Shachtman - Marxist Politics or Unprincipled Combinationism?

Letter by Glotzer to International Secretariat

20 November 1935

Written: 20 November 1935
Source: Prometheus Research Library, Prometheus Research Series No. 5, New York, 2000
Transcription/Markup/Proofing: John Heckman.
Public Domain: Encyclopedia of Trotskyism On-Line 2006/Prometheus Research Library. You can freely copy, display and otherwise distribute this work. Please credit the Marxists Internet Archive & Prometheus Research Library as your source, include the url to this work, and note the transcribers & editors above.

Chicago, Ill.

Dear Comrades:

My attention was drawn to a letter written by Comrade Cannon to the I.S. which appeared in the September Internal Bulletin, which letter purports to deal with the internal situation in the American party. I am compelled to write, not only because of the association of my name with that of Comrade Weber (which association I readily acknowledge), but more so because the letter of Comrade Cannon misrepresented the entire situation and falsely stated the disputes insofar as the Muste group and the Weber group are concerned. An additional reason for this letter is the fact that the communication of Cannon, which he says was purely private (even so, its contents are not justifiable) became a public matter.

The obvious impression which it aimed to create by the letter is: The American party has four groups, one is an “orthodox” ICL group (Cannon-Shachtman); the other three (Muste, Weber and Oehler) are in union as an anti-Trotskyist and anti-ICL bloc. Had the Cannon letter concerned itself with the Oehler group, such a characterization would have been justified. But the creation of an amalgam of the three groups becomes a fiction, invented out of the whole cloth. In order to set the facts aright, it is necessary to state as briefly as possible what were the relations of the groups prior to the October Plenum. I amplify these remarks with copies of the letters sent to LD. The contents of this letter will be further strengthened and confirmed by the communications from the New York comrades.

1. The June Plenum of our party observed four groups in existence. The party prior to the June Plenum had experienced a heated internal dispute with the Oehler group. The political motives behind this dispute lay in Oehler’s persistent opposition to the French turn, and its international aspects. His group endeavored, in spite of the fact that the party had only just become organized and had not entered into a discussion period, to organize the party against the views of LD, the ICL and the French organization. He attempted to do that, naturally, on the basis of winning political support to his point of view.

It is necessary to bear in mind at all times that our party is the result of a fusion with the AWP. That section of the party had no real acquaintance with the French turn, the activities and policies of the ICL. The Oehler agitation was gaining ground simply because there was no counteracting influence in the party to this agitation. The Cannon group proceeded on the notion that it could solve the problem of the Oehler group without a necessary and thorough-going political discussion with the aim of the complete clarification of the party organization. It proceeded on the assumption that the way to liquidate the problem was simply through the medium of the expulsion of the Oehler group. That is the course it pursued. They sought to expel the Oehler group at the June 1935 Plenum of the party—that is, at a time when the party had not discussed a single issue in dispute, at a time when a section of the party (the Muste group) was almost unaware of the political issues involved. Such a course would not and could not have clarified the political differences, would have (as was indicated at the June Plenum) alienated the Musteites, and permitted the exit of the Oehler group with about 200 followers (the support he claimed prior to the discussion in the party).

The Muste group was, I dare say, somewhat bewildered by the events in the party. The Cannon group—with the position that the party could not then entertain political discussions, but must do practical work! (as if such a separation is feasible or conducive to the healthy life of the party)—proceeded to put it into practice by failing to discuss the burning international questions. The March Plenum took up the International question thru the “intervention” of LD in the form of a private letter to Cannon suggesting that the WP enter into fraternal relations with the ICL. There was no difficulty on this score. The former AWP members on the NC readily accepted the proposal and belied the fear of the Cannon group that we must not move too fast! (as if the question of speed was involved) since the Musteites would not be assimilated quickly. Between March and June, again a period of no action, no discussion, etc. on international questions, except in the bad form that it was raised by the Oehler group. The arrival of the Open Letter compelled the leadership to concern itself once more with the International question.

At the June Plenum, three questions presented themselves on the above. The Cannon resolution called for unequivocal support of the Open Letter. This position supported and thereby enabled it to obtain a majority in the plenum. The Muste group, while supporting the Open Letter, as a result of their incomplete knowledge of the situation and the confusion created by the Oehler group, took a position which involved some delay in the publication of the Open Letter (they wished to seek more signatures, etc.). The Oehler group introduced a resolution denouncing the ICL, the French turn, etc., making such proposals as would render the Open Letter impossible. Our group took one step further than Cannon. We foresaw that the party would have to concern itself with the issues in dispute, that it would be necessary for it to discuss the French turn, the other international questions and the issue of the Fourth International in order to put an end to the agitation of the Oehlerites and to render a decisive political defeat to that group. While supporting the Cannon resolution, we introduced a supplementary statement (signed by Weber, Satir and Glotzer) which dealt specifically with the French turn and called for its support by the party (more evidence of an anti-ICL position!!). In presenting this statement we declared it our intention to begin the discussion on the political differences existing on the international questions and the aim to win the party to the support of the ICL. What should have the Cannon group done? It should have declared its support of our declaration. Instead it turned its heaviest attack on us. We could not accept their support of the ICL as being of the best kind, nor sufficient by any stretch of the imagination. Their arguments: the Weber group could not support the Cannon group, the Weber group had to present its own statement, the Weber group was a clique! And for what? Because we declared it necessary for the party to record itself on the disputed questions and because we declared it necessary for the party to support the ICL and the French turn, and proceeded to outline the reasons why. We had an additional reason for issuing that statement: to attempt to put the real issues before the Musteites in order to counteract the Oehler agitation. The Cannon group, instead of joining with us in this endeavor, turned around and attacked us for it.

A brief word on “history.” The Cannon letter declared falsely that the Weber group formed a sort of opposition to the fusion. The Weber group constituted itself only immediately before the CLA convention (November 1934) and at the convention. It is also stated that the Weber group made a bloc with the Oehler group at that time. The bloc consisted in this: Oehler’s agreement to vote for Weber as a member of the National Committee and the rights of all viewpoints to be represented on the NC. It was revealed in the discussions at the CLA convention that the Cannon group had proposed a bloc to Oehler in order to fight the Weber group, with whom they were in supposed political agreement. The tone to our relations with the Cannon group was set by Shachtman, then a new spokesman for the Cannon group, who in his closing remarks at the convention stated: We can collaborate with the Oehler group but we cannot collaborate with the Weber group!

2. Then followed the question of orientation to the Socialist Party in America. We had sufficient basis to believe that the Cannon group had the perspective of the WP entering the SPUSA. They made no effort to clarify their own position. Their previous actions, their speeches and private conversations only confirmed this belief. The resolution introduced by them, coupled with their former actions, only made their position all the more ambiguous. And it was necessary, particularly because of the agitation of the Oehler group to the effect that Cannon was preparing the WP for entrance into the SP because he supported the French turn, to speak out clearly. For the Oehlerites, anyone who supported the French turn must inevitably end up in the SP. The Cannon group would not budge from its position and we presented our own resolution. It was brief and to the point. It rejected an SP orientation and declared for the independent existence of the WP, the organization of the party work under this conception, and similarly, the organization of effective work in the SP. Muste likewise had his own resolutions, and the Oehler group had their own sectarian position. No resolution carried. The question was not settled at the plenum nor was clarification obtained in this meeting of the NC.

3. And finally the question of the internal situation. Here was revealed the whole approach of the Cannon group to the deep political disputes. As I already stated above, the Cannon group sought to settle these differences simply by the expulsion of the Oehler group. That course—the method of organizational liquidation of political disputes prior to discussion and clarification—was rejected. The party was on the border of split at the plenum. We rejected organizational measures against the Oehler group in order to prevent him from raising the cry of “bureaucratic persecution” prior to a discussion, and in order to begin the political discussions without the stigma of such organizational measures, so that the discussion could proceed freely without any taint. We felt certain that a discussion would decimate the ranks of the Oehlerites and had nothing to fear from such a discussion. We felt that it was necessary to win the party ideologically. That is why we rejected the Cannon course, which would have meant without a doubt a split in the party. The Muste group supported our position and Muste himself adduced evidence, in the form of a letter from Cannon, that their intention was to expel Oehler at the June Plenum and to settle the disputes in that manner.

4. From all of this, briefly as I have stated the facts as they were, Cannon deduces his bloc! And what really happened? Between the June and October Plenums the party entered a protracted period of discussion. The Oehler group, as we forecasted, suffered blow after blow in the discussion. They lost heavily. In the meantime our group, instead of trying to build a large faction, deemed it more important to win the leadership of the former AWP to our point of view on the French turn. While the Cannon group was charging up and down the party [that there was] an anti-Trotskyist bloc of Muste-Weber-Oehler (a dishonest method as it was sure to drive Muste to Oehler, if it were not for our intervention), we carried on discussions with Muste and his comrades. The result? We succeeded in arriving at agreement on all the political questions facing the party, destroying the possibility of any bloc between the Muste and the Oehler groups, and thereby winning a most important section of the party to the French turn. That accomplished, a joint statement was drawn up in support of the French turn, signed by Muste, Weber, Johnson, Lore, Satir, Gould and Glotzer (and supported by McKinney with a statement). We presented this statement to the PC in response to its invitation that all resolutions be prepared and presented to the PC. It became the first document for the October Plenum and settled finally the questions: what would the Muste group do.

In the meantime the friendly advice of LD helped considerably to liquidate, at least for the October Plenum, any SP orientation; to solve the internal relations among all anti-Oehlerites in the party, so that they might collaborate in the fight against the latter. What made it possible that the three groups could collaborate at the October Plenum was agreement on the International question, agreement on the party-building resolution, the war question and finally the internal situation.

When presented with our French turn resolution, Cannon signified his intention of supporting it. For the October Plenum, his group drew up another resolution on the International question dealing with the contact commission, etc. We agreed with it. Cannon was ready to make our French turn resolution the document of the majority of the PC. At the plenum, however, they could not find it possible to vote for our resolution and instead introduced a substitute, making it basic material for another resolution to be more comprehensive and to deal with Belgium, Spain, Chile, etc. We regarded their refusal to vote for our French turn resolution as an example of their factional pride and nothing else. Having come to agreement on the party-building resolution and the war question we were able to confront the Oehler group with a politically united plenum against their point of view and thus be able to demand of them to cease breaking party discipline, to accept the decisions of the plenum, to refrain from taking the party disputes outside of the party; if not, then they were liable for expulsion.

Following the October Plenum, the Oehler group, already proceeding on the basis that it could not remain in the party, began to sell its illegal bulletins publicly from the newsstands, attacked the party at its mass meetings and finally arranged its own mass meetings. The break with them is now consummated. They have at the most 75 members nationally, adult and youth. They are losing support daily.

5. In view of what transpired how is it possible to reconcile events to the Cannon letter? There was never a bloc between us and Oehler. Our existence was based on our profound differences with the Cannon group and with all others. We fought for a point of view in the party, and I think very successfully. Now the party has reached a concord on the main political questions which were disputed up until October. It is possible to unite the party for work. If what the Cannon letter stated [were true]—that Muste was moving toward the conservative elements and turned his back toward his left development; that we were a clique of an unprincipled kind, in a bloc with the anti-Trotskyists—the achievements of the October Plenum would never have been possible. The Cannon letter was a lie from beginning to end. It misrepresented the facts of our party. It tried to create an amalgam—a practice which is very shoddy and should be left to its inventors. And now the letter is torn to shreds by the events.

An example of what I mean. The letter states or insinuates that the Oehlerites gained strength in the Spartacus Youth organization because of the role of Comrade Nathan Gould, National Secretary of the Spartacus Youth League, who is a member of our group. First of all, Comrade Gould was on a three-month national tour, initiated shortly after the outbreak of the struggle in New York. Up until the time Gould left on his tour, not only was the SYL experiencing very good growth, but the Oehlerites’ following could be counted on one hand. At that time Gould was even successful in breaking Comrade Streeter (the only NC member of the SYL who supported Oehler) from supporting the Oehler group in the party. Streeter returned to the Oehler fold only after Gould left for his tour.

Following the June Plenum, Gould fell ill, was in an auto accident together with other plenum delegates and spent a good portion of time in the hospital. During his long absence the Cannonite representatives among the young were in charge and during that period the Oehlerites made their gains in the youth organization in New York. Only when Gould returned to his post did that trend cease. It is generally acknowledged too that during his absence from the Center the SYL work seriously declined and again experienced progress and growth upon his return.

We might further point out that recently Gould was sent by the Secretariat of the Workers Party to Chicago to combat the Oehlerites (this was on the eve of their split from the WP). Gould was most instrumental in reducing the Oehlerite following in the SYL there to four.

In passing I may mention that the party representative to the Youth during all this time was Comrade Shachtman. Is it too much to suggest that he was in a position to check Oehlerist tendencies in the Youth, but quite obviously did not?

What now? That remains to be seen. The October Plenum liquidated the Oehler group. On the basis of the agreements arrived at in New York, it should be possible to unite the party so that it may be able to carry out its mountainous tasks. On our part, we intend to do everything possible to help the party accomplish the above. I shall endeavor to keep you informed from time to time as to developments in this country.

Albert Glotzer