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Draft Resolution on the Indochinese Revolution for the Eleventh World Congress

Submitted by Aubin, Duret, Roman, and Walter

The draft resolution for the Eleventh World Congress on the Indochinese revolution was submitted by four comrades (Aubin, Duret, Roman, and Walter) to the October meeting of the United Secretariat. It was approved by a majority vote at the November United Secretariat meeting.

This draft will have to be amended later to bring it up to date, in particular as regards the situation created in Thailand after the coup d'état of October 6, 1976, and the impact of these events on the region. It will also have to be revised in accordance with the gathering of factual information still lacking and new analytical data. This concerns especially the Cambodian situation, the policy and nature of the Angkar, and so on. In regard to this matter, we are limited today to making "working hypotheses" rather than finished analyses. Finally, certain questions should be incorporated into the document, such as a study of the main lines of the "transitional economy" in Vietnam, as well as the policy of the Workers party of Vietnam in this area.

* * *

The vote at the November United Secretariat:

For: Aubin, Claudio, Domingo, Duret, Fourier, Frej, Georges, Jones, Otto, Roman, Rudi, Verjeat, Walter.

Against: Adair, Galois, Johnson.

* * *

1. The victory of the Indochinese revolution is one of the major events of the past two decades. Thirty years of unyielding and virtually uninterrupted battle by the Vietnamese people against the imperialist intervention enabled them not only to free themselves from colonial and neocolonial dependence, but also to bring down the regime of the large landlords, of the urban and rural bourgeoisie. The two Indochinese wars saw the extension of the ongoing revolutionary process in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and then the nearly simultaneous victory of a triple revolution. But the impact of this combined victory of the year 1975 extends well beyond the borders of former French Indochina. It contributes to favorably modifying the international relationship of class forces, aggravates the crisis of political leadership of the imperialist world, and unbalances the previous system of neocolonial domination in East Asia. The Indochinese victory is a great revolutionary event from the standpoint of both the interests of the Laotian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese masses and those of the workers of the entire world. The lessons of this victory are of the greatest import for all those struggling for the success of the world socialist revolution.

I. Class Content of the National Liberation of Vietnam and of the Indochinese Revolution

2. Western propaganda has tried to explain the imperialist defeat in Indochina exclusively by the evolution of the relationship of military forces due to the American "disengagement" and the increase in Soviet aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Similarly, in the past this propaganda tried to justify the U.S. intervention by denouncing alleged "North Vietnamese aggression" against the South. The conditions under which the victory of the revolutionary forces occurred refute such claims: *on the contrary, they sum up the characteristics of the movement of national liberation and social revolution that triumphed in April 1975.*

The successive American governments sought to break the back of the Indochinese revolution *militarily*. They failed, despite the unprecedented intensity of the force concentrated against a population of less than 60 million. The capacity of military resistance to the aggression was an indispensable prerequisite for the success of the revolution. Without this *prolonged* military resistance, the revolutionary forces would have been stamped out in a lasting manner, the Vietnamese revolution would have been unable to assert itself as an international question and thus compel aid from the bureaucratized workers states, and the prosecution of the war in Indochina would not have politically undermined the French government during the 1950s nor permitted the decisive development of the antiwar movement in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. This mass resistance physically and morally broke the back of the expeditionary corps of 550,000 GIs that Washington sent to Vietnam beginning in 1965. In each of the three countries of Indochina the liberation armies won battles that were decisive for the evolution of the conflict. The imperialist military escalation can be understood in no other way: each new stage of the war was rendered necessary for Washington by its failure to achieve the objectives of the preceding stage. The genuine reinforcement of the military potential of the DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) aided in the ultimate demoralization of the counterrevolutionary forces.

But American imperialism was never *militarily* defeated in the real sense of the term. *Overall* U.S. military power was not destroyed, nor even whittled down from the technical and quantitative standpoints. The Pentagon comes out of this war better armed than ever. U.S. imperialism's rear bases in the United States, Thailand, the Pacific islands, and the Seventh Fleet remained out of the range of the revolutionary armies. The peoples of Indochina never possessed the military means, which the USSR nevertheless did possess, to put an end to the terrible U.S. escalation by barring the Indochinese skies and coasts to U.S. imperialism's air force and fleet. To the very end the United States and the Saigon puppet army enjoyed control of the air and sea space. From the strictly military point of view, the imperialist escalation could have continued beyond 1973 and the liberation army would not have commanded the resources with which to

liberate Saigon and the major coastal cities of South Vietnam. *The indispensable prerequisite for the victory was the moral, political, and social collapse of the Thieu regime and the political paralysis, or at least relative paralysis, of U.S. imperialism. In this sense, the victory was political and social more than military.*

The American-puppet rout in South Vietnam in 1975 is exemplary in this regard. On the eve of their disintegration, the neocolonial military and paramilitary forces still commanded well over a million men. American "aid" remained considerable. The regime was nonetheless swept away without great battles. The revolutionary forces penetrated the capital of South Vietnam without having to make use of their military potential, which was then quite large. The sudden collapse of the formidable puppet military apparatus was a social phenomenon, a product of the contradictions of the Thieu regime and the political action of the revolutionary forces as much as of the combat capacity of the National Liberation Front. It is from this point that one must begin in order to understand the reasons for and significance of the 1975 victory in Indochina.

3. The bulk of the resistance was *rural, based in the villages*. For the fighter in the liberation army, the stakes of the war were both possession of the land and conquest of national independence. Even during the first, French Indochina war, the call for radical agrarian reform was the precondition for the popular rising that allowed for the military offensives of 1953-54 and the victory at Dien Bien Phu. The second Indochina war began largely in the form of a *social conflict* in the countryside, with the villagers rejecting the overturning of the agrarian reform that had been enacted by the Vietminh. The Diem regime was perceived as simultaneously neocolonial (in particular because of its rejection, under U.S. aegis, of the elections that had been scheduled for 1956), dictatorial (because of its bloody repression against resistance veterans), and as the agent of the big landlords, whose power the regime was trying to restore wherever it had been broken during the liberation struggle. In the eyes of the population, the regime appeared both antinational and antipopular.

The extraordinary resistance capacity exhibited by the Vietnamese population was largely linked to this tight fusion of the social struggle for the land, the political struggle for democratic rights, and the national struggle against imperialist domination. The importance of the struggle for the land was such that the Saigon regime and its U.S. "advisers" tried to implement a land reform of their own favoring the formation of a layer of capitalist peasants committed to the regime. The distribution of land became the very concrete stakes of each revolutionary or counterrevolutionary offensive. The fusion of the social revolution and the democratic national struggle could not have been carried through nationally and in lasting fashion in a spontaneous manner. The role of the Vietnamese Communist party was decisive. But the very needs of the struggle stimulated pressure toward a deepening of the agrarian revolution, especially in the liberated zones, where the collective organization of labor was indispensable for the economic, social, and military strengthening of these zones. In the course of the struggle itself the "mutual aid teams" (assuring collectivization of labor) underwent great development. *The agrarian revolu-*

tion in the liberated zones of South Vietnam was one of the most profound revolutions carried out even before the final victory of the liberation struggle. Its social balance sheet is impressive. In the liberated zones, and to some extent in the contested zones, the power of one former ruling class was destroyed, that of the large landlords. The power of another potential ruling class in the countryside, the capitalist peasantry, was undermined before it really took shape. The poor peasantry and agricultural workers dominated the political life of the villages. In an agrarian country like Vietnam, in which landed property remained one of the essential bases both of the indigenous bourgeoisie and of the neocolonial regime, the import of these socioeconomic upheavals was very great.

4. The class stakes of the conflict could not be limited to the countryside. In spite of the timorous character of the policy of the Vietnamese Communist party on this question during the initial years of the resistance, the social dimension was never absent from the liberation struggle in Vietnam. In practice, a class polarization occurred very quickly. On the side of the neocolonial undertaking stood the bulk of the landowners, the indigenous bourgeoisie—primarily landed, comprador, and parasitic—and the military hierarchy, which controlled an important share of smuggling, enjoyed manifold fringe benefits and broad institutionalized corruption, and held interests in many enterprises. The resistance assembled above all the urban working class, the rural proletariat, the poor and middle peasantry, and a part of the intellectual and petty-bourgeois layers in the towns. The armies in the field represented these two antagonistic blocs, which were under the leadership of the imperialist forces on the one hand and the Vietnamese Communist party on the other.

It is this class polarization that explains the bitterness of the struggle and the American commitment. *At stake in the conflict was not simply a change of government, or even of regime, but the victory or defeat of a social revolution.* Hence the character of the imperialist war, which penetrated all realms of the social, economic, and cultural life of the country. Although imperialism hoped to win essentially through military means, it nonetheless made efforts on the social terrain. It attempted to broaden its indigenous base through the enactment of a "counter agrarian reform" of a capitalist type, an inordinate effort at "forced urbanization" and displacement of populations, a policy of ideological and cultural penetration of the consequently uprooted masses, and a massive effort to give layers of the population a material interest in the maintenance of the imperialist presence and the continuation of the war. This class polarization also permits an understanding of the important role played in the social and political disintegration of the puppet regime by the continued existence of an urban resistance (in spite of terror of rare intensity), the action of the working class, the struggle for demands by small merchants, the anti-imperialist mobilization of the student movement, and the radicalization of politico-religious currents (even among a minority of Catholics). The regime appeared for what it was: the corrupt instrument of the imperialist enterprise. It proved incapable of preventing the worsening of the living conditions of the urban masses and of the soldiers in its army and the functionaries in its administration. The only future it held out was unending war and repression.

Under these conditions, the political action of the revolutionary forces received an increased response in the big urban centers of South Vietnam after the signing of the Paris accords of January 1973. Final victory appeared possible. The strengthening of the infrastructure of the liberated zones and of the military potential of the PRG, thanks to the continuation of aid from the DRV, and the organization of a progressive response to the constant nibbling operations of the puppet army wound up throwing the Thieu regime off balance. Finally, the constant maintenance of the objective of reunification of South Vietnam with the North Vietnamese workers state lent full historical meaning to the multiform struggles waged south of the seventeenth parallel. While it was a national liberation struggle, the anti-American resistance in Vietnam was also a fight for the reunification of the South with the North.

5. The victory of April 30, 1975, sealed this social and national struggle. With the disintegration and then dissolution of the puppet armed forces, the complete destruction of the Thieu administration, and the banning of the political parties of the old regime, the Vietnamese neocolonial bourgeois state was broken. With the destruction of its state power, the Vietnamese big bourgeoisie also lost an important part of its economic strength, which extensively depended on the imperialist presence, the maintenance of links with landed property, and the power of the military hierarchy.

Political hegemony throughout the country was henceforth in the hands of the Vietnamese Communist party (the Workers party of Vietnam), which directed the NLF and PRG, completely controlled the liberation army, and animated both the "popular committees" already established in the liberated zones and the many nuclei of urban resistance. Issued of the destruction of the power of the bourgeoisie and its state, based on the liberation army, founded on the mobilization of the masses of workers and peasants, and under the hegemony of the Vietnamese Communist party, *the state that arose just after the imperialist debacle was a workers state capable of undergoing an immediate fusion process with the North Vietnamese workers state.* Since this fusion had been prepared and initiated in the course of the struggle itself through the organization of the liberated zones and through the role of the VCP, the pace of the reunification of Vietnam was extremely rapid. Immediately after April 30, 1975, the effective political leadership of the whole of Vietnam was one, the army was placed under unified command, the assignment of cadres and functionaries was decided centrally (many of them crossing the seventeenth parallel to go back to the southern part of the country), and an economic plan concerning all of Vietnam was placed under study.

6. It took only one year for this de facto political unity of the country to be ratified by general elections throughout the country. The completion of state unity was accompanied by the continuation of the social revolution in the South.

In the countryside the agrarian reform was extended in diversified forms: progressive motion toward the formation of cooperatives in the zones that had been liberated previously; distribution of land to poor peasants and the initiation of "mutual aid teams" in the villages liberated

more recently; placing of foreign plantations under government control; formation of state farms in zones of industrial agriculture; complete reorganization into "new economic zones" of areas that had suffered profound destruction during the U.S. escalation.

In the cities the holdings of the Vietnamese big industrialists, most of whom had fled, were nationalized. Some small-scale industrialists rejected exile and agreed to collaborate with the new revolutionary regime in restarting production. Their technical skills, concurrently with the strengthening of the nationalized or collectivized sector, were used to avoid an increase in unemployment and to assure production.

But a class conflict was rapidly joined, fueled by the economic difficulties of the new regime. On the one hand the extreme dependence of the apparatus of production on foreign sources of raw materials, spare parts, and even energy (oil), and on the other hand the maintenance of control by comprador wholesalers over important commercial networks, various sorts of trafficking, and great sums of money provoked the opening of an economic crisis and fostered attempts to strangle the regime: disorganization of the market; secret hoarding of goods of prime necessity and artificial creation of shortages; currency speculation and aggravation of the inflationary spiral; organization of a trade blockade by Washington. In September 1975 this socioeconomic offensive of the bourgeois forces led the VCP to take a series of measures to eliminate these threats. A new currency was minted and control of liquidities by the banks, all of which had been nationalized and unified, was strengthened. A "campaign against compradors" was launched, accompanied by popular demonstrations; large secret stocks of commodities were seized; great fortunes were inventoried, and private networks of commercial speculation were attacked. State control of foreign trade had already been implemented in practice, and state chain stores were set up parallel to the free market. The contracts the Thieu regime had signed with foreign firms were annulled, in particular those relating to oil prospecting, and the PRG floated new negotiation offers.

The urban economy in the South today appears equally as diversified as the agrarian structure. There are five sectors: state, private (capitalist), mixed state-private, cooperative, and artisanal. But the state sector has become dominant since it controls the largest production units, the supply of the enterprises, and the major industrial markets and is in position to attempt to integrate the activity of the private enterprises into its orientation.

The restarting of the apparatus of production nevertheless remains uneven because of the bottleneck in supplies. Likewise, the measures that have been taken up to now have been insufficient to eliminate all possibility of economic sabotage and speculation operations. The printing of counterfeit money in particular has attained dramatic levels. The restructuring and reorientation of the industrial apparatus of the South, the establishment of which has been conceived in line with imperialist exigencies, requires planning for the whole of Vietnam, which will make it necessary to continue the process of nationalization and collectivization of the economy in order to harmonize the socioeconomic structures of the North and South, as well as to complete the breaking of bourgeois resistance. Likewise, the extensive and lasting damage done to agriculture by the imperialist aggression,

along with the presence of a very large mass of unproductive refugees in the cities, presents the new regime with extremely serious difficulties which can be resolved only on the scale of the entire country. As in the North two decades ago, the necessary restructuring of agriculture requires its progressive collectivization.

The sequels of the victory of April 30, 1975, like the problems with which the Vietnamese people must deal today, illustrate the permanence of both class conflict and the dynamic of revolutionary struggle after the liberation. *The completion of the bourgeois-democratic reforms that had been initiated was far from assured when the revolution already had to overturn bourgeois property and law and take the first measures of socialization of the economy. The progressive growing over of the national liberation movement into socialist revolution is one of the characteristic features of the struggle launched in Vietnam thirty years ago.* The immediate reunification of the country confirms this dynamic.

7. The victory of the Vietnamese revolution has once again settled in practice the debate that runs through the international workers movement on the nature of the revolution and the conditions for genuine liberation from imperialist domination in the colonial and semicolonial countries. Economically, there was no stage of capitalist development between the destruction of precapitalist social relations in the countryside and the breaking of the links of economic dependence on the one hand and the socialist transformation of the revolution on the other hand. As far as the state is concerned, between the liberation of Saigon and the establishment of a single national assembly throughout the territory of the country, there was no reconstruction of a bourgeois state in South Vietnam on the ruins of the puppet state apparatus. *It is clearly according to a process of permanent revolution that the Vietnamese revolution developed and triumphed. Such is the first lesson the Vietnamese revolution offers the national liberation movements: the outcome of the revolution will be socialist or there will be no revolution. The state that emerges from the revolution will be a workers state or national liberation will not be achieved.*

8. The Indochinese revolution experienced a twofold process of uneven and combined development. French colonial policy and later American strategy, along with geographic proximity and the history of the communist movement in this part of the world, made solidarity among the struggles in Indochina *a feature of the revolutionary struggles*. But the assertion, or reassertion against imperialism, of an identity, a national community proper to each country—culturally, socially, and economically differentiated—also played a key role in the revolutionary dynamic in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. This was especially the case since the reunification of the country was one of the major stakes of the anti-imperialist struggle in Vietnam, which had been divided into three “countries” under French colonization, by the sixteenth parallel after the Potsdam accords of 1945, and by the seventeenth parallel after the Geneva accords of 1954. Likewise, the commitment of the ethnic minorities, often Montagnards, to the revolutionary struggle clashed with the systematic policy of division pursued by France and the United States, a policy whose effects were different in each of the three countries. The roads of the Vietnamese, Laotian, and

Cambodian revolutions therefore differed in more than one respect. This twofold feature of the Indochinese revolution marked its history profoundly and continues to weigh on its present course.

The socioeconomic structures, the scope of the agrarian crisis, the weight of the colonial situation, the nature of the traditional culture, and the breadth of previous struggles all came to bear in clearly different ways in each country. Consequently, the sharpness of the internal class contradictions in each of these societies under colonial domination and the contradictions born of the prosecution of the imperialist war in Indochina were asserted very differently in each case. It was in colonial Vietnam that the overall crisis was gravest by far. It was also here that the tradition of struggle was greatest and that a young proletariat took shape and began to play a political role of its own during the 1930s. In Cambodia, as in Laos, the agrarian crisis became acute only much later, and no comparable urban or mining proletariat emerged. Finally, in Laos, which is a checkerboard of ethnic groups, national consciousness did not exist before the social and anti-imperialist rising of the first Indochina war. That consciousness had to be forged in the course of the liberation struggle itself.

If Vietnam became the backbone of the Indochinese revolution, and if it was there that the first socialist revolution of the region triumphed (in 1954), this was above all because it was in Vietnam that the national and social crises were combined with greatest intensity. The Laotian and Cambodian societies of the time were obviously not exempt from internal contradictions, without which there would have been no revolution in these two countries. But their more belated development in comparison to Vietnam and the lesser sharpness of their contradictions lent a relatively greater weight to the external factor: imperialist aggression.

9. The objective solidarity of the struggles under way in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos was asserted very early on. As far back as 1945 there was a chain of declarations of independence subsequent to the Japanese defeat. But the geographical and historical proximity of the Indochinese countries, like the common experiences of colonization and the formation of the communist movement, could not suffice to unify the rhythm of revolutionary uprisings. The implantation of the Indochinese Communist party remained very uneven, as did the weight of Communist leaderships in the armed resistance movements during the first Indochina war. Military coordination of struggles did emerge, which enabled the offensives of 1953-54 and the Dien Bien Phu victory to occur. But the Geneva conference and the policy of peaceful coexistence followed by the USSR resulted in the first Indochina war's ending with Vietnam divided and with the process under way in each country dissociated.

The strategic imperatives of the second Indochina war were to aid in reawakening this solidarity. Incapable of breaking the back of the NLF, Washington very soon had to try to isolate it. U.S. imperialism sought to seal the seventeenth parallel and carry the war into Laos, and then, in 1970, into Cambodia. The Bonapartist Sihanouk regime, already undermined by the sharpening of its own contradictions, was unable to resist the contradictory exigencies of the social and national combat that unfolded

within its borders. The formation of the FUNK marked the decisive entry of the Cambodian people into the Indochinese revolutionary struggle and the rapid conquest of hegemony within it by the Khmers Rouges.

The second Indochina war permitted the continuation of what the first left in suspense: the conjugation of a triple revolutionary process on an Indochinese scale. In various forms the agrarian revolution combined everywhere with the national liberation movement. In spite of the extreme weakness of the Laotian and Cambodian proletariats, under the impact of the regional class confrontation a fundamentally analogous social polarization took root in each country, a polarization in which a popular liberation army and a puppet army stood opposed. The year 1975 saw the collapse of the puppet regimes and armies in each of these countries, the flight of fortunes, the extension of socioeconomic measures, the victory of the revolutionary armies under the leadership of Communist parties, and the birth of bureaucratically deformed workers states. The ephemeral coalition regime in Laos rapidly gave way to the new "people's republic," while at the beginning of 1976 Sihanouk resigned his post as chief of state, a post which had become purely honorific already.

10. Nevertheless, this combined process was not sufficient to assure the unity of the Indochinese revolution beyond the liberation struggle. The unity in action of the Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian Communist movements had been indispensable to the coordination of the military fight against imperialism. Once the imperialist intervention had been defeated and the seizure of power assured, serious divisions were openly manifested among the various components of the Indochinese revolutionary front.

In Laos the political links forged with Vietnam from the time of the Indochinese Communist party seem to have essentially remained intact. On the initiative of the Revolutionary People's party (the Laotian CP) the new regime, while preserving its own identity, turned to Hanoi for aid in rebuilding the country and reconvertng the economy. This process was accelerated by the provocative measures taken toward Laos by Thailand, which in the past had provided Laos an outlet to the sea. The difficulties the new people's republic has to face are considerable in view of the state of economic backwardness and the destruction in which the country was left by the colonization and the imperialist war and also in view of the virtual lack of existence of an indigenous proletariat and the weakness of the Communist party. The new regime in Laos bears the stigma of these social and political weaknesses even more than in Vietnam.

It is in Cambodia that the consequences of the uneven and combined development of the Indochinese revolution are most serious. The particular evolution of the movement led by the Khmers Rouges came on top of an economic and social backwardness nearly as dramatic as that of Laos. None of the three regimes issued of the victory of the Indochinese revolution is free of deep bureaucratic deformations. But in Cambodia these deformations assume clearly broader dimensions than in the other two countries. Given the almost complete closure of the country and the anticommunist slander campaign that has consequently been able to be waged, the absence of information prevents an effective balance sheet of the evolution of the

regime from being drawn. But the measures taken both immediately after the victory (the emptying of Phnom Penh and the other newly liberated cities) and later (mass displacement of population to assure large-scale labor projects), the notorious weakness of the mass organizations, and the silence and deliberate mystery that surrounds the Angkar (the ruling "organization") manifest the existence of a bureaucratic regime qualitatively more authoritarian and repressive than that of Vietnam or Laos.

11. The tasks facing the Indochinese revolutions objectively place on the agenda some aspects of the original program of the Indochinese Communist party on the question of nationalities.

The difficult unity between the struggle for the formation of independent national states and the respect for the rights of ethnic minorities—including the right of self-determination—as well as the unity between the construction (or reconstruction) of national identities and Indochinese development, were not problems solely during the revolutionary fight for liberation. They remain key questions of socialist development after the victory. After 1954 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam attempted to assure the integration of Montagnard minorities into the development of the transitional society by assuring the creation of "autonomous zones," by making efforts to foster the culture of these peoples (which included the formation of alphabets for languages that had been unwritten), and by establishing development plans aimed at making up for their economic lag. But the problem remains unsolved today on the Indochinese scale. The economic reconstruction of countries devastated by the war and the application of socialist planning can be conceived only on an Indochinese scale and through the expansion of trade, especially with the other workers states. The reclamation of the Mekong, for example, cannot be achieved solely in Laos or Cambodia. It requires the close participation of Vietnam, not only in terms of resources but also in terms of outlets, not to mention that of Thailand, which could favor further revolutionary developments. During the 1930s the Indochinese Communist party had tried to respond to this problem by advancing the perspective of the formation of a "Union of Soviet Republics of Indochina" guaranteeing the right of self-determination to minorities and integrated into a "Union of World Soviet Republics." Whatever the actual underestimation of the differences that were to emerge in the course of the Indochinese revolutionary processes, this perspective did seek to respond to a problem that remains one of the key questions today. This perspective has not at all been abandoned.

Here again the differences that have emerged among the Indochinese regimes since the seizure of power threaten to weigh heavily on the future development of each country. Laos is trying to find immediate practical solutions to its isolation. But the policy of the Cambodian leadership runs counter to these objective necessities. The choice of an almost exclusive alliance with the People's Republic of China, nurtured in particular by the USSR's previous criminal attitude of refusing to recognize the GRUNK; the choice of an economic development project as autarkic as possible, based on the accelerated formation of a surplus of rice at the expense of any other priority; the assertion of a

suspicious nationalism; and the refusal to bring Cambodian diplomacy into line with Laotian and Vietnamese diplomacy have extensively contributed to weakening the Indochinese unity that had been constituted in the struggle as well as to strengthening the authoritarianism of political structures in Cambodia itself.

The Indochinese revolution is now suffering the repercussions of the crisis of internationalism caused by the Stalinist degeneration of the Communist International between the two world wars and the policy of world status quo pursued since then, first by the Soviet bureaucracy and later by the Chinese bureaucracy. The awakening of genuine internationalist conceptions—based on the struggle against the chauvinism of the previously dominant ethnic groups, on real equality among ethnic groups and nationalities—remains crucial both in regard to the tasks that devolve upon the new revolutionary regimes and in regard to coming developments of the revolution in Southeast Asia.

II. World Impact of the Indochinese Revolution

12. The Indochina war was never a “local” war in the proper sense of the term. Even the first Indochina war quickly took on a twofold international dimension: on the one hand with the crisis of one of the greatest imperialist empires and on the other hand with the uprising of colonial and semicolonial peoples of the postwar period, as an extension of the Asian revolution after the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949. It was because of this international dimension that American imperialism very quickly began to play a decisive role in financing the French war. But the world impact of the second Indochina war was clearly more immediate and profound.

Indeed, the aim of the American government was never to defend the remnants of a declining French colonial empire. American imperialism had few direct economic interests in Indochina itself at the time. From the very beginning of the U.S. commitment in the war, the objective of the successive American governments was to fulfill U.S. imperialism's role as policeman of the capitalist world. The aim was to halt the wave of Asian revolutions and thereby to guarantee imperialist access to the riches of all Southeast Asia, to complete the encirclement of the People's Republic of China, to engage a test of strength with the workers states which would enable imperialism to break the DRV and which could even serve as the prelude to an aggression against China, to conduct a test of American counterrevolutionary capacity that would show the peoples of the world the price they would have to pay for trying to oppose U.S. will, and finally to perfect the methods of “counterinsurgency warfare” for use against other revolutions in other parts of the world, especially in Latin America, a region that is of direct strategic importance for the United States.

The Indochina war was not a “mistake” on the part of one belligerent faction of the “American political class.” It was the “democrat” Truman who committed the United States to the French. It was Eisenhower who proposed a direct American intervention in face of the debacle of Dien Bien Phu, who refused to sign the Geneva accords, and who supported the dictator Diem in South Vietnam. It was Kennedy who decided on the first steps of the second war,

which had become an American war. The Democrat Johnson and the Republican Nixon were both agents of the military escalation. The apostle of the bloody policy of “Vietnamization” was the Nobel Peace Prize winner Kissinger. Finally, Ford was the instigator of the “Mayagüez incident.” The Indochina war was the war of the entire American bourgeoisie, until the excessively blatant failure of the U.S. intervention and the rise of antiwar sentiment in the United States itself began to divide this bourgeoisie.

The support Washington extended to the French government was a response to the rise of the colonial revolution, the deterioration of imperialist positions in China immediately after the second world war, and then the opening of the “cold war.” Kennedy's decision to engage in “special warfare” at the beginning of the 1960s followed the U.S. failure in Cuba. The commitment to “local war” in 1964-65 was part of an international imperialist counteroffensive marked by the Indonesian coup of 1965. The Vietnam policy of the American government was always one of the key elements of an international strategy that aimed at guaranteeing the maintenance of imperialism as a system of world domination.

The international stakes of the struggle explain the intensity and duration of the American commitment. First Vietnam and then Indochina became the primary place where all world contradictions were refracted, the site of confrontation between international revolution and counterrevolution, the test of the relationship of forces and of the policies advanced by the capitalist governments and the leaderships of the workers movement, in the first place the leaderships of the bureaucratized workers states.

13. The Yalta and Potsdam accords of 1945, which placed Vietnam in the zone of Western influence, and the Geneva accords of 1954, which concluded with a compromise that was more favorable to France than the Vietnam had hoped for on the basis of the relationship of forces in the field, manifested the desire of the Stalinist bureaucracy to preserve the essence of the world status quo. But the objective stakes of the war in Indochina (a crushing imperialist victory would have dealt a serious blow to Soviet positions and would have directly threatened China), along with the political authority won by the Vietnamese revolution on the international scene, made it impossible for the Soviet leadership to purely and simply abandon its “fraternal party” on a lasting basis. The Indochina war highlighted both the fundamental class regroupments of the postwar period and the nature of the policies of the various workers and bureaucratic leaderships.

In spite of the military aid it belatedly provided, the Soviet Union refused to make the territory of the DRV, which was being bombed by the United States, an inviolable part of the “socialist camp,” for it did not send Vietnam armaments of sufficient quantity and quality to enable the Indochinese fighters to put a rapid end to the U.S. escalation. The Stalinist leadership likewise permitted the unprecedented concentration of counterrevolutionary resources against Indochina by not aiding the extension of the revolutionary process elsewhere in the world. The creation of “two, three, many Vietnams,” following the slogan of Che, who had understood the

stakes of the Vietnamese confrontation, would have in fact qualitatively diminished the impact of the resources committed in Indochina by the United States, removed an important part of the terrible burden borne by the peoples of Indochina, and rapidly defeated the operation of bloody intimidation decided on by Washington.

The counterrevolutionary character of the "peaceful coexistence" policy of the Stalinist leadership was asserted once again. But through the duration and depth of their struggle, the Vietnamese fighters little by little *forced* aid from the USSR. This aid, in spite of its criminal inadequacy, enabled the resistance to hold out and take new steps forward. Likewise, the peoples of Indochina were able to impose the *fait accompli* of their victory on the Soviet leadership. Finally, the Vietnamese revolution aided the awakening of revolutionary struggles throughout the world. *The Indochinese revolution demonstrated the actuality and effectiveness of the slogan of the "united front of workers states" in defense of an ongoing revolutionary struggle*, regardless of the degree of bureaucratic degeneration of such workers states and their leaderships.

After agreeing to play Moscow's game during the Geneva conference, at the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict the Chinese leadership fostered this perspective through its attitude. But the content the Maoist leadership gave to its polemic prevented it from continuing to do so, in spite of the maintenance of a more radical course. The Vietnamese leadership was nevertheless able to take advantage of Sino-Soviet rivalry to foster the shipment of material aid as well as the affirmation of a minimum of political solidarity on the part of the major bureaucratized workers states.

Nevertheless, it was around the Indochinese question that the character of the turn in international policy made by the Maoist leadership during the years 1970-71 appeared most sharply. The invitation to Nixon to visit Peking, made in July 1971, was in fact extended without prior consultation of the Indochinese leaderships and without making a halt to the escalation and the American intervention a precondition for the normalization of Sino-American relations. The Maoist leadership agreed to aid Nixon's attempt to pass himself off as the apostle of peace and win the 1972 elections; it sharply weakened the antiwar movement in the United States, which was disoriented even though it was experiencing new developments; it aborted a very important diplomatic offensive of the Vietnamese leadership. The Chinese leadership made these choices independent of and directly against the interests of the Indochinese masses in struggle.

By forcing aid from the bureaucratized workers states, highlighting the importance that would have been assumed by the opening of many new revolutionary centers in the process of weakening the aggressive capacity of imperialism, assuring the effective extension of the revolutionary process throughout the three countries of Indochina, and contributing to undermining the stability of Thailand, the Vietnamese and Indochinese revolutions manifested the objective correctness and applicability of the fundamental principles of proletarian internationalism. They also exposed the abandonment of any genuinely internationalist perspectives by the world workers movement with the Stalinist degeneration of the Communist International.

14. The Indochinese revolution likewise underlined the crucial importance of the international solidarity movement as a condition for the success of a revolutionary struggle. The absence of a determined reaction by the USSR to the imperialist aggression rendered the action of the solidarity movement especially necessary in weakening the imperialist ability to intervene. It was the opposition of the American masses to the continuation of the U.S. commitment in Indochina that contributed decisively to paralyzing the military power of the Pentagon.

The American governments always sought to *directly associate* other bourgeois governments in the counterrevolutionary endeavor being prosecuted in Indochina in the name of defense of the "free world." Limited Thai, Korean, and Australian contingents (the latter temporarily) were sent to the theater of operations. But the only aid Washington was able to obtain was political, financial, and material assistance (here again, limited) from the major capitalist governments. The open and direct commitment of these governments to the war was rendered impossible, in spite of their desire for American success, by the predictable reactions of the workers movement and by the breadth of the sentiment of revolutionary solidarity with the Indochinese fighters among the youth. We see here both the echo of the postwar crisis of colonialism and the effects of the new wave of the colonial revolution on the imperialist countries, where the new rise of the class struggle was asserting itself.

Even taking account of the world context, *it is remarkable that the potential and active weight of the international workers movement and of the radicalization of youth prevented the formation of a more active counterrevolutionary front*. On various occasions American imperialism, even though it was acting in the name of the general interests of the capitalist world, found itself the butt of maneuvers by competing imperialist powers. Without challenging the fundamental solidarity with the U.S. undertaking, these maneuvers limited the U.S. margins of political action. Breaking with the myth of defense of the free West, the movement of international solidarity aided the formation of the antiwar movement in the United States. Often led by revolutionary currents asserting themselves as the bearers of internationalist solidarity and identifying with the fight of the peoples of Indochina (especially in West Europe), this movement weighed on the policy of the Communist parties and the traditional workers movement and broke down the audiences for the policy of "peaceful coexistence" among the youth of these organizations.

As a whole, the antiwar movement in the United States never attained the level of political consciousness of the international solidarity movement, which ranged itself *on the side* of the Indochinese fighters and consciously acted for their victory. Nevertheless, the role of the American antiwar movement was more direct, immediate, and in the final analysis decisive than that of the international solidarity movement. Awakened by the sending of the American expeditionary corps to Vietnam in 1965, fueled by the scope of the resistance of the peoples of Indochina and the consequent duration of the war, and aided by the appeals to the American people issued by the Indochinese

revolutionaries, the antiwar movement became a structural feature of the domestic political situation in the United States. This movement reflected the anti-imperialist radicalization of the student youth under the impact of the Cuban revolution and the civil rights movement; the crisis of values among the youth fueled by the horrors of the "dirty war"; the uneasiness exhibited by certain circles of workers in regard to the social effects of the American commitment and the growing losses in the field; the revolt of the Blacks and Chicanos, who refused to bear the costs of the imperialist intervention and identified with the rise of the colonial revolution.

Although the antiwar *movement* in the strict sense of the term entered a crisis in 1972 and disappeared in 1973, antiwar *sentiment* continued to weigh on the situation. The American government was unable to exceed certain limits in its escalation (use of nuclear weapons), nor could it send new troops to the ground fighting, nor could it prolong the escalation for too long at the level it had already reached. Failing to break the Indochinese resistance or even to limit the extension of the revolutionary process to Vietnam alone, U.S. imperialism lost any hope of a military victory. The electoral dates in the United States, the persistence of the movement of international solidarity, the rise of the class struggle throughout the world, and the gravity of the American government crisis made a rapid solution to the conflict indispensable.

The existence of the solidarity movement in the United States and throughout the world thus played an effective role in the unfolding of the struggle in Indochina. Nevertheless, the importance of the stakes, the depth of the Indochinese resistance, and the potential of the international workers movement required more than the assertion of political solidarity. Broad concrete actions of the workers movement itself should have and could have been organized. This occurred only in Australia (the dockers boycott), although the staging of internationalist strikes such as Cockerill-Ougrée in Belgium or in the ports of Italy demonstrated the potential for action by the European workers movement. The responsibility of the Stalinist and Social Democratic leaderships of the workers movement is very great here. Indeed, they alone could have organized support commensurate with the real needs of the Indochinese revolution. They refused to do so, and the role of motor force played in many countries by groupings of the revolutionary current in solidarity with Indochina in struggle exposed the bankruptcy of these leaderships in regard to these elementary internationalist tasks.

15. The effects of the imperialist defeat in Indochina on the leadership crisis of the capitalist world are deep, commensurate with the ambitious objectives the American bourgeoisie had set itself. The political crisis in the United States was aggravated by the debacle. The confidence of many bourgeois governments, especially in the neocolonial world, in American guarantees was suddenly shaken. The trauma provoked by the direct U.S. commitment in Indochina will not be able to be easily surmounted in the United States. Any massive shipment of American troops to intervene in ongoing revolutions or civil wars would run up against a renaissance of deep mass mobilization and the opening of a new political crisis. *Under these conditions, U.S. imperialism is now incapable for a whole*

period of playing its role as world cop of capital in this form. And no other imperialist power is presently in position to replace U.S. imperialism. This entirely new situation was reflected during the Angolan crisis. The specter of a new Vietnam paralyzed the direct intervention capacity of American imperialism. The USSR was able to furnish extensive military aid to the MPLA without an effective response from the United States, and Cuba was able to send troops to support the MPLA without running the risk of an immediate blockade of its shores.

We owe this colossal historical advantage to the heroism and revolutionary determination of the Vietnamese and Indochinese masses. Such is the enormous debt of gratitude all revolutionaries owe to the Indochinese revolution. This historical advantage is obviously only temporary and relative. It does not rule out many international attempts to strangle revolutions through economic sabotage, isolation, political and material aid to the counterrevolution, anticommunist slander campaigns. Everything must be done to take advantage of this favorable moment as quickly as possible.

16. The implications of the defeat of imperialism in Indochina are especially sharp in East Asia. The United States had set up an integrated regional system that was supposed to assure the maintenance of neocolonial domination and guarantee the isolation of the People's Republic of China. A massive American presence, even in the form of military contingents, a dense and complex network of various bases, the establishment of military and police dictatorships closely linked to the anticommunist campaign, and the economic intervention of Japanese imperialism formed the elements of this system of regional domination. It had begun to be thrown off balance after the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the failure of "local war," and the failure of the U.S. imperialists to achieve their objective of a crushing military victory over the DRV.

The temporary suspension of bombing of North Vietnam, the gradual withdrawal of ground combat troops, and Johnson's abandoning of the race for president did not signify the end of the counterrevolutionary intervention in Indochina. But the turn thus imposed on the American bourgeoisie implied a profound modification of its policy toward China: The American failure in Vietnam opened the way for the international recognition of the People's Republic of China.

The process of normalization of Sino-American relations began in 1971. It inevitably had profound repercussions on the regimes in Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and South Korea, whose internal cohesion and the coherence of whose international policy lay in denunciation of Chinese communism. Symptomatically, the Thai military dictatorship, abandoned by its American protector and master as well as by a part of the Thai ruling classes, fell in October 1973 under the hammer blows of an intense mass mobilization.

The debacle of the puppet armies and the scope of the revolutionary uprising in Indochina had a regional echo that was especially immediate in that it resonated with a new rise of social and democratic struggles in many countries of Southeast Asia as well as South Korea. Here again, Thailand, in direct contact with the Indochinese revolution, is the country in which the crisis following the imperialist debacle was most evident.

Since the end of the second world war, Japan has not possessed an imperialist army of *intervention*. All it has been able to reconstitute has been an army of civil war which is also capable of occupying a still minor place in the U.S. Pacific defense system. Japan ought to undertake a new rearmament effort to fill the relative gap left by the U.S. defeat in Indochina. But the pacifist sentiments of the Japanese masses, enlivened by the memory of the criminal nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the crisis of the government party, aggravated by the Lockheed scandal, and the significance a counterrevolutionary Japanese intervention would assume for the masses of Southeast Asia after the experience of the second world war prevent Tokyo from hoping to rapidly replace Washington in its role as regional policeman of imperialism.

The new rise of social struggles in Southeast Asia and the crisis of the Park regime in South Korea certainly remain slow processes. In part they reflect socioeconomic transformations—urbanization, relative industrialization, pauperization of the peasantry in Southeast Asia—that are often still recent. As for the deepening of workers struggles in Japan, it remains fragile. Above all, the workers movement on a regional scale has entered a phase of recomposition that will require more time to be completed. *But the victory of the Indochinese revolution has nonetheless opened a new period of class struggle.*

17. *What we are now seeing, in fact, are the beginnings of a third revolutionary wave in East Asia.* The first wave was largely dominated by the evolution of the Chinese situation from 1911 to 1919 and 1927 and the consequences of the first world war. Although it basically ended with the bloody defeat of the second Chinese revolution, it was marked by important developments, especially in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, and found an echo in the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. It gave rise to the first important Communist movements in the region. It marked the entry of East Asia into the era of international class struggles and the passage of a part of the national movement under Communist leadership.

The second revolutionary wave in East Asia was largely shaped by the consequences of the military expansion of Japanese imperialism and then of the crisis of the major colonialist powers just after the second world war. In Japan itself the 1930s and 1940s were marked by great passivity of the proletariat, the gradual establishment of a semifascist regime, the chauvinist wave of the wars of conquest, and then the effects of the defeat and the initial period of American occupation. But Japanese military expansion powerfully contributed to shaking the political prestige of the European colonial powers, eroding the traditional equilibrium of the village-based societies, awakening a profound anti-imperialist national current, and weakening the indigenous bourgeois forces (and consequently the anticommunist nationalist current). The heart of this second revolutionary wave in Asia remained in China, where a protracted mass resistance to the occupation was organized and the Chinese Communist party found the relationship of forces with the Kuomintang first reestablished and then reversed. But the uprisings immediately after the war affected all the countries of the region (with the exception of Japan itself). This second revolutionary wave in East Asia, relatively

unified because of the role played by Japanese imperialism on the one hand and by the various Communist parties on the other, terminated with the end of classical colonialism, some important victories (China, North Korea, North Vietnam) and several grave defeats (Malaya-Singapore, Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, and later Indonesia), and the affirmation of absolute American preponderance in the regional imperialist system.

The continuation of the Vietnamese revolution and the broadening of the Indochinese revolution assured the transition from the second revolutionary wave in East Asia to the third and enabled the imperialist vise in the region to be loosened. The time gap between the defeats suffered in several countries during the 1950s and 1960s and the new struggles now engaged is not the only thing that separates the two revolutionary waves. The modifications that have occurred in the socioeconomic structures (process of urbanization and impoverishment of the peasantry), in the form of imperialist domination (acquisition of formal independence and the combined role of the United States and Japan), in the regional context (effect of the Indochinese debacle and the class struggle in West Europe) make their imprint on the battles now under way and on the emergence of new generations of militants. *These modifications make a combined process of recomposition of the regional revolutionary movement indispensable and explain why the struggles of these past years very often exhibit a pronounced social character even before assuming their full anti-imperialist significance.*

In this sense the battles to come are not simply extensions of the victory of the Indochinese revolution. The third revolutionary wave in East Asia objectively poses the problem of combining the process of proletarian revolution in Japan and political revolution in China with the continuation of the process of permanent revolution in Southeast Asia, the Pacific, and South Korea in this new context. *The objective solidarity that ties together the struggles on a regional scale should be extended by a capacity for coordination of the regional revolutionary forces.*

18. The continuation and victory of the Indochinese revolution in spite of the U.S. escalation has weighted on the evolution of the crisis of Stalinism. A living condemnation of the Kremlin's policy of "peaceful coexistence" and of the policy followed by the Maoist leadership, the Vietnamese revolution extensively aided the formation of a new international revolutionary generation which, after learning strategic hatred of imperialism from the Vietnamese revolution, also perceived the price of the bureaucratic and reformist betrayals. The Indochinese revolution has aided in weakening the grip of the Social Democratic and Stalinist leaderships on the youth and the workers vanguard. The Vietnamese revolution has effectively aided the formation of new communist vanguards independent of the traditional leaderships throughout the world.

Likewise, in view of the current prestige of the present Vietnamese leadership, Peking's international policy toward Vietnam and the possibility of an aggravation of the existing conflict around the islands of the South China Sea or around what attitude to take toward the USSR tend to further detach the Maoist-oriented Communist parties in Southeast Asia from Peking and to weaken the Mao-Stalinist currents throughout the world, thus weighing

upon the next stage of the crisis of Maoism.

III. The Indochinese Communist Movements and the Formation of Bureaucratically Deformed Workers States

19. The Indochinese revolution concretely expresses the evolution of the world situation over the past thirty years or so, the progress made by the colonial revolution since the period of worldwide ebb of the workers movement between 1923 and 1943, as well as the accumulated delay of the revolution in the imperialist centers and its implications for the specific forms of development of the world revolution.

The final victory of the Indochinese revolution primarily expresses the overall favorable evolution of the world relationship of forces, marked by the end of the period of isolation of the Soviet workers state with the victory of the Yugoslav, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions and the revolutionary dynamic of the rise of the colonial masses, the renewed sharpness of the world crisis of capitalism, and the actuality of socialism. But it also reflects the imprint left by the bureaucratic degeneration of the USSR and the Stalinist betrayals over a whole historic period. On two separate occasions, 1936 and 1945-46, a profound convergence took shape between the rise of class struggle in colonial Vietnam and the rise of class struggle in the French metropolis. On both occasions the French Communist party abandoned its internationalist duty to the Indochinese peoples as well as revolutionary perspectives in France and Europe. The defeat of the Spanish revolution in 1936 and of the revolutionary rise of social struggles in France, as well as the policy of the Popular Front, checked the crisis of colonization and were the prelude to the second world war. The voting for war credits by the French Communist ministers just after the Liberation paved the way for the development of the first Indochina war.

In 1936, as in 1945-46, the heart of the national liberation movement in Vietnam was located in the cities. With the arrival of the French-British expeditionary corps, the revolutionary forces were driven to retreat from the cities and engaged in a long war of resistance whose center of gravity was henceforth located in the countryside, in spite of the maintenance of significant activity in the urban centers. The double failure of the European revolution in the period between the two world wars and between 1943 and 1948 and the Stalinist degeneration of the Communist International broke the unity of the world revolution for a long time and considerably reduced the direct weight of the industrial proletariat within it.

This uneven development of the world revolution is also expressed in the evolution of the relationship of forces established between the bureaucratic apparatuses and the masses and of Moscow's control of the CPs and the solidarity movement. It was on the direct orders of the Comintern that the Chinese CP adopted the suicidal policy that led to the bloody defeat of 1927. In 1936 the Stalinized leadership of the Communist International was able to dictate a suicidal Popular Front policy to the Spanish and French CPs and was able to control the movement of solidarity with the Spanish revolution that emerged at the time and use it for its own ends. But the Chinese and Vietnamese CPs (like the Yugoslav CP) rejected in practice

the implications of the Yalta and Potsdam accords and the Chinese and Indochinese revolutions triumphed against the policy of the Stalinist bureaucracy. The movement of solidarity that developed during the second Indochina war largely escaped the grip of the Social Democratic and Stalinist leaderships and became a partially independent factor influencing the outcome of the war in a positive direction. But the weight and influence of the revolutionary Marxists themselves in the international workers movement remained very weak. The new rise of world revolution is still only partial and fragmented, inadequate to break the control of the mass movement by the bureaucratic apparatuses definitively.

In its forms—a national liberation movement compelled to win through a long military struggle centered in the countryside in the absence of a revolutionary upsurge in the major imperialist centers—the Vietnamese revolution remained part of this world context. But in its socialist content it confirms and deepens a favorable evolution of the international relationship of forces. This ambivalent situation is reflected both in the nature and orientation of the Vietnamese Communist party and in the regimes born of the victories of 1975.

20. The character of the Vietnamese Communist party—the present Workers party of Vietnam—is in fact a reflection of all these changes as much as a constituent element in them. It is unthinkable that the revolutionary mobilization of the Vietnamese population could have been maintained for three decades despite the hammer blows of the counterrevolution without the action of a subjective factor, namely the Vietnamese Communist party. It is this party that was wholly responsible for the organization of the struggle for power, both military and political, during the first and second Vietnam wars. Its role was decisive in the outcome of the conflict. The exigencies of the national liberation struggle led the VCP to take growing distance from Moscow, refusing to apply the Diktat of Soviet diplomacy after the Potsdam conference, rejecting the “advice” of prudence from the Stalinist leadership after the first spontaneous uprisings in South Vietnam in 1958-59 and engaging in the second resistance, resisting successive political and material pressures during the escalation against the DRV to seek a compromise with the United States at the price of halting the revolution in the South, refusing to betray the Vietnamese revolution, as had been done by the French, Spanish, Greek, and many other Communist parties in Europe.

In order to assure the mass mobilization indispensable for pursuing the battle, and in spite of its desire to maintain a policy of “broad union,” in 1952-53 the Vietnamese Communist party had to raise the call for radical agrarian reform. It rejected in practice a policy of class collaboration by assuring, behind the frontist formulas advanced, its tight and unshared control of the liberation army, the Vietminh, and later the NLF. It assured the destruction of the bourgeois state and the constitution of a new workers state in the North in 1954 and in the South in 1975. The revolutionary role played by the VCP *confirms two lessons of the permanent revolution: that the victory of a national liberation struggle cannot be achieved in the framework of the Stalinist theory of the revolution by stages; that the growing over of the revolution to a socialist one cannot occur outside the*

action of a proletarian party oriented toward the seizure of power and the establishment of a workers state.

But the orientation of the VCP also confirms the thesis that the rediscovery of a properly revolutionary Marxist program cannot occur without a reappraisal of the historical debates of the workers movement, a complete theoretical break with the heritage of Stalinism, and an integration of the experience of the world revolution. These three elements are foreign to the political history of the Vietnamese Communist party. In this, the VCP remains marked by the particular trajectory taken by the Vietnamese revolution, by its mass base (above all peasant in composition), by its political framework (that of a national liberation struggle), by the form taken by the struggle (that of a protracted war), and by the character of the links established with the USSR. And this imprint was especially deep since it was combined with the Stalinist training received in the Communist International during the 1920s and 1930s and the maintenance of the VCP in the "official" Communist movement. As far as the forms of proletarian power are concerned, the lessons of the Russian revolution of 1917 were never fully drawn and transposed to Asia. The "model" offered by the victorious Chinese revolution completed the erasure of these lessons. The experience of workers councils and soviet power remained generally foreign to the Vietnamese Communist party. Likewise, internationally, while the VCP was conscious of its *objective* role in the emergence of a new revolutionary generation, it relied mainly on the existing forces to strengthen its own struggle, never seeking to participate actively in the recomposition of a new world revolutionary vanguard. The VCP is the advocate neither of genuine proletarian democracy based on councils nor of complete internationalism—and especially the organizational extension of internationalism, the International itself. It is opposed to it.

The orientation of the Vietnamese Communist party is the product on the one hand of the integration of the features of a national revolution which permitted it not to conform to Stalinist orthodoxy and to play a decisive revolutionary role in the anti-imperialist battles and on the other hand of adaptation to these same features, which prevented it from rediscovering certain key elements of the revolutionary Marxist program and which perpetuated the programmatic heritage of Stalinism in certain areas, notably that of the conception of the workers state. This twofold process of integration and adaptation permits an understanding of the programmatic conceptions of a formation like the VCP, its qualities and limits. These reflect the deformed course followed by the colonial revolution in the absence of developed revolutionary activity by the proletariat of the imperialist metropolises and the consequence of the persistence of the crisis of the subjective factor on an international scale in the absence of a new mass revolutionary international.

The character of the so-called policy of national concord of the Indochinese Communist parties illustrates this programmatic orientation. This policy implied neither real compromise with imperialism nor keeping the national bourgeoisies in power and it did not damage the Communist parties' leadership role in the struggle. The outcome of the battles confirms this once again. The Khmer Rouge kept Sihanouk out for months after the victory and shortly

after his return to the country he announced his decision to "retire." From 1974 the VCP was preparing the final offensive in Vietnam which was to lead to the collapse of the Saigon regime, and in April 1975 it seized full power. The Revolutionary People's party of Laos, under the cover of a government of "national union," gradually took control of all the armed forces, stimulated urban mobilizations, and accelerated the disintegration of the puppet forces, before proclaiming the abolition of the monarchy and the birth of a new people's republic.

But while the policy of "national concord" did not practically place in question the continuation of the revolutionary struggle for power, it made more difficult the development of consciousness of the role independent proletarian organs should play in the constitution of a real regime of socialist democracy, bolstering the substitutionist character of the action of the party and the revolutionary army in relation to the masses. In the final analysis, the policy of "national concord" sanctioned both the exclusion of the problem of socialist democracy from the program of the VCP and the party's fierce desire to move to the seizure of power and the socialist reunification of the country.

It is on this latter question that the debates within our movement were most intense. On the basis of a different assessment of the role played by the Vietnamese CP, the character of its orientation, and even its social nature, some comrades drew a radically different assessment of the likely outcome of the struggle. The analysis of the International Executive Committee of 1972 was fully confirmed by the evolution of events.

21. The character of the regimes born of the victories of 1954 and 1975 must be understood in this overall context. The victorious outcome of a liberation struggle, the constitution of new workers states, and the socialist growing over of the revolution do not in fact guarantee the birth of a genuine proletarian democracy in the absence of a party with a revolutionary Marxist program and in the absence of prior soviet experiences by the masses. On the contrary, the birth of genuine socialist democracy is rendered doubtful by several factors: a historical conjuncture dominated by the relative passivity of the proletariat of the industrialized countries; the mold of a military liberation struggle and the conceptions of the party that rose to its head. *The Indochinese workers states were born bureaucratically deformed.* This was already the case in North Vietnam in 1954. The second resistance, against U.S. imperialism, certainly saw a genuine political advance of Vietnamese Communism in several spheres. The lessons of the first Indochina war were drawn, notably as regards the role of the agrarian reform. The analysis of the socialist growing over of the colonial revolution was refined, as well as that of the international relationship of forces. But this new wave of revolutionary struggle nonetheless did not give rise to the emergence of soviet structures of power nor to the challenging either of the political monopoly of the Workers party of Vietnam or of its internal regime. The balance of social forces engaged in the revolution in the South was not qualitatively modified.

South Vietnam has gone through an intense process of "urbanization" during the past decade. But this was a "forced urbanization," the product of the exodus of

refugees, driven away by bombing or systematically displaced and deported. The American intervention did not foster the growth of a proletariat, urban or rural, but on the contrary tended to socially "marginalize" an important part of the population, who were reduced to the status of beggars or "lumpen proletarians" living parasitically or through prostitution. The specific weight of the socially organized proletariat in the cities of South Vietnam tended to decrease not increase.

The liberation of Saigon did not alter the character of the relations the VCP had established with the masses. The reunification of the country had ambivalent effects in the South, accelerating the socialist growing over of the revolution but also offering an already established institutional model, that of the bureaucratically deformed workers state in North Vietnam. The general elections of April 25, 1976, confirm this. All of the great *problems of orientation* (pace of unification and statization of the economy, content of the future constitution, political structure of the country, etc.) were discussed only by the leaderships of the party and the state. The VCP enjoys a real *political monopoly*. The formal presence of "small parties" in the Front of the Fatherland in the North and the National Liberation Front in the South or the association of political personalities of the former "third force" do not alter this status. The presentation of lists of candidates—single lists—was the act of the masses organizations controlled by the party and could not give rise to a *confrontation of different programs of development* within the framework of the socialist reunification of the country. The elections had an essentially *plebiscitary* character, the major leaders of the party drawing more than 90 percent of the vote, as high as 99.76 percent in the case of Le Duan in Hanoi. This plebiscitary character, confirming the process of socialist reunification of the country and the complete political hegemony won by the VCP, was especially clear in the Saigon region. Under these conditions, such elections reinforce the substitutionist role of the party and curb the politicization of the masses instead of aiding in raising the level of political consciousness of the masses.

But at the same time, since the final liberation of the country the mass organizations in the South, including those in urban areas, have experienced development. The masses rapidly took direct charge of some local problems of production, the organization of labor, the hierarchy, and the operation of the factories. In the North, the demands of the population after the victory are being expressed forcefully, especially through a vigorous critique of bureaucratic phenomena. This characteristic gap between the direct participation of the masses in political, social, and economic life on the local level (in the villages, neighborhoods, and factories) and the absence of their direct participation in national political life and the effective management of the state (over which the leadership of the Communist party exercises its political monopoly) reflects the absence both of a soviet system of state power and of an effective conception of socialist democracy on the part of the Vietnamese Communist party, even though the Vietnamese regime never assumed a repressive character analogous to that which prevailed with the victory of Stalin in the USSR.

22. The bureaucratic deformation of the Vietnamese

workers state is expressed on three levels: political, institutional, and social.

Politically, it is primarily expressed by the *one-party* position of the VCP and by the *bureaucratic centralism* that governs the internal functioning of this party. The "small democratic parties" are more front organizations or professional associations (controlled by the CP) than real political parties that compete with the VCP and are able to wage their own political propaganda. There is no law guaranteeing the opportunity of building workers parties other than the Workers party of Vietnam. In this context, the mode of internal functioning of the VCP is no less gravely damaging. Indeed, within the party, as within the state, the debates over orientation and principal decisions are the business only of the leadership. The debates organized throughout the whole of the party relate mainly to the problems that arise in the application of the line that is determined beforehand. This *combination* of a de facto one-party regime and a bureaucratic centralist functioning within the VCP is one of the factors that *prohibit* the *direct* participation of the masses in the management of society as a whole.

Institutionally, the bureaucratically deformed character of the Vietnamese workers state is expressed in the institutional gap that exists between the local "popular committees" on the one hand and the National Assembly on the other hand, as well as in the recognized preeminence of the party within the state. By refusing to make the National Assembly a direct emanation of the local committees, the VCP facilitated institutionalized *expropriation of political power* through votes in each electoral district on lists that were drawn up by the CP itself in the final analysis. This delegation of power is fundamentally illustrated by the pre-eminence of the VCP over all the other organs of power, as is recognized in the preamble to the constitution now in force in the North. Here again, this *combination* of the role assigned to the (sole) party and the institutional structure of Vietnam prohibits the direct exercise of power by the masses on a national scale and paves the way for a close fusion of the party and the state.

Socially, the bureaucratic deformations of the Vietnamese workers state have a double corollary: *the institutionalization of privileges of function* on the one hand and the possibility of bureaucratic growths drawing support from the very institutional structure on the other hand. Although there has not yet been any official decision in the South, in the North there is a detailed span of wages (for wages higher than 105 dong) as well as a strict hierarchical structure of advantages of function. The wage span remains relatively less open and while institutionalized privileges of function (automobile, cook, special stores) are already significant, they are still relatively limited when compared with those that exist in the "people's democracies." But this codification of the hierarchy of wages or privileges of function is reproduced in the hierarchy of responsibilities in the party. It has probably served both to limit the extension of authorized bureaucratic privileges and to legalize them at the same time. This *combination* between the legalization of privileges of function and the identification between the social hierarchy and the political hierarchy on the one hand and the institutional gap that prohibits the direct exercise of state power by the masses on a national scale on the other hand facilitates the permanent development of social tendencies

toward bureaucratization.

Only the direct exercise of economic and state power by the masses can really put an end to these bureaucratic developments. But this direct exercise of power by the masses requires a profound remodeling of the institutional structure, giving rise to a regime of the soviet type, the establishment of democratic centralism within the VCP assuring free discussion of great orientations, the free formation of tendencies and public debates, the real possibility of the formation of several parties within the framework of socialist legality, and effective means for any popular group to fully participate in debates within soviet organs with its own press and its own propaganda.

IV. A New Period in the Indochinese Revolution

23. The continuity of the orientation advanced by the VCP so far is linked in good part to the international historical conjuncture and to the framework of struggle within which this orientation was formulated. With the evolution of the world situation and the completion of the anti-imperialist battle, the context in which the VCP acts and the central tasks with which it is confronted are radically transformed.

The international position of the Vietnamese revolution has been doubly modified. It can no longer put itself forward on the international scene as a fighting revolution, thus imposing its authority, objectively fulfilling a profound internationalist function simply by virtue of the struggle it was waging and the effect it had on the world relationship of forces. The Vietnamese revolution has won victory at a time when the crisis of Stalinism is gradually entering a new phase, more explosive and clearly more critical than in the past. The open tensions between the People's Republic of China and Vietnam (over ownership of the Spatly and Paracel Islands as well as over general diplomatic orientations), the latent tensions between Cambodia and Vietnam, the new responsibilities that devolve upon the Indochinese revolution with regard to the class struggle in Thailand, and the objective responsibility of the VCP in the recomposition of the revolutionary movement in Southeast Asia represent the initial signs of the new difficulties and tasks with which the VCP and more generally the Indochinese Communist parties are and will be confronted.

Internally, the waging of a protracted guerrilla war in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and a war of national defense of the DRV facilitated the simultaneous maintenance of an intense mass mobilization and the political monopoly of the Communist party leaderships over the great decisions. Today the Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian revolutions are facing tasks primarily of economic reconstruction and the problems of transitional societies in economically and socially backward countries. The extreme underdevelopment in which colonization and imperialism left Laos and Cambodia make the period now opening in these countries particularly difficult. In this new context, the nature of the relations established by the Communist parties with the state on the one hand and the masses on the other hand will, more than in the past, weigh negatively on the course of the revolution. In the historical context of the post second world war period, the

Vietnamese revolution was able to resolve the tasks of the conquest of power, national liberation, agrarian reform, and construction of a workers state without resolving, in fact without even posing, the question of genuine proletarian democracy. This is no longer the case, however, when the task at hand relates to society in transition to socialism. *The VCP is now directly and centrally confronted by two key tasks whose real solutions are foreign to its program and history: the maintenance of a properly internationalist policy after the victory and the institution of a genuine socialist democracy in the framework of the transitional society.* The Vietnamese Workers party's conceptions of the party and the state will increasingly sharply be counterposed to the objective tasks of the Vietnamese revolution. In Laos the relative weakness of the social dynamic internal to the country, as well as the relative weakness of the CP, are added to the difficulties. In Cambodia the policy of the Angkar has forbidden the very formation of stable mass organizations, even under the control of the CP, as a result of the authoritarian displacements of population carried out in the name of the exigencies of reconstruction.

24. The soviet conception of the workers state is not just one conception among others. It is the only conception that can fundamentally resolve some of the problems that determine the evolution of society in transition to socialism: the direct intervention, through the representation of the workers and peasant councils at all levels, of the masses in the management of the state; the democratic confrontation of orientations and of possible choices of development within the framework of soviet legality, and hence effective control over cadres and functionaries and the blocking of bureaucratic phenomena; the rotation of functions; the elaboration of an economic plan that takes exact account of the requirements of the population; the permanent raising of the class consciousness of the workers. It is this system that guarantees the dictatorship of the proletariat and simultaneously permits the beginning of the withering away of the state.

The existence of a free and untrammelled process of self-organization of the proletariat in power is in fact an indispensable condition for the establishment of a socialist democracy and for the struggle to counteract tendencies toward bureaucratization. The solution to the infinitely complex problems of the transition to socialism requires, more than anything else, a very high degree of conscious activity of the masses. This implies the intervention of a mass revolutionary party capable of proposing the necessary orientations, the active organization of the masses in councils, and the genuine right of tendencies or parties that accept soviet legality to defend their own program.

The absence of a workers state based on the soviet system *objectively implies* the permanence and tendential aggravation of bureaucratic phenomena, waste and economic malfunctioning, grave errors in the pace of socioeconomic development (as was the case in 1956 in North Vietnam), the tendential widening of the gap between cadres and functionaries on the one hand and the masses on the other hand, and a permanent danger of depoliticization of the masses. *This remains true regardless of the gains of the victorious revolution in terms of mass political consciousness and mobilization.*

25. The lessons of the Chinese revolution and of the course it has followed since 1949 confirm this. These lessons must be fully assimilated to the benefit of the Indochinese revolutions. In spite of the considerable historic import of the victory of 1949, in spite of the qualities exhibited by the leadership of the Chinese CP during the national liberation struggle, in spite of the absence of any grave defeats of the Chinese masses (like the defeats that presided over the process of Stalinization in the USSR), the Chinese regime has entered a profound crisis, a crisis that the cultural revolution did not resolve in spite of the scope of the mass mobilizations that occurred at the time. One of the fundamental explanations of the prolonged crisis shaking the Chinese regime lies in the existence of a political and institutional gap between the state and party on the one hand and the masses on the other hand. The trends toward bureaucratization have been able to take lasting root in this gap and acquire considerable dimensions.

The phenomenon of bureaucratism finds its objective roots in the economic, social, and cultural underdevelopment of the former colonies or semicolonies and in the need to maintain a state and "bourgeois" norms of distribution during the period of transition. But this phenomenon is able to express itself especially freely since it is lodged in the institutional structures of a deformed workers state and is endorsed by the orientation of the CP itself. Now, what the Chinese experience confirms is that the emergence of a genuine socialist democracy—and of consistent internationalism—presupposes a *programmatic break* with the orientation of the CP. The same is true today in Indochina. And here again, a number of powerful obstacles will prevent such a reorientation: the presence of these parties within the "official" communist movement and their relative dependence on Moscow or Peking; the absence of previous experiences in soviet democracy on their part, whether regionally or internationally; more generally, the maintenance of authoritarian state traditions beyond colonization, which were never broken by a bourgeois-democratic revolution; the weight of social and economic backwardness aggravated first by colonization and then by the destruction caused by the war; the programmatic limitations inherent in the absence of participation in a mass revolutionary international, which does not exist today; the existence of a established constitutional and state framework and the emergence of bureaucratic privileges.

Because it clashes both with a deeply rooted political tradition and with the material interests of bureaucratic layers in formation, the challenging of the previous orientation on the questions of constitution and international policy cannot occur in the form of a simple adjustment. The sharpness of bureaucratic phenomena in Vietnam today confirms this: In spite of the maintenance of a intense mass mobilization and in spite of the deepening of class consciousness occurring in the cities of the South, the expression of these phenomena is such that the leadership of the VCP has been led to engage in a real campaign of denunciation of bureaucratic *behavior*. A "corps of popular inspectors" elected by the rank and file, the members of which remain in the productive system, has been constituted in the North to inquire into this behavior.

But the whole of the policy of the VCP leadership is directed against the excessively serious *effects* of the bureaucratic deformations of the workers state and the party more than at their profound *causes*. Here again the example of China, where campaigns of antibureaucratic denunciation of great scope were waged, demonstrates the inadequacy of these types of measures. The Chinese example confirms that by itself no wing of the bureaucracy can pose and resolves the question of socialist democracy in its institutional dimensions or in its political and social dimensions. It also confirms the inability of essentially *subjectivist* antibureaucratic campaigns (that is, campaigns attacking attitudes and behavior by relying on the consciousness of cadres and the indirect control of the masses more than attacking the state structures) to halt the tendencies toward bureaucratization in a lasting manner.

In fact, a resolutely internationalist and soviet orientation cannot be born without a twofold and new experience of the Vietnamese proletariat and Indochinese masses: the experience of the tasks of socialist industrialization and the experience of future developments of the world revolution. In the absence of an extremely favorable and not very likely international conjuncture (namely the *very rapid* development of the world revolution in several sectors: West Europe, Southeast Asia, even political revolution in China), the crystallization of bureaucratic interests will inevitably mount in the coming period.

The twofold task of inserting the Vietnamese revolution into future developments of the world revolution and establishing soviet democracy basically remain the stakes of a combination of political and social conflicts that will very probably eventually be reflected in open political and organizational crises of the VCP, the Laotian PRP, and the Cambodian Angkar. The exact form such crises will take will depend in large part on the evolution of the social mobilization of the masses in Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries and on the pace of development of the world revolution.

26. It must not be deduced from this that the Vietnamese and Indochinese revolutions have lost their dynamism, that the Workers party of Vietnam will henceforth oppose the development of social struggles in Southeast Asia, or that the Indochinese Communist organizations will immediately enter an open crisis. While the trend toward the ever more pronounced crystallization of bureaucratic interests is now inevitable, *the decisive confrontation between the bureaucracy in process of consolidation and the mobilized masses will be the outcome of a process that had only just begun.*

The situation in Vietnam is especially complex in that it involves the "fusion" of a workers state born more than twenty years ago with another workers state barely formed, and in that it involves the combination of two decades of postrevolutionary developments in the North with a revolution just now victorious in the South. While the experience acquired in the DRV will be precious for all Vietnam, the weight of bureaucratic deformations in the northern zone, the scope and gravity of the destruction, and the character of the social deformations caused by the imperialist aggression in the southern zone constitute serious objective obstacles.

The rapidity of the reunification of Vietnam, the scope of the social upheavals that accompanied it in the South,

and the vigor of the mass mobilizations throughout the country testify to the continued vitality of the ongoing revolution. The links that have been forged among the VCP, the Laotian PRP, and the Thai CP, like Hanoi's attitude to the successive governments in Bangkok, illustrate the progressive role they continue to play in the extension of the revolutionary process on a regional scale, even though the Vietnamese Communist party will very probably not call for the constitution of a Southeast Asian OLAS and will normalize its diplomatic relations with the governments of the region.

More generally, the historic import of the Vietnamese revolution derives in large part from its *prolonged duration and vitality*. The only revolution to have achieved victory in a colony through establishing a workers state (in the North), it is also the first to have defeated American power after the latter had committed its full political authority and the essential part of its non-nuclear war resources. The Vietnamese revolution forms a bridge between two periods of the international and regional class struggle. It is this unique *continuity*, spanning the interruption of the Geneva accords, that best manifests the depth, vigor, and scope of the revolutionary process that permitted the successive vanquishing of French colonialism and American neocolonialism. It is this exceptional endurance that enabled the Vietnamese revolution to obtain aid from the USSR and to victoriously resist the imperialist counteroffensive unleashed just after the victory of the Cuban revolution, in spite of the unprecedented concentration of means of destruction against Indochina and in spite of the serious defeats suffered by the international workers movement in several regions. It is this that enabled the Vietnamese revolution gradually to act on the world relationship of forces, which was often unfavorable, and then to benefit from the general new rise of class struggle that took shape in the late 1960s.

This capacity to act over a long duration, this profound mobilization of the population, which has affected several successive generations, was not suddenly exhausted on the day of final victory over imperialism. Given the present world situation, the Vietnamese masses cannot experience a profound and rapid defeat like that suffered by the Soviet proletariat between the two world wars.

In this context, the new sharpness of the internal contradictions within the Indochinese transitional societies will only gradually make itself felt *openly*, at least in Vietnam. The homogeneity and authority of leaderships like that of the Workers party of Vietnam, the quality of the links the latter has forged with the masses, and its capacity to respond to the initial tasks of reconstruction and industrialization mean that its orientation will not rapidly be challenged. Especially since the fatigue consequent to the war is probably deep among the masses. A latent resistance to the growth of bureaucratic privilege and to the strengthening of the power of the bureaucrats will nonetheless be strongly felt. In this sense, the lessons of the crisis of 1956, during which a section of the peasantry reacted very violently against the administrative and bureaucratic extension of the agrarian reform, remain current.

Nevertheless, it is these contradictions, political and social, national and international, that already dominate the evolution of Vietnam, Laos, and, in a particularly

explosive manner, Cambodia. It is to these contradictions that the Indochinese peoples must objectively respond today.

27. The responsibility of the world workers movement and the Fourth International is involved here, as in the past. Our movement has an important tradition of solidarity with the Vietnamese and Indochinese revolutions. Since the beginning of the 1930s, with the formation of the first Vietnamese Trotskyist organizations, our movement has oriented its action as a function of the dynamic of permanent revolution that had to be acquired by the national liberation struggle. Just after the second world war our French section, in spite of its extreme weakness, was one of the rare organizations of the imperialist metropolis not to abandon its internationalist responsibilities toward the peoples of Indochina and rejected the holy French Union. In December 1965 at the beginning of the "local war," the Eighth World Congress of the Fourth International issued an appeal for international mobilization. In Japan and Europe our sections were able to play an active role, sometimes a leading role, in animating the solidarity movement, as was the Socialist Workers party in the United States in organizations like the National Peace Action Coalition.

This activity was not without weaknesses, and it was sometimes impossible to guarantee the continuity that was necessary. But as a whole it was considerable, taking account of the strength of our movement. This tradition of anti-imperialist solidarity must be maintained and deepened.

Likewise, the present international context must enable the workers movement and revolutionary militants to continue to contribute concrete aid to the Indochinese revolutions—by struggling for war reparations to be paid by American imperialism and by organizing international aid for reconstruction, as well as by acting on the ongoing evolution of the world revolution.

The continuing international rise of class struggles will profoundly modify the relationship of forces within the workers movement in favor of the revolutionary forces. It will tend to qualitatively diminish the capacity of the imperialist powers to undertake operations to "destabilize" new revolutionary regimes and will likewise diminish the possibilities of the major bureaucratized workers states' putting economic and political pressure on the Indochinese revolution.

In addition, what we are seeing today is not merely the extension of revolutionary processes. The progressive shift of the center of gravity of class struggle toward the developed capitalist countries implies a new transformation of the forms of the international revolution, the reactualization of soviet organs of power, and the increase of the specific weight of the industrial proletariat in the revolutionary struggle. Indeed, the first steps of the new rise of class struggle in West Europe confirm that *the generalization and centralization of soviet type organs of self-organization of the broad toiling masses constitute the key problem of revolutionary strategy from the very beginning of the revolutionary crisis in Europe*. The regime of workers councils will cease to be simply a theoretical acquisition of the workers movement and will again become an empirical reality, an experience lived through by the world revolution. It is incumbent upon revolutionary Marxist militants in particular to increase

the echoes these experiences may have in the Indochinese countries engaged in the transition to socialism and to foster to the utmost the birth of genuinely antibureaucratic and internationalist tendencies.

The world revolution, and quite particularly the proletariat and toiling masses of the imperialist centers, owe much

to the Indochinese revolution. They are now in position to repay their debt by demanding the organization of international aid for the reconstruction of the countries of Indochina and by favorably modifying the world context in which the Indochinese masses continue their revolutionary work.