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FINAL AGENDA FOR 1977 I.S. NATIONAL CONVENTION.

Saturday, March 12th to Monday, March 14th at Leland House, 400 Bagley, Detroit.

- SATURDAY**
- 9 to 10-45 Faction Meetings.
 - 11 to 11-15 Convention S.C. Report(Agenda and credentials).
 - 11-15 to 2 resolutions Session 1..Ending the Faction Fight
 - a)expulsion motion(maj)
 - b)ending the fight(psc)
 - 2 to 3-30 Lunch Break.
 - 3-30 to 5-30 resolutions Session 2..Nature of the Period
 - a)economic and political perspectives(maj)
 - b) industrialisation, mass work and priorities(maj)
 - c)amendments to economic perspectives(psc)
 - d)industrial priorities(psc)
 - e)the economy(left)
 - f)industrialisation(left)
 - g)priorities(left)
 - h)Portugal(left)
 - 5-30 to 7-30 Dinner Break and Womens Caucus.
 - 7-30 to 9-30 resolutions Session 3..Sadlowski Campaign and other Mass Work
 - a)keynote motion(maj)
 - b)on evaluation of Sadlowski campaign(maj)
 - c)industrial committee(E.C.)
 - d)labor perspectives(psc)
 - e)teamster work(left)
 - f)public sector work(left)
 - g)strike support work(left)
 - 9-30 to 11-30 Black Caucus.
- SUNDAY**
- 9-30 to 12-30 resolutions Session 4..Policy for Building Workers Combat Org;
 - a)program motion(E.C.)
 - b)role of organisers(organisers)
 - c)internal functioning(psc)
 - d)democratic centralism(left)
 - 12. to 1-30 Lunch and Southern Africa Fraction.
 - 1-30 to 3-45 Industrial Fractions (IBT,UAW,USW,CWA,PO)
 - 4 to 6 resolutions Session 5..Functioning and Organisation of IS
 - a)expanding and developing leadership(maj)
 - b)education and training(maj)
 - c)districts and national organisation(maj)
 - d)politicisation and education(psc)
 - 6 to 8 Dinner Break.

	8 to 10-30 resolutions	<u>Session 6..Election of New Leading Bodies(EC,CC,M</u> a)platform of the EC(E.C.) b)slate for new EC(maj) *c)alternative slate(psc) *d)new EC division of labor(E.C.)
MONDAY	10 to 12 resolutions	<u>Session 7..Womens Perspectives</u> a)keynote motion(maj) b>womens liberation(psc) c>women(lefts)
	12 to 1	Lunch Break
	1 to 3 resolutions	<u>Session 8..Black Perspectives</u> a)keynote motion(maj) b)self-org of oppressed groups(psc) c)black work(lefts)
	3-30 to 5-30	<u>Session 9..Building the I.S.</u> a)keynote motion(E.C.) b)on Workers Power(maj) c)using WP(maj) d)propaganda, agitation and WP(psc) e)students(psc) f)students(lefts) g)relations with "left"(psc) h)youth work(lefts)

* Denotes motion
not yet received.

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NOTES Convention Steering Committee will be Glenn Wolfe (chair), Gay S, Mark L and Joel J. Its first meeting will be on Thurs, March 10th. All business for the convention must first go to the convention SC. Convention Assesments will not be paid by branches on members of the "left" faction. Left faction delegates will receive no travel expenses. No delegation will be seated unless convention Massesment has been paid. All delegates, one alternate from each branch and all NC members (who have speaking rights at convention) will receive expenses. Convention Fees will be paid by everyone who attends convention when they first register. They will be \$5 for employed and \$2 for RT members and unemployed. International Delegates from Canada and Britain will not be allowed to attend as the two organisations in question have ceased to function as fraternal organisations some time ago. Contacts will be allowed to attend the convention as observers at the discretion of branch execs and the RT EC. Contacts who ~~xxxxxx~~ have no knowledge of the faction fight and imminent split should probably not be invited. Contact the National Secretary for further advice. Convention Staff. The national treasurer will be responsible for the assesments and expenses. The assistant to the natsec will deal with problems of accomodation, child-care, fees/registration etc. Sun Distribution will be present to deal with literature.

Glenn Wolfe,
National Secretary,
March 8th, 1977.

CONVENTION RESOLUTION: ORGANIZERS ARE AGENTS OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

Organizers are expected to function as agents of the national organization. This means specifically: they are to implement the policies of the national organization as decided by the Convention, NC, CC and EC and fraction steering committees.

They are to bring the line, or the campaign, into the branch or district life and to make sure it is being carried out creatively, with reference to local conditions and local needs.

They are to provide feedback to the center about problems with the line as well as lessons learned in carrying it out, They are to be responsible for bringing the lessons of other branches, fractions and campaigns into their branch/districts.

They are to play a leadership role in carrying the majority position of the organization even if they disagree with it, and they cannot use their staff positions to pursue an independent political path. This doesn't mean that organizers are not free to express their differences to the center, or indeed even to branch members. But this does not relieve them of the obligation to see the line carried through in practice.

In particular, it is not finally up to an organizer or a branch to decide to opt out of a ~~xxxxx~~ campaign or whatever. This can only be done in consultation and with the agreement of the center.

Organizers are expected to collaborate with the local exec, fraction leaderships, and branch/districts in carrying out ~~xxxxxxx~~ their tasks. Similarly the execs, fractions and branch members are expected to collaborate with the organizer in implementing organization policy and carrying the national line.

Organizers are appointed by the EC in consultation with the local branch/districts.

--Endorsed by: Jack T., Atlanta Organizer
Mike U., NY Organizer
Val D., Detroit Organizer
David L., Gary Organizer
Eric H., Cleveland Organizer
Dennis S., Pittsburg Organizer

POLITICAL SOLUTION CAUCUS RESOLUTION
1977 I.S. CONVENTION

FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE LEFT FACTION (its new organization)

It has been the general rule in the history of revolutionary organizations that, after major splits, particularly those that take the form of expulsions, the resulting groups develop an extremely sectarian attitude and practice towards one another. This is due not only to the mutual hostility and mistrust that arose during the faction fight preceding the split, but as a political consequence of the need to establish, differentiate and justify a separate organizational and political existence for the new group. Both the emerging differences between the groups and the remaining political agreements can act as a spur to sectarian behavior. The new differences do so because they're the new group's badge of a separate identity, but the remaining agreements can do so as well, because they make competition over the same base of potential contacts and recruits that much more intense.

To the degree that this will apply to relations between the I.S. and whatever new organization the L.F. will set up, it will pose severe dangers, at least in the short run, to the maintenance and continued growth of some of our hard-won gains in the working class, specifically among teamsters and steelworkers, but most notably in TDU and UPS.

Some comrades may seek comfort in the expectation that the LF's politics will lead them away from our industrial arenas, or that, in any case, their new organization will not prove viable in the long run. We find this to be small comfort indeed. This is because, as wrong as we have always maintained the LF's political conclusions to be, it is a false and misleading over-simplification to say that they do not desire or intend to try to recruit workers and to intervene in workers' struggles. Further, it is a false consolation to bank on their lack of long-run viability because the history of small left sects demonstrates, if nothing else, the unbelievable tenacity with which small sects hang on to their existence. Though small sects may never grow enough to build anything permanent, they can sure hang around long enough to help destroy, or at least hinder, the development of movement organizations.

In this particular split, we believe that there are some countervailing tendencies which, potentially, may enable us to overcome at least some of the danger of such destructive sectarianism. These are: the fact that both groups still view themselves as operating from the same fundamental political assumptions, belonging to the same international tendency and historical tradition, and the fact that (at least so far) neither group has abandoned the rank & file movement/class struggle unionism/revolutionary party perspective for the U.S. in favor of any sterile "program fetishism" or bureaucratic short cuts. This means that, although our sharp differences on tactics and methods for implementing these perspectives may have convinced enough comrades that, at this point, we could no longer co-exist within the same organization, it may still be possible to develop bases for cooperation and joint work in specific instances in the outside world.

The prospect of TDUs in the midwest and on the west coast being demoralized

Political Solution Caucus

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and perhaps turned away by sectarian battles with our ex-comrades, that the same might happen to worker contacts in Portland and Los Angeles, or steelworkers in Gary makes it imperative that, at this convention, the I.S. for its part commits itself to an approach to future relations with the L.F.'s new organization that might lessen these dangers. We therefore urge the adoption of the following:

1) Although our present differences may, unfortunately, have convinced a majority of I.S. members that we cannot co-exist within the same organization, we reaffirm that we are part of the same revolutionary Marxist historical tradition and of the same international tendency. We share the same fundamental body of political theory, ranging from our commitment to third camp socialism in revolutionary opposition to both capitalist and stalinist social systems, to the development of a revolutionary party through the building of the rank & file workers' movement and including such key approaches as class struggle unionism and self-organization of the oppressed. We wish to maintain fraternal relations with not only the L.F.'s new organization, but with the SWP in Great Britain and the I.S. in Canada as well. We call on all these organizations to state the same. As a matter of fact, it is our hope that developments in the working class and the political growth of our respective organizations will make reunification possible at the earliest possible date.

2) For our part we hereby express our commitment to seek every means to prevent or at least minimize the likelihood of those arenas in which we're both active -- notably IDU and UPSurge -- becoming sectarian battlegrounds between our organizations to the detriment of IDU and UPSurge. Wherever and whenever there is a basis of political agreement we will seek to establish united front relationships with the Left Faction's organization.

3) We will encourage local I.S. branches that are likely to be functioning in the same milieu as the L.F.'s organization (such as Portland and L.A.) to seek united fronts or other forms of cooperation with them.

POLITICAL SOLUTION CAUCUS RESOLUTION
1977 I. S. CONVENTION

ON ENDING THE FACTION FIGHT

We oppose the Majority Caucus motion to expel the Left Faction at this convention. We are convinced that whatever changes individual leaders and members of the Left Faction may have gone through regarding their attitude towards winning the majority to their politics on the one hand, or splitting from the I. S. on the other, it is still worth the effort to attempt to reintegrate as many of the Left Faction's members as possible. What's required is the desire to do so on the part of a majority of comrades, and the confidence that the procedures of democratic centralism will allow us to achieve disciplined unity in action with internal freedom of criticism, so that once again we'll reach a point at which the loyalty of all comrades is beyond doubt. We therefore call for;

- 1) An end to the present faction fight by the convention through a resolution of all issues raised by the Left Faction. We call for an overwhelming reaffirmation of the methods of industrialization, priorities and agitation.
- 2) A cessation of formal discussion of all issues resolved by the convention. The debate may not be continued in any I. S. body (leading committees, branches or fractions). It may, however, be continued in the pages of the Internal Bulletin.
- 3) The disbanding of all present factions and caucuses.
- 4) The election, at this convention, of an Appeals Board which is given authority by the convention to hear and investigate any allegations of: failure to implement convention decisions, incidents of disloyalty to the I. S. , violations of I. S. constitutional provisions, and failure actively to carry out any perspectives for I. S. external work decided on by the organization -- occurring at any time in the post-convention period.
- 5) This Appeals Board further to be given power by the convention to take disciplinary measures it deems appropriate, up to and including expulsion, of any individuals or groups it finds guilty of any of the above-mentioned violations.

We are confident that with the implementation of the above steps, the I. S. will not only be able to avert this tragic and unnecessary split, but will also achieve the means by which to effectively end this faction fight and return to re-building the I. S. internally and building our external work as well.

Resolution on Internal Functioning

Political Solution Caucus

The key to the survival and growth of the IS into a workers' party is the degree to which our membership develops and internalizes, through discussion and debate, the line of the organization and collaborates in implementing the line effectively and flexibly. While this is always true, it is especially so in difficult periods where we do not expect to be leading massive struggles or recruiting masses of workers. The question before us is how to develop political cadre in the IS and how to make the internal functioning of the IS facilitate rather than retard this process. This is the job of the national leadership, first and foremost the EC which must take the lead in coordinating and implementing our national policies, but also the NC (CCM) and the national fraction and commission leaderships. It is also the primary job of local branch execs and organizers.

We reject the ~~na~~ notion that political leadership develops solely through discussion or solely through practice, but rather in the constant interaction between discussion (ie. developing perspectives, strategies, positions, etc.) and practice (ie. carrying out these perspectives in a disciplined manner). No revolutionary organization can survive unless it can critically assess its practice in light of experience so as to correct mistakes. Such assessment itself is impossible unless all comrades understand the need for complete unity in action, despite differences over the line. Otherwise, the line itself cannot be adequately tested. That is why discussion groups can never test their line or even take it seriously. By the same token, however, a revolutionary organization has to be structured, from top to bottom, in a manner designed to facilitate the expression and resolution of political differences as a precondition for disciplined political functioning. Carrying the line without understanding it or knowing what alternatives were rejected, and why, weakens our comrades' ability to argue the line effectively or change the line ~~if~~ if it fails. This retards the development of leadership and results in a passive, depoliticized membership, increasingly susceptible to clique politics or bureaucratic loyalty as a substitute for political clarity.

Despite many NC and EC resolutions to the contrary about the need for politicization, there is still an atmosphere in the IS which discourages and even ridicules the kind of discussion and debate which is a ~~pr~~ precondition for ~~disciplined political functioning~~ ~~disciplined political functioning~~ politicization. Comrades who openly raise differences with the leadership are personally attacked as cranks or are ~~even~~ considered to be "dupes" of other cranks. Opposing positions are characteristically distorted beyond recognition in order to "smash" them, rather than argued against in a political and ~~comradely~~ comradely fashion. Whatever it says, in fact, the leadership deems collaboration ~~impossible~~ impossible when differences arise (eg. removing an EC member from the EC for the last pre-convention period because he supported the convention opposition). Secondary leaders are not adequately consulted in developing policy.

The same fear of debate that leads to the suppression of differences within the leadership, with the effect of politically disabling the rank and file, has created an atmosphere in which individuals, fractions, or branches are discouraged from carrying their doubts and disagreements into the organization. As a result, the leadership has not been getting necessary feedback by which it can deepen and develop our politics and make correctives in our strategy to bring it more in

line with the real world. The experience of the members carrying the line in the class, then politically assessing their work on the basis of that experience and discussing it with the leadership connects the leadership to the working class. When the membership is neither politically prepared for, nor confident about, affecting the leadership, it may ~~passive~~ passively accept leadership directives or shine them on. Before long, the leadership becomes isolated and can no longer lead. Six people cannot think for a whole party. But the EC's exhortations for participation and feedback will remain unanswered, because they are not willing to submit their politics to challenge and debate.

Our tasks require an end to this kind of leadership and in favor of a fully collaborative, working body of comrades who share enough of a common political outlook to work together despite our differences.

To make this possible, we propose the following:

1. An end to the disciplined EC (and CC) as an unacceptable, anti-democratic method of socialist leadership which has contributed to the depoliticization of the IS. We seek a leadership that openly represents important political differences in the organization and insist that it collaborate. Those who cannot collaborate should be removed. It is the job of the EC to organize political discussion in the organization -- including around its own differences -- and then to see to it that the decisions resulting from such discussion are carried out. This is the most efficient as well as democratic means of resolving differences. It assists the members knowing how decisions are arrived at, what alternatives were rejected, and what positions individual leaders take. This makes it possible for the membership and the NC to hold its leaders accountable without having to treat the leadership as a monolithic faction. On the other hand, the notion of a leadership acting as a disciplined faction only encourages the formation of unprincipled anti-leadership factions, to the detriment of the ~~group's~~ group's internal functioning as well as external activity.
2. The EC should collaborate fully with other leadership bodies (ie. the NC, national fraction steering committees, commissions, etc.) to expand leadership. Wherever possible, the EC should encourage this broader leadership to take more initiative in developing perspectives, positions, etc. for their respective bodies, rather than sitting on top of them or ignoring them. Depending on the kind of NC meeting desired, documents can be circulated enough in advance to facilitate branch discussion and input to the NC. Non-EC NC members should be consulted systematically and involved in developing the perspectives to be discussed at the NC. NC meetings should generally be open to members, although some meetings and/or sessions may be closed at the discretion of the NC or EC.
3. We propose an end to the training of organizers as 'the political agents of the EC.' Many branch organizers have failed or faltered because they could not develop collaborative relations with the local Exec or members of their branch. The role of organizer is a dual one-- as a two-way transmission belt from the center to the base and from the base to the center. Instead, organizers have been trained to see their role as mainly a one-way process: to "carry" their Exec and their branch to the line of the EC. This top-down conception handicaps the membership and the leadership because it stifles the feedback and input from the base which the leadership needs in order to evaluate and possibly alter its line. We propose a fully collaborative relationship between the organizers and branch membership and leadership in the car-

rying out of national ~~xx~~ policies. It should be assumed that all members will carry out national directives. At the same time, it should be assumed that it is ^{also} the organizer's responsibility to assist the branch in assessing the line so that corrections can be made. Seeing the role of organizers as disciplined agents of ~~leadership~~ a leadership faction completely undercuts this latter role so essential to developing tactical and strategic flexibility in our work. It further serves to depoliticize the membership.

4. We support the right to form caucuses, factions, etc. inside the IS at any time as a guarantee of the rights of minorities. At the same time, we strongly discourage the formation of factions as a regular feature of IS internal life. The best antidote to the formation of factions is a fully democratic and politically rich internal life. We generally encourage temporary ideological groupings to form in pre-convention periods when such discussion is most appropriate. In the event that such groupings arise at other times, the organization has the right to determine the limits of that discussion in keeping with the IS's activities.

In order to further collaboration and reduce the danger of factionalism, we support the right of minorities to be represented in all leading bodies, including the EC. In general, we advocate such representation as a means of ensuring the collaboration of all sections of the organization in carrying out the majority line and guaranteeing that different points of view are represented in hammering out new policy. Again, we expect leaders with differences to collaborate; if they can't they should be removed.

5. The NC should become a working body, consisting of from 15-17 members, which would meet approximately 6 times a year, though at flexible intervals. It should include at least one person from the East and West Coasts and its non-EC members should be mainly composed of leaders of our fractions and community work.

6. A politically represented Appeals Board should be elected, composed of 3-5 people residing in the Midwest (so it can meet without great difficulty) and should include no more than one member of the EC. This will be the ultimate appeal body for all disciplinary cases between Conventions and NC's.

DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM

LEFT FACTION RESOLUTION

The I.S. affirms the conception of democratic centralism expressed in the slogan, "Unity in action and freedom of discussion." This formula correctly contains no specific organizational prescriptions, rather questions of internal life and organization are subordinate to political tasks.

The current internal practices of the I.S. amount to a bureaucratic distortion of democratic centralism. Centralism is no substitute for politics; building the I.S. is 99 percent inspiration and 1 percent discipline. Accordingly the following changes in I.S. internal functioning must be made.

- 1) The "disciplined" EC established by the '75 convention has resulted in the formation of a leadership faction which stifles democracy in the I.S. and retards the political development of the group. Be it resolved that the EC of the I.S. is no longer "disciplined."
- 2) The description of branch organizers as "agents of the EC" is a matter of controversy in the organization. Be it resolved that branch organizers are loyal to the line of the organization and not to a specific leadership. Branch organizers are "agents" in the same sense that all members are—responsible for carrying the politics and policy of the whole organization.
- 3) The rights of minorities to organize for their views is called in question by the "majority caucus" characterization of the Left Faction as "entrists" and their motion to expell the Left Faction. The existence of temporary ideological groupings is necessary to the development of the politics of the I.S. Be it resolved that political minorities have the right to organize for their differences within the bounds of our political principles expressed in "Where We Stand," including, when appropriate, the right to representation on leading bodies.

LEFT FACTION
RESOLUTIONS ON BLACK WORK

1. Possibilities The Black Liberation Movement of the '60s; the destruction of many of the reforms that it had brought as a result of the depression of the '70s; the effect of Vietnam and Watergate on black consciousness; all these things have created a long-term radicalization among black people. This radicalization does not mean that masses of black people are ready to move, but while white workers have the alternatives of racism and even fascism to look to, in this economic and political crisis, these are not viable alternatives to blacks.

As a result, there remains today numbers of black people open to radical and revolutionary ideas, well above almost any other section of the population. Black people, more than anyone, don't need to be convinced that the system is rotten - they need a political alternative. Today, a few blacks, because of their consciousness are open to take that alternative if it is there for them to take. The failure of black nationalism has meant that many blacks are willing to be in a multi-racial organization.

However, any radical alternatives open to black people must put black liberation at the forefront, if it is to be successful. For a predominantly white organization, this cannot be overstressed. This is not to say that black people are only interested in the black aspect of their oppression, but given the weight that being black puts on you in this country, it is always central. For this reason, it must be equally central to the IS.

2. Workers' Power Our newspaper is our most important tool in relating to black struggles and dealing with black political issues. WP will cover all black issues that arise at work, in the community and in society in general. It will deal with these issues in an ongoing and consistent way. The paper will be aimed at blacks and at whites to win them from racism. The paper will make clear the relationship between socialist politics and black liberation, and will examine racism in all its forms.

3. In The Workplace Our caucuses and groups in industry - in the union or on the shop floor - will be formed on the basis of active anti-racism and will continually take on the questions of racism that arise. Our policy is to bend over backwards to raise issues of racism and black liberation and to organize among white workers for this, as well as among black. We would rather organize a smaller group which includes black liberation at the heart of its program and activity (and therefore relates to concerns of black workers) than to organize a larger group which sidesteps or tokenizes the issue. It is in this way that we can lay the basis for lasting rank and file unity between black and white.

In our existing rank and file groups this fight will be made. It is not enough for a plank of equal treatment for blacks to be included in the TDU program. We fight for TDU to have a special orientation to black workers, whether they are in the freight section of the union, or not. The issues exist everywhere. We will push for continual coverage in rank and file publications for coverage of black issues and racism on the job and in the union.

We argue that racism is the deepest division and open wound in the working class -- it can only be healed by taking it head on. While the specifics of activities against racism and for black liberation are not principles, our basic orientation towards black workers is. We are willing to break with people on this, particularly in the ongoing formations that we participate in.

In situations where we have black members or contacts who are unable to win over white workers to fight for black demands in the short run, we encourage them to organize independently on black issues. We do not just "fold" these groups into broader formations whenever the opportunity presents itself. We refuse to subordinate black liberation to the racism among white workers.

Often there will be workers attracted to us on black community issues well before they see the need in fighting on the shop floor or in the union. We can recruit to the IS with these community issues at the workplace if we raise them consistently. Black workers in particular are often concerned about their community just as much as they are about their job situation, or more so.

4. Community Work While there is no national black movement, there are struggles which come up in every city. These range from black youths being killed by racist cops, to welfare struggles, to fighting evictions, to prison issues to busing. These are usually small and often short lived fights, but they are the active resistance to racism today and we must be involved in them.

IS intervention in such struggles cannot usually be mapped out in advance, or nationally coordinated and prioritized, and they don't need to be. We will do away with the idea that every issue must become a national campaign. IS branches will have flexible local priorities and interventions based on the actual situation in their cities. They will be in a position to investigate any promising activity against racism and attempt to become involved in those.

Local branches will assign particular members to keep on top of our local work with Gary Tyler Defense and organize realistic and political activities around the case, particularly when breaks in the case occur. The issue should be raised in our South Africa work and we should continue to hold meetings of GT supporters where they exist to carry out limited ongoing activity.

In all of our community work, Workers' Power is our key wedge and tool to put forward our politics and to recruit to the IS.

5. Student Work We know from experience that if we have the proper tools at the right time, we can recruit black high school students. We will continue this though more than ever based on our politics and with major emphasis on recruiting to the IS.

There are also black college students who are interested in black liberation and/or socialist politics. Especially where our members go to school, teach, or are on staff, the IS will have a political presence of public meetings, literature tables, etc. to attract black students. When black struggles come up on

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campuses, we will get involved as the IS. We want to appeal to black college students both on the basis of our political ideas and our activities in industry, the community and the campuses. One important way to attract black students to the IS is to become involved in the debate on the black left of "socialist vs. nationalist."

6. Pamphlets The IS will immediately produce a basic pamphlet on black liberation. This will explain our position on black liberation and the struggle for socialism. It will be followed in the future by pamphlets on the particular aspects of black oppression and most importantly by pamphlets coming out of the different black struggles we become involved with. Our branches must learn to do this. It is a basic organizing tool.

LEFT FACTION

RESOLUTION ON PORTUGAL

In Portugal, the right-wing has scored several victories: the attack on agrarian reform, reinstatement of many bosses to their factories, an offensive on the strength of the trade unions, and purges in the armed forces. Yet the working class has not suffered a decisive defeat, and in fact, has rebuffed many of the right-wing's advances. Working class activity is still high.

The C.P. has consolidated its hold over the militant section of the class, both in the trade unions and in the elections, where they've drawn support from both left and right.

Portugal's political future is balanced precariously on its social democratic government, which finds it impossible to take any decisive action without worrying about its imminent collapse. A military coup is a predictable solution.

The biggest tragedy in Portugal has not been the attacks on the working class, but rather the terrible failure of the revolutionary left, in particular the P.R.P., to seize the time and opportunities they've had to grow in size and influence. The much-hailed GDUPS have fallen apart to nothing but a sectarian battlefield, and the popularity of the Otelo campaign has all but disappeared.

LEFT FACTION

LEFT FACTION RESOLUTIONS ON YOUTH WORK

1. Where the Work Stands The achievements of our youth work, through the Red Tide, are in many ways impressive. The Red Tide has led the organization in black recruitment and community work. The RT has been able to develop work around issues like Gary Tyler that relate to young people and bring them around the organization. In short, the RT has demonstrated that young people in small but significant numbers, are open to our ideas.

But the achievements of the RT must not blind us to the real problems of IS youth work today. The problems we see in the RT are directly related to the current perspectives and practice of the IS (for example, voluntarism, triumphalism, substitutionism, lack of politics, etc.). These problems of the IS have been exaggerated in its youth organization. These problems have lead to a situation where the RT is unable to hold its recruits for any real period of time and instead has a revolving door, in and out of the organization, for its membership.

2. Structure and Goals A large part of the problem in our youth work is the unrealistic structure of the RT which boasts as a national organization, but in reality is composed of a few small branches, in the Midwest. Instead of putting time and energy into phoney structures and illusions, the RT branches should be attached to local IS branches and seen as local IS branch units. The separation between the youth work and the IS must be overcome, and the work of the RT branches must be part of the actual work of the IS. This will help deal with implementing the actual goal of our youth work and the RT -- recruitment to the IS. Rather than keeping youth work a separate activity, we want to bring contacts and recruits to the RT around the IS. Our goal in youth work is to make the IS itself a young organization.

3. Youth Involved In Work Young people that join the RT and the IS should carry on work among young people in high schools, the unemployed, etc. Young people will play the central role in bringing around other young people to the organization. However, young RT and IS members should be involved in the overall work of the IS as well, selling and writing for Workers' Power, carrying on s trike support work, contact work with workers, etc. Only in this way will young revolutionaries become fully integrated into the IS.

4. Self-Conception and Political Training The RT is not a replica of the Black Panthers and it should not continue to attempt to seem as if it was. Our work among young people must be based on politics and not false posturing and see-through bravado. The basis for recruitment and integration of members both to RT and IS must be based on our activity - both among young people and the other work described above. We recognize that members will only be held through continual Marxist training in every area which has continued to be neglected in the youth work. We will not hold members based on a frenzied pace of activity. Young people attracted to our ideas and commitment to struggle will be turned off and embittered if their own development is left to chance or ignored altogether. It is the right of every recruit to be given the training in the politics of the organization.

5. Expectations of Members We reject the idea that membership or "cadre" in our organizations is defined by their total lack of activities and interests outside the group. We must set realistic time requirements for membership if we are to recruit and keep youth, and we must encourage our members to maintain other interests and activities. Occasionally a new recruit will want to spend 24 hours a day on the revolution, and we will be very pleased about that, but our primary goal is to keep that member over the long haul.

TEAMSTER WORK

LEFT FACTION RESOLUTION

1. The I.S. recognizes the importance of recruiting to the I.S. out of TDU to both build a socialist current in the Teamsters Union and to ensure the survival and growth of TDU as a politically active rank and file organization. The key to this is developing an I.S. political presence and periphery in the TDU by developing a readership for Workers' Power and other I.S. literature among Teamsters active in TDU. I.S. literature should be pushed more actively by our TDU members as a step in developing more of an I.S. political presence in TDU.

2. The I.S. members of TDU will push for projects and activity geared towards bringing younger, more politically open workers around the TDU. In particular, I.S. members will emphasize projects and activities to bring non-freight workers into TDU and the I.S. periphery. These workers will tend to be younger, with a larger proportion of blacks and latins and women than the mainly older, white male freight workers. The I.S. members in TDU will argue against projects such as pension campaigns being the primary or only focus of TDU, and will also argue for directing the activities of TDU more toward the companies.

3. Because of the large Workers' Power readership among UPS workers, the I.S. will try more direct socialist propaganda and agitational intervention among these workers. This is a change from the main emphasis on just pushing UPS workers to become more involved in the TDU. Workers' Power flyers, agitational leaflets, etc, directed at the problems facing UPS workers should be used where we have large W.P. sales. Special efforts should be made to plan and advertize branch events to appeal to UPS workers.

PUBLIC SECTOR WORK --LEFT FACTION RESOLUTION

1. The 1970's have seen a continual crisis in the public sector. Federal social spending has been cut drastically. New York City, center of world capital, still has a debt of \$1.6 billion. Whatever fat is left on the public system is being rapidly cut away. Labor, and more specifically PUBLIC labor, is paying the cost of the crisis. The response to the crisis by public workers has not been as dramatic as the situation warrants; but strike activity among public workers on the rise. We can expect activity to increase as the contradiction deepens. Workers' demands are increasing while the public crisis means that the capitalists' ability or willingness to pay grows smaller and smaller. The IS must intervene in strikes of public sector workers where possible with Workers' Power and strike support. Our goal in this work must be building the IS - recruitment.

2. The concentration of women and blacks in the public sector is enormous. 60% of all public sector workers are women. 65% of all black workers are employed in the public sector and service industries. We are still a largely white and largely male organization. So long as we focus exclusively on white male workers, the chance of changing this is very slight. The emphasis in our public sector work will be the oppression of women and black workers. A pamphlet on the public crisis and our Workers Power coverage for public sector workers will focus on the issues of racial and sexual oppression.

3. The question of public sector work has been raised in the IS more than once; but always before it has been raised in terms of our industrialization policy. We will not be setting up a "priority" in the public sector. Rather we will intervene politically in the public sector where-ever it is possible. We already have a number of members and contacts working in the public sector. These members will fight around job issues as they arise, participate actively in their unions, and follow up on any opportunities to make contacts for and recruit to the IS. Where possible our members will work in public sector unions: AFSCME, SEIU, AFT, 1199, AFGE, etc., building rank and file groups to fight both in the union and on the shop floor.

4. Where we have members, we should get involved in the Clerical Women's organizations, such as Boston Nine to Five, Cleveland Women Working, Dayton Women Working and Union Wage.

WOMEN'S LIBERATION WORK

LEFT FACTION

1. Among city workers, office workers and other public sector workers, there is a growing consciousness of the oppression of women and how it affects women on the job and in the home. The majority of these women are non white. The IS must get involved in the struggles of these women for they will play a leading role in a future working women's movement. Furthermore, we want to be part of the struggles of public sector workers to recruit more women, and in particular, Black and Latin women

2. IS members should sell Workers Power where there are large concentrations of women workers such as the telephone company, electrical plants, city offices, state offices insurance companies etc. Workers Power will also have to cover politically the capitalist attack on women, the need for women's liberation and socialist - revolutionary feminism.

3. Throughout the next period IS branches should hold public meetings, women's caucus events and educationals designed to reach out to women and to raise the issues of women's liberation, capitalism and the need for socialist revolution in order to build a periphery of women and recruit more women to the IS.

As part of this program, we should seek out the existing women's organizations (BOSTON 9-5, Cleveland Working Women, Dayton Working Women, Union WAGE etc) and also to use Workers Power leaflets as well as Workers Power to relate the issues facing working class women, such as the pregnancy ruling, the Hyde amendment (attacks on abortion) the wage gap, city cuts, cuts in welfare etc. to the capitalist crisis, the employers offensive and the need for socialism.

Our union members and if possible contacts should begin activity around the issue of the Supreme Court ruling on pregnancy benefits. Articles and leaflets should include a strong statement on this, and we should try to raise the issue in union meetings. This kind of activity has potential for reaching those women who want to make a real fight against the capitalist attack on women that goes beyond the lip service paid to women's rights by current union bureaucrats and reformist feminists.

Branches should explore other possibilities for women's work, such as Yvonne Wanrow Ella Ellison defense work, struggles against forced sterilization, etc.

4. Where possible we should have speakers on women's liberation and socialist revolution on college and university campus as a way to recruit women to the IS

5. A pamphlet on the economic attack on women and the need for revolutionary feminism should be written to be an integral part of our campaign to fight the attack on working women.

STRIKE SUPPORT

LEFT FACTION RESOLUTION

Workers who are in motion provide an opportunity for us to relate our ideas to their immediate struggle. It is workers in struggle who are most receptive to our ideas. Our newspaper, written from a workers' point of view and in support of all workers' struggles, is our main tool for intervention on picket lines. It provides a way for us to approach strikers directly with our politics.

Our intervention includes active strike support - boycotts, leaflets, and propaganda with our newspaper - where possible. Many strike situations are nothing more than passive picket lines and in some of these situations we will be able to provide tactical advice to strikers and move them away from relying on their do-nothing union leaders. Through this kind of contact with workers it is possible for us to recruit.

Where we have been able to intervene, in small or significant ways, whether or not we have recruited, we must follow up strike support work. Our activities range from political meetings and consistent newspaper sales to helping start and produce shop newsletters.

STUDENT WORK

LEFT FACTION RESOLUTION

1. The I.S. should recruit students. While at this time there is no student movement, and the I.S. is too small to rebuild it, nevertheless it is possible to recruit students to a revolutionary organization - to integrate them and train them so they can play a role in building a revolutionary organization. The fact that other left groups such as the Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party, the RCP and the OL have student or campus based groups is an indication that the IS today is missing out on a valuable area of recruitment, in particular among Blacks, Latins and women.

2. We want to recruit students to the full revolutionary politics of the IS, in particular that socialism is the self emancipation of the working class. Students will be expected to play a full role in building the IS and recruiting workers to the IS. This means selling the paper at plant gates, offices, mills etc., doing contact work, helping prepare leaflets, talks etc etc.

3. Beginning this fall, each branch should discuss what is possible to do. In particular branches where we have members or contacts at a college and university should arrange regular IS meetings, set up literature tables etc. Each branch will have to decide the specifics depending upon personnel resources the type of school etc. The resources of the organization, speakers, literature should be used for student recruitment.

4. We should stress women's liberation politics and work. There is still a great deal of interest in the politics of women's liberation among students. We should always have speakers on women's liberation and sell our women's liberation literature.

5. Black liberation and in particular the liberation struggle in southern Africa should be a major focus for student recruitment. We should have regular films and talks on the struggle in southern africa, as well as our politics, in particular the role of the working class, permanent revolution etc. Where and if possible we should get involved in, or even initiate southern Africa support groups.

6. Students should also be involved in activities involving workers. The Bloomington branch for example, has been involved in the Coca Cola strike both on and off the campus. In New Haven, I.S. members have been active in the S. P. Stevens boycott and in an organizing drive of campus workers. There will be other issues involving campus and off campus workers, budget cuts affecting students and staff, racist and sexist firings and other actions that we want to be involved in to recruit and build the IS.

7. We should also recruit professors and campus workers.

INDUSTRIALIZATION

LEFT FACTION

1. The IS should abandon its strategy of placing former students into industrial jobs as its road to the working class. While this policy has in the past brought some important benefits to the IS, it has not, in general led to consistent, serious work in the class. On the contrary, our experience is that industrialization leads to a whole host of problems - a tendency towards substitutionism, get rich quick schemes, workerism, middle class impatience. Across the country, middle class revolutionaries of all varieties implant themselves in priority plants. And, they come and go, lasting no more than a few years. The workers, of course, must stay. They have no choice.

2. Industrialization must also be abandoned because it exerts a conservative pull on the organization, while also leading to a tendency to subordinate politics. The physical presence of comrades in industry becomes our primary link to the class. All our initiative becomes based on who is where, rather than on what is actually happening in the class. The work of the industrialized comrades tends to dominate other work, because, regardless of merit, it is the work in the class. At the same time, industrialization leads to the tendency to reduce politics to questions of where to live and work, to positioning oneself. The consequences are second class citizenship and an internal life dominated by moralism and workerist appeals to personal experience. Finally, it is not the pressure of the class, as such, which conservatises the industrialized members. Rather, members entering industry from a foreign social milieu feel self imposed pressures to adapt and become "workers" by adopting superficial aspects of the attitudes and lifestyle of those they work with. They become not workers, but caricatures -- workerists. We might find a worker who is coming around socialist politics to remove the American flag from her/his jacket. Instead, we find our members putting them on.

AGITATION, PROPAGANDA, MASS WORK

LEFT FACTION RESOLUTIONS

1. We are a propaganda group today, but not because we choose to restrict our activities to discussion and propaganda. We call ourselves a propaganda group because it is the best description of our organization and our tasks. First of all it is recognition of the fact that we are very small, that there are few workers in our ranks, and that our influence in the working class is at best marginal. Our ideas, therefore, are very important - they are our strongest point. Our propaganda is the expression of our ideas, it is our means of explaining our revolutionary socialist politics.
2. We are not a discussion group. Even the smallest propaganda group must be active, it must engage in agitation. It must always be prepared to intervene in the struggles of the class. It must be prepared to give a lead whenever it can, either in action or with its ideas. There is no place for a pure propaganda or discussion group today. The only way that we can make our propaganda relevant is through our activity, our agitation, our interventions. We must organize, agitate, and propagandize both from the inside (our workplaces) and from the outside, that is, by supporting the struggles of others.
3. We expect that we will recruit primarily, though not exclusively, with our ideas. Workers, as well as students, will join us when they are convinced not only of the need to fight back today but also of the socialist alternative and the necessity of building a revolutionary socialist organization. Some will join us because of our activity pure and simple, though we expect these to be the exceptions. In general, workers will not join with us because "we are the best fighters." Some may admire our determination, but our weakness, our shortage of real muscle in the class, will be only too apparent to any experienced worker. Workers will join us when they are convinced that they too must join in the task of building for the future, when we do have an organization which does recruit on the basis of its agitation, its fighting capacity--as well as its politics.
4. In spite of the importance of propaganda, we never counterpose our socialist ideas, our full politics, to the actual struggles of the day. We must fight for, and support the fight for, partial and immediate demands. We also support the struggle for democracy in the union. Our general rule is that we are for anything that increases the workers' confidence, that strengthens their organization and capacity to struggle. And there is no victory too small. Nevertheless, we do not subordinate socialist politics and the task of building a revolutionary organization to the immediate tasks and struggles of the day. Our job is to make socialist politics relevant, to show the connections between the partial, fragmented struggles of today, and the need to overthrow and replace the entire capitalist system. We know that workers will be won to socialism only through struggle, but this includes the struggle for ideas.
5. We believe that revolutionaries must strive to be leaders in every sense. In fact, the whole point of building a revolutionary organization is to contribute to the process of developing a working class leadership,

PRIORITIES

LEFT FACTION

1. The IS must reject the strategy of basing itself on work in certain national priorities in the strategic sector - basic industry. There is little consistency in the class struggle - it is uneven, fragmented and sporadic. There is no way of predicting how, when and where struggles will develop. Certainly an organization of 300 cannot expect to chart out the course of the class struggle. A revolutionary organization must be flexible, it must be prepared to take advantage of the real struggles of the working class.

2. The IS must also reject the strategy of work in certain national priorities because these priorities have been a disaster for work among the oppressed. Black and Latin workers are often employed in the least strategic sectors, in the weakest unions, in the unorganized industries and occupations. Women workers are a tiny minority in the priority unions and industries of the IS - even a smaller minority in the priorities within the priorities (e.g. freight within IBT). The priorities of the IS reproduce within our organization the second and third class citizenships of society. The vast majority of workers become deprioritized.

3. The priorities of the IS must be determined by the actual conditions of our work, not by a grand scheme. These means making many considerations, including geographic location, local industry and conditions, the size and composition of the branch etc. There will have to be many local priorities, and most importantly, priorities must be flexible. They must be determined on the basis of successfully building the IS (recruiting) and developing our periphery. Our goal is to build - to build an organization based on industry, including in the present priority industries, but we will not achieve this goal if we maintain the present, narrow, mechanical perspectives and priorities.

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an organized advanced guard that can lead in the fight for socialism. We do not believe, however, that we can today set ourselves the task of leading the whole working class, not that we can today set ourselves the task of leading the whole working class, nor even significant sections of it, even though that is our ultimate goal. Neither do we believe we should pose as an alternative leadership in the unions. We are simply too small, too weak. We do believe, however, that revolutionary socialists, including ourselves, are potentially the best fighters, the best leaders, and a potential alternative leadership, but this is because of our politics. It is because we do not accept the limitations imposed on the struggle by the existence of the present system, including by its courts, its police, and its ideas--the so-called democratic way, the rule of law, etc. All this remains primarily potential today, however, and for us the main thing to remember is that for revolutionaries words must correspond with deeds. We will gain nothing by promising goods we cannot deliver.

6. We believe that socialists must work among the masses, as revolutionaries have always done, but we do not understand this to mean that we do mass work. That is, we do not expect to lead the masses, to have mass credibility, mass influence, except in highly unusual circumstances. We believe that we engage in activity, in agitation, among the many (the masses) to reach the few. We aim at, orient to, a very small number of workers, the radicalized elements who will be willing to join us, in particular the oppressed, the minorities and women. And the youth. We believe there are great dangers in setting our sights too high, in attempting to consistently lead the masses, to consistently do mass agitation, when we have so few forces. Also, this is a period which does not justify such a perspective. This is not the 'thirties, we are still at the beginning of the economic crisis. The dangers are all too clear. First, there is the chance that we will demoralize our members and supporters by setting impossible tasks and promising impossible victories. Second, there is the danger that we will be forced to chase those people who do have mass influence (the trade union leaders, primarily), and, having no forces of our own (and hence the possibility of no real bloc), we will politically adapt and become the servants of the reformists and opportunists - as happened in the Sadlowski work.

7. We are committed to building rank and file organizations, on the shop floor and in the unions. At various times, shop floor work will be more important than union work and vice versa. The two tasks can never be counterposed. However, we are not simply union reformists, and we must remember that the ultimate goal of fighting in the unions is to strengthen the workers for the fight on the shop floor, at the point of production. We must make every factory our fortress, and to do this we must certainly fight to change the unions. We believe it is always necessary to try to link rank and file groups and struggles - including in each particular union (as in Teamsters - TDU), in particular companies (as in UPS/UPSurge), and across union and industrial lines (as we attempted to do with the rank and file coalition at the April 26 (1975) March for Jobs and as the SWP-Britain does in the National Rank and File Organizing Committee). We also support the independent organization of the oppressed, including black caucuses, women's caucuses, etc., and reject the idea that such organization is divisive. It is racism and sexism which in fact divides the class. What we actually do in practice, in any particular situation, will always depend on the actual circumstances and conditions. The path to building a rank and file movement is just as uncharted as the path to

socialism.

8. We must also fight to build permanent rank and file organizations, though there is no mechanical formula for this. And the truth is that permanent rank and file groups will be very few and far between in today's conditions. Struggles will come and go--they will be uneven, sporadic, volatile. Rank and file groups and movements will rise and fall, as they have in the coalfields, in the Teamsters, and elsewhere. Revolutionaries must do everything we can to strengthen the organization of the rank and file, but we cannot expect to impose permanence and consistency on the working class and the class struggle. Revolutionaries are almost always the backbone of any lasting rank and file movement, and today revolutionaries are all too few in the working class. Therefore, we must learn to live with inconsistency--in the level of struggle and the degree of organization in the working class. Most important, we must always emphasize recruitment and building a political periphery. In reality, it is only the revolutionary organization that can provide real consistency, and that can provide the organization with which militants can make it through the ups and downs. It is also only the revolutionary organization that can provide the place to learn the lessons of defeats and victories, and at the same time prepare for the future. This is primarily because of the importance of revolutionary theory in building a workers' movement.

9. We work in the trade unions, and our goal is workers' control of the unions in the same sense that we are for workers' control of production, distribution, etc. We do not stand aloof from the struggles within the unions, and more than we would abstain from fighting for immediate demands in the economic struggle. In particular, we support efforts to democratize the unions, and this must always be an important part of our propaganda. In addition, we actively support even reformists who set out to change the unions--the Chavez's, Miller's, Sadlowski's. This is always clearly critical support, however, and at the same time we support these reformers, we must be actively trying to undercut the illusions that good rank and file militants have in them. And we must openly be attempting to bring people in the direction of our politics, including our analysis of the left, reforming wing of the trade union leadership. We never, however, rely on the reformers, nor do we subordinate the task of building a rank and file movement independent of the trade union bureaucracy. The trade union leadership vacillates between the state, the employers, and the workers. At best, it dreams of reforms, but fears the rank and file struggle which alone could win those reforms. Union leaders also fear losing whatever popular support they have, but they are more afraid of losing their privileges, in relation to the rank and file. Mostly they fear mass struggle, and consequently, in the end, they will always side with the state. This is what Miller and Patrick have done in the United Mineworkers, it is what Sadlowski would have done in the Steel Workers. We must always recognize the contradictory nature of the trade union leadership and be prepared to take advantage. Today, however, we must mainly recognize the dangers for revolutionaries who put themselves at the service of the reformers, whether by staffing a UFW Boycott office, or going to work for Sadlowski. The danger is that, with few or no forces, we will simply become the cogs in someone else's machine, the flies on the back of the ox. There are, in fact, dangers even when revolutionaries have sufficient forces with which to seriously bloc. And we should remember John L. Lewis's famous remark concerning the fact that he used Communist

Party organizers: "Who gets the bird, the hunter or the dog?"

10. Today, the task of socialists is still to attempt to recruit workers, to begin to build a base for ourselves in industry, so that we can take the first steps toward establishing a presence for our socialist ideas in the working class. And how do we do this? In the words of Duncan Hallas of the SWP-Britain: "By serious, active and persistent struggle on those issues that actually concern their the socialists' fellow workers, maintained consistently over time. And these issues will be economic issues, sectional issues; issues of conditions, bonuses, grading, wage rates, and, at one remove, union politics. Which means that these militants--and the organizations of which they are a part--must have clear answers to all sorts of sectional problems, must be able to give a better, more successful lead on concrete, day to day, bread and butter issues, than their non-revolutionary fellows." (ISJ 56)

11. We are a very long way from doing this. Still we believe we can get to that point and beyond, if we begin recruiting workers now, building up our organization, and starting that "serious, active and persistent struggle" in every shop, factory, office, hospital, etc., where we can, where we are. In general, we do not believe this can be done with a policy of industrialization. We do not believe that this policy leads to consistent, serious work. On the contrary, our experience is that instead industrialization leads to a whole host of problems--a tendency towards substitutionism, get-rich-quick schemes, middle class impatience. Across the country, middle class revolutionaries of all varieties implant themselves in priority plants. And they come and go, lasting usually no more than a few years at most. The workers, of course, must stay. They have no choice.

12. We also believe that a revolutionary organization, and in time a genuine revolutionary workers' party, will be built on the actual struggles of the working class itself, on the self-activity of the working class. These struggles will be both large and small, involving the best organized as well as the unorganized. They will be unpredictable. They will not be confined to any strategic sector. We must be prepared to involve ourselves in these struggles, workers and students alike. We must support and build on the struggles of others, with strike support, financial support, political support. We must take the struggles of others and make issues in our own unions, and in our schools. We must put our principle of solidarity into practice. To do this we will have to have a highly flexible organization, one which can respond to the initiatives, to the creativity, and the militancy of the working class. We cannot expect to dictate the forms of struggle. Our newspaper will have to be our chief tool in this work. Outside work, support work, will of course be very difficult. Nevertheless, it can be an important first step toward focussing our attention on the real struggles of the working class.

13. A revolutionary paper is the key to building all our work. It must in fact be our best organizer. It must tie all our work together. It must be our means of explaining the importance of the various sectional, immediate struggles. It must be the expression of our belief that the divisions in the class (racial, sexual, age, craft, industrial, geographic) can and will be overcome. The paper is the key to building our organization. It is the key to building a periphery. This year's readers can be next year's members, but only if the paper is consistently sold, and only if it

carries the whole range of our politics over a period of time. The politics of the paper are especially important in this period, for those workers who are today open to revolutionary politics are often responding just as much to the political crisis as to the economic crisis. The paper can also be an important defense against the dangers of economism and reformism. As Lenin wrote, "For the socialists, the economic struggle serves as the basis for the organization of workers into a revolutionary party, for the strengthening and development of their class struggle against the whole capitalist system. If the economic struggle is taken as something complete in itself, there will be nothing socialist in it." (Works, Vol. 4, p. 367) The paper in itself is not sufficient, of course, but if used it can take all our ideas and policies into our work. It can make the connections between the struggles and conditions of the workers' lives and the struggle for socialism. (Agitation cannot be simply rank and file agitation. The paper, as well as socialist bulletins, newsletters, etc. can begin the process of socialist agitation). The revolutionary socialist paper must be the key to successful propaganda and agitation.

14. Our perspectives for today must begin first of all with where we are. We are small, very small. Our next step is not leading the masses. We must begin to recruit in ones and twos. We must build where we are. We can expect our ideas, however, to be increasingly relevant. There is an economic crisis, which is steadily deepening. U.S. imperialism was defeated in South Vietnam and today it is threatened again in Southern Africa. The workers' movements in many other countries are growing. In Britain, the Socialist Workers' Party has been founded. In this country, the demand for black liberation, for women's liberation has not been relinquished. There are, therefore, real possibilities. The trade union leadership, left, right and center, is no longer able to deliver the goods. The political structures of the nation have hardly ever been so discredited.

15. Our weaknesses must be obvious to all. But these can be overcome. It will take, however, in Cliff's words: "Readiness to learn, readiness to experiment systematically, above all readiness to try and translate the general theories into practical activities - that is what is necessary. In a complex and rapidly changing situation, readiness to move from simple tasks to more difficult ones, above all readiness to overcome one's own mistakes (Lenin, vol. 26, p. 58). The greatest defect of revolutionaries who have been isolated for years from the mass movement, is their inclination to make a virtue out of necessity, and concentrate on theories to the exclusion of practice, forgetting that above all the duty of a revolutionary is to raise theory to the level of practice." (ISJ 36)

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LEFT FACTION RESOLUTION

THE ECONOMY

1. This is a period of economic stagnation. It began in the late '60s, following the post-war boom. This stagnation is the central fact to be considered in gauging our relation to the class struggle. It is not the fluctuations of commercial crises that are central. These fluctuations are imposed on the more extended stagnation.

In the US, the rate of profit has not recovered its 1965 peak. Real wages have stagnated at the 1965 level. Capital investment has been less than it was in the '60s.

The employers' offensive that began with the onset of stagnation--and not with the 1974 recession--will continue. Stimulatory spending by the federal government cannot reverse the tendency to stagnation, whose roots are in the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.

2. Working people have developed heightened class consciousness as a result of the disappointed expectations that the post-war boom generated. The political defeats suffered by the working class in the McCarthy and Cold War periods had led to a very low level of consciousness. This low level was sustained by the boom.

As a result, the relatively higher level is not high enough to produce generalized struggles against the employers' offensive. At this time and for the foreseeable future, militancy will be uneven, rather than generalized. There will, that is, continue to be upsurges in only some industries. Where they will occur will depend on the specific historical conditions in the various industries.

In particular, no more generalized militancy is to be expected due to a possible inflation-recession fluctuation in the coming year. At this point it is not clear that there will even be such a fluctuation.

3. In the coming few years, socialism will be built only slowly within the ranks of the working class.

To take advantage of uneven militancy at this stage in the period of stagnation, socialists need to join in struggles in some of those few places where they will occur. By working with militants in these struggles, we can build working-class membership.

These struggles will not be limited to basic industry. They have already broken out among teachers, hospital workers, and workers in unorganized places. The best places to intervene must not be ignored by a policy limiting intervention to basic industry.

4. Our propaganda must, thus, be built around the idea that in this period of stagnation--which can be expected to continue--the system cannot deliver. Wage struggles, in which we will certainly participate, are now at best defensive actions. To turn defense into offense, it will be necessary to relate all of these struggles to the need for socialist relations of production.

RESOLUTION ON TRADE UNION METHOD

From Political Solution Caucus

IS politics has shown a tendency to drift to the right in the recent steel and auto campaigns. In particular, our politics concerning the labor bureaucracy has been distorted in ~~xxx~~ practice and unclear in theory. Recent attempts by the Majority Caucus to explain our labor work has only increased the confusion, in particular by running together a series of different and distinct questions.

First, What is our attitude to reform struggles like official strikes, which of course are generally led by bureaucrats? This question was settled long ago in the IS. We participate in such struggles and do our best to help them win. We do so with the full expectation that the bureaucrats will systematically fail to take the measures necessary to bring them to a successful conclusion, especially in this period.

Second, What is our attitude toward the election campaigns of "left" or "out" bureaucrats-- campaigns which have neither an adequate program, nor a method which relies on organizing the rank and file. But, which nevertheless offer the potential, if successful of causing a break in the bureaucracy thus making it easier for the ranks to get self-organization and a measure of control. Our position should be critical support. The organization put forward the correct line on the Sadlowski campaign, especially in the Convention Document Critical Support for Sadlowski. However, the organization did not carry out this policy in practice. In particular, it failed to adequately maintain a politically independent position of critical support. This was especially evident on the pages of Workers Power. Our failure to produce an IS pamphlet laying out our political position on the Sadlowski campaign did not help matters.

Third, When do we enter a real bloc with bureaucrats, i.e. a united front around a common program with a shared leadership--albeit a program which sets limited goals and is for a limited time period? In general, this depends on conditions: there are no hard and fast rules. However, our strategy for CGC--where we explicitly sought to build a united front with secondary bureaucrats as a central means of getting the rank and file into motion--was a misapplication of the united front. Our limited base, the lack of motion in the rank and file, and the position of the bureaucrats in auto made this strategy for building CGC an incorrect one. This is our strategy (whether or not it was put into practice at all times) is indicated in the organizations documents, especially the EC's reply to the left faction and the evaluation of CGC.

1. IS and Reform Struggles Led by Bureaucrats

First of all, when we support an official strike, or an analogous struggle, led by bureaucrats, we are not blocking with these bureaucrats. They have made no commitment to us; we have made no commitment to them. As revolutionaries, we believe it is essential to build reform struggles, whether or not led by bureaucrats, because we believe that in struggle workers gain confidence and develop their self-organization. At the same time, they are open to new ideas and new ways of struggling as well, ~~xxxx~~ in other words to our politics. Naturally, we hope, but we do not expect, that bureaucrats will get struggles going; for we believe that such struggles can take on their own logic. Indeed, it may be possible for us to agitate successfully for more effective, more militant and political, forms of carrying on the struggle. The more effective we can make the struggle, the more open workers will be to us and our ideas.

It should go without saying, that we make no bloc with the bureaucrats in these cases, precisely so that we can be entirely free to put forward our politics, our specific ideas for making the struggle more effective and our broader conceptions. Because our strength will generally not be great enough to force the bureaucrats to adopt an acceptable method for carrying on the struggle, we will not be able to bloc with them, and must maintain our freedom. It is by maintaining our political independence that we stand the best chance to intervene materially and politically to carry the struggle forward. For example, we fully support and participate in the Ford strike ~~sk~~ led by Woodcock. But we retain our full freedom. We put forward, and try to organize around, a strategy which has a better chance to win. We explain why Woodcock is certain to sell out, especially by putting the struggle in the broader context of our politics.

Even so, we have to expect that, especially given the weak forces at our command, that bureaucrats will maintain control of the struggles. Therefore, in general, we will not get to demonstrate that in practice we as socialists are best able to carry the fight forward, although this is of course our aim. Our views may sound better, but the workers will not generally ~~see~~ see it as practical to break with the official leadership, or even try to force our suggestions on their ~~and~~ leadership. All the more reason for us to put forward very clearly and forcefully our ideas, in order to win over those who are open to our reasoning. If the struggle develops and the opening presents itself, the workers will help us to show the superiority of our ideas in practice.

2. Critical Support for Sadlowski

In entering Sadlowski's campaign as critical supporters, we were not making a bloc with Sadlowski. We ~~w~~ could not make such a bloc because this would have meant our taking responsibility for his program and method. We could not support his program because, among other things, it was inadequate concerning ENA, which is the key issue today before steelworkers. But much more important, we did not believe that Sadlowski's campaign could be ~~for~~ the way forward for the steelworkers. This is because it failed to take up the indispensable task for any success in fighting the bosses in this period: organizing the rank and file.

We do not believe that the victory of an out bureaucrat can in itself take the ranks forward, even with a good program on paper, because of our analysis of the bureaucracy in this period. First, the privileged position of the bureaucrats leads them to shy away from fights with the bosses, or from mobilizing the rank and file. For either of these could endanger the bureaucrats. The bosses could defeat the union in a fight and thus jeopardize the union and the official. The rank and file could get out of hand.

Moreover, the bureaucrats' tendency to sell out is magnified in periods of crisis and employers' offensive, like this one. Most bureaucrats usually see no choice but to allow the capitalists to restore their profits, so that the workers can then get their share. But even a self-styled socialist who got into office in the manner that Sadlowski did--i.e. without a strong rank and file to control him and back him up--would be in no position to fight. This is because the only way to stand up to the capitalists in this period is through mobilizing the power of the organized rank and file. Sadlowski never tried to build such rank and file organization, so no matter how "left" or "socialist" his rhetoric, he would have had to cave in before the bosses and other bureaucrats.

The proper tactic for Sadlowski, from our point of view, would have been to not run an election campaign, but to organize a rank and file movement in steel--possibly around ENA. Had he gone this route, we might have had the basis for a bloc with him. But of course, he had no intention at all of doing this, so we had no choice but critical support. Support was necessary, because a Sadlowski victory would have provided a more favorable environment for carrying out the indispensable task: organizing the rank and file. But because the campaign did not in itself organize the rank and file, we had to maintain a critical position. We had to put forward the line that the self-organization of the rank and file was the key task, and Sadlowski wasn't doing it

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It should be emphasized that in an election campaign, critical support and maintaining our political independence is particularly crucial, perhaps even more clearly so than during a strike. A strike is a struggle in which workers learn by doing; for the very act of opposing the bosses collectively is consciousness raising, and opens the way for self-organization. Indeed, the whole logic of a struggle against the bosses, like a strike, is on the side of the Left, i.e., us. In order to carry it out successfully, it is usually necessary to go far beyond the point most bureaucrats have any intention of going. This becomes clear to at least some workers and opens the way, perhaps, for us. The more militant and political struggle is almost always the best way to win.

But, in an election campaign run by an out bureaucrat, the dynamic is very often entirely different. Because the focus is on getting the candidate elected above all, the rank and file sees every reason to let the leader decide the methods of the campaign. The fact is, moreover, that the best method to win the campaign is not at all necessarily the method of rank and file organizing, more militancy, better politics. Very often, what is needed by a "left" or "out" bureaucrat to win, is to attract more conservative workers. So, the logic might be to go to the right and to not rock the boat. For this reason, we usually have much less chance than in a strike or a struggle against the employers to do any independent agitation, or to show in action the superiority of our ideas. For this reason, putting across our political position of critical support in our paper and other literature takes on much greater importance: it is by far our best weapon.

The correct position on Sadlowski was summed up in the IS Convention document Critical Support for Sadlowski.

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Our support for Sadlowski is unconditional. That is, we put no conditions on Sadlowski to win our political support. But our support is also critical. That not only means that we frankly state our criticism of Sadlowski's actions, lack of program, or whatever, but also that we put forward our class struggle views. In WP and other IS literature we want to make clear that we do not believe Sadlowski can take on the big steel companies or really turn the USWA into a fighting union because he is fundamentally a supporter of the capitalist system. We want to put forward class struggle union politics in the rank and file steel workers movement.

This line was not carried out in WP or other IS literature. Here in fact we undermined our position of critical support. We put forward Sadlowski's program to fight the companies as if in itself it had any meaning. This contradicted our own position that "we do not believe Sadlowski can take on the big steel companies." On the other hand, it was typical of our coverage that we could go so far as to proclaim, "the enormous changes a Sadlowski victory could lead to inside the union." (WP, 1/24/77, p. 7). This contradicted our official position

that "we do not believe Sadlowski... can turn the UWSA into a fighting union." Most simply, we did not explain our position on the labor bureaucracy. This would have required a full explanation of the connection between Sadlowski's inability either to challenge the capitalists or turn the USW into a fighting union... and his support for the capitalist system. It would have required a constant emphasis on the need for the rank and file to develop its own organization if they were to successfully take on the bosses.

3. The Bloc with Bureaucrats in CGC

Our alliances, and attempted alliances, with bureaucrats in CGC did constitute a bloc: that is, a real united front around a common program and with shared leadership, for limited goals for a limited time (the contract fight). This position, it should be emphasized, is a real bloc--unlike either our entry into struggles led by bureaucrats or our critical support for bureaucrats in an election campaign. For in this bloc with bureaucrats, we do take responsibility for the same program and leadership which they do. So "critical support" in this context makes no sense. For how can we criticize them for their program and their method (as we do in "critical support"), when we, too, have agreed that this program and method represents the "next step" in a particular struggle (which the bureaucrat's program and method in a union election campaign of course does not). However, we have to realize that in entering an alliance with someone on a common program, by the very fact, we give them a certain recognition and legitimacy and, to a degree, our political approval. For after all, they are allying with us around a fight we think is important on what we think is a decent program. For this reason, classically, revolutionaries entered into united fronts when they had relatively strong forces of their own, forces which could be to some extent mount a struggle on their own. The reason for this was that they expected to win people primarily in action. Because they had gone in with a common program and a common method, they could not expose the program and method of the bureaucrats from their independent political position of critical support. They had a much stronger way of exposing them--that is by showing their superiority over the bureaucrats in struggle. This is a much more powerful way to prove your politics than through putting forward an independent political position which you can not expect to be able to put into practice, as is generally the case with critical support. However, it has one major requirement: That you can actually carry the struggle out, to a degree, on your own. If you can't, your alliance makes little sense. For in that case, if the bureaucrats fail to carry through on their common program, you cannot really offer a credible alternative. Your program, again, may sound better, But in fact, it will not appear realistic to the ranks, who will tend to see the bureaucrats, as offering the more realistic strategy because of their power.

In this context, it is useful to remember Trotsky's original formulations for the Third International (1922) concerning the basic conditions for entering a united front. These cannot be simply mechanically applied, but they do point up the problem of method.

...wherever the Communist Party already constitutes a big, organized, political force, but not the decisive magnitude; wherever the party embraces organizationally, let us say, one fourth, one third, or even a larger proportion of the organized proletariat & vanguard, it is confronted with the question of the united front in all its acuteness.

In cases where the Communist Party is still remains an organization of a numerically insignificant minority, the question of its conduct on the mass struggle front does not assume a decisive practical and organizational significance. In such conditions, mass actions remain under the leadership of the old organizations, which by reason of their still powerful traditions continue to play the decisive role.

Similarly the problem of the united front does not arise in countries where... the Communist Party is the sole leading organization of the controlling masses.

The First Five Years of the Communist International
Vol. II, p. 92

Now, the error of the IS in CGC was in its strategy to build CGC, and specifically the rank and file base of CGC, by means of allying with second level bureaucrats. There are conflicting reports about what actually happened. What was wrong, however, was the method, the strategy, explicitly set out in both the EC's response to the Left Faction and in the Evaluation of the Campaign Around the Auto Contract. These documents stated very clearly that central to our whole approach was the notion that we could use the secondary bureaucrats to generate motion in the rank and file. As the EC anti New Course document put it (Special Bulletin No. 4):

Our perspective was to build a broad united front for a good contract... By entering into various united fronts, and even by trying to influence sections of the secondary leadership we were positioning ourselves to become the leadership of the rank and file forces.

One of the main reasons cited for the failure of CGC in the Evaluation of its auto campaign was that

With the exception of the President of the Twinsburg local we failed to get any of the broader forces we mobilized seriously involved in and taking responsibility for CGC.

It can be seen from these statements, that we expected that we would get second level bureaucrats to ally with us and moreover that they would actually mobilize their rank and file. This was central to our plans, and for this reason we saw our failure to get secondary bureaucrats into our united front as the basic reason for the CGC's lack of success.

To base our strategy on the idea that we could get an effective alliance with secondary bureaucrats contradicts our whole analysis of this period. It is a cornerstone of this analysis that we do not expect bureaucrats of any stripe to take up the struggle against the bosses, unless they were forced to do so by the rank and file. On the other hand, because we lacked any sort of base of our own, we had no real basis for seeking out an alliance, even if we could get one with some bureaucrats. Since we systematically should have expected that they would not follow through on the struggle, we could not have expected them to mobilize their base for action. On the other hand, we put them in a position to ~~mix down~~ derail any small motion we might have actually got started on our own; for we could not really offer a ~~conv~~ credible alternative leadership for the movement, given the forces behind us in comparison to those behind the bureaucrats. For the same reason, it was unrealistic to believe that we could rip off their bases; ~~conv~~ especially since these were in fact largely passive.

On the other hand, although we didn't get anything out of the alliance with the bureaucrats, our tendency to try to "use" them may have hurt us. Because we hope to use these allies to move the rank and file, it was logical for us to promote them. This is precisely what we did for Weissman, Oginsky, et al on the pages of WP. We would have found it difficult to tell the rank and file that although these bureaucrats gave formal support for CGC, they could not be counted on to carry through fight because of their bureaucratic positions. To do this, would have undermined our very purpose for allying with them in the first place. Our strategy was harmful therefore because it prevented us from putting forward our politics concerning the labor bureaucracy--its position and its tendencies in this period. Indeed, it has yet to be explained how we allowed to pass without notice the fact that Weissman, our chief bureaucrat ally, undermined the wildcat strike action that occurred in his own local ~~xx~~ at the time of the contract settlement. After this, we even continued to refer to him favorably in our press. This appears to have been the ~~logical~~ logical outcome of our strategy. It was certainly a mistake.

Our strategy with CGC should be contrasted with that of TDC/TDU. Here, we had no conception of using an alliance with bureaucrats to mobilize the rank and file. We went directly to the rank and file: first, with a petition campaign; then with a campaign to get local endorsements; then, with a campaign for national demonstrations, and to be "ready to strike." We realized that our ability to build a fight for a decent contract would depend on our ability to mobilize the rank and file; that we could not get the bureaucrats ~~xxxx~~ to do this for us. The problem was the rank and file's lack of organization and self-confidence. We realized that the rank and file would have to break from their normal dependence on the bureaucrats if they were going to build any sort of real fight. Building self-organization and self-confidence and breaking from the bureaucracy were the opposite sides of the same coin. This is, obviously, not to say that we would have kept bureaucrats out if they wished to join the movement. We will have to learn to deal with bureaucrats jumping on the bandwagon, if we have further success in TDU. But this is a different thing from saying that we are looking for alliances with bureaucrats as a strategy to go forward in this period.

We have to realize that there are no substitutes and no shortcuts to rank and file organization. In some instances, we will have to realize that our intervention cannot be on a large scale, because we simply do not have the support. So, in our Post Office campaign, because we did not have supporters, we had to come from the outside as ISers with an IS pamphlet to get our first rank and file contacts. On ~~this basis~~ the basis of those we attracted in this way, we went on to form rank and file groups around the contract. We did not really succeed in getting a movement going, but we did get more recruitment and in some places the basis for ongoing organization. ~~Gx~~ In CGC, we appear to ~~not~~ have gotten neither of these things.

Summary

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1. We participate in reform struggles led by bureaucrats and do our best to help them win. We do so with the full expectation that the bureaucrats will systematically fail to take the measures necessary to ~~make~~ make them successful. They will not fight for a decent program. They will not organize the ranks to fight in the manner necessary to win. Therefore, in such struggles, we maintain our full political independence. It is our goal to intervene agitationaly and with our ideas to make the struggle more successful. We do this, while raising our broader ~~poli~~ politics to explain to the rank and file the viewpoint from which we are putting forward our ideas to improve the struggle. In particular, why we expect that the bureaucrat leaders will not carry ~~th~~ through on the fight.

2. We give critical support to campaigns by out bureaucrats or left bureaucrats which promise to cause a break in the bureaucracy. We do so for one main reason: a victory will provide a better environment to carry out the essential task, i.e. organizing the rank and file. But because we do not see electoral campaigns as the way forward--as the way to get the rank and file organized--we do not bloc with bureaucrats in such struggles. We cannot support their program. More important, we have to maintain our freedom to explain to the rank and file that even an election victory will not take them forward, unless they ~~xxx~~ use this opening to get themselves organized. This is because the bureaucrat, because of his position, will not organize the rank and file. Yet, a strong, well-organized rank and file is the only weapon which can successfully take on the bosses in this period.

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3. United fronts with bureaucrats--ie. struggles with a common program in which will generally take some leadership responsibility in alliance with bureaucrats ~~(agreement)~~--will not generally be a desirable strategy for organizing struggles in this period. We will generally not as yet have ~~the~~ the forces to use the bureaucrat, and prevent being used by them. Nor is the rank and file struggle yet at a level to ~~pose~~ pose an obvious threat to the bureaucrats control, and thus to provide us with a large enough room to maneuver. On the other hand, making blocs with bureaucrats in this period will tend to undercut our ability to fight for our political position in the trade unions.