Documents 3 to 17 and 19 to 24 originally published in Internal Bulletins of the SWP and the International Bulletins of the International Committee
Dear Jim:
To provide a report on the last IS meeting, it is necessary to retrace in brief some of the events at the meeting of the IEC which was held just prior to your May Plenum. After that, I propose to set forth some opinions on the present situation in the international.
At the IEC a conflict developed between myself and Pablo on the way to approach the new events in Russia. This was not so much around the contents of the resolution (although some points required more elaboration) but on the way it was presented by the spokesmen for the IS. In my opinion, an all too optimistic colouration was introduced. No one can doubt, of course, the significance of the events, but to generalize these into language which implies a new millennium immediately for our section can cause disappointment and disillusionment later. I said that we should remember the mistakes of the French section on Yugoslavia (which in my view now had some roots in the IS). Here everyone was hopped up to the point where the Party was unprepared for the sharp turn that became necessary in August 1950 (the Kardelj speech to the UNO). The subsequent unfortunate events were in no small way related to this.
On the new stage of events in the USSR I said that we must avoid this in order to arm our people on a realistic approach, and warn them about the constant changes of Stalinist treachery in a situation which was getting ever more desperate for Malenkov & Co. The French and Pablo attacked me with great heat, even going so far at times as to interrupt me when I was speaking. Germain the reporter was much more considerate, and in reply went out of his way to answer satisfactorily my points. However, I have been long enough around to judge incidents, and in the course of an IS bureau meeting the next day, whilst informally discussing the dispute in the SWP Pablo made his statement of support for Frankel and 'against the articles of Wright.' immediately following the IEC Pablo made his way across the room to J. Lawrence, my fellow delegate, and took him away for a two-hour discussion. The contents of this are just beginning to emerge now.
On returning I reported my contribution to our EC. Lawrence gave what he terms a 'Factual' account. I reported that following the dissolution of the old IS we were called upon to elect a representative on the new IS. In doing this I expressed the opinion that our EC should know that I felt a little unhappy about things, especially Pablo's remark on the Frankel document. Lawrence got annoyed and heated, claiming that this was directed against him. His outburst took me aback, and I replied that I wanted the committee to be aware of my opinions before voting on my nomination. I explained that in point of fact, the IEC wanted to elect me at its session, but I avoided this by requesting time to report this back so that the committee could make a choice. This was also necessary out of courtesy to Lawrence who was the previous representative. After this, I was elected unanimously with Emmet abstaining. I cite these events to give a little background to the last IS. My informal reception from Pablo was decidedly cool. He told me that he had a letter from someone in your minority who told him that the agreement came about this way, 'At some point in the debate you [Cannon] asked Clarke if he was an agent of Pablo, when assured that this was so, you brightened up and after that agreement was reached.' He asked me to explain this, and I declined, stating that it was not my job to explain such things.
At the meeting we had the two documents now in your hands before us. Germain and Frank gave me a verbal translation before the meeting, but it was impossible to make a contribution on this basis. After a little discussion we agreed to send them out to all members of the IEC. The next item was a report from Pablo on the situation in Ceylon, where it appears that the Stalinist wing of the LSSP were making some progress. The IS bureau recommended that Germain should be sent. I did not feel happy about this, but as I had no concrete alternative I let the decision go. Pablo reported on Bolivia and stated that he was going there. He said that Sal Santen from Holland (who is in S. America and who was in Bolivia) was now in Uruguay, in a demoralized position with little money. He was sent there on Pablo's insistence last year.
We then came to your question. Frank opened up by emphasizing the political cohesion of the minority, stating his support for Frankel's document. He said that we must stress with the Americans the need for a very full discussion on the new documents for the Fourth Congress. This was necessary because of the 'American way of life' outlook prevalent in the SWP. This remark implied some lack of interest in international matters by the SWP majority. Pablo, Germain, and myself opposed him on this. I made a statement supporting the SWP majority. Pablo interrupted me with a violent attack. He said that I had maneuvered Lawrence from being our representative on the IS, that I was maneuvering my section to support the SWP majority, etc. etc. He had a factional report of our EC from either Lawrence or Hilda Lane (who is in touch with Pablo's wife). I fancy it was the latter. I let fly at him in reply and told him bluntly that this sort of nonsense made no impression, and that it was half-truths from beginning to end. I told him that he was not dealing with 'little boys' and that in a Bolshevik organization there were procedures for dealing with this sort of misunderstanding -- all he had to do was write for an explanation, and not confront me in an atmosphere of intimidation on the IS. The matter closed without anything concrete emerging except an agreement on the statement now in your hands. Germain seemed neutral on the questions, but seemed friendly. Frank is the Frank he always was on such matters. Livio the Italian inclined toward the Frankel document. Afterwards, Pablo became more friendly, and we parted in a comradely way, but obviously under a cloud for the future. He is in touch with some elements here, and from that meeting onwards I have proceeded accordingly.
The next incident was last Wednesday at an editorial Board meeting of our Review. Tom had written an article on Stalin's death which up to the time of the meeting had only been read by Lawrence, and myself. Lawrence moved that we refuse to publish the article because it was contrary to the line of the IS. He did this with great force, which is not generally a characteristic trait of his. I replied that such an attitude was absolutely intolerable, and that we must have a discussion with Tom present when all the members could read his article. Lawrence then told me that I supported Tom politically, and should get down to amendments to the new documents. This was news to me, but the method quite old, and since I am not used to 'hoop-jumping' I replied that I must read all sides of the case, and make up my mind. I told Lawrence that we must not poison the international discussion before we got started, and that any impatient tendency to stampede people was absolutely at variance with our traditional methods. I cannot honestly say that I agree with Tom, but it was not the question of 'agreement' or 'disagreement', that worried me, but the type of thing which ties up with a whole series of impatient experiences at the hands of Pablo. He is in touch obviously with people here, and the tactic seems to be to settle with Tom and push me into some line. These 'amateurs' like so many others before them,think we are a lot of ignorant peasants who do not understand politics from a bull's foot, but we shall see.
Before this we had a letter at our EC from Ceylon asking us to send one of our boys as a press reporter of the 'Samasamajist' to Bucharest Youth Peace Conference. They had received an invitation from the Stalinists. We took a decision outlined in the following letter:
Dear Leslie:
Mike [Banda] received your telegram and letter enclosing the cablegram about a press representative at Bucharest for the Youth Festival. We discussed this at our last Executive and I was asked to write you as follows.
1. We would be in agreement if any delegation we sent was representative of a worker's organization, which would in turn be able to protect the delegation. This would be very useful like your delegation in China.
2. A press representative, consisting of one young man alone is an atmosphere of picked Stalinists and their stooges, is something we could not risk at this time, even though we agree wholeheartedly with the desirability of getting closer to these countries.
In the present atmosphere of impending trials, there is an element of chance which we could not take. Even bourgeois correspondents representing powerful papers have been picked up from time to time, and Mike is fairly well known as a Trotskyist. It would be different if he were part of a representative delegation.
I am sure you will appreciate our point of view in this matter.
Fraternal greetings
Burns
We sent a copy of this letter to Pablo, and this is his reply:
'On the matter of Mike: Tilak has just written us also on this. Your precautions on the subject of sending Mike seem to us a little exaggerated. It is scarcely probable that the Stalinists could attempt the abduction of people invited officially by themselves, journalists, and who are not in any case Trotskyist leaders, who are not known nationally or internationally. It is scarcely probable that they could risk a campaign against their congress (which they would wish to be a complete success) by entering into actions of so little profit for themselves. In any case, we hope that Mike has already replied by telegram to Tilak, so that they can consider sending someone else there.'
More rush, more impatience, apart from the fact that we have absolutely no news from inside these countries about the exact position.
You will, I know, excuse all these details. In the normal course of events, this would not be necessary, but what we are grappling with here is two very different methods in building an international. From experience, we have learned that the strength of a national section lies in the maturity of its cadre. Maturity flows from the collective way in which a cadre works. This, as you know, does not arise from the brilliance of this or that individual in a particular field. It arises from the historical selection of devoted people who supplement each other's talents by learning to work as a team. Like the development of the class struggle itself the development of those who comprise the cadre is an uneven one. You find people who have many weaknesses in some directions, playing a powerful positive role inside the cadre. This is, in fact, not only the great strength of the cadre, but also its weakness. A responsible, mature leader has these things fixed in his mind at all times.
Another factor which plays a role, is the receptiveness of the cadre towards changes in the political situation. Some people have quite a flair for this, and make useful contributions in assisting the cadre forward. Yet, it is possible to find on occasions, in comrades who make turns easily, a certain feverishness which can flow from a basic instability rooted in class questions. An experienced cadre checks from time to time these manifestations, and enables the comrade or comrades concerned, to go forward toward a new, more advanced, stage of development. On the other hand, a cadre will always contain such people because they are an essential reflection of the development of the class itself.
Experience has taught us that the construction of a cadre takes time and many experiences. In spite of the inflammable international situation you cannot short-cut cadre building. In fact, the two things are dialectically related. The more explosive the situation, the more experienced a cadre must be in order to deal with it. The long time taken in developing a cadre then begins to pay off big dividends. What appears previously to be a long difficult process now changes into its opposite.
Those of us who have gone through this process in national sections are familiar with its intricacies. Because of its enormous collective power, a cadre is also an intricate instrument. The wise leader must attune himself to the need for sharp changes, and what is all important, the way to prepare the cadre for such changes. He must know his people, and how sometimes to help the 'lame ones' over the stile. Leadership is not a question of theoretical ability only, one must know the cadre.
Our present international leadership came together after the war, but in spite of the important progress in knitting its work together, it has been impossible as yet to construct an experienced cadre, and the reason is not hard to find. If it takes a long time in national sections, with many experiences and difficulties, then it is considerably more complicated on the international arena. A national leadership must learn to know its country and itself, an international leadership must know the world, and embody the collective experience of the national sections.
Fable does not understand this,and we now begin to see the trouble more clearly. Here is a man with many great theoretical qualifications, who is a powerful thinker. He gets out in front with the line, but fails to understand the strength and experience of our cadre who have to apply this. Here he gets terrible impatient, and the one-sidedness of his positive gifts begin to emerge. Not understanding (because he has never experienced it) the problem of a cadre, he proceeds like a 'talent scout.' The leadership of the SWP is sluggish, conservative, etc. so Clarke's the boy. Burns is 'awkward' and follows the SWP majority, so Lawrence is the man, etc. Then comes the trouble. The people picked up superficially seemed to jump into a line faster, but in their own sections play specific roles. Fable, in failing to understand the decisive cadre fiddles around like a man with a hatchet in the operating theatre. He ignores the past history (which in some cases he has not understood) and proceeds to 'allocate' 'authority' to men who, as part of a cadre, are certainly important people, but as 'inspired guides' are shouldering impossible tasks. Fable sends them on the road to destruction. Their weak sides are built up, and they get involved in struggles of self-distinction.
Take our section, for example. We educated ourselves from your history. This not only served us well in the big fight with Hasten, but continues to assist us all the time. Lawrence is well known internationally both for his strength and for his weaknesses. In the decisive fight with Hasten he played practically no role, but in the LP work he has played an important one for some time. One of the reasons for this is the character of the man himself. Working in a team he evinces fine qualities, but as an individual fighter, he will be cut to pieces. During the six years since we parted with Hasten, I have never lost an occasion to help him. In the dispute over Stalinism, where he made some serious and bad mistakes, I confined the issues to the Secretariat, and kept it from the EC so as to preserve his authority and prestige. Manuel can tell you this. We placed a whole department under his guidance, and I would no more think of interfering with his work than cutting off my right hand. He has weaknesses which crop up from time to time, but we let them pass. To pick him out for a specific role in Britain is a crime against the man and our movement. I tell you that I shall do everything humanly possible to protect Lawrence. We are not going to permit a factional situation to develop here if it can be avoided.
A few more points in conclusion. Our international has been badly administered for some time now. I should perhaps take some blame, but I did not want to go off on a wrong issue that would be misunderstood. ...
Yugoslavia comes, and the French almost move there en masse. It's the 'golden gate' for a few months. Now of course we were all for taking the fullest advantage of the situation, but only if everyone knew the strength and weakness of this problem. We did a lot of work here, but we kept our powder very dry. A few days after Kardelj made his speech, we had a brigade of ours return from Belgrade. The Yugoslav ambassador booked a big hall here for our boys to tell what they saw. It was a 'big do' with the ambassador present, as well as a lot of young Stalinists. Under our instructions, we utilized part of the time to criticize Kardelj. The Stalinists, who thought they would have a great time at our expense over Korea, were taken aback. I well remember the angry way the Yugoslav contact man assailed 'my treachery.' All I could say was 'sorry, but there has been a misunderstanding -- we are not a Stalinist party, and you are not the Cominform.' We were plenty flexible on Yugoslavia, but our line was applied on the basis of traditional Bolshevik experience. The French were not so fortunate. In a desperate 'all or nothing' impatient way they intervened, and laid the foundation for their crisis a few months later.
I think these events (whilst the lessons are well known to you) should help in looking at our present problem. We must save this man Pablo. It is a big responsibility but it will require some plain speaking. Before anything is done I would like your views. We should work as close as we can together. I am attending another IS this Friday and a report will be sent. Your 'Peace Agreement' helps, but I fear a stormy time ahead. However, I am confident that we can turn it, like so many others, into profit in the long run.
Warmest regards,
Gerry
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Last updated 17.8.2003