

# International Internal Discussion Bulletin

**volume XI    number 5**

April 1974

**FOURTH WORLD CONGRESS SINCE REUNIFICATION  
(Tenth World Congress)  
February 1974**

1. Minutes	3
2. Voting Record	11
3. Attachments to the Minutes	15
4. Statement of the Majority Tendency at the Conclusion of the Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International, submitted March 17, 1974	24
5. Statement of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, submitted April 3, 1974	26

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# Fourth World Congress Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress) of the Fourth International February 1974

## MINUTES

### *First Session*

Chair: Aubin, Crandall.

Convened: 10:40 a.m.

### *I. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS*

Congress convened by Walter.

The congress pays tribute to the comrades who have died since the last world congress, including: Tomás Cham-bi, member of the Central Committee of the Bolivian section, killed while leading the La Paz peasant column that took part in the August 21, 1971, battle against the Banzer coup; Luis Mamani Limachi, murdered by the Bolivian military dictatorship; Eduardo Merlino, murdered by the Brazilian military dictatorship; Nelson de Souza Knoll, murdered by the Chilean military dictatorship; Luis Pujals, Pedro Bonnet, the other Trotskyist leaders of the PRT-Conbatiente [Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores—Revolutionary Workers Party], and their comrades, including those in Trelew, murdered by the Argentine military dictatorship; Peter Graham (Ireland), murdered; José Zuniga, peasant leader of the FIR [Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario—Front of the Revolutionary Left] in Cuzco, Peru, murdered; Seki (Japan); Georg Moltved (Denmark); Renzo Gambino and Libero Villone (Italy); Edith Beauvais and Charles Marie (France); Vincent Raymond Dunne and Constance Weissman (U.S.); Joe Baxter (Argentina); Lazaris (Greece); Maureen Keegan (Ireland); Kenth-Ake Andersson (Sweden).

*Motion by Walter:* That an honorary presidium be elected consisting of comrades being held in prison under imperialist or Stalinist repression in Spain, Chile, China, Bolivia, Greece and Uruguay. Those whose names are known include Cheng Chi-lun, Cheng Chin-tung, Yin Kwun, Lau Sau, Lau Peng-chil, Lee Lok-ming, Mui Yui-tun, Chau Ten-sun, Lam Ching-kai, and Wang Kwok-lung. That Luis Vitale, now being held by the military dictatorship in Chile, be named honorary chairman.

*Motion carried.*

*Motion by Ghulam:* To send solidarity greetings to Rohanna Wijeweera and other imprisoned militants of the JVP in Sri Lanka as follows:

The Tenth World Congress salutes Rohanna Wijeweera and his comrades, who are at the present time incarcerated in Sri Lanka's prisons and are being tried for high treason. We assure them that we will continue to wage a campaign for their unconditional release throughout the world. We assure them that the continuing repression against them by the Bandaranaike coalition government shall be brought to the notice of the entire workers movement. We assure them of our continuing solidarity.

*Motion carried.*

*Procedural motions from the outgoing United Secretariat, Hans reporting:*

- a. To accept the following rules:
  1. Time limit for reports, 45 minutes.
  2. Time limit for contributions to discussion, 10 minutes.
  3. Time limit for summaries, 15 minutes.
  4. On disputed procedural points and points of order, one speaker for and one against, 3 minutes each.
  5. No second round of speakers until all who want to speak on first round have spoken.
  6. Contributions to discussion to alternate, beginning with IEC Majority Tendency, then the IEC Minority Tendency, then the Mezhrayonka Tendency, Japanese delegation, and delegates not associated with either of the two main tendencies.
  7. Limit congress to two daily sessions.
  8. That all delegates present have one vote on procedural questions; no votes to be taken on political resolutions until the final session.
- b. Presidium to be composed of the following 12 members: The 4 members of the United Secretariat Parity Commission (Hans, Walter, Fourier, Juan), 3 each from

the IEC Majority Tendency and the IEC Minority Tendency (Lars, Moss, Thinville, T.T. Roy, Lorenzo, Dunder), and one each from the Japanese delegation and the Mezhrayonka Tendency (Sakai and Karew).

c. That there be 4 secretaries: Benny, Robs, Dugger, and Chino.

d. That a Security Committee be constituted by the Presidium.

e. That a Mandates and Recognition Commission be constituted with five each from the IEC Majority and IEC Minority Tendencies, and one each from the Mezhrayonka Tendency and the Japanese delegation (Werner, Martine, Rooth, Petersen, Manuel, Stateman, Dunder, Alberto, Cesar, Fireman, Herb, Sakai).

f. That an auditing commission be constituted consisting of Martine, Darnelle, and Jensen for the Majority, and Aubrey and Thérèse for the Minority.

g. That Aubin and Crandall chair the first session.

h. To approve the following discussion schedule:

1. Three reports, discussion and summaries on World Political resolution—10 hours.

2. Two reports, discussion and summaries on Bolivia—8 hours.

3. Two reports, discussion and summaries on Argentina—8 hours.

4. Three reports, discussion and summaries on Armed Struggle in Latin America Resolution—4 hours.

5. Three reports, discussion and summaries on European resolutions—8 hours.

6. Statutes, mandates and recognition of sections, voting, election of IEC.

*Motions on organization of convention carried.*

## II. *IEC MAJORITY REPORT ON WORLD POLITICAL SITUATION* by Walter.

### *IEC MINORITY REPORT ON WORLD POLITICAL SITUATION* by Hans.

Session recessed for lunch at 1:20 p.m.

Session reconvened at 3:05 p.m.

*Chair reads statement from Swedish delegation:* The Swedish delegation protests against the presence of Comrade Anders at this Congress who is not a delegate. The leadership of the Swedish organization has neither been informed nor consulted prior to this accomplished fact. This shows that the so-called Leninist-Trotskyist Faction places its own factional interests and discipline *above* the interests and discipline of the sections of which they are members.

*Motion from Italian delegation* by Edgardo: Not to permit Luigi to report on World Political Situation for Mezhrayonka Tendency because he is not a delegate.

*Declaration of vote of Italian delegation:*

The Italian delegation protests Comrade Luigi's participation in the proceedings of the Tenth Congress:

1. Because the delegation does not feel that a minority declaration is sufficient grounds for having the right to

be seated and have voice at the world congress, especially when insufficient votes were cast to elect a delegate; this right is reserved for delegates and members of outgoing leaderships;

2. Because the motion put forth by Comrade L.'s tendency at the congress of the Italian section asking approval to send one member of the tendency to the world congress was rejected by the vast majority of the delegates.

The Italian delegation feels that the Compass Tendency's statement acknowledging its erroneous method was completely superfluous:

1. Because it involved the repetition of an error—L's attendance at the congress of the Walloon section having gone against the advice of the section itself—while at the same time a meeting of the Italian Central Committee, of which L. is a member, was being held;

2. Because it isn't worth very much to make a self-criticism that has no consequences. Given the situation, the consequences should have included the refusal to admit Comrade L. and the rejection of a policy of making fait accompli decisions.

Unanimous decision of the Italian delegation.

### *Discussion Against* Herb.

Chair read statement from United Secretariat recommending that Luigi be permitted to be a reporter:

1. Normal procedure requires that at a world congress the reporters should be either delegates or members of the IEC.

2. In case of small but recognized international tendencies that have declared themselves as such on the basis of a written platform, and in order to protect their right to full democratic participation in the discussion, the congress can make an exception and grant them the right to designate nondelegates as reporters if they think it is in the best interests of defending their political positions to do so. However, such proposals must be made through normal organizational channels and the leadership of the sections involved must be consulted prior to submitting their proposals to the congress.

3. In the case of the International Compass Tendency which has just indicated its programmatic basis in a written form (see attachment #1) and which has designated Comrade Luigi as their reporter for the political resolution at the world congress, the United Secretariat regrets that this procedure was not followed. The United Secretariat notes that the International Compass Tendency has itself recognized that it made a mistake by not doing so. But in order to underline the widest application of tendency rights at this congress, the United Secretariat suggests granting the International Compass Tendency its request.

*Vote on Edgardo motion:*

For, 45; against, 108; abstentions, 23.

*Motion defeated.*

## *MEZHRAYONKA TENDENCY REPORT ON WORLD POLITICAL SITUATION* by Luigi.

Discussion on World Political Situation: Roman, Galois, Sakai, Ghulam, Raúl E., Krasno, Jaber, Alberto, Chandra, Gabriel, Thérèse, Almouen, Moss, Norma, Mikado, Key.

Session adjourned at 7:45 p.m.

Session reconvened at 9:30 a.m.

Discussion on World Political Situation continued: Dar-melle, Ahmad, Montes, Duret, Juan, Domingo, T.T. Roy, Enrique, Jake, Mike, Roberto, Fourier, Josefina, Tom, Jeff, Dumas.

*Summary of Mezhrayonka Tendency report on World Political Situation by Luigi.*

*Summary of IEC Minority report on World Political Situation by Hans.*

*Summary of IEC Majority report on World Political Situation by Walter.*

Session recessed at 1:50 p.m.

Session reconvened at 9:10 p.m.

*Recommendation from Presiding Committee:* No afternoon session to allow IEC Majority reporters time to prepare reports.

*Recommendation adopted.*

Chair: Thinville and Susan.

III. **IEC MAJORITY REPORT ON BOLIVIA** by Serrano.

**IEC MINORITY REPORT ON BOLIVIA** by Lorenzo.

Discussion on Bolivia: Alejandro, Antonio, Heredia, Sebastian.

Session adjourned at midnight.

Session reconvened at 9:25 a.m.

Discussion on Bolivia continued: César, Chandra, Tous-saint, Chino, Nagai, Raúl A., Pedro, Krasno, Miguel, Blanco, Herb, Raul B., Paille, Janes, Charbonneau, George, Dudi.

Session recessed for lunch at 1:00 p.m.

Session reconvened at 2:40 p.m.

Discussion on Bolivia continued: Martine, Lee, Juan B., Scott, Claudio, Atwood, Manuel, Alberto.

*Summary of IEC Minority report on Bolivia by Lorenzo.*

*Summary of IEC Majority report on Bolivia by Serrano.*

Session recessed at 5:10 p.m. on request of IEC Majority Tendency for caucus meeting.

Session reconvened at 6:25 p.m.

IV. **IEC MAJORITY REPORT ON ARGENTINA** by S. Lopez.

**IEC MINORITY REPORT ON ARGENTINA** by Arturo.

Session adjourned at 8:10 p.m.

Session reconvened at 9:35 a.m.

Discussion on Argentina: Gallego, Hans, Heredia.

*Motion by Presidium:* To grant Heredia a 10-minute extension.

*Motion carried.*

Discussion on Argentina continued: Nestor, Efraim, Krasno, Fideli, Paille, Sakai, Carlos, Chino, Anna, César, Peledo, Norma.

Session recessed for lunch at 12:50 p.m.

Session reconvened at 2:40 p.m.

Discussion on Argentina continued: Ramiro, Blanco, Segur, Bundy, Karew, Claudio, Jorge, Beto, Alberto, René, Mario, Sebastian, Atwood, Walter, Ernesto, Fourier, Pedro.

*Summary of IEC Minority report on Argentina by Arturo.*

*Summary of IEC Majority report on Argentina by S. Lopez.*

Session recessed at 6:40 p.m.

Session reconvened at 6:55 p.m.

Chair: Scott and Sylvia.

V. **IEC MAJORITY REPORT ON ARMED STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA** by Roman.

Session adjourned at 7:43 p.m.

Session reconvened at 9:15 a.m.

**IEC MINORITY REPORT ON ARMED STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA** by Juan.

*Motion by Juan:* To extend time for reports, discussion and summaries on Armed Struggle in Latin America from 4 to 8 hours. Following Mezhrayonka report the tendencies should caucus to consider this proposal.

Discussion: Walter.

**MEZHRAYONKA TENDENCY REPORT ON ARMED STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA** by Willie.

Session recessed for caucus meetings at 10:47 a.m.

Session reconvened at 12:23 p.m.

*Motion by Presidium:* To extend discussion on Armed Struggle in Latin America for rest of the day with 11 speakers each for the IEC Majority and IEC Minority, and five for Mezhrayonka, Japanese delegation, or other unaffiliated delegates. One speaker each from the IEC Majority and IEC Minority tendencies to be allowed to speak twice.

*Motion by Presidium:*

- a. To continue with European reports, discussion and summaries as scheduled.
- b. No interruptions by tendency caucuses during sessions on Armed Struggle in Latin America and Europe.
- c. Limit time on reports and discussion for final session to 5 1/2 hours.
- d. Schedule for final session to be as follows:
  1. Statutes.
  2. Mandates and Recognition Commission Report.
  3. Status of groups in Argentina, Spain, Canada.
  4. Voting on resolutions.
  5. Election of IEC.

*Vote on motions*

For, 106; against, 43; abstentions, 22.

*Motions carried.*

Discussion on Armed Struggle in Latin America: Walter, Blanco, Thomas, Nestor, Bundy, Anna, Roberto, David, Nagai, Manuel, T.T. Roy, Chandra, Domingo, Blanco, Carlos, Sabawe, Heredia, Claudio, Pedro, Serrano, Jorge, Enrique, Lorenzo, Claudio, Hans.

*Summary of Mezhrayonka report on Armed Struggle in Latin America by Willie.*

*Summary of IEC Minority report on Armed Struggle in Latin America by Juan.*

*Summary of IEC Majority report on Armed Struggle in Latin America by Roman.*

Session adjourned at 8:15 p.m.

Session convened at 9:35 a.m.

Chair: Paille and Brewster.

**VI. IEC MAJORITY REPORT ON EUROPEAN RESOLUTION** by Claudio.

**IEC MINORITY REPORT ON EUROPEAN RESOLUTION** by Roberto.

**MEZHRAYONKA TENDENCY REPORT ON EUROPEAN RESOLUTION** by Herb.

Discussion on European resolution: Jesús, Scott, Allen, Walter, Fireman.

Session recessed for lunch at 1:00 p.m.

Session reconvened at 3:00 p.m.

Discussion on European resolution continued: Edgardo, Adair, Thinville, Willie, Susan, Mintoff, Nagai, Friedrich, Jensen, Sakai, Dunder, Brewster, Mario, Dumas, Ned, Krasno, Williams, Lebrun, Raúl E., Rudi, Crandall, Enrique, Thérèse.

*Summary of Mezhrayonka report on European resolution by Herb.*

*Summary of IEC Minority report on European resolution by Roberto.*

*Summary of IEC Majority report on European resolution by Claudio.*

Session adjourned at 8:05 p.m.

Session reconvened at 5:50 p.m.

Chair: Claudio and Stateman.

**VII. IEC MAJORITY TENDENCY REPORT ON MEASURES TO HELP MAINTAIN UNITY** by Fourier.

**IEC MINORITY TENDENCY REPORT ON MEASURES TO HELP MAINTAIN UNITY** by Hans.

*Motion from the Presidium:* To adopt the following recommendations:

*Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain Unity of the Fourth International*

Unanimously adopted by Presiding Committee—  
February 14, 1974

1. No exclusion of any groups or members now belonging to the tendencies or factions in the Fourth International.

2. No reduction in status of groups currently recognized as sections or sympathizing groups.

3. Adoption of a general formula to determine status in the following special situation:

In countries where adherents of the Fourth International are divided into two or more groups acting publicly apart from each other, no group shall be recognized as a section, but all groups shall be recognized as sympathizing groups. But if the groups in any of these countries fuse before the next world congress, the International Executive Committee is empowered to recognize the united group as a section.

These are exceptional measures not to be taken as setting a precedent of any kind. It is not the purpose of these measures to encourage splits by giving minority groups the hope that they will receive recognition from the International if they leave a section and set up a public formation.

4. No recognition of challenges to mandate claims placed before the mandate commission by sections, sympathizing groups, or groups applying for recognition.

5. The vote cast on the counterposed political resolutions shall be taken as the criterion in determining the approximate proportional representation in membership

of the different tendencies or factions on the incoming International Executive Committee and Control Commission.

6. Enlargement of the membership of the incoming International Executive Committee to reflect the growth in size of the Fourth International since the last world congress.

7. Adoption of the following two categories in the membership of the incoming International Executive Committee:

a. Full status for members of sections.

b. Consultative status for members of sympathizing groups.

Full members and consultative members shall have the same rights in everything except voting. Full members shall have decisive votes; consultative members consultative votes. For purposes of replacement, alternate members shall be listed according to tendency or faction and placed in numbered rank.

8. Reaffirmation of the ten-point agreement defining the preconditions for an authoritative world congress that was unanimously adopted by the United Secretariat September 19, 1973. (See attached.)

9. As part of the implementation of this agreement, each of the tendencies or factions shall make statements at the close of the congress proclaiming their firm support to maintaining the unity of the Fourth International.

#### *Attachment*

#### *Recommendations to the Delegates of the Coming World Congress*

Adopted unanimously by the United Secretariat  
September 19, 1973

The fear has been voiced that the differences under discussion in the Fourth International and the organizations in sympathy with it could lead to a split. To counteract this danger and to strengthen the unity of our movement, the United Secretariat reaffirms its statement "The Preconditions for an Authoritative World Congress" that was unanimously adopted on April 9, 1973.\*

In addition, the United Secretariat unanimously recommends to the delegates of the Fourth Congress Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress) that they adopt the following proposals:

1. That there be no expulsions or suspensions or application of disciplinary measures against sections of the Fourth International or any of its sympathizing groups.

2. That all sections and sympathizing groups be granted full voting rights at the next world congress in accordance with the number of their members in good standing, as specified in the statutes of the Fourth International.

3. That the present temporary statutes of the Fourth International be adopted without change.

4. That in those countries where two or more groups exist because of splits or other reasons, the united moral authority of the Fourth International be brought to bear for the earliest possible fusion of the groups on a principled basis.

5. That only resolutions and counterresolutions on the following points be placed on the agenda of the coming world congress for a vote: (a) the world political situation; (b) the question of orientation in Argentina;

(c) the question of orientation in Bolivia; (d) European perspectives; (e) statutes of the Fourth International.

6. That the international discussion on these points be closed following the world congress for one year unless the IEC decides to reopen the discussion earlier.

7. That the following points be considered in commissions or panels at the coming world congress: (a) the "cultural revolution" and China; (b) youth radicalization; (c) women's liberation; (d) Middle East; (e) Vietnam; (f) Eastern Europe.

8. That votes on these topics not be taken at the coming world congress.

9. That the international discussion on the questions listed in point No. 7, excluding analysis of conjunctural events in Vietnam and Eastern Europe, be continued in literary form following the coming world congress in a monthly bulletin not to exceed 48 pages.

10. That the Fifth Congress After Reunification (Eleventh World Congress) be held within two years following the coming world congress.

September 19, 1973

\* *The Preconditions for an Authoritative World Congress*  
Adopted unanimously by the United Secretariat

April 9, 1973

In view of the backlog of translations still to be done of documents submitted to the preparatory discussion for the next world congress and the number of documents already announced for presentation in the coming weeks, it appears unlikely that these can be placed in the hands of the rank and file before the conferences of the sections are held to choose delegates for the next world congress.

To overcome this difficulty and thus help to assure a fully democratic discussion and election of world congress delegates, the United Secretariat therefore unanimously recommends to membership of the I.E.C. postponement of the world congress. In accordance with the new date it also recommends that the final date for submission of material be set approximately three months in advance of the world congress. The United Secretariat is not bound to translate and publish material submitted after that date.

All national pre-world congress conferences should be rescheduled to be held as close to the world congress as practical, but not earlier than 6 weeks before the congress.

Some comrades have expressed fear that the delay in translating documents might be part of a process that would bring into question the authoritativeness of the next world congress.

The United Secretariat is of the unanimous opinion that fulfillment of the following conditions, regardless of the date of the congress, will assure recognition of the statutory authority of the decisions of the next world congress by all sections, sympathizing groups and international tendencies of the Fourth International.

1. A fully democratic preparatory world discussion.

2. Translation and circulation at least into English, French and Spanish of all documents submitted before the final deadline.

3. The democratic election of delegates to the world congress.

4. Democratic conduct of the congress.

*Recommendations of Presidium*

*New Sections*

Antilles  
Colombia  
Denmark  
Ireland  
Israel  
Lebanon  
Luxemburg  
Netherlands  
New Zealand  
Sweden  
Venezuela

*New Sympathizing Groups*

Brazil POC  
Brazil Ponto de Partido  
Finland  
Iran  
Iraq  
Norway  
Portugal  
Uruguay

*Particular Split Situations*

*Application of Point No. 3 of Agreement*

*Argentina:*

PST sympathizing group.  
FR sympathizing group.  
FB sympathizing group.

*Australia:*

SWL sympathizing group.  
CL sympathizing group.

*Mexico:*

GCI sympathizing group.  
LS sympathizing group.

*Spain:*

LCR/ sympathizing group.  
ETA VI  
LC sympathizing group.

*Application of Points No. 1 and No. 2*

*Canada:*

LSA/LSO section.  
RMG/GMR sympathizing group.

*Application of Point No. 2*

*Peru:*

FIR (Combate) section, two public factions.  
FIR (Comission Reorganizada)

*Hand vote on the motion:*

For, 138; against, 4; abstentions, 21.

*Motion carried.*

VIII. *REPORT ON STATUTES* by Duret.

*Motion from the outgoing United Secretariat:* To adopt the current statutes without change.

*Motion carried unanimously.*

IX. *VOTING ON RESOLUTIONS*

*Motion by Hans:* That this congress not vote on the International Majority Tendency resolution on Armed Struggle in Latin America; and that the incoming IEC be instructed to organize a discussion in the ranks on this question as part of the preparatory discussion for the next world congress.

*Vote on the motion:*

For, 56; against, 101; abstentions, 6.

*Motion defeated.*

*Motion from the Presidium:* That each tendency have one minute to specify what it is asking the delegates to vote for.

*Motion carried.*

*Walter for the International Majority Tendency:* To vote for the following resolutions and against all others:

1. For the International Majority Tendency "Draft Political Resolution."
2. For the International Majority Tendency "Draft Resolution on Bolivia."
3. For the International Majority Tendency "Draft Resolution on Argentina."
4. For the International Majority Tendency "Draft Resolution on Armed Struggle in Latin America."
5. For the International Majority Tendency "Draft Resolution on the Construction of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe."

*Hans for the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction:* To vote for the following resolutions and reports and against all others:

1. For the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction "Draft Political Resolution."
2. For the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction "Section Two of 'Argentina and Bolivia — The Balance Sheet.'"
3. For the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction "Section Three of 'Argentina and Bolivia — the Balance Sheet.'"
4. For the counterreport by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction to the "Draft Resolution on Armed Struggle in Latin America."
5. For the counterreport by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction to the "Draft Resolution on the Construction of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe."

*Herb for the Mezhrayonka Tendency:* To vote for the following resolutions:

1. For general line of "Why we reject the draft political



resolution, a question of method and contents," by CLC, Kompass and T.M.R.

2. For the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction "Section Two of 'Argentina and Bolivia — The Balance Sheet.'"

3. For the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction "Section Three of 'Argentina and Bolivia — the Balance Sheet.'"

4. For general line of "On the Orientation of the Fourth International in Latin America" (IIDB No. 22) by Kompass Tendency (Germany).

5. For rejection of the IMT draft of the European document and its concept of the "new Mass Vanguard," a criticism which is outlined in the draft for revision of the EPD by the Kompass Tendency (IIDB No. 25) and the contribution "New vanguards or building of the revolutionary party" by Nemo, Roc, Eleonore, Lesueur, Varlet (Wallonia).

Discussion: Aubin, Herb.

#### *Mandated votes on Political Resolution:*

International Majority Tendency:

For: 142 (sections, 114; sympathizing groups, 28)\*

Against: 124 (s, 20; sg, 104)

Abstentions: 4 (s, 3; sg, 1)

Leninist-Trotskyist Faction:

For: 118 (s, 14; sg, 104)

Against: 147 (s, 119; sg, 28)

Abstentions: 4 (s, 3; sg, 1)

Not voting: 1 (s, 1; sg, 0)

Mezhrayonka:

For: 7 (s, 7; sg, 0)

Against: 259 (s, 127; sg, 132)

Abstentions: 1 (s, 0; sg, 1)

Not voting: 3 (s, 3; sg, 0)

#### *Mandated votes on Bolivia Resolution:*

International Majority Tendency:

For: 137 (s, 109; sg, 28)

Against: 125 (s, 20; sg, 105)

Abstentions: 7 (s, 6; sg, 1)

Not voting: 1 (s, 1; sg, 0)

Leninist-Trotskyist Faction:

For: 125 (s, 20; sg, 105)

Against: 141 (s, 113; sg, 28)

Abstentions: 1 (s, 0; sg, 1)

Not voting: 3 (s, 3; sg, 0)

#### *Mandated votes on Argentina Resolution:*

International Majority Tendency:

For: 137 (s, 109; sg, 28)

Against: 125 (s, 20; sg, 105)

Abstentions: 7 (s, 6; sg, 1)

Not voting: 1 (s, 1; sg, 0)

Leninist-Trotskyist Faction:

For: 125 (s, 20; sg, 105)

Against: 140 (s, 112; sg, 28)

Abstentions: 1 (s, 0; sg, 1)

Not voting: 4 (s, 4; sg, 0)

#### *Mandated votes on Armed Struggle in Latin America:*

International Majority Tendency:

For: 142 (s, 114; sg, 28)

Against: 125 (s, 18; sg, 107)

Abstentions: 1 (s, 0; sg, 1)

Not voting: 2 (s, 2; sg, 0)

Leninist-Trotskyist Faction:

For: 118 (s, 13; sg, 105)

Against: 143 (s, 115; sg, 28)

Abstentions: 6 (s, 5; sg, 1)

Not voting: 3 (s, 3; sg, 0)

Mezhrayonka:

For: 9 (s, 9; sg, 0)

Against: 259 (s, 126; sg, 133)

Abstentions: 1 (s, 0; sg, 1)

Not voting: 1 (s, 1; sg, 0)

#### *Mandated votes on European Resolution:*

International Majority Tendency:

For: 144 (s, 116; sg, 28)

Against: 125 (s, 20; sg, 105)

Abstentions: 1 (s, 0; sg, 1)

Leninist-Trotskyist Faction

For: 118 (s, 13; sg, 105)

Against: 149 (s, 121; sg, 28)

Abstentions: 2 (s, 1; sg, 1)

Not voting: 1 (s, 1; sg, 0)

Mezhrayonka:

For: 5 (s, 5; sg, 0)

Against: 259 (s, 126; sg, 133)

Abstentions: 3 (s, 2; sg, 1)

Not voting: 3 (s, 3; sg, 0)

\*Sections are those groups recognized as such by the 4th World Congress Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress). Sympathizing groups include those who owing to reactionary legislation in their own countries (such as Argentina and the United States) are not able to affiliate to the Fourth International and cast consultative votes only.

## **X. ELECTION OF IEC**

### *Motion by Presidium:*

That the International Executive Committee be composed of a total of 127 members having the same rights in everything except voting. Full members having a decisive vote, and alternate members having a consultative vote are to be chosen from sections. Replacements of full members are to be made from the body of alternate members listed according to tendency or faction and placed in numbered rank. Members of sympathizing groups elected to the IEC have a consultative vote.

The composition of the 127 members of the International Executive Committee shall be as follows:

Full members, 51. Of these, 27 to be chosen by the International Majority Tendency; 20 by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction; plus Herb chosen by the Mezhrayonka Ten-

gency; Bala of the Sri Lanka section, and 2 chosen by the Japanese section.

Alternate members, 24. Of these, 12 to be chosen by the International Majority Tendency; 10 by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction; 1 by the Japanese section, plus Chandra chosen by the Mezhrayonka Tendency.

Consultative members, 52. Of these, 31 to be chosen by the International Majority; 21 by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction.

That the Control Commission be composed of 6 members. Of these, 4 to be chosen by the International Majority Tendency; 2 by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction.

*Motion carried.*

*International Majority Slate* presented by Duret:

To nominate as full members: Walter, Rudi, Jones, Petersen, Ghulam, Ned, Thinville, Fourier, Georges, Roman, Aubin, Segur, Duret, Karl, Jens, Frey, Claudio, Fideli, Barmann, Serrano, Felipe, Mintoff, Kurt, Valdez, Mikado, Jaber, a comrade from the Antilles to be chosen by the section.

To nominate as alternate members: Brewster, Werner, Domingo, Moss, a comrade from the Antilles to be chosen by the section, Fred, Metz, Mogens, Carlos, O'Leary, Herman, Sylvia [ranking to be submitted].

To nominate as consultative members: [list to be submitted].

To nominate as Control Commission members: Tantalus, Hoffman, Lars, Eduard.

*Leninist-Trotskyist Slate* presented by Hans:

To nominate as full members: Marcel, Adair, Scott, Abel, Crandall, Peng Shu-tse, Friedrich, Mohan Gan, T. T. Roy, Key, Blanco, Tuco, Atwood, Celso, Galois, Johnson, Pepe, Stateman, Thérèse, Antonio.

To nominate as alternate members: 1. David, 2. Fireman, 3. Pedro, 4. Ronald, 5. Anders, 6. Williams, 7. Mitchell, 8. Lee See, 9. Asgar, 10. Susan.

To nominate as consultative members: Alfredo, Eduardo,

Guillermo, Hector, Jorge, Luis, Ricardo, Dunder, Ken, Martin, Fernando, Otto, Ahmad, Cyrus, Josephina, Roberto, Carmen, Raoul, Roberto, Trude, Juan.

To nominate as Control Commission members: Bundy, Gormley.

*Japanese delegation slate* presented by Sakai:

To nominate as full members: Sakai, Kihaza.

To nominate as alternate member: a comrade to be chosen by the section.

*Nominations approved unanimously.*

*Statement by the Mezhrayonka International Tendency* read by Herb:

The comrades and tendencies who have formed the Mezhrayonka Tendency announce the dissolution of this third international tendency at the end of the Tenth World Congress. They reaffirm their common agreement with the principles outlined in the Frankfurt Communiqué of November 17-18, 1973. They intend to continue further collaboration and communication in order to clarify and homogenize their common political basis.

The dissolution of the Mezhrayonka International Tendency in no way concerns the four national tendencies, Kompass-GIM (German section), Kompass-RSF (Danish section), Revolutionary Marxist Tendency-GCR (Italian section), "Against the Stream."

Kompass-GIM  
Kompass-RSF  
TMR-GCR  
Krasno, member of the steering committee of CLC tendency  
Kailas Chandra

*Concluding remarks* by Juan.

*Concluding remarks* by Walter.

Congress adjourned at 8:30 p.m.

## VOTING RECORD

## Political Resolution

<u>Country</u>		<u>Mandates</u>	<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>Mez.</u>
Antilles		2	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
Argentina	PST	72	72 Ag	72 F	72 Ag
	FR	6	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag
	FB	4	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag
Australia	SWL	2	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
	CL	1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Austria		2	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
Belgium		5	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag
Bolivia		6	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag
Brazil	POC	1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
	PdP	Absent			
Britain	Majority	10	10 F	10 Ag	10 Ag
	Minority	1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Canada	LSA/LSO	4	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag
	RMG/GMR	3	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
Ceylon		1	1 F	1 NV	1 NV
Chile	PSR	3	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
	LCR	1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
China		1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Colombia	Majority	2	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
	Minority	Consultative	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Cyprus		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Denmark	Majority	2	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
	Minority	1	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F
Germany	IMT	3	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
	Mez. Thomas	1	1 Ag	1 Ab	1 F
	Karew	1	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 F
	Willy	1	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F
	LTF	1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Greece		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
India	Kailas	1	1 Ag	1 Ab	1 F
	T.T.Roy	1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Iran		1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Ireland		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Israel		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Italy		5	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag
Japan		4	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag
Lebanon		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Luxemburg		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag

<u>Bolivia</u>		<u>Argentina</u>		<u>Armed Struggle</u>			<u>Europe</u>		
<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>Mez.</u>	<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>Mez.</u>
2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
72 Ag	72 F	72 Ag	72 F	72 Ag	72 F	72 Ag	72 Ag	72 F	72 Ag
6 F	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag
4 F	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag
2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag
6 F	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag
1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
10 F	10 Ag	10 F	10 Ag	10 F	10 Ag	10 Ag	10 F	10 Ag	10 Ag
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag
3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
1 NV	1 NV	1 NV	1 NV	1 F	1 NV	1 NV	1 F	1 NV	1 NV
3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
2 F	2 Ag	1 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F
3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ab	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ab	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag
4 Ab	4 Ag	4 Ab	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag	4 F	4 Ag	4 Ag
1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag

<u>Country</u>		<u>Mandates</u>	<u>Political Resolution</u>		
			<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>Mez.</u>
Mexico	GCI	3	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
	LS	2	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
Netherlands		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
New Zealand		1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Peru	FIR (CR)	2	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
	FIR (Combate)	2	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
Portugal		1	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab
South Africa		1	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
Spain	LCR/ETA VI	7	7 F	7 Ag	7 Ag
	LC	5	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag
Sweden		5	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag
Switzerland		6	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag
U.S.A.	Majority	22	22 Ag	22 F	22 Ag
	Minority	2	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
Uruguay		1	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
Venezuela		2	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
Wallonie	Majority	48	48 F	48 Ag	48 Ag
	Krasno	2	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F
	Dumas	2	2 Ab	2 Ag	2 NV
<u>Totals</u>					
	For		142	118	7
	Against		124	147	259
	Abstain		4	4	1
	No vote		0	1	3

<u>Bolivia</u>		<u>Argentina</u>		<u>Armed Struggle</u>			<u>Europe</u>		
<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>Mez.</u>	<u>IMT</u>	<u>LTF</u>	<u>Mez.</u>
3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag	3 F	3 Ag	3 Ag
2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F8	2 Ag
2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab	1 Ab
1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 NV	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag
7 F	7 Ag	7 F	7 Ag	7 F	7 Ag	7 Ag	7 F	7 Ag	7 Ag
5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag
5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag	5 F	5 Ag	5 Ag
6 F	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag	6 F	6 Ag	6 Ag
22 Ag	22 F	22 Ag	22 F	22 Ag	22 F	22 Ag	22 Ag	22 F	22 Ag
2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag
1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag	1 Ag	1 F	1 Ag
2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag
48 F	48 Ag	48 F	48 Ag	48 F	48 Ag	48 Ag	48 F	48 Ag	48 Ag
2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ab	2 F	2 Ag	2 Ag	2 Ab
2 Ab	2 NV	2 Ab	2 NV	2 NV	2 NV	2 F	2 F	2 Ag	2 NV

137	125	137	125	142	118	9	144	118	5
125	141	125	140	125	143	259	125	149	259
7	1	7	1	1	6	1	1	2	3
1	3	1	4	2	3	1	0	1	3

## ATTACHMENTS

### Attachment 1: Declaration of the International Mezhrayonka Tendency

With this declaration the undersigned tendencies and comrades of different sections of the 4th International announce the official formation of an international tendency for the 10th World Congress (4th since Reunification) of the 4th International.

This third international tendency is the outcome of the political struggle of these tendencies and comrades in their sections during the Pre-World-Congress discussion period against the political and methodological errors and insufficiencies which, as we see it, are involved with key important draft resolutions of the World Congress. This common political struggle laid grounds for intensive communication and cooperation between these tendencies to elaborate their position on the issues under discussion. This common agreement was expressed in the Communiqué of Frankfurt from Nov. 18, 1973 (IIDB 24). In this situation, the formal declaration of a third international tendency for the 10th World Congress based on political agreement in key important questions, is a necessary step,

— to assure equal rights at this Congress in comparison with the already existing international tendency and faction;

— to defend the unity of our movement against the danger of a split in an organized way.

This international tendency is based on the following positions:

1. For general line of "Why we reject the draft political resolution—a question of method and contents" by CLC, Kompass and T.M.R.

2. For general line of "On the Orientation of the 4th International in Latin America" (IIDB No. 22) by Kompass-Tendency (Germany).

3. For rejection of the IMT-draft of the European document and its concept of the "new Mass Vanguard," a criticism which is outlined in the draft for revision of the EPD by the Kompass-Tendency (IIDB 25) and the contribution "New vanguards or building of the revolutionary party" by Nemo, Roc, Eleonore, Lesueur, Varlet (Wallonia).

4. The Communiqué of Frankfurt for the defense of democratic centralism and the unity of the 4th International against the danger of a split.

The voting formula of the international tendency includes also to give critical support to the balance sheet of the LTF on our experience with the 9th World Congress line in Argentina and Bolivia, e.g. to vote for the general line of part 2 and 3 of "Argentina and Bolivia—The Balance Sheet."

Kompass-Tendenz/GIM (Germany); Kompass-Tendency/RSF (Denmark); T.M.R./GCR (Italy); Krasno (member of the steering committee of Contre le Courant-tendency/Wallonia).

### Attachment 2: Why I Did Not Join the Third International Tendency

I. The creation of 4 national tendencies (Kompass—GIM, TMR—GCR, CLC—wallonia, Kompass—RSF) and the perspective of creating a third international tendency were based, in the second half of 1973, on the following elements:

a) the analysis made by the 4 tendencies of the *blind alley* into which the LTF and the IMT had led the IVth International—notably on the level of the functioning of its leadership.

b) an extremely critical appreciation of the analyses offered by the IMT on Europe and even more on a world scale; we have already emphasized the *erroneous method* of these analyses—objectivist and catastrophist.

c) the incapacity of the IMT to offer a *serious political and organizational balance sheet* of the orientation adopted by the 9th World Congress on Latin America; the succession of three or four documents on Argentina and Bolivia; the final submission for vote at the Tenth World Congress of a text entitled "Balance Sheet of the Armed Struggle in Latin America" which is not a balance sheet and *even less*

*an orientation for the militants of the Fourth International in Latin America.*

d) the incapacity of the LTF to counterpose to the failures of the IMT an orientation and perspectives offering our movement the possibility to face up to its tasks and to overcome its current internal crisis.

The lateness and the content of the LTF world counter-resolution; the partial character of its positions on Europe and on the perspectives of revolutionary Marxists on this continent; its circumspection—which tends to make one suspicious—concerning the dubious politics of the PRTU and the PST—despite the correctness of many criticisms it makes of the IMT's Latin American positions; its erroneous conception of political debate in a Leninist organization which applies democratic centralism (forming a faction) all this has convinced us of the objective need to break the IMT/LTF 'duo' and to begin to present to the militants of the FI a problematic and perspectives which have been brought to the fore by the 3rd international tendency.

II. But the actual creation of the 3rd international tendency has in its turn seen the classic dialectic objective necessity/subjective capacity come into play.

a) Two of the four tendencies within it (Kompass/GIM and TMR/GCR) were formed in the context of a *national debate prior to the preparation of the 10th World Congress*. This partly explains the lateness of the two others (CLC and Kompass/Denmark) with respect to the working out of a program.

b) Although a national tendency may legitimately be formed around a single issue, for an international tendency it is obligatory to define itself *not merely critically* but also positively in relation to the two currents which at present monopolize debate within the Fourth International; obligatory, in other words, for it to be capable of beginning the process of defining its own perspectives and its own line. Without this, ultimately, it would limit itself to a parasitic attitude to the leadership—an attitude which is incompatible with the traditions and norms of Bolshevism.

c) It is now clear that although the "Frankfort Communiqué" of November 17 and 18 was a first step in the regroupment of comrades who could not and would not identify with the two international tendencies, the comrades who signed this "communiqué" neither had the time nor the capacity to *qualitatively go beyond the threshold of an initial criticism*—itself most welcome and positive—of the IMT. Neither the written contribution ("Why We're Voting Against the World Political Resolution") nor the adoption of a largely negative "voting formula," common to the four tendencies (and on which there still remain differences: "critical" support of points 2 and 3 of the Argentina-Bolivia balance sheet of the LTF) constitute a sufficient base for the responsible formation of the third international tendency.

III. This impossibility of creating at the 10th World

Congress, a third international tendency that is anything but a passing circumstance, is confirmed by a certain number of *"tactical adjustments" which end up modifying the initial basis on which this third international tendency was founded*.

ā) For a certain number of comrades in the four countries, the dynamic of the tendency struggle has given their *"democratic" battles* (?) against the IMT/leadership a very excessive, politically erroneous (and not very profitable) priority.

b) Because of this (?) the *political differentiation with the LTF diminishes* to the point of practically disappearing in the oral reports and in the written contributions. This results in totally and unilaterally falsifying the necessary debate and the specific function of the third tendency.

CONCLUSION. The third tendency was not meant to be neutral, "centrist"—i.e., at equal distance between the positions of the IMT and those of the LTF. But the disappearance of any consistent criticism of the positions of one of these two tendencies makes the comrades who signed the platform *appear in fact as a sub-tendency of the LTF*. Since there are tactics involved in the international debate it would be much more healthy if they clearly took this position. It is a position with which certain comrades of the "Against the Stream" (Walloon section) will continue to disagree until the internal debate within the Walloon section renews the terms of the discussion with, probably, a cleavage in the tendencies, permitting them to contribute more clearly the common tasks of the construction of our organization.

7 February

Jean-Francois Dumas

(secretariat of the Against the Stream of Wallonia)

### Attachment 3: Letter to the World Congress from the Bolchevik-Leninist Group of Vietnam

Dear Comrades,

The Bolchevik-Leninist Group of Vietnam (BLV), sends you its fraternal greetings and wishes the Congress great success in keeping with our great hopes.

We know that serious subjects are presently being discussed in the International, especially the Vietnamese problem. We deeply regret that for material reasons (date of the Congress became known too late, passports, visas . . .) the BLV is absent from your debates. We regret it all the more because our group does not have the same position as the International nor the comrades of the opposition. We could contribute original ideas as Vietnamese Trotskyists, having been able to read many Vietnamese documents hardly known outside of the country.

Our BLV group was constituted as a section of the International in 1947, by joining the International. It has a long history behind it. It was our group that had successfully led, during the 1946-1953 period, the movement of 20,000 emigrant workers in France. During this period, it was able to train new cadres (500 cadres) who for the most part were sent to North Vietnam. Our group was able to resist the most brutal repression of French im-

perialism during the first war in Vietnam.

Since the departure to Vietnam of most of our comrades, a small group remains in France and carries on in spite of a thousand difficulties. It is the present defender of Vietnamese Trotskyist traditions and ideas.

Although for tactical reasons we don't officially identify ourselves in our press as Trotskyists, all the Vietnamese political circles in France know of our existence, especially the North Vietnamese ruling circles. We are seeking to constantly intervene in the struggle against American imperialism through all sorts of actions taking many different forms.

In the very special historical conditions in Vietnam, where the enormous weight of the VCP crushes all the organisations to its left, maintaining a Trotskyist group, even a propaganda group, is an extremely difficult task. We have been able to do this during these last years with no help whatsoever from the International or from the Ligue Communiste.

In the political debate now unfolding in the International, we note two opposite errors. The first consists of prettying up the VCP to the point of labelling it a Revolutionary



Party, thus forgetting the entire past historical development of this party, and not taking into account its present opportunistic and empirical policy which could cause serious setbacks for the Vietnamese Revolution. The second error is wanting at all costs to stick to the old schemas and refusing to see the evolution of this party in the new conditions and the fact that it has successfully led the national liberation struggle.

The BLV group is constantly careful to not fall into either of the two errors. It constantly attempts to keep in touch with reality, to understand it and to draw the lessons from it for action, never losing sight of the fundamental principles of Trotskyism and Leninism.

Comrades,

We request that you make our existence known to the sections and that you debate out the following questions:

1) Should the International concern itself with a Vietnamese Trotskyist group which has remained loyal to the International and which has carried on against great obstacles, in the most difficult of conditions?

2) Should we work towards the creation of a section of the Fourth International in Vietnam?

An answer to these two questions would already resolve half the debate under way on the Vietnamese problem.

Our very fraternal greetings,  
the BLVG

February 5, 1974

#### **Attachment 4: Letter to the World Congress from Peng Shu-tse**

Dear Comrades,

I regret very much not being able to attend the congress. I would like to make three points:

1. I protest the fact that the technical preparations for the congress were made the exclusive responsibility of only one side in the debate. As you know, the country where the congress was held has racist restrictions making entry especially difficult for some nationalities. A certain amount of time is required to get the necessary visas. Because the committee in charge of technical preparations did not provide us with sufficient notice, it was impossible to get the visas. Thus we were unable to attend the congress.

2. The resolution on Latin America passed at the last world congress, which included an orientation toward guerrilla war, has been proved by events to have been completely wrong in the two countries where it was tested out—Argentina and Bolivia.

Recent developments in Bolivia further underscore this: the new rise of a peasant movement and the strike actions of the miners and other sections of the workers.

The question is posed: Are the Bolivian Trotskyists to continue with the line of guerrilla war, or are they to

participate in this new mass movement in accordance with the Transitional Program and the methods it outlines for building a mass revolutionary party?

3. The resolution on the Chinese question adopted at the last congress has also been proved bankrupt by events. According to that resolution the Chinese Communist Party was objectively playing a revolutionary role and would not capitulate to imperialist pressure at the expense of the colonial revolution. But the CCP did exactly that.

According to the latest document presented by the IEC Majority Tendency, the CCP showed that it was not Stalinist in character because it transformed property relations in China.

If this criterion were to be taken seriously, then Stalin himself was not Stalinist inasmuch as he transformed property relations in Eastern Europe following World War II.

I call on the congress as a whole to oppose this alarming new revisionism.

February 6, 1974

Peng Shu-tse

#### **Attachment 5: Letter to the World Congress from Luis**

Comrade Delegates to the Tenth World Congress

Comrade Hansen has involved me personally in the pre-World Congress debate, and the 1961-62 Peruvian situation has been used as a polemical argument.

For this reason I feel obliged to respond. I have not done so before because Hansen's document only reached me recently and it has been difficult for me to gather the minimum documents I needed to write these pages. I would have preferred to participate in person, but for various reasons that is impossible. The presence of a comrade from the organization will make the understanding of my position easier. There are two points to which I will refer: one is the Peruvian experience itself; the other is the context in which the present discussion has unfolded, since, according to Hansen, my intervention and influence goes far beyond the events in Peru.

##### *1. The Peruvian Experience*

Since 1960, all the revolutionary organizations in Latin America have been influenced by the victorious Cuban Revolution. This influence was two-fold and contradictory: there was the positive side of resurrecting the role of armed struggle and rejecting the Stalinist theories of coexistence; and there was the negative side, wherein the method of guerrilla warfare, and more concretely the foco, was elevated to the category of a panacea. Our Argentina organization could not remain free of this influence. In 1961, the military apparatus was created, led by members of the Political Bureau, who had no experience. The Peruvian comrades who, faced with the growing peasant mobilization, went to Buenos Aires seeking aid, had no greater experience. At the beginning of 1961 a task was undertaken which some of us comrades have continued up to

today, with various ups and downs, but whose central objective I believe to be correct: the application of armed struggle as a fundamental method of action, an indispensable tool for building the revolutionary party in Latin America, in order to join with the masses in their struggles and advance toward the taking of power.

Armed struggle must be added to all the means used by revolutionaries. It does not negate or replace all those that have been used up to now. On the contrary, armed struggle strengthens and insures them. It must not substitute for the masses, but rather it must be an indispensable instrument of their struggles. The organization must see to its implementation, in this way taking on a vanguard role.

In order for the proletariat to be able to arm itself and struggle for power, we revolutionaries must prepare ourselves *beforehand*, so that we are not surprised by events. This preparation is political and military. To leave the military preparation to the moment when the masses are ready to fight with arms in hand is criminal negligence. It is to forget the lessons of Marx on the insurrection. *Today in Latin America, in order for an authentic revolutionary organization to insure its permanent existence, to elude the repression, to be able to take its propaganda and agitation to the proletariat without ups and downs, and to aid the masses in their struggles around their demands, which are so often drowned in blood, the organization must necessarily have recourse to the use of armed struggle along with all the other means we revolutionaries rely on.*

Beginning from this point of departure, to the extent that the class struggle sharpens and the consciousness of the masses grows, the party will be strengthened and the armed struggle will be the indispensable instrument for the taking of power by the proletariat.

In 1961 we were just beginning to understand these problems; the experiences were very costly but they could and should have been used to advance to a deeper understanding of the question. Unfortunately conservative leaders used the errors, which were many, to absolve themselves from responsibilities and not to aid in overcoming the errors critically. Thus we see leaders like Moreno who, after pushing military preparation, after approving expropriations, and after sending comrades to get military training in Cuba, faced with those who have fallen and the defeats, don't know how to do anything but beat a retreat and avoid their responsibility; a leader who never intended to personally take on the undoubtedly difficult task of correctly applying armed struggle. How different from the example of Trotsky who, at 40 years of age, threw himself into organizing an army and placed himself at its head.

The truth is that in 1961 we didn't know anything about military problems; when we look at Peru, we had nothing resembling a line, only the conviction that we had to organize the military task, because the mass movement had made it indispensable; but in Argentina, where rather than a rise in activity among the masses instead there had been an ebb since 1959, we also believed in the need to organize the military task, and in the possibility of guerrilla struggles. Thus the work in the North, in Tucuman, was begun, with the sending of comrades there; an expropriation was carried out. P. was in Peru and at the beginning of 1962 the party was de facto militarized, with

some comrades being sent to Cuba for training.

This entire task was carried out, of course, with the general agreement of Moreno. Moreno's work, *The Latin American Revolution*, which is characterized by its clear praise of guerrilla warfare, dates from this period.

One of the party leaders of that period, Valencia, who now shares the political position of the PST, said in this regard: "The boldest promoter of the framework of armed struggle is the leadership itself (Moreno). By formulating theoretical and political premises that involved great concessions to Guevarism, they sowed confusion and uncertainty among the cadres, and did nothing but stimulate the dynamic that in the long run made them lose the majority in the Central Committee, strengthening the tendency of the new leaders."

*That is, the deviations that developed in Peru have their origins in Argentina and in Moreno's guidance.*

I believe that there were militarist deviations in Argentina, that they should have been overcome patiently through political struggle and experience, overcoming the errors but without abandoning the apprenticeship and the use of a method that is indispensable for revolutionaries.

Nothing like this took place in Argentina, and when Bangochea's group returned from Cuba, Moreno operated behind the back of the organization until Bangochea dropped out of the party, without any serious discussion. There is not a single document from the period which records any such discussion and collective elaboration, at a time when one of the major leaders and a group of comrades left the organization.

The same attitude was taken with respect to Peru. Moreno gives verbal encouragement, promises aid of all kinds, and then launches a war against the comrades who had to apply the resolutions.

P. was accused of being a putschist, as were all the Cuzco people. Moreno refused to hold meetings in Cuzco, despite the fact that the main leaders were unable to travel because they were totally or partially underground. To the repeated requests that he remain in Peru, Moreno answered that he had to go to Argentina to resolve financial problems and aid Peru, aid which never arrived.

Were errors and deviations committed in Peru? Yes. We overestimated our own forces, and hoping for too much from a young and weak party, military tasks were undertaken which the comrades were not sufficiently prepared for.

These deviations did not at any time signify the desire to substitute guerrilla warfare for the party, as Hansen says; all the activity was carried out from the FIR.

It isn't true that the Tupac Amaru group was created. What was involved was just a diversionary maneuver in the face of the identification of various members of the FIR who were part of the military team. The Tupac Amaru group never existed. Of course no one sought to substitute for the masses either. It was precisely the peasant masses of Cuzco who pressed us, asking our members for help; and also, our conviction, based on the experience of the struggles in Peru, that a bloody showdown, a harsh repression was approaching.

We committed many errors, yes. But before making hasty comparisons and deductions, it would be preferable to try to explain how one should have proceeded, given the situation and forces in Peru in 1961-62. Unfortunately, rather than drawing from the experiences and going for-

ward, our Argentine party, like Hansen, dedicated itself to censuring the "crazy adventurists," in whom it had a short time before reaffirmed its confidence by voting it huge tasks to carry out.

In Lima, at the SLATO [Latin American Secretariat of Orthodox Trotskyism] conference in February 1962, gigantic politico-military tasks were unanimously approved. Moreno participated and approved. The tasks began to be carried out. When the collapse came, all the blame was placed on those of us who were on the front line. There was no serious explanation nor a word of self-criticism from Moreno.

Hansen takes Moreno's version, and motivated by a factional spirit, paints him as the standard-bearer of 100 percent correct positions against the "militarists."

But the reality is something different. We were members of a party. We fought politically. Hugo Blanco, whose position in the international dispute I do not share, asserted in his book *Land or Death*: "The arrival of Pereyra and other militants of the Peruvian POR in Cuzco [in December 1961] strengthened our work enormously.

"The FIR began to grow in Cuzco. It had already been constituted on a national scale. Mass peasant work was intensified significantly, as much on a provincial scale (La Convención and Lares) as on a departmental scale (Cuzco). The FIR apparatus in the city, led by Pereyra and Antonio Aragon, energetically helped the peasant movement, recruiting students who went to the countryside to organize, printing leaflets and newsletters needed there. . . .

"In addition, it gave serious impetus to the preparation for armed struggle. Although preparation had begun earlier, it was clearly becoming urgent to step it up in view of the advanced level of the class struggle in the countryside." [pp. 38-39].

Every Peruvian militant knows these things. So why caricature reality? Is it because the arguments are not sufficiently sound?

## 2. *The Present Framework of the Polemic*

Today the role of armed struggle, among many other things, is being debated in the International. I place myself within the majority current, but I believe it has shortcomings and errors that have facilitated the minority's arguments. After the IX World Congress resolution on Latin America, the United Secretariat did not push ahead in the exploration and study of the forms in which to apply a line that was totally new, around which there had been few experiences. It was a line formulated in generalizations which did not examine the possibilities in each country in depth, which led to errors of analysis regarding the Latin American political situation.

It was a resolution that had the great merit of raising the question of armed struggle, which constituted a great step forward, but one that stayed within general formulations.

In the concrete case of Argentina, this led the United Secretariat into an impressionism regarding the PRT (C) wherein the United Secretariat only saw successes, ignoring the problems that arose in the party around the application of the armed struggle, problems that led to the split of the PRT. The withdrawal of the section from the ranks of the FI compelled the United Secretariat to go into the

question more deeply, seeking the cause of the errors that were committed, which will have to be done with a deep spirit of self-criticism. From this, various lessons will emerge regarding the best way to use armed struggle without falling into militarist deviations. But this self-criticism cannot be made from the reformist point of view of rejection of the use of a fundamental means of action for revolutionaries. Those who, while supporting the use of armed struggle in words, are opposed to its use in all the countries in which they carry out their activity, and in all the countries that are being discussed, can scarcely help to correct our errors. This is the basis of the present debate. Supporters and opponents of armed struggle are facing each other. In the debate the minority uses the errors and deviations that we must overcome.

We mustn't fall into a trap. We won't defend any errors or deviations, and we will continue seeking the correct application of a basic tool for revolutionary struggle. Let's be clear. The difference with the minority is fundamental. It has to do with the essence of revolutionary work in Latin America.

In Argentina, after the Peruvian experience, this polemic was again raised in 1966 after the Onganía coup. It wasn't P. who raised the question, because he was in jail, but rather a growing number of militants. Moreno tried to maneuver among them. A military team was appointed (yes, in 1967) with representatives in each cell, but, as always, without accompanying this organizational resolution with a serious and deep-going focus regarding the objectives and forms of carrying this delicate task out to the end.

When the polemic unfolded in 1967, Moreno tried some fancy footwork; he placed himself in the ultraleft, called for saving Inti, placed himself under the discipline of OLAS to fight . . . in Bolivia.

This was seen by the majority as a maneuver and therefore rejected: the majority was in favor of armed struggle and that was why he lost the majority. There is no mystery as Hansen hints. Moreno broke with the party and the discussion remained inconclusive. The party resumed its course with little clarity. This was the source of the later crisis and split. Within the PRT those who were partisans of armed struggle and those who weren't coexisted: all rejected the methodology of Moreno. And among the partisans of the armed struggle there was confusion, many undeveloped shadings under the surface. Only practice would refine them, until it led finally to the split in 1970 where the Santucho faction, with a majority, imposed its thesis on initiating revolutionary warfare. It was an undeniable militarist deviation, which we had participated in in its beginnings, and from which a segment of the organization had to divorce itself.

One of the United Secretariat's biggest errors is not to have given importance to the discussion which developed at this time in Argentina among the three tendencies that were established. So, can one deduce from Santucho's militarist deviation, which the United Secretariat supported for some years, that the use of armed struggle is not valid? *Absolutely not.*

One can and must deduce that it is necessary to eliminate the deviations, that one must be very careful, that the use of armed struggle must answer the needs of the class struggle and the needs of party building. The minority's response ignores the problem. It says what one must not

do. It offers the activity of the PST as a response: that is, the full utilization of legality, headquarters, union activity, dialogue with governmental authorities.

The PST's activity is not a revolutionary response to the problems of the Argentine working class. It is reformist activity, based on the propaganda of the general ideas of Trotskyism. There's been experience with this in the history of our movement.

*To be revolutionary in Argentina involves the obligation to build a combat organization, capable of, as Lenin said, struggling against the political police and, we might add, against the fierce repression that is already beginning to be again unleashed by the official repressive bodies and the para-political and bureaucratic commandos.* And it also means being prepared to join with and lead the masses in the use of violence, which is inevitable in the stage that is opening up.

Comrades, when Hansen declared me guilty of being a partisan of armed struggle he was right. *I am guilty.* I have committed plenty of errors and I will try not to

fall into them again. When Hansen accuses me of rejecting party building, of being a partisan of the foco, of shortcuts, he is wrong. *I am innocent.* In order to build the parties that we need in Latin America, we will necessarily have to determine the correct way to employ armed struggle if we don't want to follow the proletariat in its defeats and massacres with our posthumous analyses. This is not the only problem but it is one of the fundamental ones, and it is certain that neither Moreno nor Hansen is going to help us overcome them. The FI must give fundamental importance to this problem and deal with it with the maximum seriousness, study the experiences, and move forward. The defeats and deviations must not hold us back, but rather must spur us on to overcome them.

Fraternally,  
Luis  
January 31, 1974

### Attachment 6: Statement by Claudio

I vote in favor of the resolution on armed struggle in Latin America. However, I don't agree with certain aspects of this resolution and certain statements contained

in Comrade Roman's report.

Claudio

### Attachment 7: Statement by Heredia

Concerning the Unity Agreement:

Since there was no discussion at the Congress on a series of theoretical, programmatic, and political questions that are of great concern to the proletarian vanguard and decisive for the future of the world communist movement, any split based on administrative or organizational questions would be injurious to the International and an obstacle to the process of its overcoming the crisis in which it finds itself. Such a split would be an unprincipled one.

For this reason, while understanding that this agreement maintains a federal mode of functioning contrary to the program and principles of a democratically centralized world party, I am voting for it so as to prevent a split.

*Political Resolution:*

General agreement, along with the criticisms contained in the document submitted by my faction to the pre-Congress discussion, as well as reservations on "The New Yalta," "On the Chinese Cultural Revolution," and on the evaluation of "workers states," and Cuba in particular.

*European Resolution:*

General agreement, with the criticisms contained in the document submitted by my faction to the internal discussion.

*Bolivia:*

General agreement, in addition to the reservations I expressed in my remarks to this Congress.

*Argentina:*

General agreement, with the additions and criticisms contained in my report to the Congress.

*Armed Struggle:*

General agreement, with the criticisms made in my remarks to this Congress.

Heredia, Fracción Bolchevique  
(Argentina)

### Attachment 8: Statement by PST Delegation

To the Presiding Committee of the Congress:

The delegates of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores [PST] of Argentina vehemently protest the discrimination to which our party has once again been subjected in not being recognized as an official section.

This criterion for classifying as a sympathizing organization what may be the strongest orthodox Trotskyist or-

ganization in the Fourth International and is certainly the predominant revolutionary Marxist organization in the Argentine republic, is the culmination of a series of bureaucratic maneuvers carried out by the so-called majority of the International designed to secure its control of this Congress.

This becomes obvious if we compare the criterion used

here with the one adopted at the Ninth Congress for recognizing sections. At that time, when the situation of the PRT (Combatiente) and our organization were being debated, Comrade Livio Maitan based the position for recognizing the PRT (C) exclusively on the number of militants, without considering the political positions of each of the organizations.

This criterion furthermore reflects putting factional interests ahead of those of the World Party and provides a basis for judging the factionalist attitude that has given this Congress its undemocratic character.

We expressly request that all the delegations be informed of this protest, as the leadership of the Fourth International must stop committing errors of this kind, where it has

gone to the length of openly discriminating against an organization that in its political development, method and practice stands on the ground of orthodox Trotskyism. We have been subjected to this discrimination precisely because our entire course shows that we will continue our fight to build the World Party of the Socialist Revolution, and that in this fight we will oppose any maneuvers by a leadership thrown up by an accidental majority that jeopardize the future of world Trotskyism.

Fraternally,  
Mario, Chino, Arturo, Alberto,  
Fierro  
For the PST delegates to the  
Tenth World Congress

### **Attachment 9: Protest Against Recognition of Ponto de Partido (Brazil)**

We protest the recognition of the Brazilian group Ponto de Partida as a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International representing the LTF. In this respect we would like to make the following comments:

1) The Ponto de Partida group was formed in exile in Santiago at the beginning of 1971 by comrades of Posadista and centrist origins on the basis of a document criticizing the December 1970 kidnapping of the Swiss ambassador to Brazil.

2) Several months later this group split into two parties:

a. Ponto de Partida 1

b. Ponto de Partida 2, linked to the LTF

The split occurred on the basis of the decision of PP-1 to build an organization in Brazil, whereas PP-2, linked to the LTF, decided to carry on factional activity within

the PSR, Chilean section of the Fourth International, abandoning all plans to build an organization in Brazil. The entire Brazilian left is aware of this fact.

3) Today the majority of the PP-2 members are working inside the Argentine PST. They have two members in Canada and one in Mexico. They not only lack any members in Brazil, but in addition have no political line, position, or perspective with respect to revolutionary activity in Brazil.

4) For these reasons we formally protest to the Tenth World Congress the recognition of PP-2 as the Brazilian sympathizing organization of the Fourth International.

Delegations of POC-Combate (Brazil); PSR (Chile); Fracción Roja-PRT/ERP; POR-Combate (Bolivia); FIR-Combate (Peru); GCI (Mexico); Rossi, Toussaint (Rouge); Liga Comunista (Chile)

### **Attachment 10: Proposal Submitted by the Liga Socialista Chilena**

The Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International has received a formal petition from the Chilean Communist League (Liga Comunista) asking to be recognized as a sympathizing organisation.

Even without an exhaustive study of the Chilean situation and detailed knowledge of the political and organisational reality of the Liga Comunista, the antecedents in possession of the International's leadership, recommend to the Congress taking a favorable attitude towards the formal petition formulated by this organisation.

Nevertheless, the comrades of the Revolutionary Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario), Chilean section of the Fourth International, have not ended their discussion in this matter among themselves and have not held the indispensable discussions with the Liga Comunista Chilena in order to take a definite position.

The Congress considers that, despite this, the petition

of the comrades must be received positively and fraternally recommends to the PSR comrades to take the means in order to adopt a position in relation to the L. C.'s petition, in a favourable sense.

The importance of the political developments in Chile during these last 4 years, the lessons that must be drawn by the revolutionary Marxists, not only in Chile, but on a world scale, imply a profound discussion in the International, especially about the activity of the Chilean Trotskyists during this period.

The Congress mandates the new leadership in order to open the most rapidly possible a discussion with the Chilean comrades of the official section and the Liga Comunista, discussion which should lead to the unification of the two.

Proposal submitted by the Liga Socialista Chilena

## Attachment 11: Protest Concerning Status of RCL (Iraq)

We regret the non-recognition (for the sake of a compromise) of the Revolutionary Communist League (Iraq) as section of the Fourth International, when this group has to wage its struggle in one of the most repressive states in the world.

Vergeat (IEC)  
Jaber (Lebanon)  
Mikado (Israel)  
Krasny (Arab Commission of the Walloon Section)  
Laborde (Arab Commission of the Walloon Section)

## Attachment 12: Statement by Mikado and Jaber

We have asked the Tenth World Congress to recognize our groups as sections. We based our request on the present statutes. But for the next Congress we will request that the statutes be revised so as to allow for the formation of an Arab section of the Fourth International.

In addition, for political as well as security problems,

we are asking to be identified only as sympathizing groups in the organs of sections and groups in the International.

Mikado, for Matzpen-Marxist (Israel)  
Jaber, for Revolutionary Communist Group (Lebanon)

## Attachment 13: Statement by the Japanese Delegation

We protest against recognition of the Iranian group as a sympathizing group of the International. The question of Iranian group of the International should be discussed among all the Iranian comrades of the International before the decision. We think the Iranian comrades in exile should

be members of the section or group in the country, according to the International statutes.

Asian comrades of the IMT support our protest.

Japanese delegation

## Attachment 14: Statement by Alejandro

On the Unity Agreement: Abstention

1. At its international congress, the GCI decided to apply for recognition as a section of the Fourth International on a *political basis*. Now, on *organizational grounds*, the unity agreement has invalidated the decisions of our congress.

2. Our abstention also signifies a vote for recognizing the need to wage a political struggle within the International to transform it into a party to fight for world

socialist revolution—an International where there would be no room for rightist tendencies like the Argentine PST or the Mexican Liga Socialista.

3. This abstention registers our disagreement with the concessions granted to the minority, especially in the cases of Spain, Mexico, Uruguay, and Brazil.

Alejandro, GCI (Mexico)

## Attachment 15: Statement by Manuel

I abstain on the proposal of the majority and of the Presiding Committee to implicitly refuse to recognize the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista [GCI] as a section and

to maintain its current status as a sympathizing group.

Manuel, Grupo Comunista  
Internacionalista, Mexico

## Attachment 16: Statement by Ramiro

On the Unity Agreement of the Presiding Committee:

I want to register an abstention for reasons having generally to do with the political and organizational question in Mexico; that is, we feel it is incorrect to give equal standing to the GCI and the LS, a numerically smaller group of *splitters*, which moreover has clearly refused to respect and put into practice the resolutions of the Ninth World Congress of the Fourth International. Likewise,

this agreement gives the LS a justification for claiming more members than it really has, even with its decidedly semi-Menshevik conception of organization and recruitment, which are alien to the Leninist and Trotskyist tradition of the Fourth International and to our tradition in the GCI.

Ramiro, GCI (Mexico)

## Attachment 17: Statement by Sebastien

I abstain in the vote on recognizing sections and sympathizing organizations, because the method employed in the discussion did not offer general political criteria or an informative view of the sections concerned. I am opposed to the concept of recognizing a section on the basis of

the number of members it claims without considering how rooted it is in the masses or the kind of political struggle it is carrying on.

Sebastián, FIR-Combate (Peru)

## Attachment 18: Statement by LCR-ETA (VI) Delegation

The undersigned comrades oppose the non-recognition of the Spanish LCR-ETA (VI) and the Mexican GCI as official sections of the Fourth International, however we abstained in the voting so as to prevent any danger of

a split.

Enrique, Santiago, Roberto, Mikel (Spain) LCR-ETA (VI)

## Attachment 19: Statement by Hoffman, Ana, Jesus

Our vote against the proposal reached by the presiding committee stems from disagreement with the refusal to recognize the LCR of Spain and the GCI of Mexico as sec-

tions, a move that encourages splits.

Hoffman, Ana, Jesus

## Attachment 20: Statement by Juan

To the Presiding Committee of the Congress:

As a delegate of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores del Uruguay [PRT-U], I protest the unjustified resolution of this Congress not to recognize us as an official section of the Fourth International in Uruguay.

Our party has published a fortnightly (*Tendencia Revolucionaria*) for five years; we had a public headquarters from May 1971 until the June 27, 1973, coup d'etat; and we have participated in most of the struggles of the mass movement in our country since May 1968, when we emerged as a party, consistently defending the positions of orthodox Trotskyism.

Given the fact that groups having neither an organ nor regular activity have been recognized as official sections—organizations which, moreover, have had nothing to do with the class struggle in their respective countries—this discrimination against the Uruguayan Trotskyists can be explained in no other way but as a factional maneuver by the International majority to keep out of the Fourth International a section whose majority has adhered to the Leninist-Trotskyist minority tendency (and later the faction) since its inception.

The argument has been passed around against us that we haven't kept in regular contact with the International. This ignores the very self-criticism made by the out-going leadership of the International regarding its inability to maintain regular relations with sections and sympathizing groups.

This argument also overlooks the fact that where it would have been most natural to maintain a relationship, with the Argentine section—the PRT (Combatiente), the official Argentine section of the Fourth International—it consistently claimed that there was no need to build a party in Uruguay, since the Tupamaros already existed, and that the Trotskyists should enter this organization. This eliminated our most accessible means for establishing a relationship with the Fourth International.

Furthermore, failing to recognize our party as an official section means rejecting a Trotskyist organization that proved its firmness by maintaining its activity and *regularly* publishing *the only* underground *left paper* in Uruguay that has appeared since the coup d'etat, despite the jailing and imprisonment of its members.

We have written this note for publication in the International Bulletin so that every militant of the Fourth International will know that despite the discriminatory positions of the current leadership of the Fourth, against which we will continue tirelessly to struggle, we will go on defending Trotskyism in Uruguay and fighting to build the World Party of the Socialist Revolution, that is, for a bigger and stronger Fourth International.

Fraternally,  
Juan, delegate to the Tenth  
World Congress  
For the PRT (U), sympathizing  
section of the Fourth International

## STATEMENT OF THE MAJORITY TENDENCY AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE TENTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

The majority tendency accepted numerous organizational compromises in the preparation for, and the course of the World Congress:

- Excessive number of internal discussion bulletins;
- Counting the votes of sympathizing groups as well as those of sections (which tended to erase an important distinction inscribed in our statutes, and which partially falsifies the real relationship of forces between tendencies);
- Registering the total number of mandates claimed by each group, when some of them seemed (and still seem) to us to be greatly exaggerated (the clearest case being that of the Argentine PST whose 72 mandates we categorically challenge). This in turn falsified the tendency relationships, except in the composition of the IEC.
- Taking no action against the nonpayment of proper dues on the part of some formations (the PST's dues, in particular, are ridiculous in relation to the number of members it claims);
- Recognizing as sympathizing groups formations whose political weight and representativeness are highly dubious (the Brazilian Ponto de Partida and the Iranian group);
- Recognizing as a sympathizing group a formation not only of doubtful membership, but whose orientation has also been a particular disgrace to the Fourth International (in Uruguay, the case of the PRT-U which can not fail to pose serious problems in our relations with the Latin-American vanguard);
- Not recognizing as sections formations which by their activities and their real political weight fully deserved such recognition—and these groups are in countries that are very important for the future of our movement (LCR-ETA (VI) in Spain and GCI in Mexico . . .);
- Recognizing the Mezhrayonka de facto as an international tendency, when the statements published during the congress (declaration of tendency, and the "semi-dissolution" statement) demonstrate its lack of a clear basis. The Mezhrayonka was set up and maintained for one week in order to "obtain a guarantee of equal rights" with the supporters of the majority and minority and "to defend the unity of our movement" (how?). It got 2.5 percent of the mandates. This sort of thing tends to deprive the very concept of international tendencies of its meaning (since the concept of forming international tendencies requires presenting political perspectives on the questions in dispute that constitute an alternative orientation to that of the other tendencies and an alternative for our movement as a whole).

In sum, these organizational compromises are considerable. They can make the development of our movement more difficult in certain cases. They put some of our organizational principles partially in abeyance. We accepted them for the following four reasons:

- To focus the international debate on the *political* differences and keep it from getting diverted and bogged

down in procedural or narrowly "organizational" questions (a foretaste of this danger was provided by the SWP leadership artificially creating a sensation over the Barzman letter "affair"). In this way, we could establish a majority on a clearly *political* basis.

— To eliminate any excuse to challenge the decisions of the World Congress by demonstrating that, even in the most favorable conditions for the minority, an unchallengeable majority had emerged. *The strength of this majority is substantially reflected by the composition of the IEC* (with a majority of 60 percent, and a minority of 40 percent), while still—let us emphasize once again—providing for representation of sympathizing organizations, particularly the Argentine PST.

— To create a political framework conducive to the *application* by the entire International of the majority line, one that would facilitate recognition of the authority of the World Congress, its political decisions, and the leaderships elected there, and avoid opening a procedural battle or an unlimited political debate that would endanger our *work*.

— To maintain a framework in this way that would preserve the unity of our movement, a unity that would have been gravely threatened if there were no authoritative World Congress and if our movement's work were paralyzed by the continuing internal debate.

That being said, the organizational compromises adopted at this World Congress should in no way be taken as precedents for the future functioning of our movement. The transformation of these exceptional measures into operating rules would endanger certain principles which guarantee and cement the unity of the Fourth International. The exceptional character of these measures is demonstrated, moreover, by the unanimous adoption of our new statutes.

We regret that, despite the agreement adopted in common by the Tenth World Congress, the minority faction has refused—up to now—to accept joint responsibility for the day-to-day leadership of the International. We proposed a United Secretariat *capable of acting* (with 20 or 21 members) in which the majority would have 66 percent of the positions (a *minimum* percentage if it is to be allowed to lead), the minority would have had five or six positions, and Herb would be elected for the German Compass (and not for the dissolved and inconsistent Mezhrayonka). The minority then refused to designate as its representatives in the United Secretariat comrades whose authority and position would make it possible to involve the most important minority section in the day-to-day leadership of the International. This leads us to a very dangerous situation where the representatives of the minority are not even in a position to vote on proposals for action without first consulting with their tendency leadership. This tends to transform the official leading organs of the International into consultative or-



gans or "sounding boards." Behind this lies a federalist conception of the International which contradicts the statutes and the line adopted by the World Congress. Whatever the circumstances, we will act in accordance with the statutes and the decisions of the congress which give the leadership of the International full authority to apply the decisions of the World Congress and to take all the necessary day-to-day decisions.

In view of this exceptional situation that arose in the

aftermath of the Tenth World Congress, the continuation of the debate on several limited subjects (Vietnam, China, the mass movements . . .) and the continuing activity of the minority faction, the majority tendency has decided not to dissolve and to continue to function as a centralized international tendency.

Submitted March 17, 1974

## STATEMENT OF THE LENINIST-TROTSKYIST FACTION

At a meeting held February 22, that is, a week after the world congress, representatives of the "Majority Tendency" asked representatives of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction if they would agree to the MT attaching a statement to the minutes of the world congress explaining why they had voted for the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International," the nine points that were adopted at the congress.

The LTF representatives were somewhat surprised at the request. They could see no real need for such a statement, since the nine points had been jointly settled on by representatives of the two sides at a series of meetings at the congress. They held that the agreement spoke for itself and that the main thing now was to put it into practice, a course that would make it possible to relax tensions and facilitate carrying out the daily work of the international.

However, in view of the request of the MT, the LTF representatives stated that they would not object to a statement being attached to the minutes provided that one by the LTF could also be attached in the event that the MT statement proved to be of tendentious nature.

The MT did not have their proposed statement ready since it was still under consideration. It took another three weeks to prepare it, a copy not being given to the LTF until March 17.

These facts are important inasmuch as the MT statement consists of two parts: (1) their reasons for voting for the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International," and (2) their view of the course followed by the LTF in the four-week period since the world congress, including the three weeks from the time the subject of a possible statement was brought up until a draft was made available.

### I.

The relationship of forces in the Fourth International following the discussion preparatory to the world congress was not as pictured in the MT statement. According to the information presented to the Mandates Commission, a total of 5,277 comrades voted for the positions of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, while a total of 5,663 voted for the positions of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, and 245 voted for the positions of the Kompass Tendency or of positions close to them.

The rest of the members, which was a considerable number, either failed to vote or abstained because they were not yet sure about the differences, or, in some sections where supercentralist statutes are in force, were denied the right to vote because of their status as "candidates" (their membership being used nonetheless as part of the basis for mandates at the congress).

It should be noted, too, that the votes of youth groups were not included in these figures, or even registered for the record, although some of them participated actively in the discussion. In general the youth groups that expressed an opinion favored the positions of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction.

As for the mandated votes at the congress, which were weighted in favor of the IECMT because of the abstentions or restrictions, the vote was still only 137 to 125 with 7 abstentions and 1 not voting on the IECMT resolution on Argentina. In other words, the IECMT resolution on Argentina received 50.5 percent of the votes. On the counterposed world political resolutions, which the two sides had mutually agreed should constitute the decisive resolution to determine who held the majority on the incoming International Executive Committee and by what proportion, the vote was 142 for the IECMT resolution, 124 against, and 4 abstentions, giving the IECMT 52.6 percent of the votes.

This outcome reflected a discussion that was far from completed. Besides the inordinate procrastination in translating even the key documents into languages other than English, the distribution of documents did not come up to the norms of the Trotskyist movement, nor did the organization of the discussion in some sections. Certain sections and groups had hardly begun the discussion on the eve of the congress. A resolution with such far-reaching implications as "On the Question of Armed Struggle in Latin America," submitted unilaterally at the last minute by the IECMT as a new point on the agenda of the world congress, was neither discussed nor utilized as a basis for election of delegates in important sections and groups.

To this should be added the disturbing fact that a substantial wing of the IECMT, as revealed by Comrade Barzman and as corroborated by other evidence, had a split orientation.

In view of this situation, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction felt that the interests of the Fourth International as a whole called for exceptional organizational measures to counteract the centrifugal tendencies and to strengthen the possibility of maintaining the unity of the movement following the congress. Taking the initiative, representatives of the LTF approached some of the leading comrades of the IECMT on this. Their response was positive. They indicated that they had a similar interest in avoiding a split. This led to the joint meetings that worked out the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International."

In our opinion, the adoption of this agreement by a very large majority, including all but a small wing of the IECMT, augured well for reducing tensions in the international following the congress despite the continued existence of deepgoing differences on various important political and theoretical questions.

The statement which the Majority Tendency submitted March 17 for attachment to the minutes of the congress runs counter to this perspective, in our opinion.

The statement presents the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International" as a series of organizational concessions granted by the IECMT to counter supposed threats of the LTF to divert the discussion and to demonstrate that "even in the most favorable conditions for the minority" it could not win on the basis of its political positions. The statement describes the concessions as so extensive as to "put some

of our organizational principles partially in abeyance," one of the consequences being that the concessions "can make the development of our movement more difficult in certain cases."

This contrasts with the position of the LTF, which we thought was shared by the MT, that the nine points would help maintain the unity of the Fourth International.

Not once does the statement indicate that the organizational compromises were jointly reached in the interests of the movement as a whole. It makes no mention whatsoever of the considerable organizational concessions yielded by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction for the sake of avoiding a split and strengthening the unity of the movement.

It passes by in silence, for example, the concession made by the leadership of the Canadian section giving the status of "sympathizing group" to an opposing formation that had just fostered a split in the section. That concession was accorded only after the most careful consideration. Of all the blows dealt at the congress to the Fourth International's concept of the integrity of sections, this was the gravest one. The Canadian comrades agreed to make the concession only because the IECMT had given every intimation that the decision might well determine whether a split occurred at the world congress.

The MT statement says nothing at all about the rather notable fact that the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction acquiesced in granting only the status of "sympathizing group" to the largest party in the Fourth International, the PST of Argentina, which had upheld the program of Trotskyism and applied it in the class struggle in an exemplary way during the years when the official section was preparing to desert. In this instance, too, the IECMT placed inordinate importance on the organizational concession, which was why it was consented to.

In its listing of organizational complaints and grievances, the MT statement singles out the fact that in accordance with the formulas followed in the nine-point agreement, the LCR-ETA (VI) in Spain and GCI in Mexico were not recognized as sections. But it was the leaders of the IECMT who insisted on the formula applied in these cases. The LTF representatives argued for a more objective formula. That is, in countries where splits had occurred, they proposed recognizing the largest group as the section. This would have meant recognition as sections for the LCR-ETA(VI) and the GCI among others. The IECMT leaders rejected this formula for reasons they did not explain to us but which we assume they made clear to their caucus. Presumably their recommendations were approved by the membership of the caucus.

The MT statement names two sympathizing groups, "the Brazilian Ponto de Partida and the Iranian group," whose "political weight and representativeness are highly dubious." These two groups appear to have been singled out for this qualification on grounds of their agreement with the political positions of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction. It is to be noted that groups that supported the IECMT are not singled out and characterized in this way although such a procedure would certainly be called for if one were to apply the same criteria to both sides. It appears to us that it is not in the best interests of the Trotskyist movement as a whole to subject groups of sincere and devoted cadres facing totalitarian conditions like those in Brazil and Iran to such invidious treatment.

The same goes for the subject of payment of dues. A number of sections and sympathizing groups are badly in arrears in dues. This is a serious question and warrants serious handling. To single out the PST in this respect while saying nothing about the others reveals an attitude that is not even-handed, to say the least.

Perhaps the worst instance of this factional approach is the decision to pillory the PRT of Uruguay as "a particular disgrace to the Fourth International." This is an echo of vile insinuations that were vigorously answered on the floor of the congress. To resume factional mudslinging immediately following the congress can only arouse the gravest doubts as to the motives of those engaging in it.

The gratuitous remarks concerning the Mezhrayonka Tendency fall into the same pattern. In reality the participation of the representatives of the Mezhrayonka Tendency in the discussion at the world congress furthered the clarification of issues. The MT, however, seems to frown on the formation of "small" tendencies that try to take an independent stand and to think for themselves. This reflects a supercentralist concept of the international that tends to carry over from the organizational level to the sphere of political opinion.

The heavy stress in the statement on the "unchallengeable majority" held by the MT deserves attention. First of all, the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction did not challenge the outcome of the vote. As we stated at various times in advance of the congress, we expected that under the circumstances the IECMT would emerge with a majority. All we can add is that we were astonished at the slimness of that majority. Apparently the narrowness of their base is now a source of some worry to the MT, which would explain both their sensitivity on this question and their current course of action, including the nature of the statement they decided to append to the minutes.

They now "categorically challenge" the 72 mandates of the PST recognized by the Mandates Commission at the congress. They registered no such protest in the Mandates Commission. That was because both sides had agreed in advance not to challenge mandates. The agreement to refrain from challenges was reached with the objective of helping to center the discussion on the political issues in dispute and to prevent the discussion from bogging down on procedural or narrow organizational questions. This decision—reached in common—was correct in our opinion. In the absence of such an agreement, it is certain that the surprising number of mandates claimed by some of the groups supporting the IECMT would have been challenged by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction.

On the basis of their narrow ratio of 53 to 46 in mandated votes, which, as the figures presented to the Mandates Commission show, did not reflect the majority vote cast by the cadres of the Fourth International for the positions of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, the MT leaders decided to set a ratio of 60 for their side and 40 for the other side on their slate for the incoming International Executive Committee. This ratio was picked unilaterally in their caucus.

On the basis of that unilateral caucus decision, they decided to set a still more disproportionate ratio of 66 to less than 33 for the United Secretariat (14 seats for the IMT, "five or six" for the LTF, plus one for the Kompass Tendency). On top of this, they violated Bolshevik

norms by insisting on determining in their caucus which individuals among its elected IEC members the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction must include among its representatives.

The members of the International Executive Committee adhering to the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction objected to this undemocratic procedure and voted against it. Nevertheless, in the interest of doing everything possible to maintain the unity of the movement, the LTF made some nominations. These were rejected by the MT as unacceptable. The LTF then asked for time to attempt to work out the necessary arrangements for possible additional nominations. This was granted by the representatives of the MT, although with evident reluctance.

## II.

At the March 16 meeting of the United Secretariat, the representatives of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction reported that they were working on the problem of additional nominations to meet the difficult conditions laid down by the Majority Tendency as to the composition of their representation on the United Secretariat.

They were then confronted with a new problem. The MT representatives on the United Secretariat stated that they had decided on the following composition for the Bureau, which handles the day-to-day work of the international between sessions of the United Secretariat: For the MT, 10 members; for the LTF 3 members.

But the LTF was not to freely select three comrades among their representatives who had been elected to the United Secretariat. At least one had to meet specifications laid down by the MT as to "political level" and "authoritativeness." If this ultimatum was not met, then none of the three could serve on the Bureau. The MT would go ahead and set up a "homogeneous" Bureau, cutting off the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction completely from participation in the day-to-day leadership of the international.

The representatives of the LTF voted against this anti-Leninist procedure. As a consequence, the three members of the United Secretariat selected by the LTF to participate in the work of the Bureau, Hugo Blanco, Marcel, and Johnson, were rejected as not meeting MT specifications, and the MT set up a Bureau consisting solely of their own members.

References to this turn of events are included in the final two paragraphs of the MT statement, which was handed to the LTF the following day. Summing up the four-week period following the world congress, the MT leaders aver that "the minority faction has refused—up to now—to accept joint responsibility for the day-to-day leadership of the International."

They characterize this alleged refusal as reflecting "a federalist concept of the International which contradicts the statutes and the line adopted by the World Congress."

The MT—within four weeks!—is already suggesting that the LTF is guilty of violating the statutes and the line of the world congress. What does this show about *their* course?

The only possible interpretation of such astonishing assertions is that the leaders of the MT have decided to try to *provoke a heightening of tensions within the International*.

They do not assume responsibility for this course, making it out to be a legitimate reaction to "this exceptional situation that arose in the aftermath of the Tenth World Congress." The "exceptional" postcongress situation resulting from their own handiwork is turned to further account. It is utilized as part of their justification for a decision "not to dissolve and to continue to function as a centralized international tendency."

What they mean by functioning as a centralized international tendency is shown in practice by their factional actions in the aftermath of the congress, inflating their majority in the leading bodies of the international to the point of setting up a "homogeneous" Bureau and excluding the LTF from participating in the day-to-day leadership of the international unless an anti-Leninist demand is met as to the qualifications of its representatives.

The LTF had hoped for a course in consonance with the spirit of the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International." As the LTF announced at the congress, its own course has been aimed at reducing tensions so as to facilitate putting the agreement into practice.

The MT appears to have decided on a different course, as their statement itself shows. That does not bode well for working relations in the coming period. We regret that the MT decided to make such provocative moves.

April 3, 1974