Fifth Congress of the
Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores
Resolutions of the April 1971 Executive Committee Meeting
Party Propaganda and Education
The advance of the masses throughout the country (exemplified most outstandingly at the moment in Córdoba) poses the need anew for paying much more attention to one of the central features pointed up by our Fourth and Fifth Congresses propaganda and political agitation.
The Leninist definition, let’s remember, was that propaganda is the art of teaching many ideas to a few and agitation is the art of teaching few ideas to many.
In other words, propaganda is explaining to the working class and popular vanguard all the central problems of the revolution in a profound and clear way. Agitation is explaining to the masses as a whole or broad sectors of them the basic questions in a thorough and simple way.
In order to do this we must develop a certain number of organs and permanent and semi-permanent means at the national and local level, also taking into account the following aspects:
(a) Propaganda work must be carried on jointly by the Party, which addresses itself fundamentally to the proletarian vanguard fighting for proletarian hegemony; and the Army, which addresses itself to the masses as a whole, fighting to build the Army of the People and to involve all the oppressed in the revolutionary war.
This should not be interpreted to mean that propaganda is the task of the Party and agitation of the Army. Both must carry on agitation and propaganda, but with the Party putting its stress on propaganda and the Army on agitation.
(b) In the area of propaganda and agitation a contradiction arises between centralization and decentralization.
The indicated way for resolving this is by trying to centralize propaganda (at the national or local level) and decentralize agitation (in the various theaters, areas, and teams).
Party Propaganda
The Party has a national propaganda organ El Combatiente. In the first months after the Congress there was a very great deficiency in the issues of this organ. Subsequently (in the last three issues) the content of the periodical has been improving, to judge from a cross section of opinions coming from cadres, activists, and contacts. Moreover, the National Propaganda Commission has promised to bring it out on a regular biweekly schedule starting with this issue.
Nonetheless, it is still necessary to greatly improve our organ in order to meet all the needs imposed by the revolutionary process. In order to achieve this, the collaboration of the entire Party is needed in the task.
The first thing we must do in this regard is to reeducate the members on working with the paper, which is not always utilized to the full extent of its possibilities. The indicated methods are the following:
(a) Every team must discuss the paper as soon as they receive it, later circulating their suggestions and criticisms through the Internal Bulletin. In conjunction with this, they must discuss the whole paper politically with the readers, with every one of them, soliciting their opinions, suggestions, and criticisms also. In this way, all of the needs that the paper must meet will emerge in a living way, from reality itself, and become known to the editors. On the other hand, the compañeros themselves and even the readers will be encouraged to write articles or plans for articles.
(b) This discussion and political work must be coordinated and directed by the regional leaderships, with regional teams being freed from all other assignments in order to carry out this task, which is as important as direct work among the masses or armed action.
Party Agitation
It is recommended that each region periodically publish leaflets or semi-propagandistic foldouts for its whole sphere of activity. In conjunction with this, great attention should be paid in the areas, fronts, and teams to permanent agitation through leaflets, local foldouts, and factory and neighborhood bulletins.
This last activity above all takes on a great importance. In every major industrial center and in every major residential concentration of workers that we can penetrate with bulletins signed by the party and projecting the party’s line on the basis of the immediate problems of the factory, union, or neighborhood in question, we must undertake to publish such bulletins regularly.
The Army’s Agitation and Propaganda
Some time ago, it was voted to have regional Army bulletins but this has not yet been put into effect. Publishing such bulletins is a task of great importance that the Army’s regional organizations must immediately take up.
In the eyes of large sections of the people the armed actions of the ERP have put us in the lead of the guerrilla organizations. We must capitalize on this prestige by developing the Army’s political work.
In order to develop this work in a Leninist way, it is essential to provide a backbone by means of the Army’s own agitational and propaganda organ. This should be published for the masses as a whole and come out regularly at least every two weeks. As the local bulletins are developed, we can take on the task of publishing a more propagandistic central organ (more propagandistic that is in putting forward the Army’s program), which would appear less frequently.
Organizing Agitation and Propaganda
It is clear for anyone who approaches organizational problems from a Leninist standpoint that all these tasks we require of the Party and Army’s agitation and propaganda work cannot fail to conflict unless we set up standing propaganda committees in all the regions, preferably with full time compañeros assigned to them.
Up to now propaganda has been approached as a secondary, routine matter, something to be taken care of by some compañeros in the moments of spare time left them by their mass work or military activities. We must realize that propaganda is as important as other tasks, and that the activists assigned to it will not be “wasted.” Moreover, these teams will have their areas of mass and military work, as the National Propaganda Commission determines, but devote the lion’s share of their activity to propaganda.
Parallel to this the necessary measures must be taken to assure that every front of work (at least every important front) has its own propaganda apparatus to publish agitational and propaganda materials, above all factory and neighborhood bulletins.
The National Situation
The military coup that ousted Levingston ushered in the final stage of the military dictatorship. The adventure undertaken by the military officers in 1966 is coming to its conclusion in the midst of the most profound crisis. In its almost five years of life, the military government has proved incapable of stabilizing the bourgeois economy, and its pro-monopoly measures have won it not only the hatred of the workers and the people but have also brought constant frictions with other sectors of the bourgeoisie.
The popular explosion in Côrdoba gave the coup de grace to the deteriorating image of the dictatorship. The workers and popular mobilization of March 15 had some special characteristics. There was the unmistakable sympathy shown by the masses for the armed movements, the existence of class struggle leaderships in important unions, the disrepute of the bureaucracy and its evident inability to canalize the popular protest into peaceful roads. Another characteristic, perhaps the most important, of this second Córdoba uprising was the growing activity of the armed vanguard, which linked up with this process and saw the masses adopt its emblems as their own. The possibility that the proletariat could turn massively in the near future to revolutionary war under the leadership of this vanguard forced the Armed Forces to stage the coup that liquidated Levingston’s policy, which was only a continuation of the Onganía regime, in order to seek a new solution.
The military dictatorship’s abrupt replacement of the helmsman, the new one being Lanusse, marks a retreat for the regime. Checkmated by the massive explosions of protest from the working class and the people and by the development of revolutionary war, the dictatorship is retreating and beginning to make concessions. Along with this a new picture is opening up in the process of popular struggles.
Looking at the events from this vantage point, we can make some estimates about the possible future orientation of the military government. Various concrete signs show unmistakably that the government is setting the stage for an electoral farce. Among these are the rehabilitation of the political parties; the appointment of Mor Roig as minister of the interior; and the statements of the politicians who, on the government’s invitation, have had talks with him. Conscious of its lack of prestige and showing its fear of the advance of revolutionary war, the dictatorship finds itself forced to make deals with politicians that only yesterday it repudiated, and together with them it is going to try an electoral solution, in an attempt to put a brake on the mobilization of the masses and isolate the armed vanguard from them. They are trying to make the scope of this maneuver as broad as possible, as can be gathered from the rumors that the CP is certain to be invited to participate in the political talks with Mor Roig. Lanusse will even try to reach an agreement with Perón himself. The basis of the deal will be to form a broad political movement uniting the Peronists and the Radicals, in exchange for Pern’s return. An article developing this project and pointing to such a deal as the basis for institutional normalization appeared in the Yankee publication, the New York Times. The functionaries of the Press Secretariat promptly translated the article and distributed it immediately to all the journalists in the Casa de Gobierno. Clearly they did so because the article fitted in with the main lines of Lanusse’s policy. The obvious beneficiary of such an operation would be the La Hora del Pueblo movement, where an alliance of the bourgeoisie could be concretized under the benevolent aegis of imperialism, allowing the officers to return to their barracks and assuring the stability of the regime by the populist faade of this movement.
However, it would be illusory to think that the bourgeoisie as a whole accepts this plan and is going to carry it out without conflicts. The latest statements by Onganía are an alarm signal. Onganía is not speaking for himself. Behind his opinions is the thinking of sectors of the Armed Forces that do not go along with Lanuss&s electoral perspective and the plans for a return of Peron. This indicates that the process of normalization will not be free of conflicts, which, as a result of inter-bourgeois frictions, may interfere with its development.
All these efforts by the bourgeoisie must not lead us to believe that if the electoral process actually takes place that the masses will unfailingly be caught up in it, enabling the bourgeois government to consolidate itself and operate in relative tranquility. The crisis of the dictatorship is also the crisis of the bourgeoisie, which is incapable of solving a single one of the great problems of the masses. Liberalization on the political level cannot by itself offer a solution to starvation wages, super-exploitation, chronic poverty, and underdevelopment of the country. The measures taken by the bourgeoisie to patch up one evil will only expose another. This is shown by a recent development. Lifting the negotiating ceiling of the parity commissions, an act that offers the possibility for higher wages than foreseen, has already touched off speculations about more inflation. On the other hand, this same liberalization will spur the struggle of the masses for their demands. The picture that is shaping up then promises tumultuous activity by the masses and highly favorable conditions for the development of a revolutionary organization.
In our case this perspective is made even more favorable by the brilliant possibilities opened up for us among the masses by the fact that so far we have applied the correct policy, especially in the field of military activity. For a whole series of reasons the successful completion of the first operational plan; the outstanding role played by our militants in the workers and popular struggles, especially in Cordoba; the close ties with the masses that have been forged throughout the country; and the political and military tempering of our members we can look forward to the present stage of the political process being marked by substantial growth of our Party and Army. In order to make this possibility a reality and ’take the maximum advantage of all the favorable conditions that present themselves, all militants must throw themselves boldly into mass work, expanding our contacts with the masses, creating new party cells and support commando teams for the ERP, organizing the masses where they are and doing extensive, sustained propaganda and agitational work. We need to be persistent in carrying out our propaganda tasks, expanding the means at our command through developing influence in bourgeois publications and through mass editions of classical Marxist literature. Our party must make a serious effort to take full advantage of all legal opportunities. We should make clear, however, that none of these tasks must in any way affect the clandestine organization of the party and the army, which must be maintained at all cost. Quite the contrary, if we are able to utilize it properly, this period of relative legality will reinforce our underground structure by increasing our ties with the masses, by buttressing our political relationship with them, which is the basis of all genuine clandestine activity.
One point where a correct use of the legal opportunities could bring satisfactory results is on the question of the prisoners. We must strain all our efforts to form committees to support or defend the prisoners, or join those already formed, and through them give impetus to a campaign for the release of the political prisoners, in this we must try to achieve the broadest possible popular participation, promoting demonstrations, rallies, etc. Such activity would offer unsuspected political opportunities, because through legal or semi-legal avenues, it would open up a broad field of work in sectors of the population that it has not always been easy for us to reach.
The question of the party’s attitude toward the elections merits a separate paragraph. The test of a party’s maturity, its capacity to become a real mass leadership able to respond to any eventuality, is whether or not it can find an adequate theoretical answer to such problems as they arise without departing from a consistent principled position. Ignoring the elections, taking a passive attitude toward them is no answer. It is true that our strategy is to smash the elections, to show that they are a farce, to expose their dishonest bourgeois character. We will do this by advancing unceasingly our political and military activity, maintaining our clandestine apparatus and fulfilling all the stages laid out in our general strategy. But we must also combine this activity with taking advantage of the legal opportunities offered by the electoral process. The way to turn the electoral farce into a failure is to be found in the real situation facing us at this moment. We might use one of two methods—boycotting the election or participating in it. But, as Lenin said: “No social democrat who stands on the ground of Marxism decides to resort to a boycott on the basis of how reactionary this or that institution is but rather on the basis of special conditions in the struggle. . . .”
In certain circumstances, such as in a period of turbulent mass mobilization, when the militancy of the masses is on a high level and they retain their determination to struggle without any major sectors being tempted by the electoral mirage, an active boycott of elections can be a correct tactic. But this should always be when it is possible to achieve militant participation by the masses, when the mass struggle can be channeled behind this objective.
However, we must not exclude the possibility of participating in elections when these conditions do not obtain, that is, when the boycott tactic cannot be based on a real mass mobilization of the working class and the people, when there is not a high level of mass militancy. In this regard, the possibility may exist in some sectors of running slates of workers candidates with a class struggle program. Since the bourgeoisie cannot tolerate such a situation, this would force them to expose the dishonesty of their so called free elections open to all. This possibility seems the most remote. But it must be stressed because there is a danger in the present situation of an ultraleft deviation of tending to reject the whole electoral process in an abstract way, without taking into account the concrete situation of the masses, which must serve as our best barometer for determining our position.
Through a serious and close study of the concrete situations in each locality, we will be able to make the best decision.
This whole perspective in nowise affects carrying out our strategic line. Quite the contrary, more than ever it is necessary to increase the quantity and quality of our military actions, improving the operational capacity of the ERP and putting into practice the plans we have adopted as the opportunities arise. This growing and sustained military activity will contribute in an important degree to wrecking the electoral farce, regardless of which tactic is chosen, participation or boycott.
Along with this, of necessity, there must be no modification whatsoever in the party’s clandestine organization. We must persevere firmly in the task of strengthening clandestine organizational forms, not forgetting for a second that we are at war, no matter whether the elections take place or not, and that therefore maintaining the underground apparatus is and will continue to be a vital matter for the organization.
All these subordinate aspects converge in the central task in this stage, building the Party and the Army. All our advantages the mood of the masses, the prestige our Army has won among them, the ties we have achieved with the working class and popular sectors, the experience we have won in our battles, combined with the opportunities offered by a situation of relative legality—must be utilized to the fullest in this stage for the tasks of building the Party and the Army. The perspectives are brilliant, and if we throw ourselves boldly and resolutely into the task of organizing and politicalizing the masses at the same time as carrying out our second Military Operational Plan, in the space of a few months we will be able to increase considerably the forces of the Army and the Party. This will also require intense political education party-wise, enabling us to train new cadres or strengthen those we already have so that they will be able to meet the demands we will have to make on them. In expanding considerably the ranks of the Party and the Army we are going to need a large number of cadres in order to make effective use of the new recruits. In order to meet this need, the work of the cadre school now functioning must be strengthened. Likewise, it is essential to get a military cadre school going as soon as possible. Together with persisting in our policy of proletarianizing the Party and the Army, this will enable us to attract important nuclei of workers, who will be the means of assuring the construction of a firm proletarian Party and a revolutionary Army.
Specific Points on the Party and Army
Following the correct line laid down by the Fifth Congress and the November CC, our party has thrown itself into combat and mass work. Many questions have occurred to cadres and activists in their attempts to apply these resolutions correctly. We will try to answer some of them.
Party and Army: The distinction between the Party and the Army as separate organs and the relationship between them was not made clear enough in two areas in the resolutions of the congress. (1) The composition of the membership in both organizations; (2) how the various types of cells should function.
In fact, on the first question, the type of members of the organization, a conceptual error slipped in of making a distinction between party militants and fighters in the army, tending to draw a sharp line between the two. This has been corrected in practice and we must make it clear that every member of the Party is also a fighter in the Army, regardless of the front to which he is assigned. All members of the Party must undergo military training and be prepared to transfer from a mass to a military front when the organization requires it.
In the army there are also nonparty fighters who function in the cells without belonging to the PRT.
In this respect, moreover, we must also correct the false theory that some compañeros have that you have to enter the Party through the Army, a point of view that overlooks the importance of political and economic struggle, which is also a source of experience and training qualifying persons to join the Party. Naturally, once such elements coming from economic struggles have joined, for example, they will receive the proper training inside the organization and fight as members of the ERP.
Let us look now at the second point, that is, the functioning of the various types of cells. The party at present has mass cells, military cells, and apparatus cells. The main task of the ms cells is to penetrate the mass front for which they are responsible (the factory, neighborhood, student milieu, etc.). This is what they will devote most of their efforts to. At the same time they will train themselves militarily and carry out military actions, with the specification that these actions will be small scale (seizing and distributing food and goods, disarming police and soldiers, etc.) and the cells will try to carry them out in a way that contributes to their work in the respective mass fronts.
The military cells for their part engage in fighting as their principal task, and they will devote their main efforts to this; naturally they will carry out larger scale actions. At the same time, each military cell is responsible for contacts and is assigned to a mass front (neighborhood, factory, etc.), which it must look after as a complementary assignment. The other area of mass work for these cells is our own military force, the ERP, which must absolutely be kept under the leadership of the Party.
Finally the apparatus cells (publishing, etc.) have as their central task the efficient execution of their assignment, maintaining a high level and quality of publishing for instance. They also fight, because as we have already said no member of the organization is exempt from participating in military action but must carry out small-scale actions (seizures, disarmings, etc.) and seek by means of these expropriations to acquire the things they need to carry out their tasks effectively. These cells likewise work with mass fronts.
Resolutions on the Revolutionary Tasks in Bolivia and Argentina
Applying in practice the Marxist Leninist internationalist conception personified in an exemplary way by Comandante Guevara, the CC of the PRT, Argentinian section of the Fourth International, in the presence of delegates from the International Secretariat and the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, Bolivian section of the Fourth International, resolves:
(1) To propose fraternally sharing with our sister section, the Bolivian POR, all the political, military, organizational, and practical tasks of developing the revolutionary war in Bolivia and Argentina against our common enemy—Yankee imperialism, the Argentine military dictatorship, and the Bolivian militarists.
(2) On the basis of this common effort, to struggle to unite, within the Latin American process of revolutionary war, all the armed vanguard of the continent in building a common military force able to bring into reality the second Vietnam foreseen by Che, a struggle that would lead to the victory of socialism on this continent.