Encyclopedia of Trotskyism On-Line

—Socialist Workers Party [US] Education for Socialist Bulletins—

Part I. The Antiwar Strategy of the SWP and the YSA

4. A Reply to a Criticism of Our Antiwar Policy By Lew Jones

The following article was written in reply to a criticism of the policies followed by the Young Socialist Alliance in the antiwar movement. The criticism, which was submitted to the YSA preconvention discussion in 1967, was written by Steve Chase, Eloise Linger, John Barzman, and Linda Sheppard. Subsequently Chase, Linger, and Sheppard changed their views and decided that the antiwar strategy adopted by the SWP and YSA was correct. Barzman went on to develop much deeper differences with the YSA and SWP, and eventually left the SWP in 1974.

The criticism, entitled “Minority Antiwar Resolution,” can be found in YSA Discussion Bulletin, Volume 10, No. 7, published in March 1967. The reply by Lew Jones is reprinted from YSA Discussion Bulletin , Volume 10, No. 8. This document has been abridged for publication in this collection, omitting a detailed treatment of events in the antiwar movement in 1966. * * * The Vietnam war’s central importance to world and national politics and our leading role in the antiwar movement make the antiwar discussion and decisions at the coming convention crucial for our work in the next period.

The submission of the minority resolution underscores the importance of the discussion. The YSA is now presented with what the authors contend is an opposing general line for our central arena of activity.

We will first reiterate briefly the general line which has guided our activity in the antiwar movement since its inception and which is embodied in the NEC [National Executive Committee] draft resolution. Second, we will deal with the minority version of the history of the antiwar movement. Third, we will examine the alternative course for our antiwar work implied by the minority resolution.

I. Our Line

From the beginning our attitude toward the antiwar movement has been based on the characteristic which makes it unique compared to past pacifist movements. Classical pacifism opposed war in time of peace, but when war broke out, used its authority to mobilize patriotic support for “this particular war.” That is, classical pacifism always voiced its opposition to war in general but always found an “exceptional reason” for supporting its “own” government after the outbreak of armed conflict. The crime of the pacifist leaders was that they used their authority as advocates of peace, to turn the wholly progressive pacifism of the masses, who are opposed to war, into its chauvinist opposite when war broke out.

The present antiwar movement is distinguished from classical pacifism above all by the fact that it has developed and grown in explicit opposition to the shooting war being waged now against the Vietnamese. This is the first time in American history that such a movement has developed during a war. This fact dictated from the beginning the necessity not only of our participation but a willingness to shoulder leadership responsibility in this movement. It precluded intervening by simply condemning the movement as pacifist and “making the record” as to where we stand.

Proceeding from this premise, and from the knowledge that the movement was made up of conflicting tendencies, we have from the beginning fought for a policy of non-exclusion. Non-exclusion is the basis of our participation in the broad united-front-type coalition that makes up the antiwar movement.

As we interpret the concept of non-exclusion it embodies, not only the principle that no tendency shall be excluded because of nonconformist ideas, views, and opinions, but that we reserve the right, for ourselves—and others—to advance such slogans and demands within the movement that we feel can best advance the struggle in opposition to the war. We do not issue ultimatums to others to accept our views as a condition for joint action in the struggle against the war. Nor do we tolerate such ultimatums from others. We are confident that given a democratic milieu our views will prevail among substantial numbers of young militants and antiwar activists. This basic framework of non-exclusion and a serious attitude toward working out specific agreement for joint action dictates the necessity of arriving, within strictly defined limits, and wherever possible, at decision by consensus. United action would otherwise become impossible, It is within this general concept that we have, from the beginning, advanced and vigorously promoted our central slogan, Bring the Troops Home Now!

Our insistence on a “single issue” antiwar movement has been grossly misunderstood in some quarters. The “single issue” around which the coalition has been built was never intended to be the single slogan of withdrawal of U.S. troops but joint struggle in action to end the war. It is around this issue that the widest possible unity in action has been mobilized against the imperialist war in Vietnam and against the capitalist class that is waging that war.

We never considered, and we do not now view the antiwar movement as a united front of propaganda with a general program. It is a united front of action. Opposition to imperialist war is tested not in words, which come easy, but in deeds, in marches and in periodic mass demonstrations. It was around this axis that we concentrated our efforts to keep the movement from being channeled into class-collaborationist politics, community organizing projects, individual antidraft gimmicks, research projects, etc.

It is this that has characterized our “single issue” approach to the antiwar movement.

Within the broad united-front-type coalition organized around struggle against the war, we have been able to build and maintain to this point a working bloc with the radical pacifists. The bloc has rested upon agreement on the following points: 1) The most important question of the day is opposition to the war, and it is around this issue that the broadest coalition of diverse tendencies can be formed. The movement must be non-exclusive. 2) The movement should engage in mass actions, and not subordinate such actions to the so-called “multi-issue” projects of particular tendencies. 3) The movement’s propaganda should reach out to the labor movement, the civil rights movement, and the G.I.’s. 4) Within the broader coalition, we seek to convince as many as possible to demand immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops. This demand is a concretization of the right of the Vietnamese to self-determination and links up the immediate interests of the G.I.’s in Vietnam with the antiwar sentiment at home.

This is our political line , embodied in resolutions of past conventions and national committee plenums, conferences, articles, and editorials in our press, in pamphlets, brochures, speaking tours, etc. From this general line flows our tasks, as outlined in the NEC draft resolution.

The minority comrades contend that they represent a tendency with a contrary line which they present in the form of a minority resolution for convention decision as a substitute for the line, of the majority. Unfortunately, nowhere in their document is their alleged “line” clearly set forth.

Except for some casual, unsubstantiated “criticisms” in their first few paragraphs, they do not critically examine the line of the NEC draft resolution. Instead, we are presented with an “indictment” of the leadership for being derelict in carrying out the line adopted by previous conventions. Yet, although not explicitly stated, the logic of the views expressed does lead to a contrary political conclusion from which flows their charge of tactical “adaptation,” unwarranted concessions, deviations, etc., etc. [Section II of this document, entitled “A Review of the Last Year,” is omitted from this edition, except for the following:]

The Current Conjuncture

Where does the antiwar movement stand today? Our perspective for it has in good measure been proved correct. The process of reaching out to other sections of society has moved forward, drawing in representatives of both wings of the civil rights movement, a few unions and the conservative peace groups. The addition of James Bevel [of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference] as executive director [of the Spring Mobilization Committee] symbolizes and further aids the process of organizing antiwar sentiment in the ghetto. The addition of Cleveland Robinson, secretary-treasurer of District 65, as a vice-chairman and the formation of labor subcommittees within the Spring Mobilization Committee and local union support on the West Coast indicates the growing labor support and the expanding opportunities in this area.

It took time and constant campaigning by our forces to set the Spring Mobilization in motion. The call, delayed by long political debates, has finally been released containing the demand for withdrawal of U.S. troops and no demand suggesting that the U.S. has the right to negotiate the future of Vietnam. This call is the most militant of any of the previous days of protest.

Around the mobilization a campaign spirit is developing, promising to make April 15 the largest demonstration in the antiwar movement’s history.

The Effects of New Forces

There is a contradiction involved in the entry of labor and civil rights groups into the movement, of course. As organizations from the labor movement and the Negro struggle begin to become involved in the protest movement, they move through their own organizations leaderships, and at their present level of political consciousness. These leaders are for the most part class-collaborationists.

The leaders move toward the movement because 1) they feel antiwar pressure from their own ranks 2) they see a growing radical movement that threatens to go over their heads.

Their entry is welcomed by us, because it signals the beginning of antiwar activity by working class forces. Of course the entry of bureaucrats adds to the specific weight of reformism in the movement and will lead to increased attacks on withdrawal, non-exclusion, and radical influence generally. If such forces do come into the movement in sufficient numbers, it is likely we will have to refight some of the prior battles of the antiwar movement.

In such circumstances our conjunctural role will begin to change. It will tend to shift from one of direct leadership in a relatively small mass movement to one of fighting to build a class-struggle left wing among larger organized masses.

But we do not approach this conjuncture nervously and fearful that we will lose our integrity, talking about “girding” ourselves and “we must fight even if it means merely ‘making the record’” as the minority does. No, we welcome, urge, and actively solicit the entrance of new forces into the antiwar movement, confident that we will not merely “make the record” but will reach out to even more people with our ideas and build a class-struggle left wing.

There is no contradiction between the leading role we are now playing and what may be our role 3-6 months from now. On the contrary, by building the Spring Mobilization we maximize the possibilities and opportunities for our ideas and influence in the future.

There are other factors which will or could influence the development of this contradiction: the 1968 elections, the possibility of negotiations, the escalation of the war, a new revolutionary upsurge in the world, etc. Our job will be to watch the objective developments closely and gauge our tactics realistically to the movement as it develops in order to reach our strategic aims.

The central tenets of the analysis of the antiwar movement in the minority resolution are completely wrong. The movement has not declined. It has continued to grow, reflecting the deepening sentiment against the war in the population, particularly in the labor and civil rights movements. The last year has seen the growth of united fronts of action based on non-exclusion on national, local, and even campus levels. The liberals and pacifists have not taken over, and the movement has not lost its “independent thrust” since March 25-26. Just the opposite is the case. The independence and anti-imperialism of the movement has deepened and will reach its highest point so far on April 15. At this time new forces are beginning to enter the movement which will give increased opportunities to disseminate our ideas to greater numbers of people. Our past activity has prepared the YSA to play such a role, contrary to the position of the minority. Had their approach been followed during the last year we would now be isolated from the present openings.

III. The General Line Of The Minority Resolution

Underneath the tendentious and false charges made against the YSA leadership, the counter-resolution contains an implicit general line which runs counter to the line the YSA has been following for the past two years and which the NEC resolution projects for the next period. This line is nowhere made clear and explicit, but can be deduced from their document.

They state, “Bring the Troops Home Now . . . is the only principled basis of opposition to U.S. imperialist war.” On the same page, they say, “Therefore it is our main task to build an organizational form in the antiwar movement which can adopt this slogan (withdrawal of troops) as its central demand.” And they say, speaking of the Student Mobilization Committee, “In reality this formation is not based on the demand for withdrawal. Again, as in the Spring Mobilization Committee, withdrawal is just one of three demands which are subordinated to the central task of building the mobilization”

(This last statement contains the absurdity that the Student Mobilization Committee is “not based on the demand for withdrawal,” because “end the draft” and “end university complicity” are also slogans the committee supports. This almost defies comment. Are they suggesting that we should not support these two demands? Are these demands in contradiction to the withdrawal demand? The committee, in fact, is based on withdrawal and the other two slogans are good ones which help to build the committee.)

These three quotations, as well as the thrust of their criticisms in general, indicate that they do not understand the essential character of the antiwar movement.

The antiwar movement, by which we mean the whole coalition which has been built up around the single issue of struggle and action against the war, is deeply, profoundly anti-imperialist in character. It is not true that the withdrawal wing is the anti-imperialist wing within the larger movement—the whole movement is anti-imperialist. The test of anti-imperialism in a period of war is action against the imperialist war in Vietnam; this is the concrete test of anti-imperialism in the present period.

This fundamental appraisal of the thrust of the movement against the war has been the basis of our whole approach since the 1965 SDS March on Washington. This is why we are for the broadest possible coalition around action against the war, and why we do not make acceptance of the withdrawal slogan a condition for our participation in and leadership of united actions. From this view of the antiwar movement’s deeply anti-imperialist character, our primary task is not now to “build an organizational form in the antiwar movement which can adopt” the withdrawal slogan. Our primary task is to continue to build mass actions against the war to achieve the greatest unity in action of a continually expanding antiwar movement Yes—the “central task” of the Student Mobilization Committee is to build the April 15 Mobilization!

They say, “By this time [the November, 1966 Cleveland antiwar conference] almost every major opponent had given lip service to the slogan of withdrawal. This position had been clearly adopted by the previous Cleveland conference on its own initiative. Yet our fraction did not even attempt to have this statement reaffirmed officially (emphasis added) by this conference.” That’s right—we decided that rather than register a purely formal victory for verbal radicalism at Cleveland, it was more important to get agreement to launch the next antiwar action and to lay the groundwork to bring the largest possible numbers of people out into the streets against the war.

We had enough support to carry the vote at the conference, but did not have that majority among the antiwar forces we wanted to bring into the April 15 action. We should also note that far from contradicting our line of Bring the Troops Home Now, our tactics beginning in Cleveland have not only helped consolidate the largest action against the imperialist war in Vietnam to date, within which we have complete freedom of action, but for the first time in any national day of protest, the formal call “makes the record,” if you please, for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam.

Throughout their document, they denigrate the concept of the antiwar coalition, belittling our efforts to build the widest possible unity against the war. The Parade Committee is referred to derogatorily as the “catch-all Parade Committee.” We are for “catch-all” committees like the Parade Committee, to organize the widest possible unity in action against the war. We want to build the “catch-all” antiwar movement. We hope it eventually “catches all” of the labor movement and Negro movement.

Following through on their belittling of the united actions against the war, they say: “Furthermore, to confine ourselves to finding activities which divert their attention away from political conflicts, conflicts which would threaten the alliances between us and petty bourgeois organizations, is to throw away the lessons of the revolutionary working class tendency in the united front.” And, “we must fight even if it means merely ‘making the record’ or isolating ourselves from the petty bourgeois organizations we oppose.”

Implicit in this approach and behind this advocacy of verbal radicalism and “making the record” (what record?) lies the concept of reversing the priorities in our antiwar work.

Instead of the primary task being to build the widest possible unity in action against this imperialist war, and fighting for our slogans, demands, ideas, etc., within this framework, they would have us open a fight to make withdrawal the central demand and not “subordinate it to” building mass actions!

This approach could have only one result and effect, whatever the authors subjectively intend. That effect would be to split the movement against the imperialist war in Vietnam.

Implicit in their position is that we begin laying down conditions, making ultimatums—fighting “even if it means merely ‘making the record’ or isolating ourselves.” From this we can only conclude that they want us to demand that the antiwar movement adopt our line and to thereby exclude those who refuse to go along. But this would be the wrong turn at the wrong time. The next “moderate forces” who will come into the antiwar movement are sections of the labor movement and Negro movement! This is just what we want. What we want then is only the right to express our views as a minority within a mass movement, not be standing on the sidelines, safely wrapped up in our purity, smugly content for having “made the record.”

The whole thrust of their line, intended or not, is to jettison a basic plank in our approach—non-exclusion. A fundamental tenet of non-exclusion is that we do not force others to accept withdrawal as a condition of joining the movement, just as we demand to be included in the broader movement against the imperialist war with the right to educate about and advocate the slogan for withdrawal of U.S. troops. The counter-resolution lists a series of truisms everyone agrees with on the united front. “The united front,” they say, “is not a partnership with the reformists but a form of struggle against them. We must not rely on them but mistrust them.” That is true—but the logic of their position leads in the direction of abandoning the point of departure for the application of Leninist concepts within the united front; that point of departure is the united front itself.

Our Bloc with Muste and the Radical Pacifists

On the question of the militant pacifists, they say: “The ‘radical’ pacifists who are sympathetic to the liberation struggles play the role of fence sitters and mediators, but at every critical turn line up with the reformists on the crucial dispute over withdrawal as a central demand, as Muste has done time after time.” (Emphasis added). Again, they see the question of whether the withdrawal slogan is the central demand as the central issue. Not only Muste, but we , the YSA have not forced the withdrawal slogan to be the demand of the massive national actions against the imperialist war in Vietnam because we understood that not everyone agreed with it who could be mobilized in action against the imperialist war, and it is this action against the war which is our central objective. This is the correct, anti-imperialist approach.

They repeat their criticism of the radical pacifists: “It appears that the pacifist leadership in the Spring Mobilization Committee are sympathetic to the Vietnamese revolution and they agree with us on this 1evel. But it must be remembered that they continually waver on the key questions of withdrawal and self-determination, and generally fail to aid us at any critical conjuncture.” (Emphasis in original).

In the first place, this is factually incorrect. If it were true that Muste and Dellinger and the other left wing pacifists fail to side with us at any critical juncture, the movement would not have been able to establish unity on the militant basis that it has. The radical pacifists support the withdrawal demand. Time after time they have sided with us on non-exclusion, withdrawal, broadening the coalition, and the single issue basis of periodic actions against the war.

The latest time was in the Spring Mobilization Committee, when the CP and other class-collaborationist forces on the West Coast succeeded in passing a resolution recommending that the Spring Mobilization drop its withdrawal position in favor of advocacy of negotiations to end the war. The radical pacifists among others blocked with us to kill this move.

Muste and the SWP “Peace Candidate”

Another factual error: they state, “The Newsletter contained an article in May raising the question of peace candidates, but since then contained not a word publicizing or exposing peace candidates—not even on minimal basis of their antiwar platforms being for or against immediate withdrawal. Why not? Because we were to use the Newsletter to form an alliance with Muste who supported peace candidates.”

Muste supported no capitalist party peace candidates. He did support Judy White and Herbert Aptheker—two working class candidates—or does the minority consider White and Aptheker in the same category as capitalist peace candidates? Within the antiwar movement, Muste was the main single force outside of ourselves fighting to prevent the movement from being diverted into support to capitalist peace candidates instead of building mass actions. The whole question of peace candidates was handled by the Newsletter through its fighting for the alternative policy of actions against imperialist war. The Newsletter , as an organ of the antiwar movement, could not present the full Trotskyist analysis of the question. This was done in the Young Socialist and The Militant in articles directly on the question, articles explaining the Judy White campaign, articles explaining our critical support of Aptheker, and articles on our opposition to the petty-bourgeois “peace” candidates. The SWP election campaigns, which we supported, provided us with an important avenue to fight on this question. It was by bringing these campaigns to our coworkers in the antiwar movement that we made some of our biggest gains.

Again, what is the implicit line contained in this position on the radical pacifists? Although they don’t come out and say so, the logic of the minority position is that we should not be in a bloc with the radical pacifists, and we should now break that bloc. This, too, just like their implicit position that we give up non-exclusion is another piece of sectarianism bordering on abstentionism. Without our bloc with the radical pacifists neither the antiwar movement nor our movement would be where it is today. Of course this bloc has its frictions, Of course new events may upset it and maybe sooner than we would prefer. But we are going to hold onto it as long as we can, and won’t lightly break it up in order to “make the record.”

“Making the record” appears to be the essence of revolutionary politics to the minority. What we fear is hidden behind this verbal radicalism is a position that objectively approaches that of PL, Wohlforth, Spartacist, and the other ultralefts. They “make the record”—from A to Z—and have used that as a springboard to launch themselves completely out of the movement. That is the logical extension of the implied “line” in the minority resolution, and the road which we unqualifiedly reject.

The antiwar movement has been the first large movement the YSA has had an opportunity to work deeply in as builders and leaders for a sustained period of time. It is important we approach this movement correctly, by understanding its inherent anti-imperialist character, by understanding and applying the concept of non-exclusion to build the broadest unity in action against the imperialist war, by learning how to present our ideas and build the YSA without losing sight of the tasks of building the antiwar movement itself in struggle against the class enemy. In this movement we are learning valuable, if incomplete, lessons on how to intervene in the working class movements and great class battles to come.

No, our task is not to “make a clean break from the policies of the leadership in the past year” as the minority says. Rather it is to reaffirm the general line we have carried out in the past, affirm our tasks for the future, and deepen our understanding of the class-struggle approach of this line. We must reject the line implicit in the minority resolution—the line of isolating and splitting ourselves off from this movement.

One final point. The general line of the counter-resolution is unclear, and is not spelled out. The authors insist that they have a counter political line to that of the NEC draft resolution, however, since they place their resolution in opposition to that of the NEC. We have discussed the logic of their position, and have demonstrated where it is leading them. Supporters of the counter-resolution should seriously consider whether they actually agree with the political implications of their resolution or whether they are in actual agreement with the political line and tasks of the NEC resolution, with perhaps reservations and criticisms on how that line was carried out.. If that is the case, the principled course for such comrades should be to vote for the line of the NEC resolution, making their criticisms and suggestions concerning implementation.
March 12, 1967