and bombing the road and railway links with China. Even during the heaviest bombing of North Vietnam in the 1965-68 period, Johnson had always drawn back from mining North Vietnamese ports because he feared a confrontation with the Soviet Union and China. Nixon could only feel confident to go ahead with this escalation on the basis of the success of his secret diplomacy with Peking and the calculation that the Moscow bureaucrats would put their upcoming dealings with him above the interests of the Vietnamese.

Success in drastically reducing the flow of supplies into North Vietnam would over an extended period hamper the ability of the Vietnamese to keep fighting. But of even more importance to the immediate military situation was the escalation of the bombing in both South and North Vietnam to the highest levels in the history of warfare, including, beginning in May, the systematic bombing of the dikes in North Vietnam.

The antiwar movement's response was immediate. Beginning the night of Nixon's speech, thousands of students took to the streets in an even bigger and broader campus upsurge than that in April. Demonstrations were held in many cities on May 13, and a march on Washington on May 21 was jointly called by NPAC and the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). Tensions were building toward a major antiwar mobilization in the U. S.

However, Nixon's evaluation that the Soviet Union would back down was shown to be correct when, only three days after the blockade was announced, a Soviet diplomat visited the White House to have his picture taken joking with Nixon, and to assure him the trip to Moscow was still on. On May 11 the Soviet Union issued a mild protest statement that criticized the mining of North Vietnam's ports, but was more significant for what it did not say. The statement did not cancel the invitation to Moscow; it did not assert the right of North Vietnam's allies to continue their military and other aid; it did not warn of countermeasures or pledge to provide the sophisticated military hardware (which the Soviet Union has) that could make North Vietnam's waters and airspace inviolable; it did not call for antiwar demonstrations. A few days later Nixon was welcomed in Moscow.

Once it was clear that no response to Nixon's provocation was forthcoming from the Soviet Union, antiwar activity quickly subsided. Not only had the tension and sense of urgency caused by Nixon's apparent willingness to go to the brink of nuclear war been dissipated, but the victory for his policies shown by the summitry tended to discourage and demoralize many antiwar activists. In addition, many Americans who oppose the war mistakenly believed that the Moscow visit would hasten its end. The May 21 demonstration was far smaller than its original potential, and since the Moscow trip antiwar protests have been relatively small and scattered, although the August 6-9 demonstrations were somewhat larger than in previous years in some places.

It is of course impossible to know exactly what secret agreements were reached or what assurances were given when Nixon went to Moscow and Peking. Even so, the Kremlin's craven capitulation to Nixon's aggression clearly represents a betrayal of the Vietnamese revolution. The Chinese rulers bear equal responsibility for this betrayal, both because of the criminal inadequacy of their own response to the escalation, and because their dealings with Nixon helped open the door for Moscow's. Moreover, the frenzied diplomacy since the Moscow trip, with Kissinger hopping all over the world, and the Kremlin's repeated pronouncements on the need for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, make it more than likely that some counterrevolutionary understanding was in fact reached between Nixon and the Stalinist bureaucrats, and that the Vietnamese are being strongly pressured by their supposed "allies" to make concessions to U. S. imperialism at the bargaining table. The existence of the international antiwar movement helps prevent the Soviet Union and China from more openly scuttling the Vietnamese. For either power to cut off aid to the Vietnamese completely or openly call on them to come to terms would expose it before the entire world as an open accomplice of world imperialism.

The Vietnamese are also under great pressure from the U. S. bombing, which has actually increased since the spring. Saturation bombing is used to terrorize the population and against any area where a concentration of North Vietnamese or National Liberation Front troops is suspected. Although this bombing has enabled the puppet army to stave off the total defeat that was imminent last spring, Saigon troops are being chewed up in ambushes and in protracted battles attempting to retake areas lost earlier in the offensive, and the Saigon regime has admittedly lost control of vast areas of South Vietnam. The position of the U. S. puppets in Cambodia and Laos is even more precarious.

Because of the apparent impossibility of winning a clear-cut military victory in South Vietnam under these circumstances, Nixon's tactics are now largely aimed at forcing the Vietnamese to make concessions in the negotiations, under the threat of the total physical destruction of North Vietnam. This is the meaning of the bombing of the dikes, and of Nixon's boasts that "We could wipe out North Vietnam in an afternoon" and that "Unless there is progress on the negotiating



front which is substantial, there will be no reduction of the bombing of North Vietnam." The pretense that only military targets are being bombed has worn very thin. The New York Times recently quoted a "high-ranking intelligence official" as saying, "They have not been hit fatally, but they are slowly bleeding to death--even if it takes two more years. We are doing serious damage to their social structure."

It must be noted that the Vietnamese leadership has a Stalinist background, which presents dangers to the revolution. Today the program of the National Liberation Front explicitly calls for the establishment of a coalition capitalist government in South Vietnam. However, our support to the struggle of the Vietnamese against imperialism is not conditional on their program.

The key factors to recognize are these:

- 1) The fundamental aims of U. S. imperialism have not changed. The U. S. is not about to give up in South Vietnam.
- 2) So far the Vietnamese are continuing their struggle despite pressure from Peking and Moscow and despite the genocidal U. S. bombing.

The central conclusion to be drawn from this situation is the burning necessity to build the antiwar movement, educate on the fraud of "Vietnamization" and the terrible destruction caused by U. S. bombing in Indochina, and mobilize the largest possible numbers in demonstrations demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all U. S. forces from Southeast Asia.

The Young Socialist Alliance will continue to place the highest priority on building the antiwar movement as long as the war itself continues.

#### EFFECTS OF THE WAR

The expenditure of billions of dollars for the war in Vietnam has had an increasingly deleterious effect on the living standards in America, and has prompted the government to impose compulsory wage controls in an attempt to drive down the real wages of American workers. The war has been an important factor in bringing out the contradictions inherent in the long period of capitalist expansion and apparent stability following World War II.

The boom was based on the vastly greater strength of U. S. imperialism in relation to the other capitalist powers. The U. S. was the only imperialist power to escape widespread destruction of its industry during World War II. Devastated Japan and Western Europe provided a ready market for the export of American capital and goods. The U. S. moved in on the former colonial holdings of the other powers. The expansion was also fueled by the rapid rate of technological innovation, itself a product of huge state expenditures on military

technology, research and development. The great differential in labor productivity between the U. S. and all its rivals gave U. S. capitalism, faced with the powerful trade union movement and union struggles, the leeway to increase wages. The working class got only the crumbs of the expansion, but even the crumbs provided for significant increases in real wages and social benefits.

The rebuilding of Japanese and European capitalism has now led to a situation where they are increasingly stiff competitors with U. S. capitalism. Because their economies were reconstructed on the basis of the most modern technology, they are beginning to narrow the gap in labor productivity. The capitalists in the other imperialist countries, especially Japan, also benefit from lower wages than those in the U. S.

Inflation is a basic characteristic of modern capitalism. In the U. S., large government expenditures for war production -- absolutely necessary for the U. S. because of its role as top world imperialist cop -- are financed by the inflationary measures of deficit spending and expansion of credit. This inflation serves to dampen the effects of the business cycle. It also serves as an indirect way of attacking workers' wages. But rapid inflation of the U. S. dollar erodes the competitive position of U. S. goods on the world market and undermines the stability of the world monetary system.

These are the economic contradictions that the war in Vietnam has greatly exacerbated.

The government is politically unwilling to take the only steps that could actually slow down inflation, because it is unwilling to give up in Vietnam or stop financing its war machine. But, in trying to hold down its expenditures and budget deficits without cutting war spending, it is more than willing to cut back the meagre social services it provides. Thus expenditures for education, health care, transportation, housing, etc., are slashed, and the quality of life in the U. S. deteriorates.

To improve their competitive position, the U. S. capitalists are driven to attack the wages and working conditions of American workers. From their point of view, this could best be accomplished through the agreement of a prowar labor movement to "emergency" austerity measures and controls, like during World War II. But the antiwar sentiment of the working class rules out this approach.

Another way of attacking real wages is to adopt recessionary fiscal and monetary measures that tend to increase unemployment, in the hope that the threat of unemployment will force workers to lower their wage demands. When that approach, attempted during the first half of the Nixon administration, was defeated by the militancy of American workers in defense of their living standards, Nixon opted for a more drastic and direct approach and imposed wage controls.

The capitalist government and its spokespeople "justify" wage controls with the myth that wage increases cause in-

flation. Phony price controls are thrown in as window-dressing. But the real underlying purpose of the wage controls is to drive down real wages. The results of the first year of the controls bear out this contention. The level of wage increases has declined in the last year, while corporate profits are hitting all-time highs, and prices, especially for basic necessities like food, are rising. At the same time, unemployment is only slightly lower than at the peak level of the 1970-71 recession, and workers are being pressed to increase their productivity through speed-up.

The first year of wage controls has been quite successful from Nixon's point of view. Profits, productivity, and industrial production are up; wage increases are down. Nixon has won a temporary reprieve from the monetary crisis that threatened last summer. Most important, the unions, under their bureaucratic misleadership, have utterly failed to fight the controls. There are three main reasons for Nixon's apparent success.

- 1) The trade union bureaucracy has done nothing to mobilize the workers to struggle against the wage controls, unemployment, inflation, and speed-up. The bureaucrats accept the idea that wage increases cause inflation and they are not opposed to the general concept of wage controls. The union tops took seats on the Pay Board, and when some of them walked off it was only as a pro-Democratic, anti-Nixon move, not as a move to open a struggle against the controls. Most of the bureaucracy has reacted by supporting McGovern and the Democrats, who support the wage controls. The most reactionary elements, unable to stomach even the thin radical veneer of the McGovern campaign, bolted into the Nixon camp. The "neutrality" of Meany in the 1972 elections has nothing whatsoever to do with independence from the capitalist parties--it is only backhanded support to Nixon.
- 2) The controls were imposed as the U. S. economy was in the middle of a recession. The beginning recovery from the recession--which coincided with but was not caused by the wage controls--has meant a slight decrease in the rate of inflation and a slight decrease in unemployment. Thus the effects of the controls have been cushioned and their real meaning is not yet clear to most workers.
- 3) The government deliberately followed a policy aimed at minimizing confrontations with the trade unions when the controls were first imposed, letting some wage settlements go by in excess of their guidelines. After a period of winning tolerance of the controls, the screws are now being tightened to hold wages down even more.

However, the imposition of the wage controls symbolizes the definitive end of the long post-World War II period of capitalist expansion and the beginning of a period of intensifying international capitalist competition, marked by a long-term attack on the wages, working conditions, and most fundamental rights of the working class. Although there will continue to be ups and downs in the business cycle, the historical trend is toward increased pressure on the working class, which

will sooner or later lead to a response and a qualitative sharpening of the class struggle around wage and job issues.

Most important, the wage controls are an attack upon the entire working class by the capitalist class through its government. This attack makes it clear that the economic questions facing the working class cannot be solved on the economic level alone, but only through political action that takes on the centralized power of the capitalist state. The great importance we foresee for the wage controls in the radicalization of the American workers lies in the fact that they impel the workers to fight on the political level.

The trade union bureaucracy, because of its class-collaborationist outlook, has proved totally incapable of defending the basic interests of the working class. To meet this attack by the ruling class, the bureaucracy will have to be replaced by a new leadership consciously based on a class-struggle program of action. The strategic aim of revolutionists is to build a class-struggle left wing in the unions based on such a program. As yet, however, there is no discernible motion toward the formation of such a class-struggle left wing.

The development of such a left wing is not separate from or counterposed to the development of the current radicalization among students, youth, women, and Blacks and other oppressed nationalities. The politicization and radicalization of the working class will be the combined result of both the sharpening struggle around economic questions and the issues raised so far in the radicalization. Under class-struggle leadership, the trade unions and a labor party based on them would not oppose or ignore, but rather champion, the demands of students, women, Blacks and Chicanos. These demands are part of the class struggle and are in the interest not only of the significant sections of the working class that are young, female, Black, etc., but of the entire working class.

The YSA's work in the next period in response to the wage controls is twofold.

- 1) We will continue to support the propaganda campaign of the Socialist Workers Party for a congress of labor and an action program to fight the wage controls, inflation, and unemployment. The purpose of this campaign is to explain the program around which such a class-struggle left wing will be built and to recruit the most conscious workers to the revolutionary socialist movement. Our best vehicles for doing so are sales of The Militant to workers and support to SWP election campaigns.

Members of the YSA in trade unions should coordinate their work in this field with the Socialist Workers Party.

- 2) We will continue to link the war with the wage controls and seek to involve workers in antiwar demonstrations and coalitions. The YSA can best contribute to this process by building the student antiwar movement, which serves as a base for reaching out to workers.

The struggle against the wage controls and other economic

effects of the war is not limited to the trade unions. In fact, for the YSA as a youth organization with limited forces, the best immediate opportunities to participate in such struggles will be found among high school and college students.

All students are hurt by the wage controls and the rest of Nixon's economic policies. The cuts in aid to colleges and universities mean that students face rising tuition costs for deteriorating educational opportunities -- poorer facilities, fewer scholarships, more overcrowding, fewer professors. The predominantly Black and Raza high schools in the urban centers are the hardest hit by massive cutbacks in funds for teachers and facilities.

The difficulties faced by Black and Raza students trying to get into college have been increased because of the cutbacks in welfare and scholarship aid and the decline in their

own and their parents' real wages. And naturally, the first programs to be cut back are Black and Chicano studies departments.

The economic situation means that, according to school administrators, there is "no money" for programs like child-care facilities, women's studies, and decent health care for women students, including free and legal birth control information, contraceptives, and abortions.

The YSA should be alert to opportunities for participating in and helping provide leadership for struggles around these issues. We should explain their connection with the war and the economy, and seek to involve students concerned about these issues in antiwar activity as well. We should also explain that the socialist program offers the only complete answers to these problems, and urge students who oppose the wage controls and budget cutbacks to join the YSA.

# Development of the Current Radicalization

Discontent with the functioning of American capitalist society is greater than at any time since the 1930s and continues to grow. A process of radicalization, that is, questioning of the established norms, beliefs, values, morals, customs and institutions, distrust of the government and spokespeople for the status quo, disagreement with the general direction of society, and conviction that drastic changes are called for to right the situation, has deeply affected American youth, especially students. Broad layers of the population, notably among the oppressed nationalities, have also been deeply affected by this process.

While the general trend is for radical consciousness to deepen and spread to new sectors of the population, there has been less activism on the campuses and in the high schools in the last two years than in the preceding period. This fluctuation has led many commentators to write premature obituaries of the student movement. The political mood of youth today is distinctly different not only from the "silent generation" of the 1950s but also from the campus explosions of 1968-69 and from the vast antiwar upsurge of May 1970. In its evolution, the student movement has been passing through different phases of development. A clear-eyed and realistic assessment of where the radicalization and the student movement stand today is indispensable for revolutionary socialists. Our actions must be based on a correct understanding of the objective situation we face.

In order to understand the current stage of the radicalization, it is necessary to examine the factors that have influenced its development.

## WORLD REVOLUTION

The radicalization of youth is rooted in the processes of world revolution generated by the fundamental contradictions of capitalism. Since World War II, the most dynamic sector of the world revolution has been the colonial revolution.

The seeds of the radicalization were planted in the McCarthyite period of reaction and cold war hysteria by the upsurge of the colonial revolution in China, Korea, Guatemala, Iraq, the Congo, Algeria and Cuba. The winning of formal independence by many African nations helped stimulate the emerging civil rights movement. The Cuban revolution had the greatest impact in this country. The still small layer of the most advanced politicizing youth was inspired by the Cubans' victory and identified with Castro's and Guevara's non-Stalinist leadership.

The effect of the colonial struggles on radicalizing American youth can be seen in several ways.

- 1) Youth, and especially students, who have greater access to information, are struck by the contradiction between America's supposed ideals of freedom and democracy and the brutally oppressive regimes it bankrolls and upholds. They tend to identify with the colonial masses struggling for a better life, not with Washington's puppet dictators.
- 2) Youth are repelled by the barbaric efforts of the imperialist powers to crush the liberation struggles.
- 3) The colonial revolutions inspire youth with the conviction that it is possible to take on imperialism and win -- that resistance is not futile but can result in victories.

The impact of the colonial revolution has helped make internationalism one of the key characteristics of the new radicalization. The attitude of the Cubans, epitomized by Che's call for "two, three, many Vietnams," contributed to this rebirth of internationalism.

The radicalization was carried to a qualitatively higher stage all over the world in response to the U.S. escalation in Vietnam and the resistance by the Vietnamese. Millions of youth first awakened politically in outrage against the Vietnam war and rallied to the defense of the Vietnamese. Since 1965 Vietnam has been the most important factor shaping the radicalization.

From 1965 through 1968, the U.S. rulers seemed hell-bent on achieving a military victory in Vietnam regardless of the consequences, and protest actions against the war mounted along with the escalation. The invasion of the Dominican Republic by 23,000 American troops in 1965 further exposed the imperialist nature of U.S. foreign policy and accelerated opposition to the war in Vietnam. In 1968, the Tet offensive threw imperialism clearly on the defensive, dashed its hopes for a rapid victory, and inspired the international antiwar movement.

In response to the Tet offensive and the growing opposition at home and abroad to the war, the U.S. rulers began a tactical shift of slowly withdrawing U.S. troops and pretending to wind down the war. This change in approach, which became clearest after May 1970, had an effect on the

antiwar movement. The decreased troop levels, lower U.S. casualty rate and draft calls confused some antiwar youth and led them to drop out of activity. These factors also lent credence to the false notion that the Vietnamese had already won and further antiwar action was unnecessary. This coincided on the other hand with the frustration of some activists because their demonstrations had not succeeded in ending the war.

However, the shift in the tactics of the White House and Pentagon also served to legitimize and deepen antiwar sentiment. This was massively expressed when Nixon pushed too far. The reaction to his military moves showed the extent of hatred for the war and the willingness of many people to take action. This antiwar sentiment was translated into mass actions after the invasion of Cambodia, the invasion of Laos, and the escalation last spring. Continued U.S. aggression in Southeast Asia, which is far from over, is likely to call forth renewed waves of antiwar activity in this country.

In this era of jet transportation, television, and almost instantaneous communication around the globe, international developments interact and affect each other with unprecedented directness and immediacy. One example of this internationalism of the jet age is the rapid spread of the women's liberation movement from its beginnings in the U.S. and Canada to Europe and some parts of the colonial world. Another is the role of the African liberation movements in inspiring a new generation of leadership for the Black struggle in the U.S. Students in one country quickly learn from and copy the example of combativeness in another.

The campus explosions in the U.S. in 1968 and 1969 were part of a high tide of global struggle that included Quebec, Mexico, Argentina, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Yugoslavia, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Pakistan, and, perhaps most importantly the Tet offensive and the May-June 1968 worker and student upsurge in France.

The French events, which have opened a new period of intensified workers struggles in Europe, marked a turning point in the international youth radicalization. They confirmed on the one hand the revolutionary potential of the working class in the advanced countries, at a time when disbelief in that potential was a hallmark of radical youth, and on the other hand the increased social weight of students and their potential to act as a transmission belt of revolutionary ideas to the working class.

But the French upsurge, climaxed by the largest general strike in working class history, did not lead to victory; it was dampened and derailed by the Communist Party leadership. Once it subsided, the political situation was restabilized for a time. The student struggles of 1968-69 were either set back or else ebbed away for one reason or another. There has not yet been another convergence of student struggles on such a broad scale. Nor have there been inspiring new victories in

the colonial world. In fact, in September 1970 one of the most dynamic sectors of the colonial revolution--the Palestinian struggle--suffered a major defeat during the civil war in Jordan, and the period since then has seen a steady strengthening of reaction throughout the Middle East. And in spring 1971 an uprising by revolutionary-minded youth in Sri Lanka was crushed in blood.

Nonetheless, in addition to the persistent struggle of the Vietnamese, there are dozens of powder kegs for imperialism all around the globe where revolutionary situations could break out at any time. U.S. imperialism will inevitably be pushed by the necessity to uphold and extend its domination of the world into further conflicts with the colonial masses. We cannot predict whether the next major U.S. intervention will be in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, or Asia, but we can be confident that when it comes, such aggression will spur on the radicalization and call forth the same kind of angry opposition as the war in Vietnam.

### BLACK STRUGGLE

The Black liberation struggle was the central factor initiating the youth radicalization in the U.S. Its resurgence, beginning with the Montgomery bus boycott in 1955, served--like the colonial revolution but in a more direct way--to expose the contradiction between America's professed ideals of equality and the reality of racist oppression, and to inspire youth by its example of militant action.

The beginnings of the student movement can be traced to the sit-ins, freedom rides, voter registration drives, and other civil rights activities of the early 1960s, out of which came a layer of young Black leadership, primarily organized in the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Most of the early civil rights leaders and organizations rejected nationalist concepts like all-Black organization and political independence, and based their strategy instead on cooperation with white liberalism. Nevertheless, the direct actions they helped organize awakened a new sense of confidence and self-awareness among Black people and tended to propel the Black masses beyond the limitations of civil rights and pacifist ideology.

These actions by Blacks also generated a response from some white students, beginning with the Woolworth boycott picketing in solidarity with the lunchcounter sit-ins in 1960. The issue around which most white students radicalized, prior to the emergence of the mass antiwar movement, was the Black struggle, and a whole generation of student leadership came out of the experiences of the civil rights movement.

At that time the nationalist currents in the Northern cities, although growing, were still relatively small and tended to abstain from struggle. But then the ideas and example of Malcolm X foreshadowed and prepared the ground for the rise

of Black nationalism on a mass level.

The Watts rebellion in 1965 called the power and combativity of the urban Black masses to the attention of the entire world. Out of the ghetto uprisings, the teachings of Malcolm X, and the experiences of the limitations of the civil rights movement developed "Black Power" and the modern Black nationalist movement.

Unfortunately, SNCC, which had adopted a nationalist position, and the Black Panther Party, two of the most advanced and influential nationalist organizations, both fell into the trap of ultraleftism. Both misread the significance of the ghetto rebellions, thinking the revolution was right around the corner, and adopted a strategy centering on rhetoric about urban guerrilla warfare rather than promoting the mobilization of masses of Black people for control of their communities. They mechanically assumed that tactics that seemed prominent in the colonial revolution could be automatically transposed to the current stage of the Black struggle. But the ghetto rebellions were largely spontaneous, chaotic, undirected explosions of Black rage, which died down after 1968. Their emphasis on military-technical preparation for guerrilla war rather than political preparation for mass struggle left them increasingly isolated from the Black community.

With the rise of "Black Power" consciousness, Black students, who had played the leading role in struggles from the start, began to organize themselves and formulate their own demands. Their confrontations with school administrations and often the police--at Howard University, Northwestern, Texas Southern, Columbia, Duke, Brandeis, Cornell, Swarthmore, San Francisco State, and Berkeley, to name just a few--were at the center of the growing student movement. Most big actions during that period on the college campuses were connected with actions and demands of Black students.

The Black student demands--for open Black admissions and more scholarships, for Black studies under Black control, against the war, against university expansion at the expense of the Black community--pointed in the direction of transforming the university from an instrument perpetuating racist oppression into a vehicle for struggle in the interests of the Black community, that is, a "Black university."

Black high school students moved into action around nationalist demands for Black studies, more Black teachers and administrators, Black community control of the schools, as well as demands for better conditions. Their actions began as early as 1967, when a mass demonstration by Black high school students in Philadelphia was attacked by Police Chief Rizzo's cops. Another high point was a series of one-day strikes by Chicago students in fall 1968 involving nearly 100,000 students.

The Black college student organizations and actions, looking toward the Panthers for leadership, were heavily influenced by ultraleftism. Many of the protests fell into a pattern in which a few students would engage in a militant action on their own--

like seizing a building--and then large numbers of students were drawn into action only after being outraged by a police attack on the original demonstrators. Such an approach was much less effective and left militants more open to victimization than a strategy of educating and mobilizing the largest number of students around defensively-formulated demands. In some cases ultraleft leadership led the struggles into crushing defeats that left the campus disillusioned and demoralized for a long time afterwards. After the first rash of building takeovers, some administrators learned to take advantage of the militants' isolation from the masses of students by making a few cheap concessions and demagogically attacking the demonstrators for supposedly violating the "free speech" of others.

The decline of the Panthers had a devastating effect on the Black student movement. The Panthers' "pick up the gun" rhetoric and increasing isolation left them more vulnerable to police attack. When in city after city Panther leaders were harassed, framed-up and imprisoned, or brutally gunned down, the BPP had no effective strategy for defending itself. Under the impact of these deadly attacks, the Panthers' influence dwindled until they retreated not only from ultraleftism but from nationalism and militant political action as well. Today the Panthers led by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale are mainly concerned with "survival" organizing.

In the wake of the failure of ultraleftism, many Black student militants retreated from struggles for Black studies and the Black university and turned inward to primarily cultural activities. In addition to its repression, the ruling class moved in with foundation grants, poverty-program dollars, or positions in token Black studies departments to buy off former militants. In these ways a whole emerging layer of young Black leadership was decapitated: murdered, imprisoned, or bought off. The leadership of the struggle then fell by default to more conservative elements.

Since about 1969 a lull in activity has persisted in the Black student movement along with the Black struggle as a whole. This lull is largely due to the crisis of leadership and lack of clear perspectives for effective action, not to any amelioration of conditions in the Black community or lessening of its nationalist consciousness or combativity. On the contrary, the Black community has shown its willingness to struggle in many outbreaks of mass activity, including protests against police brutality in Chicago, New York, and Detroit; actions of Black workers in Seattle and Atlanta; and demonstrations in support of the Attica rebels. But these outbreaks have been sporadic, scattered, and uncoordinated.

The Black struggle is the most powerful radicalized social movement in this country especially since throughout the entire development of the radicalization the white working class has not yet been in motion. Students were naturally drawn to it, sought to link up with it, and followed its lead. The Black struggle set the example for other movements with concepts like self-pride and self-organization. It is not surprising that over the last period the lull in the Black movement has had

an important effect in dampening the student movement as a whole.

### ROLE OF LEADERSHIP

The ideological development of young radicals, the consciousness of masses of students, and the capability of their leadership, are influential in shaping the course of the radicalization.

Four important negative factors have conditioned the development of the student movement in this country.

- 1) The relative quiescence of the working class ever since the post-World War II strike wave.
- 2) The absence of any mass working class political parties.
- 3) The legacy of Stalinism, which had exercised virtual hegemony over the radical movement of the 1930s and 1940s.
- 4) The weakness of the revolutionary socialist movement.

In the 1950s the Khrushchev revelations and the Hungarian revolt left the Communist Party seriously weakened and crisis-ridden, coming on top of the blows it suffered in the witch-hunt. Both the YSA and the "New Left" current emerged from the deepgoing shake-up of the CP and the "socialist regroupment" of the late 1950s. The original New Left radicals incorrectly identified Marxism with Stalinism and thereby rejected Marxist theory and Leninist methods of organization. Based on their own narrow experience and empirical observations, they wrote off the working class as a force for social change, looking instead to students and intellectuals (and later the romanticized "Third World"). "Participatory democracy" was touted as the replacement for democratic centralism. Eclecticism, instability, and lack of discipline were fostered by the social nature of the student movement. These basic weaknesses were conspicuous in SDS, the highest organizational expression of New Leftism in this country.

SDS started out with an essentially left-liberal, pacifist, humanist political outlook. It favored reform of the Democratic Party, and offered social-work-type "community organizing" as the main focus for its activity. Its most significant contribution to the development of the student movement was its call for the April 17, 1965, March on Washington against the war in Vietnam, and the subsequent building of that action on a non-exclusionary basis. This highly successful demonstration, which drew almost 25,000 participants, marked the beginning of the mass antiwar movement and helped stamp the movement with its united-front, non-exclusionary character.

The success of the March on Washington gave SDS a national reputation and more than quadrupled its membership. Yet shortly after the demonstration, the SDS leaders turned their backs on the developing antiwar movement in favor of "local organizing." This was really a retreat into liberalism

by refusing to organize a movement to confront the government directly around the war issue. The SDS leaders justified their abstention by the elitist explanation that most Americans could not see the war as an issue that directly affected their lives and therefore would not be interested in an antiwar movement. Later, unable to avoid the centrality of the war issue, SDS advanced various alternatives like draft resistance unions and "anti-imperialist" organizing, counterposed to building massive antiwar demonstrations.

Pragmatism was always the hallmark of SDS. Lacking a revolutionary theory, it reacted to every new event with impressionistic improvisations, quickly abandoned. In response to "Black Power" and SNCC's decision to become an all-Black organization, SDS called for "Student Power." However, SDS saw "Student Power" only in the narrowest terms of purely campus issues. It never adopted a strategy for linking campus issues and student struggles to the needs and demands of the working class and oppressed nationalities.

SDS never had any one consistent program or political perspective. It attempted to be an all-inclusive organization and, in fact, viewed itself as the student movement. There was not the slightest homogeneity among local chapters around the country. Many local SDS chapters were active in the antiwar movement, but the national leadership never consistently participated in the Student Mobilization Committee or any other antiwar united front. To the extent that SDS exercised leadership for the student movement on a national scale, that leadership was largely destructive.

Around 1967 SDS began to turn more and more toward ultraleftism and adventurism. The SDS leaders never understood that power lies in the mobilization of masses of people, so from liberalism--hoping the ruling class would under pressure reform itself--they rebounded to ultraleftism--thinking that small groups of dedicated individuals could change society. For example, they stressed draft resistance as the main focus for antiwar action, oblivious to the fact that refusing induction and going to jail--however sincere or even heroic the individual draft resister might be--was not a perspective that could reach out to and involve masses of people. The adventurism of SDS was also an imitation of ultraleft Black groups like the Panthers.

In addition, the SDS leaders were reacting to the Maoist Progressive Labor Party's attempt to gain control of SDS. Lacking a consistent political line of their own to counterpose to PL's, they tried to outflank PL from the left by escalating their own super-"revolutionary" and eventually even Maoist rhetoric. SDS actions on the campuses became increasingly adventurist.

Although the student movement in the U. S. today has more social weight than any previous student movement in history, still, by itself, it cannot change society. Its strength as a political factor lies in its ability to link up with and even act as a detonator for struggles of more powerful social

forces--the working class and the oppressed nationalities. But how this linkage can be made is far from obvious when the working class is not in motion and there exist no mass political parties of the labor movement. Out of frustration at its own limitations, the student movement is susceptible to both opportunist and ultraleft schemes.

The YSA pursued an entirely different course. From 1965 on, the YSA concentrated its efforts on building the antiwar movement, through united front coalitions like the Committees to End the War in Vietnam, various national coalitions, and, after its formation in December 1966, the Student Mobilization Committee. We helped organize teach-ins, debates, local demonstrations, and actions against ROTC, the draft, and campus complicity, as well as massive national demonstrations. These actions, which involved thousands and at peak points millions of young people, built the antiwar movement into a powerful political force on a world scale. The leadership of the YSA and the Socialist Workers Party was indispensable in maintaining the continuity and mass action orientation of the movement. We exerted a constant pressure on SDS and all other radical groups to participate in the antiwar movement. As the antiwar movement grew, the national SDS was forced to give at least token endorsement to some antiwar actions and many local SDS groups became involved in antiwar organizing.

While every other organized radical tendency defaulted on its responsibility to the Vietnamese revolution by taking a sectarian and abstentionist position toward the antiwar movement, we have stuck to our perspective year after year. The results of our consistent work can be seen both in the strength of the antiwar movement and in the hundreds of antiwar activists recruited to the YSA.

However, the YSA was a small organization of just a few hundred members nationally, while SDS was many times larger and was looked to all over the country as the leadership of the whole radical wing of the student movement. The YSA actively participated in all the campus struggles that broke out where we had members, but in very few cases were we able to win the leadership of struggles away from SDS. Consequently, incorrect, ultraleft leadership led to many defeats in struggles of great national significance, like the San Francisco State strike in the winter 1968-69.

The campus explosions of 1968 and 1969 involved thousands of students and won many important gains for the student movement. But even at schools where gains were won or an apparent stand-off was reached, SDS's inability to involve the masses of students in effective action to defend those gains enabled the administrations to later renege, victimize militants, and isolate the radicals. SDS miseducated the student movement through its identification of radical activism with ultraleft adventurism.

Beginning with the campus upsurge of 1968-69, increasing numbers of students became disillusioned and were unwilling

to follow SDS's ultraleft leadership. When the contradictions that had been building up inside SDS finally blew it apart in the summer 1969, a vacuum of leadership was left in the student movement. Thousands of radicalized students who had been drawn into action were now looking around for a correct strategy and orientation.

It is significant that all the ultraleft splinters of SDS--RYM II, Weatherman, and PL-SDS--declined rapidly in the following year. Lunatic actions like the "Days of Rage" in Chicago in October 1969, and the revulsion most students felt when some of the most desperate ultralefts carried out bombings and other terrorist acts, further discredited and isolated the ultralefts. Some students saw no alternative to ultraleftism and dropped out of activity. Some who learned absolutely nothing from their experiences are still hanging around as cynical, embittered ultralefts.

The YSA became an alternative pole of attraction and grew rapidly in this period, recruiting many of the best ex-SDS members and sometimes whole chapters. Our work in support of the 1968 SWP campaign of Halstead and Boutelle enabled us to popularize the name and program of the YSA very widely in this ferment on the campuses. But it was the Student Mobilization Committee that most effectively stepped into the gap left by SDS's demise.

The organized antiwar movement had been in a slump during the 1968 election period, and was just beginning to recover through the April 5-6, 1969, demonstrations called nationally by the SMC. Then in the summer of 1969, three factors opened up the possibility of organizing one of the most successful antiwar offensives ever. First was the breakup of SDS, which since 1965 had stood in the way of, not helped, the antiwar movement. Second was the reestablishment of a broad national antiwar coalition, the New Mobilization Committee. Third was the decision of some elements of the Democratic Party to identify themselves with the antiwar "Moratorium" in a partisan move against Nixon. Out of these factors came a significant growth of the SMC, and the mammoth antiwar demonstrations on October 15 and November 15.

The movement experienced a slight letdown after November 15. Most participants in a mass antiwar demonstration do not have a consciously worked out long-term strategy for ending the war, and some of them are liable to be frustrated because their action has not succeeded in ending the war.

This frustration was exploited by the consciously anti-mass-action tendencies in the antiwar movement. After November 15, the Communist Party and radical pacifists, who were in the leadership of the New Mobe, backed away from organizing further mass actions. When the coalition called demonstrations for April 15, 1970, narrower forces were involved in building these actions and they were correspondingly smaller than the previous fall. Some big campus demonstrations occurred around issues related to the war or the Black



struggle, but they tended to be shorter and more scattered than in 1968-69.

Then, in May 1970, in response to the invasion of Cambodia and the gunning down of students at Kent and Jackson, the biggest student strike in history took place. The May upsurge was so vast that it encompassed almost the entire student population and on many campuses went beyond the stage of a strike to the actual taking over of university facilities and transforming them into antiwar organizing centers.

The peak of activity during the May events lasted only a few days on the majority of campuses, or up to two to three weeks at the most active ones. During that time students on the most advanced campuses began a process of reaching out to more powerful social strata, most importantly the working class and the Black community. Although some initial link-ups were made, as reflected in the mass turn-outs on demonstrations May 9, on the whole the upsurge was not extended beyond the student movement, and with the closing of schools it gradually faded out.

The May upsurge was a spontaneous and largely uncoordinated political strike of the American student movement. It was not led by the YSA or any other political tendency. We played an important role in local strikes and on a national scale in projecting the correct strategy, in transmitting information through The Militant, and in drawing the lessons for the future. But the development of antiwar universities and the success of the May upsurge were due primarily to the correct instinct of the masses of students in action. The YSA alone could not keep up the momentum of the upsurge or rekindle it at will.

The May upsurge was the most significant protest in the history of the American student movement. It drew millions of students into action, including many who had never considered themselves radical at all before. It altered the course of the war. The new forms of struggle established in May--the mass meetings, the democratic strike councils, the initiatives taken to transform the university for reaching out to more powerful sectors of the population--will set the pattern in the student movement for years to come.

But the upsurge did not end the war. This fact along with the fact that the masses of workers were not brought into action, pointed up the limitations of the student movement and led to disappointment and frustration on the part of a whole layer of activists who incorrectly felt that action by students was futile.

With the continued lack of large scale action by the working class, and in the absence of mass workers' parties toward which to orient, students did not see any obvious channel for their efforts to reach more powerful social forces. This, too, led to a feeling of discouragement, a questioning of what tactics were effective, a mood of skepticism, and a hesitancy to take further action.

The government, of course, proclaimed that what students did was not important and would have no effect on administration policies. This propaganda was reinforced by the reformists, who told students their demonstrations were ineffective and they should get involved in "real politics" in the Democratic and Republican parties, and by the ultraleft sectarians, who had said all along that the students could not accomplish anything.

Only the Marxist vanguard--organized in the YSA and the Socialist Workers Party--clearly understood and explained how May showed both the limitations and the power of the students. Although important lessons were absorbed by a much wider layer of activists, the student movement since May has lacked clear direction, and this vacuum of leadership has contributed to the decline in activity. Only the revolutionary socialist movement understood the meaning of the new forms the struggle took, the real significance of the antiwar university, and the role the student upsurge played in forcing the U. S. to withdraw from Cambodia and continue withdrawing troops ever since.

#### DYNAMICS OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

The demands of modern capitalism for a more highly educated and technically skilled work force have led to an accelerated expansion of the educational system to the point that there are now about nine million college students and 15.5 million high school students in this country.

College students especially, because of their relative freedom from family or job restraints, their access to information, and the leisure time they have to read and discuss, are highly sensitive to issues of world and national politics. But the universities are institutions of class society, designed to suit the needs of the ruling class, not the students or the masses of people. This contradiction is at the root of the student revolt.

Students want to learn the truth, but the university distorts and suppresses the truth. Students want freedom of political expression and activity, which the university denies. Students want to develop their creative capabilities, but the university aims to mold them to the needs of big business. Students oppose the war, but the university is intimately tied to the war machine through research contracts, ROTC, etc.

The universities systematically discriminate against Blacks, Chicanos, and other oppressed nationalities, perpetuate the racist myths used to justify their oppression, falsify and conceal their history. The universities uphold the oppression of women in much the same way.

The expansion of the educational system has meant that students are more and more treated like assembly-line products rather than human beings. Although higher education trains workers, technicians, and administrators who are

indispensable for the functioning of the social system, students and their families are forced to bear an increasing share of the rising costs of education. And college graduates are increasingly likely to find that the system has "overproduced" their particular skill so that they find no job or professional career waiting for them.

The situation facing high school students is different primarily in that the oppression and thought-control are even more blatant. The "tracking system" directs students into different curricula depending on whether they are intended to go on to college or directly into the work force or army. It is particularly used to give Black and Raza students an inferior education, and to prepare women for housekeeping or secretarial jobs.

The explosive power of the student movement today stems from the fact that the issues of concern to college and high school students are not narrow college or high school-centered issues, but are closely linked to the major political concerns of the masses. When students struggle for control of the educational institutions in order to advance the antiwar movement, Black struggle, women's liberation movement, etc., their efforts and aims are in the interests of the working class and the majority of people.

The student revolt of the 1960s won important victories. The most significant of these was the withdrawal of most U. S. ground troops from Vietnam. Students on many campuses also won the abolition of ROTC, the creation of Black or Chicano studies departments, and liberalization of many restrictions on student activity. Since then campus administrations have often sought to avoid confrontations over such issues. In the last two or three years, certain administrations have granted demands for Black, Chicano, or women's studies departments, recognized and even funded controversial student organizations, placed token students on policy-making boards, lessened censorship of the student press, and granted "free university" classes with less of a fight than before.

Fewer concessions have been made in the high schools, but some gains in free speech, the right to form political organizations, the right to leaflet, easing of dress codes, etc., were made.

These concessions have contributed to the decline in activity in the student movement, although the main reasons for this decline are the lull in the Black struggle and the illusions that the war is winding down.

In the long run, minor reforms cannot overcome the crisis of education or quell the radicalization, simply because capitalist society cannot and will not make the universities and high schools anything but institutions serving the interests of the ruling class. Neither the universities nor the high schools can be made into ivory towers isolated from the development of the class struggle.

Plans are already being discussed for "reforming" the educational system so that the socially-necessary skilled workers are turned out through a process less likely to radicalize them. One idea is to cut back on the number of students who receive a traditional liberal arts or humanities education and channel more students into "vocational" schools or courses. A Carnegie Corporation report issued this year calls for "fundamental restructuring" of higher education, including "reducing the normal undergraduate program from four to three years" and "transferring many vocational courses to a network of new schools of 'further education' linked to industry." This spring Vice-President Agnew suggested, "Possibly our problem is not enough emphasis on the pragmatic need to teach our young people to take a useful place in society, regardless of whether or not they fit in the framework of higher education."

But the student movement will not accept such changes, which would only make education more alienating and more openly tied to big business, without a fight.

College administrators are already moving to attack the gains won by students in earlier struggles. Such attempts include bringing ROTC or war recruiters back on campus, cutting back on Black, Chicano, and women's studies departments, challenging the right of student political organizations to be recognized or funded, whittling away at free speech rights, and eliminating the gains students have won toward controlling their education. Such attacks, which are part of the ongoing conflict between the interests of the ruling class and the interests of the masses of students, will continue to generate new struggles on the campuses and in the high schools.

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# The Youth Radicalization Today and the Tasks of the YSA

A temporary decline in activity is not the same as a reversal of the radicalization process. All the contradictions of capitalism that produced the radicalization are still operating to generate new waves of struggle. Discontent with the present order of society continues at a high level. That anti-war sentiment has continued to spread was shown by the response to the escalation last spring, as well as by public opinion polls. Nationalist sentiment has continued to spread throughout the Black community.

The rising tide of activity in the late 1960s swept new sectors of the population into motion around their own demands. The biggest Chicano struggles, such as the Los Angeles Chicano moratorium of 30,000 on August 29, 1970, erupted during this period, and leading Chicano militants, taking the development of the Black movement as a springboard, advanced ahead of the Black movement by breaking with the Democratic and Republican parties and initiating independent Raza Unida parties. The women's liberation movement was begun in part by women from the antiwar movement and various radical groups, and its largest action to date, August 26, 1970, followed on the heels of the May upsurge. The beginning of the gay liberation movement can be traced to the June 1969 "Stonewall Riots" in Greenwich Village, and radical-minded activism in defense of the environment reached large proportion in spring 1970.

The student movement since May 1970 has been in a "lull" in comparison with previous high points of activity, but this does not mean that the student movement has become quiescent. Many campus and high school struggles have occurred over the last two years, but they have received less attention in the press than earlier struggles. Some of them have taken place in schools in more isolated areas, which are going through experiences that occurred several years ago in the major cities. Others have been in response to administration attacks. A significant number of students have participated in mass action campaigns and organizations like the Student Mobilization Committee and the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition.

A recently-published comparison of surveys of campus opinion from 1969 to 1971 illustrates the trend of deepening radicalization among students. Asked to choose among different attitudes toward the American way of life, the percentage of students who think "The American way of life is superior to that of any other country" has dropped from 17 percent in 1969 to 12 percent in 1971. The percentage who think "There are serious flaws in our society today, but the system is flexible enough to solve them" dropped from 70

percent to 61 percent over that period. The percentage who agreed that "The American system is not flexible enough; radical change is needed" went from 13 percent in 1969 to 22 percent in 1970 to 19 percent in 1971. But the decrease from 1970 to 1971 does not indicate a decrease in radicalism. It was registered because in 1971 a fourth choice was added-- "The whole social system ought to be replaced by an entirely new one. The existing structures are too rotten for repair"-- and 8 percent of students agreed with that!

Another indication of the deepening radical consciousness is the favorable response to socialist ideas. In the fall 1970 subscription drive over 15,000 new Militant subscribers were obtained. One year later, in about the same time period and with about the same forces, we got over 32,000 subscriptions. The 1972 Socialist Workers campaign has received qualitatively more support than any previous SWP campaign.

The mood in the student movement today is a complex and contradictory one. The layer of students who think society needs to be fundamentally changed is bigger than ever, encompassing millions of students. But it is a heterogeneous layer, including people who have gone through many different experiences and drawn different conclusions. Many students today are skeptical about their ability to bring about change and are not as willing to take action. They are not sure how they can be effective.

The campus opinion poll cited above also asked students in 1971 what they considered the best methods for "achieving meaningful social change." The method with the highest rating (78 percent) was "individual doing what he can in community." "Working within the system" was picked by 65 percent of students, but a large minority favors more radical methods. "Organize new political party" was listed by 25 percent; "Nationalize private industry," 24 percent; "create class consciousness," 14 percent; and "create conditions for revolution," 11 percent.

Some ex-radical activists, in a frustrated and individualistic response to the limitations of the student movement, have turned to various utopian schemes. This frustrated turning away from attempting to change society underlies the tendency toward counterinstitutionalism--that is, attempts by individuals or small groups to escape from capitalist society through an "alternative life style," organic food, co-ops, communes, etc.

Most students still have illusions about bourgeois politicians, but they are not staunch supporters of the two capitalist

parties. In fact, a small but growing number of radicalizing youth are rejecting the two capitalist parties. Interest in socialism and Marxism is high, and thousands of students are receptive to the ideas of the Young Socialist Alliance.

## THE YSA AND THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International, a basic programmatic document of the revolutionary socialist movement written by Leon Trotsky, begins: "The world political situation as a whole is chiefly characterized by a historical crisis of the leadership of the proletariat."

This observation holds true both as a broad historical generalization and in a very immediate sense in relation to the current youth radicalization. Building the YSA is the only solution to the crisis of leadership among radicalizing youth, because only the YSA has a correct program that points the way for young people to take effective action.

A key question of concern to radical youth is the relation of the working class to the struggles that have come to the forefront of the current radicalization, which are at this time primarily carried out by students and others from the student milieu. The Young Socialist Alliance bases itself on the program of Marxism, affirming that the working class is the decisive force for social change. The problems facing women, Blacks, Chicanos, and students can only be solved in the long run by the working class winning state power and carrying out a socialist transformation of society. By joining the YSA, young people are helping to build the revolutionary socialist movement that is necessary to lead this transformation.

The YSA's strategy for the student movement is one of mobilizing the greatest possible number of students around demands of immediate concern to them, while putting forward an approach of linking these struggles with the working class. Our strategy is based on the recognition that for students to be most effective they should use their base of strength in the high schools and universities to reach out to and involve workers and oppressed nationalities. The best example of the success of this strategy is the antiwar movement, where persistent work in building the student-based antiwar movement has not only played a role in changing the attitude of most workers to the war from support to opposition but actually brought out thousands of workers in action against the war and laid the basis for even more powerful antiwar actions that can mobilize workers.

Another important aspect of the YSA's relation to the working class is our support for the Socialist Workers Party, which aims to become the mass revolutionary party of the American working class.

The YSA is an organization for all young revolutionaries--students, workers, GIs, and unemployed; Black, Chicano,

Puerto Rican, and white; men and women. Those YSAers who are workers do not regard their time spent on the job as time in which no political work can be done. On the contrary, where possible, they talk to their fellow workers about political ideas, sell The Militant, and try to interest other workers in political activity and recruit them to the YSA. Opportunities for YSAers to raise our program in the trade unions are closely coordinated with the trade union activities of the SWP.

The arena in which nearly all of the YSA's activities can best be carried out is the student movement. Students are today the most radicalized and politically active sector of the population. The YSA has the best opportunities to lead in action and influence the political development of the antiwar movement, the women's liberation movement, and the struggles of the oppressed nationalities by concentrating its forces in the student movement. Moreover, students are the most receptive to revolutionary socialist ideas at present, and the student movement is the best recruiting ground for the YSA.

No political tendency can legitimately claim to be in the leadership of the student movement today. The YSA is stronger than any other organized socialist youth tendency, and the YSA, more than any other, has been in the center of activity on the campuses and in the high schools.

But compared to the mass organization we intend to become, the YSA today is still a tiny nucleus of activists, engaged primarily in propaganda. We cannot on our own generate mass struggle where none exists, nor can we expect large numbers of people to follow us in action simply because we are the YSA. We employ the united front approach of working together with all other forces willing to carry out action around a particular issue. By following this approach, our correct program enables us to become, in certain situations like the antiwar movement, a key element in mobilizing and providing leadership for broader masses in struggle. Building the YSA is a combined process of participating in the struggles of young people as they arise, arguing for a mass action perspective that can advance the struggle and win victories, and putting forward our socialist program and recruiting to the YSA.

In the next year, we should continue to support and build the activities of the SMC and WONAAC, which provide an example of how students can organize to win their demands, and which will provide an action focus that will attract the best of the young radicals. We should also be ready to participate and provide leadership in local campus and high school struggles. These may develop around campus complicity with the war, attacks on Black or Chicano studies departments, women's liberation issues, tuition hikes, attacks on students' rights, or many other issues. We cannot predict where or how the next student upsurge will occur. But we know that these local struggles, with correct leadership, can begin to mobilize students again, build up confidence that the movement can

win victories, provide an example of how to fight, and thereby prepare the movement for future upsurges.

At the same time, the YSA should sharply step up our socialist propaganda activities designed to get out our program to as many students as possible and win them to the YSA. These activities, such as sales of The Militant and Young Socialist, YSA student government campaigns, literature distribution, and classes and forums, will be a major focus of activity for the YSA in the period ahead.

To carry out these tasks, the YSA should work to build up the strongest possible base on the campuses. Having a strong campus base means more than just having YSAers who are students at a particular school. It means having fractions that are in the center of the political life of the campus, that know the student movement inside out, that know the student government and the student newspaper, that know the mood of the campus and what the local issues are. It means the YSA should try to get an office on the campus and a budget from the student government. It means the YSA should aggressively put forward its ideas and leadership for the student movement on all the different issues that arise.

In the coming year the YSA should devote increased attention to work in the high school movement. The entrance of high school students into the radicalization is of great importance to the YSA because of the leadership role of high school students in various struggles, their largely proletarian social composition, and their future as college students, GIs, or workers. The struggles of Black and Chicano high school students are closely linked with the broader issues facing the Black and Chicano communities.

High school students came into action as early as 1967-68, and have played a prominent role in struggles ever since then, both around the demands of the antiwar, Black, and other movements, and around their own special demands as high school students. They have tended to follow the lead of the college student movement in action, and the high school movement has also experienced a decline in activity in the

past period. But today's high school students have spent their entire conscious lives in an atmosphere of radicalism and dissent. Few of them have gone through the defeats and demoralization that have affected some college students. And conditions in the high schools are so repressive that they can only be characterized as tinderboxes, liable to erupt into major struggles at any time.

We should build the SMC and WONAAC in the high schools; participate in local struggles for high school rights, against cutbacks, and especially in the struggles of Black high school students. We should carry out socialist propaganda activities in the high schools aimed at winning high school students to the YSA.

Although recognizing that our current strength in the high schools is less than on the campuses, we should begin the process of constructing high school fractions that can participate in and lead the political life of their schools on a day to day basis.

Building the YSA also involves systematic education of our membership on all aspects of Marxist theory, the history of the socialist movement, and revolutionary strategy and tactics. This education and development of leadership takes place through organized educational activities, individual YSA members' reading and study, and their experiences as socialist activists. YSA members should follow the discussions for the 1973 SWP convention as an important educational opportunity.

Internationalism is the cornerstone of the YSA. Our internationalism is expressed through our actions in support of the Vietnamese revolution and other revolutionary struggles around the world, through our defense of political prisoners, especially in Latin America at this time, and through our fraternal and collaborative relations with revolutionary socialist organizations in other countries. YSA members should follow the discussion leading up to the next World Congress of the Fourth International, scheduled for summer 1973.

## ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

The antiwar resolution approved by the 1971 YSA Convention noted: "From the earliest days of the antiwar movement the YSA has been the consistent advocate of the strategy that has been responsible for the growing power and mass appeal of that movement." The key elements of this strategy may be summarized as follows.

- 1) MASS ACTION. To force the U. S. government to halt its aggression in Vietnam it is necessary to mobilize the power of the masses of American people, especially the decisive power of the working class and the oppressed nationalities. The war cannot be stopped by reliance on capitalist politicians or by the actions of small groups. Mobilizations in the form of rallies and street demonstrations have developed antiwar sentiment, involved new people in activity, educated them about their own power, maintained the visibility of the movement, and legitimized the idea of mass action against the war.

The demonstrations to date have not been powerful enough to stop the war, but they have been essential in building the antiwar movement into a powerful political force on an international scale. The antiwar movement has forced the U. S. government to alter its war plans and withdraw 500,000 troops, and has severely limited the government's options in carrying out its aggressive designs. It will be necessary to build even more powerful mass actions which, together with the resistance of the Vietnamese people, can finally stop the war.

- 2) UNITED FRONT. In order to mobilize the greatest possible forces in action against the war, the YSA has helped build united-front-type coalitions. These coalitions are based on the single issue of agreement to carry out a demonstration against the war, not on a general political agreement among the forces participating. The coalitions are non-exclusionary, that is, open to anyone who will support the demonstration. All who participate are free to voice their own ideas and programs and engage in their own activities on other questions. The coalitions are democratic, so as to involve the greatest number of people in decision-making, and educate them through debate and discussion.
- 3) IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. The demand for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all U. S. forces from Southeast Asia is the correct demand for the antiwar movement, because it is a principled demand that defends the right of the Vietnamese to self-determination and that can mobilize the greatest forces in action.

The National Peace Action Coalition and its local affiliates, based on these fundamental principles, have successfully assembled diverse organizations and individuals into a functioning coalition and thereby organized the largest demonstrations in U. S. history. NPAC relates the war to other social issues like inflation, cutbacks, the oppression of Blacks, etc., and seeks to involve people concerned about those issues.

The Student Mobilization Committee has played a crucial role in the antiwar movement because it has consistently fought for the approach of united mass action for immediate withdrawal. The success of the SMC is based on its two-fold approach of 1) organizing high school and college students; and 2) mobilizing the student antiwar movement to reach out to other sectors of the population and involve them in antiwar activity. This approach found its highest expression in May 1970 with the creation of antiwar universities. The SMC also organizes students to struggle against ROTC, war recruiters, war research, and other forms of campus and high school complicity with the war, against the draft, for GI rights, and for the rights of high school students to engage in antiwar activity.

### THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT IN 1972

Because virtually all Americans, including those who are radicalizing, still have illusions that fundamental changes can be brought about by supporting Democratic and Republican party politicians, election periods put severe strains on the antiwar movement. The bourgeois politicians themselves, the mass media, the trade union bureaucrats and other reformist leaders, and some tendencies in the radical movement, most importantly the Communist Party and Young Workers Liberation League--all counterpose electoral activity to mass action against the war. During an election period, many antiwar activists are disoriented and trapped into working for capitalist party candidates instead of building the independent antiwar movement.

During the 1972 election period, support for NPAC and the SMC narrowed because of these pressures, but they have been maintained as ongoing action coalitions. The reasons for this are found in the solid, principled basis on which they have been built, their success in involving very broad forces in recent years, and the role of the YSA and SWP. NPAC and the SMC persisted in building antiwar demonstrations regardless of the defection of many pro-Democratic party forces, and when Nixon escalated the air war the April 22 demonstrations called by NPAC were seen as the natural focus for protest. For the duration of the upsurge NPAC continued to provide authoritative national focus dates for action, calling and

organizing demonstrations on April 29, May 13, and May 21, as well as collaborating with other forces in building a May 4 moratorium. Since the upsurge was cut short by the Moscow summit, NPAC has continued antiwar action with a national antiwar convention on July 21-23 and demonstrations on August 6-9, October 26, and November 18.

The spring 1972 antiwar upsurge was not as extensive as May 1970 for several reasons. One was the effect of the previous lower level of activity on the campuses. Second was the fact that the escalation consisted of increased bombing, not an invasion by ground troops. Third was the election pressures and the abstention of most organized pro-Democratic Party forces from the mass meetings, demonstrations, and strike steering committees (although many individual students who support capitalist candidates did participate). That the upsurge developed as far as it did in spite of these factors testifies to the depth of antiwar sentiment on the campuses. Because the upsurge did not draw in the overwhelming majority of students, like May 1970 did, or more powerful social forces, many of the student protesters became frustrated and were diverted into futile actions like trashing, blocking highways, etc. The lack of sufficient political breadth in mass meetings and steering committees sometimes gave undue weight to the ultralefts. On other campuses, the SMC successfully led demonstrations and reaching out activities that helped build the antiwar movement.

On a national scale, the SMC set up a national information center, got out special Student Mobilizers explaining a correct strategy for the upsurge, and organized a national student antiwar conference for April 23 in only about four days. The SMC was in the center of the action all over the country, and only the SMC continued to organize antiwar activity on campus after the upsurge ebbed.

### McGOVERN AND THE WAR

The campaign of George McGovern got a big boost from the spring antiwar upsurge. McGovern has pledged to withdraw all U. S. forces from Indochina within 90 days of his inauguration. The support for McGovern is largely based on opposition to the war, and his successful transformation from long-shot underdog to Democratic Party presidential candidate is attributable to the mobilization of antiwar youth in support of his campaign. The vast majority of antiwar activists, and nearly all radical tendencies except the YSA and Socialist Workers Party, are supporting McGovern.

However, McGovern has made it perfectly clear that he supports the overall goals and policies of U. S. imperialism, and he has also demonstrated many times over his willingness to compromise his "radical" stands in order to win over more rightwing elements of the Democratic Party. There is no reason to believe that McGovern, if elected, would abandon imperialism's stake in Southeast Asia.

Either Nixon or McGovern, if elected, is capable of various maneuvers to quiet the antiwar protests--including temporary cutbacks or halts in the bombing, varying the troop levels, or announcing "breakthroughs" in the negotiations. It is not impossible that Nixon will resort to such a maneuver before the elections to help assure his reelection. But neither Nixon nor McGovern nor any other capitalist politician will ever withdraw all U. S. forces and allow a victory for the Vietnamese revolution except as a result of massive pressure from the Vietnamese and the antiwar movement.

The real significance of the McGovern candidacy is that it has weakened the antiwar movement and pulled many activists into futile work in the Democratic Party at this critical time for the Vietnamese revolution, thereby helping to free Nixon's hands to inflict as much damage through the bombing as he can without worrying too much about an organized mass response from the antiwar movement.

### TASKS

The antiwar work of the YSA in the next year will center on building the SMC in the high schools and colleges. We will be involved in organizing national demonstrations and conferences called by NPAC and the SMC. We should also be alert to the possibilities for local struggles around campus complicity, and we should put special emphasis on building the High School SMC and participating in struggles for high school rights.

The YSA's antiwar work should include a major effort to reach out to Black students. In some areas this can best be done directly through the SMC; in other areas, where the situation and our forces permit, we may initiate or participate in all-Black antiwar formations.

In the Chicano movement antiwar sentiment has been actively expressed through participation in national antiwar demonstrations and at nationalist events, including Chicano antiwar demonstrations. YSAers should be in the forefront of efforts to organize even larger numbers of Raza in struggle against the war, through nationalist antiwar formations and through the general antiwar organizations.

Although the size of antiwar demonstrations in the coming period depends on objective developments in the war as well as the energy and dedication of antiwar activists and for that reason cannot be predicted, the persistent work of NPAC and the SMC, especially their leading role in the spring antiwar upsurge, will facilitate the growth of the movement after the elections.



## WOMEN'S LIBERATION

During the past year the ideas of feminism have continued to spread and to influence ever-wider layers of American society. This has been reflected in the proportion of women delegates at the Democratic Party convention and the growing number of women political candidates, as well as in the continued interest on a national level in such feminist issues as abortion, childcare, the Equal Rights Amendment, and equal job opportunities.

As builders of the women's liberation movement and as supporters of the SWP election campaigns, YSAers have been in the forefront of the effort to spread feminist ideas and build the movement by involving the largest possible numbers of women in struggle. In particular, during the past period, we have played an important role in building the struggle for abortion law repeal.

The launching of a national mass-action oriented campaign in defense of women's right to abortion and the formation of a united-front-type coalition to initiate this campaign --the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) --represented a crucial step forward for the women's liberation movement. The abortion question offers the best possibility at this time for uniting and mobilizing large numbers of women in struggle against the government. It has the potential of drawing thousands of new women into action, thereby broadening and strengthening the feminist movement and educating through struggle on how women can win their demands.

The importance of the abortion fight as a focal point of struggle for the feminist movement has been confirmed by events of the past year. The repeated attacks against legalized abortion by rightwing anti-abortion forces along with the growing sentiment in favor of abortion have sharpened the struggle around this issue. At the Democratic Party convention the abortion-reproductive plank was the focus of the central debate on women's issues. In courts and legislatures in nearly every state, there are struggles taking place over the abortion laws.

With anti-abortion forces, led by the Catholic Church hierarchy, in an all-out campaign to prevent any further progress and to drive back the gains already won by women, the feminist movement is faced with a challenge it cannot ignore. A defeat in the struggle over abortion would represent a setback for the feminist movement. On the other hand, victories in this fight will lay the basis for a deepening of the struggle for the liberation of women in other areas.

A recent Gallup poll showed that the percentage of the population agreeing that "The decision to have an abortion should be made solely by a woman and her physician" has

risen from 40 percent in November 1969 to 50 percent in October 1971 to 64 percent in June 1972.

That this pro-abortion sentiment has not yet been reflected in the size of demonstrations organized by WONAAC is primarily due to the recent abstention to a large degree of the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC)--the two largest and best-known women's liberation organizations--in organizing a mass-action approach for abortion law repeal and in responding publicly and aggressively to the attacks on a woman's right to choose. During this election period particularly, NOW has taken the general approach of trying to win women's demands by relying on and supporting liberal capitalist politicians. Although this has been the general approach of the NOW leadership, some local chapters and many individual members of NOW have supported, spoken at, and built actions and meetings organized by WONAAC across the country for abortion law repeal.

With the approach of the 1972 elections, NOW women and other prominent women initiated the National Women's Political Caucus as a vehicle for pressuring the Democratic and Republican Parties. Although thousands of women were drawn to the NWPC with the incorrect belief that their demands could be won through the capitalist parties, the attractiveness of the NWPC is an indication of the receptivity of increasing numbers of women to feminist demands and their realization that the fight for these demands is a political one.

The experience of the 1972 elections is showing many women the futility of relying on the capitalist parties. Although more women than ever before were delegates to the Democratic Party convention, a weakly-worded resolution in favor of abortion and contraception rights was defeated at McGovern's behest. McGovern reversed his pro-abortion stand in mid-1972 and stated that abortion laws should be left up to the states. In his latest retreat he stated that his position is no different than Nixon's. After the Democratic and Republican conventions, the Political Caucus has tended to disintegrate as its leaders concentrate their efforts on electing the particular candidates they support. The leaders of NOW and NWPC persist in supporting capitalist candidates despite these candidates' failure to support women's demands.

WONAAC has continued to get out its propaganda in favor of abortion, explain its strategy, organize demonstrations, and reach out to new women, including the ranks of NOW and other women working for capitalist party candidates. WONAAC has gained considerable authority within the women's liberation and abortion movements. WONAAC is the only national organization working today to unite women in action around

a specific aspect of their oppression. Its central importance to the women's movement lies in the fact that it consistently puts forward a mass struggle approach.

WONAAC's projected activities for fall 1972 and spring 1973, including the local abortion hearings on October 21-22, petitioning for the Abortion Rights Act of 1972, and the International Tribunal called for March 9-11, have the potential of involving large numbers of women. Already WONAAC has been able to draw in many women from NOW into work on the International Tribunal, and the potential to broaden support for WONAAC and the Tribunal will increase as the elections draw to a close. It is likely that a major discussion will ensue within the women's liberation movement following the elections attempting to answer the question, "What next?" WONAAC can play an important role in that discussion and debate.

### TASKS

Building support for WONAAC and its activities will continue to be the main focus of the YSA's participation in the women's liberation movement. In order to build as strong an abortion movement as possible, it will be important to continue to help organize a strong base of support on the campuses and in the high schools, where many of the most consistent WONAAC activists are to be found, and to help that base to reach out to mobilize other forces. In some areas this can best be done through participation in a campus or high school women's liberation group; in others, an abortion group is the best vehicle. The abortion campaign can be built through referenda, strug-

gles for abortion and contraception information and facilities, and other local campus and high school activities, as well as the petition drive, October hearings, and March International Tribunal.

Women of the oppressed nationalities are especially hurt by restrictive abortion laws, because they are most likely to be poor and least likely to be able to get safe and legal abortions. Although some tendencies in the Black and Chicano movements, echoing ruling class propaganda, attack the women's liberation movement in general as white and middle-class, and abortion in particular as genocide, many Black and Raza women have responded favorably to WONAAC, and reaching out to Black and Raza women should be an important part of the work of WONAAC and campus groups.

High school women, too, face additional obstacles in winning control over their own bodies. They are almost always denied access to birth-control information and devices; they are liable to instant expulsion or transfer to a school for unwed mothers if they become pregnant; they have the most difficulty obtaining abortions. The YSA should make our efforts to reach out to high school women a major part of our women's liberation activity.

In addition to the abortion campaign, the YSA should participate in and help to organize, where possible, other women's liberation activities. These may include struggles for equal opportunities and jobs for women in education, for women's studies departments, or winning support for the Equal Rights Amendment as it comes up for ratification in various states.

## BLACK STRUGGLE

Conditions in the Black community, far from improving, have gotten worse. The recent recession and Nixon's new economic policies have hit hardest at Blacks, who are among the "last hired and first fired" and lowest paid. The unemployment rate among Black teenagers is about 35 percent. The urban school systems are in perpetual crisis, housing in the ghetto is intolerable, police brutality continues, and states are vying with each other over which can cut welfare rolls more.

As yet no organization with mass authority in the Black community has developed a strategy that can win the basic goals of the Black liberation struggle: Black control over the institutions that affect the lives of Black people and an improvement in the miserable social conditions faced by Black people. Such a strategy entails combining the mass mobilization of Blacks for their demands with the formation of a Black political party to carry the struggle for Black liberation into the political arena.

Among the traditional "integrationist"-oriented organizations, the Urban League remains relentlessly loyal to the big business interests that control it and hostile to Black nationalist ideas. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), one of the largest and most influential Black groups, also maintains a conservative stance. This was reflected in Roy Wilkin's recent journey to South Africa to attempt to prove that U. S. investment in that racist country is in Black people's interests.

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which tries to combine an integrationist and pacifist strategy with support to some mass actions, has suffered an organizational decline and a split of its Chicago chapter. Jesse Jackson, leader of the Chicago group, has founded Operation PUSH (People United to Save Humanity). Both SCLC and PUSH remain enmeshed in pro-Democratic Party activities.

The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) has twisted Black nationalism into the fantasy of "Black capitalism" and concentrates solely on trying to help Black businessmen.

As a reaction to the deepening of Black nationalist consciousness and radicalism within the Black community, the Democratic Party has been forced to run increasing numbers of Black candidates for local, state, and federal offices. With the lack of strong alternative leaders, these Black politicians have emerged as major recognized spokespeople for the Black community.

In 1971 this process jumped forward with the formation of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). The formation of

the Caucus reflected in a distorted way the pressure for Black unity and political independence. The Congressional Black Caucus and its individual members have held hearings on Black GIs, Africa, and other questions and have associated themselves with mass demonstrations, such as the Children's March and African Liberation Day. In order to maintain their own standing in the Black community they have associated themselves with the current radicalism in the Black community through these actions.

The most significant nationalist organization is the Congress of African People (CAP). CAP, which is led by Imamu Amiri Baraka, is a coalition of several Pan-Africanist groups across the country. While CAP maintains a formal position of support to the long-run perspective of building a Black political party, at present CAP counterposes counterinstitutionalism and working within the Democratic Party to an independent Black political course. CAP represents one major trend of thought among Black nationalists about how to relate to the Black Democratic politicians. CAP proposes that Black nationalists support the Democrats as a way of winning immediate gains and supposedly preparing for the formation of a Black party sometime in the future. This strategy of support to the Black Democrats is expressed in the slogan "unity without uniformity."

### THE GARY CONVENTION

The National Black Political Convention held in Gary last March was significant as a reflection of the current stage of the Black liberation movement. It was attended by nearly every part of the Black movement--nationalist and non-nationalist--and the turnout of over 8,000 was an indication of the depth of interest in organizing for Black political power. The Gary convention was initiated by Black nationalists such as Baraka and several Black Democratic politicians. Several of the members of the Congressional Black Caucus, especially Charles Diggs (D.-Mich.), associated themselves with the convention although most of the Black Congresspeople remained aloof from it.

The orientation of the conference organizers was toward winning concessions from the Democratic Party in the 1972 election campaign. They aimed at mobilizing an impressive show of strength and unity at the convention to improve their bargaining position with the Democratic Party.

The entire history of the relationship of Black people with the Democratic Party, including the aftermath of Gary, shows that this strategy is false. The interests of the Black commu-

nity and all others oppressed and exploited by capitalism clash with the interests of the imperialists who control the Democratic Party. The only road for real gains for the Black community in the political arena is to launch an independent Black political party to struggle against the Democratic as well as the Republican Party.

The Gary convention helped publicize and popularize the ideas of independent Black political action and a Black party and indicated the depth of sentiment in favor of such a party. It also revealed the practical possibility for forming a Black party. The sentiments of the 8,000 participants for a radical change in conditions in the Black community and their demands for Black control of the Black community were reflected in the National Black Political Agenda, a programmatic document passed at Gary.

The Preamble to the Agenda states:

"A Black political convention, indeed all truly Black politics must begin from this truth: The American system does not work for the masses of our people, and it cannot be made to work without radical, fundamental change. . . .

"The challenge is thrown to us here in Gary. It is the challenge to consolidate and organize our own Black role as the vanguard in the struggle for a new society. To accept that challenge is to move to independent Black politics. There can be no equivocation on that issue. History leaves us no other choice. White politics has not and cannot bring the changes we need." (emphasis in original)

The organizers of the Gary convention tried to keep the sentiment for independent Black politics reflected in the Black Agenda from leading to a breach with the Democratic Party. They opposed proposals for a Black political party on the grounds that it was "premature" and would break up the "unity" they were trying to establish with the Black Democrats.

As soon as Gary was over, however, the Black politicians beat a hasty retreat from the nationalist and radical ideas expressed in the Black Agenda. At first, under pressure from the Congressional Black Caucus and other Black politicians, the Black Agenda was amended to remove radical positions on busing and the Palestinian revolution. Later, the Congressional Black Caucus came out with a twelve-point "Black Bill of Rights." This document was much more moderate than the Black Agenda and was to represent their basis for "bargaining" with the Democratic candidates.

Even this document was forgotten as the Black Democrats lined up behind one or another Presidential candidate. At the end all they got from McGovern was the supposed promise--never made publicly--of more Black appointments to the Supreme Court, ten percent of job patronage in the states for Blacks, and some money for voter registration in the Black communities. And all of these "plums" would be

distributed on the basis of McGovern's decisions, not on the basis of the will of the Black community. As the Student Organization for Black Unity (SOBU) accurately commented, "unity without uniformity" was replaced by "opportunism without accountability."

Neither Nixon nor McGovern is going to do anything for Blacks in this country. The disastrous results of the "give the Democrats one more chance" policy show that even in terms of winning immediate concessions, much less total liberation, an independent Black party is needed.

## STRUGGLES IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY

One of the ways to help lay the groundwork for such a party and to advance the struggle is through the mobilization of the Black community in action. During the recent period there have been some such actions in areas around the country.

Blacks in Detroit have organized protests against a special police unit called STRESS that has gunned down more than a dozen Afro-Americans in the last year. Demonstrations were organized in New York after police broke into a Muslim mosque. Meetings have also been held in Chicago to oppose the brutality and racism of Daley's cops. In the last year Black protests have forced the release of Black political prisoners like Angela Davis and Huey Newton. Defense efforts are continuing for the many other Black political activists framed up and imprisoned, like the Harlem 4 in New York and Gary Lawton in Riverside, California.

Black construction workers in Seattle formed a caucus to fight for jobs in the industry there. A series of militant wildcat strikes by Black workers has broken out in Atlanta. These strikes have received widespread support from the Black community, including organized support from Black students.

The Black high schools, already in an advanced state of decay, feel most sharply the financial crisis of the school systems. Many protests have already broken out against overcrowding, few teachers, cutting back the length of the school year, and racist practices in the schools.

Black college students are also coming under attack as Nixon's new economic policies take hold, with cutbacks in aid that enabled Blacks to attend college as well as attacks on Black studies departments. Protests against these attacks are likely in the future, although few have occurred to date.

Another important example of action in the Black community recently was the African Liberation Day demonstrations held on May 27 in Washington, D. C., San Francisco, and New Orleans as well as other parts of the world.

The African Liberation Day demonstrations were largely

initiated by the Student Organization for Black Unity (now renamed Youth Organization for Black Unity--YOBU). YOBU is a revolutionary-minded Pan-Africanist youth organization with chapters in North Carolina and on campuses around the country. For the past two years YOBU has been publishing a biweekly newspaper, African World, with extensive coverage of struggles in Africa as well as the Black movement here.

African Liberation Day was organized around a mass-action perspective. It showed that the best way to publicize the U. S. government's complicity in the oppression of African people is through mass demonstrations. It indicated that pressure could be exerted on the government by such actions, in the same way the demonstrations of the antiwar movement have weakened the ability of U. S. imperialism to intervene militarily against the colonial revolution. Most importantly, it showed the role of mass demonstrations in giving Afro-Americans a sense of their own strength, a sense of confidence and unity, and in raising the political consciousness of those involved.

The approach of leading organizers of the African Liberation Day demonstrations was to involve the broadest possible endorsement and participation. Active supporters ranged from Black Democrats to members of CAP, to Black Panthers, to members of the YSA. This approach was the key to the success of the demonstrations.

Black students were the most active builders of African Liberation Day. In a number of local areas, African Liberation Day committees were organized, mainly on college campuses. In New York, for example, over 40 buses were chartered, with all but one paid for by Black Student Unions or student governments. In addition, Black students organized support actions and build-up actions toward May 27.

A whole series of other struggles have also been launched by Black students in support of the African revolution. At Harvard University, over 2,000 Black and white students rallied to protest Harvard's complicity in Portuguese colonialism. Harvard holds over 663,000 shares in the Gulf Oil Company, and last year alone Gulf paid Portugal over \$30 million, half of its defense budget, for its colonial wars. In Burnside, La., Black students and Black longshoremen demonstrated against the importation of Rhodesian chromium ore.

Following May 27, the African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee reconstituted itself as the African Liberation Support Committee, which will continue to carry out activities, including educational projects, a Gulf Oil boycott, and probably further demonstrations. Local affiliates of ALSC in some areas have been meeting regularly and planning activities.

Pan-Africanists are becoming increasingly aware of the centrality of the Vietnamese revolution. YOBU has noted the connection between the African and Vietnamese revolutions and the importance of Blacks acting to defend the Vietnamese. One example of the potential response to Black

antiwar organizing was the series of demonstrations by Black high school students in Washington, D. C., during the spring 1972 antiwar upsurge. Over 1,000 Black students from Eastern High School took part.

## TASKS

The YSA should continue to support and solidarize itself with any mass protest activity that develops in the Black community. The YSA should be involved in exposing and fighting concrete manifestations of racism and should champion the struggles of the Black community. We should help defend Black activists who are framed up and imprisoned.

Important to the YSA's participation in the Black struggle are support to the SWP election campaigns and sales of our press. These are our best vehicles for explaining how and why a Black party should be built, supporting struggles of the Black community, building participation in actions around Africa and Vietnam, and convincing Black activists of a revolutionary socialist perspective. We should utilize every opportunity to sell The Militant and Young Socialist in the Black community and especially to Black students.

The local SWP election campaigns coming up in 1973 can focus in on the local problems, issues, and demands of the Black community, for example, around control of the police, the school crisis, or the struggles of Black workers,

Young Socialist campaigns for student government should emphasize support to Black students' struggles, such as defense of Black studies programs, for open admissions for Blacks, and against campus complicity with the oppression of Africa. These campaigns can also help build support for other struggles in the Black community.

Even when we are not running election campaigns, the YSA can publicize and support such struggles through our press, forums, and other activities, including, where appropriate, the organization of support demonstrations. One example of such activity was the YSA's work in Atlanta in helping to organize student support for striking Black workers.

The YSA has an important role to play in organizing Black antiwar activity, because of our understanding of the importance of Vietnam and our rich experience in building the antiwar movement.

Where possible the YSA should help to build African Liberation Support Committees or other ad hoc committees on Africa. We can help organize forums, teach-ins, or other educational programs on Africa, and participate in campaigns against campus complicity with oppressive regimes in Africa.

The significance of the Black liberation struggle is indicated by the social composition of the Afro-American population--overwhelmingly proletarian and concentrated in the

major urban centers. Blacks suffer a double oppression as workers and as a distinct national minority. The movement for Black liberation encompasses both a national struggle for the democratic right of Afro-Americans to self-determination and a proletarian struggle of one of the most exploited sections of the working class against the capitalist rulers. It is the explosive combination of these two aspects of the struggle that impels Afro-Americans into the vanguard of the revolutionary struggle against U. S. imperialism.

The coming American revolution will have a combined character. It will be both a revolution of the oppressed nationalities (Chicanos and Puerto Ricans are the largest of these after Afro-Americans) for self-determination and a revolu-

tion of the entire working class for socialism.

This explains the necessity for the revolutionary socialist party and youth organization to win Black militants to our program and organizations, because unless we can build a revolutionary Black leadership there will be no successful revolution. On the other hand it also explains the necessity for revolutionary Black nationalists to join the YSA and the SWP, because for the Black struggle to succeed in winning self-determination it must be combined with the overall revolutionary struggle against capitalism. This can only be accomplished through a multinational revolutionary party and youth organization, based on a Marxist program that takes into account the complexity of the combined revolutionary process.

## CHICANO STRUGGLE

The decision of the recent national conference of La Raza Unida parties to not support either Nixon or McGovern was made in the context of strong election year pressures on the Chicano movement. Especially intense are the pressures to support McGovern, even if only as the lesser evil to Nixon. Farmworkers leader Cesar Chavez and other Chicano leaders have endorsed McGovern and are actively campaigning for him. Democratic Party money is producing "Viva McGovern" literature in Chicano barrios. Members of the Kennedy family have been brought forward to woo Raza voters.

In passing this election year test, the El Paso Raza Unida conference served as an example for all the oppressed, but especially for the Black movement and the labor movement, two potential allies of La Raza whose political outlook and direction lags behind that of the Chicano parties. If the masses of Black people and the labor movement were brought into action along the independent course charted by the Raza Unida parties, a drastic shake-up in American politics would occur, a shake-up the two-party system could not survive. It is this prospect--even though not an immediate one--that so worries the opponents of independent political action within and outside the Chicano movement. It is this prospect that has frightened government and foundation bureaucrats into allocating large sums of money in an effort to buy off young militants with scholarships and jobs in poverty programs. It is this prospect that has prodded federal, state, and local officials to brutalize, frame-up and jail militants who won't be bought off.

At the same time, the prospect of a mass Chicano party, a Black party, and a labor party--parties that together could encompass the overwhelming majority of the American people--is not an immediate one. For one thing, only very small numbers of Black activists are moving in the direction of independent political action, and very few militants in the trade unions are even discussing such steps. But even in the Chicano movement, which has taken significant steps in this direction, a mass party has not yet come into existence.

In several small, predominantly Chicano cities in South Texas, Raza Unida administrations have replaced white racist officials by taking control of the city governments. In Crystal City and San Juan the Raza Unida officials have been able to take advantage of federal programs and make changes that have benefited the Chicano people. In other areas, including California and Colorado, Raza Unida candidates, though not elected, have received encouraging vote totals. Thousands of voters have registered Raza Unida Party in Texas and California and sympathy for these parties is often widespread in the Chicano barrios. Efforts to organize Raza Unida parties have been or are reportedly being made in Arizona, New Mexico,

Washington, Oregon, Nebraska, and in the Midwest.

Despite these encouraging steps forward the Raza Unida parties remain embryos of future mass parties. In order to develop into mass parties of the Chicano people, the RUPs will have to maintain their independence from the Democratic and Republican parties, organize the masses of Raza in struggles around demands for Chicano control of the Chicano community, and maintain their nationalist character as Chicano parties.

The question of support to Democrats and Republicans has been seen by some Raza Unida Party leaders and candidates as a tactical question rather than one of principle. This weakness can be seen most clearly in the "balance of power" strategy projected prior to the national Raza Unida conference by leaders of the Texas party. This strategy left open the possibility of supporting Nixon or McGovern under certain conditions.

Though the "balance of power" strategy was not openly discussed, conference delegates signalled their rejection of this approach by declaring "complete independence" from the Democratic and Republican parties and deciding that the Raza Unida parties would "support none of the two major candidates for president."

If it is true that mass parties of the oppressed and exploited are not an immediate perspective, should those Chicano militants who have embarked on an independent course pull back and wait for the Black movement and the labor movement to catch up? The YSA does not think so. Such a course would be self-defeating for La Raza, would postpone indefinitely the hard work of beginning to build a mass independent Chicano party, and would delay the emergence of independent Black and labor forces.

### STATE AND LOCAL RAZA UNIDA PARTY CAMPAIGNS

The El Paso conference approved a set of guidelines for the drafting of a national program that included "immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and Indochina," "community control of social, economic, political and educational institutions," "enforcement of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo," "an end of right to work laws," and to "pledge responsible support to the struggle of Latina women in their struggle for equal rights in all spheres of life."

The conference emphasized the importance of building the local and state Raza Unida party campaigns. State campaigns are being run in Texas, Colorado, and New Mexico and local candidates are running in Southern California.

The campaign of Ramsey Muñiz for governor of Texas has won broad endorsement in the Chicano community, even from more moderate groups like LULACs (League of United Latin American Citizens) and from organizations in the Black community such as SCLC.

In Colorado, a large slate of candidates has been nominated and community campaign offices set up. The Colorado Raza Unida Party contingent led the recent march of 5,000 in Denver celebrating Mexican Independence Day.

In East Los Angeles, supporters of Raza Unida Party candidate for state assembly Raul Ruiz confronted George McGovern and Ted Kennedy at a recent campaign rally. Kennedy is a sponsor of legislation that would victimize "illegal aliens," most of whom are undocumented Raza workers.

### THE "ILLEGAL ALIEN" QUESTION

The last year has seen the development of a movement against the victimization of Raza workers by the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The right of hundreds of thousands of mexicano and Latino workers without visas to reside and work in this country has emerged into a question of national importance. This question has become an explosive issue not only in California, but also in a number of other states. Among these are Colorado, which is considering legislation aimed against undocumented workers, Texas, where many deportations have been taking place, and New York, where Dominicans and other Latinos have been victimized on the basis of pending federal legislation which would make it illegal to "knowingly" hire workers without visas and for such workers to accept employment.

These renewed efforts to enforce the racist immigration laws do not only affect mexicano and Latino workers who have come into this country trying to escape unemployment and miserable wages in their native countries caused by the imperialist exploitation of Latin America. They make all Raza workers subject to discrimination and harrassment, and those that are unable to produce papers to prove that they are "legal" residents of this country are often summarily deported.

The "illegal alien" scare is a tactic used by the ruling class depending on the needs of the economy. In periods when cheap labor is in demand workers from Latin America are allowed to flow freely into this country, with or without visas. When the economy goes into a downturn, and the unemployment rate rises, the government reverses its policies, using the "illegal alien" as a scapegoat for the rising unemployment rate.

The bosses use the "illegal alien" scare as a tactic to divide the working class. They tell Anglo, Black and even Raza workers that their real enemy is not capitalism but rather the mexicano or Latino worker who has come to this country to

find work.

Undocumented workers are forced to accept the most miserable jobs at the lowest wages or face the threat of deportation. Because of this, bosses attempt to use the undocumented workers to curb the demands of other workers for higher pay and better working conditions and to break strikes.

The YSA opposes all attempts by the employers to use the "illegal alien" scare to divide the working class and victimize undocumented workers. We unconditionally defend the right of all Raza workers to remain and work in this country without harrassment regardless of their present immigration status.

The attacks on the rights of workers without papers and the vicious and cynical way in which the employers use these workers to divide the working class and especially La Raza has led to the formation and rapid growth of Centro de Acción Social Autónomo/Hermandad General de Trabajadores (Center for Autonomous Social Action/General Brotherhood of Workers) in Los Angeles. CASA claims a membership of 15,000 people, the majority of whom are Mexican workers, although many Chicanos are also members. CASA has organized mass demonstrations against the Immigration Service and California's Dixon-Arnett Law. The Dixon-Arnett Law, although it formally provides only for fining employers who hire undocumented workers, has been used by the state and the bosses as a tool for attacking Raza workers whether they are "legal" residents or not. CASA's participation in court suits and demonstrations succeeded in getting the Dixon-Arnett Law declared unconstitutional on a technicality, but similar laws are now being considered again in California's legislature and in the U. S. Congress. CASA opposes all such legislation and demands an immediate cessation of deportations and the legalization of the status of all Raza workers in the U. S.

### CHICANO STUDENTS

At every stage of the development of the Chicano movement the youth and students have played a major role. Activists from the student movement have been in the forefront of organizing La Raza Unida parties, supporting the farmworkers' struggles, and building Chicano antiwar demonstrations, as well as waging their own struggles for demands like the right to speak Spanish in the schools, for Chicano studies departments, for an end to racist teachers and textbooks, and for an end to corporal punishment.

In the recent period there have been clashes between Chicano students and college administrations over attacks on Chicano studies departments, in the form of both cutbacks in funds and facilities for such departments and by blocking Chicano control over them. Chicano high school students have been particularly active, and walkouts protesting various forms of racist oppression in the high schools remain a frequent occurrence.



## TASKS

The YSA should continue to support and, wherever possible, participate in the process of building Raza Unida parties. Our press and our election campaigns can be effective tools in this work.

The YSA should also continue to support and participate in actions of Chicano students to defend and extend the gains

of previous struggles.

The YSA should speak to Chicano youth not only on the question of support to the Raza Unida parties but on the basis of our entire political program for social change, urging Chicanos to support the Jenness-Pulley campaign and join the YSA.

## OPPONENT TENDENCIES ON THE LEFT

It is important for the YSA to be thoroughly familiar with the political positions and activities of the other organizations vying for the allegiance of radicalizing youth. Many young people will look around and carefully examine all the different groups before deciding they want to join any of them. YSAers must be able to explain the positions of the other tendencies and where they go wrong.

Before taking up the Young Workers Liberation League (YWLL) and Progressive Labor Party's SDS, the two strongest opponent youth groups, it will be helpful to look at one political error that is common to virtually all our opponents--from the YWLL and PL-SDS to the sectarian grouplets like the Workers League, Spartacist League, etc. That error is a failure to understand the dynamics of the current radicalization and its relation to the working class.

### "WORKERISM"

The early New Left rejected the workers as hopelessly complacent and bought-off. They thought that students and intellectuals acting alone would be the force for social change. With the increasing political sophistication of the student movement, following events like the May-June 1968 upsurge and general strike in France, which demonstrated the revolutionary potential of the working class, and various experiences that have demonstrated the limitations of the student movement, this question is being reexamined. Today many radicals have simply turned the New Left concept upside down, by declaring that students can play no role in the revolutionary process except by "going to the factories." Part of the confusion stems from the fact that nearly every radical tendency except the YSA echoes this error in one way or another. They all proclaim the necessity of serious revolutionaries turning away from the current struggles and they all condemn the YSA as "petty bourgeois" for not doing so.

The YSA has understood and welcomed what all these tendencies have rejected--the radicalization of youth around a whole variety of issues, even before the mass of workers have begun to move. All our opponents take what is in reality a conservative attitude toward the new developing movements. For example, they all condemn Black nationalism and feminism as "divisive" and "obstacles to working class unity." But this position is really an adaptation to the more backward, privileged layers of the working class. True working class unity, which will indeed be necessary to overturn capitalism, can only be based on support for the special needs and demands of the most oppressed sectors of the working class, like Blacks, Chicanos, and women.

Our opponents' rejection of the current radicalization also indicates an economist attitude toward the working class. That is, they see the struggle of workers only in relation to wage and job issues, not in relation to political issues. But making the socialist revolution is not simply a question of wages and working conditions; it is a matter of the working class taking state power away from the capitalist class. That is, it is a struggle on the political level.

The political issues raised today by students, women and Blacks are of great importance to the working class. One main issue for example, has been the fight against the imperialist war in Vietnam. The success of the antiwar movement has already made it very difficult for prowar jingoism to be used against workers' struggles. Even leaving aside the effects of the Vietnam war on the U.S. economy, it is very much in the interests of the working class to fight against the war, because that fight weakens U.S. imperialism and advances the world revolution.

For the working class to successfully win state power and lead the socialist reconstruction of society, it will need to mobilize all oppressed sectors of the population on the basis of supporting the just demands of these oppressed sectors. Today's protest movements, from the antiwar movement to women's liberation, are in the interests of the working class. In addition, they raise issues of immediate concern to the millions of workers who are young, Black, Chicano, Puerto Rican, or women and will further the political radicalization of the workers they involve.

The "workerist" approach of our opponents is simply a cover for their conservative, abstentionist rejection of the real unfolding of the class struggle.

### YOUNG WORKERS LIBERATION LEAGUE

The Young Workers Liberation League, which is in political solidarity with the Communist Party U.S.A., is the largest, strongest, and most important national youth organization presenting an alternative perspective to that of the YSA.

The YWLL is the first successful youth group established by the CP in over twenty years. All their earlier attempts to do so during the 1960s ended in miserable failure--from Advance to the Progressive Youth Organizing Committee to the DuBois Clubs. They have learned from these earlier experiences--and also from watching the successful development of the YSA. Because they are the U.S. representatives of the world Stalinist movement, which holds power in the Soviet

Union and Eastern Europe and which has mass workers parties in many countries, the American Stalinist youth have always been viewed by the YSA as our most important opponent on the left. This is even more true now that they have a viable organization.

The politics of the CP and YWLL are based on total subservience to the narrow interests of the Soviet bureaucracy. Nowhere in recent years has there been a clearer example of the thoroughly counterrevolutionary nature of Stalinist theory and practice than in relation to the Moscow summit.

The YSA should continue to get out the facts on the Stalinist betrayal of the Vietnamese and use this example to educate in the radical movement on Stalinism. It is likely that the Moscow trip raised questions in the minds of some YWLL members, and we should take every opportunity to discuss and debate this question with them. We should also take on the YWLL for supporting the totalitarian domestic policies of the Stalinist bureaucracies, challenging them to speak out for socialist democracy and against repressive acts like the recent political trials in Czechoslovakia.

Following the fundamentally reformist perspective of seeking "peaceful coexistence" instead of world revolution, the American Stalinists' goal is not to lead a socialist revolution in this country but to build up pressure on an imaginary "progressive" wing of the ruling class to establish better relations with the Soviet Union. An integral part of this approach has for decades been political class collaboration through support to the Democratic Party, in which the more "progressive" capitalists are supposedly found. The CP and YWLL see the different social movements solely in terms of exerting this leftward pressure on the ruling class and winning a few reforms. But the strategy they put forward of subordinating the movements to the Democratic Party is an obstacle even to winning reforms, much less advancing the political consciousness of the participants on the need for independent, anticapitalist, working class political action.

The thrust of the CP's activities during the 1972 elections has been to campaign for McGovern, under the cover of "defeat Nixon." At the same time they have run their own formally independent candidates for President, Vice-President, and a few local offices. These campaigns, the biggest the CP has run in decades, are primarily intended to help build the CP and YWLL by getting out their politics and giving them a public face. These campaigns represent a new and more aggressive approach to building their own organizations, but no change at all in their class-collaborationist political line of support to the Democratic Party. The central message of the Hall-Tyner campaign is "defeat Nixon."

The CP and YWLL have had success in recruiting Black members. This success is due both to the fact that historically they have had more Black members and a stronger influence in the Black struggle than the revolutionary socialists, and, in the recent period, to their recruitment of young people in-

involved in the Angela Davis defense committees. However, their political positions of opposition to Black nationalism and uncritical support to the Black Democrats leave them far to the right of most young Black nationalists. In order to recruit Blacks, the YWLL especially tends to adapt to Black nationalism and conceal its real politics. We should keep up our polemics against the YWLL on this question and make sure that no one joins the YWLL under the mistaken impression that it supports Black self-determination or independent Black political action.

The YSA's approach to the YWLL is twofold. First, we press them to participate with us in united front activities in the antiwar movement, women's liberation, Black struggle, or any other appropriate situation. Their participation would make the united fronts broader and the movements more powerful. In addition, working together with their members would enable us to have political discussions with them. Second, we struggle against their incorrect politics in the independent movements, and through our press, literature, forums, and in discussions and debates.

#### STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

After the break-up of the old SDS, the ultraleftism, sectarianism, and goon-squad tactics of the PL faction led to their almost total isolation in the radical movement. Reacting pragmatically to the situation of isolation and decline in which they found themselves, PL-SDS engaged in self-criticism for their earlier sectarianism, and they are now making an effort to link up more with the student movement so they can have some opportunity to recruit. They have in the last year participated in the antiwar movement under the slogans "U.S. Out of Southeast Asia Now" and "Stop the Bombing," and in the abortion movement under the slogan "Free Abortion on Demand." Their main activity has been a campaign against racist professors and textbooks in the universities. In contrast to the tight control with which PL ran SDS from 1969-71, they are now trying to build up SDS as a broad anti-racist student movement that includes many different political viewpoints, and they have succeeded in attracting new people around SDS both because of the name and the actions they carry out.

The only way for PL to act less sectarian is to submerge their political program and project a reformist "workerist" line for the student movement, along with the rhetorical fight against racism. They still maintain their opposition to Black nationalism and feminism, their belief that the Soviet Union (and now China, too!) is an imperialist state, their belief that the Vietnamese have sold out the revolution by participating in negotiations, and they are still liable to advocate adventurist tactics.

The YSA should welcome the participation of SDS in any united action front, while at the same time drawing out the political program of PL-SDS so as to drive a wedge between it and any serious new people it may attract.

## LOCAL ULTRALEFT GROUPS

Since the breakup of the old SDS in 1969, the general ultraleft milieu on campus has not been able to pull itself together in a national organization. This milieu has tended to splinter into collectives, communes, and grouplets, little involved in political activity. Many of these local groups have turned toward counterinstitutionalism and maintain their only visible presence around an underground paper, small radical bookstore, or community center.

Organized ultraleft groups still function on some campuses, like the Anti-Imperialist Coalition at Columbia and the Revolutionary Union in the Bay Area. These groups rarely have any consistent political program, but they are almost

always hostile to any perspective of uniting large numbers of students in action around concrete demands. In some areas they have recently become involved in organizing support to the 7-point-program of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, counterposing such support to building antiwar demonstrations for immediate and unconditional withdrawal. At the same time many of them support McGovern.

Where they carry out activities these ultraleft groups may become a pole of attraction for radicalizing students. Some people around these groups may be confused and miseducated, but genuinely want to be revolutionaries. While keeping up our polemics against their incorrect political ideas, the YSA should encourage these groups and their individual adherents to participate in specific actions such as antiwar demonstrations.

## AFTER THE 1972 ELECTIONS

The developing radicalization in America was reflected in a distorted fashion in the politics of the 1972 elections. Writing weeks before the elections take place, it is impossible to present a detailed and complete analysis of the meaning of the election campaigns. However, the underlying dynamic of the process is clearly discernible.

The focus of the political debate in 1972, which took place in what was seen as a general crisis of American society, was shifted to the left. Even Nixon had to campaign as a "progressive," saying "the choice is between change that works and change that doesn't work," rather than openly defending the status quo. McGovern, who was seen as not only a "peace" candidate but something of a radical, was nominated by the Democratic Party, whose strategists talked about basing the party on "a new coalition of protest." Caucuses of Blacks, youth, and women were formed to influence the Democratic and Republican Parties. Questions that were not even discussed in polite society in 1968, such as abortion or the rights of homosexuals, were debated as legitimate political issues in 1972.

The new developments within the two-party system were based on both the deepening radicalization and a contradictory phenomenon--the continuing belief by most of those radicalizing that support to one or another capitalist party politician would solve their problems.

The impact of the radicalization is primarily seen in the Democratic Party. The real meaning of the changes within the Democratic Party is that the capitalist class, endangered by the threat of independent action by the radicalizing masses, is moving to trap discontent within its two-party system in order to dissipate it harmlessly. A similar maneuver was successfully carried out in the 1930s and '40s to channel the labor radicalization away from the formation of an independent labor party. Will it work on the radicalization of the 1960s and '70s?

The old vote-catching coalition on which the Democratic Party rested, a coalition forged during the '30s by Roosevelt, was made up of the big city political machines, the Southern Democrats (Dixiecrats), and the trade union bureaucracy. In addition, Blacks and Chicanos could be counted on to vote Democratic--when they could vote at all. Social developments of recent years, most importantly the rising power and militancy of the urban Black community, have eroded the basis for that coalition and exacerbated the conflicts within it.

The complexion of the urban vote has shifted markedly as the European ethnic groups, on which the city machines were based, have been assimilated and along with other whites fled the inner cities, to be replaced by growing concentrations of

Blacks. This shift is reflected in the election of Black mayors like Gibson in Newark, Hatcher in Gary, and Stokes in Cleveland. The Democratic Party increasingly needs Black figureheads, rather than Daley-style machines, to hold onto the urban vote.

The industrialization and urbanization of the South has undermined the hold of the Dixiecrats' one-party system there. At the same time, the blatantly racist and reactionary politics of the Wallace wing and the old-time machines clash more and more with the image the Democratic Party must have to hold the Black vote. One of the concessions won by the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and '60s was giving the vote to a greater percentage of the Black population, and now the Democratic Party has to be very concerned with the Black vote, without which it cannot win elections. This, of course, is one reason why the formation of an independent Black party would deal powerful blows to the capitalist two-party system. But today the more the Democratic Party adapts to the Black struggle, the more it alienates its most reactionary wing. And the more it openly appears to be a party that includes figures like Wallace and Daley, the more it risks losing the Blacks.

The reforms instituted in the Democratic Party since 1968 represent an attempt to improve the image of the party and lay the basis for a new coalition that includes Blacks and other radicalizing elements of society. Needless to say, such reforms in no way alter the character of the Democratic Party as a party of the capitalist ruling class. This reform process was accelerated by the May 1970 upsurge, which further illustrated the danger the radicalization poses for the capitalist system. Concretely the May upsurge won the vote for 18 to 21-year-olds.

George McGovern's campaign in the primaries was a successful move, based on the party reforms, to use young activist forces against the still-powerful conservative wing represented by figures like Meany, Daley, and the Southern Democrats. This "new coalition of protest" approach seemed highly successful in the spring of 1972: it won McGovern the nomination and it co-opted many left-moving forces into support for his campaign. However, it is also a risky approach that threatens to rebound against the two-party system.

For example, the formation of the caucuses--Congressional Black Caucus, National Women's Political Caucus, National Youth Caucus--is an important part of the strategy of co-opting the left. The caucuses are needed to help convince Blacks, women, and youth that they will get something out of their support for the Democrats. But the caucuses tend to legitimize the independent organization of oppressed groups to fight in the political arena for their demands.

Another example is the Democratic Party convention itself. The convention was marked by radical rhetoric and a delegate composition including many more youth, women, Blacks, and Chicanos than ever before--supposedly showing that party reform had worked and these groups now had powerful "input" into the Democratic Party. But, again, the convention gave further legitimacy to the movements and demands of the current radicalization.

The continued attempt of the Democratic Party to encompass both the "old coalition" and the "new coalition" tends to disillusion the radicalizing elements of the "new coalition" before it is even built. Thus McGovern, even before he got the nomination and much more so afterwards, rapidly moved to try to make up with the "regular" Democratic Party. He recognized that, important as the radical activist support had been for winning in the primaries, it did not have the organizational strength of the old power brokers, which he needed to have any chance of winning in November. So he visited Wallace, soothed Daley's ruffled feathers, threw overboard many of his "radical" stands and softpedaled the rest, and started appealing to the Democratic ward-healers on the basis of "Democratic Party unity." By mid-fall he had succeeded in alienating many of his radical-minded supporters, without winning over much of the rightwing support he sought. McGovern's problems epitomize the difficulties the Democratic Party faces in trying to hold together all its disparate constituencies.

In the long run there is no basis for the Democratic Party being reconstituted as a party of liberal capitalist reform that would be at all stable. The American capitalist system today, in the face of increasing international competition, does not have the resources to make enough concessions to satisfy the movements the Democratic Party is trying to co-opt. The Democratic Party cannot deliver on its promises of reform, because it is committed to upholding the capitalist system. It cannot end imperialist war; it cannot solve the problems of the Black community; it cannot grant the demands of women.

The Republican Party is in even less of a position to hold the allegiance of growing radicalized elements of the population, no matter what success it may enjoy in November 1972 because of factors like the Peking and Moscow trips, the confusion and disorganization of the Democrats, and Nixon's appeal to the racism of many white workers. Its only promise to improve the living standards of the masses is the "trickle down" theory--that is, the theory that if enough favors are done to big business so that its profits stay good and high, the benefits will eventually "trickle down" to the workers.

Thus the developments of the 1972 elections, even though they sowed confusion among many radicals and dampened independent social struggles for a period, are symptoms of a deep-going instability in the two-party system and indicate growing opportunities for winning more adherents to independent anticapitalist political action. The validity of this conclusion is also indicated by the increasing number of young voters who register "independent," and the increasing number who

vote a split ticket.

We do not have any illusions about the speed of this process. Most radical or liberal youth continued to support McGovern despite his moves to the right; in fact, many even agreed that he should move to the right if that would help him win the election. But a significant number were embittered by his turn to the right wing of the Democratic Party. His radical-minded young supporters are getting an education in the futility of capitalist party politics, and the YSA stands to gain from this process if we explain the lessons of the McGovern campaign and pose the YSA as the only real alternative for those who are interested in fundamental social change.

The success of the Socialist Workers Party 1972 national and local campaigns is one of the most important indications of the changing political climate and the favorable opportunities for building the YSA. For almost the last year and a half the YSA has put building the SWP campaign at the center of all its activities. We correctly recognized that because of the heightened political interest generated by the elections, the campaign would be the best way to build the independent movements and win adherents to our socialist program. The Jenness and Pulley campaign won more support than any previous SWP campaign. Even before the last two months of campaigning, over 12,000 endorsers of the campaign--mostly young people--had been signed up. The election campaign has popularized the ideas of the YSA and helped convince hundreds of new members to join the YSA.

We have gained a wealth of experience during the 1972 campaign in how to explain our ideas clearly to large numbers of people and how to relate our overall socialist program to the immediate demands and struggles of workers, Blacks, students, and women.

The election campaign has been a particularly valuable propaganda vehicle because of the current stage of the student movement. We think that today more students than ever before are interested in radical and socialist ideas, but that many of them, for various reasons flowing from the historical development of the student movement, are hesitant and skeptical about taking action. The YSA cannot win these people over solely on the basis of being the organization of the best activists in the different movements. We have to convince them that our overall program is correct. The election campaign has enabled us to explain our program and link it up with the real class struggle going on at its present level.

The period after the elections should be a favorable one for the growth of the YSA. Participation in the independent movements is liable to increase, and we can expect a resurgence of social struggle on many different fronts. Many young people will be disillusioned by their experiences of working within the capitalist parties and will be looking for an alternative.

In order to take advantage of this situation, the task before

us is to go forward from the support we have won and the experience we have gained in the 1972 campaign by carrying out increased socialist propaganda activities in the name of the YSA. The process of stressing the YSA and putting forward the public face of the YSA has already begun through the election campaign. It should be continued after the elections by the YSA beginning to carry out many of the types of propaganda activities of the campaign, although these activities cannot be exactly the same or on as big a scale as during the election campaign.

A major part of our propaganda effort will be increased sales of The Militant and Young Socialist. The Militant presents the views of the YSA on a week to week basis, and is the main publication with which we can make an impact on fast-moving political developments. The reestablishment of the Young Socialist newspaper is an important step forward for the YSA and an integral part of our projections for building the YSA in the post-election period. The Young Socialist will be the public voice of the YSA, reaching thousands of students with our program and news about our activities. Regular sales of large numbers of Militants and YSs on the campuses is one of the best ways to build our campus base and recruit to the YSA. We should view the YS as particularly important in our plans for increased work in the high school movement, and make a special effort to get the YS out to high school students.

In addition to our periodicals, the YSA should produce more basic propaganda materials such as flyers, brochures, and short pamphlets, similar to material produced during the election campaign. Distribution of such materials, along with The Militant, YS, and books and pamphlets from Pathfinder Press, should be carried out through regular literature tables on campus and, where possible, at the high schools, as an important part of presenting the public face of the YSA.

Young Socialist campaigns for student government office both in the high schools and universities have proved an effective way of explaining and winning support for the YSA's program for the student movement. They provide a good

opportunity for concretizing our program and tying it in to the issues that concern students in a particular area. Carrying out such campaigns wherever possible should become a standard part of the YSA's functioning.

The Socialist Workers Party will run municipal election campaigns in many areas in 1973. Local campaigns can be easily linked up with the local struggles of high school students and the Black community, helping us step up our activity in these arenas. The YSA should actively support these election campaigns and apply our experience from 1972 to them. We should look for opportunities to run YSA members as candidates for offices like school board or university board of regents.

The high level of regional work done in connection with the 1972 campaign should be continued wherever possible. In addition to a regional organizer, YSA speaking tours through the regions or traveling Young Socialist teams can help bring new members to the YSA on the many important schools throughout the regions.

In addition, YSA locals should think out how best to utilize forums and classes on campus to build the YSA. Getting YSA speakers into the high schools is more difficult, but every effort should be made to do so as part of our drive to convince high school students to join the YSA.

These increased propaganda activities, if carried out alongside continued participation in the living class struggle on all its fronts, will lead to further growth in the size and influence of the YSA.

The progress of the radicalization has been and will be uneven. The student movement will continue to go through ups and downs. But our central task is to steadily and consistently build the YSA: to lead in action, to win new members, and to educate and develop the cadres who will be in the leadership of the American socialist revolution.



# Join us!

## ... at the Young Socialist National Convention

**Nov. 23-26  
Cleveland, Ohio**

For more information on transportation, housing, and registration, call or write: Young Socialist Alliance, Box 471 Cooper Station, New York, New York 10003; (212) 989-7570; or, Young Socialists for Jenness and Pulley, 706 Broadway, 8th Fl., New York, New York 10003; (212) 989-7676.

The Young Socialist Alliance is hosting the Twelfth Young Socialist National Convention, and we invite all young people interested in radical politics to participate. We're meeting in Cleveland, Ohio, at the Sheraton-Cleveland Hotel, November 23-26, 1972.

Over a thousand young activists from every part of the country will gather to evaluate the meaning of the 1972 elections and decide on a revolutionary socialist course of action to pursue beyond November.

We'll be discussing what we can do to end the war, fight for women's liberation, win high school rights, fight for Black and Chicano liberation, and support revolutionary struggles around the world.

A special feature of our convention will be a huge wind-up socialist campaign rally for the Socialist Workers Party campaign. Both Linda Jenness and Andrew Pulley will be there, as well as hundreds of Young Socialists for Jenness and Pulley.

- I would like more information about the YSA and the convention.
- I'm coming - send me material to help build the convention.
- I want to join the YSA.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

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