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C O N T E N T S

REPORT AND RESOLUTIONS OF PLENUM --
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, JUNE 1946

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FIRST PLENUM OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The first meeting of the new International Executive Committee elected at the April Conference of the Fourth International, was held in June 1946.

The following questions were on its order of business:

1. Report on the activity of the International Secretariat.
2. Unification between the SWP (Socialist Workers Party) and the WP (Workers Party) in the United States.
3. Critical examination of the position taken by the French Section in the referendum of May 5, 1946.
4. The tactic of the British section toward the Labour Party.
5. Report on the reorganization of the German section.
6. Various matters.

The sessions of the IEC lasted four days and the debates inscribed on its agenda were closed with resolutions. The IEC unanimously approved the report of the IS on its activity. On the question of unification between the SWP and the WP, the resolution adopted by the IEC stresses the need of a preparatory discussion between the two organizations to clarify the differences and to establish the degree of agreement existing at present between the WP and the orientation held by the SWP and the International. The IEC was unanimous in condemning the split undertaken by Comrades Williams, Goldman, etc., and the provocations to split made by the Shachtman leadership of the WP in regard to this question.

On the French referendum, the IEC rejected the arguments of the majority which had formed in the Central Committee of the PCI for a "Yes" position and characterized it as a deviation of an opportunist nature.

Concerning the tactic of our British section toward the Labour Party, the IEC, after a first discussion, advised an orientation according to which the most important part of our work in England should be in the direction of the Labour Party.

An initial report was presented on conditions prevailing at present in Germany and on the first steps taken toward the reorganization of our German section.

The IEC also adopted an important resolution which draws the conclusions from the failure of the Big Four conference of May 1946 in Paris, of the prolonged military occupation of Europe and of the impasse into which the world has been led by the policy of the imperialists and of the Soviet bureaucracy. This resolution stipulates that the Fourth International will intensify its struggle for the universal withdrawal of the troops, including the Soviet troops, from

all the occupied territories in Europe and in the colonies, and for the right of all peoples to self-determination.

After considering the problems relating to the preparation of the next world congress of the Fourth International, the IEC decided to prepare to hold it in 1947 and to declare as opened the pre-congress discussion, on the basis of the resolution adopted by the April 1946 conference and the supplementary resolution mentioned above relative to the withdrawal of the occupation troops.

All delegates present participated in the debates of the IEC, everyone contributing to them on the basis of his own experience. The discussions were thoroughly democratic and particularly instructive for the entire international. All the reports as well as the minutes of the discussions based on them will be published in the internal bulletins of the International.

June 1946

The International Secretariat

I

RESOLUTION ON THE AMERICAN UNIFICATION QUESTION

Adopted: 5 in favour - 2 opposed (British, French Minority)

The International Executive Committee, having discussed in its session of June 1946 the question of unification between the SWP and the WP, considers:

1. However desirable unity may be in general, the unification of the SWP and the WP, an organization claiming to adhere to the ideas of the Fourth International, is not a matter of formal agreement on the general principles of Marxism, but of agreement on the precise programme of the International. This is the indispensable condition for guaranteeing a stable unity and for contributing to the development of the revolutionary party defending the programme of the Fourth International. There exist between the two organizations as well as between the WP and the line of the International, fundamental differences which, even according to the leadership of the WP, are on a whole series of questions, of a programmatic character.

2. A discussion to clarify these differences and to measure the degree of agreement existing between the two organizations in theoretical, political, and organizational questions is necessary.

In this discussion the SWP as well as the leading organizations of the International will seek to bring the WP as close as possible to the positions of the International.

The IS will publish in a first international bulletin documents of the SWP and the WP setting forth their points of view on the existing differences and on the unity question.

In another bulletin the IS will publish all the documents emanating from members of the two organizations as well as from members of the International concerning the question of unity.

In the light of this discussion the IEC will again take up the question at its next session and express its opinion on the possibility and timeliness of an immediate unification.

The IEC considers that a unification arrived at without a clarification of the differences between the two organizations runs the risk of turning the active life of the party inwards particularly the energy of its leading cadres; especially in the present period of mass radicalization, such a unification would have disastrous consequences for the unified organization, making it impotent in face of the existing favorable opportunities to penetrate the working class and build a mass revolutionary party. The IEC would strongly oppose any unification which it considers would have this result.

3. A different atmosphere from that existing at present should be established, excluding manoeuvres and even the appearance of manoeuvres. The majority of the SWP and the international leadership will continue to assure the democratic character of the discussion and the rights of minorities. The SWP minority, having on several occasions violated the discipline of the party, should desist from pursuing this course which completely hinders the solution of the unity question.

Furthermore, the WP leadership, as long as it continues to parallel its campaign for unification with provocations to split in the SWP and to act along the lines described in the letters of Shachtman to Goldman, can hardly expect to convince the members of the SWP and the International of a genuine desire for unity on its part.

4. The IEC condemns the attitude of Comrades Goldman, Williams and others in leaving the SWP and the ranks of the International to join the WP. It considers that emulation of their attitude by other members of the minority would complicate a favorable development of the question of unification.

RESOLUTION PRESENTED BY THE DELEGATE OF THE RCP ON THE QUESTION
OF SWP - WP UNIFICATION

Rejected: 2 in favour (British-French Minority) - 5 opposed

The IEC, having discussed in its session of June 1946 the question of unification between the SWP and the WP of America declares:

1. That, the WP, which claims to adhere to the principles and ideas of the Fourth International has in fact numerous programmatic and tactical differences with the Fourth International and with the SWP.

2. That, in view of the declaration of the WP leadership that

it is prepared to accept the leadership of the Fourth International and the discipline of the fused organization, in the event of a fusion being arrived at in which the ideas of the WP have minority expression, the differences are compatible with adherence to the Fourth International and a unification of the WP with the SWP is to be desired.

3. That, however, a unification arrived at without a clarification of the differences between the two organizations and, or a unification which resulted in turning the life of the party inwards, particularly the energy of its leading cadres; in the present period of mass radicalization, would have disastrous consequences for the unified organization, making it impotent in face of the existing favourable opportunities to penetrate the working class and build a mass revolutionary party. The IEC would strongly oppose any unification which it considers would have this result.

4. Only on the basis of the clarification of existing political differences, the healthy interpenetration of the membership and leadership and the elimination of the bitter factional atmosphere that has poisoned the relations between the two organizations, can a principled unification be arrived at and which will be to the advantage of Trotskyism in the United States and the International Party.

5. With the object of trying to bring such a unification into being, the IEC makes the following proposals:

a. That the discussion to clarify the existing differences on theoretical, political, tactical and organizational questions and to find the measure of agreement between the two organizations, which has already commenced, should be energetically pursued, if possible in regulated joint bulletins and at joint membership debates for a period to be determined by the IEC at its next session.

b. That the maximum common activity in the day-to-day life and struggles of the American working class should be undertaken during the period of the discussion, with the object of integrating the members of both organizations.

c. The IEC will ensure the democratic character of the discussion and the rights of minorities, but it insists upon minorities acting in a disciplined and responsible manner; the IEC condemns in the strongest manner the split of Comrades Goldman, Williams and others in splitting from the SWP and the ranks of the International to join the WP, and considers that the emulation of their action would result in creating an unfavorable and adverse relation in the question of unification; the IEC calls upon Comrade Morrow and the other members of the minority who have violated the discipline of the party to desist from pursuing this course, which can only hinder the creation of a good atmosphere necessary for the favourable solution to the question of unification.

6. To bring a different atmosphere into the discussions the IEC calls upon all the participants in the discussion to exclude manoeuvres and even the appearance of manoeuvres and will energetically condemn any action which can be construed as manoeuvres.

7. The IEC insists that the WP leadership end its campaign to provoke a split in the ranks of SWP, as is established in the letters of Shachtman to Goldman, which does not show a genuine desire for unity and can only be construed as a hostile act by the members of the SWP and by the whole of the Fourth International.

8. In an attempt to bring about a serious and fruitful unification, the members of the IEC and the IS will participate in the discussion together with the leadership and membership of the SWP and will seek to bring the members of the WP entirely on to the position of the Fourth International.

9. In order to inform all sections of the Fourth International on the basic questions in dispute and the development of the discussion, the IS will publish in an international bulletin the most important contributions of the SWP and WP setting forth the arguments of difference and basis of unification; the IS will follow this up with a further bulletin with articles from members of the two organizations and sections of the Fourth International.

10. At its next session the IEC will review all the developments, political and organizational, in the unification discussion and issue a further directive for the continuation of the discussion or period of its conclusion.

MOTION PRESENTED BY THE FRENCH MINORITY ON THE BASIS
OF THE PROPOSITIONS OF COMRADE J-

(Withdrawn in favor of resolution presented by the RCP delegate)

1. The IEC considers the fusion between the WP and the SWP to be desirable. But it equally considers that its coming about is subordinated to a political agreement on precise points.

2. In order to determine precisely the existing differences between the two parties, the IEC recommends the continuation of the discussion already commenced with a view to political clarification. It equally requests that the practical collaboration envisaged by the Plenum of the SWP in October 1945 become a reality.

3. The IEC undertakes to guarantee that the discussion have a fair and democratic character. It appeals to all not to let any manoeuvres thwart the effort in favor of unity, and, in particular appeals to the minority of the SWP to express its point of view inside the SWP, as also to the leadership of the WP to carry on the desired fusion by ceasing to call on the SWP members to split.

II

RESOLUTION ON THE QUESTION OF THE FRENCH REFERENDUM

The International Executive Committee condemns the "Yes" vote adopted by a majority of the Central Committee of the P.C.I. as a typically opportunist deviation.

The referendum of May 5 did not imply a forced choice between two forms, one more, the other less, reactionary, of the bourgeois state. It was not a question of choosing between a bourgeois monarchy and a bourgeois republic; or between a parliament of two houses and a single assembly. The referendum of May 5 consisted simply in acceptance or refusal of a bourgeois constitution.

The revolutionary party utilizes the period of agitation around the constitutional question in order to put forward democratic and transitional demands, and supports the most democratic provisions against more reactionary proposals. But this does not imply acceptance ever of an entire bourgeois constitution, no matter how democratic it may be. In the case in question, there was not a choice among various constitutional provisions but merely one of rejecting or accepting the constitution as a whole.

To vote "Yes" meant, whether one wanted to or not, to sanction the bourgeois state, capitalist property, national defense and colonial oppression. It is not a matter of tactics but a matter of principle to remain under all circumstances hostile to a bourgeois constitution, whatever it may be. No tactical reason could justify abandonment of this principled position with regard to the bourgeois state.

The tactical reasons invoked for abandoning principles have proved to be, as is always the case, in contradiction with a correct analysis of the actual relationship of forces between the classes. The "Yes" was justified by the existence of an "offensive of the bourgeoisie", at least of a "regrouping with a view to an offensive," by the will of the bourgeoisie to make this referendum a "test of strength," finally by the necessity of setting up in opposition, in these conditions, of a "united front" of the working class.

Now, in France, as in all Europe, the bourgeoisie, far from going over to the offensive, in thinking only of finding the means of damping or curbing the upsurge of the masses. For the whole world capitalist press, the referendum of May 5 and the elections of June 2 have brought the satisfaction only of seeing that the growth of the C.P. has stopped for the time being.

The notion of "regrouping" of the bourgeoisie in the vague form in which it was used to justify the "Yes" brings only confusion. The bourgeoisie has certainly no intention of disappearing without a fight. Since the collapse of the Vichy regime and its combat organizations, the French bourgeoisie has constantly tried to "regroup" its forces. But it has so far not succeeded in constructing anything solid, and the rejection of the constitution of May 5 has nowise helped it. In withdrawing about thirty election lists of the P.R.L. in favor of the

M.R.P. on the eve of the June 2 elections, French capitalism has shown that, in its attempts at regrouping, it still proceeds with caution and hesitation rather than with an aggressive spirit.

The argument concerning the "test of strength" had no justification before the referendum. It was based both on the substitution of parliamentary relations between parties for the general correlation of forces between the classes, and on the mistaken identification of the working class with the big parties betraying it. After the event it literally collapses. Neither the referendum of May 5 nor the election of June 2, wherein the M.R.P. won an electoral success, have caused a rightward swing of the helm by the bourgeoisie on any plane whatsoever. On the contrary, it is afraid of seeing the C.P. go over into opposition. Actually, this so-called "test of strength" from which the proletariat supposedly emerged defeated is followed by a left turn of the C.P. and the C.G.T. on the wage question. A turn, to be sure, made on the eve of the elections, but in order to anticipate the profound will to struggle on the part of the masses who did not see, in the piles of ballots, a defeat of their class.

The idea of an electoral "united front" is in contradiction with all the teachings of Lenin and Trotsky on the united front: to march separately and strike together. The genuine united front, i.e., an agreement for an actual struggle for a definite objective, cannot take the form of a vote in common with reformist parties for a bourgeois constitution with a view to "barring the path to reaction." Under the united front label the most vulgar electoral opportunism manifests itself.

When the revolutionary party proposes voting for the candidates of workers parties, it does not engage in any united front, it is a matter of eliminating obstacles on the path of the political development of the working class; but it does not take any responsibility for the program of the candidates or parties for which it proposes to vote. The decision to vote "Yes" hindered the political development of the workers, by making the revolutionary party endorse the program of class collaboration, of tripartism, which found its most complete expression in the constitution.

When we defend the slogans "For a Workers and Peasants Government," "For an S.P.- C.P. - C.G.T. Government" or "Labour to Power" we do so, not on the basis of the program for which these parties stand but on the contrary, we do so in order to impel the masses to force these parties to apply the program of the workers. In the case of the referendum, voting "Yes" meant to approve the platform of tripartism precisely against which it was necessary to mobilize the masses in the name of an S.P. -C.P. -C.G.T. Government.

The referendum of May 5 was first of all an electoral manoeuver of the bourgeoisie, particularly of its main party at present, the M.R.P. This manoeuver aimed at the following objectives:

- 1: To cast on the workers' parties alone the responsibility of the disastrous results of the three-party policy which was crowned by the constitution;

- 2: To frighten the workers' parties by leaving them with the

working class, on a plane without danger to the bourgeoisie and to force them thus to reveal even more, their opportunism;

3: To leave hanging over the Assembly elected on June 2 the mortgage of the referendum vote, and to obtain concessions from the Socialist and Stalinist candidates-elect;

4: Secondly, for the M.R.P. to protect itself from the P.R.L. on its right.

The result of the referendum of May 5 was a set-back for the workers' parties, but not a defeat for the working class.

By shouting about an offensive by the reaction and by calling on the workers to answer it with ballots, the Socialist and Stalinist parties remained true to their opportunist nature. The decision of the majority of the C.C. of the P.C.I. to vote "Yes" under the pretext of not cutting itself off from the masses, was the expression of a fear of delimiting itself clearly from the big parties and particularly from the Stalinist party, and was only an adaptation to the opportunism of these parties. The policy of these parties tends to strengthen parliamentary illusions among the masses. The "Yes" vote for the constitution, decided on by the C.C., in spite of the statements trying to explain that it was a "Yes" that meant "No" to all the constitution's provisions, has contributed to nurturing parliamentary illusions.

The June 2 elections have pertinently demonstrated that the success won by the P.C.I. was certainly limited by the fear of many sympathizers of "throwing away their votes", of thus "playing into the hands of reaction", which caused them to vote for the Stalinist party.

* * *

The International Executive Committee calls on all members of the Fourth International to study the question of the French referendum and to assimilate its lessons. On the one hand, the numerous elections in recent months in the countries where political processes will exert the greatest influence in Western Europe, permit the studying of them with extreme precision and minuteness. On the other hand, through an episode in the development of the French situation there was revealed the danger a section can face in its transition from a propaganda circle to a party with roots in the masses: The results obtained from stubborn work in clearing the ground with the revolutionary program cannot be maintained and increased by tactics and maneuvers in contradiction with that program. The struggles of the French Bolshevik-Leninists before and during the war and since the "liberation" have resulted in the success of June 2, when 45,000 workers voted for the candidates of the P.C.I. This result gives promise of a great development of the revolutionary party in France, on the primary condition that it holds faithfully to the program of the Fourth International and does not give way to the pressures of those who are themselves the expression of bourgeois pressure in the working class.

The mistake committed in the question of the referendum will serve as a lesson for the Fourth International as a whole and for the French section in particular.

June 1946

Note: On the manner of expressing most clearly our opposition to the bourgeois constitution and the class collaboration policy which produced it, comrades in agreement with the above analysis hold different views, some favoring a "No" vote and others favoring the writing-in on the ballots of the formula "For a Workers and Peasants Government." This is a matter of a secondary tactical difference.

RESOLUTION ON THE FRENCH REFERENDUM--PRESENTED BY THE RCP

DELEGATE

Rejected: For 2 (British, French Minority) - Against 5

1. The IEC supports the main orientation in the editorial article which appeared in "La Verite" of April 26th 1946 under the signature of Jean Marcoux, in which the directive to vote "Yes" in the French referendum on the Constitution was issued by the P.C.I.

2. The IEC rejects the resolution of the minority of the PCI which advocates a boycott of the referendum. It also rejects the position of the IS which advocates a "No" vote as a question of principle. In particular it rejects decisively the characterisation made by the IS of the "Yes" position as "a typical opportunist deviation", insofar as this position is expounded in the aforementioned editorial.

3. The IEC declares that as a general principle, the parties of the Fourth International base themselves on the struggle for soviet forms of state rule -- the dictatorship of the proletariat -- in opposition to the parliamentary republic and any other forms of bourgeois state organisation. At all stages of the class struggle it is our duty to develop and struggle for the proletarian form of state and to seek the overturn of the bourgeois parliamentary state. But soviets arise out of the class struggle at a given stage in history. While advocating and struggling for soviets and the dictatorship of the proletariat, revolutionaries have the duty to base their tactics upon the class struggle, not as we would like it to be, but as it really exists.

4. The IEC considers that the majority of the PCI - as established in the editorial of Marcoux--correctly understood the issues which were at stake in the conflict which arose between the workers' and the bourgeois parties on the question of the Constitution, not the abstract principle, for or against a given bourgeois constitution but the antagonism of interests between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie reflected through the constitutional struggle, and the flow of class forces as the expression of that antagonism.

5. The real issues which were at stake, however, were not whether capitalist property was to be protected by two chambers or only one. That was the form in which the conflict took place. In content it was a showdown between the bourgeois reaction and the workers' parties.

6. The majority of the PCI correctly understood this problem and gave the correct directive to vote "Yes" in the referendum. They did not create illusions in the bourgeois state thereby, but on the contrary, used this opportunity to expose the bourgeois character of the state. They did not create illusions in the mass workers' parties, but on the contrary, used the opportunity to expose the capitulation of these parties to the MRP. At the same time they sought to use the conflict to drive a wedge between the workers' parties and the MRP, and to create a bridge to the workers who support the mass parties. From the standpoint of principle, our French comrades of the majority were on solid ground. From the standpoint of tactics, their insight was superior to that of their critics.

III

RESOLUTION ON THE TACTIC OF THE R.C.P. TOWARD THE
LABOUR PARTY.

The IEC on the basis of a first discussion of the question, believes that the tactic of the RCP toward the Labour Party in Great Britain should be based on the following considerations:

1. With the general election of 1945, the radicalization of the British workers took a great leap forward, opening up a revolutionary perspective for the coming period in that country.

2. In contradistinction to the process of radicalization on the European continent which expressed itself in the main by the growth in influence and power of the Stalinist parties, in England this process took shape in the overwhelming sweep of the masses toward the Labour Party which is based on the trade unions.

3. In the preceding period the RCP correctly put forward the slogan "Break the Coalition - Labour to Power" as the most immediate transitional slogan expressing the needs and desires of the masses in their growing conflict with the capitalist class and its class collaborationist agents at the head of the Labour Party.

4. This slogan was based on recognition of the fact that the direction in which a mass revolutionary development of the British workers would flow, would be the Labour Party in the first instance. Consequently, it implied an orientation of the British Trotskyists toward the Labour Party as the main field of political work, in order to influence this process once it has begun.

5. The trend of developments in Britain, beginning with the July elections and continuing through the municipal elections last November, confirms the correctness of such an orientation and makes it more urgent than ever.

6. In the opinion of the IEC, it is the task of the RCP to direct its main attention toward the radicalized masses following the Labour Party with the aim of aiding them to take further steps

in line with their revolutionary aspirations. This signifies the concrete application of the transitional program of the Fourth International under the conditions of a reformist workers' government in power, viz., the extra-parliamentary mobilization of the masses for the realization of the nationalizations undertaken, without compensation; for workers' control of nationalized industry; for the sliding scale of wages and hours etc... The entire propaganda of the RCP - in the press, among the Labour Party members, in the unions - should be so directed as to pose these transitional demands as tasks for the Labour government to act on. At the same time, these demands should be linked with a presentation of our full revolutionary program.

7. To facilitate organizationally the carrying out of this task, the orientation toward the Labour Party requires in the opinion of the IEC the concentration of the greatest part of the forces of the RCP within the Labour Party itself, with the object of patiently building up an organized Left Wing. The broad class structure of the Labour Party and its decisive victory in the elections have reduced the left wing parties outside of it to relative insignificance, on the one hand. On the other hand, the workers have been reenforced thereby in their belief that their aspirations can and ought to be achieved through this party. Under these conditions it is evident that the masses are most receptive to revolutionary agitation inside the framework of the Labour Party and that efforts in this direction from the outside risk the danger of failure insofar as active intervention in the life and development of the radicalized masses is concerned. But this, precisely, is the task of the revolutionists in combat against the treacherous reformists, centrists and Stalinists.

8. In line with a determined orientation toward the radicalized masses in the Labour Party, the RCP should weigh the practical possibilities of entry into this party. On this basis, it should determine the most propitious time and the necessary measures from the point of view of the preparation of the membership. But, in any case, the RCP should immediately undertake an organized campaign along the lines outlined.

Amendment proposed by -4- (Canada):

9. Total entry can be a complete failure if the party and its leadership are not firmly convinced of its necessity and have not prepared a plan for its execution that is clear to the entire membership. Entry can be achieved successfully only after an ample, democratic discussion which leads to a clear line and a determined course on the part of the whole party. To this end, the IEC proposes to aid in ensuring an amicable and objective discussion, both nationally and internationally, and to review this question again at a future session.

Resolution adopted as amended: For 3 (Belgian, Canada, Secy)
Against: 1 (British)
Abstain: 2 (French majority, Spanish)

Counter-Resolution of the British Delegate.

The IEC having heard the discussion on the British situation and the tactics of the RCP endorses the present policy and tactics of the leadership of the R.C.P.

Rejected: For 1 (British) Against: 5 (Belgian, Spanish)

Canada, French Majority, the Secretary).

RESOLUTION ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF OCCUPATION TROOPS

Held one year after the end of the second world war, the Big Four conference at Paris in May 1946 has again clearly shown the inability of the victors of this war to establish a stable peace and to enable Europe to rise up again from its ruins, to make progress and to live in freedom.

The complexity of the antagonisms between the American and British imperialist interests and the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, as well as the opposition between these interests and the elementary needs of the masses, are such that the victors fear public discussion before world opinion and prefer to engage in the greatest secrecy in sordid deals made arbitrarily and cynically concerning the fate of millions of human beings in ruined Europe and the oppressed colonial countries.

The Paris Conference was not able to solve any of the principal questions concerning the peace treaty with Italy and the other satellite countries nor above all the essential questions of Austria and Germany. Its failure has just brought about the breaking of the Potsdam agreements concluded between the defeat of Germany and that of Japan. More than ever the partitioning of Germany and Austria into zones continues with disastrous results for the workers of all Europe.

At the Paris Conference American diplomacy for the first time undertook a strong offensive against Soviet diplomacy and declared itself ready to call the latter before the United Nations Organization.

If the servants of American imperialism have once again been able to pose as the champions of peace, of the right of self-determination of peoples, etc...despite their policy of looting both in Europe and in the Far East, it is because the spokesmen of the Soviet bureaucracy have been seen not only to abstain from taking positions, even platonically, for the right of free self-determination of peoples, but on the contrary, become the "realistic" defenders of reparations, annexations, of the military occupation of Europe and the imperialist guardianship over the colonial countries and engage in bartering among the claims of the different powers at the expense of the vanquished.

If the champions of Wall Street have been able to brandish the threat of calling on the U.N.O. it is because, the Soviet bureaucracy is in practice unable to win over to its cause, as the foreign policy of the October revolution did, the sympathy of the oppressed masses of the imperialist nations, and the small nations victims of the imperialists.

In this period of tension, in which compromises ensuing from the recent world war are adjusted, the military occupation of spheres of influence in Europe and in the world serves the imperialists and

the Soviet bureaucracy as pledges in their current policy of a trial of strength. Meanwhile, the reactionary effects of this occupation are becoming more and more obvious.

The military occupied countries, already ruined by the war, are growing even more exhausted, crushed under the weight of the occupation costs and of foreign control over their resources and their economy; at the same time the free development of the mass movement is fettered by the reactionary military apparatus of the imperialists and the Soviet bureaucracy.

The continuation of military occupation entails an accentuation of the economic decomposition of Europe and the colonial countries and the strangling of their revolutionary movements.

Moreover, prolonged military occupation results, within the victor countries themselves, in the maintenance of a burdensome and costly military apparatus and permits the building and selection of cadres and troops designed to be used eventually against the workers of those countries.

The maintenance of important military forces, the occupation of territories in Europe and throughout the world, and the holding of millions of Japanese and German workers as prisoners of war, utilized as an extra-cheap labor force, are the direct continuation of the war. Consequently the continuation of the struggle which the Fourth International and its sections have carried on throughout the war for the disintegration of the armed forces of capitalism, for the fraternization of the workers of all countries, "Allied" or "Enemy", in uniform or out of uniform, must find its expression in a struggle against the maintenance of the military apparatus, against military occupation, for the liberation of all prisoners of war, and for the international solidarity of the proletariat.

In this struggle the Fourth International denounces any and all pretexts which cover up this reactionary policy of the imperialists and of the Soviet bureaucracy. In opposition to the machinations of their secret diplomacy, it sets up the slogan of the right to self-determination of the peoples of the European and colonial countries.

The Fourth International demands the withdrawal of all foreign armies, including the Red Army, from all occupied territories. It opposes all annexations, reparations, forced transfers of populations and the detention of millions of German and Japanese workers as prisoners of war, either by the imperialists or by the Soviet bureaucracy. The Fourth International recognizes no other frontiers than those drawn by the culture and freely expressed preferences of the populations concerned.

To the impasse into which the policy of the imperialists and of the Stalinist bureaucracy has led, to the bankruptcy of the peace conference and of the U.N.O. and to the threat of the Third World War, the Fourth International counterposes the revolutionary struggle of the exploited masses of all countries for the triumph of the world socialist revolution and the Federation of the Socialist United States of Europe and of the world.

In demanding the withdrawal of the Red Army from the territories it occupies, the Fourth International nowise abandons its slogan of

unconditional defense of the USSR. The Fourth International, likewise defends the progressive economic measures carried out in the territories occupied by the Red Army. But the defense of the planned state economy of the USSR as well as that of the progressive reforms carried out in Eastern Europe cannot be assured by purely military means, and especially not by the occupation of territories for a strategical purpose. Real defense is based first of all on the free revolutionary activity of the masses which must assure the total victory of the proletarian revolution. The masses of the countries at present must feel absolutely free, without any pressure, to determine their own fate. The occupation of these countries by the Red Army, the burdens imposed upon them, their treatment as defeated countries, can only harm the fundamental interests of the world socialist revolution and dangerously compromise in the eyes of the masses the defense of the USSR against imperialist attacks. Examples in this sense are already numerous (elections in Hungary, Austria, Germany).

Consequently, the unconditional defense of the USSR cannot, in the zone occupied by the Red Army lead to any policy of support even provisional or temporary, with this or that bourgeois or petty bourgeois clique or organization which banks on the bureaucracy, as against bourgeois or petty bourgeois parties which bank on imperialism. It can be applied only by an energetic carrying out of uncompromising class struggle of the proletariat against its own bourgeoisie. That is why the slogan "immediate departure of the occupation troops" and an energetic campaign against the barbarous methods of the bureaucracy are alone capable of rehabilitating the policy of the defense of the USSR by clearly indicating that the defense of the USSR nowise justifies the crimes of Stalin.

Where, however, reactionary movements arise which, with the backing of the imperialists, attempt to overthrow the more or less stultified economy and restore landlordism in order to establish a base for attack against the Soviet Union, we oppose such a movement and fight alongside the Red Army for the defeat of the imperialists and their agents, until the workers in that country are able to stand alone against the bourgeois counter-revolution.

In the application of this general policy, the sections of the Fourth International will emphasize it differently according to the position of their own country.

The British and French sections as well as the American Trotskyists put forward the slogan of the withdrawal of the troops of their own imperialism from all the countries which they occupy (Europe, India, Indonesia etc...for England; Europe and colonies, for France; Europe, Philippines, China etc..for the USA). The Bolshevik-Leninists of the USSR denounce the anti-working class policy of the Stalinist bureaucracy in the occupied countries and demand the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but the sections in the occupied countries will emphasize especially internationalist and revolutionary fraternization with the soldiers of the occupying armies, fraternizations to which they will subordinate the campaign for the withdrawal of these troops. Our comrades in all zones of occupation must present the policy in such a way that it cannot be used against the Soviet Union to the advantage of the imperialists.

Resolution adopted unanimously by the IEC -- June 1946